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
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
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


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Problems of Communism

JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1985



Book Reviews

Dale R. Herspring
George G. Weickhardt
Jill A. Friedman



North Korean Foreign Policy

Young C. Kim

South Asia After Afghanistan

Stephen P. Cohen

Independent Currents in Czechoslovakia

H. Gordon Skilling

Ceaușescu's Socialism

Vladimir Tismaneanu

Notes & Views

Doublethink in the USSR

James P. Scanlan

Problems of Communism

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North Korean Foreign Policy

Young C. Kim

Despite an early dependence on the Soviet Union and China, North Korea has evolved a relatively independent foreign policy, siding with one or the other of its communist neighbors on specific issues but aligning with neither. Pyongyang has also shown a keen interest in gaining access to Western technology and capital, in particular in its dealings with Japan and other developed states. At present, however, the overriding concern of North Korea's foreign policy is the withdrawal of US troops from the South and the reunification of the Korean peninsula.

South Asia After Afghanistan

Stephen P. Cohen

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 has had an unsettling effect on the politics of South Asia. The move, taken without consultation with treaty partner India, only served to expand American economic and military assistance to Pakistan and raise the possibility of a US-Pakistani-Chinese condominium, thereby indirectly heightening the degree of insecurity in New Delhi. Although Indian dependence on the Soviet Union, primarily for arms, has grown since 1979, it appears unlikely that India and the Soviet Union would join in some venture to dismantle Pakistan.

Independent Currents in Czechoslovakia

H. Gordon Skilling

Although popular disaffection with regime policies in Czechoslovakia has not expressed itself in mass protests, it can be seen in an upsurge in religiosity, a revival of an independent youth culture, as well as the continued activities of Charter 77 and similar groups. These trends have helped foster independent scholarly and cultural expression frequently at variance with what is officially condoned. A recent and more political divergence between regime and society has occurred over the stationing of missiles in Czechoslovakia and the peace issue generally.

Ceaușescu's Socialism

Vladimir Tismaneanu

Ceaușescu's brand of socialism sets Romania apart from the other Soviet satellites both in its domestic and foreign policies. The country's public life is dominated by the President's personality cult, while its ideology and international behavior have expressed a large degree of independence from Moscow. The roots of Romania's uniqueness can be found in the evolution of the Romanian Communist Party as well as in Ceaușescu's personality and career.

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(Abstracts continued on reverse side)

Notes & Views

Doublethink in the USSR

James P. Scanlan

In Soviet society, certain aspects of the concept of "doublethink" introduced by George Orwell in his novel *1984* are used in different ways. Those who would defy the totality of control that Moscow would impose use doublethink to frustrate the purposes of the authorities, while the state finds itself incapable of putting its own ideological straitjacket on a rich and diverse culture.

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Essay-reviews

Technology and the Soviet System

Dale R. Herspring

High technology has had a pervasive impact on all segments of Soviet society, including the military. It also has major implications for East-West relations and especially the arms race. The problem for the West, in devising policies on technology transfer to the East, is how to balance security considerations with the possible impact of such transfers on both the domestic and foreign postures of the Soviet Union.

Ustinov versus Ogarkov

George G. Weickhardt

The September 1984 demotion of Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov may well mark the culmination of an important strategic debate in the Soviet military that had pitted the Chief of the General Staff against the Minister of Defense, Dmitriy Ustinov. Ogarkov seems to have been the lead man among advocates of a nuclear offensive capability for the Soviet Union. Ustinov, whose views would appear to have triumphed, reflects the Brezhnevite acceptance of the concept of mutual deterrence. Such a view does not preclude efforts by the USSR to draw political benefits from its growing military might.

Policy Succession in China

Jill A. Friedman

The passing of Mao Zedong has forced China watchers to study an entire array of less familiar successor personalities and policies. Since China's current reform effort entails a systemic transformation in such sectors as agriculture, the analysis of the new policies is of more immediate interest than that dealing with personalities. While most scholars focus on the prospects of China's reforms, some remain more interested in reconciling themselves with their disillusionment regarding Mao's revolution.

North Korean Foreign Policy

Young C. Kim

Geopolitically, the Democratic People's Republic of (North) Korea occupies a unique position in Northeast Asia. To the north and west is the People's Republic of China (PRC); to the south and east, the Republic of (South) Korea and Japan. At the tip of its extreme northeastern border is the Soviet Union. Since its inception in August 1945, when the Soviet Union and the United States agreed to a temporary division of the Korean peninsula along the 38th parallel,¹ North Korea has been a focus of considerable attention in the region. In September 1948, it proclaimed its sovereignty and claimed authority over the entire peninsula (as did the South a month earlier). In June 1950, the North invaded the South, easily routing and outmaneuvering the poorly trained and ill-equipped South Korean forces.² The North's early victories precipitated an immediate American commitment of troops, which in turn precipitated the intervention of Chinese "volunteers" four months later. The subsequent stalemate lasted some three years and involved all the major actors in the region in some capacity.

Despite its early dependence on the Soviet Union and China, over the next several decades the North,

under the leadership of Kim Il-song, evolved a relatively independent foreign policy. Key to this independence has been Kim's extraordinary ability to manipulate his country's posture of "equidistance," siding with one or the other of its communist neighbors on particular issues but aligning with neither.³ Such fluctuations, moreover, are neither haphazard nor unfocused. On the contrary, under Kim's leadership, North Korea has consistently pursued a policy designed to secure its borders against attack from hostile nations; avoid a direct confrontation with either the Soviet Union or China; isolate South Korea from the international community; strive for economic self-sufficiency; force a withdrawal of American troops from the South; and reunify the Korean peninsula.⁴ That some of these objectives seem contradictory or unattainable only attests to Kim's versatility and determination.

Recent events on the Korean peninsula underscore the unique nature of the relationship between North and South Korea and how this relationship affects other nations in the region. On August 20, 1984,

¹For a concise discussion of the political maneuvering leading up to the division of the country, see Chong-Sik Lee, "Historical Setting," in *North Korea: A Country Study*, 3rd Ed., ed. by Frederica M. Bunge, Washington, DC, The American University, 1981, pp. 17-24.

²*Ibid.*, pp. 18-23.

³After initially relying heavily on Soviet assistance in the building of the communist party in the North, North Korea steadily drew closer to China as Khrushchev's de-Stalinization speech and call for peaceful coexistence triggered a sharp decline in Soviet-North Korean relations, culminating in a complete cutoff of Soviet aid in 1963. Relations improved slightly after Khrushchev's ouster in 1964, remaining cool but "correct." The North's relations with China chilled during the Cultural Revolution. For several years, Kim stayed aloof from both the USSR and China, only warming up to China once Zhou Enlai apologized in 1969 for China's earlier transgressions. The North also strongly condemned Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea, which angered the Soviets, and initially refused to endorse the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. For a discussion of North Korea's differing policy stances during the Sino-Soviet dispute, see Robert A. Scalapino, "China and Northeast Asia," in Richard H. Solomon, Ed., *The China Factor: Sino-American Relations and the Global Scene*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall, 1981, pp. 183-94. See also Byung Chul Koh, *The Foreign Policy Systems of North and South Korea*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1984, pp. 204-10.

⁴See Scalapino, loc. cit.; and Rinn-Sup Shinn, "Government and Politics," in *North Korea: A Country Study*, pp. 193-206.

Young C. Kim is Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington University (Washington, DC). He is the author of numerous works on international politics and East Asia, including Soviet Strategy Toward Japan (in Japanese, 1983) and Japanese Reporters and Their World (1982), and coeditor of Japan and US Policy in Asia (1982).

South Korean officials offered to extend economic and technical assistance to the North; six weeks later, amid great fanfare and after a historic meeting in the truce village of Panmunjom, the North delivered 725 truckloads of relief goods to flood-ravaged areas in the South. During the next month and a half, the two sides agreed to set up a telephone hotline, discussed exchanges in trade and economic cooperation for the first time, and convened a meeting to discuss the question of separated families.⁵ But this goodwill was short-lived. On Friday, November 23, a 22-year old Soviet Korean-language student sprinted across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) into South Korean territory touching off an intense 10-minute fire fight between border guards on each side. By the time a cease-fire had been arranged a half-hour later, four soldiers had been killed and six wounded, including one American.⁶ After an angry exchange between North and South officials the following day at a meeting of the Military Armistice Commission, created in 1953 to serve as a forum for airing grievances on truce violations, the North temporarily suspended economic talks with the South.

The November 23 border incident merely confirmed what regional leaders feared most—that “peace” on the Korean peninsula is highly volatile and precarious. Indeed, the “Korean problem” has figured prominently on the agenda of numerous high-level summit meetings that have taken place in the past several years among the major actors in the region. North Korea’s Kim Il-song visited both Moscow and Beijing; China’s Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang, and Zhao Ziyang went to Pyongyang; Japan’s Nakasone Yasuhiro traveled to Beijing, Seoul, and Washington; and US President Ronald Reagan exchanged visits with Zhao Ziyang and South Korea’s Chun Doo Hwan. In late November 1984, immediately following Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Kapitsa’s visit to North Korea, Kim again traveled to Beijing to confer with Deng and Hu. Such heightened diplomatic activity attests to the significance that the Korean question holds for the peace and security of East Asia, as well as of the rest of the world.

This essay is primarily concerned with selected aspects of the foreign policy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), in particular that country’s

recent dealings with the Soviet Union, China, Japan, the United States, and South Korea. I shall attempt to analyze the major policy objectives and motivations underlying the North’s current policy, taking into account the key factors that shape the DPRK’s relations with each of these countries. While this is not intended to be a comprehensive survey, several important themes will receive considerable attention, most notably the North’s efforts to safeguard its national security, maintain a high degree of independence from China and the Soviet Union, bring about the withdrawal of US troops from the South, and reunify the Korean peninsula.

Securing Soviet Support


From the North Korean perspective, objectively the Soviet Union is perhaps the DPRK’s most crucial ally. It provides a protective shield that ensures the North’s security, serving as both a countervailing force against any combination of hostile powers and an effective deterrent against any military actions by the United States and South Korea. The Soviet Union is also the only country that can satisfy North Korea’s need for sophisticated advanced weaponry. Moreover, among socialist nations the Soviet Union is most capable of providing the North with substantial economic and technological assistance. The much-touted principle of *Juche* (self-reliance) notwithstanding, the North has consistently sought Soviet cooperation in these respects. However, both the quantity and quality of Soviet provisions to North Korea have fallen seriously short of North Korean expectations, especially in the military sphere. An often cited example of this is the Soviets’ reluctance to supply the North with MiG-23’s, at least until recently.⁷

In the field of diplomacy, too, Soviet power and international influence are extremely valuable for North Korean foreign policy undertakings, particularly those concerning South Korea. For one thing, the Soviet Union has played a crucial role in mobilizing the support of other socialist and nonaligned Third World countries to buttress the DPRK’s irredentist claims. For another, although the North Koreans have at times shown considerable distrust of the Soviet Union, occasionally labeling Soviet actions as signs of “dominationism,” they are also aware that cordial relations with the Soviets afford them significant leverage vis-à-vis China, Japan, and the United States. In particular, good relations between North Korea and the Soviet Union inevitably make China more sensitive to the needs and interests of the North.

⁵For a concise summary of recent developments in North and South Korean interaction, see “Key Events in Korean Relations,” *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston, MA), Nov. 20, 1984.

⁶See “U.S. and North Korea Trade Charges on DMZ Clash,” *The New York Times*, Nov. 25, 1984.

⁷See Paul Ensor, “Pyongyang’s Military: A State of Perpetual Alert,” *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong—hereafter *FEER*), Feb. 2, 1984, pp. 26–27.



North Korean and South Korean Red Cross officials meet at Panmunjom on November 20, 1984, to discuss family reunification; on November 23, a North Korean border guard scrambles for cover with a wounded comrade during a skirmish that broke out in the Demilitarized Zone in the course of a Soviet citizen's escape to South Korea.

—UPI.

But the North has experienced setbacks in its diplomatic maneuvering with the Soviet Union, most notably in its efforts to block Soviet-South Korean interaction. Indeed, the North has been extraordinarily sensitive to any signs of improved relations between these two states. Northern leaders recognize that any Soviet deviation from the North Korean policy line would seriously undermine the level of support socialist and nonaligned countries give to the North, perhaps even resulting in a shift in their policy toward the Korean peninsula. The North's fears are not entirely unwarranted. Since the early 1970's, despite North Korean protests, the Soviets have allowed South Korean nationals to attend international conferences held in the USSR. Still, with few exceptions, the Soviets had not authorized their own nationals to visit South Korea until the fall of 1982, when Soviet TASS office officials and an official from the Ministry of Culture attended an international conference in Seoul. (It is interesting to note that the Soviet decision to allow its officials to attend the meeting in Seoul followed both Kim's visit to China and the Soviets' declaration of dissatisfaction with the North's stance on the Vietnam-Kampuchean issue.)

But the Soviet destruction of Korean Air Line's Flight 007 redounded to North Korea's advantage, drawing the two nations closer together. Kim's government did not issue a pronouncement fully supportive of the USSR on the incident until after Soviet authorities had publicized their decision not to attend the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) conference being held in Seoul (three weeks after the incident). If not for the KAL tragedy, it is highly probable that the Soviet Union (along with other East European countries)

would have attended the IPU meetings. Subsequently, when 17 South Korean officials were assassinated in an explosion in Rangoon, Burma, on October 10, 1983, Soviet commentators rejected the generally held view (later confirmed by Burmese authorities) that the North Koreans were responsible for this terrorist act.⁸

Throughout the early months of 1984, Soviet-North Korean relations continued to improve, especially as Soviet leaders showed signs of adopting a more accommodating attitude toward the question of political succession in North Korea.⁹ Kim Il-song's interview with a TASS correspondent in March of 1984 clearly indicated Kim's perception of an improvement in the relations between the two countries, and encouraged

⁸The Soviet press chided "Seoul authorities" for "taking advantage of the explosion" to whip up tensions and to fan a "military psychosis" in the South. The Moscow Domestic Service also stated that "observers" had attributed the "hullabaloo" over the bombing to President Chun's efforts to intensify suppression of opposition groups in the South. See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, "Seoul 'Whipping Up Tensions,'" *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-SOV*), Oct. 12, 1984, p. C/1. Burmese officials later "firmly established" from the "statements of the two captured Koreans, the articles seized and other facts obtained from investigations . . . that the explosion was the work of saboteurs sent by North Korea." Cited in John McBeth, "The Verdict Is Guilty," *FEER*, Nov. 17, 1983, p. 18.

⁹In February 1984, a deputy foreign minister of the Soviet Union attended, presumably for the first time, a reception given by the North Korean Embassy in Moscow in celebration of Kim Chong-il's birthday. See *Naewoe Tongsin* (Seoul), May 11, 1984. A quick perusal of recent coverage of North Korea in the Soviet media indicates a continuing warming trend. Thus, "Soviet-Korean political consultations," in which the two countries' foreign ministries agreed on a plan for cooperation in 1985-86, took place in an "atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding." Moreover, a DPRK party delegation visited Leningrad at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism, and a North Korean citizen received in Moscow a "Badge of Honor" from the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium's deputy chairman for rescuing Soviet Baykal-Amur railroad workers during a flood. See, e.g., *FBIS-SOV*, Nov. 26, 1984, pp. C/1-2.

North Korean Foreign Policy

speculation among Western analysts that Kim would soon visit the USSR.

As expected, President Kim visited the Soviet Union in May 1984, the first time in 18 years. From the Korean leader's perspective, the trip promised to promote at least several of North Korea's foreign policy objectives. It provided Kim a high-level summit meeting in which he could directly solicit Soviet political, economic, and military aid. It also gave the North Korean leader a chance to seek a firm pledge from the Soviets to support his country's policy toward the South and to oppose any movement toward a policy recognizing two Koreas on the peninsula. In terms of Korean domestic politics, the trip provided Kim the opportunity to seek Soviet tolerance—if not understanding and support—concerning the issue of North Korea's political succession. At a minimum, Kim hoped to persuade the Soviet Union to abstain from interfering in North Korea's domestic affairs. At best, the North Koreans hoped to receive Soviet acknowledgment of Kim Chong-il's unique position as

successor-designate to his father as head of the party and government.


The meetings also enabled Kim to convey North Korea's perception of the threat posed by US and Japanese actions in and around Korea, and presented to the rest of the world a convincing demonstration of Soviet–North Korean solidarity, which would, the North Koreans hoped, constrain actions of the United States, Japan, and South Korea and induce China to adopt a more positive attitude toward North Korea's interests. Actually, the fact that Kim's visit even occurred is significant. Although Moscow had been considering such a visit for a number of years, it had never materialized. That the trip finally took place attests to the coincidence of the two nations' interests at the time.

Three additional factors expedited Kim's trip to the Soviet Union: the resumption of negotiations between the Soviet Union and China; the profound strengthening of North Korean relations with China; and the worsening of US–Soviet relations. Thus, North Korean



North Korean party and state leader Kim Il-sung, right, meets with his Soviet counterpart, Konstantin Chernenko, on May 25, 1984, in Moscow.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.



Chinese and North Korean dignitaries in Pyongyang, May 1984: from left to right, Kim Chong-il; Hu Yaobang, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CC CCP); Kim Il-song, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party; and Yang Shangkun, Permanent Vice Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission of the CC CCP.

—*China Pictorial* (Beijing), No. 8, 1984, p. 11.

leaders may have thought the timing of Kim's trip appropriate, as they judged the friction between China and the USSR to be low and Soviet sensitivity and amenability to North Korea's requests to be high.

For their part, when pondering the implications of US military activities in Asia and the evolving cooperative relationship among the United States, China, Japan, and South Korea, the Soviets undoubtedly recognized how closely Korean views and interests approximated their own.¹⁰ The Soviets clearly saw the necessity of exerting anew their influence over North Korea, which would afford them an opportunity to prevent the North from drifting toward better relations with the United States and Japan under Chinese tutelage, and the chance to prevent a closer cooperation between China and North Korea. Thus, the Soviet Union sought to reassert itself as a dominant and interested force in Korean affairs, emphasizing that no political settlement, whatever the format of negotiations, was to take place without Soviet approval. Kim, on the other hand, tried to wrangle a bit more independence. Although it is still too early to assess the results of Kim's visit, it appears that he accomplished most of what he aimed to do.

North Korea's "Militant Friendship"

If the Soviet Union is at the heart of North Korea's quest for an independent foreign policy, then the People's Republic of China perhaps is at its soul. Indeed, public declarations of the intensity of admiration and support between North Korea and China generally have surpassed those extolling Soviet-North Korean

relations. The signs of mutual support are ample. Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Hu Yaobang proclaimed (September 16, 1982) that Kim Il-song had led the Korean people to victory through creative application of the universal truth of Marxist-Leninist principles to the particular conditions of Korea.¹¹ Kim on his part acknowledged (September 21, 1982) the CCP's socialist modernization program to be an appropriate policy wholly compatible with the interests of the Chinese people.¹² Moreover, during the past few years, there have been extensive and numerous high-level visits between the leaders of the two countries. In addition to such dignitaries as Deng Xiaoping, General Secretary Hu, and Premier Zhao Ziyang, China's foreign and defense ministers have visited Pyongyang. North Korean visitors to Beijing have included President Kim, Kim Chong-il, the premier and deputy premiers, as well as the foreign and defense ministers.

This feeling of closeness is in part rooted in a sense of cultural and racial affinity for one another. It may also in part be a result of Kim's military and political experiences in China during the war with Japan. In general, however, the warmth of this feeling is attributable to other, more practical factors. The North Kore-

¹⁰Notice the striking similarities in the assessments given by the Soviet Union and North Korea of President Reagan's visit to South Korea in November 1983. For an analysis of Soviet policy toward Korea, see Young C. Kim, "Soviet Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula," in Ichikawa Masaaki, Ed., *Kankoku-Kita Chōsen Sōran* (Compendium of Papers on South and North Korea), Tokyo, Hara Shobō, 1983.

¹¹See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (hereafter *FBIS-CHI*), Sept. 20, 1982, pp. D/1-3.

¹²See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Asia and Pacific* (hereafter *FBIS-APA*), Sept. 22, 1982, pp. D/3-7.

North Korean Foreign Policy

ans keenly appreciate that relations between the two countries can best be characterized as a "militant friendship cemented in blood."¹³ That Chinese intervention during the Korean war was critical in ensuring the survival of the North Korean regime shows the vital importance of a friendly China to North Korean security. Certainly, a hostile China would fundamentally affect the North's strategic posture vis-à-vis the South. Also, like the Soviet Union, China is an important source of military equipment and supplies and of economic support. In 1983 alone, China provided North Korea with some 20 to 40 A-5's (an improved version of the MiG-21-type fighter).¹⁴ In addition, China supplies North Korea with substantial amounts of oil, and in recent years, these oil supplies have actually exceeded those provided by the Soviet Union. In terms of volume of trade, China accounted for about 17 per-

¹³For Kim's views on North Korea's "militant friendship" with China, see *ibid.*, p. D/6.

¹⁴Reports give different figures on the number of Chinese A-5's sent to North Korea. For the lower figure, see Young Whan Kihl, "North Korea in 1983," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley, CA), January 1984, p. 105; cf. Chung-whan Chun, "The Triangular Relationship Among China, the Soviet Union, and North Korea," *Korea Hyoron* (Tokyo), May 1983, p. 34.

cent of North Korea's total foreign trade, which was slightly more than half that accounted for by the Soviet Union (33 percent).¹⁵

But it is in the realm of diplomacy that China has perhaps been most useful in Kim's foreign policy undertakings. The vitality of the relations between the North Koreans and the Chinese provides the North with considerable leverage vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. By strengthening its ties with China, therefore, Pyongyang feels it can deal more effectively with "Soviet dominationism," as well as solicit a higher level of economic and military assistance from the Soviets. Good relations with China also potentially benefit North Korea's recent diplomatic *démarche* toward the United States and Japan. Chinese leaders could, for instance, intervene on behalf of the North Koreans, urging these nations to adopt a more flexible policy to-

¹⁵See Chun, *loc. cit.*, p. 34. Professor Chun estimates the amount of Chinese oil supply in recent years to be about 0.8 to 1.5 million tons as compared with about 0.5 million tons from the Soviet Union over the same period. Also, some analysts put the combined figure for Chinese and Soviet volume of trade with North Korea at 60 percent of the North's total. See, e.g., Mike Tharp, "A Nimble Neutrality Keeps Moscow and Peking as Allies," *FEER*, Feb. 2, 1984, p. 29.



At a North Korean metallurgical plant in 1982; the slogan in the background reads: "Everybody on the Road to Achieving the Three Great Technological Revolutions."

—Hiroji Kubota/MAGNUM.

ward the DPRK. This could facilitate the North's much-desired access to Western technology and capital. Chinese support has also proven instrumental in sustaining and increasing support for North Korea among Third World countries.

Most important, China's support is crucial in the execution of North Korea's strategy toward the South. China has consistently and vigorously voiced its support for North Korea's reunification policy. Most remarkable is the fact that since the fall of 1983, Chinese leaders have shown an active interest and willingness to discuss Korean affairs with American and Japanese officials. Recent Chinese efforts to promote talks involving the two Koreas and the US on behalf of North Korea have been particularly conspicuous.¹⁶

Domestically, China's public expressions of respect and support for President Kim and his achievements have been a source of enormous satisfaction to the North Korean leadership. Particularly meaningful to Northern officials (both in the domestic and international contexts) has been Chinese acceptance of and support for successor-designate Kim Chong-il in recent years. Although Chinese officials had earlier officially ridiculed Kim's practice of political primogeniture as feudalistic,¹⁷ by the fall of 1981 they began to acknowledge Kim Chong-il's ascendancy at official state banquets. Deng and Hu also reportedly conveyed their support of the younger Kim's succession during their visits to Pyongyang in April 1982. When President Kim visited China in September 1982, the Chinese leadership took the opportunity to express again its support for the ascendancy of the younger Kim. Both President Kim's reception in China and the treatment accorded him during his stay were extraordinarily warm and enthusiastic. Kim, in return, expressed his support for the policy line of Deng and his associates. The Chinese stance on the question of political succession crystallized in June 1983 when General Secretary Hu invited Kim Chong-il to China. Hu further emphasized Chinese support by personally serving as host during a part of Kim's tour.¹⁸

There are, however, several factors that contribute to occasional tensions between North Korea and China. For one thing, North Koreans are sensitive to all manifestations of what they see as "big nationalism," harboring a general distrust toward all major powers,

including China. Thus, when North Koreans speak of "dominationism," their code word for hegemonic tendencies, they refer to both the Soviet Union and China. For another, the North has always feared a betrayal of DPRK interests by its socialist allies. China's relations with the United States and Japan might, for instance, evolve to a point where North Korea's interests would be jeopardized. Therefore, the apparently increasing cordiality between China and the United States, North Korea's archenemy, causes serious anxiety among North Korean leaders. The most authoritative statement of this fear came in General Secretary Kim's October 1980 report to the 6th Party Congress, when he declared that

*The socialist countries, nonaligned countries, and all the newly emerging nations must make no unprincipled compromise with imperialism...The socialist and nonaligned countries must not give up their anti-imperialist stance in order to improve their diplomatic relations with the imperialist countries, nor must they sacrifice the interests of other countries in their own interests.*¹⁹

Moreover, despite North Korea's public endorsement of Deng's Four Modernizations policies, Kim's government is clearly dubious about the ramifications of such policies for the politics and ideology of a socialist state. Particularly disturbing to the North Korean leadership is the process of de-Maoization that is currently under way in China, a process that clearly raises serious doubts about the legitimacy of Kim Il-sung's leadership and of the regime itself.

The potential for improvement in Chinese-South Korean relations is another area of grave concern to the North Koreans. The North Korean government has watched the recent multiplication of contacts between China and South Korea with growing apprehension and disdain. Among the recent developments that have heightened North Korea's concern are: the participation of a Chinese scholar in an academic conference in Seoul in 1981; the growing indirect trade between South Korea and China through intermediaries in Hong Kong; the direct government-to-government negotiations following the hijacking of a Chinese civil airliner to Seoul in 1983; the commencement of sports exchanges (South Korea's tennis team in Kunming and China's basketball team in Seoul); and the permission granted to Chinese of Korean descent to visit their relatives in South Korea.

¹⁶See the numerous articles in the Chinese press translated in *FBIS-CHI*, mid-February through mid-March, 1984.

¹⁷*Renmin Ribao* (Beijing), Aug. 9, 1984.

¹⁸For an analysis of the younger Kim's visit to China, see Yoshida Masaya, "The Significance of Kim Chong-il's China Visit," *Korea Hyoron*, September 1983, pp. 29-36.

¹⁹Quoted in Young C. Kim, "North Korea in 1980: The Son Also Rises," *Asian Survey*, January 1981.

Combating Japanese Militarism

It is hardly surprising that North Korea's attitude toward Japan is heavily influenced by the legacy of Japanese colonial rule and Korea's anti-Japanese struggle for independence. The symbolism and rhetoric of North Korean political communications still evoke powerful emotions among the North Korean populace, and are perceptibly shaped by the Koreans' prewar struggle against Japanese colonialism and imperialism. But for North Korea, its assertion that Japan is still dreaming of establishing hegemony over Korea is not mere rhetoric. Having witnessed both the steady and significant growth in Japan's military capabilities and the progressive expansion of the role of the Japanese military,²⁰ North Koreans genuinely fear a revival of Japanese militarism and an evolving triangular security relationship among the United States, Japan, and South Korea. The most recent authoritative statement on this was given by President Kim himself in a talk to a delegation of the Soviet news agency TASS on March 31, 1984:

*The revival of Japanese militarism in Asia poses a grave threat to the Asian people. It is very justifiable that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government, and people heighten vigilance against the revival of Japanese militarism and raise their voice of struggle against the scheme to fabricate a US-Japan-South Korean tripartite military alliance, and we fully support this stand.*²¹

The persistence of these fears has greatly increased North Korea's sense of urgency concerning the reunification of Korea. While North Korean leaders are aware of the constitutional and political constraints that inhibit the expansion of Japan's military role, they still fear that a militarily powerful Japan would be likely to take actions—though not necessarily military—to impede the reunification process. Indeed, from the North's perspective, Japan already dominates the South, extending economic, political, and diplomatic support that directly undermines North Korean interests. The South Korean government and economy would collapse, North Korean leaders contend, if not for US military and Japanese economic



A helicopter of Japan's Self-Defense Forces transports a jeep during autumn 1983 maneuvers.

—H. Yamaguchi/Gamma-Liaison.

aid. Interestingly, North Korea perceives Japan as a more formidable and tenacious enemy than is the United States: a protracted struggle might conceivably drive out US forces, but Japanese influence in the South would be much more difficult to eradicate.

The North has shown considerable interest in the campaigns waged by the leftwing forces in Japan against the US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, recognizing that the United States's ability to render effective and timely military assistance to South Korea would require Japanese cooperation. Also, North Korean leaders recognize that this security treaty actually provides a rationale and an impetus for Japan's growing military power.²² Whether North Korea would prefer a militarily powerful yet independent Japan to a Japan growing within the framework of the security treaty is unclear. What is clear, however, is the North's steadfast commitment to the undermining of Japanese support for the South, and to the weakening of the ties between these two countries, thus reducing Japanese influence on the Korean peninsula. An important ally in this endeavor can be found in Japan itself, where some 700,000 Koreans reside. At least one-third of them, a force of some political significance, is said to be loyal to the North Korean regime.²³ They are expected to give full support

²⁰ For a discussion of Japan's military role in Northeast Asia, see Tetsuya Kataoka, "Japan's Northern Threat," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March-April 1984, pp. 1-16.

²¹ DPRK Permanent Observer Mission to the United Nations, "Press Release," New York, Apr. 11, 1984.

²² See Kataoka, loc. cit., pp. 2-3.

to the effort to bring about the realization of North Korean foreign policy objectives.

But if Japan constitutes a major threat to North Korean foreign policy interests, it also represents a key resource in the North's quest to diversify its economic relations. Thus, North Korea continues its attempt to expand existing ties with Japan, acutely aware of the potentially vast technical and economic benefits that such expansion might provide. In terms of volume of trade, Japan accounted for about 14 percent of North Korea's total foreign trade in 1983.²⁴ And in connection with its next economic plan, North Korea looks to the expansion of trade with Japan and other Western countries with which it has no diplomatic relations—a tactic that is consistent with the policy adopted at the January 1984 meeting of the Supreme People's Assembly.²⁵ Accordingly, Pyongyang has encouraged Japan to establish a trade office in the North, to conclude an aviation agreement, and to expand its personnel exchanges to include high-level government officials and resident journalists.

“Liberating” the South

From its inception, the North Korean regime has doggedly pursued its objective of eliminating US influence from South Korea. To the North Korean leadership, South Korea is being forcibly occupied by the US military, and the liberation of Southern brethren from American imperialism and colonialism constitutes the supreme and urgent national task—for a true Korean revolution would not be complete without a revolution in the South. In North Korean eyes, US domination of South Korea is indisputable: the United States maintains operational control over the South Korean military, dictates South Korean politics, and controls the South Korean economy. The United States is also, according to the North, capable of replacing at whim the present leaders of the South Korean “puppet” government. In addition, North Koreans allege that the

United States is raising tensions on the peninsula by turning South Korea into a nuclear forward base from which the US can launch its aggressions against North Korea and other socialist countries on the Asian continent. Indeed, Pyongyang claims to have sighted some 1,000 nuclear warheads in the South, and North Korean officials warn that the United States plans to introduce intermediate-range Pershing II and Tomahawk nuclear missiles.²⁶

For these reasons, North Korean leaders consider the US military presence in Korea as the single most important obstacle to the reunification effort. Without the removal of US forces from South Korea, they contend, the establishment of either a South Korean people's democratic government (following a revolution) or a government led by “patriots and democrats” could not be expected to occur. The removal of the US military from South Korea thus has become the objective of highest priority in all of North Korea's foreign policy undertakings.

To help accomplish this task, in March 1974 the North Korean government issued its first explicit proposal for a peace agreement with the United States. Under the provisions of this proposal, each side would pledge “not to invade the other” and to “remove all the danger of direct armed conflict.”²⁷ Other provisions called for the discontinuation of “arms reinforcement” and for the withdrawal of US forces from Korea. The proposal was notable not only for its provisions but also for its treatment of South Korea, which would be allowed to attend a North Korea–United States conference only as an observer and would be excluded from participating in the peace agreement. Only after a peace agreement had been reached with the United States would North Korea negotiate with South Korea regarding what the North called “practical measures.”²⁸

As expected, the United States responded to the proposal by announcing full South Korean participation as a precondition for US participation, an idea that it took the North Koreans *ten* years to accept. Finally, in the so-called tripartite conference proposal of January 1984, the North declared that it would accept equal status for the South in the proposed talks. Despite this promise of equal standing, the North apparently has not revised its earlier proposal in such a way as to include South Korea in US–North Korean peace negotiations. Whether the South would be al-

²⁴ Donald M. Seekins estimates Japan's Korean population at 675,000 in 1981.

Although he gives no concrete figures on the percentage of this population that is sympathetic to the North, Seekins does note that the most prominent Korean interest group in Japan is the North Korea–sponsored General Association of Korean Residents in Japan. See his contribution to *Japan: A Country Study*, 4th Ed. Rev., ed. by Frederica M. Bunge, Washington, DC, The American University, 1983, p. 274.

²⁵ Tharp, loc. cit., gives an even higher figure (20 percent) for Japan's portion of total North Korean trade (p. 29).

²⁶ “Resolution of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK, On Strengthening North-South Cooperation and External Economic Activities and Further Developing Foreign Trade, January 26, 1984,” in *Documents of the Third Session of the Seventh Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK* (hereafter *Documents* ...), Pyongyang, January 1984, pp. 2–10 (in English).

²⁷ See “The Two Kims' Dream of Peace,” *FEER*, Feb. 2, 1984, pp. 30–31.

²⁸ Shinn, loc. cit., p. 204.

²⁹ Young C. Kim, “Korea's Future: Pyongyang's Perspective,” *Asian Survey*, November 1977.

lowed to participate in discussions about this agreement (let alone in its signing) is not clear.

At any rate, the January 1984 proposal stated that the North and South should adopt a mutual declaration of nonaggression whereby each side pledges not only to refrain from using arms against the other, but also to cut drastically its own army and armaments.²⁹ Only after the adoption of the peace agreement and the signing of the nonaggression declaration at the tripartite talks does Pyongyang plan to hold a dialogue between the North and the South to address the question of reunification. Again, as in the 1974 proposal, the North Koreans insist that the proposed peace agreement must lead to the withdrawal of US forces from the South. However, it is not clear whether US troops would actually have to depart prior to the adoption of the nonaggression declaration with the South.

North Korea's priorities are clear (in order of importance): a peace agreement with the United States, a nonaggression declaration with the South, and a reunification dialogue. Although the proposal maintains that the peace agreement and nonaggression declaration would be discussed at the tripartite talks, it really envisages two separate sets of talks within the framework of the tripartite talks. After all, it still remains uncertain whether the North Korean-US talks and the North-South talks would occur simultaneously or serially. Would the peace agreement, for instance, necessarily precede the nonaggression declaration?

Although it remains unresolved how South Korea could be excluded from the peace agreement and still be deemed a full participant, and what the North Koreans' true intentions are regarding the tripartite talks, the fact that the North Koreans even declared a willingness to accept South Korea as an equal in these talks is significant. This is especially true in light of the North Koreans' rationale for earlier rejecting South Korean participation. Southern officials should be excluded, they argued in 1974, because the South had opposed the 1953 armistice agreement and had refused to become a signatory. Moreover, according to the North, since the United States maintained operational control of the South Korean armed forces, it was the only power that could guarantee that the South would honor the peace agreement. Interestingly, the January 1984 proposal uses similar arguments to try to induce the United States to sign a peace agreement with the North. But now, the proposal also *urges* South Korean authorities, "as another party directly involved in the creation of the present tensions," to

take part in the negotiations "so as to fully solve in all aspects the question of removing military confrontation and to ease tensions."³⁰

Of course, North Korea had in the past rejected South Korean proposals for the conclusion of a nonaggression pact, arguing throughout that such a proposal would be tantamount to supporting a two-Korea plot designed to perpetuate both US occupation of the South and the division of the Korean nation. Besides, the South's proposals made no provision for the withdrawal of US troops from Korea and was therefore unacceptable to the North Koreans, who persistently assert that the presence of the United States on the Korean peninsula is the main cause of tension and conflict there. Finally, Pyongyang argued that such a proposal would artificially separate the issues of peace and peaceful reunification, rendering the attainment of the latter more difficult.³¹

Peace or Propaganda?

Why has North Korea recently called for a nonaggression declaration, given its past objections to such a pact? Although the North Korean government has been silent thus far on this question, one likely explanation is that the North considers its proposal appropriate because conclusion of the declaration presupposes a peace agreement with the United States and the subsequent withdrawal of US troops from the South. However, the January proposal, in its present form, is unacceptable to the other two parties. The United States is unwilling to participate in negotiations whose principal objective is to terminate the US military presence in the South. Also, both the United States and South Korea find many aspects of the proposal itself untenable, including the proposed role and status of the South at the talks, the insulting and abusive descriptions of US and South Korean actions in and around Korea, and some of the actual premises for North Korea's call for such talks.

Indeed, such considerations lead many specialists to doubt North Korea's sincerity and to call the January proposal merely a deceptive propaganda attempt designed to divert public attention from the Rangoon incident.³² These specialists point with incredulity to

²⁹Ibid.

³¹Young C. Kim, "Korea's Future," pp. 1082-83.

³²According to the North Koreans, the Rangoon blast incident is a "slandorous self-produced drama by traitor Chon Tu-huan." See commentaries by the North Korea Foreign Ministry and the account in *Nodong Sinmun* (Pyongyang) following the Burmese government announcement that the incident was the work of operatives of North Korea, in *FBIS-APA*, Nov. 7, 1983, p. D/1.

²⁸"Report by Deputy Ho Dam," in *Documents...*, pp. 13-22.

the timing of the initial transmission of the proposal: North Korea asked China to transmit the DPRK's willingness to hold talks with the United States and South Korea shortly before the bombing in Rangoon. The message, however, reached the United States after the incident, and the public announcement of the proposal was not made until January 1984. It is possible, of course, that North Korea expected a positive response to its proposal despite the bombing. The United States and the South had, after all, called for such a tripartite meeting as far back as 1979. In a speech to the National Assembly in Seoul in November 1983, President Reagan stated that the United States would enter into talks with the North if South Korea's full participation were ensured. Moreover, the North Korean government later claimed—but the US

denied—that it had received a communication with a similar proposal from the United States in September 1983.³³

Both the substance and the tone of the January proposal reflect an inflexible and self-righteous attitude as well as numerous misperceptions. Perhaps the need to justify their past policy stances dictated the use of many expressions that are harsher and more strident than even North Korean leaders believe realistic. On the other hand, it is reasonable to assume that the Northern leadership was conscious of the propaganda advantages to be gained even if the proposal were rejected.

³³"Report by Deputy Ho Dam," in *Documents...*, pp. 13-22.



A Japanese television shot of one of the victims of a bomb exploded by North Korean agents at Rangoon's Martyrs' Mausoleum on October 10, 1983, that killed four ministers of the government of the Republic of Korea and other South Korean nationals.

North Korean Foreign Policy

There is little doubt that the Rangoon bombing deeply affected US and South Korean perceptions of North Korea's proposal for tripartite talks. As noted, the dominant view among Western analysts was that the proposal was a device designed to recover the prestige North Korea lost following the bombing. The question these analysts ask most often is how the North Koreans could have perpetrated such an act had they been seriously considering talks with the South. It is conceivable, however, that in the minds of the North Koreans, the terrorist elimination of the South Korean leadership and the pursuit of some *modus vivendi* with the South are compatible. Indeed, there are indications that the North Korean government has been groping for a more "pragmatic" way of dealing with the South, one of whose components could possibly be the assassination of Southern officials, including the President. The elimination of President Chun could presumably cause considerable instability in South Korea, seriously impeding the South's attainment of economic, political, and diplomatic goals. An unstable situation there could discourage heads of state from visiting Seoul and cause foreign investors to reassess their commitments to business ventures in the Republic of Korea. It would also no doubt frustrate South Korea's diplomatic offensive toward nonaligned countries. Such prospects may have appeared irresistible to the North Korean



North Korean Premier Kang Song-san, right, with Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang, during a visit to China in the summer of 1984 to examine light industry in Shanghai and the Special Economic Zone in Shenzhen.

—Wide World.

leadership, especially given the high chance of success and the minimal risk of exposure of North Korean complicity.

Some analysts argue, however, that North Korea has in fact adopted a more moderate and realistic policy toward the South. Although most Western analysts consider this view somewhat ludicrous, a few thoughts may be advanced to support this minority view. First, Kim Chong-il, who is deeply involved in all North Korean decision-making, has demonstrated an active interest in economic development. He appears determined to enhance the legitimacy of the regime and of his own leadership through increasing economic benefits to the people. As evidence of the North's increasing interest in this regard, these analysts point to the stream of leading cadres from North Korea that have been visiting China in recent years to observe the PRC's economic modernization program at work. Moreover, Pyongyang has progressively shown an interest in gaining access to Western technology and capital, the most dramatic evidence of this being the enactment in September 1984 of a law sanctioning joint economic ventures. But the North realizes that the United States and Japan will both remain unresponsive unless North-South relations improve. While his efforts have reportedly met with resistance from some old revolutionary cadres, the younger Kim seems to enjoy support from technocrats and other cadres who are his contemporaries.

To rebut these arguments, many analysts point out that politics and economics in North Korea are highly compartmentalized, and that ideological considerations dwarf economic requirements. While President Kim might be able to deviate somewhat from ideological dictates in his policies (given his vast authority over the North's populace), it is not clear that his successor-designate would have such flexibility. Indeed, to counter those who assert that Kim Chong-il could simply make use of his father's authority to put forward his controversial policy line, the majority of analysts emphasize how ideologically rigid the North Korean populace is—especially the younger generation—and how much Northern leaders seem to need to demonstrate militant fidelity to the orthodox policy lines of Kim Il-song.

No one disputes that the North Korean leadership has placed enormous emphasis upon economic development and is increasingly inclined toward interaction with foreign—that is, Western—economies. What most analysts challenge is the "spillover" effect of economic imperatives into politics that some claim has taken place in the North's dealings with South Korea. Why, they ask, did North Korea until very re-

cently remain opposed to the resumption of dialogue or other exchanges with the South if it is really interested in reaching a modus vivendi with the South? And earlier this year, they point out, North Korea rejected a proposal for trade and economic cooperation by insisting upon two preconditions: the withdrawal of US troops from Korea and the termination of anticommunist policies within the South Korean government.

The Drive for Reunification

The North Korean government approaches the question of reunification with utmost seriousness and a strong sense of urgency. The North's proclaimed supreme national task is reunification and the "emancipation" of its Southern brethren. Most, if not all, of the North's domestic and foreign policies are directed toward this goal. Northern leaders have insisted that the reunification effort be governed by three guidelines: it should be free of external interference, be accomplished by peaceful means, and produce a national unity that transcends ideals, ideologies, and social systems. These three guidelines constitute a portion of the North-South joint communiqué of July 4, 1972.

According to the North Korean perception, peaceful reunification will be possible only under one of two circumstances: (1) when a successful revolution in the South results in the expulsion of imperialistic forces, the overthrow of their puppets, and the subsequent establishment of a people's democratic government; or (2) when a "patriotic and nationalistic" government is established in South Korea. Thus, even in the absence of the establishment of a government of workers, a government composed of "democratic personages with nationalistic consciences" (the North's code words for those in the South who oppose the government there) would be able to reach an accord with the North concerning reunification.³⁴

North Korean leaders have long advocated the establishment of a confederal system of government, the most elaborate proposal for which was presented by General Secretary Kim in a report to the 6th Party Congress in October 1980. Kim stated that Korea "should be reunified by founding a confederal republic through the establishment of a unified national government on the condition that the North and the South recognize and tolerate each other's ideas and social systems, a government in which the two sides are represented on an equal footing and under which

they exercise regional autonomy respectively with equal rights and duties."³⁵ On numerous other occasions, North Korea has renewed its call for such a government, which it has labeled the Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo, apparently in commemoration of the dynasty that consolidated control on the peninsula in the 10th century.³⁶

For the establishment of this state, Northern leaders call for the convening of a national political consultative conference to be attended by representatives of various parties and groups from both the North and South. In its January 1984 proposal, however, the North Korean government specified certain preconditions for such a dialogue. The proposal states, in part,

*When a legal guarantee for the relaxation of the tension in Korea is provided and preconditions for the independent and peaceful reunification are created with the signing of a peace agreement and the adoption of a declaration of nonaggression at the tripartite talks, a reunification dialogue between the North and the South will be held to solve the question of reunification.*³⁷

By contrast, South Korean officials advocate direct talks between the North and the South on all matters. These talks could then be followed, if necessary, by a four- or six-party conference.

A Negotiated Settlement

While North Korea claims that it is prepared to allow the "South Korean authorities" to participate in the proposed tripartite talks, it is not willing to hold bilateral talks with the South—particularly with representatives of the Chun government. Indeed, as preconditions to such bilateral talks, the North has repeatedly specified some or all of the following: the cessation of "anticommunist rackets" and/or anticommunist policies; the renunciation of a two-Korea policy; the release of political prisoners and an end to the suppression of "patriotic and democratic personages"; acceptance of the North Korean formula for reunification; and withdrawal of US troops. Until quite recently, the North had even rejected South Korea's proposal concerning economic exchanges and the

³⁵ Kim Il-song, *Report to the Sixth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea on the Work of the Central Committee*, Pyongyang, Foreign Languages Press, 1980, pp. 69–70.

³⁶ Young C. Kim, "North Korea in 1980," pp. 115–17.

³⁷ "Appeal to Parliaments and Governments of All Countries," in *Documents...*, pp. 10–13.

³⁴ Young C. Kim, "Korea's Future," pp. 1077–78.

question of reuniting separated families, since from the North Korean perspective, humanitarian and economic issues are inseparable from political issues. Thus, talks on humanitarian issues would be meaningful only in the context of broad reunification efforts.

It should be kept in mind that North Korea is committed to a South Korean revolution as part of the reunification effort. The very conception of a revolution in the South is significant, since North Korean leaders define it as both a national liberation revolution against the United States and a people's democratic revolution against the "stooges" of American imperialism. Again, the US military presence is the most fundamental issue here, and all other problems must be evaluated in light of this issue. However, other considerations in the North's perception are also operative. First, North Korea's decision to hold talks with South Korean government representatives would be tantamount to recognition of the legitimacy of Chun's government and thus betray "patriotic and democratic personages" fighting in the South. Moreover, the North's participation in a direct dialogue would, by legitimizing Chun's rule, contribute to the growing stability of South Korea. This would clearly be contrary to North Korean interests, particularly as the Chun government is perceived as still recovering from the Kwangju incident of mid-1980 (when government troops deployed to quell a student uprising caused a large number of casualties) and from a series of scandals.

Both of these considerations derive from North Korea's overestimation of the revolutionary potential in the South. The North holds a perennial hope that a "democratic personage with a nationalistic conscience"—if not a people's government—will emerge in the South to replace Chun. But this will take time. It is possible, therefore, that North Korean leaders may be reluctant to hold talks with the South because they perceive the current situation in the South as making it relatively invulnerable to North Korean designs and objectives.

One of the most fundamental explanations for the dismal record to date of North-South dialogue is this reluctance on the part of the North to acknowledge that there is a separate government in the South (however illegitimate the North may perceive it to be) functioning and exercising its rule over the South Korean populace. From the North Korean perspective, it is only to be expected that the DPRK would refuse to deal with a ruling clique in the South that supports a policy of two Koreas and insists upon a continuous US military presence. This also helps to explain the North's repugnance to the concept of "cross recogni-



Preparations for US President Ronald Reagan's visit to Seoul in November 1983.

—H. Yamaguchi/Gamma-Liaison.

tion." After all, the South Korean government, they claim, is only a puppet and is unworthy of diplomatic recognition. Also, such recognition would effectively legalize the present division of Korea.

Clearly, such an attitude on the part of the North is contradictory to its professed desire for a confederal state. After all, under such an arrangement, each side would be allowed to retain its own ideology, as well as its own social, economic, and political systems. Perhaps the North Koreans would justify their stand by saying that the establishment of a confederal Korean state could only be seriously contemplated after a withdrawal of US troops and a repudiation of a two-Korea policy.

It is important to bear in mind that North Korea's quest for reunification is not merely symbolic or rhetorical, but a genuine factor shaping North Korea's policies—both domestic and foreign. North Korea has pursued this goal relentlessly through a three-pronged strategy that calls for strengthening the revolutionary power base in the North, fostering revolutionary potential in the South, and increasing solidarity with in-

ternational revolutionary forces. Southern revolution and reunification, they believe, depend ultimately on success in these three spheres.

Military Solution?

Although North Korean leaders have repeatedly affirmed the sincerity of their commitment to a peaceful reunification process, they have not ruled out reunification by military means as a possible alternative. Such means would be employed, they claim, only if war were first forced upon them by their enemies. In this case, they warn, imperialist forces would be defeated, and the war for liberation of the South would be fought and won. Recall the speech that President Kim made in Beijing in April 1975. If a revolution were to take place in the South, Kim declared, North Korea would strongly support the South Korean people. And if the enemy were to start a war, the North would, again, answer that challenge with war. In this war, Kim claimed, Korea would "lose the military demarcation line and gain the country's reunification."³⁸

The dominant view among Western specialists currently seems to hold that a North Korean military operation against the South is unlikely, but not impossible. Some specialists, however, believe that such opera-

tions by the North remain very possible, and even probable, at least through this decade.

The former group, who doubt that a North Korean invasion of the South is likely, cite the following considerations in support of their view. First, the North Korean government would not risk incurring the massive destruction that such a war would certainly wreak upon the North. Moreover, both China and the Soviet Union are at present opposed to reunification by military means, and Northern leaders recognize that these powers are critical to a decisive victory for the North. Another effective deterrent is the North's awareness of an almost automatic and certain US intervention on behalf of South Korea, which would be formidable given the scale and manner of deployment of US forces in the South. Also, they argue, now that economic development is a top priority for the Northern leadership, successor-designate Kim Chong-il would probably see a war as damaging to both this new goal and the legitimacy of his own rule. In this regard, these analysts note, it is significant that the younger Kim is prominently portrayed in the North Korean media as promoting economic development. Finally, North Korea's current military capabilities do not necessarily betray an offensive strategy. They may, instead, reflect the North's insecurity in view of the quantity and quality of the South's arms and the joint US-South Korean military exercises that have been conducted there under the code name "Team Spirit."

Interestingly, the other specialists, those who believe that a Northern invasion of the South is probable,

³⁸Young C. Kim, "The Democratic Republic of Korea in 1975," *Asian Survey*, January 1976.



US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Republic of Korea Minister of National Defense Yoon Song Min at an April 1983 press conference in Washington; at right, American troops are welcomed to the Republic of Korea for the "Team Spirit 1983" maneuvers of US and South Korean forces.

—US Department of Defense.

enced by such factors as the possible engagement of US troops elsewhere, the character of the conflict, and the question of North Korean responsibility for aggression.

Several other important considerations round out their rebuttal. They point out that the North Korean leadership has become increasingly anxious about the steady and significant growth of South Korea's military and economic power. Aware that their own weaponry is rapidly becoming obsolete, might not Northern leaders conclude that their reunification efforts would be most successful if undertaken in the near future? The possibility of a renewed US superiority in the US-Soviet balance of power in the future adds to the North's urgency concerning the reunification effort. There is also the critical issue of leadership change. Kim Chong-il might be more likely to resort to war than

cite many of the same considerations to support their view; however, their interpretation is dramatically different. While it is true that such a war would be extremely destructive, they respond, the Northern leadership would accept a higher level of risk than Western leaders would consider tolerable, given the value that the North places upon the attainment of reunification. Moreover, North Korea has sufficient materials to wage a sustained war for three months even without Soviet and Chinese help. Besides, the Chinese and Soviets would probably be drawn into the war on the North's side despite their initial objections. Even the value of the US deterrent is questionable. Might not North Korean leaders choose to attack if they believed the United States unable or unwilling to provide effective and timely assistance to its Southern allies? US intervention would, in any case, be influ-



Kim Chong-il and General O Chin-u, Minister of the People's Armed Forces, at an April 14, 1982, joint meeting of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party and the Supreme People's Assembly marking the 70th birthday of Kim's father, Kim Il-song.

—Hiroji Kubota/MAGNUM.



Kim Il-sung, left, is seen off at Beijing's railroad station by (at right, from left to right) Xi Zhongxun, Ulanhu, Hu Yaobang, and Yang Shangkun at the end of his unofficial visit to the People's Republic of China in late November 1984 at the invitation of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

—New China Picture Company.

would his father, who has experienced the destruction of war and the near collapse of his regime. The younger Kim's inexperience and personality characteristics,³⁹ compounded by the instability of the period of power transition and the ideological rigidity of the younger generation of cadres, suggest that he may pursue a more adventurist policy line than his father.

Finally, these specialists contend, North Korea's military capabilities are more important and meaningful than are its stated intentions, which may change quickly. The quantity and quality of North Korean weaponry, the pattern of its deployment, the discipline and morale of the North Korean forces, and the nature of party-military relations all suggest that a sudden invasion of South Korea might be successful. This sensitivity to North Korea's war-making capabilities is natural, they contend, in view of the lack of convincing evidence that North Korea is truly seeking political accommodation with the South.

Conclusion

Whatever one's judgment about these two alternative interpretations, it seems indisputable that the North's quest for a reunited Korea is sustained by a strong ideological compulsion and is intertwined with regime legitimacy and the dynamics of domestic politics. The call for reunification is not an empty slogan,

but a powerful driving force, shaping North Korea's undertakings, both domestic and foreign. It is therefore safe to assume that North Korean foreign policy will continue to exhibit both revolutionary and conflictual tendencies toward South Korea.

On the other hand, along with the manifestations of militancy and inflexibility in the political sphere, there are some indications of growing pragmatism in the economic sphere. Also discernable are the undercurrents indicating a search for alternative means of goal attainment and a modest reordering of priorities.

Just how such a reordering of priorities would affect North Korean relations with the major actors in the region is unclear. It is highly unlikely, of course, that the North would alter its stance on either the presence of US troops in the South or the legitimacy of the current government of South Korea. Nor is it likely that Northern leaders would adopt a policy that clearly favored one of its huge communist neighbors over the other. Recent diplomatic activity suggests a steady course for North Korean "equidistance"—note the coincidence of the initialing of a border treaty with the Soviet Union (in Pyongyang on November 26 of this year)⁴⁰ and of Kim's recent unexpected visit to Beijing to meet with Deng and Hu. Thus, it is in the area where the political and economic spheres overlap that the potential for change is greatest. Indeed, any clear signs of pragmatism "spilling over" into the political sector and producing a demonstrable North Korean interest in securing a *modus vivendi* with the South would call for a reassessment of some of the prevailing assumptions about North Korean foreign policy behavior.

³⁹On the personality traits of the younger Kim, see *Naewoe Tongsin*, Nov. 18, 1983.

⁴⁰See TASS, "Treaty Initialed," in *FBIS-SOV*, Nov. 29, 1984, p. C/1.

South Asia After Afghanistan

Stephen P. Cohen

The assassination of Indira Gandhi heightened interest in the tense international relationships existing in South Asia. Of course, one of the chief sources of regional tension is the fundamental, long-standing rivalry between India and Pakistan, which just prior to Mrs. Gandhi's death had flared up to the point where some observers, including her own son, predicted a new war between the two states. However, another significant factor has been the Soviet Union: directly, through its massive arms shipments to India; and indirectly, through its invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 1979. How have the invasion and the continued Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the face of a fierce national resistance movement affected relationships on the subcontinent? Has the heightened Soviet presence spurred on an arms race in which India's reliance on Moscow grows, or may it ultimately encourage states of the region to find new grounds for cooperation?

Five years have passed since Soviet forces occupied Afghanistan. Unless the Soviets decide to increase dramatically their forces, expand their actions beyond Afghanistan, or—improbably—unilaterally concede defeat and withdraw, it appears that five years from now they will be still enmeshed in a savage war of attrition. Although considerable attention has been given to the impact of the invasion on

Afghanistan and on relations between the USSR and the United States, relatively little has been given to its impact upon Afghanistan's neighbors to the south and east—a region containing about one-quarter of the world's population.¹

In looking at South Asia, it is reasonable to ask whether the invasion of Afghanistan was designed to advance some important Soviet goal or goals in the region. What effect has the invasion had and is it likely to have on the most important regional conflicts that predate it, especially that between India and Pakistan? What are the prospects for a major Soviet-backed escalation of the war into Pakistan, or even of a joint Indo-Soviet move against Pakistan? Not only have these questions been submerged in the larger debate over the strategic consequences of the Soviet invasion, but much of the early analysis has proved wrong. In turning to a more careful examination of these questions, it is useful first to review Soviet regional policies and interests, including those pertaining to Afghanistan.

Soviet Regional Influence

Twenty-five years ago there was virtually no important support for the Soviet Union in South Asia except from the pro-Soviet wing of the Communist Party of India (CPI) and a few ideological supporters in the Indian Congress Party. The Communist Party of Pakistan was outlawed, and in any case had only a

Stephen P. Cohen is Professor of Political Science and Asian Studies at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and in 1977-78 was a Visiting Research Professor at Andhra University, India. He is author of The Indian Army: Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation (1971) and The Pakistan Army (1984) and coauthor of India: Emergent Power? (1978). He is currently completing a manuscript on the security of South Asia.

¹There is some confusion whether Afghanistan is or is not in "South" Asia. For political purposes, various governments have tended to treat it as a part of "Southwest" Asia along with Pakistan and Iran. However, it is also culturally part of Central Asia and South Asia, and the Indian and Pakistani governments have always regarded it as part of their region. For a cultural, political, and geographical analysis, see Joseph B. Schwartzberg, Ed., *An Historical Atlas of South Asia*, Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, 1978, which includes Afghanistan in "South" Asia.

small following. Russian influence in Afghanistan was competitive but marginal (even then the local communist party was sharply divided),² and there was no Soviet presence in either Nepal or Ceylon. The Soviets were about to enter into a major arms deal with India (in 1962) selling MiG-21 interceptors, helicopters, and transport aircraft, although India's MiG's did not actually fly until 1964. Indeed, it was the United States that seemed to be the most influential power in the region. It was primarily to the United States that Indian defense planners turned after the Sino-Indian border war of 1962. At the time, American and Commonwealth air units participated in joint exercises with their Indian counterparts. Also, India adopted some of US Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's innovations in defense planning, and several hundred US military personnel were stationed in India until 1965.³ There was also a large US civilian and military presence in Pakistan until 1965, and that country liked to term itself the "most allied of allies," as it was linked to the US through a bilateral treaty and membership in CENTO and SEATO.

A quarter century later, the Soviet position is unquestionably improved.⁴ The USSR finds itself maintaining a substantial military presence in a devastated

Afghanistan, with a view to converting that mountainous land into a Soviet satellite. Despite routine charges that Islamabad is aiding the Afghan "insurgents," Moscow has normal diplomatic relations with Pakistan, and Soviet-Pakistani economic projects, including construction of a steel mill in Karachi, are on schedule. Although the Soviet presence in Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh remains minimal, India has become closely linked to the Soviet economy and defense establishment through massive purchases of weapons, paid for by shipments of Indian-made consumer goods.⁵ The Indian Air Force flies many recent Soviet models, the Navy is more than half Soviet or Polish in origin, and the Indian Army is newly dependent upon the Soviet Union for armor. On the day of Indira Gandhi's assassination, October 31, 1984, Indian Defense Minister S. B. Chavan was in Moscow reportedly negotiating details for India's acquisition of 40 advanced MiG-29 fighter planes—reputedly the first Soviet sale of these aircraft to any country.⁶

But Soviet influence in the region did not expand uninterrupted during this period. Moscow's influ-

²For a survey of the communist parties of Afghanistan see Anthony Arnold, *Afghanistan's Two Party Communism: Parcham and Khalq*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1983.

³The air exercises, a response to Nehru's frantic appeals for help, were held between November 9 and 19, 1963. A squadron of USAF F-100 Supersabres, a squadron of RAF Javelins, and two Australian Canberra bombers participated along with the Indian Air Force. Later, the US designed and built much of India's air defense network. For details of these exercises see *Foreign Affairs Record* (New Delhi), November 1963, pp. 264-65.

⁴For a recent overall assessment of the net gains and losses in Soviet influence in Asia—South Asia in particular—see Thomas P. Thornton, prepared statement and testimony, in US Congress, House of Representatives, *The Soviet Role in Asia*, Hearings before the Subcommittees on Europe and the Middle East and on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, July–October 1983, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1983, pp. 3-27.

⁵Ironically, some of these goods are manufactured in plants established by Western multinationals. There is some debate in India over the desirability of tying down so much production capacity to Soviet markets. For one, it tends to lessen the competitiveness of Indian goods on the world market. Moreover, the Soviets have dumped some of these goods on the international market, undercutting Indian-marketed items.

⁶William Branigin, "India Is Expected To Keep Its Reliance on Soviet Weapons," *The Washington Post*, Nov. 14, 1984.



Soviet MiG-21 aircraft in the complement of the Indian Air Force.

—Der Spiegel (Hamburg), Oct. 6, 1980, p. 182.



Soviet Premier Aleksey Kosygin, standing at center, hosts talks between President Muhammad Ayub Khan of Pakistan and India's Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri on January 4, 1966, at the Uzbek SSR's Government House in Tashkent.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

ence was probably greatest in 1966–71, when the US had virtually withdrawn. The Soviets presided over the 1966 Tashkent meeting that formally ended the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war (and even received American blessings for the effort). Moscow found itself supplying weapons to both India and Pakistan in 1968, and, with the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1971, the USSR greatly increased the flow of Soviet weapons to India. Some have even argued that the Soviet Union used its Far Eastern military buildup to deter China from entering the 1971 Indo-Pakistani conflict on the side of Pakistan.⁷ It was also during this period that the Soviets floated the idea of a re-

gional collective security treaty—a proposal that New Delhi gave serious consideration before rejecting.⁸ However, the USSR failed (as had the British and the Americans before it) to bring Pakistan and India into a de facto alliance. And communist ideology remains unattractive to the South Asian states, most of all Afghanistan, where it is sustained only by a massive Soviet military presence.⁹ In a word, the Soviet Union unquestionably exercises considerable influence in South Asia today, but it is more a consequence of the brutal intervention in Afghanistan than of an expanding mutuality of interests, and the influence has come at considerable material and political cost.

⁷See Harry Gelman, "Soviet Policy Toward China: The Contending Perspectives in Moscow," in *Soviet Role in Asia*, p. 353. Gelman is probably wrong in this assessment. New Delhi shrewdly waited until the snows had blocked any possible Chinese movement in the northeastern Himalayan passes before invading East Pakistan. Moreover, the Indians had had tactical superiority over the Chinese along their border for some time.

The Soviet connection was important because of the promise of weapons supplies and the nuclear "umbrella" Moscow extended over India. This umbrella—assurances of support in case of a Chinese nuclear threat—had earlier been offered by the United States in 1964–65, but had been withdrawn by the US on the eve of President Richard Nixon's visit to China in 1972. For a civilian and a military analysis

by Indians of their strategic nuclear problem, see respectively Bhabani Sen Gupta, *Nuclear Weapons: Policy Options for India*, Beverly Hills, CA, Sage Publications, 1983; and Maj.-Gen. D. K. Palit, *Nuclear Shadow Over the Subcontinent*, New Delhi, United Services Institution of India, 1981.

⁸For a history of the Brezhnev proposal, see Robert N. Donaldson, *Soviet Policy Toward India*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1974, p. 219.

⁹Recent reports indicate an increase of 70,000 in the level of Soviet forces in Afghanistan, which had been estimated at between 105,000 and 110,000. *The New York Times*, Oct. 10, 1984. This may be a temporary increase reflecting replacement of old units by new. See also *ibid.*, Nov. 1, 1984.

Soviet Regional Interests

What motivates Moscow in its quest for influence in South Asia? Soviet interest in the region seems largely indirect, reflecting concern with important strategic correlations elsewhere. The exception is Moscow's involvement in Afghanistan, although even there the 1979 Soviet invasion may have been undertaken in part with an eye toward developments in Poland.¹⁰ As for India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, it is primarily indirect strategic calculations rather than ideological, cultural, or economic considerations that occasion Soviet interest.

In India, where the Soviets move most freely and appear the most welcome, relations exhibit little personal warmth or ideological fervor. To the Soviets, India remains a bourgeois society at the top and a prerevolutionary quagmire at the bottom.¹¹ For their part, Indian officials, even those with the strongest attachment to the Soviet tie (such as the late Indira Gandhi), have not hesitated to crack down on India's communists when it suited domestic needs.¹²

Soviet interests in South Asia are certainly not economic. Although the barter arrangement with India is convenient, the Soviets are under no compulsion to export their weapons to India nor are they dependent upon any raw materials or finished products acquired from South Asia. They do get an unknown quantity of cheap natural gas from Afghanistan, but this hardly was the chief reason for the Soviet invasion.

Militarily, the Soviets see no threat emanating from South Asia. No South Asian country belongs to an alliance harboring aggressive designs on the USSR. Indeed, Moscow was able to normalize relations with Pakistan in April 1965 after Muhammad Ayub Khan made it clear that his country's membership in CENTO and SEATO and reliance on the US for arms did not reflect anti-Soviet motives.¹³ The Soviets were, after all, able to live in harmony with a Shah of Iran heavily dependent upon American weapons. And,



Pakistan's President Zia ul-Haq shakes hands with Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on March 6, 1983, at the start of the 7th summit of the Nonaligned Movement, in New Delhi; bilateral talks between the two countries were scheduled to be held after the conference.

—Wide World.

since 1965, there has been no serious American military presence in South Asia that might explain the great expansion of Soviet military and economic aid to the area.

Finally, some might attribute Soviet interest in ties with India to the latter's role in the Nonaligned Movement. However, although it was doubtless viewed by Moscow as useful to have such a prestigious and friendly state assume importance in that movement again in 1983, India has not been a pliable partner (it is too early to determine how Rajiv Gandhi will relate to the Nonaligned Movement). Cubans and others have been available for several years to express the authentic Soviet position in this and related forums.

Rather, Soviet interest in South Asia is primarily strategic in nature, deriving almost entirely from the long-standing Sino-Soviet conflict. Soviet-Indian relations thus fluctuate in tandem with the state of Sino-Soviet relations and the relations between China and individual South Asian states. Nothing brings Soviet generals to New Delhi bearing gifts of military hardware faster than the prospect of Sino-Indian negotia-

¹⁰The massive use of force in Afghanistan may have been intended to demonstrate to troubled allies that the Soviets had not lost the will to control dissident communist allies since 1968. For a comparison of the 1968 and 1979 invasions, see Jiri Valenta, "From Prague to Kabul: The Soviet Style of Invasion," *International Security* (Cambridge, MA), Fall 1980, pp. 114-41.

¹¹While Soviet scholars are reasonably well informed about India, this—on the basis of my own limited contacts—seems less true of Soviet officials and bureaucrats. Of course, the officials and bureaucrats of other important states also have an imperfect understanding of this complex and diverse state. See Donaldson, *op. cit.*, pp. 183-84.

¹²In 1959, while serving as President of the Indian Congress Party, Mrs. Gandhi toppled a communist-led government in the South Indian state of Kerala. If given a chance, she probably would have toppled the current communist governments in West Bengal and Tripura. Her approach to such matters was nonideological.

¹³Pakistan had made it known when it entered the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO) that it was not entering into a military "alliance" against the USSR, and that its real concern lay with the Indian threat. For a survey, see William J. Barnds, *India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers*, New York, Praeger, 1975.



Soviet Defense Minister, Marshal Dmitriy Ustinov, reviews an Indian honor guard at New Delhi's airport in May 1984 on one of his periodic visits to India.

—SYGMA.

tions over their border dispute.¹⁴ Similarly, the Soviets have always been troubled by Pakistan's continuing military and strategic tie with China, perhaps even more than by the revitalized American connection with Pakistan. One recalls that in the 1960's, American intelligence flights from Pakistan and Turkey embarrassed the Soviet Union but were not necessarily perceived as a direct threat. Indeed, such "national means of verification" have since been legitimized by the various SALT treaties. What Moscow finds more troubling is to see another major communist power exercising an independent diplomacy along or near the Soviet periphery, even if objectively such diplomacy is primarily defensive, aimed at easing pressure on China by bolstering other states, like Pakistan, that share a common strategic interest.¹⁵

If Moscow perceives China as a threat, it is not China in isolation or even a China in combination with Pakistan.¹⁶ Rather, it is China and Pakistan in combination with a large industrial power. A China-US-Pakistan relationship not only could strengthen an unfriendly (albeit not hostile) government in Islamabad, which can embarrass the Soviets in Afghanistan; it also could potentially serve as a link in a broader security system that would be an effective counter to Soviet power.

The link between China and Pakistan is galling, for it allows direct passage between Xinjiang and Gilgit, along a route that traverses the Karakoram only a few miles from Afghanistan's Wakhan Corridor. This desolate area was the point of contact of four historic empires (the British, the Persian, the Russian, and the Chinese), and Moscow must assign it great symbolic and strategic value, judging from the fact that Soviet

¹⁴For a concise survey of the Indo-Soviet military relationship, see S. Nihal Singh, "Why India Goes to Moscow for Arms," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley, CA), July 1984, pp. 707-20.

¹⁵See Jonathan Pollack, *The Lessons of Coalition Politics: Sino-American Security Relations*, Santa Monica, CA, The Rand Corporation, 1984.

¹⁶John J. Stephan, "Asia in the Soviet Conception," in Donald S. Zagoria, Ed., *Soviet Policy in East Asia*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1982, p. 40.

troops occupied the Wakhan simultaneously with their capture of Kabul and other major Afghan cities.

Compared with concern about China, the lure of the Indian Ocean is of only secondary importance in Soviet calculations.¹⁷ While access to the seas is doubtless included among Soviet long-term objectives, the Soviet Union remains a land-based state, more immediately aware and excessively fearful of the diverse problems along its borders, especially those bounding the three-quarters of the USSR that lies in Asia. China represents one kind of challenge to Soviet regional domination; the possible fall of a pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan represented another. Both have implications for our understanding of whether the Soviet Union seeks influence, equality, hegemony, or dominance in its regional relations.

Because of the importance of China, the Soviet Union has reason to cultivate India, which has also experienced strife with the People's Republic. India is one of only a few countries other than the USSR that have a common border with China, and this could conceivably be of vital importance to the Soviets in case of a major Sino-Soviet conflict.¹⁸ There is, to be sure, no evidence that the Indians have agreed to help the USSR against China (and the Soviets must be uncertain as to how useful the Indians would actually be in such a crisis), but only India and Vietnam have the capacity and motivation to assist the Soviets in containing China. Moreover, for Moscow to strengthen these two does not threaten any established Soviet interest in South or Southeast Asia.

Beyond the indirect strategic calculations that underlie the Soviet link with India, the relationship has a certain inertia—related to the stake that various Soviet civilian and military bureaucracies have acquired in



Rajiv Gandhi, left, Secretary General of the Indian National Congress and a Deputy of the Indian Parliament, meets with Soviet Politburo member and Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko in Moscow on July 8, 1983, during a visit to the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Parliamentary Group of the USSR.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

its maintenance. This does not mean that the Soviet Union is incapable of switching sides should opportunities arise and conditions alter. One might conceive of at least three circumstances that might alter Moscow–New Delhi relations.

First, were Sino-Soviet relations to improve, neither Beijing nor Moscow would have as great an incentive to support what they believe to be their regional surrogates, Pakistan and India respectively. However, my view is that such an improvement is improbable.¹⁹ Somewhat more probable are two other developments. One involves Soviet interests in Iran and the Persian Gulf. Should the Gulf's politics become more unstable, some Soviet strategists might argue that a warmer relationship with Pakistan—even at the cost of strained relations with India—might pay considerable dividends in a region where there already is a major Pakistani military presence. For the Soviets the calculation would involve comparing the relative values of India vis-à-vis China and of Pakistan vis-à-vis the Gulf and Afghanistan. Such a closer Soviet-Pakistan relationship might just detach Pakistan from Chinese and American influence as well. The present Pakistani leadership is unlikely to welcome such a policy, but there are those in the political community, and even within the military, who have argued for closer ties to the USSR.²⁰ From Pakistan's perspective this would

¹⁷For an excellent survey, see Walter K. Anderson, "Soviets in the Indian Ocean: Much Ado About Something—But What?" *Asian Survey*, September 1984, pp. 910–30.

¹⁸The amount of Soviet equipment pouring into India is not inconsistent with Edward Luttwak's scenario of a possible Soviet attack on China. See Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1983.

¹⁹Two recent collections, the hearings *The Soviet Role in Asia and Zagoria's Soviet Policy in East Asia*, present diverse views on the prospects for Sino-Soviet normalization, as well as on Soviet goals in Asia, which are seen as "equality," "hegemony," "world socialism," a "security glacis," or "defense." See especially the articles and testimony by Thornton, James Kelly, and William Brown in the former volume, and by Zagoria and Paul Langer in the latter.

²⁰The author has met several Pakistani army officers who, in frustration at a perceived failure of the United States to support Pakistan adequately, have speculated that "perhaps we should turn to the Soviets." Among the military, such views have receded since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, but they are held more widely among dissident Pakistani civilians.

From the Soviet perspective, the prospect of an extended occupation of Afghanistan makes the cultivation of Pakistan, with its good relations with the Islamic world, attractive despite Islamabad's current ties with the United States or China. Such calculations might yet prompt a change in Soviet policy.

raise the possibility of delinking India from the Soviet Union. This would present New Delhi with a strategic dilemma. India is simply less useful than is Pakistan in any grouping juxtaposed to the USSR, and China (with a running border dispute with India very similar to that with the Soviet Union) therefore has little incentive to normalize relations with New Delhi except perhaps to embarrass the Soviets.

The third alternative to the present structure of Soviet influence in South Asia would be an increase in regional cooperation, free from Soviet control. Were India to conclude that closer ties to Pakistan lessened its own need for Soviet arms, and that its own power was more than sufficient to enable it to negotiate on an equal basis with China, it might strike deals with both Islamabad and Beijing and emerge as a powerful regional leader, free from the stigma of the Soviet military connection. The prospects for this occurring are slightly greater now than they were under Indira Gandhi. Her son, Rajiv, has not demonstrated much interest in external relations during his brief political career. India's domestic problems have sharply increased over the past few years, especially in the Punjab, and will demand considerable attention. Rajiv has also stressed domestic economic reform. All of these factors seem to point in the direction of caution in external affairs. However, Rajiv, fresh from a stun-

ning electoral triumph, is not tied down by the prejudices of the past, and a bold international initiative would further establish him as a national leader. Both China and Pakistan have indicated their willingness to normalize relations with India, and a "window of opportunity" may thus be briefly opened in 1985.

Currently, South Asia confronts two major issues relating to the Soviet Union: one, the continued occupation of Afghanistan; the other, the future of Pakistan vis-à-vis both the USSR and India. Let us look at each in order.

Soviets in Afghanistan

It is difficult to be optimistic about the prospects for negotiating the Soviets out of Afghanistan.²¹ Moscow has repeatedly stated that Afghanistan must not only continue to pursue a foreign policy that is compatible with Soviet interests, but that the "revolution" (really a coup) of 1978 must not be reversed. The USSR has been willing to pay a stiff price for its Afghan war, not

²¹The best overview of the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan is in Henry S. Bradsher, *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union*, Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1983.



Soviet tanks that were flown into Kabul during the December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan.

because it sees Afghanistan as a route to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean (or even the Persian Gulf), but because Afghanistan now falls into the category of allied border states that includes Mongolia and Eastern Europe. Having demonstrated its willingness to use force to save a pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan, Moscow is not likely to "trade away" Afghanistan for, say, Nicaragua or Cuba. The Soviets are content to talk indefinitely—that is, as long as they can continue the building of an infrastructure of loyal, if not happy, Afghans—and would welcome outside guarantees of the Kabul regime that would ease the process of Sovietization.²² The support rendered to the mujahidin by Pakistan and Iran is troublesome, but the Soviets have the option of forcing even more refugees across the borders into those two countries, further destabilizing them.²³

But the Soviets have found the Afghans to be a much tougher foe than they had expected. Moscow has gradually increased the number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan over the past year (to about 150,000), and has adopted large-scale search and destroy missions aimed at the destruction of crops.²⁴ This change in Soviet tactics has been accompanied by a gradual improvement in mujahidin tactics, weapons, and coordination. The war, after five years, remains a stalemate—more violent, perhaps, but nonetheless a stalemate—with no sign that either side will bend, let alone yield and negotiate.²⁵ Meanwhile, the Soviets will take whatever benefits they can from Afghanistan. Natural gas and mineral resources are promising, and balance some of the cost of the war and occupation. One also cannot preclude the use of Afghan territory

by Soviet forces that are oriented towards the Gulf, the Indian Ocean, or further afield.

What impact have events in Afghanistan had on the Soviet position in South Asia generally? Prior to the invasion, the Soviet role in the rest of South Asia was at low ebb. While the Janata government in New Delhi had negotiated a major arms deal with the Soviets, it had preferred Western weapons when they were available.²⁶ The dominant strategic issue on the subcontinent was India's growing military power vis-à-vis Pakistan, not the possibility of a Soviet invasion.²⁷ Pakistan had earlier responded to India's growing muscle by embarking upon a covert nuclear program,²⁸ and by adjusting its strategy along more defensive lines, as all three Indian services had begun to embrace a more offensive-minded approach. Yet, Pakistan's chief concerns were with domestic order, as the military regime led by Zia ul-Haq had not yet stabilized. Despite Pakistan's relative weakness, it had responded to Janata's moves to normalize relations between the two countries. Janata lost power in mid-1979, and Pakistan itself took the initiative two years later, offering India a "no war" pact.²⁹

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan aroused universal disapproval in South Asia. All states in the region—including India—called for the withdrawal of Soviet forces, although New Delhi softened its appeal by referring only to the withdrawal of "foreign" forces. There was even some hope that the Soviet presence might bring India and Pakistan closer together. However, this has not happened. To be sure, both countries mutually adjusted some of their policies after 1979, and have cooperated in the South Asian Regional Council (SARC),³⁰ first proposed by

²²The most sensible proposal for a combined political-military approach to the problem is contained in Jagat S. Mehta, "A Neutral Solution," *Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC), Summer 1982, pp. 139–53. Mehta suggests that a regional military force, drawn largely from Islamic states, serve as an occupation power while the Soviets withdraw and a new national government is formed.

²³About one-quarter of Afghanistan's population have been killed or live as refugees in Pakistan (almost 3 million) or Iran (almost 1 million). See Dr. Hasan Askari-Rizvi, "Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: Influx, Humanitarian Assistance, and Implications," *Pakistan Horizon* (Karachi), No. 1, 1984, pp. 40–61.

²⁴It is hard to obtain accurate information about the state of the war in Afghanistan. For a survey, see Tahir Amin, "Afghan Resistance: Past, Present, and Future," *Asian Survey*, April 1984, pp. 373–91.

²⁵Projections about the course of the war vary considerably. Two European scholars, basing their work on guerrilla war patterns elsewhere, speculate that the mujahidin position will improve over the next decade. See Pierre Allan and Albert A. Stahel, "Tribal Guerrilla Warfare Against a Colonial Power: Analyzing the War in Afghanistan," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (Beverly Hills, CA), December 1983. However, recent published reports indicate that other experts, including some US government observers, believe that recent changes in Soviet tactics, the increase in Soviet forces in and adjacent to Afghanistan, and the still-small number of weapons flowing to the mujahidin foretell a decline in their fighting capabilities. See Leslie Gelb, "US Aides Put '85 Arms Supplies to Afghan Rebels at \$280 Million," *The New York Times*, Nov. 28, 1984.

²⁶My own conversations with Indian civilians and military officials in New Delhi in 1977–78 indicate their concern about the need to diversify weapons sources. However, the US and various other Western powers have been unable to match Soviet prices and terms. For a case study, see Raju G. C. Thomas, "Aircraft for the Indian Air Force: The Context and Implications of the Jaguar Decision," *Orbis* (Philadelphia), Spring 1980, pp. 85–101.

²⁷Indeed, Moscow's action took all South Asians by surprise, even though leaders in Islamabad had warned visitors in April 1978 that the coup in Kabul was irreversible and that the Soviets had gained a foothold in the subcontinent. From conversations the author had in Islamabad and New Delhi in 1978.

²⁸The matter of a Pakistani nuclear weapon is discussed in Stephen P. Cohen, *The Pakistan Army*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1984, pp. 152ff.

²⁹This proposal was made by the government of Pakistan on the same day it announced the acceptance of a military assistance program from the US (Sept. 15, 1981). *Ibid.*, pp. 112–13. The proposal originally dated back to an Indian initiative of Dec. 22, 1949, which had since been rejected by Pakistan. For the views of the leading Pakistani advocate of normalization between India and Pakistan, see Lt.-Gen. A. I. Akram (ret.), *Make Peace, Not War*, Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, 1982.

³⁰The SARC has not attempted to deal with strategic or military issues, but has rather concentrated on common economic, cultural, and social problems. For a (continued on p. 26)

Bangladesh. But, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan also jolted the strategic relationship between India and Pakistan by causing the renewal of the US-Pakistan military tie.³¹ Thus, India's chief strategic antagonist, Pakistan, was indirectly aided by the Soviet invasion, yet New Delhi itself was irrelevant to the purposes of that invasion and of little immediate utility to the Soviets in prosecuting their war in Afghanistan.

Pakistan's Precarious Position

As a consequence of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, Pakistan now finds itself with a three-front security problem. The first threat, from India, dates to the partition of British India in 1947. It has grown in recent years as the Indians have developed their military infrastructure in Rajasthan and have acquired aircraft (the British Jaguar) that can reach every corner of Pakistan from Indian bases. India expects Pakistan to accept its permanent inferiority and fit itself into an India-dominated system of regional security, although the post-1979 US rearming of Pakistan somewhat moderated the imbalance of forces on the subcontinent.³² The second threat is internal: Pakistan has major dissident groups and regions, most notably in Sind and Baluchistan, and the military regime of Zia ul-Haq remains less than popular. Paradoxically, the most recent threat—from the Soviets or their Afghan clients—has the oldest heritage. It is the latest manifestation of the very old "great game" of imperial expansion, a game that began in the 19th century, but which had been virtually absent from public consciousness for the past 25 years.³³

The image of Pakistan as threatened on two external fronts, and also at home, led many outside observ-

ers to view the military situation as hopeless and to question the wisdom of extending military support to Pakistan, on the grounds that it might provoke the Soviets to foment rebellion in Baluchistan.³⁴ Inside Pakistan, too, many civilians and even some in the military threw up their hands at the prospect of resistance and urged a policy of conciliation with the Soviet Union and even India.³⁵ Others have argued that Pakistan is not serious about the danger to its west and is using its new arms to build up capacity against India rather than reinforce the Durand Line.³⁶

However, careful analysis of the actual terrain involved, of the level of Soviet forces presently in Afghanistan, and of historical precedents would indicate that Pakistan's military situation is not as desperate as many believed. First, the Soviet force level now in Afghanistan is only adequate to control the major cities and intermittently control major road routes. Soviet/Afghan airpower operates unopposed over Afghanistan, but would meet a technological equal in the Pakistan Air Force. A major increase in enemy forces based in Afghanistan could be quickly detected and matched by a smaller increase in defensive forces.³⁷ Thus, Pakistan's current deployment in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) along the Afghan border seems reasonable if it is regarded as a forward defense force with the rest of Pakistan's army treated as a ready reserve available for that front.

Second, the combat record of the Pakistan Army is such that the Soviets could expect a stiff battle. The Pakistan Army may be the best army that never won a war. Its performance in the invasion of India in 1965 was exceedingly zealous; it fought well in East Pakistan in 1971 even though demoralized and often ineptly led; and there is no evidence—despite a great deal of insinuation—that its involvement in politics since 1977 has seriously hurt its fighting spirit.

comprehensive and perceptive study of types of regionalism in South Asia, see Surjit Mansingh, *India's Search for Power*, Beverly Hills, CA, Sage Publications, 1984, esp. Ch. 6, "Cooperation, Strife, or Hegemony?"

³¹US assistance comprised a US\$3.2 billion program of economic aid and military sales plus, most significant, the separate sale of forty F-16 aircraft. All sales were made on strictly commercial terms, with relatively high rates of interest. For a summary of the program, plus government and private testimony, see US Congress, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs, International Economic Policy and Trade, and Asian and Pacific Affairs, *Hearings and Markup on H. Con. Res. 211*, Apr. 27, Sept. 16, 22, 23; Nov. 17, 19, 1981, Washington, DC, Committee Print, 1981.

³²See, e.g., Cassandra (pseud.), "India's Military Ascendancy," *The Muslim* (Islamabad), Apr. 15 and 16, 1983.

³³For two perceptive surveys of the historical significance of the Soviet move into Afghanistan, see Milan Hauner, "The Last Great Game," *Middle East Journal* (Washington, DC), Winter 1984, pp. 72–84; and Robert L. Canfield, "Soviet Gambit in Central Asia," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* (Villanova, PA), Fall 1981, pp. 10–30.

³⁴For informed criticism of the arms sales program, see the testimony of Selig Harrison and William Richter in *Hearings and Markup* (see fn. 31).

³⁵There is a considerable range of opinion on these issues in Pakistan. The writings of Lt.-Gen. A. I. Akram are most conciliatory toward India (see fn. 29). The Pakistani periodical *Viewpoint* (Lahore) has been critical of the government for failing to press for a settlement that would return the Afghan refugees to their homeland. The daily newspaper *The Muslim* has also taken an independent line in foreign policy matters, within the constraints imposed by press censorship in Pakistan.

³⁶This has been the burden of many Indian statements since 1980. Actually, Pakistan has improved its infrastructure along the Durand Line, but it has never hid the fact that it regards India as a major military threat. See Cohen, op. cit., pp. 134ff.

³⁷The British developed several plans from 1926 onward to defend what was then northwest India from a possible joint Afghan-Soviet military attack. Their 1939 defensive deployment along the Durand Line would have required only five or six divisions (about what the Pakistanis now have there), plus air superiority. See Historical Section (India and Pakistan), *Official History of the Indian Armed Forces in the Second World War, Defense of India: Policy and Plans*, New Delhi, Combined Inter-Services Historical Section, distributed by Orient Longmans, 1963, pp. 23, 39.



Units of the Pakistan Army on maneuver.

—SYGMA.

Third, a direct Soviet attack on Pakistan would raise the prospect of American, Chinese, and other support for Islamabad. A Soviet buildup of ground forces would give these and other countries sufficient time to coordinate their assistance. A rapid buildup of Soviet air units in Afghanistan would be possible, but this could be quickly matched if foreign states and Pakistan were willing to base foreign aircraft and crews in Pakistan on an emergency basis (as India accepted US and Commonwealth aircraft in 1963). As for increased Soviet/Afghan air strikes on Pakistan, this would be ineffective militarily and possibly counterproductive politically. Such pressure, whether on the ground or in the air, might force Pakistan to reduce its support for the mujahidin, but there are limits to Pakistan's ability to restrain the Afghans.

Taken in isolation, then, the Soviet military threat to Pakistan has been exaggerated. Pakistan has maintained its precarious security with a modest increase in its forces. What throws such calculations to the wind, however, is the possibility of a two-front war,

with Soviet and Indian pressure applied at the same time, overwhelming Pakistan's defenses. Pakistan's reserves for the Rajasthan/Sind front with India include many of the same troops that would be deployed in case of a Soviet/Afghan attack in Baluchistan; if these reserves were frozen in place by Soviet action, Pakistan would be at a severe military disadvantage. If this took place at a moment of heightened internal disorder, then Pakistan's situation could become desperate. The critical question is therefore whether joint pressure might be applied by the Soviets and the Indians.

India's Calculations

To assess the prospects for such a development one must first attempt to determine what impact the Soviet action in Afghanistan has had on Soviet-Indian relations. The Soviet invasion of 1979 came as a considerable surprise to India, which had not been told in



An F-16 aircraft, the first of 40 purchased by the Pakistan Air Force, in its initial flight, on October 13, 1982, at Ft. Worth, Texas.

—General Dynamics.

advance about Soviet intentions. Compounding India's embarrassment, India's polite private suggestions to the Soviets that they withdraw have simply been ignored.

However, the Indian government's greatest concern has been with the indirect consequences of the Soviet invasion—namely Pakistan's rearmament. New Delhi launched a vehement campaign against US military support for Pakistan, lobbying intensively in Washington.³⁸ Nevertheless, in the context of the Indo-Pakistani military balance, the modest expansion of Pakistan's weaponry was quite significant. Thus, the Soviet invasion—by contributing to Pakistan's rearmament—had the somewhat paradoxical result of increasing India's reliance on the Soviet Union for arms.

To be sure, India could have managed the crisis by taking up Pakistan's offer of negotiations over arms levels, troop disposition, and other security-related issues; by moving more quickly in its negotiations with

China; and by accepting American offers of arms sales. This would have reduced its dependence upon Soviet weapons and the very need for such weapons. But the Indian military has stuck to its goal of ensuring complete dominance over Pakistan, and the 1980 arms deal with the Soviets has been followed by two other deals of equal or greater magnitude.³⁹ India is buying the most advanced Soviet aircraft (MiG-23, MiG-27, and MiG-29) and may produce some of them in its own arms factories. The Soviets have offered to let India handle the entire spare-parts production of such older weapons as the MiG-21, and will allow India to manufacture the T-72 tank. Indian defense experts remain divided over whether to accept such offers. While they would strengthen India's defense production sector, it would be at the cost of Soviet control over sales and transfers (the Soviets refused to allow India to sell MiG-21 spare parts to Egypt after that country cut its Soviet military ties). The technology is

³⁸The Indian Ambassador met personally with several individuals invited to testify, and embassy officials attended the hearing en masse, distributing an unattributable "Fact Sheet" that rebutted some US government statements about the Indian-Pakistani military situation.

³⁹The Soviet Union supplies about 70 percent of India's arms imports, which now run about \$1 billion or more per year, although details about exact numbers, cost, and terms of agreement are usually kept secret. See Singh, loc. cit.; and Raju G. C. Thomas, *Indian Defense Policy*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, forthcoming.

attractive, but the terms and political restrictions violate directly India's long-term goal of autarky in defense production.⁴⁰

The paradox of increasing Indian dependence upon the Soviet Union at just the moment when the Soviets have entered Soviet Asia as a military power is explained by some as one manifestation of India's client status, and by others as an indication of a long-range plan in which both countries will join forces to swallow up Pakistan.⁴¹ If either of these arguments is correct, then the situation in South Asia is grave indeed. Ultimately, we could expect the joint pressure of these two giant states to overwhelm Pakistan, and it is unlikely that Pakistan's distant friends could do much about it. The Soviets would obtain a foothold in Pakistan itself either directly or through client states along the Afghan border. Finally, the alleged Soviet "dream" of a warm-water port could be fulfilled, as these client states knuckle under to Soviet demands.

However, there are a number of reasons why it is very unlikely that India will join with the Soviet Union in pressuring Pakistan or risk a solo attack on

Pakistan. First, though Pakistan is an irritant to India, it does not pose a vital threat. India has uncovered no substantial evidence that Pakistan intends to attack it, that the Pakistani nuclear program would be a threat, or that Islamabad supports any of the several terrorist or insurgent movements that exist in India. Pakistan's rearmament does, however, make it more difficult for India to maintain rough superiority on land and in the air, and New Delhi can no longer count on a quick victory in any war with Pakistan, even if in a long war India would still have the advantage in numbers.

Second, the Indian armed forces are themselves temporarily vulnerable. Many indigenously built weapons systems are no longer modern, and the Indian defense industry is incapable of producing adequate replacements. Although India has, for many years, enjoyed a numerical superiority over Pakistan of some 1.6:1 in armor and 2.5:1 in aircraft,⁴² it now must turn abroad for wholesale replacement of its aging inventory in both categories. Moreover, the disaster of Operation "Bluestar"—the June 1984 seizure of the Golden Temple in Amritsar from Sikh opposition forces—revealed inadequate intelligence, poor civil-

⁴⁰The most comprehensive statement of Indian strategic goals is in an "Address" 43 pages long by the then Indian defense minister, C. Subramaniam, "India's Defense Strategy in the Next Decade," delivered in late 1979. Another comprehensive and authoritative summary of Indian strategic objectives is in K. S. Bajpai, Ed., *India's Security*, New Delhi, Lancer's, 1983.

⁴¹The latter suspicions surfaced most recently during a briefing before the Joint Intelligence Committee of the US Congress in September 1984. See "India-Pakistan Tension Causes Concern to U.S.," *The New York Times*, Sept. 15, 1984. According to this account, two senators indicated that Mrs. Gandhi had been advised to attack Pakistani nuclear facilities.

⁴²Data from International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*, 1983-1984, London, IISS, 1984. Richard Nations mysteriously comes up with figures indicating a "4:1 or better" ratio of Indian superiority, which is certainly wrong. See *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), Aug. 16, 1984, p. 23.

In any case, the use of these ratios is highly misleading, and successful attacking countries have often had inferior weapons ratios. Terrain, climate, leadership, and the quality of manpower and weapons are also critical in the calculation of military relationships. For a discussion of these and other factors in the India-Pakistan case, see Cohen, *op. cit.*, pp. 22ff.



Leonid Brezhnev signs a major agreement for Soviet arms sales and economic assistance to India during an October 1980 visit to New Delhi, as Prime Minister Indira Gandhi looks on.

—Raghu Rai/MAGNUM.



Afghan refugees, some of nearly 3,000,000 now in Pakistan, at a camp in that country's North West Frontier Province.

—MAGNUM.

military coordination, and the temporary unreliability of some Sikh units. A quick Indian strike to incorporate Kashmir and its hinterlands (such as Gilgit) and install a more pliable Pakistani government seems unfeasible without a substantial improvement in weapons, intelligence, and AWACS (airborne warning and command systems). It probably would also require active Soviet assistance.

But this raises a third point. The alleged Soviet "connection" is problematic for India. Any Soviet proposal for joint action aimed at Pakistan would be analyzed carefully in New Delhi in terms of Indian gains and losses. The political, economic, and military costs of being perceived as a Soviet proxy would be high for India. Relations with China and the United States would be gravely injured. Informed Indian strategists also recognized that while a weak Pakistan suits Indian interests, a broken Pakistan does not, because it would only bring Soviet forces closer to Indian territory. Would the Soviet frontier be extended to the Hindu Kush, the Durand Line, or the Indus? What states might emerge from the ashes of Pakistan? Would they be Soviet, Chinese, or Indian clients? What would India do if a new state backed by New Delhi became embroiled in a conflict with a Soviet client state?

In such a conflict, or in a heightened conflict with China, good relations with the United States would be essential, but these would surely not survive a joint Indo-Soviet operation against Pakistan. India might choose to participate in the dismemberment of Pakistan should the USSR attack the latter, but there is a fair chance that India might disregard its current dependence on the USSR for weapons and offer tacit assistance to Pakistan to prevent the latter from disintegrating. This latter course would allow New Delhi to avoid antagonizing China, the United States, and Pakistan's Islamic supporters.

An Indian decision to come to the aid of Pakistan might depend on who was in power in New Delhi, but the idea is an old one, and one that makes good strategic sense.⁴³ It may be that the Soviets will yet inad-

⁴³British generals of the Indian Army made this point when India and Pakistan were partitioned. Indo-Pakistani strategic cooperation was also urged by various American administrations, from 1947 onward. See Robin J. Moore, "India in 1947: The Limits of Unity," and A. J. Wilson and Dennis Halton, Eds., *The States of South Asia*, Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1982; and the State, Army, Navy, Air Force Coordinating Committee for the Near and Middle East, "Appraisal of US National Interests in South Asia," Washington, DC, April 19, 1949, printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1949, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1977, Vol. 6, pp. 8–28.

vertently push India and Pakistan to a common strategic outlook: India might thus opt for regional dominance within the context of a sharing of the military burden of regional defense. The alternative for India is to engage in an arms race propelled by the actions of its own major arms supplier.

Conclusion

I have focused the discussion on extreme cases. It is important to do so, if only to show their relatively low probability. The real threat to Pakistan from the Soviet Union lies at a level below that of all-out attack. Joint Indo-Soviet attack is even less likely. Pakistan's ability to meet external threats, or at least force a would-be attacker to greatly increase its force level for any aggression, is greater than most observers recognized five years ago, when even Pakistanis were tending to exaggerate their security problems. Despite its domestic political problems, Pakistan remains a powerful state with an effective military establishment. This reality has several implications for the future of South Asia and the Soviet presence there, particularly in Afghanistan.

The Soviet decision to enter Afghanistan reflected a combination of hubris, ignorance, and—above all—the wish to ensure that a proper ally on its border did not fall. This immediate motivation, does not mean that the USSR may not yet exploit its position in Afghanistan for adventures further afield. But it is not likely to be in the direction of South Asia. To the degree that Moscow has expanded its presence in this part of the world, it has been as a function of the weakness of individual states, as witnessed in Afghanistan in 1978–79. Pakistan is a more significant obstacle to Soviet ambitions. At present

Pakistan's own internal situation is the greatest likely source of change. If that country can continue its very slow march toward stability and can broaden the scope of political participation so as to include the many dissident groups in Pakistani society, external forces are unlikely to be effective. If it cannot, then outside pressure could have considerable impact.

Pakistan is likely to continue its tacit support for the Afghan mujahidin. Indeed, Islamabad would be hard pressed to stop the mujahidin activity should Moscow increase pressure on it to do so, although it recently put Aghan rebel groups on notice that they can no longer operate openly in Peshawar.⁴⁴ Meanwhile it continues to advocate negotiations that would lead to the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and the honorable return of the several million Afghan refugees to their own country.

India is unlikely to join with the Soviet Union in pressuring Pakistan, or to launch an attack upon Pakistan by itself. The latter action would involve considerable military risk and would entail full-scale war; the former would be a colossal political blunder that would leave India facing the Soviet army across an uncertain frontier.

The old conflict between India and Pakistan still blocks a coordinated regional response to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. India missed its moment in 1980–81, but in the post-Indira setting there is perhaps a new possibility to forge a joint regional response that could apply serious diplomatic and even military pressure on the Soviets to accept some sort of plan that would ease them out of Afghanistan, with or without their dignity intact.

⁴⁴*The Washington Post*, Nov. 24, 1984.

Independent Currents in Czechoslovakia

H. Gordon Skilling

In comparison with the exciting movement for reform in 1980–81 and subsequent widespread resistance to military rule in Poland, Czechoslovakia often appears to be a country of stagnancy and stillness where “dissent” has been extinguished by the regime and has little potential for affecting the future of that benighted land. Charter 77, once admired, seems to have disappeared or to count for little as a factor of change. In a world rife with protest and opposition, often violent in form and massive in scope, the peaceful and predominantly verbal dissident activity of Czechs and Slovaks is ignored or forgotten by the world public. Those who act independently in Czechoslovakia neither aspire to be a political opposition nor enjoy widespread popular support. Thus, to the outside observer, they appear lacking in political significance. The repression of relatively few “dissidents,” viewed as severe by the victims and their associates, pales in comparison to the physical liquidation of opponents practiced in an Iran or El Salvador, and arouses only limited concern.

To assess properly the phenomenon of dissent in Czechoslovakia requires not only an updating of the continuing work of Charter 77, but also a better understanding of the broader context of independent thinking, writing, and action within which this takes place. Moreover, the somewhat misleading term “dissent,” commonly used to describe such activities in communist countries, needs to be clarified. Václav Havel, Czech playwright and outstanding proponent of independent action, has analyzed the nature of “dissent” in a brilliant essay, “The Power of the Power-

less.”¹ Those who are called dissidents, he wrote, are not “professionals,” defending a “group interest”; still less are they political persons presenting themselves as an alternative ruling group. Rather, they are “‘ordinary’ people, living with their ‘ordinary’ worries, and differing from others only in that they say aloud what others are unable to say or dare not say.” The so-called dissident is “simply a physicist, sociologist, worker, or poet, who only acts as he feels he must, and who has been led, simply by the inner logic of his thinking, behavior and work...without consciously striving for this or even deriving any pleasure from it...to an open clash with those in power.” In Havel’s view, persons who thus contribute to “the independent spiritual, social, and political life of society” include:

writers who write as they wish, without regard for censorship or official requirements and who publish their work in “samizdat”; philosophers, historians, sociologists, and other scholars, who go their own way in independent scholarly research...and disseminate their work in “samizdat,” or arrange private discussions, lectures and seminars; teachers, who privately teach young people what is concealed in the regular schools; clergymen who try in their pastorate or, if they are deprived of their office, outside of it to foster a free religious life; painters, musicians, and singers, who create independently regardless of what official institutions think of their creations; all persons who

H. Gordon Skilling, Emeritus Professor of Political Science, University of Toronto, Canada, is author of Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution (1976) and other works on Czechoslovakia and Eastern Europe.

¹Václav Havel, “The Power of the Powerless,” *Cross Currents, A Yearbook of Central European Culture*, Ann Arbor, MI, 1983, pp. 3–22. This is a translation of a part of Havel’s October 1978 essay of the same title that was included in a samizdat symposium, *O Svobodě a moci* (On Freedom and Power), that circulated in Czechoslovakia in 1979 and was published abroad under the same title by Index, in Cologne. It is scheduled for publication in English in 1985. Citations were translated from the Czech typewritten original (pp. 29–32, 35–38) and are not included in the English-language version cited above.

share in this independent culture and disseminate it further; people who try...to express and defend the authentic social interests of the working people, to return real meaning to unions or to found independent unions; people who are not afraid constantly to draw the attention of the authorities to injustice and who strive for the observance of laws; various associations of young people who strive to free themselves from manipulation and to live their own lives, in the spirit of their own hierarchy of life's values, etc.

An organized "dissident movement," Havel argued, is "but one of the manifestations of the independent life of society...the most visible, at first sight the most political, and...the most clearly articulated...although not necessarily the most mature or the most important." It is but the "tip of the iceberg" and "unthinkable without the background of the whole entity from which it grows, of which it is an integral part, and from which it derives its vital strength." Independent activity may be carried on by individuals outside official structures, and within narrower limits, within official institutions. It may also be practiced by individu-

als in their private lives. Whether acting alone or with others, such people seek to "live in the truth," to use Havel's phrase, and thus to escape from the pervasive controls of party and state.

Therein lies the significance of such independent activity and the reason for the regime's hostility to it. It challenges the central principle of the system of real socialism, namely, "the leading role of the party." No matter how limited or personal a manifestation of independence may be, the authorities fear it as something that defies the ruling ideology and threatens their exercise of control over all aspects of life. However nonpolitical, such activity is at once defined as political by the authorities and treated accordingly. If a manifestation of independence threatens to spread and to link up with other forms of independent action, the authorities try to destroy it without compunction. Hence the refusal of the Soviet Union and its East European followers to countenance a broad program of independent reform such as was launched by the party in Czechoslovakia in 1968 or initiated outside the party by Solidarity in 1980-81. Hence also the strenuous efforts to limit or prevent the more modest



Czech playwright Václav Havel photographed in his study in June 1984.

—Photo by a visitor.

forms of independent action by Chartists and other Czech and Slovak citizens, which will be discussed in this essay.

Charter 77

Charter 77 enters the ninth year of its existence in 1985.² When the original declaration with 241 signatures was issued in January 1977, the signatories had no idea that they were bringing a durable entity into being. However, the number of signatories had risen to 750 by mid-1977, and reached over 1,000 by June 1980. Very few persons, some 15 in all, have withdrawn their signatures. Perhaps a hundred or so who were unable to endure systematic police harassment and job discrimination, or who lost hope of change in their life-time, have gone into exile. The losses caused by withdrawal or emigration, and by a few deaths, have been balanced numerically by additional signatories, announced in groups once a year.³ The number of signatories is now almost 1,200, of whom some 1,000 remain in Czechoslovakia. Although many are now not active, a substantial minority, in spite of persecution and sometimes imprisonment, have assumed the heavy responsibilities and risks of sustained Charter activity.

Charter 77 remains a relatively small "community" united by a common resolve to work for civic and human rights, with no aspirations to become a mass movement. Its significance rests, it is said, not in the act of signing the Charter but in the spirit of independence thereby demonstrated. The signatories embody a certain pluralism,⁴ representing different generations, occupations, religious persuasions, and political outlooks; they have quite diverse value orientations and had not previously been associated with each other. Although its leadership has come primarily from among intellectuals, Charter 77 includes a substantial proportion of workers.⁵ Young people, including many who were children at the time of the Prague Spring or even at the start of Charter 77, have



A Czechoslovak secret police operative photographs visitors to the Prague apartment of Charter 77 signatory Jiří Hájek.

—Vincent Mentzel.

been well represented among later signatories. Initially, the Charter had supporters in towns and small cities throughout Bohemia and Moravia. However, persecution has forced many Chartists to move to the major cities or to emigrate, so that Charter 77 is now mainly a Prague and Brno phenomenon. It has always been almost entirely a Czech movement, with Slovaks scarcely present in its ranks.

Although Charter 77 has deliberately eschewed anything but a minimum of organization, it has been guided by a succession of "spokesmen," who now rotate regularly at the beginning of each year. The three original spokesmen—philosopher Jan Patočka, diplomat and cabinet minister Jiří Hájek, and playwright Václav Havel, were well-known figures, as were some of their successors in 1978 and later.⁶ More recently, spokesmen have been younger and less prominent. The older ones have usually remained active and served on the 15-member "collective of spokesmen," first formed in early 1980. Those imprisoned, such as Havel, Jaroslav Šabata, Václav Benda, Jiří Dienstbier, and Rudolf Bátek, have continued to be listed as spokesmen. The three spokesmen are not regarded as representing specific groupings among the signatories. In practice, however, they tended to include former leading communists, prominent noncommu-

²On the first five years of Charter 77, see H. Gordon Skilling, *Charter 77 and Human Rights in Czechoslovakia*, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1981. See also an essay prepared by Vilém Prečan for a conference in Franken, West Germany, in 1979 in *Vývoj Charty, Záznam z konference ve Franken* (The Charter's Progress, Record of a Conference in Franken), Index, Cologne, 1981.

³Lists of new signatories, as well as letters of withdrawal, were published in *Informace o Chartě 77* (hereafter cited as *Infoch*), a Czechoslovak samizdat bulletin.

⁴Prečan, loc. cit., pp. 23–24.

⁵Among the first 1,000 signatories, the proportion of workers was about 40 percent (Skilling, *Charter 77*, pp. 40–41). In later listings, signatories who called themselves workers numbered 30 among 44 (*Infoch*, Apr. 27, 1981); 21 of 36 (*ibid.*, Feb. 5, 1982); 21 of 37 (*ibid.*, Mar. 3, 1983); and 11 of 25 (*ibid.*, Feb. 7, 1984).

⁶For biographical sketches of spokesmen up to 1981, see Skilling, *Charter 77*, pp. 20–36; for others, see successive issues of *Infoch*.

nists, persons with a strong religious affiliation, and cultural figures (categories that frequently overlapped). There has usually been a woman among the spokesmen. As time goes on, it becomes more difficult to find persons who are both willing to assume the risks and burden of spokespersonship and who are suitable for this responsible and demanding task.

Closely associated with Charter 77, but a separate organization, is the Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Persecuted (known by its Czech acronym, VONS). VONS was formed in 1978, with 17 publicly named members.⁷ At the end of 1984, 27 names were given, of whom two were then in prison. Eleven others continued as members although they live in exile. In late 1979, VONS became a member of the International Federation of Human Rights and adopted the supplementary name of Czechoslovak League for Human Rights. Between April 1978 and December 1984, VONS issued a total of 409 numbered communiqués (*sdělení*), each containing a brief report on a case of prosecution or persecution. In a comprehensive listing of cases still outstanding, issued on November 8, 1984 (No. 400), VONS recorded 22 persons in prison and 50 under investigation or with suspended sentences. The communiqué also noted that VONS had reported on 179 cases that were now closed, and on 402 cases of extrajudicial repression (detentions, house searches, surveillance, limits on freedom of movement, beatings, etc.) and appealed for assistance from those who could provide data on other cases since VONS alone could document only a small proportion of existing cases.

While not regarded as the organ of either Charter 77 or VONS, the bulletin, *Informace o Chartě 1977* (Information on Charter 77), which has been appearing regularly approximately every month since its first issue in January 1978, publishes documentation about both.⁸ *Infoch*, as it came to be called, is issued by an "independent editorial group of Charter signatories," and lists as editors Petr Uhl and his wife, Anna Šabatová (daughter of Jaroslav Šabata). It was she who bore the brunt of editing this journal from 1979 to 1984, while her husband was in prison. Usually 9 to 20 pages in length, *Infoch* contains most Charter documents and other materials, VONS communiqués, as well as individual protests and letters, biographical sketches, and feuilletons.

The "politics" of Charter 77. Initially, Charter 77 was important for bringing together for the first time

people of differing political standpoints and world outlooks—noncommunists and former communists, democratic and revolutionary socialists, Catholics and Protestants. They were all seeking, after the disillusionment of 1968 and the discouragement of the 1970's, to discover new personal values and orientations, and they found a common bond in a concern for human rights. In its initial declaration, Charter 77 denied that it was in any sense an opposition or that it offered a program of political and social reform. Rather, in the exposition of its purposes by Charter spokesmen, it was described as a moral challenge. Nonetheless, the Charter could not help but be implicitly "political," since the full implementation of the rights the Charter defined would have transformed or even undermined the existing system in Czechoslovakia. In its later statements, Charter 77 adopted a critical attitude toward economic or environmental policies having little or nothing to do with human rights. Thus it challenged the regime on basic issues and offered alternative courses of action. As might have been expected, its offer of dialogue was rejected by the authorities, who, by attacking the movement as an opposition force, made it into a highly political phenomenon. In opening up a dialogue with the people, Charter 77 sought to extend its influence and win broader support so as to exert an influence on the regime and the course it was pursuing.

Although there was a wide consensus among signatories on the nature and the purposes of the Charter, there were differences of view and, during the early years, a good deal of controversy and open polemics



Professor Jan Patočka, a signatory of Charter 77, talks with representatives of the foreign press in Prague in 1977, shortly before his arrest and death.

⁷Skilling, *Charter 77*, pp. 118–20.

⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 94–95.

among its leading figures. Some, such as Havel and Ladislav Hejdránek, conceived of Charter 77 as Jan Patočka had—namely, as primarily a moral challenge directed to individuals and not requiring a high degree of organization. At most they favored a “nonpolitical politics,” in Hejdránek’s phrase, that would encourage various kinds of activity in the cultural and other fields outside the framework of the Charter proper. Václav Benda dubbed these “parallel institutions,” which together might constitute “a parallel polis.” Others, such as Uhl, Šabata, and Jan Tesař, would have liked to see the Charter be avowedly more political and challenge the regime more directly even at the risk of open confrontation. They also advocated a greater degree of organization of the movement. Some of them engaged in “surrogate” politics by informally grouping themselves on the basis of common ideas—“reform communist,” “independent socialist,” or “revolutionary socialist”—and issued joint statements. There were also heated debates among nonpolitical Chartists such as the writers Ludvík Vaculík and Havel, who strongly disagreed on tactics. Vaculík preferred what he called small-scale work (*drobná práce*) by ordinary persons in their normal life. Havel defended the more heroic and challenging actions, even at the risk of imprisonment.⁹

By 1984 these controversies had largely faded away. The passage of time had diminished the importance of disagreements about the Prague Spring and sustained common activity had tended to iron out differences and to mold a consensus on tactics. Moreover, the chief spokesmen of the more radical and political views had either been jailed for many years (Šabata and Uhl) or had gone into exile (Tesař and Julius Tomin). In any case, some of their organizational objectives had been achieved with the formation of VONS and the publication of *Infoch*, although the regular rotation of spokesmen militated against a tighter organization of the Charter as a whole. The long imprisonment of Havel and the withdrawal of Vaculík from active involvement in Charter affairs had blurred the differences between their standpoints.¹⁰ More recent spokesmen have been younger and often had no distinctive political profile. It was also felt that

there was no need to change methods or approaches. In fact, no feasible procedure existed for making changes, since the consent of all signatories would be required.

Thus, in striking contrast to the Polish scene, there were no organized political groupings or presentations of political views or programs in Czech samizdat materials. Although vestiges of the groupings mentioned above continue to exist, they are but minor or marginal tendencies, each represented by a handful of persons, and do not constitute even potential political parties. The so-called reform communists or Eurocommunists have had no leader of stature since the emigration of Zdeněk Mlynář in 1977, and have become less unified and exclusive than originally. As a result of the decline of Eurocommunism in Western Europe, they can no longer look abroad for firm support except, on occasion, to the Italian Communist Party. The independent or democratic socialists, with their leading figure, Rudolf Battěk, in prison for many years and their most militant member, Tesař, in exile, have been reduced to a tiny group (Jiří Mueller and others, mainly in Brno), and were disappointed in their hope for recognition by the Socialist International. The revolutionary socialists or Trotskyites ceased to be a political grouping with Uhl’s five years’ imprisonment and the emigration of his chief associate, J. Suk. Šabata, who might be called an “independent communist,” emerged from prison as one of the most politically minded Chartists who enjoys the respect of all groupings and seems capable of perhaps formulating long-term political conceptions. Similarly, Václav Havel, who enjoys widespread esteem and admiration, serves as an integrating force—but in the intellectual rather than the political realm. Somewhat ironically, it is the nonpolitical Catholic grouping that has become more influential among Chartists in recent years.

Charter documents. In spite of the decline of “politics” among Chartists and the absence of controversy over Charter 77’s purposes and tactics, there continue to be undercurrents of conflict arising from differences of personality and general outlook. At present, differences seem to focus not on tactics but on the substance of documents.

The principal activity of Charter 77, and the chief responsibility of its spokesmen, has been the issuance of various types of typewritten materials that are circulated among interested persons, and in appropriate cases, sent to relevant government departments or officials, to international organizations, or to individuals at home and abroad.

⁹For the political groupings and earlier polemics, see Skilling, *Charter 77*, pp. 43–51, 66–80, 181–83. On the nonpolitical character of Charter 77, see Prečan, loc. cit. pp. 21–23.

¹⁰Vaculík had also given up his independent publishing activities and concentrated on the preparation of a long diary-novel, which circulated in samizdat form and was eventually published as *Český snlár* (Czech Dreamer), Toronto, Sixty-Eight Publishers, 1983. In it he recounted his own activities in the independent literary community, including the controversy with Havel. His book was highly praised by the latter in a review in *Kritický sborník*, No. 1, 1984, pp. 1–8.

The exclusive use of the typewriter, motivated by the hope of avoiding prosecution for illegal publication, limits the distribution to the number of copies which can be made in several typings. In the early years, the materials were described as declarations, open letters, and communiqués or "documents," the last of which were numbered and dealt at length with a major theme.¹¹ During 1980 and 1981, as a result of heightened repression and the imprisonment of leading Chartists in 1979, almost no numbered documents were released, although several thematic analyses were issued under other designations. In early 1982, however, a new practice was adopted and has continued ever since, namely, to number all materials signed by the spokesmen, whatever their content or character. Also, when Charter 77 had to disavow a forged document, it was decided to list periodically all documents that had been issued by it during a six- or twelve-month period.¹²

The preparation of thematic documents is arduous and time-consuming, often taking months, and is sometimes not completed at all. The drafts usually reflect the specialized knowledge of the draftsmen, but are subject to modifications and amendments to satisfy the many persons drawn into the process. Sometimes the result is an approved final version that is colorless or lacking in clarity. Collective consultation is hampered by police surveillance, confiscation of drafts and typewriters, the lack of telephones, and the need for hand-to-hand distribution. Occasionally, however, a document is released without adequate consultation and produces criticism by other Chartists. All materials are signed by the three spokesmen, who vouch for their authenticity and assume responsibility for them, and sometimes names of some from the collective of spokesmen or of other Chartists associated with the preparation of a document are added.

During the first two years of Charter 77's existence

the numbered documents reflected the original emphasis on human rights and dealt with violations of international agreements in areas such as education, the economy, literature and scholarship, freedom of expression, treatment of prisoners, travel abroad, and the status of gypsies. Other Charter materials recorded details of individual cases of violation of rights and persecution, often relating to Chartists. Criticism among signatories of this predominantly legal orientation and of the failure to deal with matters of more direct concern to the population as a whole led to a gradual change of emphasis. This began in May 1979 when a document on consumer problems appeared, followed by a supplement on this subject in November. In May 1980, a study of the problems of pensioners appeared. After the lull in 1980 and 1981 the number of "documents" greatly increased, but only a few dealt with specific themes in detail. During 1982, for instance, 38 were published, including a review of the Charter's first five years (document No. 3), studies of price rises and the economy (No. 6), international covenants and the criminal code (No. 14), employment discrimination (No. 17), education and training (No. 20), prison conditions (No. 22), religion and the law (No. 23), and scientific research (No. 26). During 1983, 44 documents were released, including studies of the economic situation (No. 4 and 36), literature (No. 14), environmental problems in northern Bohemia (No. 26), popular music (No. 31), and the Madrid conference (No. 43). Up to the end of November 1984, 20 documents were issued, including studies on the economic outlook (No. 6), the proposed school law (No. 7), the right to history (No. 11), security, peace, and human rights (No. 12 and 13), health care (No. 14), the right to information (No. 20), to history (No. 20), as well as a tribute to Jaroslav Seifert, winner of the 1984 Nobel Prize for literature and a Charter 77 signatory (No. 17).

The sharpest controversy occurred over the document on history. For the first time some signatories condemned openly and in strong terms a statement issued by the spokesmen. The analysis of the "right to history," whose author remains anonymous, was not the product of the usual wide consultation, not even with Chartists who are professional historians. Some of them promptly issued statements of censure. Paradoxically, these scholars, who had been dismissed from their institutes in 1969, not only pointed out serious errors in the study but also objected to its categorical condemnation of historical work performed by scholars within official institutions. Historiography should not be divided into official and non-official, they argued, but into good and bad. The controversy

¹¹Skilling, *Charter 77*, pp. 86-94. For a full list of Charter documents and other materials issued to the end of 1980, see *ibid.*, pp. 331-36. English summaries or translations of excerpts are available in the *Bulletin* and the *Summary of Available Documents* (the title varies), published irregularly by the Palach Press Limited, London. The documents are usually given in Czech in *Listy* (Rome). For a full analysis of charter documents in 1983, see V. Prečan's supplement to *Listy*, No. 2, 1984. A collection of Charter materials is located in the Thomas Fisher Rare Books Library, University of Toronto. See also Prečan, *Human Rights in Czechoslovakia: a Documentation, September 1981-December 1982*, Paris, 1983, published for the Madrid follow-up conference by the International Committee for the Support of Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia.

¹²The document of denial (No. 15) and the first list of documents (No. 16) were given in *Infoch*, April 1982, pp. 4 and 5. Full lists of documents for 1982 and 1983 were later given in *ibid.*, December 1982 (No. 38), June 1983 (No. 25), and January 1984 (No. 44). *Infoch* caused some confusion by publishing some documents without numbers or inaccurately numbered, and then assigning correct numbers in the full list that appeared later.

took on religious overtones when some critics censured the strongly Christian, even Catholic, spirit of the document and its implicitly pro-Habsburg tendency.¹³

Independent Activity

Charter 77 can be understood only within the context of society as a whole, and not as something isolated from the mood and the circumstances of the people in Czechoslovakia. The experience of 1968 and its aftermath, "normalization," and the consequent disappointment, frustration, and hopelessness, produced the environment in which Charter 77 was formed and had its being. Its birth represented the recovery by limited circles from the post-1968 depression, and the revival of a will to act independently in the "here and now," however slight the expectations of early and significant change might be. This could not help but exert some influence on others. In Havel's words, Charter 77, "by its rise and its consistent, persevering, and fearless efforts, broadened the space for diverse other independent activities and initiatives, especially cultural ones, which were not directly connected with it but which would probably, but for its existence, not have arisen at all or at least would not have developed to this extent."¹⁴ An important benefit of the Charter lies therefore in its character as a stimulus or catalyst for independent thinking, writing, and acting, even though it is often difficult to distinguish its direct or indirect influence from other social forces generating such activity.

Independent activity may take modest and unspectacular forms, personal in character and not widely known, but always ferreted out and hounded by the regime as if harboring the germs of a dangerous social movement. A group in a small town prepares an amateur production of Smetana's *The Bartered Bride*; or people in a district of Prague put on a puppet show for children—both are censored. Some workers in a hospital form a travel club which hires a ship for evening cruises on the Vltava, with dancing—this is banned. Someone writes freelance, under a pseudonym, or publishes a book under someone

else's name. An artist exhibits his work to a limited circle of friends and acquaintances. Parents seek to instill traditional values in their children and to protect them from regime propaganda. People grow their own vegetables and fruit at their cottages in the country, and may even sell some of their produce. Others earn extra income by "moonlighting" in the evenings or weekends, or even during working hours; or they speculate in foreign currency or Tuzex coupons. Groups of specialists in foreign affairs or economics meet every month to discuss their subjects. Amateurs of literature meet regularly to read poetry or the works of Milan Kundera. Historians meet over many years to prepare a large-scale study of Czech history. Every year, writers and philosophers hold "congresses" as in the old days. Young or old gather for "talk" in one of the thousands of inns or wine cellars, or go on excursions on weekends, sometimes pursuing historical or environmental interests. Thousands of young people gather to listen to a dozen or more rock bands. Tapes and cassettes containing popular music, or lectures and articles, pass from hand to hand. Graffiti appear on the walls of Na Kampě in Prague, reminding people that "Lennon is still with us" and, when painted over by the police, are replaced with other slogans on music or peace.

Four examples of independent activity that is broader in scope and better known will be discussed below. Their development suggests that changes in the mood and mentality of society are taking place. Most of these activities occur outside the official structures, but some take place within established institutions and organizations. Some are conducted by Chartists, and some have no direct connection with the Charter. One of these tendencies—independent activity in culture and scholarship—antedates Charter 77 and contributed to its emergence. A second, independent movements among youth in the sphere of popular culture, were one of the breeding grounds of Charter 77 and now are blossoming anew. A third, the revival of religion and a growing independence vis-à-vis the regime on the part of the Catholic Church's hierarchy and believers, represents a relatively new development that poses a difficult challenge for the regime. Finally, there is an entirely new phenomenon—the reaction of Charter 77 and of society generally to problems of peace and nuclear war. This reaction was stimulated by the West European peace movement and by the placement of Soviet missiles on Czechoslovak soil.

Independent writing and publishing. Charter 77, it has been said, stimulated "an explosion of typewritten

¹³See Charter documents No. 11, 1984 ("The Right to History") and No. 16, 1984, in which the spokesmen described the document as an appeal for discussion, and appended the critical comments made by historians M. Hájek, H. Mejdrová, J. Opat, and M. Otáhal (June 25, 1984). Other historians joined in with polemical criticisms, e.g., Milan Hübl, "Dispute Over Two Concepts of Czech History," *Infoch*, July–August 1984; Luboš Kohout, "The Historian's Responsibility," *ibid.*, September 1984; Jan Křen, "On 'The Right to History,'" and Petr Uhl, "Letter to Charter 77 Spokesmen," *ibid.*, October 1984.

¹⁴An unpublished communication from Václav Havel.



Ludvík Vaculík, a writer and signatory of Charter 77, who in 1972 founded Edice Petlice (Padlock Editions), which published more than 250 unofficial volumes.

—EASTFOTO.

material" and created "a typewriter culture."¹⁵ This "parallel" culture, although not as prodigious as in Poland both before and after Solidarity, is rich and variegated, and includes hundreds of books, dozens of journals, and hundreds of feuilletons, essays, short stories, and poems. No one, including those actively engaged in creating it, is familiar with all of this outpouring, nor can anyone estimate how many copies are made—often by readers inspired to reproduce on their own typewriters something they value highly. In spite of the time and effort lavished upon its production, much of this material is not seen by the bulk of the population, many of whom would be interested in reading it but have no way of getting hold of it. Distribution is difficult and dangerous, since even posses-

sion of samizdat works is often made the basis for criminal charges. Yet these samizdat materials (as well as journals and books published in the West) are to be seen in private homes—and are often confiscated during house searches by the police. Complete collections do not exist, except perhaps in police headquarters. Relatively few copies are sent abroad, so that no complete archive could be established anywhere, although large collections are held in some private hands or in libraries in the West.¹⁶

The "publishing" of books in samizdat form by a number of "edice" (publishing houses) has produced, at a modest estimate, at least 600 and perhaps many more titles. Best known is Edice Petlice (Padlock Editions), initiated in 1972 by Ludvík Vaculík, who put out more than 250 volumes.¹⁷ The author of each book, whose consent for "publication" was required, signed each copy. Edice Kvart (Quarto Editions) was started even before Petlice (as Vaculík found out to his surprise) by the writer Jan Vladislav, who issued about 120 books before he was forced into exile.¹⁸ A third series, Edice Expedice (Dispatch Editions) was organized by Václav Havel, who selected the books on his own and signed them himself.¹⁹ Other publishing ventures, such as Edice Popelnice (Ashcan Editions), were more short-lived due to the arrest of the respective chief editors. There were as many as seven religious or theological edice—one of which, in Olomouc, published 80 books before the arrest of its editors ended this venture. Duch a Život (Spirit and Life), Přátele (Friends), and Cesty myšlení (Paths of Thought) were put out in xerox or printed form and thus had a wider circulation than typewritten material.

The production of a book series is a thankless and time-consuming task, as the editors have reported.²⁰ As in all publishing, it requires the reading of many manuscripts and the selection of those to be accepted, often on the basis of readers' reports; editing and having the book typed and bound; correcting the typed copies; and distributing, personally, 25 to 50 copies all over Prague and to other parts of the repub-

¹⁶For religious materials, see the collections at Keston College, Keston, Kent, England. For other materials, see the collections in the Fisher Rare Book Library, Toronto.

¹⁷A bibliography of Petlice, with a foreword by J. Gruša, is being prepared by the Fisher Rare Book Library and the Centre for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Toronto. Vaculík issued several works by Jaroslav Seifert that were later published officially although in censored form.

¹⁸See Vladislav, loc. cit.; also V. Prečan, "Secret Reader, Secret Critic, and Secret Publisher," in Jan Vladislav, *Male morality* (Small Moralities), Munich, Arkyl, 1984, pp. 146–47.

¹⁹During Havel's imprisonment Expedice books were signed by his wife Olga, and a number of books appeared under the rubric Edice Svíce (Candle Editions).

²⁰Vladislav, "All You Need is a Typewriter," loc. cit.; Vaculík, op. cit., passim.

¹⁵See Zdena Tomin, "The Typewriters Hold the Fort," *Index of Censorship* (London), No. 2, April 1983, pp. 28–30; Jan Vladislav, "All You Need Is a Typewriter," *ibid.*, pp. 33–35.

lic. The price, to cover out-of-pocket expenses, must be calculated and payments collected. Often the publisher must do almost everything himself, and thus loses time that he would rather have devoted to his own writing. Editors and authors are constantly harassed by the police, by frequent house searches, questioning, and sometimes confiscation of manuscripts or finished books, and occasionally by imprisonment. Typists, binders, and those possessing or distributing books are also prosecuted.

Another form of samizdat publishing is the literary or scholarly journal, which entails the same problems for editors and authors. In addition to *Infoch*, issued on Charter's behalf, many other journals have appeared as the result of a kind of spontaneous process by groups of friends, who put together articles which they or others had written.²¹ Almost all are typewritten and usually not bound. Some are issued without even a title. Some last but a short time due to the imprisonment or emigration of the editors. Names of the editors are almost never given, but the authors usually sign their real names. At present, the best-known journal is *Kritický sborník* (Critical Review), which has appeared four times a year since 1981; it is usually 80 to 100 pages long, and contains articles by well-known writers and scholars. Others, such as *Obsah* (Contents) and *Vyber z čl. čtenářské samoobsluhy* (Selection from Czechoslovak Readers' Self-Service), have appeared for several years.²² Three theological journals having a large circulation due to the use of means of reproduction other than a typewriter are: *Vzkříšení* (Resurrection, appearing since 1979); *Informace o církvi* (Information on the Church, since 1980); and *Teologické texty* (Theological Texts, from 1980)—the successor to *Teologický sborník* (Theological Review, from 1977 to 1979). An annual, *Una Sancta Catholica*, appeared in 1983 and 1984. A novel development was the appearance of Slovak journals: a theological journal, *Naboženstvo a súčasnosť* (Religion and the Contemporary World, since 1982); and two others—one without a name (identified only by an "X" on its cover), the other entitled *Kontakt*.

Another category included scholarly journals such as *Ekonomická revue* (Economic Review), which comes out irregularly, with Vladimír Kadlec (government member under Dubček) as a major contributor, and *Čtverec* (The Square), devoted to foreign affairs.

The first issue of the latter was edited by Jiří Dienstbier, (formerly a foreign correspondent for Czechoslovak radio) although two others appeared after his imprisonment. More sustained was a historical journal, first issued under the title *Historické studie*, which has continued regularly since 1978, each number having a different name. The editors were not identified. After eight issues had been produced, the editors evidently differed on the content of future issues, since two separate journals with different titles appeared simultaneously in November 1982.²³

Finally, one should mention one other type of samizdat publication, the *sborník*, a symposium or collection of essays on a single theme. The most significant of these in the field of history were a 750-page collection on T. G. Masaryk, the first president of Czechoslovakia; a symposium on the 200th anniversary of the issuance of the Toleration Patent by Emperor Rudolf II; and two collections of essays on the First Republic.²⁴ An even more ambitious project was the multi-volume publication of the collected works of the late Jan Patočka.²⁵

Youth and independent music. Another example of independent activity has been the attempt by young people to have their own life style as well as to express themselves in the writing or enjoyment of their own poetry and music. The persecution of rock musicians and their fans led a number of young people, including several well-known musicians, to sign the Charter and to take an active part in its work.²⁶ Within the Charter's leadership, Václav Havel was from the beginning a strong supporter of "underground music." During 1977, when one of the Charter spokesmen was the popular folk singer of the 1960's Marta Kubišová, Charter 77 issued a document that described the structure of official control of popular music and the measures taken to inhibit and ultimately liquidate any really independent musical expression. More recently, Charter 77 put out a fuller statement, which referred

²¹On journals see Skilling, *Charter 77*, pp. 113–14; George Moldau, "Samizdat Journals in the CSSR," *Listy*, No. 5, October 1983, pp. 59–61.

²²Other journals include *Prostor* (Space), *Nový brak* (New Rubbish), *Nový Petřín* (New Petřín), *Horizont* (Horizon), *Moravská čítanka* (Moravian Reader), and *Čtení na dovolenou*—(Vyběr) (Holiday Reading—A Selection).

²³For a review of the first eight issues, see Skilling, "Independent Historiography in Czechoslovakia," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* (Toronto) December 1983, pp. 518–39.

²⁴Milan Machovec, Petr Pithart, and Josef Dubský, Eds., *T. G. Masaryk a naše současnost* (T. G. Masaryk and Our Contemporary World), typewritten, Prague, 1980; M. Machovec, Ed., *Sborník ke dvousetému výročí tolerančního patentu* (Symposium on the 200th Anniversary of the Toleration Patent), 1981; *Sborník k 65. výročí vzniku Československé republiky* (Symposium on the 65th Anniversary of the Rise of the Czechoslovak Republic), Prague, 1983; *Studie z dějin předmnichovské republiky* (Studies from the History of the Pre-Munich Republic), Prague, November 1983. For a review article on the Masaryk symposium, see Skilling, "The Rediscovery of Masaryk," in *Cross Currents, A Yearbook of Central European Culture*, pp. 87–114.

²⁵*Sebrany texty Jana Patočky* (Collected Writings of Jan Patočka), probably ten volumes in all, including volumes on Plato, Komenský, Masaryk, philosophy and art, and the natural world.

²⁶See Skilling, *Charter 77*, Ch. 1, on popular music and the origin of Charter 77.



Marta Kubišová, a leading Czech pop singer and one of the spokesmen for Charter 77 in 1977.

—EASTFOTO.

to the "mass discontent of youth as a result of the crisis of civilization and its basic values," and described this kind of music as "a revolt of conscience and spirit ... almost the main guide, or medium, of this important spiritual and social confrontation."²⁷ Various forms of popular music—jazz, rock and roll, folk, rock, and punk rock—and the lyrics of the songs—expressed the young people's distinctive values and challenged, explicitly or implicitly, the consumer society and the totalitarian polity in which they had to live.

The regime deemed popular music a threat to the conformity demanded of youth and made each style, in turn, the target of verbal denunciations and persecution of the musicians. Ivan Jirous, the moving spirit behind the group called the Plastic People of the Universe, was singled out for specially ruthless treatment and is now serving his fourth prison term.²⁸ Concerts

were often cancelled or broken up by the police, and those who had come to listen were questioned and sometimes beaten up or arrested. Many fans were sentenced to prison merely for possessing musical tapes.

Jazz, once condemned and banned, is now accepted, at least in the form of nostalgic imitations of American songs of the 1920's. Some 10 jazz bands perform legally, for instance, the Prague Syncopated Jazz Orchestra, which may be heard in public concerts and on television. Rock, however, is still almost entirely taboo, except for several officially approved bands of poor quality. The Plastic People, forbidden to perform even privately, confine themselves to making recordings.²⁹ Recently, in an unusual collaboration with singer Kubišová, the Plastics have recorded a new collection, *Pulnoční myš* (Midnight Mouse). There are as many as 200 other rock bands that perform semilegally, usually outside the main cities on weekends. The "new wave," initiated by punk rock, also caught on, and some 50 bands have come into existence. Although many young people, concerned to protect their university studies and their careers, shun open participation in concerts, thousands of others do attend or listen to tapes and cassettes.

The fans of popular music have developed from an "interest group" of youth into a "social community," which includes older as well as young people, and extends its concern to other forms of art and culture.³⁰ The chief advocate of this community, and the main defender of "alternative music," is the Jazz Section (Jazzová Sekce or JS) of the Union of Musicians, which has so far survived persistent efforts by the Ministry of Culture to make its life difficult or even to terminate its existence. The JS has a membership of 4,000, each of whom pays an annual fee of 40 crowns, but it has a following estimated at close to 100,000. The JS receives no funds from its parent organization and depends on membership fees and income from some of its activities. Its staff is entirely volunteer, headed by Karel Šrám, who has been subjected to police harassment and dismissal from his regular job and now faces trumped up charges of fi-

²⁷Eighty-five young people in Moravia demanded the release of Jirous and others in a letter of Aug. 31, 1983 (*Infoch*, August 1983, pp. 3-4).

²⁸Records have been prepared and distributed by Boží mírny, Toronto, Canada. On the Plastic People and Czechoslovakia's underground culture, see "Banned in Bohemia," which contains an interview with Václav Brabenec of the Plastics and an article by Ivan Jirous, *Index on Censorship*, February 1983, pp. 30-34.

²⁹See Charter document No. 31, 1983, and a report by the Jazz Section of the Union of Musicians (see below), given by Mary Novak in *Západ*, No. 4, pp. 16-21, and articles by Vladimíra Burke, *ibid.*, October and December 1983, and October 1984.

³⁰Document No. 13, 1977; text given in *ibid.*, pp. 252-56; document No. 31, 1983, summarized fully in *Západ* (Ottawa), No. 6, December 1983, pp. 1-4.



An amateur jazz group at a private concert in Prague in the summer of 1984.

—Jazz Section of the Union of Musicians.

nancial irregularities. Although JS has no formal links with Charter 77 (Srp is not a signatory), it is described by the police as "a legal arm of Charter 77," and is treated accordingly. Its ability to survive is due to wide popular support as well as to its affiliation since 1979 with the International Jazz Federation under the Music Council of UNESCO.

The Jazz Section had as its main original purpose the promotion of jazz, and later of rock, and became well-known for organizing over a period of nine years the successful Prague Jazz Days, an annual festival that presented all kinds of popular music and included both amateur and professional bands, some from abroad. Lasting 10 days, the festival attracted capacity audiences. In 1981, the festival, although sold out, was cancelled by the authorities at the last minute, and similar bans in subsequent years have forced the JS to organize only private concerts.

The Jazz Section then turned to publishing, something permitted under its organizational statute. Despite increasing official persecution, the JS issued for its members a Jazz bulletin, a magazine of some 100 pages, dealing with art, theater, and literature, as well

as music. It became a veritable publishing house, initiating several book series, usually printed, such as Edice Situace (paperbacks dealing with painting and containing reproductions), Edice Dokumenty, and Jazzpetit Edice, a series on subjects as varied as rock, poetry, E. F. Burian and John Lennon, Dada and surrealism, the music of the Terezín ghetto, and Czech rock and roll. Its program included even a book by Bohumil Hrabal, banned by official publishers, *Jak ja obsluhoval anglického krále* (How I Served the English King). It has also published, in three volumes, *Rock 2,000*, probably the largest bibliography of rock music in the world.

In the spring of 1983 the war of the regime against "the new wave" of popular music culminated in a savage attack in *Tribuna*. The attack was aimed at all non-conformist music, including even some rock bands hitherto officially approved, and it was immediately endorsed in *Rudé právo*, the party newspaper.³¹

³¹Jan Krýzl, "'New' Wave with Old Content," *Tribuna* (Prague), Mar. 23, 1983, given in *Západ*, October 1983, pp. 1-2; also Z. Bakešová, *Rudé právo* (Prague), Mar. 30, 1983.

The article condemned musicians for "spreading among the youth opinions unacceptable to our ideology, a philosophy of nihilism and marasmus, a cynical approach to life and all its values," lamented the fact that such musical events were often sponsored by trade union and youth organizations, local authorities, and official cultural centers, and called for "strict control of their activities" and for strict measures against individuals. This vicious diatribe produced a wave of protest letters from young people (most of which were, naturally, not published) and a detailed response by the Jazz Section in a booklet entitled *Rock na levém křídle* (Rock on the Left Wing), which was distributed in large numbers.³² This tried to correct the distorted picture of the history of rock at home and abroad, and charged that the official attitude toward this popular and socially conscious musical form had created distrust of the Communist Party among youth. Charter 77, in its own document (No. 31, 1983), warned that if young people "are constantly denied the music that they enjoy, this can only lead to a deepening of general frustration, feelings of hopelessness, of powerlessness, and of the emptiness of life—or on the other hand, to the nourishment of latent social tensions."³³

By late summer of 1984 the regime had still not brought about the demise of the JS and its activities, in part because of the latter's dogged resistance to its own liquidation, in part because the Union of Musicians failed to dissolve the Jazz Section. In July, the Ministry of the Interior suspended the Union for three months and threatened to dissolve it if the Union did not liquidate the JS and its publishing activities. The Union was dissolved on October 22, 1984.

Religion and the church. Another illustration of independent activity is to be found in the "rebirth of religious faith" noticeable at the time of Charter 77's formation,³⁴ and, more recently, in the more self-confident stance adopted by the Catholic hierarchy. The most striking manifestation of the former was a turn toward religion by youth, who became a visible presence in churches and who took part in services held in private homes. The lack of attraction to Marxism-Leninism and of faith in communism caused young people to look for meaning in life in religion of all kinds, including Buddhism and other non-institutionalized belief. Priests and pastors (some 500 of whom have been deprived of licenses to perform

their duties) conduct services privately in what some have called "the underground church" and have often been prosecuted and imprisoned for "obstructing state supervision of church affairs."³⁵ A number of pastors, priests, and theological students, as well as Catholic and Protestant laymen, have taken an active part in the Charter 77 movement and are the target of especially severe police harassment. As noted above, there has been a widespread dissemination of Catholic samizdat books and journals, published presumably with the tacit encouragement and perhaps with some concrete assistance from local churches. This has extended also to Slovakia, where such activity is carried out in greater secrecy. There have been similar tendencies, somewhat more limited, among Protestants.

This revival of faith has reflected itself in the past two or three years in a changed comportment by František Cardinal Tomášek, the Czech Primate, who celebrated his 85th birthday on June 30, 1984. He had long avoided public criticism of the regime and sought to rectify problems through private discussions with secular authorities. Largely as a result of the election of Karol Cardinal Wojtyła as Pope, and under his personal influence, Cardinal Tomášek has begun to take an increasingly independent stand and has sought to identify himself with the believers and the nation as a whole.³⁶ It is now his practice, after serving mass in St. Vitus Cathedral on a Sunday morning, to stroll slowly through the courtyards of the Castle across the square to his palace, greeting and blessing the faithful. They in turn applaud him and chant, "Long live our Father Cardinal," or sometimes, "Long live John Paul II." In a symbolic confrontation of church and state, Cardinal Tomášek then appears on the balcony of his palace, which is right across Hradčany Square from the President's residence in the Castle.

The starting point of this shift in the Cardinal's behavior has usually been considered to be the Vatican edict in 1982 banning political activity by the priesthood. In consequence, the Cardinal condemned *Pacem in Terris*, the pro-regime organization of priests, and the equally pro-regime Catholic newspaper, *Katolické noviny*, whose right to speak for Catho-

³²Published by Edice Dokumenty, text given also in *Západ*, October 1983, pp. 2–6.

³³In *Západ*, December 1983, p. 4.

³⁴Jiří Lederer, "Charter 77 and Christians," *Studie* (Rome), No. 84, 1982, pp. 581–86.

³⁵Charter 77 issued a document (No. 22, July 8, 1982) on the use of article 178 of the criminal code for the persecution of clergymen. See also document No. 11, 1982 (March 10, 1982), on the persecution of priests, believers, nuns, and others; document No. 8 (March 3, 1982) on the limitation of freedom of conviction, including religious faith; letter of April 23, 1983, signed by 3,397 Catholics and Protestants to Cardinal Tomášek protesting police harassment of believers.

³⁶Bradley Graham interview with Cardinal Tomášek, *The Washington Post*, National Weekly Edition, May 28, 1984, p. 17.



František Cardinal Tomášek speaking with the faithful in the courtyard of Prague Castle in June 1984.

—Photo by a visitor.

lics he firmly denied. On a later occasion, the Cardinal reacted to a personal attack on the Pope printed in *Tribuna*, and defended John Paul II as “a great humanist, indomitable defender of human rights, and one of the great popes of all time.” He censured the author of the *Tribuna* article for not contributing to the relaxation of international tension and for breaching international covenants on human rights.³⁷

Cardinal Tomášek took his strongest stand during the Prague World Peace Assembly meeting in the summer of 1983, when, in a brief appearance, he delivered a bold pronouncement on the indivisibility of peace and human rights:

He who threatens truth in the interest of propaganda threatens peace; he who threatens respect for justice for all without exception threatens peace; he who threatens basic human liberties, including religious

*freedom, threatens peace. . . . There will be no peace on a large scale unless there is peace on a small scale. This means peace within every community as well as within each individual.*³⁸

The Cardinal's attitude toward Charter 77 also underwent a change. Although some Catholics, such as the former priest Václav Malý and laymen such as Benda and Radim Palouš, had served as spokesmen, Tomášek had assumed an unsympathetic, if not unfriendly, posture and had been sharply criticized by individual Catholic Chartists. More recently, there seems to have been a gradual meeting of minds between Church and Charter, and an increasingly friendly attitude toward Benda. The culmination of this tendency was a petition for a visit by the Pope to Czechoslovakia which was circulated, probably with the knowledge of the Cardinal and perhaps with the aid of Chartist believers. It secured more than 17,000 signatures (lists with 11,000 more signatures were

³⁷The Cardinal's statements were, of course, not published in Czechoslovak newspapers, even in *Katolické noviny*, but they circulated in samizdat form, for instance in *Informace o církvi*. For the article attacking the Pope, see *Tribuna*, Mar. 28, 1984; the Cardinal's reply was dated April 9, 1984. His letter on *Pacem in Terris*, not dated, was given in *Infoch*, October 1982, pp. 3–4.

³⁸English translation in *Czechoslovak Newsletter* (Washington, DC), Nos. 7/8 (82/83), July–August 1983.

confiscated by the police). The Cardinal thereupon invited the Pope to come to Czechoslovakia to commemorate the 1100th anniversary of the death of the Slavic missionary, St. Methodius who, tradition has it, is buried in Moravia. The Pope accepted the invitation and explicitly thanked the thousands of believers who had supported it. His reply (dated May 1, 1984) was circulated in samizdat and transmitted by the Cardinal to the authorities, who rejected the visit almost at once.

There has been no comparable evolution within the Protestant churches, whose leading figures have remained largely unsympathetic to Charter 77 and have offered little moral support for pastors and laymen suffering persecution for their actions in the human rights movement. The Evangelical Synod, however, on several occasions expressed views on issues of public concern, e.g., it protested the arrest and imprisonment of a prominent Protestant Chartist Jan Litomiský and adopted a resolution which condemned the stationing of missiles in both East and West.³⁹

Human rights and peace. Charter 77 derived much of its inspiration from the United Nations covenants on human rights and the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and based many of its appeals on these and other international agreements that the Czechoslovak government had endorsed.⁴⁰ The opening of the Madrid CSCE review conference in 1980 led Charter 77 to renew appeals to its own government to honor its obligations under the Helsinki Accord and to take measures to bring the country's laws into harmony with these commitments. Charter document No. 29, 1982, urged the delegates to strive for a balanced concluding document, which would contribute to a peace that was not merely "a truce among states," but also to "a life within states which gave priority to values such as freedom, human dignity, responsibility, sacrifice for others, and respect for truth." Concretely, it suggested the establishment of an international coordinating committee that would supervise the fulfillment of obligations and would work closely with "civic initiatives" such as Charter 77. The appeal also called for the release of a number of prisoners, whose names were listed, and for the termination of proceedings against others.⁴¹

The concluding document agreed on at Madrid was welcomed by Charter 77 as a contribution to the solution of the "crisis of mutual confidence." The Charter praised the inclusion of provisions dealing with human rights and the emphasis on the equal validity of all ten principles of the Final Act. Charter 77 called for concrete measures to implement these principles, in particular the approval by Czechoslovakia of Article 41 and of the optional clause of the UN Covenant on Political and Civil Rights, and urged that the government guarantee the right of citizens to participate in monitoring human rights through such groups as Charter 77 and VONS. The document also demanded the release of prisoners and protested police raids in November 1983 in connection with the stationing of missiles in Czechoslovakia.⁴² At the end of December, Charter 77 issued a detailed evaluation of the Madrid meeting and stated that the proceedings had "internationalized the whole problem of human rights" and had confirmed the legitimacy of groups such as Charter 77 which sought to monitor their government's record in this area.⁴³

Charter 77 issued a number of documents on the international dimension of the struggle for human rights. Several of these expressed support for the Solidarity trade union and condemned the declaration of martial law.⁴⁴ On the anniversary of the Soviet intervention in 1968, Charter 77 usually released a statement condemning the use of armed force and calling for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Czechoslovakia. Noting the social crisis produced by the intervention and by the policies followed during the subsequent 16 years, Charter 77 demanded that the crisis be resolved by the abandonment of these policies.⁴⁵ One of these, discrimination in employ-

Madrid protesting repressive actions against defenders of human rights, May 15, 1981 (*Bulletin and Summary of Available Documents*, No. 17, June 1981, pp. 11-12).

³⁹Charter 77 document No. 39, Nov. 14, 1983, (*Infoch*, November 1983, pp. 1-3). *Infoch*, in an earlier report (September 1983, pp. 9-10), published paragraphs 8 to 17 of the concluding document, which had been omitted by *Rudé právo* (Sept. 24, 1983) in its text of the document. See Charter 77's letter of June 17, 1983, to the Czechoslovak Committee for European Security (document No. 12, 1984).

⁴⁰Document No. 43, 1983 (*Infoch*, January 1984, pp. 1-8). For a full treatment of the Madrid conference, see Skilling, "CSCE in Madrid," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July-August 1981; also Skilling, "The Madrid Follow-up," in Robert A. Spencer, Ed., *Canada and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe*, University of Toronto, Centre for International Studies, 1984, Ch. 8.

⁴¹Documents Nos. 2, 5, 28, 30, in 1982; Nos. 34 and 35, 1983 (given in English in *Bulletin and Summary of Available Documents*, Nos. 18-20, 21-23, 24). On Feb. 2, 1984, a joint statement was issued by Chartists and members of KOR and Solidarity, later endorsed by 19 Hungarians (see *Summary*, No. 24).

⁴²Documents No. 26, 1982, and No. 30, 1983 (*Summary*, Nos. 21-23, 24). Police raids on leading Chartists on August 16, 1984, confiscated a draft declaration on the anniversary, but a document calling for the withdrawal of Soviet armed forces was nonetheless issued on August 19 (No. 15), 1984.

³⁹The texts of these resolutions were not available to this author. See a November 1983 criticism of the inadequacy of the latter resolution by the Protestant Chartist Miloš Rejchrt in *Summary of Available Documents*, No. 24, July 1984, pp. 67-68.

⁴⁰For the international aspects of Charter 77, see Skilling, *Charter 77*, Ch. 8.

⁴¹The appeal was dated Oct. 22, 1982 (*Infoch*, October 1982, pp. 1-2). On earlier proposals, see Skilling, *Charter 77*, pp. 162-64. See document No. 14, 1982, on the Czechoslovak criminal code and the international covenants. See also VONS letter to



British participants in the June 1983 World Assembly for Peace and Life, Against Nuclear War in Prague.

—EASTFOTO.

ment, was the subject of repeated appeals to the government and to the International Labour Organization. Although admittedly there has been a slight change for the better after the ILO's 1978 condemnation of Czechoslovak practices, the discrimination continued, since the mass dismissals of 1969 and 1977 were not reversed and because political requirements for employment continued to be imposed.⁴⁶

Although Charter 77 had from the start considered itself a constituent part of the worldwide movement for human rights in both East and West, the rise of peace movements in Western Europe added a new dimension to Charter 77's perspective and required it to formulate its own position on the peace issue. Chartists in general took a positive attitude toward these groups, regarding them as being, like their own movement, manifestations of "civic responsibility."⁴⁷ Char-

ter 77, it was stressed, was a human rights movement, not a peace movement, but it also always regarded "the right to life" as one of the fundamental human rights without which others could not be assured. Conversely, peace, as the Helsinki Final Act had stated, was inseparably linked with the observance of human rights. Although this viewpoint was not always shared by Western peace movements, Charter 77 believed it desirable to develop an active dialogue with them. The holding of the World Peace Assembly in Prague in 1983 provided the first opportunity for direct contact with some Western peace activists.

Space prevents anything more than a telegraphic summary of salient viewpoints of Charter 77 on peace, as expressed in documents issued since 1981, usually in response to invitations to attend Western peace conferences or as messages to such meetings.⁴⁸

⁴⁶Documents No. 19, 1982, No. 18, 1983, and No. 10, 1984. See also a letter to the Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, March 26, 1981, from a group of Charter signatories, which contained a long analysis of violations of ILO conventions and suggestions for their correction.

⁴⁷Prečan, in *Vývoj Charty*, pp. 88–90.

⁴⁸The most important Charter documents on peace were as follows: declaration of Nov. 16, 1981; document No. 13, Mar. 29, 1982 (open letter to the peace movements); No. 18, Apr. 21, 1982 (letter to peace movement in the GDR); No. 25, Aug. 27, 1982 (open letter to the Interchurch Peace Council, Holland); No. 9, Apr. 30, 1983 (letter to the European Conference on Nuclear Disarmament in West

- Peace (the right to life) is but "one of the fundamental rights" and enjoys no special priority. There are other values for which life may have to be sacrificed (document No. 13, 1982).⁴⁹

- "Peace at any price" does not guarantee an enduring absence of war as the Munich Agreement of 1938 demonstrated (No. 29, 1982).

- It is not enough to have "any kind of peace," but a peace of justice and of dignity is needed in which "internal peace" between state and citizen promotes "external peace" (No. 20, 1983).

- "There is no peace without freedom." (ibid). Only freedom guarantees "effective control" of governments and of international negotiations (No. 29, 1983).

- Peace is indivisible also in respect to the relationship between North and South, the poor and the richer nations, and the danger of ecological catastrophes and the devastation of nature (No. 9, 1983, and No. 20, 1983).

- Arms reduction creates a favorable environment for peace, but the military threat is not the main danger for peace and is but "one of the dimensions of that danger" (No. 20, 1983, and No. 25, 1982).

The world peace assembly in Prague in the summer of 1983 helped Charter 77 to have an impact on Western public opinion. When its request to participate was denied by the Prague organizers, Charter 77 submitted a long statement to the gathering, supplemented by a collection of documents by Chartists on peace.⁵⁰ The document included some of the arguments summarized above and advanced for the first time the proposal that negotiations on arms control

and peace should be opened up to public control through the publication in each country of the proposals, arguments, and statistical data of both sides (document No. 20, 1983). The Chartist statement was read to the gathering by some Western delegates. Despite police interference, some Chartists managed to meet with a few Western delegates, and were able to issue several brief joint statements on the link between peace and human rights.⁵¹ At the conclusion of the conference, and independently of Charter 77, some 300 young people succeeded in carrying out a short march under the banner of "peace and freedom" before it was broken up.⁵²

Although the domestic media did not report on these events, they received much attention in the world media, especially on British television, and became known, from Western broadcasts, to people in Czechoslovakia. The official use of the world assembly for Eastern propaganda purposes was thus effectively counterbalanced by these unofficial actions. Moreover, police repression and censorship offered telling arguments in support of the proposition that the lack of freedom placed obstacles in the path of peace.

At the end of 1983 came the deployment of missiles on Czechoslovak soil—something that profoundly touched the emotions of many citizens and aroused their deepest fears. Leading Chartists were warned by police against any expression of opposition, under penalty of criminal charges.⁵³ Nevertheless, a Charter document turned the tables on the regime by quoting an official declaration to the effect that the stationing of missiles in Western Europe did not promote security.⁵⁴ Evidence of widespread apprehension was the petition against the stationing of missiles "anywhere in the world," initiated by several young people in Brno and signed by several thousand.⁵⁵

During 1984, Charter 77 continued to stress the necessity of dialogue with kindred movements of "civic responsibility" in Western Europe, "across the fron-

Berlin); No. 19, May 30, 1983, and No. 20, June 15, 1983 (letters to the World Assembly in Prague); No. 29, July 26, 1983 (letter to the French peace conference in Larzac); No. 9, May 1, 1984 (letter to British peace movements, CND and END); No. 13, June 30, 1984 (open letter to Conference on European Nuclear Disarmament in Perugia).

For an excellent analysis, see "Charter 77, Its Relationship to Questions of Peace and War and to the Contemporary Peace Movement," by Vilém Prečan (in Czech), in Milan Schulz, Ed., *Mír, mírové hnutí, křesťanská etika* (Peace, the Peace Movement, and Christian Ethics), Munich, Opus Bonum, 1982, pp. 75–100.

⁴⁹See the phrase "one of the important human rights" in document No. 25, 1982. This was inaccurately translated as "that most basic of human right [sic] in Jan Kavan and Zdena Tomín, Eds., *Voices from Prague, Czechoslovakia, Human Rights and the Peace Movement*, London, European Nuclear Disarmament and Palach Press Ltd., 1983, p. 26.

⁵⁰Document No. 20, 1983. The collection *Sborník, Charta 77 o míru* (Symposium—Charter 77 on Peace), Prague (presumably), 1983, contained documents issued by Charter 77 and by individual Chartists. Other samizdat symposia, entitled *Diskuse o míru* (Discussion of Peace), were issued in Prague (only No. 4, 1984 was available to the author). The Kavan-Tomín collection cited in fn 49 contained some of the same documents as the Prague collection and others, but the translation contains a number of errors. For reports on events surrounding the efforts of Chartists to attend the assembly and to meet Western delegates, see Charter documents Nos. 21 and 24, 1983.

⁵¹Document No. 24, 1983, gave the text of joint statements, one with the French peace organization, CODENE, the other with individual delegates from West Germany, Britain, the Netherlands, and other countries. CODENE and some individual British leaders refused to attend the assembly because of the exclusion of Charter 77, and Green party delegates of West Germany protested the breaking up of the unofficial meeting in Prague. See also Charter 77 report on a meeting attempted later with French and Dutch peace movement representatives in Prague on March 3–4, 1984, which was also interrupted by the police and by the expulsion of the foreign visitors (No. 5, 1984).

⁵²*The Times* (London), June 23, 1983.

⁵³Charter document No. 38, November 1983.

⁵⁴Charter document No. 39, 1983.

⁵⁵*Infoch* (January 1984, p. 14) published an early report that 939 persons had signed. There were unconfirmed reports of a signature campaign in the Institute of Geophysics in Prague and of protests among workers in Kladno, Pilsen, and Ostrava.

tiers of the blocs, of ideological schemata, and different experiences."⁵⁶ However, the two main documents issued in that year were strongly critical of tendencies in Western peace movements that were described in one document as "foolish and dangerous."⁵⁷ Both rejected "unilateral disarmament," "appeasement" or "peace at any price" (citing the experience of Czechoslovakia in 1938), and "one-sided pacifism," which confined its attention to armaments, especially nuclear. The message to the British peace movements favored a "firm stance, in spite of its risks." The document prepared for the conference on European Nuclear Disarmament held in Perugia, although expressing similar criticisms, was more vigorous in condemning "the politics of armed strength" (without distinguishing between the superpowers) and called for the withdrawal of both Soviet and American forces from Europe, as a way to end the division of Europe and to encourage the establishment of democracy in all of Europe. The world peace movement must build up a "mighty democratic coalition," which would seek "allies 'below' and 'above', in the East and West, in Europe and overseas."

The conference in Perugia (July 17–21) also witnessed a substantial success for Charter 77.⁵⁸ Among the 1,000 persons present were delegates of the official peace movements of the Soviet Union and other bloc countries (although not from Czechoslovakia or the GDR) and representatives of most of the disarmament and peace movements of Western Europe, as well as some exiles from Eastern Europe including Jiří Pelikan from Czechoslovakia. There were 59 empty chairs for unofficial East European delegates, including Chartists. In the discussions, the Soviet delegates found themselves isolated and often the target of censure. Although no Chartists were present, their ideas were widely discussed and had a significant impact on the European Peace Declaration issued at the end of the conference.⁵⁹ This document, which was, of course, not accepted by the Soviet and other East European official

delegations, was signed by eight Chartists, five unofficial Hungarians, and 57 representatives of peace movements from six West European countries, including France, Italy, and West Germany. The declaration stressed the "indivisibility" of peace, and respect for human rights as a condition of peace. It condemned the arms race and the deployment of missiles in East and West. It called for the withdrawal of foreign troops from all countries, the creation of an atom-free zone in Europe from Portugal to the Urals, the dissolution of the two blocs, and the overcoming of the partition of Europe. Charter 77 had thus helped to bring significant West European peace movements together with them and other independent spokesmen from Eastern Europe on a common platform of peace and human rights.

Conclusion

Charter 77 continues to be, as one of its supporters abroad has written, "a small island of civic activity in the sea of a majority of people who have adapted."⁶⁰ It has not been able to win the support of the mass of the population or to generate a social movement comparable to the one which swept Poland in 1980. Independent activity, such as described in this essay, remains limited to individuals or to a few sectors of society. Workers and farmers remain almost unaffected. Slovaks and the large Hungarian minority have—with a few individual exceptions—stayed aloof from Charter 77.⁶¹

Nonetheless Charter 77 has survived for eight years and constitutes what seems to be a more or less permanent political reality, exerting at least a limited impact at home and abroad. Shunning violence of any kind, and abstaining from marches or demonstrations, it has confined itself to verbal activity that seeks to express the interests and opinions of broad circles.⁶² As Václav Havel has expressed it, Charter 77 is "a permanent appeal to the state power and a mirror of its

⁵⁶Document No. 9, May 1, 1984.

⁵⁷*Ibid.*, and document No. 13, June 30, 1984. The first of these documents had been the subject of considerable criticism by some Chartists, especially for its critical attitude toward the Western peace movements and its reference to appeasement. The Perugia letter required long discussion before a consensus was achieved, and was signed by the three spokesmen, V. Benda, J. Ruml, and J. Sternová, and 10 others, including former spokesmen Hájek, Havel, Hejránek, Malý, and Šabata, and, for the first time, by two persons from Slovakia, Miro Kusý and Milan Simečka. Apart from differences noted in the text, it did not depart fundamentally from No. 9. A partial text or summary is given in *RFE/RL Research* (Munich), Nos. 33 and 36, Aug. 17 and Sept. 7, 1984.

⁵⁸For the proceedings, see the Radio Free Europe reports cited in fn. 57; and *The New York Times*, July 20, 1984.

⁵⁹The text is given in Czech in *Infoch*, September 1984, pp. 15–17. Later, on November 22, 1984, sixteen Charter 77 signatories and seventeen East German peace activists issued a joint declaration protesting the deployment of missiles in their two countries and calling for a missile-free Europe "from the Atlantic to the Urals."

⁶⁰Prečan, *Vývoj Charty*, p. 18.

⁶¹Charter 77 did not itself issue an analysis of Hungarian problems, but protested the treatment of Miklós Duray, a Charter signatory, (document No. 37, Dec. 28, 1982; also VONS communiqués No. 317, 327, and 375). Individual Chartists from Slovakia also protested the prosecution of Duray in letters, e.g., see letters from Ján Čarnogurský, Jozef Jablonický, Milan Simečka, and Miroslav Kusý, June 27 and 28, 1984 (*Infoch*, July–August 1984, pp. 23–25).

⁶²Prečan, in Schulz, *op. cit.*, pp. 92–93.

work," and "a continuing challenge to fellow citizens."⁶³ It is also in some degree a catalyst for independent activities by intellectuals, young people, and religious believers.

It is not easy to assess the impact of Charter 77, which is sometimes described by its own members as "a ghetto," isolated from the population not only by police repression but also by the legal and intellectual character of its documents, and their narrow circulation. Other Chartists, however, argue that its work is widely known as a result of Western broadcasts. Its documents thus contribute to the development of at least a limited public opinion. The regular reporting on injustice and persecution provides detailed documentation of value to foreign governments and media, and for international conferences.

Charter 77 has also a more subtle impact, impossible to measure. Amidst a population characterized by widespread indifference and passivity toward public affairs, and by tendencies toward opportunism and satisfaction of personal interests, Charter 77 may serve as a kind of "gauge" of honesty and courage against which people judge their own and others' behavior. It suggests what they too ought to do if they had the courage and the sense of responsibility to follow the example of Chartists. Even though Charter 77 may disavow this role, it may in fact serve as a kind of "conscience of the nation," nudging people to act more independently and decently. This may even be true of persons within the structure of power at every level. Others, impelled to be more active, may find in the Charter an example of how to do things, say, in collecting signatures on petitions, and even as a source of advice and assistance in such actions. To that extent Charter 77, as an "active minority," enjoys sympathy among the silent and non-active majority, and is thus endowed with moral authority.

In the stultifying environment of post-1968, "normalized" Czechoslovakia those commonly known as "dissidents" but who are better characterized as "independent spirits," see little or no prospect of basic change in the system, or even serious reforms, in the immediate future. Any thought of revolutionary action is regarded as quite out of touch with reality. Change will come, if at all, only after many years, perhaps in a generation or more, and not in their lifetime. Independent activity, including that of Chartists, is concerned with the "here and now," with living as freely

and honestly as possible.⁶⁴ In a more general perspective "speaking the truth out loud" may contribute to the "rehabilitation of man, with...his personal conscience and his personal responsibility, as the real creator of history."⁶⁵

This attitude of mind is accompanied by a reluctance to make predictions or to draw up blueprints for some future goal. The crushing of the hopes aroused in 1968 has produced an aversion to planning, or even to discussing the future, and a preference for concentrating on the present as expressed in work on a small scale and within narrow circles. Nonetheless, the conviction remains in the minds of many that there are currents at work beneath the surface that will eventually generate new ways. It is impossible to foresee what may happen, or when, or how. The Hungarian experience (not the Polish) is regarded with interest, but without real anticipation that it "could happen here." As in the past, a shift may come unexpectedly, triggered by a random event. This might occur tomorrow, or only in 10 or 20 years. It is not wise to entertain concrete expectations, but it is equally unwise to fall into hopelessness and inactivity. What is important is to prepare oneself and others for the time when change at last becomes possible so that one will then be ready to act.⁶⁶

Viewed from this angle, Charter 77 and the autonomous activity "stimulated and enriched by it" are engaged in "a great work of preparing and recultivating the soil for future political changes." When a moment of crisis opens the way for them, they may not be the direct result of Charter 77 and may derive from other sources. But, as Vilem Prečan has written,

*the quality of those future changes will be in part determined by the results of the preparatory work in that period of immobility and lifelessness that appeared to be a vacuum but that in reality was filled with strivings to preserve, regenerate and re-cultivate. It will be determined, among other things, by the endeavors of those who did not give up hope yesterday and today, who refused, as incompatible with their conscience, or for other reasons, to live in the lie, and who took the path of their civic right and duty, even though to the majority of their contemporaries this seemed merely the dangerous conduct of a handful of fools.*⁶⁷

⁶³Prečan, *Vývoj Charty*, p. 22.

⁶⁴Private communication to the author.

⁶⁵Prečan, *Vývoj Charty*, p. 27.

⁶⁷Ibid.

⁶³Private communication to the author.

Ceaușescu's Socialism

Vladimir Tismaneanu

The political order prevailing in Romania today, which can be labeled incipient "dynastic socialism,"¹ cannot be explained without taking into account the personality of Nicolae Ceaușescu, who dominates the country's public life. Ceaușescu has been able to install members of his family and his personal followers in key posts of the party and state apparatuses and in this way has emasculated the institutional role of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP). Moreover, Ceaușescu has increasingly been able to impose his own interpretation not merely of the history of the Romanian communist movement but also of the essence of socialism in Romania—a combination of neo-Stalinism at home and neo-Titoism abroad. Thus, developments in Romania entail a high degree of personalization of political power.

Ceaușescu's brand of communism needs to be analyzed from two angles—the biographical and the institutional. There is no doubt that Ceaușescu's style of rule has been shaped by his experiences as an activist in the Romanian Communist Party which he joined in 1933 at age 15. It is also true that the history of the RCP contains at least some features that make it unique among the East European communist parties. The RCP was principally an instrument—indeed a creation—of the Communist International. This meant that its policies and personnel were in effect imposed by the Comintern and, as a consequence, that the party had little concern for Romanian national issues, and very little support among the Romanian population. It was also subject to endemic factional battles

that were for the most part personal power struggles and not contests over policy. This mix of personal rivalries and foreign direction, as will be elaborated below, goes a long way toward explaining the sui generis brand of Ceaușescu's socialism.

Several key events in the history of the Romanian Communist Party must be outlined here.² The party was founded on May 8, 1921, in Bucharest, as a "Section of the Communist International." It operated legally until April 1924, when it was outlawed by the Liberal government then in power. After its delegitimation, some of its members continued to operate underground in Romania, while others formed a major center in Moscow. In 1928–30, the various groupings within the RCP engaged in such intense personal struggles and sectarian rivalries that the Comintern intervened by appointing an outsider, the Polish communist Alexander Stefanski, as secretary general of the RCP.

The party first gained prestige in 1933 by organizing a workers' strike in Bucharest at the Grivița railroad workshop. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, a leader of the strike, began to emerge as the outstanding personality in the domestic communist underground. Nicolae Ceaușescu became one of his adherents and collaborators. A demonstration organized by an anti-fascist coalition including the communists on May 1, 1939, against the Romanian fascist Iron Guard movement also enhanced the RCP's position. As a result of the two actions, many party activists were put in jail. Despite their imprisonment, however, they managed to keep up an active party organization. Toward the end of World War II, serious divisions again emerged among the groupings within the RCP over whether the

Vladimir Tismaneanu, who received his Ph.D. from Bucharest University in 1980, is a Research Analyst at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia. His articles on revolutionary ideology have appeared in Orbis and Praxis International, and he is currently working on a study of the radical Left in Latin America.

¹The readying of a "dynastic succession" in Romania is described by Walter M. Bacon, Jr., in his chapter on Romania in Richard F. Staar, Ed., *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs*, 1984, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1984, p. 363.

²An excellent overview of the RCP can be found in Robert R. King, *A History of the Romanian Communist Party*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1980.



Bela Kun, a Hungarian communist prominent in the Romanian Communist Party in its early years.

—EUPRA.

party should organize armed resistance against the German forces or wait for Soviet troops to "liberate" the country and impel a "revolutionary transformation."

Following the war and the return from exile of prominent party activists, the rivalries continued until Dej managed to gain predominance in the party in the early 1950's. As Dej rose, Ceaușescu's career also advanced. By the time of Dej's death in 1965, Ceaușescu's selection as secretary general was a virtual certainty, although he, too, had to face and eliminate opponents within the party.

Crucial to the history of the RCP—and of other communist parties as well—was Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign launched at the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956. The varied responses by communist parties to this shattering of the Stalin myth meant a break in the pattern of conformity to Moscow's dictates. The Chinese deviation from the Soviet line gradually developed into the Sino-Soviet split.³ In Romania, Dej temporized on de-Stalinization. Initially,

he seemed to encourage a correction of Stalinist abuses in the RCP, only to purge those who dared to try it. With regard to the Sino-Soviet dispute, he did not offer the CPSU the unqualified support that Moscow asked of its satellites. In fact, he shifted from being a "neutral" mediator in the quarrel to supporting China. In the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), Dej defied Soviet wishes by refusing to agree to a "socialist division of labor" on the grounds that it would discriminate against less developed Romania. Thus, it can be argued that the seeds of Romania's autonomous foreign policy and eventual identification with developing countries can be found in Dej's reaction to de-Stalinization. One can also argue that Ceaușescu's policies sprang from the same roots.

Unfortunately, there are numerous obstacles to a factual inquiry into the history of the RCP. They include scarcity of reliable documentary sources on the power struggles inside the party, inaccessibility of government and party archives and of memoirs of prominent party activists, and endeavors by Romanian propagandists to obscure the truth. Also, survivors of the RCP's clandestine interwar period as well as of its Stalinist era refuse for the most part to share their memories with outsiders. Therefore, some misunderstandings and inaccuracies persist in Western writings on Romania, although several thorough and well-documented studies do exist.⁴

I believe that I have had perhaps a unique opportunity to interview veterans of the RCP apparatus and the Balkan Bureau of the Comintern, as well as Romanian communists who fought in the International Brigades in the Spanish Civil War and in the FTP-MOI (Francs-Tireurs et Partisans français-Main d'Oeuvre Immigrée), the communist units in the French Resistance, many of whom now live in France and other Western countries.⁵ In addition, I have been able to obtain some party documents previously unavailable to scholars, including materials from the interwar period relating to its clandestine congresses and factional struggles.

⁴See, for example, Ghita Ionescu, *Communism in Rumania, 1944-1962*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1964; Ghita Ionescu, *The Politics of European Communist States*, New York, Praeger, 1967; Kenneth Jowitt, *Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania, 1944-1965*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1971; Stephen Fischer-Galati, *The New Rumania: From People's Democracy to Socialist Republic*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1967.

⁵My personal and intellectual interests led me to seek out and interview a number of participants in the Romanian communist movement while I still lived in Romania. Subsequently, in 1981-82, I had the opportunity to meet many former activists of the RCP in Paris. Regrettably, I cannot identify my sources by name as this could put them and their families at risk.

³For one of the earliest and best accounts of the development of the quarrel, see Donald Zagoria, *Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1962.

I shall attempt to contrast the information from these sources with the interpretation of Romanian developments offered by the Ceașescu entourage. Since Ceașescu became engaged in constructing a personality cult that rivals Stalin's, many events and actors in the history of the RCP have been played down or ignored by propagandists in Romania. It is my hope that this essay will help to provide a much-needed corrective.

The Formation of the RCP

The RCP was formed in 1921 as a result of a split in the Romanian socialist party. As in other socialist parties, the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and the establishment of the Communist International in Moscow in 1919 led to divisions among the socialists in Romania over their attitude toward and connection with both.⁶ Among those pushing for close ties between Romanian socialists and the Bolsheviks and the Comintern were such figures as Bulgarian-born Christian Rakovsky, who later served as a leading diplomat for the Soviet government. In 1920, a six-member delegation of Romanian socialists went to Moscow where they had a historic meeting with Lenin to negotiate affiliation with the Comintern. Some of the delegates objected to the subordinate position of the "national sections" in relationship to the Comintern.⁷ Subsequently, the RCP was founded by the leftwing members of the socialist party who accepted the principle that the RCP should be a Leninist vanguard party subject to the discipline of democratic centralism and form an integral part of the Comintern.

The chief features of the RCP—sectarianism and a propensity toward factionalism—were thus imprinted upon it from the very beginning. The socialist party did not have a particularly large following in Romania. The RCP had an even smaller one. Moreover, many of the members and influential figures in the RCP were not Romanian by nationality. Thus, for example, Bela Kun, the Hungarian communist leader whose short-lived Soviet republic in Hungary was suppressed in part by Romanian troops, was delegated by the Comintern to be a sort of "tutor" to the RCP. Like Christian Rakovsky, he became an inspiration for many decisions adopted by the Romanian communists. Both Rakovsky and Kun disregarded Romanian cultural

and political traditions. They denigrated the Romanian socialist movement, underrated the nationalist aspirations of the Romanian intelligentsia as well as of the working class, and ignored the interests of the Romanian peasantry. The Romanian communists, too, were largely indifferent to the problems of the people they claimed to represent, as well as to Romanian national-patriotic values.⁸ These tendencies became accentuated after the Romanian government banned the RCP in 1924. Even if the party had remained legal, it would have had a difficult time in attracting a sufficient following to allow it to participate in Romanian political life. As it was, the RCP functioned increasingly as a branch of the Comintern and, by extension, of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Its policies were dictated by Soviet foreign policy considerations, and its leadership was changed whenever Soviet policy was modified in the course of the factional struggles in the CPSU that spilled over into the Comintern following Lenin's death.

A major split occurred within the RCP in 1928, following its 4th Congress which took place in Khar'kiv, then the capital of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. It separated the followers of the "elected" secretary general, Vitaliy Holostenko (known as Barbu), a member of the Bolshevik Party, from the supporters of Marcel Pauker (Luximin), whose base was the Union of Communist Youth in Bucharest. Irritated by the exacerbation of the rivalry between the two factions, the Comintern Presidium decided to put an end to this "unprincipled factional struggle" by adopting a resolution ordering the dismissal of both men and the appointment of different leaders with a new political program. The new leader was Alexander Stefanski (Gorn), whose task was to enforce the Comintern's line by ensuring the Bolshevikization and normalization of the RCP's internal activity in the aftermath of the squabbles.

The Comintern's resolution followed the post-Bukharinist line, the so-called third period strategy.⁹ Predicated on the assumption that capitalism was on the verge of collapse and a communist revolution imminent, the resolution branded as "rightwing deviationism" all collaboration between the communist and social-democratic parties, on the principle that the proletariat should not ally itself with "social fascists." The resolution also criticized the lack of

⁶See "Communist International" in *Marxism, Communism and Western Society. A Comparative Encyclopedia*, Vol. II, New York, Herder and Herder, 1972, pp. 89–99.

⁷The first secretary general of the RCP, Gheorghe Cristescu, who was expelled from the party in the 1920's, recalled these events in his memoirs, excerpts of which were published in Romanian historical journals after 1965.

⁸This applied especially to territorial claims. See Henry L. Roberts, *Rumania: Political Problems of an Agrarian State*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1951, pp. 247–54.

⁹See, for example, Milorad M. Drachkovitch and Branko Lazitch, "The Third International" in Milorad M. Drachkovitch, Ed., *The Revolutionary Internationals, 1864–1943*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1966, pp. 185–86.

"Bolshevik intransigence" in the Romanian communist leadership, advocated the strictest ideological vigilance, and called for the expulsion of "traitors" from the party.¹⁰

The victims of the ensuing purge of the RCP belonged to the Leninist generation who had imposed the Bolshevik style on much of the Romanian revolutionary movement but who, abiding by their original faith, expressed doubts about the validity of the Comintern's line. In particular, they questioned the growing bureaucratization of the Comintern and the applicability of its directives to Romania.¹¹

The 5th RCP Congress, held in Moscow in 1931, brought another change of tactics and another set of leaders. The new policy blended the revolutionary optimism of the Comintern's third period strategy with a more realistic assessment of Romanian socio-economic and politico-cultural conditions. The realization that the RCP was isolated from the Romanian population led to an emphasis on social revolution as a gradual process that could occur only after a "bourgeois-democratic" revolution had taken place. This was held to apply especially in an underdeveloped country like Romania that had a large peasant majority and a comparatively small working class that lacked a strong revolutionary consciousness. This strategy called for the infiltration of labor unions and peasant organizations.¹²

As noted earlier, the communists under Gheorghiu-Dej's leadership managed to organize a strike of railroad workers in 1933. Although Dej was arrested before the actual strike began, his trial made him known in Romania and considerably enhanced his reputation within the party. It was also in the 1930's that the RCP began to attract some prominent Romanian intellectuals and journalists, who had become alarmed by the growing political strength of the Iron Guard and dissatisfied with the policies of King Carol II. Moreover, in 1935 after the Comintern decreed its "united front of democratic forces" policy in order to combat fascism,



Nicolae Ceaușescu in the early 1930's, when he was elected a member of the National Anti-Fascist Committee.

—EUPRA.

the RCP tried, but with only limited success, to become a part of the forces opposed to the Iron Guard and the King's dictatorial proclivities.¹³ It is difficult to measure accurately the importance of the RCP in the anti-fascist coalition largely because Dej and, after him, Ceaușescu have been able to impose their own interpretation of this period. Nevertheless, it is true that RCP activists played an important role in organizing an anti-fascist demonstration on May 1, 1939. Among the organizers was Nicolae Ceaușescu, then a leader of the Communist youth movement. He was arrested for this activity and remained imprisoned until summer 1944.

Factional struggles subsided after 1931 in the sense that all the groups within the RCP became more responsive to the Comintern's directives. Nevertheless, the party continued to have a divided leadership that engaged in bitter personal rivalries. After 1933, three centers existed—one in Moscow and two in

¹⁰King, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

¹¹After 1965 the Political Publishing House in Bucharest published a series of biographies of the first generation of Romanian communists, including Elek Köblös, Eugen Rozvanyi, Marcel Pauker, Gilbert Moscovici, Timotei Marin, Alexandru Dobrogeanu-Gherea, David Fabian, Ecaterina Arbore, and Imre Aladar. Despite many distortions, these studies have contributed to a better understanding of the conflicts between the Comintern and the Romanian communists.

¹²Most important among the activists who shaped this major change in strategy was Elena Filipovici (Maria Ciobanu), Stefanski's closest collaborator, who was elected to the Politburo at the 5th Congress. She delivered the political report at the congress and was later appointed the RCP's representative to the Comintern. Unlike many other party leaders, she was born to a Romanian working class family and was more concerned than many of her comrades with the everyday life of the proletariat. During the Great Purge, she was accused of being a Trotskyite and was killed.

¹³For Romania's political situation in the 1930's, see Roberts, *op. cit.*, pp. 170-222.

Romania. Of the domestic centers, one was led by the elected secretary general and the other coalesced in prison around Dej. Although some of the communists who had been arrested with Dej were released or managed to escape earlier, Dej remained imprisoned until 1944.¹⁴ The jailed communists had sufficient room for maneuver to maintain their organizational structure, hold discussions, and communicate with their comrades outside. Soon the party organization in the prisons began to compete for preeminence with the formal leadership. It was during his first imprisonment for party activity in 1936–38 that Ceaușescu had established ties with Dej—ties that were then cemented when he was serving his term following the 1939 protest demonstration.

After the 1936–38 purges, the party leadership in Romania was transferred from Stefanski to Boris Stefanov and then to another team headed by Stefan Foris, a Hungarian. Foris had a solid intellectual background, but he was also a doctrinaire who loyally carried out the Comintern's policies. His selection was supported by the Moscow-based center of the RCP, many of whose members worked in the Comintern apparatus. In 1940 the leadership of the Moscow center also changed, following the imprisonment or execution of a number of Romanian communists in Stalin's purges.¹⁵ Stefanov, a Bulgarian, was Romania's representative to the Comintern at that time and also briefly headed the Moscow center of the RCP; he was removed for committing some political blunders and replaced by Ana Pauker and Vasile Luca.¹⁶ Both belonged to the old guard of the RCP and had the full trust of the Comintern Presidium. They also had the support of a group of political refugees that included many of the veterans from the International Brigades during the Spanish Civil War and RCP old-timers mostly of Bessarabian origin, who had followed the directives of the RCP and left Romania for the Soviet Union after the Soviet annexation of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina in 1940.¹⁷ During World War II, directives were regularly transmitted via the Soviet consulate in Varna, Bulgaria, from the Moscow group to the two domestic centers of the RCP (Dej's "center of prisons" and the Foris group).¹⁸

One of the facts obscured by contemporary official Romanian historiography is the competition that existed during the war between the two domestic groups within the RCP. The party was theoretically led by the Central Committee and its secretary general, Foris. But his leadership was seriously challenged by the center of prisons especially after the start of the Soviet-German war in 1941. Apart from some personal animosities that nourished the competition, the two groups differed in their views on strategies for anti-fascist resistance in Romania. It is almost certain that Foris and his supporters, among whom Remus Koffler was the most influential, opposed the idea of organizing a partisan movement, while the center of prisons favored it.¹⁹

The center of prisons was unquestionably dominated by Dej. My interviewees characterized him as being imbued with a sense of political mission and responsibility, eager to exert total control over the party organization, and combining power of persuasion with ruthlessness toward potential rivals. Dej's principal supporters in Doftana prison included his fellow railroad workers and militants who had organized the 1933 strike: Dumitru Petrescu, Constantin Doncea, and Gheoghe Vasilichi.²⁰ Other communist activists in Doftana were Gheorghe Apostol, Teohari Georgescu, Iosif Chișinevschi, Alexandru Draghici, Chivu Stoica, Iosif Ranghet, Bela Brainer, Alexandru Moghioroș, as well as a group of Soviet agents charged with espionage. The most prominent among the latter was Pintilie Bodnarenko (Pantiusha) who would become the chief of the Romanian secret police in the 1950's.

Dej's group was split up in 1940 after the establishment of the military regime of General Ion Antonescu. Some prisoners, including Dej and Ceaușescu, were sent to the Tirgu-Jiu concentration camp, while others, mostly Jews, were deported to camps in Transnistria, an area of the Soviet Union then being administered by Romania. After 1941, Dej's faction allied itself against Foris with Petre Gheorghe, Foris's

¹⁴Some of my sources ascribe Dej's intense dislike for the Comintern and some of the RCP leaders to the fact that Dej was among the few prominent activists whose rescue from jail was never arranged.

¹⁵For the purges, see Roy Medvedev, *Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1972.

¹⁶Stefanov had written an article in 1939 which anticipated the Soviet annexation of Bessarabia in 1940. Upon the strong protest from the Romanian government, the Soviets disavowed any such intentions and had Stefanov dismissed.

¹⁷King, op. cit., pp. 28–29.

¹⁸In its striving for total independence from the USSR, the RCP has done its best to conceal the Varna channel.

¹⁹Personal communication to the author.

²⁰These three escaped from Doftana in 1935 with help from the RCP. They went to the USSR where their paths diverged. Vasilichi went to France in 1936 and later became a key figure in the FTP-MOI. Doncea fought in the International Brigades during the Spanish Civil War, then returned to the USSR where he worked at the Romanian department of Radio Moscow together with Dumitru Petrescu. Both Doncea and Petrescu became political officers in the Tudor Vladimirescu division organized in the USSR from among Romanian prisoners of war. Doncea and Petrescu were expelled by Dej from the Central Committee in June 1958 but were rehabilitated by Ceaușescu in 1968.



Nicolae Ceaușescu, center, with his wife Elena at a Bucharest youth rally in August 1944.

—EUPRA.

deputy and the secretary of the Bucharest party organization.²¹

In early 1944, two emissaries were dispatched from Moscow to Bucharest to report on the situation within the RCP; they were Emil Bodnaras and Constantin Pirvulescu, two of the most trusted of Stalin's agents in the Romanian party.²² They judged the Foris team to be politically bankrupt, and recommended that Foris be removed from his position of secretary general and that Moscow back the center of prisons. For the CPSU's emissaries, the Foris Central Committee was too isolated, rigid, and sectarian to transform the RCP into a mass party. On the strength of these recommendations, Dej, an ethnic Romanian, benefited from Moscow's decision to build up the national base of the RCP so as to counteract the negative impression created by the dominance of foreigners in the party leadership.²³

The RCP in Power

A coalition government—of the National Peasant, National Liberal, Social Democratic, and Communist parties—was established following the coup of August 23, 1944, which deposed General Antonescu's regime and switched Romania's allegiance from the Axis to the Allied powers. By that time, the Soviet armies were in Romania. Their presence naturally enabled the RCP to gain the political preponderance in the government that the RCP could not have achieved by itself. RCP membership also increased very rapidly.²⁴ By 1948, the RCP was able to dispense with its coalition partners.

Dej's domestic center and the group of Romanian communists returning from Moscow merged. Ana Pauker and Vasile Luca, together with Dej and Georgescu, became the RCP's ruling quartet. Their first goal was to eliminate their common enemies, namely, the faction led by Foris. Foris was removed from the RCP leadership, accused of having acted against the revolutionary movement, placed under house arrest by the party, and executed without trial in 1946.²⁵ This union of the Dej and the Pauker-Luca groups was only a provisional alliance against adversaries inside and outside the party.²⁶

The 6th Congress of the RCP (the 1st Congress of the Romanian Workers' Party), which took place in February 1948, sanctioned the destruction of the Romanian Social Democratic Party through its "merger" with the Communist Party into the Romanian Workers' Party. The decisions taken at this congress emasculated the anti-fascist front and firmly established the communists in power. The Social Democratic leaders who had opposed the merger with the RCP were imprisoned, while those who cooperated with the communists became their pawns. Dominated by Dej and Ana Pauker, both of them tempestuously acclaimed, the congress codified the new strategy that would turn Romania into a people's democracy.²⁷

²¹Gheorghe was captured and killed by the Gestapo. In 1944, Dej's faction accused Foris and Koffler of informing on Gheorghe and other communists.

²²Bodnaras was an officer in the Romanian Royal Army when he was exposed as a Soviet agent. He defected to the USSR and returned to Romania during World War II to organize communist paramilitary units. In the Stalinist era, he was a member of the Politburo and defense minister. Although he maintained close contacts with the Soviet leadership after Stalin's death, he became one of the architects of Dej's autonomous foreign policy. He was also a close adviser to Ceaușescu, among the few from the old guard to be retained.

²³Robert King, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 64. Membership rose from an estimated 1,000 in August 1944 to over 1,000,000 by February 1948.

²⁵Foris was arrested by the military secret service of the RCP on April 4, 1944. The decision to execute him was made by the four secretaries of the RCP in 1946; the operation was carried out by the Soviet agents inside the RCP, led by the chief of the administrative department of the CC, the NKVD officer Pintilie Bodnarenko.

Bodnarenko also organized the assassination of Foris's mother. His wife, Victoria Sirbu-Foris, was arrested and convicted as her husband's accomplice; she survived her prison term and was invited by Ceaușescu to speak at a meeting of the Bucharest party cadres in April 1968, when both Foris and Patrașcanu were rehabilitated.

²⁶François Fejtő, *A History of the People's Democracies: Eastern Europe Since Stalin*, New York, Praeger, 1971.

²⁷For a history of the economic and social policies introduced in Eastern Europe, see Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1967.

The late 1940's in Eastern Europe were years of Stalinist terror and dictatorship by the political police which was in turn controlled and manipulated by Soviet advisers and agents.²⁸ Yugoslavia's conflict with the Soviet Union in 1948 contributed to the tightening of political screws. According to Stalinist thinking, the "class enemy" had infiltrated the communist parties. Purges were launched to root out "hidden conspirators."²⁹

The purge of Lucrețiu Patrașcanu in 1948, and his trial and execution in 1954, is one of the least studied of the East European political trials and one of the most disgraceful episodes in the history of Romanian communism. It falls into the second phase of Stalinist repression—the persecution of prominent national leaders of communist parties who had been active in the anti-Nazi underground (László Rajk and later Janos Kádár in Hungary and Władysław Gomułka in Poland).³⁰

Patrașcanu undoubtedly was one of the party's most gifted and popular leaders.³¹ A long-time RCP activist, Patrașcanu had been in charge of the RCP's negotiations with the Liberal and National Peasant parties in preparing the anti-fascist coup and was appointed minister of justice in the first post-coup coalition government. He was a member of the delegation that went to Moscow in September 1944 to negotiate an armistice between Romania and the Soviet Union. There, some of his remarks were interpreted by the Soviets as an indication of "nationalist arrogance." He was also a member of the Romanian delegation to the 1946 Peace Conference in Paris. Later that year he was publicly attacked by Dej for a speech he had made before Romanian students in the city of Cluj in



Ana Pauker, center, and Soviet Marshal Kliment Voroshilov meet the widow and family of Georgi Dimitrov at the Sofia railroad station after accompanying the body of the well-known communist figure from Moscow in 1949.

—BLACK STAR.

Transylvania, following ethnic incidents there. In that speech, Patrașcanu had tried to emphasize the RCP's commitment to Romanian patriotic values. His ideas were distorted by Dej and invoked as an argument against him in the Secretary General's report to the Central Committee in November 1946. Patrașcanu was dismissed from his posts and was not permitted to speak in his own defense at the Congress of the Romanian Workers' Party in 1948. Georgescu declared before that body that the former minister of justice had "fallen under the influence of the bourgeoisie," "become an exponent of bourgeois ideology," and had constantly "overestimated the forces of the enemy."³² He was also accused of being a "Titoist-Fascist" agent and a spy working for Western intelligence services. He was imprisoned together with his wife and several close associates and subjected to exhaustive interrogations.³³

Although there is no room here to discuss Patrașcanu's trial in detail, the idea prevails in Western scholarship that he was a potential Tito. This impression has to be rectified. There is nothing in Patrașcanu's writings to suggest a blueprint for an "independent" approach to socialist revolution.³⁴ It is

²⁸Materials published during the Prague Spring describe the system of repression operated by the political police and confirm the involvement of the Soviet secret police in the show trials in Czechoslovakia. (See, for instance, Eugen Loebli, *My Mind on Trial*, New York, Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1976; and Jifi Pelikan, Ed., *The Czechoslovak Political Trials*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1971.) In Romania, Soviet agents had an even more decisive role since they were officers of the Romanian political police and members of Dej's entourage. When the Romanian-Soviet conflict broke out, the agents were removed from their positions but continued to live as privileged citizens of Romania.

²⁹Adam B. Ulam, *Titoism and the Cominform*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1952; Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, *Le grand frère. L'Union Soviétique et l'Europe soviétisée* (The Big Brother: The Soviet Union and Sovietized Europe), Paris, Flammarion, 1983.

³⁰In the first phase, the "bourgeois" political parties were attacked; the third phase was directed against some of Moscow's most faithful supporters who had been involved in the Comintern's operations and "were linked to Stalin throughout their personal histories." See Carrère d'Encausse, op. cit., pp. 115–27.

³¹A Western-educated lawyer who joined the RCP in 1921, Patrașcanu served as defense lawyer in several trials of communists in the 1920's. He was one of the organizers of the Grivița strike. In the 1920's and 1930's he was elected to parliament as a member of the Workers' and Peasants' bloc. See Roberts, op. cit., pp. 256, 290; Ionescu, *Communism in Rumania*, pp. 40, 151–60, 354.

³²Ionescu, *Communism in Rumania*, pp. 151–56.

³³His wife survived and reemerged in public life after 1965. His mother was drowned in the Cris river in Transylvania by agents of the political police.

³⁴His work, *Problemele de baza ale Romaniei* (Fundamental Problems of Romania), Bucharest, 1944, was a pragmatic political piece that intended to strengthen the ideology of the RCP. His other writings, particularly *Curentii si*

worth noting that Patraşcanu was tried and sentenced to death together with Koffler, Foris's deputy, whose dismissal from the Politburo in 1944 Patraşcanu had supported. Thus, the trial's purpose was not to stamp out Titoism in the Romanian party but to remove rivals from power and discredit the party's old guard. At the trial, many "old-timers" became the accusers of their former comrades. It seems, however, that Pauker, Luca, and Georgescu did not share Dej's obsessive hostility toward the two men.³⁵

Patraşcanu was not executed until 1954. It also seems that his execution was the outcome of a Romanian initiative rather than a Soviet-dictated action, although the Romanians had used Soviet advice in preparing the trial. His imprisonment for nearly six years would not, however, have been possible without Soviet approval and—in view of the subordination of the Romanian secret police to Moscow—without direct Soviet involvement in the investigation of the case. Patraşcanu's execution, one year after Stalin's death, resulted from Dej's awareness that times were changing and that Patraşcanu might become an alternative that could be dangerous to a group that was heavily identified with the worst Stalinist excesses. Thus, Dej and his adherents feared Patraşcanu as a potential catalyst for an anti-Stalinist reaction in the party that could challenge their position. Moreover, they feared that he could be used as a political card by the Soviets in their search for alternative solutions in Eastern Europe.³⁶

Ceaşescu was not a member of the Politburo that endorsed Dej's and Chişinevski's decision to execute Patraşcanu.³⁷ This meant that he was not personally implicated in the verdict. Later, Ceaşescu was able to capitalize on this dubious political innocence in or-

der to make himself out to be an anti-Stalinist and to discredit Dej's policies.³⁸

Much better known in Western historiography is the purge by which Ana Pauker, Luca, and Georgescu were removed from power in 1952.³⁹ The elimination of his remaining serious rivals enabled Dej to impose uniformity upon the party. The successful enforcement of party discipline and a structural reorganization of the party that brought a new generation of cadres into the apparatus helped Dej consolidate power further. Ceaşescu's political career also benefited from these changes.⁴⁰

In April 1954, Dej initiated a redistribution of power in order to prevent the Soviets from imposing changes similar to those that had forced Mátyás Rákosi in Hungary to share decision-making with the reform-minded Imre Nagy. At the Second RWP Congress held in December 1955 Dej emerged as the party's uncontested ruler. At this congress Ceaşescu presented a report on the modification of party rules. This was his first major political speech. In it, he listed the preservation of monolithic party unity, of the "indestructible alliance with the Soviet Union," and of the "glorious, invincible doctrine of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin" as his chief tenets.⁴¹

The RCP's Independent Line

The 20th Congress of the CPSU in February 1956 dramatically affected the relations of Moscow with its satellites. By attacking Stalin's leadership of the CPSU, Khrushchev also brought into question Moscow's leadership of the international communist

tendinte in filosofia romanesca (Currents and Trends in Romanian Philosophy), reedited, Bucharest, Political Publishing House, 1971, were clearly ideologically orthodox.

³⁵In 1968, at a meeting of the Bucharest party cadres, Ceaşescu revealed that Dej had criticized Georgescu in 1952 for not managing, as minister of interior, to uncover all the "evidence" of Patraşcanu's "guilt."

³⁶For the evolution of Eastern Europe in the post-Stalin era, see François Fejtő, op. cit.; Leszek Kolakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism*, Vol. III, *The Breakdown*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978; Wolfgang Leonhard, *Three Faces of Marxism*, Paragon Books, 1979; Richard Lowenthal, *World Communism: The Disintegration of a Secular Faith*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1964; Leopold Labedz, *International Communism After Khrushchev*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1965; Imre Nagy, *Un communisme qui n'oublie pas l'homme* (Communism That Does Not Forget Man), Paris, Plon, 1957; Tibor Meray, *Ce jour-là: 23 octobre 1956* (That Particular Day: October 23, 1956), Paris, Robert Laffont, 1966; Tamas Aczel, Ed., *Ten Years After. The Hungarian Revolution in the Perspective of History*, New York, Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1966; for a "critical Marxist" approach see Ferenc Fehér and Agnes Heller, *Hungary 1956 Revisited. The Message of a Revolution—A Quarter of a Century After*, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1983.

³⁷Chişinevski, Stalin's henchman in the RCP who masterminded the communist takeover of Romania, turned against Stalin following the 20th CPSU Congress.

³⁸As part of his offensive against Dej's barons after 1965, Ceaşescu rehabilitated Patraşcanu, Foris, and the other victims of the Stalinist period. He attacked Alexandru Draghici, minister of interior from 1952 to 1965 and Dej's heir apparent, for the Stalinist purges; he also spoke of Dej's direct responsibility in ordering them. "We must stress that a great responsibility falls on the Political Bureau members, who contented themselves with the conclusions presented without asking for firm proof, as they should have done in light of their special party responsibility and of the gravity of the case involving a prominent militant of the party." Nicolae Ceaşescu, "Speech Delivered at the Meeting of the Party Aktiv of Bucharest Municipality on April 26, 1968" in *Romania on the Way to Completing Socialist Construction: Reports, Speeches, Articles*, Bucharest, Meridiane Publishing House, 1969, p. 178.

³⁹See Annie Kriegel, *Les grands procès dans les pays communistes: la pédagogie infernale* (The Communist Countries' Great Trials. An Infernal Pedagogy), Paris, Gallimard, 1972. Accused of conspiratorial activity together with Georgescu, the so-called rightwing deviationists were removed from their positions and imprisoned. Ana Pauker was released after a short term in prison (1952–53), but was kept under permanent surveillance in Bucharest and was periodically attacked by the party's leaders and propagandists until her death in 1960. Luca died in prison in 1963.

⁴⁰King, op. cit., pp. 91–94, and Ionescu, *Communism in Rumania*.

⁴¹*Congresul al II-lea al Partidului Muncitoresc Român* (The Second Congress of the Romanian Workers' Party), Bucharest, Editura de Stat pentru Literatura Politică, 1956.



Petru Groza, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Ambassador S. I. Kawtaradze, and Vasile Luca in 1952.

—EUPRA.

movement. Indeed, communist parties—the Chinese, French, Italian, Albanian, and Romanian—began to question Soviet policies. According to Miron Constantinescu, a member of the Romanian delegation to the 20th Congress, Dej was profoundly upset by the revelations in Khrushchev's secret speech. In Dej's view, by denouncing the idol of world communism, Khrushchev was committing a historical blunder. The Romanian leader shared Mao Zedong's contempt for Khrushchev's "sensationalism."⁴² This was the first step in the development of the Romanian-Soviet dispute. Dej began to court the Chinese; indeed, after 1956, the Romanian communists had more in common ideologically with Mao's China and Hoxha's Albania than with Gomulka's Poland. Yet, Dej also used his maneuvering skills to improve his country's relations with Yugoslavia, whose leaders he had stigmatized at the 1949 Cominform meeting as a "gang of assassins and spies."⁴³

Since he was personally threatened by the new line adopted at the 20th CPSU Congress, Dej had to temporize in the debates that developed in the RCP. Some of the party old-timers reproached Dej and his Politburo for alienating the working class and for stifling democracy and criticism within the party. At the Politburo meetings of March and April 1956, such old Stalinists as Chișinevski, Constantinescu, and Constantin Pirvulescu challenged Dej's authority. They invoked the slogan of the 20th CPSU Congress about the "restoration of Leninist norms to internal party life" in order to weaken Dej's position and restructure the party's leadership. Ceașescu's role in these political debates was somewhat ambiguous. According to statements he made later, he took a "liberal" stance, criticizing Draghici and the political police for the "inadmissible practice of ignoring the party's control over the security organs."⁴⁴

⁴²One of the best analyses of the origins of the Romanian-Soviet dispute can be found in Georges Haupt, "La genèse du conflit soviéto-roumain" (The Genesis of the Soviet-Romanian Conflict) in *Revue française des sciences politiques* (Paris), August 1968. See also Branko Lazitch, *Le rapport Khrushchev et son histoire* (The Khrushchev Report and Its History), Paris, Seuil, 1976.

⁴³See, e.g., King, op. cit., p. 52. The RCP played an important role in Moscow's anti-Yugoslavian campaign. When Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform in June 1948, the organization's headquarters was moved from Belgrade to Bucharest.

⁴⁴Ceașescu, "Speech Delivered at the Meeting of the Party Aktiv." A few days earlier, the April 1968 plenum had rehabilitated Patrașcanu, Foris, Koffler, Constantinescu, Dumitriu Petrescu, Constantin Doncea, and others. An official record of the plenum has not been published, but Georgescu's denunciation of Dej's involvement in the Patrașcanu affair was revealed at the April 26 meeting; Georgescu himself had been principally responsible for arrests and interrogations. Bodnarenko was also attacked at the plenum and later expelled from the party. In May 1971, however, on the 50th anniversary of the founding of the RCP, Bodnarenko was decorated, although only his Romanian name, Gheorghe Pintilie, was used in the

The Hungarian uprising and the Polish crisis in the autumn of 1956 placed Dej in an advantageous position in his behind-the-scenes confrontations with the Khrushchev leadership. These events also reinforced his fear of "anarchic-liberal" developments in Romania. Dej succeeded in having the June 1957 Plenum stigmatize the Chişinevschi-Constantinescu group for alleged anti-party activities. In reality, the alliance between Chişinevschi and Constantinescu had been dictated by pragmatic considerations. They believed that Dej's leadership was so compromised as a result of the revelations about Stalinist abuses that it should be removed from power. They tried to persuade other members of the Politburo to join in their efforts to topple Dej. Although they were successful in drawing Pirvulescu, the president of the party control commission, into the conspiracy, they did not manage to win over Alexandru Moghioroş, who informed Dej about the plot.⁴⁵

Subsequently, Dej extended his control by initiating a purge of the party as a whole. In this situation, Ceauşescu could once again demonstrate his loyalty and his determination to combat the "revisionist" deviators and troublemakers attempting to undermine the party's unity. In his capacity of CC secretary responsible for cadre policy, he was the organizer of the purge of those party members who had voiced doubts about Dej's policies. The purge permitted Ceauşescu to staff the propaganda apparatus and the higher echelons of the party with his own supporters.

After the Hungarian revolution, Dej's leadership attempted to frighten the party and the population into believing that any challenge to Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy or even advocacy of modestly liberal policies would bring about Soviet reprisals.⁴⁶ Dej criticized the Hungarian revolution and expressed his support for the Soviet military intervention. In 1958, Khrushchev



Chinese Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong welcomes Romanian Communist Party Political Bureau member Ion Maurer to Beijing on March 10, 1964; behind Maurer is Nicolae Ceauşescu; at center, Chivu Stoica.

—EASTFOTO.

made the unexpected decision to withdraw the Soviet troops that were stationed in Romania.⁴⁷

At the plenum of the Central Committee in December 1961, Ceauşescu delivered a speech in which he attacked Pauker, Luca, and Georgescu for "rightwing deviationism." This speech helped Ceauşescu to ingratiate himself even more with Dej. Ceauşescu already had a following in the party through his involvement in the day-to-day running of the party apparatus, which grew accustomed to his style and habits. After his 1961 speech, moreover, Dej made Ceauşescu the chief of the organizational directorate, which included the CC's section for party organization and the section that supervised the "special organs," that is, security, military, and justice.⁴⁸

The outbreak in 1962–63 of open hostile polemics between the Soviet and Chinese parties, and Khrushchev's difficulties following the Cuban missile crisis, enabled the Romanian communists to escape Moscow's domination. Dej cast himself into the role of mediator between the two competing communist centers. Rather than following Moscow's lead in relations with other communist parties and other states, Dej began to develop independent ties with them. Ceauşescu also became involved in Dej's diplomacy. Together with Prime Minister Ion Gheorghe Maurer,

official record of the ceremony. His wife, Ana Toma, who had been one of the principal witnesses against Patraşcanu and Koffler and one of Dej's closest supporters, was awarded the title "Hero of Socialist Labor," a distinction given by Ceauşescu to many other prominent personalities of the Stalinist period.

⁴⁵Constantinescu, a sociologist and historian who had been active in the prewar antifascist press and in the Union of Communist Youth, became a member of the Politburo and held the posts of editor-in-chief of *Scînteia*, head of the State Planning Commission, and minister of education. He was downgraded in 1957 and then rehabilitated by Ceauşescu in 1968.

⁴⁶Moghioroş, a Hungarian, joined Dej's faction during the war. After the war he became a secretary of the CC.

⁴⁷Others punished for the plot included Constantin Doncea and Dumitru Petrescu, Dej's comrades during the Griviţa strike, as well as Liuba Chişinevschi, Iosif's wife and a vice president of the party control commission.

⁴⁸See Robert R. King, "Romania," in Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone and Andrew Gyorgy, Eds., *Communism in Eastern Europe*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1979, p. 152.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 152–53.

⁴⁸King, *op. cit.*, pp. 66–67, 92–93.

he went to China, North Korea, and the Soviet Union in 1964 for talks with Mao, Kim Il-song, and Khrushchev.

The Romanian-Soviet dispute became overt in 1962–63 as a result of differences about CMEA's long-term strategy and Khrushchev's goal to have Romania provide an agricultural base for the industrially more developed CMEA countries. In this framework, Ceaușescu became one of the most ardent advocates of Romania's "independent" line. However, he avoided any deviation from what he perceived to be classic Leninist dogma. In a confidential lecture he delivered to students of the party academy in 1964, Ceaușescu emphasized the relevance of Stalinist ideology. His audience was apparently astonished to hear him praise Stalin's theoretical legacy, particularly the work *The Problems of Leninism*; Ceaușescu referred to it as obligatory reading for anyone wanting to understand Marxism-Leninism.⁴⁹

Ceaușescu in Control

After attending the Warsaw Pact summit conference in Poland in February 1965, Dej was immobilized by lung cancer. He died on March 19. A few days later, Ceaușescu became the party's secretary general, and Chivu Stoica, one of Dej's closest collaborators since the war years, became chairman of the Council of State. Ceaușescu had apparently been in full charge of the party Secretariat even before Dej's death and was generally considered Dej's heir apparent. His rise was fiercely opposed by Draghici and Apostol. To counter them, Ceaușescu gained the trust and support of Maurer, Bodnaras, Leonte Rautu, and Alexandru Birladeanu. The last two were rewarded for their support by being appointed secretary of the CC and full member of the Politburo, respectively. Ceaușescu further strengthened his control of the party by making Paul Niculescu-Mizil a secretary of the CC and by having Manea Manescu and Ilie Verdet elected to the party Secretariat.⁵⁰



Nicolae Ceaușescu in 1965, when he became Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party.

—EASTFOTO.

Ceaușescu now acted to impose his own style on the party. At the CC plenum in May 1965, he proposed a motion to change the party's name from the Romanian Workers' Party, adopted in 1948, to a "more revolutionary and mobilizing" one, the Romanian Communist Party. The plenum also rehabilitated the victims of the 1958 purge by annulling the resolution of the June 1958 plenum on penalties applied against a number of prominent party members who had criticized Dej in the spirit of the resolutions of the 20th Congress of the CPSU.⁵¹ At this time, Ceaușescu

culture and shaped Dej's cultural policies until 1965. In April 1964, he was one of the authors of the declaration of Romania's neutrality in the Sino-Soviet conflict. Under Ceaușescu, he became a secretary of the CC, then a vice president of the government. In 1971 he was appointed rector of the Stefan Gheorghiu Academy for Training Cadres in Socio-Political and Economic Activity and State Administration, but lost his job when one of his daughters applied to emigrate to the United States.

Birladeanu, an economist, was vice president and minister of foreign trade. He was ousted by Ceaușescu in 1969.

Niculescu-Mizil became the party's chief ideologist. He represented Romania at many international communist meetings and played an important role in shaping the RCP's relations with other communist parties. He was demoted in 1974.

⁵¹See Stephen Fischer-Galati, *Twentieth Century Rumania*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1970, pp. 204–05.

⁴⁹Private communication to author by persons present at that meeting.

⁵⁰Draghici was accused of staging the Patrașcanu trial and expelled from the party in 1968.

Apostol, a member of the Politburo and a vice president of the government, for a long time considered Dej's heir designate, was ousted by Ceaușescu in 1969. He is currently Romania's ambassador to Uruguay.

Maurer, a defense lawyer for the RCP in the 1930's, participated in the plot against Foris but fell out of favor with Ana Pauker. In 1955 he reemerged in public and became the minister of foreign affairs, president of the National Presidium, and then prime minister from 1961 until his retirement in 1974.

Rautu, head of the Romanian department of Radio Moscow, returned to Romania in 1945 and became a member of the CC. As head of the Directorate for Propaganda and Culture, he assisted Chișinevschi in his campaign of Russifying Romanian

presented himself as an anti-Stalinist and a liberal. During meetings with the Union of Writers in the spring of 1965, he took a firm stand against "vulgar sociology" and "socialist realism," and encouraged criticism of Stalinist abuses in the fields of culture and ideology. He encouraged critics of Zhdanovist aesthetics and supported their outspoken criticisms of the Russification of Romanian culture.⁵²

Ceaușescu advanced his ideological, political, and economic goals at the RCP's 9th Congress in July 1965. The congress adopted a new interpretation of the country's history, stressed the national values neglected during Dej's term, emphasized national self-determination and neutrality in the conflict between Moscow and Beijing, and explicitly criticized Dej's autocratic leadership.⁵³ Ceaușescu also strengthened his control over party structures by establishing both the Political Executive Committee (a body larger than the traditional Politburo) and the Permanent Bureau. This move aimed at weakening Dej's "barons" in the Politburo and promoting a new political elite loyal to Ceaușescu.⁵⁴

Once his power was consolidated, however, Ceaușescu returned to tighter ideological control that resembled the Stalinist era. After an official visit to China in 1971, he apparently became convinced that a cultural mini-revolution would cure the centrifugal tendencies within the RCP and the "liberalism" among the Romanian intelligentsia. He presented his views in the so-called July Theses, which are a model of political obscurantism and unrepentant Stalinism.⁵⁵ This was followed by the November 1971 plenum's rehabilitation of Zhdanovist-Stalinist aesthetics, an attack on liberalism within the party, and a call for combating "intellectualism."⁵⁶ The policy of cultural freeze has remained in effect ever since.

Ceaușescu has maintained Dej's course of distancing Romania from the USSR. Despite its membership in the Warsaw Pact, Romania does not allow the pact to conduct military maneuvers on its territory. The pact forces' invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968—without Romanian participation—led Ceaușescu to take an unequivocally anti-Soviet stand in a speech he gave in Bucharest on August 21,

1968,⁵⁷ and to reject the Brezhnev Doctrine.

Ceaușescu applies the concepts of national sovereignty and equality not only to state-to-state relations but also to communist party relations. He had consistently rebuffed Moscow's attempts in the late 1960's and 1970's to enlist Romania in its anti-Chinese campaigns. In 1968 he supported the Greek communists who founded the Greek Communist Party (Interior) in exile in Romania and expelled the pro-Soviet Kollyannis faction from the country. He had regular consultations with the Yugoslav leadership. In addition to maintaining close ties with the People's Republic of China, Ceaușescu has cultivated Bulgaria's Todor Zhivkov and North Korea's Kim Il-song. He has defended the leaders of the Spanish and Italian communist parties against Soviet attacks, despite his own reservations about the Eurocommunists' strategies.

Romania's distance from Moscow has also been stressed in Romanian interpretations of Marxism-Leninism. The concept of the "multilaterally developed socialist society" has been conceived as a Romanian reply to the Soviet concept of "developed socialism." For Romanian doctrinaires—Miron Constantinescu was the most prolific writer on this issue until his death in 1974—the difference between the two outlooks consists of the emphasis placed on the dimension of "socialist consciousness," and on the interpretation of history aimed at creating the "new human being, builder of the new society."⁵⁸

The RCP's ideologues have credited Ceaușescu with many ideological innovations, including explication on antagonistic and nonantagonistic contradictions in socialism. For Ceaușescu, the essence of socialist society precludes the emergence of antagonisms, but he insists that under certain circumstances nonantagonistic contradictions can turn into antagonistic ones, if the political leadership loses touch with the aspirations of the masses. It is the role of the "subjective factor," i.e., the Marxist-Leninist party, to discover and solve potential conflicts.⁵⁹

With regard to relations with noncommunist states, Romania began to develop good state-to-state relations earlier than other Warsaw Pact members. It also has the distinction of being the only pact country to maintain diplomatic relations with Israel. At the RCP's 11th Congress in 1974, Ceaușescu began to focus on

⁵²King, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

⁵³Fischer-Galati, *op. cit.*, pp. 183–224.

⁵⁴While the Executive Committee grouped a large number of party apparatchiks, the Permanent Bureau became the supreme body of the party. In reality, power was already divided between these two bodies, and Ceaușescu increasingly manipulated them to enhance his personal power.

⁵⁵In 1971 Ceaușescu launched a campaign to order ideological, cultural, and educational activity along Marxist lines. See, King, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*

⁵⁷*Scinteia*, August 22–26, 1968. This was the most liberal week in the history of the Romanian Communist press, but this democratic mood was suppressed after Ceaușescu met with the Soviet ambassador.

⁵⁸King, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

⁵⁹Robert Wesson, Ed., *1983 Yearbook on International Communist Affairs*, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1983, p. 328.



Nicolae Ceaușescu addresses the Congress of Political Education and Socialist Culture in June 1976.

—EASTFOTO.

the problems of socialism in developing countries. According to Ceaușescu, nonaligned countries have to challenge the superpowers' domination of the world and band together to provide solutions to international conflicts.⁶⁰ Calls for the establishment of a "new international economic order" have become a regular feature in major Romanian foreign policy statements. Romania has "guest" status in the Nonaligned Movement.⁶¹

Dynastic Socialism

Romania's once orthodox Marxist-Leninist regime is steadily evolving into Ceaușescu's personal despotism. The Secretary General and the privileged caste—in this case largely members of his own family—dominate the party and the state and are apparently intent on establishing hereditary power. Personal rule of this sort requires appropriate ideological adjustments. Legitimacy is being increasingly sought

not through Marxism-Leninism and the vanguard party but through appeals to the spirit of the Romanian nation reputedly embodied in Ceaușescu.⁶²

The Secretary General is presented by official propaganda as the incarnation of the eternal spirit of the Romanian people, whose historical mission he is fulfilling. His ideas and actions are made out to represent the contemporary equivalent of the political and moral will that inspired the struggles for independence waged by Romanian feudal princes and, earlier, the Dacian kings.⁶³ Despite Ceaușescu's reassuring statements, many Hungarian, German, and Jewish intellectuals have felt threatened by the increasingly nationalistic pronouncements and writings.⁶⁴

⁶⁰See, for instance, Trond Gilberg, "Romania's Growing Difficulties" in *Current History* (Philadelphia, PA), November 1984, pp. 375–89.

⁶¹Part of the interpretation of history under Ceaușescu is that the ancestors of the Romanians, the Dacians, had already established a centralized modern state extending over much of Eastern Europe around 100 B.C.

⁶²The publication of anti-Semitic writings was brought up by an Israeli official at a meeting with Ceaușescu in June 1984. According to a report published in the Israeli newspaper *Yedi'ot Aharonot*, Mordechai Tzipori, the communications minister, thanked Ceaușescu for censoring Corneliu Vadim Tudor, author of some anti-Semitic poetry. Tudor and the book's editor were the only people to be penalized. Eugen Barbu, the editor of the cultural magazine *Saptamina* and an influential representative of the xenophobic trend in Romanian culture, retained his position as editor but was stripped of his candidate membership in the CC at the 13th party congress in November 1984.

⁶⁰Richard F. Staar, Ed., *1975 Yearbook on International Communist Affairs*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1975, pp. 75–76.

⁶¹Romania became an "invited guest" at the Nonaligned Movement's Colombo conference in 1976. Although Ceaușescu seemingly has ambitions to become another Tito in the Nonaligned Movement, in fact, Romania is much less influential than Yugoslavia, which was a founding member.

Numerous volumes have been put out by the Political Publishing House to celebrate Ceaușescu's "creative thought." With the exception of translations of classical and contemporary Marxist philosophical works, all publications on the social sciences, ethics, and aesthetics mention Ceaușescu's contributions to the development of "scientific socialism." References to Marxism-Leninism have been replaced by ceremonial evocations of the universal truths of "historical materialism," and the Romanian philosophical dictionary gives more space to its entry on the President's "doctrine" than to entries on Marx, Engels, and Lenin combined.⁶⁵

Articles and essays that idealize Ceaușescu's achievements appear regularly in the press. Historians and social scientists attempt to define the Ceaușescu "doctrine." Ceaușescu is described as the most orthodox interpreter of Marxist doctrine, a prominent figure in international communism, a champion of the "new international economic and political order." He is extolled as a "genius of contemporary diplomacy," the incarnation of "the purest virtues of the Romanian people," the "morning star of Romania's national destiny." Other phrases used to describe him, for instance at the June 1984 plenary meeting of the RCP's Central Committee, include "the most beloved son of the people, brilliant revolutionary strategist, builder of modern Romania, eminent party and state leader, . . . illustrious communist thinker, revolutionary tribune steed in the working class' fight for safeguarding the Romanian people's vital interests."⁶⁶

Those of my interviewees who knew Ceaușescu before the war already then detected qualities in him that would be reflected in his behavior and beliefs once he was in power. The young Ceaușescu combined communist doctrine with a mystical romanticism. He was inspired by Stalin's personality cult and saw the Soviet Union as the universal proletarian motherland. His ideological education in the prewar

years was acquired from the popularized Marxist texts published and distributed by the RCP and from the discussions in prison.

He resisted all deviation from the party line. Available information does not support the thesis that Ceaușescu always cherished Romanian national sovereignty. Nothing suggests that the many Comintern actions that were contrary to Romanian national interests led Ceaușescu—as they had some other Romanian communists—to doubt the correctness of the Comintern line. Ceaușescu presumably remained undisturbed even by the June 1940 ultimatum by which the Soviet government compelled Romania to accede to the annexation of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina. Unquestionably obedient to his superiors, Ceaușescu yearned to exert his authority over the party members subordinate to him. My interviewees noted too that Ceaușescu needed approbation and accepted criticism grudgingly.

Ceaușescu has the most personalized style of rule among East European leaders. Indeed, according to Trond Gilberg, the "most important decisions in Romania today are being made in response to Ceaușescu's personal initiative. . . . The apparatchiks either wait for an initiative from the general secretary or attempt to anticipate his wishes."⁶⁷ Apparatchiks such as Niculescu-Mizil, Virgil Trofin, Ion Iliescu, or Ilie Verdet,⁶⁸ who had been pillars of Ceaușescu's offensive against Dej's "barons" but who began to mistrust his increasingly adventurous course and the appropriation of power by his family and followers, have been gradually removed from positions of influence. The constant purges and rotations imposed by the Ceaușescu clan, and the suppression of all signs of opposition by the political police have paralyzed the

⁶⁵Trond Gilberg, *Modernization in Romania since World War II*, New York, Praeger, 1975, p. 84. Several of the most important American contributions to the interpretation of the social, political, and intellectual evolution of Romania in the last few decades are David Lloyd, *Rumania: Russia's Dissident Ally*, New York, Praeger, 1965; Daniel N. Nelson, *Democratic Centralism in Romania: A Study of Local Communist Politics*, Boulder, CO, East European Monographs, 1980; John M. Montias, *Economic Development in Communist Romania*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1967; Daniel Chirot, "The Corporatist Model and Socialism: Notes on Romanian Development" in *Theory and Society*, 1980, pp. 363–81; Walter D. Connor, "Dissent in Eastern Europe: A New Coalition?" in *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1980; Myron Rush, *How Communist States Change Their Rulers*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1974; Richard F. Staar, *Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe*, 4th ed., Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1982; King, op. cit.

⁶⁶Trofin, who died in 1984, was expelled from the Political Executive Committee in 1982 and became a target for Ceaușescu's violent criticism, because he spoke up about the dangers of Ceaușescu's personality cult. Ion Iliescu who, like Trofin, was a leader of the Union of Communist Youth in the early 1960's, was criticized for "literal-intellectualist" inclinations and dismissed from his post of secretary of the CC. However, he remained a candidate member of the Political Executive Committee for several more years.

⁶⁷Publications and TV documentaries annually celebrate the President's and his wife's birthdays, as well as the anniversaries of his various "historical" initiatives. See *RFE Romanian Situation Report* (Munich—hereafter RFE/RL Report), Jan. 29 and Feb. 19, 1983. One of the more sycophantic eulogies to Ceaușescu's genius was delivered by Dumitru Popescu, rector of the party academy, at the 11th RCP Congress in November 1974. Popescu compared Ceaușescu to Julius Caesar, Peter the Great, and Napoleon. According to my sources, in the first draft of his speech, Popescu also mentioned Lenin's name, but the Romanian leader decided to abandon this comparison in order not to annoy the Soviets. See Popescu's speech in *Congresul al II-lea al P.C.R.* (The 11th Congress of the RCP), Bucharest, Editura Politica, 1974. Adrian Paunescu, editor-in-chief of the weekly *Flacăra*, is one of the most offensive poets; for example, he once thanked Ceaușescu for having built "schools and universities instead of prisons."

⁶⁸See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Eastern Europe* (Washington, DC—hereafter FBIS-EEU), June 28, 1984, p. H/3.



Romanian President Nicolae Ceaușescu and his wife, Elena, meet with West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl in Bonn during an October 1984 visit to the Federal Republic of Germany.

—Gaby Sommer/Gamma-Liaison.

party. The present elite manifests few signs of diversity.⁶⁹

Ceaușescu's principal partner in power is his wife, Elena Petrescu. They had met and married in 1939 when both were activists in the Union of Communist Youth. From 1945 to 1954, she was a functionary in the International Department of the party's Central Committee. She then enrolled at the Polytechnic Institute in Bucharest and immediately became one of the leaders of its party organization; she graduated with a degree in chemical engineering. In 1958 she became a research fellow at the Central Institute of Chemical Research (ICECHIM) and was appointed the secretary of its party organization. In 1973, she was elected to the Central Committee, subsequently rising in the party hierarchy to the Permanent Bureau of the Political Executive Committee, and to head of the CC's section for party cadres, the second most important position in the party. Currently, she is also the director general of ICECHIM, a member of the Academy of the Socialist Republic of Romania, chairman of the National Council for Science and Technology, and first

deputy prime minister of the Romanian government. Convinced of her scientific vocation and her historical mission in promoting Romania's technological development, Elena Ceaușescu matches her husband in ambition. In recent years, she has been accorded public adulation on a par with him.⁷⁰

The RCP's 12th Congress in November 1979 marked the visible establishment of the Ceaușescu clan and its cult. Only Constantin Pirvulescu, a member of the party's elite until demoted by Dej in 1960, dared to challenge Ceaușescu's monopolization of power. This defiance deprived him of his seat at the Congress.⁷¹ The active promotion by the Ceaușescus of their youngest son Nicu's political career can also be dated from the 12th congress.

Born in September 1951, Nicu has been the only one of the couple's children to be interested in becoming politically active.⁷² He was made leader of the Union of Communist Students' Associations of Romania in 1972; in 1983, he became first secretary of the Union of Communist Youth. He became a candidate member of the CC and a secretary of the Grand

⁶⁹The apparatchiks on the Political Executive Committee owe their positions to Nicolae Ceaușescu. Coman and Ciobanu are secretaries of the Central Committee, Pana is the first secretary of the Bucharest party municipal committee, and Dascalescu is the prime minister. The fact that official AGERPRESS reports mention Elena Ceaușescu's name before that of the head of government serves as flagrant proof of their subordination to the Ceaușescus.

⁷⁰For an analysis of Elena Ceaușescu's personality cult, see *RFE/RL Report*, Feb. 24, 1984.

⁷¹See a statement about this incident by AGERPRES (Bucharest), Nov. 23, 1979.

⁷²The other two children, Valentin and Zoia, are both researchers, the former in nuclear physics and the latter in mathematics, and they have reportedly refused to become involved in politics, despite their parents' encouragement.

National Assembly at the 12th congress. At the RCP's National Conference in 1982 he became a full member of the CC, and at the 13th congress in November 1984 a candidate member of the Political Executive Committee. Nicu's international contacts and initiatives, particularly his activities as chairman of the United Nations Youth Year commission, have been widely publicized in the Romanian press.⁷³ Nicu's wife, Poliana Cristescu, is the head of the Pioneer Organization and secretary of the Union of Communist Youth; at the 13th congress in November 1984 she was elected a full member of the RCP Central Committee.

The President's extended family holds key positions within the party and the government. One brother, Nicolae A. Ceaușescu, is secretary of the Political Council of the Ministry of Interior; another brother, Ilie, a general, is deputy head of the Higher Political Council in the Ministry of National Defense and a member of the CC; Ion, another brother, is the vice chairman of the State Planning Committee, secretary of the National Council for Agriculture, Food Industry, Sylviculture, and Water Management, and a member of the Central Auditing Commission; Marin, another brother, holds a post in foreign trade; Florea, a brother, is a member of the staff of *Scînteia*, the party daily; a sister was the deputy minister of education until her husband Vasile Barbulescu, also a CC member, became party first secretary in Olt County in 1983. Elena Ceaușescu's brother, Gheorghe Petrescu, is a deputy chairman of the General Union of Trade Unions, and member of the CC, the Council of State, and the Executive Bureau of the Socialist Democracy and Unity Front. The President has also been known to promote people originally from his native village Scornicești in Olt County.

The 13th RCP Congress in November 1984 was devoted to boundless adulation of Nicolae and Elena Ceaușescu. The speech by Petru Enache, a candidate member of the Political Executive Committee and secretary of the CC in charge of cultural-ideological problems, was characteristic in this regard:

In the years that have elapsed since the 12th party congress, the party and the Central Committee led by Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu personally, have carried out an extensive and multifaceted activity. At a time when, as the party secretary general of our party has so tellingly stressed, the world is like a sea with "huge boulders caused by earthquakes, storms, and eco-

nomic, political, and military hurricanes," the party has adopted the most realistic solutions and has led the country to new victories with great prospects for our homeland in terms of time and space leading up to a new national epic. Romania has successfully traveled a long, important stretch on the bright road to socialism and communism.

The unprecedented achievements in the economy, education, and culture lend our time the image of an impressive renaissance. The great victories won in these years have been possible due to the fact that our bold ship that bears the wonderful name of Socialist Romania has always had as watchman at the tri-color mast a competent and wise steersman, an experienced leader, namely Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu, the politician who, constantly concerned with fervent patriotism, with the destiny of his people, and acting toward the constant progress of the homeland, has also asserted himself as a great thinker and present-day strategist.⁷⁴

Ana Muresan, a candidate member of the Political Executive Committee and minister of domestic trade, spoke about Elena Ceaușescu as follows:

With feelings of great esteem and love we want to convey our appreciation and recognition to Comrade Elena Ceaușescu for the extensive activity she is carrying out in the party and state leadership in drafting and implementing the domestic and foreign policy promoted by Socialist Romania, in developing scientific research, education, and culture; for the valuable guidance granted to the National Women's Council; for the generosity and devotion with which she acts toward the country's progress, the people's well-being, toward strengthening and protecting the family, and toward raising and educating the young generation.⁷⁵

Although Nicu did not receive similar praise, he succeeded in promoting his close associates as members of the Central Committee. Cornel Pacoste, the former secretary of the party committee of Bucharest University, is now a candidate member of the Political Executive Committee and first secretary of the Timis County committee. Pantelimon Gavanescu, Nicu's predecessor as leader of the Communist Youth Organization; Eugen Florescu, former editor-in-chief of the official newspaper of the Communist Youth Organization; and other cohorts of his are now members of the CC.

⁷³See RFE/RL Report, Jan. 20, 1984.

⁷⁴FBIS-EEU, Dec. 3, 1984, p. H/3.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. H/2.

Among the very few old-timers who have survived in prestigious positions are Gheorghe Radulescu, Manea Manescu, and Mihail Florescu. Although he remains a member of the Political Executive Committee and vice president of the State Council, Radulescu has no real influence in the decision-making process. Manescu, who reemerged after 1982 as a member of the Political Executive Committee, is thought to be one of Elena Ceaușescu's confidants and a loyal follower of the Secretary General. Florescu, a former fighter in the International Brigades and perhaps the last Jewish member on the CC, is Elena's right hand at the National Council for Science and Technology. He owes his survival to her since she relies on him in the field of chemical industry.

It is worth noting, in conclusion, that the few remaining intellectuals of stature were dropped from the Central Committee at the 13th Congress. Among them are Eugen Jebeleanu, a distinguished poet and one of the leaders of the liberal wing of the Union of Writers; George Macovescu, formerly foreign minister and until 1982 president of the Union of Writers; and Mihnea Gheorghiu, president of the Academy of Social and Political Sciences. As Romania moves into an ever deepening economic morass, there is no one left ei-

ther to challenge or correct the policies of Romania's ruling family. Thus, the official resolution adopted at the 13th RCP Congress appears to mirror accurately the political system prevailing in Romania:

In the comprehensive work of building the new system, the great achievements in the period opened by the ninth party congress are particularly noticeable, achievements which are indestructibly linked to the extensive activity carried out with clear-sightedness and in a profound, creative spirit, with revolutionary devotion and fervent patriotism by Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu, party secretary general and president of the Republic, founder of modern Romania, the national hero who with boundless devotion serves the supreme interests of all our people, and under whose wise leadership the Romanian people have registered the richest accomplishments—in their entire history—in the past 20 years, a period that has definitely entered our nation's awareness as the "Ceaușescu era."⁷⁶

⁷⁶Ibid., Nov. 29, 1984, p. H/4.

Notes & Views

Doublethink in the USSR

James P. Scanlan

ALTHOUGH the action of George Orwell's *1984* was set in a future England, the society imagined by Orwell in 1948 bore a striking resemblance to the Stalinist Soviet Union of his day, and it is widely assumed that the Soviet Union of our day is still marked by the active use of "doublethink" and the other devices of thought control described so chillingly by Orwell. To a large degree this assumption is quite correct. But there is also a sense in which the assumption is incorrect or at least misleading, and may for that reason cause us to misunderstand the intellectual culture of the USSR in the 1980's.

It is difficult to separate Orwell's portrait from the true condition of culture in the Soviet Union because our view of the latter has been powerfully shaped by the former. A close study of contemporary Soviet philosophical thought, however, suggests that Orwell's direst prophecies concerning intellectual life under totalitarianism have not been borne out in the USSR. "Doublethink" may be found, but it is not eagerly promoted by the Communist authorities. Control of the dictionary, which they have enjoyed for decades, has not given them complete control of the mind. Constriction of the permissible vocabulary has not made subversive thoughts altogether unthinkable. Especially ironic and instructive has been the ability of individual Soviet citizens to turn doublethink and related devices *against* the authorities. Intellectual life in the USSR is not free; it is tragically repressed and confined. But

neither is it dead—though its very vitality may be called Orwellian.

By way of assessing the level and the character of that vitality, let us survey the uses of doublethink in current Soviet philosophical discussions, beginning with the standard Orwellian use of doublethink to support "goodthink," or orthodoxy, and proceeding to other uses that do not correspond to the stereotype bequeathed us by Orwell.

Doublethink in Soviet Philosophy

Although Orwell's characterization of doublethink in *1984* is loose enough to accommodate a number of different varieties of intellectual incoherence, in its root meaning the term signified for him the willingness and the ability to accept as true both sides of a logical contradiction, whether it be in the form of a pair of contradictory statements such as "Today is Monday" and "Today is not Monday" or in the form of a single, self-contradictory assertion such as the famous devices "War is peace" and "Freedom is slavery" which adorned the facade of the Ministry of Truth in the novel.¹

Is doublethink of this fundamental sort promoted in Soviet philosophy and ideology today? Certainly it is not aggressively flaunted as it was in Orwell's imaginative picture. Although the ideological devices found on Soviet buildings today include many patent falsehoods ("The Party and the people are one," "Labor is our joy"), none can be called directly contradictory or self-contradictory. But if contradictions are not vigorously advertised, are they nonetheless advanced in more subtle ways in Soviet Marxist-Leninist philosophy, with an eye to imposing on the populace views that are logically incoherent in fact if not in appearance?

¹George Orwell, *1984*, New York, New American Library, 1961, p. 32.

James P. Scanlan is Professor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University (Columbus). He is coeditor of Russian Philosophy (1965, reissued 1984). The present article is adapted from the forthcoming volume, James P. Scanlan, Marxism in the USSR: A Critical Survey of Current Soviet Thought, Ithaca and London, copyright © 1985 by Cornell University. Used by permission of the publisher, Cornell University Press.

Perhaps the most noticeable and at the same time the most revealing case of genuine Orwellian doublethink in current Soviet orthodoxy is one that may be found in the Soviet theory of the state. Marx's and Lenin's earlier characterization of the socialist state as a "dictatorship of the proletariat" had long seemed unnecessarily harsh to many Soviet ideologists. Even Stalin was moved to exclude that expression from the 1936 Constitution, calling the Soviet state instead a "socialist state of workers and peasants."² With the end of Stalin's rule, Khrushchev saw the opportunity to do away not only with the expression but with the very idea that the Soviet state continues to function as an instrument of class domination. Accordingly, in the Communist Party Program of 1961 it was announced that "the dictatorship of the proletariat has fulfilled its historic mission" and hence is no longer needed in the USSR, and that the Soviet state has become "a state of the entire people, an organ expressing the interests and will of the people as a whole."³ This new development was immediately taken up in the theoretical literature, where the "all-people's state" (*obshchenarodnoye gosudarstvo*) was trumpeted as the first state in history that is not an instrument of coercion used by one class to oppress others, but instead represents the entire population. This notion subsequently received the blessing of the Brezhnev leadership, and its ultimate authoritative recognition came with its enshrinement in the new, Brezhnev constitution in 1977.⁴

Although no Soviet writer has questioned the theoretical merits of the new political conception, outside the Soviet bloc it has been roundly condemned by Marxists and non-Marxists alike for its manifest departure from classical Marxist theory. Frederick Engels defined the term "state" as "a special repressive force" in the hands of a dominant class,⁵ and Marxist theorists from Marx through Lenin persisted in holding that it was the very nature of the state to be an instrument of class domination. And the socialist state, in the eyes of the theoretical founders of Marxism, is no exception. "Between capitalist and communist society," Marx wrote in his *Critique of the Gotha Program*,

"lies the period of the revolutionary transformation of the one into the other. Corresponding to this is also a political transition period in which the state can be nothing but *the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat*."⁶ Lenin, too, consistently regarded the socialist state, like all states, as a class weapon. "The essence of Marx's teaching on the state," Lenin wrote in *State and Revolution*, "has been mastered only by someone who has understood that the dictatorship of a *single* class is necessary not only for every class society in general, not only for the *proletariat* that has overthrown the bourgeoisie, but also for the entire *historical period* separating capitalism from 'society without classes,' from communism."⁷ It is only such a conception, of course, that imparts sense to the notorious notion that once communism is achieved the state will wither away—i.e., the state will atrophy from disuse when there is no longer a subordinate class to be oppressed. In Engels's words in *Anti-Dühring*, when the state "at last ... becomes the real representative of the whole of society, it renders itself unnecessary."⁸ Hence the idea of a "people's state," Lenin insisted in *State and Revolution*, is "nonsense" and "a departure from socialism."⁹

At this point it seems clear that there is a contradiction between current Soviet orthodoxy concerning the socialist state and the classical Marxist conceptions. It becomes a case of doublethink when we find that Soviet theorists vigorously deny that any inconsistency is present. In fact, the actual definition of the term "state" found even in the most recent of Soviet texts and reference books continues to rely on the old, genuinely Marxist formulas that exclude the "all-people's state." The latest (1980) edition of the Soviet *Philosophical Dictionary*, for example, defines "state" as "the political organization of an economically dominant class that seeks to preserve the existing order and to suppress opposition from other classes."¹⁰ Yet by this definition, of course, the all-people's state cannot qualify as a state, for according to Soviet Marxism-Leninism there are no antagonistic classes in the USSR. The new political organism is said to represent the interests and will of the entire society; hence to accommodate it, the concept "state" can no longer require class suppression as a necessary condition for

²Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as Amended by the 7th Session of the 5th Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1962, Article 1, p. 11.

³The Road to Communism. Documents of the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. October 17–31, 1961, Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, n.d., p. 547.

⁴Konstitutsiya (osnovnoy zakon) Soyuz Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik (The Constitution [Fundamental Law] of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literatury, 1977, pp. 4, 6.

⁵Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works in One Volume*, New York, International Publishers, 1968, p. 430.

⁶Ibid., p. 331 (emphasis in original).

⁷V. I. Lenin, *Polnoye sobraniye sochinenii* (Complete Collected Works), 5th ed., Moscow, Izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literatury, 1967–1970, Vol. 33, p. 35 (emphasis in original).

⁸Frederick Engels, *Anti-Dühring: Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science*, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1947, p. 333.

⁹Op. cit., p. 66.

¹⁰I. T. Frolov, Ed., *Filosofskiy slovar'*, 4th ed., Moscow, Izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literatury, 1980, p. 77.

its application. A broader generic concept of state is required, within which class-coercive and non-class-coercive states would form separate species. Yet Soviet philosophers do not advance such a broader conception, preferring instead to retain the classical Marxist conception, whose direct implication is that the state of all the people is not a state.

This inference, however, is not explicitly drawn in Soviet reference works or other philosophical writings. Certainly it is not proclaimed from housetop or billboard. Rather, it simply appears to be accepted without notice or fanfare. And because no special attention is drawn to it, we cannot say that there is any effort in current Soviet ideology to utilize precisely the *contradictory* aspect of the notion in the controlling of thought.

But why, then, it might be asked, have the dictionaries not simply been rewritten to express the broader concept required for the new, non-class-coercive state and thus avoid the contradiction? One reason, of course, is that Soviet theorists do not admit that any change has taken place; the all-people's state is not, they insist, a "revisionist" notion. But another reason may be fear of opening a conceptual Pandora's box. General recognition that the state is no longer to be seen as class-coercive by nature might encourage a search for other historical states—or worse, possible future states—to swell the non-class-coercive species, thus upsetting the claim of the all-people's state to be its one and only member. Considerations such as these may thus limit the power even of an absolutist ruling body to manipulate meanings by controlling the dictionary. It may be thought preferable to muddle along with the present confused situation, mouthing one definition but thinking another in the attempt to accommodate the conflicting demands of classical Marxism on the one hand and contemporary Soviet statism on the other.

If we may generalize from this one prominent case of doublethink in current Soviet orthodoxy, it would appear that Soviet philosophers are not so much blatantly employing doublethink to promote Marxism-Leninism among the population as they are responding to the reality that dictionary control cannot dissipate logical inconsistency in their ideology. If dictionary control could accomplish this, there would be no need for doublethink. Hence, the existence of the latter is testimony to the limitations of the former.

They are not, as we might have thought from Orwell, independent but mutually reinforcing mechanisms of thought control.

Defensive Doublethink

Indeed it would appear that in the tangled world of Soviet thought the device of doublethink is used as much by independently minded writers *against* Marxist-Leninist dogmatism as it is by Soviet authorities in the name of that dogmatism. Here the contradictions in question are again not explicitly drawn by writers, and they are certainly not *believed*. But many examples may be found in current Soviet thought of the tacit appeal to contradictory conceptual structures as a device for expanding intellectual horizons beyond what would otherwise be allowed. This "defensive doublethink," as it might be called, is surely as deliberate a use of formal incoherence as Orwell envisaged, but it is employed for the purpose of liberating thought rather than repressing it. Let us consider a few examples.

In Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy, "materialism" is a positive term, and whatever can be identified with materialism is thereby rendered worthy of consideration. Realizing this, Soviet writers are not slow to call "materialist" any views they wish to defend, up to and including views that directly contradict materialism. A case in point may be seen in the works of A. F. Losev, the distinguished Soviet classicist and philosopher. Losev, whose monumental study of the philosophy of Plato would be a credit to the scholarship of any nation, recommends attention to that philosopher on the ground that the ancient Greeks were all materialists at heart.¹¹ This contradictory identification of Platonic idealism with materialism is not drawn explicitly, but in Losev's writings it functions to justify respectful examination of Platonism.

Similarly, in Soviet philosophy of art, some writers use the label "realism" to legitimize attention to artistic standards and styles to which, objectively speaking, that term in no way applies. Thus in a 1978 article on monumental art in the journal *Dekorativnoye iskusstvo*, A. V. Vasnetsov seeks a word for the ideal toward which the monumental artist should strive, and he writes as follows: "I shall find no better term than 'realism,' understanding this term in the present case simply as an ideal of perfection contained in the truthfulness—that is, in the appropriateness and proportionality—of all the parts (ideas, material, vital and integral pictorial vision, architectural surroundings, and so on)."¹² Using such a definition, wherein "truthfulness" means not the accuracy with which a

¹¹A. F. Losev et al., *Antichnaya literatura* (Classical Literature), ed. by A. A. Takho-Godi, 2nd rev. ed., Moscow, Izdatel'stvo prosveshcheniya, 1973, p. 186.

¹²A. V. Vasnetsov, "Criteria of Intrinsic Value . . .," *Dekorativnoye iskusstvo* (Moscow), No. 1, 1978, p. 15.

representation portrays reality but rather the cohesion of the various elements of the work, one can call even the most abstract (i.e., unrealistic) creation "realist." Vasnetsov is in effect using the term "realism" to stand for purely formal values, but under contemporary Soviet conditions, it is difficult to fault him for asserting that he can find "no better term" for those values.

One of the most remarkable uses of defensive or liberating doublethink in recent Soviet philosophy may be found in an unlikely place—in the definitive and authoritative Soviet *Philosophical Encyclopedia*. Not surprisingly the work contains a lengthy article on the subject of *partiynost'* (party spirit, party-mindedness)—a quality which, in the eyes of Marxist-Leninists, is an unavoidable feature of any philosophical perspective and a particularly important feature of Marxism-Leninism.¹³ Since the interests of the Communist Party are held to be in harmony with the objective course of history, *Communist* partisanship coincides with scientific objectivity. But this encyclopedia article is no standard brief for devotion to the party's cause. The author of the article, G. S. Batishchev, presents a stinging rebuke to those whose first concern is for party loyalty—who believe, in his words, that "militancy provides a *guarantee* of objectivity in science, that subjective conviction in the service of the interests of communism and even the verbal declaration of devotion to communism in themselves assure one's correctness in an argument and a true position in the resolution of every problem." This, Batishchev argues, is a perverted conception, which (following Hegel) he calls "subjective partisanship." It reduces philosophy, he contends, "to the role of a handmaiden of religious, political, legal, and other ideological forces and institutions." True Marxism, on the other hand, stands for "objective partisanship," which he lauds in a remarkable litany:

The former [subjective partisanship] is the partisanship of the biased, prejudiced distortion of the objective logic of a subject; the latter [objective partisanship] is the partisanship of the unbiased, unprejudiced pursuit of logic all the way to its ultimate conclusions. The former means foisting onto a theory conclusions and evaluations demanded in advance; the latter means accepting and defending only those conclusions and evaluations to which we are bound by the investigation itself.... The former transforms

philosophy into an obsequious tool of external ends; the latter signifies the discovery of ends through sovereign philosophical investigation. The former looks at the whole world solely from the point of view of its usefulness or harmfulness to dogma; the latter always places the objective dialectic of the creative quest for truth above subjective considerations of expediency based on previously elaborated principles.

Subjective partisanship, Batishchev argues, appeals to "canonized texts" and leads to "the militarization of the methods and the language of debate." Objective partisanship, on the other hand, speaks for "the most eternally living science"; it opposes all dogmatism and is "the partisanship of science itself."

It would be difficult to imagine a more ardent defense of objectivity *against* partisanship than is found in Batishchev's defense of "objective partisanship." In fact there is nothing "partisan" at all, in the usual sense, in his conception: the word "objectivity" could be substituted *simpliciter* for every occurrence of his expression "objective partisanship." When Batishchev turns his praise of communist "partisanship" into an argument for an "objective partisanship" devoted to "sovereign philosophical investigation," i.e., to logic and facts, the tacit conclusion is that objective partisanship is not partisan, and Batishchev's readers are quite capable of finding the moral in that paradox.

In each of these cases, defensive doublethink is a means of enlisting the approbative force of authorized terms—e.g., "materialism," "realism," "partisanship"—behind sympathetic attention to the exact opposite of what they stand for officially. And if there is no genuine doublethink here (since no contradiction is *believed*), at least it behooves us to note that not all doubletalk in Soviet philosophy is "doublethink" of the standard, pejorative variety. Some of it, in the convoluted intellectual world of the USSR, is a device for evading the limitations on philosophical thought imposed by Communist authorities.

Toleration of Ambiguity

A feature of Soviet intellectual life that is still more important than defensive doublethink, however, and is perhaps the single most important respect in which the Soviet intellectual scene differs from Orwell's imaginative picture, consists in what might be called the continued toleration of ambiguity in Soviet thought. A principal feature of Orwell's "Newspeak"—the imposed language of the controlled society—is its attempt to strip authorized words of unwanted meanings, so that the words cannot be used to entertain or

¹³F. V. Konstantinov et al., Eds., *Filosofskaya entsiklopediya*, 5 vols., Moscow, Sovetskaya entsiklopediya, 1960–1970, Vol. 4, pp. 217–19.

to express unwanted thoughts. It is indisputable that efforts of this sort do take place in the Soviet Union—efforts not only to limit the lexicon of acceptable terms but to impose a single desired meaning upon each of the words that remain. But in Soviet practice these efforts have in no way produced a philosophical discourse that is perfectly unambiguous and incapable of heterodoxy. The continued ability of thinkers to entertain and employ different and sometimes contradictory meanings for the same “approved” term is another form of liberating doublethink in Soviet society.

A survey of recent Soviet philosophy shows that, in field after field, even the more orthodox Soviet philosophers are engaged in exploring, and in many cases in expanding, the variety of meanings that still attach to the most hallowed and elementary terms in the Marxist-Leninist vocabulary. Does the term “matter” mean the whole of objective reality, or does it name a particular class of ontological entities with specific properties? Does “infinity” signify spatio-temporal endlessness, the unceasing variety of material forms, or the epistemological inexhaustibility of the universe? Does “logic” stand for the study of formal relationships or of “dialectical” connections among things? Is what is called a “real contradiction” a logically consistent physical opposition in the material world (such as the antagonism of economic classes), or is it an antinomial, formally contradictory relationship among real things? Does the expression “economic base” extend to intellectual and emotional forces (such as science, and the morale of the socialist worker), or is it limited to strictly “material” factors? Is “art” a name for a particular kind of ideological reflection of economic interests, for the workings of material productive labor, or for a special kind of sign system?

Each of the alternative answers to each of these questions has champions among Soviet philosophers, and for that reason one cannot say that the semantic usages of Soviet Marxism-Leninism have been reduced to Newspeak poverty. If anything, they are marked by an openness that allows the kind of imprecision in discourse about which the prominent Soviet philosopher B. M. Kedrov complained when he said that some Soviet philosophers deliberately use terms in such a way that the reader may invest them with whatever meaning he pleases.¹⁴

Furthermore even when philosophers do generally agree upon a single meaning, unless the term in question is a purely invented or technical one with lit-

tle if any bearing on the lives of the great mass of people, the meaning promoted by the philosophers (and the ideologists behind them) must still compete against the other meanings associated with the term in the culture at large. Any term in common usage—“matter,” “logic,” “art,” or any other—brings with it from the broader culture and especially from the past a rich content of meaning. Its semantic freight is bound up not only with everyday activities and concerns but with a literary, artistic, and scientific heritage that Soviet Marxists have not rejected, despite certain tendencies in that direction among the early Bolsheviks. The term “freedom” (*svoboda*) is a prime example, and there is perhaps no clearer, more characteristic, or more significant case of the persistent toleration of ambiguity in Soviet intellectual culture than the failure of Soviet authorities to reduce the term “freedom” to a Newspeak uniformity of content that would preclude subversive and anti-totalitarian thoughts.

A single sense of the term “freedom” is advanced in the Soviet philosophical literature. Freedom is defined in every philosophical text and reference work as consisting in “the recognition of necessity”—the acknowledgment of, and the acquiescence in, the objective inevitabilities that structure the world around us.¹⁵ With regard to history, freedom so conceived consists in the acceptance of the objective laws of social change, in accordance with which society marches unswervingly toward communism; the free individual is the one who marches along, not the one who ignores or resists the laws. In the context of ethics, freedom is the recognition of the communist moral norms that are more and more disclosed as mankind progresses from the hell of class conflict through the purgatory of revolution toward the classless paradise. The ideological usefulness of this conception to Soviet authorities should be evident. The idea that there are inescapable external standards to which the individual's behavior must conform would appear to be just the sort of meaning a totalitarian order would seek to give to the word “freedom,” assuming that the word is to be retained at all.

When we turn to a current standard Soviet dictionary of the Russian language, however, we find no such univocal definition of “freedom.”¹⁶ Assuredly, a version of the prescribed sense is given pride of place as the first entry under the heading “Freedom.” But

¹⁴Engels, op. cit., pp. 136–37.

¹⁵S. G. Barkhudarov et al., Eds., *Slovar' russkogo yazyka v chetyrëkh tomakh* (A Dictionary of the Russian Language in Four Volumes), Moscow, Gosudarstvennoye izdatel'stvo inostrannykh i natsional'nykh slovary, 1957–1961, Vol. 4, p. 73.

¹⁴*Dialekticheskoye protivorechiye* (Dialectical Contradiction), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literatury, 1979, p. 320.

its domain is explicitly restricted to "Philosophy." This orthodox meaning yields immediately to a long list of conflicting meanings that reflect the full range of senses in which the term "freedom" is actually used in Soviet society, as it was in earlier Russian society as well:

FREEDOM ... Philos. The ability to realize one's goals and aspirations on the basis of knowledge of the laws of development of nature and society. "Freedom is not arbitrariness, but agreement with the laws of necessity." Belinsky.... 2. The condition of one who is not a slave or serf.... 3. The absence of political and economic oppression.... 4. The condition of one who is not imprisoned or in captivity.... 5. Personal independence, the absence of dependence on something or someone.... 6. ... The ability to act in some area without limitations or prohibitions, without hindrance.... 7. Easiness, the absence of difficulties.... 8. Noncompulsoriness, the absence of constraint.

Why, we may ask, have Soviet authorities not exercised their manifest power to control the dictionary, and simply eliminated all meanings after the first? No doubt because they realize that such a tactic would not prevent people from *using* the word in the other senses as long as those senses are alive in the broader culture and are appropriate responses to the events of intellectual and practical life. To strip the word of those contradictory meanings it would be necessary, for one thing, to suppress all of the Oldspeak literature in which the term "freedom" appears and is defined explicitly or contextually in any of the alternative senses. But Soviet Russia's Communists have shown themselves unwilling to take so drastic a step. They have not turned their backs on Russian folk literature or on the great Russian novelists, poets, and essayists of the 19th and early 20th centuries, but instead have resolved to tolerate the semantic diversity this rich national heritage contains. Since alternative and conflicting meanings are thus allowed to live, the controllers of the dictionary may reason that those meanings may be kept within bounds by clearly subordinating them to the prescribed philosophical definition in the dictionary listing.

But of course people do not learn their basic vocabulary from dictionaries or philosophy books, and in the everyday life in which their language is formed, alternative senses of "freedom" abound. They crop up in the most formulaic of Socialist Realist literature. Soviet leaders unwittingly employ them in their public pro-

nouncements, as in their continued references to "free time" (*svobodnoye vremya*) as opposed to working time. And the alternative senses are of course prominently and deliberately displayed in samizdat writings; when in 1971 the authors of *The Sower* demanded "intellectual freedom and freedom of information" in the USSR, they were not asking for permission to acknowledge supposed historical or moral laws.¹⁷ No doubt the most influential uses of "freedom" to mean personal independence, the absence of constraints, and the like, however, appear in the writings of Pushkin, Tolstoy, Dostoyevskiy, and the other prerevolutionary authors whose works are treasured by the Soviet public as great products of the Russian national genius. It is to that literature above all that contemporary Soviet intellectual culture is indebted for the vitality it retains. Largely thanks to that literature Soviet students are still capable of the liberating doublethink that allows them to give one definition of "freedom" in a philosophy examination and to assume another in the events of daily life.

On a snowy November afternoon in Moscow not long ago, a group of Russian schoolchildren, released at last from a regimented tour of the Tret'yakov Art Gallery, burst out the door with gleeful shouts of "Freedom!" Had these young people been thoroughly imbued with the Marxist-Leninist notion of freedom as the recognition of necessity, they would have exclaimed "Freedom!" when they were trooped into the museum, not when they were let out. But surely no such cries of acquiescence in the inevitable have ever been heard in those halls. And that is a fact full of hope. As long as there are Soviet children who proclaim their freedom when they are released from constraints rather than when constraints are placed upon them, there will be Soviet philosophers who know the difference between free thought and intellectual regimentation, and who understand the importance of striving to find, for whatever words are permitted them, the meanings those words must have if they are to describe the world correctly and fruitfully. The work these thinkers produce may fail to make a major contribution to world philosophy, but it will stand as a monument to the resourcefulness of the human spirit in pursuing significance and truth under the most difficult of circumstances.

¹⁷"Samizdat. Sotsial-demokraticeskaya partiya. From 'The Sower.' A Call for a Liberal Opposition Party in the Soviet Union," *Intellectual Digest* (New York), January 1973, p. 16.

Books

Technology and the Soviet System

Dale R. Herspring

BRUCE PARROTT. *Politics and Technology in the Soviet Union*. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1983.

ERIK P. HOFFMANN and ROBBIN F. LAIRD. *The Scientific-Technical Revolution and Soviet Foreign Policy*. New York, Pergamon, 1982.

M. M. KIR'YAN, Ed. *Voyenno-tekhnicheskii progress i vooruzhënnyye sily SSSR* (Military-Technological Progress and the Armed Forces of the USSR). Moscow, Voenizdat, 1982.

V. M. BONDARENKO. *Sovremennaya nauka i razvitiye voyennogo dela* (Contemporary Science and the Development of Military Affairs). Moscow, Voenizdat, 1976.

THE GROWING salience of high technology in the arms race has important implications not only for the USSR domestically, but for East-West relations and for the West's ability to gauge developments within the Soviet Union as well.

Dale R. Herspring is a Foreign Service Officer, US Department of State. He is coauthor of *The Soviet Union and Strategic Arms* (1984). The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the US Government.

For the Soviets, advanced technology permeates all aspects of East-West competition. It is the key to the strategic balance of forces. Despite some suggestions that the Soviets are catching up with the West in the technological race, the Soviet press and specialized journals give the clear impression that Moscow is convinced that it remains in second place. Furthermore, since high technology is inherently dynamic, the Soviets appear to believe that all major breakthroughs (e.g., a stealth bomber) will occur in the United States, thereby forcing the USSR to devote a considerable amount of time and effort to matching them.

The American decision to restrict high technology exports to the USSR will further complicate Moscow's ability to compete, especially in the strategic arena. To make matters worse from the Soviet perspective, the absence of meaningful progress on arms control negotiations in the past few years means that one of the key instruments for attempting to restrain the development of American weapons systems has been weakened. Finally, the recent downturn in US-Soviet relations combined with the perception—at least on the part of the Soviet writers—that the US is acting to regain the strategic superiority it lost in the 1970's by intensifying the arms race in high technology areas has

heightened concern in the minds of the Kremlin's leaders and focused their attention on a Soviet response.

In addition, as is clear from the four books under review, technology is having a major impact on the Soviet Union itself. This is particularly true of the military sphere where, as Soviet writers note, the development of increasingly complex weapons systems has generated the need for major adjustments in the administration and management of its gigantic military bureaucracy.

BOTH of the Western books focus on the impact of modern technology on Soviet society. Bruce Parrott's excellent study examines the interaction between politics and technological performance from the founding of the USSR to the present. He analyzes the role of technological progress in Soviet thinking about the outside world; Moscow's strategy for dealing with the challenge of obtaining needed technology (i.e., of achieving the proper mix of foreign and domestic sources for developing new technology); and how this search for technology has influenced Soviet domestic institutions.

The equally useful book by Erik Hoffmann and Robbin Laird is, however, somewhat more narrowly focused. It deals primarily with the Brezhnev period and concentrates

on the question of the extent to which the Soviet leadership wants to rely on the West for modern technology. Echoing a theme from the Parrott book, the authors argue—persuasively, in this writer's opinion—that there has long been a major debate in the USSR between “conservatives” and “modernizers” (Parrott labels them “traditionalists” and “non-traditionalists” respectively). Both groups, Hoffmann and Laird argue, advocate the selective import of Western industrial and agricultural technologies. They differ, however, in their views of how much the USSR should open itself to contacts with the West. Conservatives tend to favor an autarkic approach, i.e., place primary emphasis on generating technological innovation within the Soviet system itself. They do not object to stealing technology from the West, but they want to minimize contacts with the outside world. Modernizers, on the other hand, look to cooperative arrangements with the West as a means of increasing the efficiency of Soviet industry. They are also far less concerned with the potential for subversion that, according to the conservatives, accompanies increased contacts with the West.

In this writer's opinion, greater reliance on technology, whether developed at home or acquired from abroad, presents a number of difficult problems for Soviet leaders. First, on the autarkic approach. Emphasizing the role of domestic factors as the principal source of modern technology only reinforces the already strong tendency to isolate the favored military sector from the rest of the economy. This in turn severely limits the chances that technological innovations adopted by the military will find their way into the civilian economy. Such an approach also intensifies autarkic tendencies in

other ministries. In addition, many Soviet leaders seem to be convinced that major structural reforms will be necessary before the USSR can hope to generate the needed technology. Such changes will inevitably cause important systemic dislocations, an anathema to Moscow's conservative party and state bureaucracies. It also would mean allocating still more funding and materials to the priority defense sector, thereby potentially starving the civilian sector of the resources needed to satisfy consumer demand. Finally, while technology stolen from abroad can sometimes be useful, it can also be inefficient. One can never be certain what type of equipment will be obtained, or how to integrate it into ongoing Soviet programs.

Obtaining technology from abroad legally through trade and cooperative arrangements also presents problems. First of all, it requires scarce hard currency. The bill can run into hundreds of millions of dollars, especially when entire factories are purchased. Second, buying technology abroad can create a dependence on foreign suppliers, conceivably giving the outside world an unacceptable degree of leverage over the USSR (the greater the quantity and value of the technology, the greater the dependence). Given the Soviets' suspicions regarding the outside world—not to mention the centuries-old Russian penchant for autarky—it is not surprising that a number of Soviet leaders oppose developing a dependence on the West. Third, some Soviets argue that extensive trading with the West to obtain advanced technology opens the door to ideological subversion. Similarly, scientific exchanges bring not only technological benefits but an influx of Western ideas and influence. Moreover, in the minds of some Soviet

leaders, such an expansion of contacts increases the risk of political and military espionage. On the positive side, it is more efficient to obtain technology legally than to steal it. Production cycles can be structured to incorporate the technology at the proper moment and in such a way as to maximize its contribution to productivity.

REGARDLESS of the means of acquisition, advanced technology also creates a need for serious modifications in existing political structures. Given their penchant for control and secrecy, Soviet leaders abhor such changes, particularly for the threat they might pose to centralized party control. For example, the use of computers—if only on a limited scale—implies greater access to information by individuals. Although computers can strengthen the party's control, they can also make it difficult for Moscow to maintain a monopoly over information. Yet, it is questionable whether the Soviet Union can hope to remain competitive in the international arena without permitting greater participation in decision-making—at least by specialists—in areas dealing with high technology.

Both the Parrott and the Hoffmann/Laird books make it clear that while the autarkic model has historically tended to be dominant in the USSR, the interdependent approach has at times also been influential in the Kremlin. For example, the autarkic emphasis of the Stalinist period gave way, under Brezhnev, to a conscious effort to rely more heavily on cooperative arrangements with the West. Both works argue, convincingly, that regardless of which tendency is dominant, the basic choice of approach is a *political* decision. As such, it reflects not only the correlation of

forces within the senior Soviet leadership, but also the leadership's perception of East-West relations (the worse the situation, the stronger the pressures to avoid co-operative arrangements with the West).

While Soviet security organs and military have traditionally been thought by many in the West to favor any approach that maximizes access to foreign technology, this does not appear to be the case. The Parrott and the Hoffmann/Laird books both demonstrate that these two groups have strongly opposed close economic ties with the West. Evidently, while they do not mind stealing whatever technology they can obtain (the attempt to acquire Western computers by transshipping them through Sweden comes to mind), when it comes to open acquisition, their desire for technology seems outweighed by concern with the attendant exposure of Soviet society to outside influences.

BEYOND its impact on the Soviet system as a whole, modern technology also has major repercussions for the Soviet military complex. The book edited by M. Kir'yan chronicles the numerous major changes that have occurred in weapons systems in the past 60-odd years, and discusses how these changes have affected the structure of the Soviet military and its doctrine. For example, the book argues that in the 1930's, reequipping the armed forces with newer weapons led to Moscow's 1938 decision to transform the military from a territorial force to a cadre army (p. 101). Likewise, the introduction of nuclear weapons—seen by Kir'yan as the single most important technological development in this century—resulted in the creation of a new branch of the Soviet armed forces—the Strategic

Rocket Forces. More important, the Kir'yan book leaves the reader with the impression that the Soviets continue to devote considerable time and effort to making their armed forces more responsive to the needs of modern technology.

Although written in 1976, the book by V. M. Bondarenko, a professor at the Moscow Military Political Academy, remains one of the best conceptual analyses of the impact of modern technology on military affairs published to date in the Soviet Union. Bondarenko's main theme is that modern technology, particularly the introduction of nuclear weapons and modern missiles, has revolutionized all aspects of military affairs. Today, decisions must be instantaneous; a higher level of combat readiness must be maintained; technical education/training becomes increasingly important; command, control, and communications—including the use of automated systems (i.e., computers)—play a greater role; and increased emphasis needs to be placed on the motivation of troops. A few examples will help to illustrate the profound implications that the problems raised by Bondarenko in particular have for the management of the Soviet military machine.

To begin with, the question of inspiring initiative continues to be a serious concern. How does one instill a sense of creativity—a characteristic that, Bondarenko argues, will be a vital one in a nuclear war—when the military system gives first priority to blind obedience? Both Bondarenko and Kir'yan mention this issue, but neither of them offers a satisfactory solution. Furthermore, while some progress has been made in reconciling ideological requirements for strict discipline with the pressure for a more managerial approach to administering highly

technical branches of the Soviet military, it is clear from other Soviet writings that Moscow has not reached a decision on this matter.¹

The Soviet military leadership is also confronted with the task of quickly analyzing and assessing ever-increasing amounts of information. How can commanders coordinate the actions of large numbers of dispersed personnel while at the same time retaining centralized control? The Soviet leaders' interest in the past 20 years in areas such as cybernetics and systems analysis suggests that they are attempting to find ways to deal with this issue. Likewise, the psychological stress likely to occur in a nuclear war creates special problems, as Bondarenko's study shows. Despite the importance of these concerns, there is no evidence in either of the Soviet works reviewed here that the leadership has arrived at satisfactory solutions.

The training of personnel qualified to deal with high technology is another problem for the Soviet military. A modern, highly technical military demands competent personnel to operate its equipment. While some of the more technical branches may be adequately staffed, areas of weakness are beginning to appear, particularly in the Ground Forces. For example, in a recent article in the journal *Kommunist vooruzhënnnykh sil*, the chief of the political directorate of a military district criticized the low level of technical expertise of mili-

¹See, for example, I. I. Anureyev, *Nauchno-tekhnicheskii progress i voyennoye delo* (Scientific and Technological Progress and Military Affairs), Moscow, Voenizdat, 1978; I. I. Potapov, *Nauchno-tekhnicheskii progress i flot* (Scientific and Technological Progress and the Navy), Moscow, Voenizdat, 1977; and A. B. Pupko, *Sistema: Chelovek i voyennaya tekhnika*, (System: Man and Military Equipment), Moscow, Voenizdat, 1976.

tary personnel.² Given the anticipated increase in the share of recruits from less-educated ethnic groups in the Soviet armed forces in the future, these problems can be expected to grow. Increasingly, recent Soviet articles give the impression that political officers devote an inordinate amount of their time to dealing with technical training.³ Does the low level of education of many Soviet soldiers help account for the technical simplicity of many of Moscow's weapons systems, as at least one Western writer has suggested?⁴

The civilian-military relationship is another matter of concern, at least to Bondarenko who argues that those who do not possess a good understanding of military-technical questions are not qualified to make foreign policy decisions (p. 128). Although Bondarenko carefully avoids any criticism of nonspecialists, the implications of his statement are clear. Assuming that his sentiments are shared by his fellow officers, the military's dissatisfaction with civilian meddling in highly technical areas could emerge as a severe problem for Soviet decision-making in a crisis situation.

The issues raised in the Kir'yan and Bondarenko books deserve more attention from Western analysts and policymakers, who in assessing the Soviet threat have tended to place primary emphasis on military hardware, presumably because it could be quantified. The latter type of information, while

vital, is far more sufficient for adequately understanding the Soviet military machine in general and the figurative height of the Soviet soldier in particular. The unresolved issues of technical training, troop control, and even potential disagreement between civilian and military leaders could have a serious impact on the combat readiness of the Soviet military and its ability to conduct a war. In some cases, these problems might turn out to be even more important than the equipment itself.

NEVERTHELESS, technology and equipment unquestionably can enhance the military might of the Soviet Union, which raises the contentious issue of technology transfer. The West is clearly ill-advised to allow the Soviet Union free access to the most sensitive technologies. Indeed, a good case can be made that illegally obtained technology has played a significant role in helping Moscow upgrade its military arsenal. Hence, tightening of the regulations on transfer of critical technologies is an appropriate step in attempting to limit the growth of Soviet power.

At the same time, excessively restrictive Western export controls could have a perverse effect on the ongoing debate within the Soviet Union regarding autarkic vs. interdependent approaches to the problem of technological progress. Few would argue that the West can exercise much influence on internal Soviet politics. But as the Parrott and Hoffmann/Laird books make clear, Soviet decision-making is based at least in part on leaders' perceptions of the outside world. If the West restricts exports to the USSR of items with only the most remote potential military application, it could bolster the political capital of "conservatives" or "traditionalists" in the Soviet leadership, who have been arguing all along against Soviet dependence on and openness to the West. Besides being the leaders who tend to favor the most repressive policies at home, they are also the most likely to pressure Moscow's East European allies to reduce their ties with the West. Were such elements to gain the ascendancy in the ongoing Soviet succession process, the West would find fewer opportunities for differentiating its policies vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and its allies.

The dilemma for the West is therefore to devise a policy that carefully monitors technology transfer to the East while permitting enough East-West interaction to encourage greater openness and diversity in the USSR and Eastern Europe.

²Gen.-Lt. V. Arapov, "Weapons and Equipment—Outstanding Mastery," *Kommunist vooruzhënnnykh sil* (Moscow), No. 12, 1983, pp. 20–26; also Gen.-Maj. A. Barabanshchikov and Col. A. Pupko, "A Scientific Base for Military Technical Training," *ibid.*, *Kommunist vooruzhënnnykh sil*, No. 1, 1984, pp. 62–66.

³This is particularly true of the Arapov article cited in fn. 2.

⁴General Sir John Hackett, *The Third World War, the Untold Story*, New York, Bantam, 1983, p. 44.

Ustinov versus Ogarkov

George G. Weickhardt

ELLEN MICKIEWICZ and ROMAN KOLKOWICZ, Eds. *The Soviet Calculus of Nuclear War*, a special issue of *Soviet Union* (Irvine, CA), Vol. 10, Parts 2-3, 1983.

SAMUEL B. PAYNE, JR. *The Soviet Union and SALT*. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1980.

D. F. USTINOV. *Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i* (Selected Speeches and Articles). Moscow, Politizdat, 1979.

N. V. OGARKOV. *Vsegda v gotovnosti k zashchite otechestva* (Always in Readiness for Defense of the Fatherland). Moscow, Voenizdat, 1982.

D. F. USTINOV. *Serving the Country and the Communist Cause*, tr. by Penny Dole. New York, Pergamon Press, 1983.

OVER THE LAST two decades many inconsistent statements of Soviet doctrine on nuclear war have appeared in Soviet publications. Some of these statements, particularly those by civilian leaders and analysts, have sounded like the American concept of mutual assured destruction (MAD). Many military figures, on

the other hand, have argued that the Soviet Union can fight, survive, and even win a nuclear conflict. The most typical approach of Western analysts to this dichotomy in the Soviet sources is to dismiss Soviet protestations of adherence to mutual deterrence as propaganda or disinformation. E.g., Benjamin Lambeth, in his essay in the collection *The Soviet Calculus of Nuclear War*, edited by Ellen Mickiewicz and Roman Kolkowicz, expresses doubt that the two superpowers will ever speak a common strategic language. He sees the true measure of Soviet military doctrine in the Soviet Union's massive buildup of all types of conventional and nuclear weapons, a buildup designed, Lambeth says, to bring Soviet capabilities into congruence with Marshal Vasilii Sokolovskiy's doctrinal edicts in *Military Strategy*. The latter work, first published in 1962, emphasizes such themes as counterforce, surprise, shock, preemption, superiority, and the feasibility of victory.¹ On the other hand, a minority of Western scholars, such as Raymond Garthoff,² find persuasive evidence of Soviet

acceptance of mutual deterrence in authoritative military sources and in the statements of the top political leaders, including both the late Leonid Brezhnev and the current party chief Konstantin Chernenko.

Because of the contradictory evidence, it is difficult to resolve this dispute among Western analysts regarding the nature of Soviet doctrine. A potentially fruitful alternative approach is found in Samuel Payne's *The Soviet Union and SALT*, which treats the divergent trends in the Soviet literature as a circumscribed debate between competing factions. Payne's "arms controller" faction comes mainly from the civilian think tanks (Georgiy Arbatov and Igor Glagolev) and from the foreign ministry (Andrey Gromyko). They advocate strategic parity, guaranteed by arms control, and believe that there could be no victor in nuclear war. The most radical spokesmen of Payne's "militarist" faction work in the Main Political Directorate (MPD) of the Armed Forces (Colonels Ye. I. Rybkin and V. Bondarenko), but the military's point of view is also reflected in the writings of the most senior marshals, such as Sokolovskiy. Payne's militarists believe that the Soviet Union should seek strategic superiority in order to be assured of victory should the imperialists start a new war.

¹V. D. Sokolovskiy, *Soviet Military Strategy*, 3d ed., tr. and ed. by Harriet Fast Scott, New York, Crane, Russak & Co., 1975.

²Raymond L. Garthoff, "Mutual Deterrence and Strategic Arms Limitation in Soviet Policy," *International Security* (Cambridge, MA), Summer 1978, pp. 112-47.

George G. Weickhardt is a lawyer practicing in San Francisco and the author of several articles on the Soviet Union/Russia and arms control.

The important question is, of course, who is winning the debate? Writing in the Mickiewicz/Kolkowicz volume, Ann Sloan detects significant influence of the "arms controllers" in the history of Soviet arms control positions. But in the same collection, Keith Payne and Dan Strode argue cogently that the USSR still has not accepted the basic American theory of arms control: to leave the two societies vulnerable to retaliation (countervalue), but at the same time to prohibit weapons that threaten the other side's weapons (counterforce).

The Soviet debate between advocates of nuclear-war-fighting and those of mutual deterrence has recently taken a most dramatic turn, with the latter side emerging the clear victor. The antagonists were not MPD colonels and civilian think tank analysts; instead the debate took the form of a veiled challenge by the Soviet Union's senior professional soldier and chief of the General Staff, Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov, to the minister of defense and Politburo member, Marshal Dmitriy Ustinov. Ogarkov was obliged to recant his insubordinate nuclear-war-fighting views in late 1983, but the true dénouement to this drama came in September 1984, when Ogarkov was apparently demoted for what an unnamed Soviet source called his "un-partylike tendencies."³

As Payne indicates, Soviet polemicists never name their antagonist, nor do they attack his views directly. They merely advocate their own viewpoint, and it is usually only by the sequential appearance of inconsistent views in the press that one can detect a "debate." The ostensible issue that Ogarkov and Ustinov "debated" in this manner was the winnability of

nuclear war, but this issue by its very nature affects the broader concerns of defense planning and expenditure. Ogarkov argued that nuclear weapons, with their immense destructive power, would inflict huge losses and that nuclear warfare therefore requires redundancies or reserves in materiel sufficient to guarantee the ability to exploit one's own nuclear strikes. Because such a war-fighting doctrine can justify limitless military procurement, the level of defense expenditure was probably one of the underlying issues in the Ustinov-Ogarkov "debate."

To appreciate Ustinov's role in the development of Soviet strategic doctrine, one must view him in the context of his two immediate predecessors at the Ministry of Defense, Marshal Rodion Malinovskiy (from 1957 to 1967) and Marshal Andrey Grechko (from 1967 to 1976). Malinovskiy disavowed any Soviet intent to start a nuclear war, but called for preparations to fight such a war, because the imperialists might launch a surprise nuclear attack. He predicted that the Soviet Union would emerge victorious in a nuclear war.⁴ Grechko, while also prophesying victory, conceded that no defense against strategic missiles existed. At the same time, he called for the attainment of strategic superiority and advocated counterforce targeting and probably also a policy of "launch on warning" for Soviet missiles.⁵ Grechko, moreover, presided over the development and initial deployment of the Soviet Union's first counterforce missiles.

It was also during the Malinovskiy-Grechko period that Marshal Sokolovskiy wrote his definitive work on military strategy, which intimated that the USSR should launch a preemptive attack once war became inevitable.

While both Malinovskiy and Grechko were professional soldiers, Ustinov is a civilian, who, prior to his appointment as minister of defense, had spent virtually his entire career in the defense industry. While many Soviet military figures remained silent on SALT I (which Payne interprets as an expression of opposition), Ustinov endorsed both SALT I and arms control in 1973.⁶ He became defense minister shortly before Brezhnev gave a speech in January 1977 at Tula in which the Soviet leader avowed for the first time that the USSR did not seek strategic superiority, only parity.⁷ In choosing Ustinov as minister of defense, the Politburo passed over such obvious senior military candidates as Marshal Viktor Kulikov, then chief of the General Staff, whom Payne identifies as a militarist (p. 52). Ustinov's early speeches and writings as minister of defense, collected in the 1979 volume under review, mirror Brezhnev's Tula speech: no pursuit of military superiority, no first strike, and no prediction of Soviet victory.⁸ As already noted, Soviet practice and tradition would have permitted Ustinov to remain silent on these issues if he really did disagree with Brezhnev. As minister of defense, Ustinov thus represented a true departure from the war-fighting rhetoric employed by his predecessors.

³"Address to the XXII Congress of the CPSU," in Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, *The Soviet Art of War*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1982, pp. 167-70.

⁴Payne, pp. 50-51; and A. A. Grechko, *The Armed Forces of the Soviet State*, tr. by US Air Force, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1977, pp. 148-51.

⁵*Izbrannyye rechi*, pp. 18-19.

⁶*Pravda* (Moscow), Jan. 19, 1977, pp. 1-2.

⁷*Izbrannyye rechi*, pp. 319-20, 329, 353, 390-91, 423-25, 444, 493, 495, 500.

⁸*The New York Times*, Sept. 13, 1984, p. 1.

When Ogarkov was appointed chief of the General Staff in 1977, his public reputation was, if anything, moderate. He had been the senior Soviet military delegate to the SALT I talks, and his writings, which focused on offensive operations in depth and on modern military technology,⁹ contained no war-fighting talk. In 1979 he was also to give a strong endorsement to SALT II.¹⁰ However, shortly after his appointment he published a cryptic statement that the introduction of nuclear-tipped rockets would, in accord with Marxist dialectics, be followed by the appearance of the means of countering (*protivodeystviye*) them.¹¹

This statement took on greater meaning in 1979, when Volume 7 of the *Soviet Military Encyclopedia* appeared containing an entry by Ogarkov entitled "Military Strategy," which was very much in the mold and tradition of Sokolovskiy's formulation of Soviet strategy.¹² Although Ogarkov rejected a first strike or first use of nuclear weapons and refrained from saying that the Soviet Union could count on victory in nuclear war, he still maintained that Soviet victory was an "objective possibility" if the proper measures were taken. In a 1981 article in *Kommunist*, the party's main theoretical journal, Ogarkov continued along the same lines.¹³ Although he conceded that the fate of all mankind would be at stake in nuclear war, he nonetheless argued that such a

war would require decisive combined-arms offensives on a theater-wide level. The materiel requirements for such operations, he said, would be immense because of the scale of losses to be expected in modern (presumably nuclear) war.

As if to correct Ogarkov and clarify Soviet doctrine, Ustinov shortly thereafter published an article in *Pravda* that emphatically denied that Soviet doctrine contemplated a "possibility of surviving or even winning a nuclear war."¹⁴ On the issue of whether a new Soviet military buildup was needed, the Defense Minister had said several months earlier that there was approximate parity between the United States and the Soviet Union, and that Soviet forces "have everything they need to administer a timely and appropriate rebuff to any aggressor."¹⁵ In these statements Ustinov was again following the line of Brezhnev who, by 1981, had announced that there could be no victor in nuclear war.¹⁶

THE CONTRAST between the positions of Ustinov and Ogarkov sharpened even further in 1982 when each published a pamphlet on Soviet military doctrine. Ogarkov's *Always in Readiness for Defense of the Fatherland* appeared in January, and Ustinov's *Serving the Country*, in May. Ogarkov again emphasized that the USSR must plan for the possibility that the imperialists might unleash a nuclear war. In such an event, he said, nuclear weapons would give Soviet theater commanders "the increased ability to achieve war aims," and he argued that the Soviet Union should pursue "decisive political and strategic aims."

In the context of the discussion of nuclear war, Ogarkov reiterated several times that the aim of military operations was victory, although he never explicitly stated that the USSR would or could achieve victory. His discussion of nuclear weapons was in the context of their use within a Soviet "theater of military operations"—e.g., Western Europe or the Far East—rather than in the context of massive intercontinental attacks on cities. Perhaps Ogarkov was arguing that nuclear weapons could be feasibly employed in a limited war. But even this viewpoint would have been heretical, because official Soviet doctrine has long stated that a limited nuclear war (Moscow presumably envisages one initiated by NATO in response to a Soviet conventional offensive in Western Europe) would quickly escalate into an intercontinental exchange of strategic missiles. This point is discussed in the fine essays by Desmond Ball and Christian Hacke in *The Soviet Calculus of Nuclear War*. The Ogarkov pamphlet also stressed the importance of surprise in military operations and tended to glorify the cult of the offensive, suggesting that Ogarkov believes that a preemptive strike may be appropriate.

By contrast, Ustinov's pamphlet emphasized that "to count on victory in the arms race and in the nuclear war is madness." In probable reference to Ogarkov's discussion of the use of nuclear weapons in theater operations, Ustinov stated emphatically: "There can simply be no limited nuclear war." A limited nuclear war in Europe would lead to "irreplaceable losses" and the destruction of "entire peoples and their civilizations," and would inevitably assume a worldwide character.

On the issue of surprise and preemption, Ustinov pontificated

⁹"We Stand on Guard," *Izvestiya* (Moscow), July 20, 1967; "The Theoretical Arsenal of the Military Leader,"

Krasnaya Zvezda (Moscow), Sept. 3, 1971, p. 2;

"Operations in Depth," *Sovetskaya voyennaya entsiklopediya*, Vol. 2, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1976, pp. 574-78; "Guarding the Motherland," *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (Moscow), Feb. 23, 1977, p. 2.

¹⁰*Pravda*, Aug. 2, 1979.

¹¹*Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 7, May 1978, p. 117.

¹²*Sovetskaya voyennaya entsiklopediya*, Vol. 7, 1979, pp. 555-65.

¹³*Kommunist*, No. 10, July 1981, pp. 80-91.

¹⁴*Pravda*, Nov. 7, 1981, pp. 1-3.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, June 22, 1981, pp. 2-3.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, Feb. 24, 1981, pp. 1-2.

that it would be impossible for either side to disarm the other with a first strike, and that the outcome of modern warfare is "in the final count, determined by objective laws"—a formula used since the time of Stalin to minimize the importance of the surprise factor in warfare. On the issue of the level of military expenditures, Ustinov employed another Soviet debater's tactic that is discussed by Payne. Customarily, Soviet opponents of increased military spending do not attack it directly; they simply advocate spending in other areas. In Soviet debates about economic priorities, one can also usually deduce the debater's priorities from the order in which he discusses allocations to one or another sector of the economy. Ustinov first spoke of investment in heavy industry, then in consumer goods, and finally in agriculture, without saying a word about increased military budgets or using alarmist language to justify higher military expenditures.

In a July 12, 1982, article in *Pravda*, Ustinov again attacked "those who invent a 'sure method' of fighting a victorious nuclear war," and quoted from Brezhnev that "only someone who has decided to commit suicide can start a nuclear war in the hope of winning it." While this attack was ostensibly directed at war-fighting theorists in the United States, the real target may have been Ogarkov. As Payne points out, the opponent's position in Soviet debates is often ascribed to foreigners, who can more safely be attacked.

SOON AFTER the November 1982 accession of Yuriy Andropov, with whom Ustinov had been closely aligned, Ogarkov began to moderate his line. In March 1983 he publicly rejected the concept of limited nuclear war, disavowed So-

viet adherence to a launch-on-warning doctrine, and endorsed Andropov's arms control initiatives.¹⁷ Two months later he backpedaled a bit, at least in his rhetoric, arguing that the Soviet Union was well prepared for the initial hours of total war, which would be unprecedentedly intense and destructive.¹⁸

By September 1983, with Andropov seriously ill, Ustinov had become, as much as any other Politburo member, the regime's caretaker. In that month, Ogarkov fully recanted: in an *Izvestiya* article he acknowledged that starting a nuclear war would be suicide and that, even after sustaining a first strike, each side would still be able to inflict "unacceptable damage" on the other side. On the issue of "unacceptable damage," he even referred approvingly to Robert McNamara, the progenitor of the concept.¹⁹

Ogarkov's recantation came only a few weeks after the September 1983 incident in which Soviet fighters shot down an unarmed Korean Air Lines passenger plane. The leadership had assigned him the difficult job of explaining (and perhaps taking responsibility for) this incident in an unusual televised news conference. We might speculate that this embarrassing crisis weakened support for Ogarkov within the Politburo and made it easier for Ustinov and his allies to clamp down on Ogarkov's insubordinate views on strategic doctrine.

A month after his dismissal as chief of the General Staff, Ogarkov was reportedly appointed commander of the Soviet western theater of military operations, one of

five such theater commands.²⁰ While it is not clear whether Ogarkov is subordinate to the commander of Warsaw Pact Forces, the new post will probably involve command authority only in time of war; thus at present, he probably has a title without a command. Although Ogarkov is not in total disgrace, it is clear that he has been significantly demoted. His new "command" is definitely subordinate to his own former position as chief of staff, and he has been moved out of Moscow (probably to Minsk), where his influence will be drastically reduced.

Numerous rumors and theories concerning the reason for Ogarkov's demotion have circulated in the Western press: a heart attack, Chernenko's displeasure with him for having supported Andropov's successful bid to succeed Brezhnev, the stalemate in Afghanistan, Ogarkov's overselling of the SS-20 missile.²¹ However, there is nothing in the public record to support any of these speculative theories. The most plausible explanation for Ogarkov's demotion is that Ustinov and the party had to show the outspoken Ogarkov who is the boss on the key issues of strategic doctrine. The Soviet system cannot tolerate for long an official who defies his superiors on such an important question as the winnability of nuclear war. Ogarkov's successor, Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev, was already on record as following the Ustinov line on this issue. In May 1983, Akhromeyev stated that Soviet military chiefs "do not see the possibility of winning a nuclear war," that

²⁰The *Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), Oct. 16, 1984, p. 2; also UPI Wire, Oct. 15, 1984, PM Cycle, International Section.

²¹See, e.g., *The Economist* (London), Sept. 15, 1984, pp. 46-47; *The New York Times*, Sept. 17, 1984, p. 2; and Associated Press Wire, Sept. 11, 1984.

¹⁷*The New York Times*, Mar. 17, 1983, p. 1.

¹⁸*Izvestiya*, May 9, 1983, pp. 1-2.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, Sept. 23, 1983, pp. 4-5.

the Soviet Union does not seek strategic superiority, and that it rejects the concept of limited nuclear war.²²

Some Western accounts erroneously attributed Ogarkov's demotion to an article he had published in May 1984 in which he advocated increased Soviet investment in "smart" conventional weapons rather than in greater numbers of nuclear weapons.²³ But, although Ogarkov may have been breaking new ground, his advocacy was not obviously out of line with any statement by a top party leader, as was the case with his pronouncements on winning a nuclear war. Indeed, Soviet military leaders have traditionally been free to voice their expertise on priorities for weapons procurement.

What is more interesting about the May article is that it reaffirmed and extended Ogarkov's previous recantation of his war-fighting theories. In it, he not only explained further the concept of "unacceptable damage," but also explicitly renounced the concept of a limited, "decapitating" first strike. If there was anything objectionable in the article, it was that Ogarkov singled out for praise Marshal Georgiy Zhukov (the last important Soviet military figure to have been sacked).

There is, moreover, no reason to assume that Ogarkov's dismissal could be attributed to his last public statement. In other cases where top Soviet leaders have been removed for publicly defying the consensus of the Politburo, the ax did not fall immediately. For example, Gennadiy I. Voronov publicly differed with Brezhnev on agricultural policy as early as 1969, but it was

not until 1971 that he was dismissed as premier of the Russian republic and until 1973 that he was removed from the Politburo.²⁴ The removal of the chief of the General Staff would require a strong consensus in the Politburo, which was probably difficult to reach in the years 1982-84, when two successions and other dramatic changes took place in the composition of the top party body. It is also not atypical for the Soviet system to exact repeated recantations from a discredited figure prior to his dismissal.

Although the Soviet press has traditionally allowed the military some freedom of expression on military matters, Ogarkov clearly exceeded this brief. Despite his marshal's uniform, Ustinov is a civilian with a perspective on strategic doctrine that differs from the military's. As Ustinov reemphasized in *Serving the Country*, Soviet military doctrine is formulated by the party (read: *not by the military!*). True, the question of whether a nuclear war could be won was the subject of a debate in the Soviet press in the 1970's, but this issue is so fundamental to Soviet security policy and so important to the Soviet Union's image in the world that it was natural for the party ultimately to impose uniformity on this subject. One can anticipate that no further open nuclear-war-fighting talk will appear in the Soviet military press.

RESOLUTION of this issue on a theoretical level will, however, have only limited impact on Soviet foreign and security policy. As Lambeth argues, the massive Soviet buildup over the last 15 years

has been designed not so much to assure victory in war as to create a fear of Soviet power that will allow the USSR to achieve its aims without war. The fact that Ustinov and the Politburo consensus he represents have rejected the notion that nuclear war is winnable does not mean that they also reject an expansionist foreign policy. During Ustinov's term as minister of defense, the "war of liberation" by proxy became a fine art in Soviet policy. (As Roman Kolkowicz notes in the lead chapter in *Soviet Calculus of Nuclear War*, the doctrine of mutual assured destruction is totally irrelevant to this aspect of Soviet policy in the first place.) One also cannot expect to see an abandonment of the Brezhnev Doctrine or of its extension to countries like Afghanistan.

Moreover, Ustinov's acceptance of the theory of mutual deterrence does not mean that he is flexible on arms control, as Payne's model of the "arms controller" might suggest. Ustinov was probably one of the principal architects of the tough Soviet position on intermediate-range forces, and was certainly the principal spokesman for the Soviet line that led up to the walkout from the Geneva strategic arms negotiations in November 1983. Nor is there any evidence that Ustinov's concept of nuclear parity is anything other than the Soviet doctrine of equal security, which, among other things, means that the Soviet Union should have an arsenal equal to the combined arsenal of all its potential adversaries. Last, Ustinov's version of the doctrine of mutual deterrence does not necessarily mean that he or the Politburo is likely to accept what the Americans regard as the corollary of that doctrine, i.e., that weapons capable of destroying the other side's strategic weapons should be severely lim-

²²The Washington Post, May 18, 1983, p. A-12; British Broadcasting Corp. Wire, May 19, 1983.

²³For the article, see *Krasnaya Zvezda*, May 9, 1984.

²⁴Harry Gelman, *The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Détente*, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1984, pp. 53-54.

ited. Ustinov, as defense minister,* has presided over the deployment of the Soviet Union's family of counterforce missiles, the SS-18, SS-19, and SS-20. In the START negotiations, the USSR showed no inclination to accept substantial limits on these de-

*This essay was completed and in type before the death of Marshal Ustinov on December 20, 1984, and the announcement of the appointment of First Deputy Minister of Defense Marshal Sergey L. Sokolov to replace him as the Soviet defense minister.—Eds.

stabilizing weapons. The true test of the Soviet Union's adoption of the US concept of mutual deterrence will be its willingness to make concessions in this area.

Nonetheless, Ustinov's version of the doctrine of mutual assured destruction will, it can be hoped, set some limits on Soviet strategic forces. As indicated at the outset, under a war-fighting doctrine, there is no limit to how many weapons are needed. Ustinov has already used the doctrine of mutual deterrence to argue against

Ogarkov's strident call for redundancy in force structure, and, in fact, the US Central Intelligence Agency currently estimates that the Soviet military budget has grown only at a moderate 2 percent per year during Ustinov's term.²⁵

²⁵Office of Soviet Analysis, Central Intelligence Agency, "USSR: Economic Trends and Policy Developments," a Joint Economic Committee Briefing Paper prepared for Hearings on the Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China—1983, before the Subcommittee on International Trade, Finance, and Security Economics, Sept. 20, 1983, p. 8.

Policy Succession in China

Jill A. Friedman

JOHN GARDNER. *Chinese Politics and the Succession to Mao*. New York, Holmes & Meier, 1982.

IMMANUEL C. Y. HSÜ. *China Without Mao: The Search for a New Order*. New York, Oxford University Press, 1982.

RONALD A. MORSE, Ed. *The Limits of Reform in China*. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1983.

BULLETIN OF CONCERNED ASIAN SCHOLARS, ED. *China from Mao to Deng: The Politics and Economics of Socialist Development*. Introduction by Bruce Cumings. Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1983.

THE DEATH of Mao Zedong in 1976 marked the end of an era, not only for the Chinese people, but for China watchers in the West as well. However unpredictable he might have been at times, Mao was a known quantity whose personality and writings had been intensely studied for more than a quarter century. His death, and the deaths of Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and other elder statesmen at approximately the same time, meant that China watchers in the West had to study

Jill A. Friedman has taught political science at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte, and served as Associate Director of the Yale-China Association. She is currently a free-lance writer and editor on Chinese politics.

a new array of personalities and policies within the uncertain context of political transition. The issues raised by the passing of the baton of leadership are the subject of several new books that attempt to shed light on China without Mao.

John Gardner in *Chinese Politics and the Succession to Mao* and Immanuel Hsü in *China Without Mao* focus attention on the people who have followed Mao to power. In works primarily intended for nonspecialists, both authors present chronological accounts of the complicated events following Mao's death. Recognizing the fact that Mao's passing raises issues of power, leadership, political structures, and other questions of interest to political scientists, Gardner has attempted to set his work within a theoretical framework of leadership transitions within socialist states. However, although generally useful as a summary of the events surrounding the rise and fall of the Gang of Four, the fall of Lin Biao, the reemergence of Deng Xiaoping, the eclipse of Hua Guofeng, etc., Gardner's work remains seriously flawed on several levels.

Most basically, Gardner's chronological presentation is so seriously oversimplified that it helps to perpetuate the myths about China's ruling elite that have elsewhere been gradually eroded—even by Gardner himself. Thus, the com-

plex machinations of the various factions struggling for power during the Cultural Revolution have here been reduced to a struggle between rightists and leftists, capitalist roaders and Maoists.

Choosing to concentrate on detailing the daily developments of Lin Biao's alleged coup attempt, Gardner ignores more interesting questions raised by the events of the Cultural Revolution. For example, why and how did political organizations disintegrate so completely and so rapidly? What role, if any, did the history and development of factional politics in pre-Communist China play in the emergence of factional politics during the Cultural Revolution? What happened to the various factions, and what are the prospects for their reemergence in the aftermath of the arrest or promotion of their top leaders? Other interesting questions arising from the Cultural Revolution and the subsequent struggle for power in the wake of Mao's death—including the comparative ones raised but then ignored by Gardner—go similarly unexplored. Addressing such issues would have made for more useful and compelling reading than the presentation of a chronology whose significant points could have been summed up in one chart.

Another fundamental problem arises from Gardner's uncritical ac-

ceptance of PRC sources in his treatment of the Lin Biao affair, the rise and fall of the Gang of Four, and other post-Cultural Revolution events. Despite brief cautionary words in his introduction on the reliability of his source material, Gardner's extensive and uncritical use of quotations from the Chinese media has the effect of lending credibility to the official PRC account of the events under study and tends to lull the general reader not only into believing he is reading "truth," but also into accepting the PRC's own weighting of the relative importance of the events in the Cultural Revolution and post-Mao periods. For example, one can only wonder whether the major significance of the Lin Biao affair lies in Lin's alleged treachery, or in some basic but here unexplored tension between the goals of the military and of the political organizations in the PRC.

A parallel distortion occurs through Gardner's uncritical acceptance of the weighting of events deemed important by the Western media, but which seem, in perspective, to have had a less significant impact on the current development of Chinese politics. Thus, his treatment of the Wei Jingsheng affair and "democracy wall" are accorded an entire 30-page chapter in which China is taken to task for not allowing the development of "Western democracy," while potentially more interesting issues, such as the tradition of this type of dissent in China after the 1911 revolution, are ignored.

Had Gardner tied himself more closely to the theoretical framework he lays out for the reader in the introductory chapter but then abandons, *Chinese Politics and the Succession to Mao* would probably have been a more interesting and useful work. Gardner, whose other work on China reveals a thorough

understanding of both contemporary events and political theory, here again raises issues significant to the literature on political leadership, e.g., the problems with identifying the real leaders whether or not they occupy formal positions of power, and the problems inherent in leadership transition. However, in this volume, the context in which Gardner sees these problems is that of comparison between "democratic" and "socialist" states, i.e., between the good and the bad guys.

Whether the problems of political succession encountered by China might not be more usefully viewed through the theoretical prism of questions of routinization of charismatic leadership, or perhaps through the exploration of questions of modernization in what Samuel Huntington refers to as the crisis of institutionalization, are issues Gardner ignores. As a result, his current work adds little to our knowledge of China or to the advancement of the study of Chinese politics as a part of the field of political science.

Many of the problems encountered in *Chinese Politics and the Succession to Mao* are also found in Immanuel Hsü's *China Without Mao: The Search for a New Order*. Like Gardner, Hsü has presented a simplified chronological account of the major political developments in China in the 1970-80 period, which does little to illuminate the more interesting questions raised by the changes in China during the last decade. Like Gardner, Hsü also relies on extensive quotations from Chinese media—both mainland and Taiwan—for accounts of the fall of the Gang of Four, the rise of Deng, etc.

However, while Gardner's work suffers from its uncritical use of these sources, Hsü's quotations seem to be specifically chosen to

serve the function of denigrating the government of the People's Republic regardless of the factional leanings of the individuals in authority. Thus, we are told that the selection of Hua Guofeng as party chairman was of "dubious legality" (p. 18); and that "everyone in socialist China today is interested in profit and openly talks about making more money" (p. 110). Hsü seems to particularly enjoy repeating anecdotes about Jiang Qing: "Jiang Qing was in bed when her captors arrived. She shouted: 'How dare you to rebel when the Chairman's body is not yet cold!'" (p. 18). Hsü is careful to point out the PRC government's efforts to eliminate political dissent: "The trend toward eliminating dissension was not limited to Democracy Wall" (p. 38). However, his concern for democratic rights seems suspended in his treatment of Taiwan. In his final chapter, entitled "Taiwan's Economic Miracle," Hsü praises the economic achievements of the Taiwanese government. He describes Taiwan as a "Treasure Island" (p. 177) of motor cycles and cars, television sets, refrigerators, washing machines, and "farmers neatly clothed and fed, with modest but comfortable homes" (pp. 172-73). In his exaltation of the material prosperity Hsü overlooks the very real issue of suppression of political dissent and the efforts to eliminate the native Taiwanese independence movement, not to mention growing urban and industrial pollution.

China Without Mao seems to have been written in the course of Hsü's preparation of the third edition of his well-known textbook, *The Rise of Modern China*, in which *China Without Mao* can be found, reproduced almost verbatim. One can only speculate at the reasons for its separate publication, but in its paperback format,

China Without Mao does serve as an inexpensive way of updating the hardcover second edition of the textbook.

THE AUTHORS of *The Limits of Reform in China* and *China from Mao to Deng*, while also interested in the shape of Chinese politics in the post-Mao era, have chosen to concentrate their attention on substantive policy changes rather than on personalities. Thus, the essays in these two volumes are generally more successful in shedding light on the consequences of the change of power following the transition from Mao. As with any edited volume, the individual essays are not of equal strength; some present original and stimulating research; others cover more familiar ground.

The Limits of Reform in China, edited by Ronald A. Morse, is the more interesting of the two books. The offspring of a conference held in May 1982, *The Limits of Reform* attempts to review and assess post-Mao changes in the intellectual, social, political, and industrial spheres of society. The published papers, here adapted and updated, are divided into two sections: "Management and Reform" and "Intellectual and Cultural Reform," with the first section being the more interesting.

In "Deng Xiaoping's Reform of the Chinese Bureaucracy," Hong Yung Lee argues that despite Deng's remarkable political skill—as demonstrated in the rehabilitation of victims of all political purges since 1957; his success, with support from the newly rehabilitated cadres, in shifting the regime's goal from revolution to economic development; and the placement of his protégés Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang in commanding positions in the party and government—Deng remains faced

with serious problems that inhibit his attempts to reform the bureaucracy in order to make it more effective in carrying out his economic development policies (p. 20). Hong sees an overstuffed Chinese bureaucracy—on the whole elderly and undereducated, beset with problems of low morale, factionalism, abuses of power, and corruption—as presenting a major obstacle to Deng's reform program. Overstaffing, a longstanding problem in the PRC, has in fact been exacerbated by Deng's reinstatement of all dismissed cadres. Hong is pessimistic about the possibilities for further streamlining of the cadre corps, particularly in the lower level government and party organizations, and believes that:

It will be comparatively easy to promote younger generations of cadres with formal education and technical competency to the leadership positions, but it will be extremely difficult to make them at the same time politically loyal to the top leadership group.... Since the corruption of the cadre is not simply due to the "bad Party style," but is a reflection of the moods and basic structure of the entire system, the ongoing effort will not be able to resolve thoroughly the problems of official corruption. (p. 34)

Andrew Walder is scarcely more optimistic about the possibilities for industrial reform in China. Walder believes that the creation of a more efficient industrial administration hinges not only upon the undertaking of a thorough-going reassessment of the industrial economy and its goals and the creation of new economic mechanisms to allocate capital and distribute industrial goods more effectively. More important, it hinges upon the creation of three fundamental condi-

tions for rationally efficient economic administration: (1) the creation of clear-cut, unambiguous incentives for efficient management; (2) the development through training, experience, and personal orientation of a capacity to respond to management incentives; and (3) the implementation in the factory of conditions conducive to rational administrative behavior. These conditions will be difficult to create because of what Walder refers to as the "human dimension" of industrial reforms. Walder argues that long-standing past policies that placed a premium on output have led to the hoarding of stockpiles of raw materials, as well as to the growth of an elaborate informal network of personal relationships for material transactions beyond the reach of formal economic controls. Moreover, Walder believes that the long history of discrimination against educated personnel has left a dual legacy. On the one hand, it has led to the emergence of a significant group of political careerists in industry. On the other hand, it has left the bulk of the managerial corps ill-prepared by previous experience to operate profitably under conditions of enterprise autonomy. These factors, Walder suggests, will hamper progress and make industrial reform in China at best "a protracted and fragile affair" (p. 59).

Walder in fact has anticipated the economic reforms announced by the PRC itself in its "Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCP) on Reform of the Economic Structure" (October 1984). The sweeping reforms of the economy called for by the CCP will seek to introduce competition among state-owned enterprises, separate government from purely economic functions, limit central planning, phase out consumer subsidies on many prod-

ucts (the prices of which will now be determined by supply and demand), and create a new economic leadership corps through the promotion of young cadres and the reshifting of existing enterprise leadership.¹ While these steps should go far toward meeting Walder's above mentioned conditions for efficient economic administration, it remains to be seen whether the factors Walder describes as obstacles to industrial reform will have as negative an effect as he predicts.

Reform in the countryside also faces serious impediments, according to David Zweig. In "National Elites, Rural Bureaucrats and Peasants: Limits on Commune Reform in China," Zweig argues that reform of the commune system will be limited by resistance from those middle-echelon bureaucrats who would lose political power and prestige, and those peasants in rich rural areas who fear both economic polarization and loss of financial security. Current poor-peasant exuberance for private enrichment, which exhibited itself in the excessive zeal with which the collective was dismantled and state goals ignored in favor of local interests, undercuts the reformist program and weakens the position of the advocates of change at the elite level, while at the same time strengthening the position of those middle-level bureaucrats and peasants from the richer areas who fear that any change in the rural structure will undermine their preferred economic or political position. Zweig points out that as the opportunities for individual enrichment built into the reform program increase polar-

ization between rich and poor, social and political tensions will be created that could derail efforts at commune reform. However, Zweig concludes that regardless of the limitations on reform in agriculture, China's countryside has already developed into a more complex political, economic, and social system whose final configuration it is impossible to predict.

The problems in reforming PRC economic and managerial systems elaborated by Zweig, Walder, and Hong Yung Lee are specific to the Chinese model of development, but are also, in their more general aspect, inherent in socialist models of development. The authors have attempted to identify real areas of difficulty with which the PRC leaders are already grappling.

By contrast, the problems identified by John Israel, Vera Schwarcz, and James Seymour in the "Intellectual and Cultural Reform" section of *The Limits of Reform* seem to derive from a more abstract model of what a modern "liberal democracy" should look like. Israel, for example, sets forth four characteristics of "liberal education": (1) a liberation and awakening of the mind; (2) an open-ended, skeptical search and humane attitude; (3) a pluralistic ideology; and (4) a diverse curriculum. He then takes the PRC to task for not living up to these standards. In similar fashion, Seymour decries China's politics for being "illiberal, undemocratic and ... feudal" (p. 153). To condemn the PRC for its failure to meet the standards of the West (a standard not always reached even there) does little to illuminate what are real problems in the areas of intellectual and cultural reform in China in particular or in socialist systems in general. Thus, rather than lamenting the fact that liberal education in the PRC has not blossomed as it did

during the historically unique situation of the Southwest Associated University (*Lianda*) from 1938 to 1946, Israel might more usefully have examined other educational reform problems.

Some of the more important issues ignored by all the authors include the sociological consequences of the widening gap between the city and the countryside created by the disparity between the educational resources of urban centers and those of rural areas; the increasing employment problems created by an ever growing population of technically trained young people whose heightened expectations and demands come up against an economy where industrial growth must be balanced with agricultural needs and economic limitations; the problems created by the return of ever larger numbers of students trained in Japan and the West; and the ongoing political, economic, and social problems of what to do with the generation of young people from the Cultural Revolution period who are ill-prepared to occupy the positions of technical expertise that they believe are rightfully theirs. These are the problems of immediate concern in terms of the limits of reform in Chinese culture and education. Sadly, they are not addressed in this volume.

THE SENSE of disappointment and disillusionment with China found in some of the essays in *The Limits of Reform* rings even more strongly in the many articles in *China From Mao to Deng*. Edited by the Bulletin for Concerned Asian Scholars (BCAS), this loosely structured volume covers such diverse topics as political cartoons in Chinese media (Ralph Croizier), new development strategy in the people's communes (Victor Lippit), the future of the Chinese revolution

¹ See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: People's Republic of China* (Washington, DC), Oct 22, 1984, pp. k/1-17. Also *The New York Times*, Oct. 21, 1984.

(Edward Friedman), rural development and agrarian structure in China (Mitch Meisner and Marc Blecher), and post-Mao changes in a south China production brigade (Victor Nee), among others. Beginning, as BCAS did in the 1960's, with a strong belief in and commitment to the development and goals of the Chinese revolution, it is perhaps natural that this BCAS volume now expresses some of the strongest dissatisfaction with the current developments in Chinese politics, the greatest disillusionment over the revealed excesses of the Cultural Revolution, and often, the most need to interpret current events in terms of a continued belief in egalitarian development in China. Thus, in his introduction, Bruce Cumings laments the fact that we live in a "sadder time because the results of this century's greatest revolution now sit tarnished" (p. 3), as if somehow China itself rather than the Western idealized perception of its accomplishments had changed.

This loss of illusion is perhaps nowhere more strongly expressed than in the article "The Original Chinese Revolution Remains in Power" by Edward Friedman. Once one of the greatest admirers of the development of the Chinese revolution, Friedman here acknowledges that "the facts were often close to the opposite of the claims" made by foreign "progressives" in reporting on Maoist China (p. 24). Detailing some of the many abuses of the Cultural Revolution, Friedman sounds a pessimistic

note on the possibilities for democratization and deregimentation of society in China. Yet his pessimism and disillusion are far from total. Friedman clings to his belief in the original goals of the Chinese revolution and seeks here to balance his criticism by recognizing and applauding some of the very real successes made in changing state and society. He cautions the reader to avoid the pitfall of extremes. Thus, if China was not as "red" as some in the West wanted to believe, neither is it as "capitalist" as many observers today would make it out to be. For Friedman, the hope for China lies in the values of the original pre-1949 revolution, and in the masses who, he believes, continue their commitment to these values.

Victor Lippit also recognizes the failure of past policies to live up to their Western reputation. In his review of Chinese agricultural policy and performance from 1957 to 1977, Lippit finds that rural income and living standards stagnated during the entire two decade period. The cause of this failure to improve conditions in the rural areas was, according to Lippit, not the egalitarian goals of China's past rural development strategy, but rather the prematurity and inefficient implementation of the strategy. Like Friedman, Lippit sees China's new leaders as pursuing not a "capitalist road," but a new path to socialism which points toward "a balanced growth of industry in a 'civilized' countryside with the commune as its institutional

core" (p. 62).

Some degree of disillusionment with the Chinese revolution as well as hope in a return to its "original" path are found in articles by Peter Van Ness and Satish Raichur, Victor Nee, James Nickum, and Peer Mollen Christensen and Jorgen Delman. With the exception of Victor Nee's "Post-Mao Changes in a South China Production Brigade," however, which attempts to avoid sweeping generalizations about the future of China and concentrates instead on drawing, based on field work and extensive refugee interviews, an interesting and detailed picture of recent changes in China's countryside, very little new light is shed on either past policies or likely future developments in China. The disagreements among the authors over the degree to which "capitalism" has taken hold seems to be a discussion that does little to illuminate the ongoing debate within the Chinese leadership on how to balance the conflicting demands of developing both industry and agriculture, or improving living standards, while maintaining a strong defense against actual and potential enemies.

This problem is one that China has faced since the 19th century. While different solutions have been attempted both before and after Mao's revolution, neither the application of the dichotomous categories of capitalism and communism, nor an emotional handwringing over the fate of China, has ever proven a useful tool of analysis.

Correspondence

NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to the Editors, Problems of Communism, US Information Agency, 301 4th Street, SW, Washington, DC 20547, USA.

SOVIET MIGHT

TO THE EDITORS: *Problems of Communism* is my favorite political journal, one that I highly respect and read regularly. The review of my book *Inside the Soviet Army* ("Underrating Soviet Might," POC, November–December 1983) has praised my efforts, and I was very pleased that it was written by Mr. James T. Reitz, whom I consider to be one of the leading experts on the Soviet Army. The review was written with a high degree of professionalism and contains both praise and criticism of my work.

Unfortunately, I cannot accept all of his praise. For example, it is an exaggeration to suggest that I am the first to write knowledgeably on such topics as the "Strategic Directions (*Napravleniya*); and the role of the Airborne Assault, Diversionary (*SPETSNAZ*), and Fortified Area troops. Everyone interested in the Soviet Army knows that the *Sovetskaya voyennaya entsiklopediya* (Soviet Military Encyclopedia), Vol. 2, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1976, on p. 327 gave a very good description of "Fortified Area Troops" before I did. When Mr. Reitz wrote his review he must surely also have had in possession *Krasnaya Zvezda* for July 9, 1983, which refers to the commander-in-

chief of the North-West Strategic Direction, in discussing events 42 years earlier, i.e., in 1941. Moreover, powerful members of the CPSU Politburo—Nikita Khrushchev, Andrey Zhdanov, Nikolay Bulganin, Kliment Voroshilov, as well as Marshals Georgiy Zhukov, Semën Timoshenko, Matvey Zakharov, Boris Shaposhnikov, Vasilij Sokolovskiy, and Ivan Bagramyan all have carried official titles including the words "strategic direction." In the Soviet Union there are thousands of books published about warfare, and none of them can avoid mention of these people and their titles. So why does Mr. Reitz sing my praises?

I am also puzzled by many of his critical observations, because they simply do not apply to me. On p. 83 Mr. Reitz states: "According to Suvorov, Khrushchev threw 1,200,000 officers and NCOs out of the Army" in the early 1960's. This figure may be outrageous, but it was cited by Khrushchev at a Supreme Soviet session. The Supreme Soviet did not find the statement outrageous, but instead in January 1960 passed a law reducing the Armed Forces by 1,200,000 men (*Pravda* [Moscow], Jan. 15, 1960). If Mr. Reitz considers this a bad law, then he should take to task Khrushchev and the Supreme Soviet, not me.

Mr. Reitz also takes exception (on p. 83) to the observation in my book that "The rocket brigades lay down a nuclear carpet ahead of the Tank Army" and to the implication that the tank army then proceeds to cross this territory. Yet, almost simultaneously with the publication of my

book, the Soviet Ministry of Defense published a book entitled *Voyennotekhnicheskij progress v vooruzhennykh silakh SSSR* (Military Technical Progress in the Armed Forces of the USSR), Moscow, Voenizdat, 1982, which carries the following passages in Chapter 7:

"The opponent is defeated first of all by a massive carpet of nuclear strikes followed up by rapid troop movements.... The use of nuclear weapons creates favorable conditions for the advance.... Armored troops can quickly cross contaminated areas and inflict in-depth strikes.... Motor-rifle troops move forward in their fighting vehicles following the nuclear strikes.... Airborne troops are capable of reaching more quickly than others those areas subjected to nuclear strikes and can consolidate success."

Nothing in these passages mentions the possibility of the troops' dying from radiation. Soviet regulations make no mention of this; therefore it should not be a matter of concern. However, Soviet regulations do state: "Neither blood nor even life itself can be spared in achieving total victory over the enemy" (*Ustav vnutrenney sluzhby* [Regulations of the Internal Service], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1975, p. 4.) These regulations were stated to have been accepted by decree of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on July 30, 1975, and thus have the force of law. Anyone who breaks the regulations out of concern for the lives of soldiers rather than for victory is a criminal and liable to severe punishment un-

der Soviet law. Mr. Reitz knows all this and also knows that the Soviet Union became a superpower only because it was prepared to sacrifice people in numbers quite unacceptable to its adversaries. So, why does he criticize me instead of Soviet law?

Mr. Reitz also describes as "outrageous" statements in my book to the effect that Soviet soldiers are not issued sleeping bags and at times must go for days without food. But, in fact, neither ordinary soldiers nor officers are issued sleeping bags. Perhaps, Mr. Reitz could produce a photo of such a sleeping bag? As for soldiers operating without food, we have an item in *Krasnaya Zvezda* of December 31, 1983, describing activities of a Soviet company in Afghanistan. The company received provisions for three days, but operated in snow and ice for ten days. Even *Krasnaya Zvezda* was forced to use the term "hunger." Moreover, this is not an isolated case. The eminent Soviet poet Aleksandr Tvardovskiy in his poem "Vasilij Terkin" spoke of the hungry soldier on the offensive as being "a law of war (*zakon voyny*)."

Did Stalin have Tvardovskiy shot for making this statement? No. He endorsed Tvardovskiy's nomination for the Stalin Prize. I describe what I myself saw in the Soviet Army. If Mr. Reitz dislikes the picture, let him criticize Stalin, Tvardovskiy, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, and the Soviet system of supplying rations, not me.

The criticism leveled by Mr. Reitz at my description of the large-scale Soviet preparations for the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 is also

puzzling. He seems to question whether and where such preparations occurred. How then did it come about that 600,000 soldiers, thousands of tanks, and tens of thousands of military vehicles entered a small country? In 1968 I was located in the Carpathian Military District, and I describe that which I saw in person. In addition, the Baltic and Northern Fleets were placed on a war footing and carried out large-scale exercises. There then followed exercises for all Anti-Aircraft Defense Forces as well as for Rear Services and communications troops, civil defense units, and all Strategic Rocket Troops. In June and July 1968, large-scale maneuvers were carried out in Eastern Europe on the territories of East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. These came to an end on July 11, and Mr. Reitz should remember perfectly well that tensions rose in Europe owing to the slowness of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia. On July 23, the USSR spoke of more high powered exercises and began mobilizing reservists and civilian transport. All this was given wide and detailed coverage in the Soviet press. British and French newspapers at my disposal (and I would assume American newspapers as well) carried reports of troop, ammunition, and fuel deployment; of the concentration of forces on the borders; and of the expansion of the network of command points, communications centers, and hospitals. How could Mr. Reitz have overlooked or forgotten all of this?

Mr. Reitz professes difficulty in reconciling the statements "Russians must not be stationed in the RSFSR, Ukrainians in Ukraine, etc." and "It is also essential to mix all the nationalities together in divisions, regiments, and battalions." Simply put, the Soviet Armed Forces attempts to pluck each leaf from its tree

and then mix the leaves of different trees together in a non-native setting. Russians, Ukrainians, Georgians, Tatars, etc., serve in Latvia; Latvians, Russians, Ukrainians, and Tatars serve in Georgia; etc. I devoted three pages to explaining and diagramming how this complex personnel policy operates.

Mr. Reitz mentions the "close similarity" between my map of Soviet military districts and their headquarters and the map on p. 95 of *The Military Balance 1980-81*, published by the International Institute of Strategic Studies, London. Yet, if he compares the latter with my book he will discover an important difference. *The Military Balance 1980-81* indicates for the Soviet Union 16 military districts (map, p. 95) and 10 air defense districts (page 10). It is my opinion that there are only two air defense districts, and I so indicated on a map at the very beginning (p. 4) of my book. (The map of military districts on p. 46 of my book, not surprisingly, does look like that in *The Military Balance*, because I agree with that publication's number and location of Soviet military districts.) At the time, my indication of only two air defense districts was a rather daring departure from conventional wisdom. Interestingly, the most recent edition of *The Military Balance* (for 1983-84) has reduced the number of air defense districts to five (p. 11). I was shocked that Mr. Reitz failed to notice the enormous risk I took in raising this issue. It is also a pity that he did not offer his own reasoned opinion on such a basic question of the organizational structure of the Soviet Armed Forces.

VIKTOR SUVOROV
London

MR. REITZ RESPONDS: In reading Mr. Suvorov's correspondence regarding my review of his book *Inside the So-*

viet Army, I must confess that I underestimated his mettle. In the finest tradition of his illustrious namesake, the legendary tsarist field marshal Aleksandr Suvorov, author Suvorov launches boldly into the attack, attempting to elevate my molehills to mountains while ignoring the towering range of his own often largely unsubstantiated statements treated in my review.

Rather than enter into a lengthy and continuing trans-Atlantic fire fight by answering Suvorov's countercharges point by point, I would like to comment on three or four of his observations and leave it up to the readers to draw their own conclusions.

First, on the subject of "strategic directions." I wrote that "Suvorov writes about a number of topics either never before or only murkily reported in open Western and Soviet literature. These include...the role of the 'Strategic Direction.'" Mr. Suvorov terms it "an exaggeration" to suggest that he was the first to "write knowledgeably on such topics." If the 14-line, unattributed entry on "strategic direction" (*Strategicheskoye napravleniye*) printed on page 555 of Vol. 7 of the *Soviet Military Encyclopedia* (*Sovetskaya voyennaya entsiklopediya*) to which Mr. Suvorov refers is not murky (like hundreds, if not thousands of other entries in that 8-volume set), I do not know what is. The concept is not even identified as a Soviet concept, nor is it fixed in time. The item only indicates that a "strategic direction" is an unspecified expanse of terrain, including any contiguous water areas and the aerospace above. Several of these "directions" can be located within a "theater of military activities" (*teatr voyennykh deystviy*). A "strategic direction" will contain strategic "installations" (*ob'yekty*) and may hold or be capable of holding "strategic groupings" of armed forces

(also further unidentified).

Suvorov, on the other hand, discusses strategic directions prior to and during World War II, as well as at the present time, and even in the future, for a total of more than 10 pages throughout his book. For example, we learn of the Western, Southwestern, and Far Eastern Strategic Directions as though they exist today and will in the future. (We cannot be sure that such "Directions" do not exist; I am just concerned that Suvorov is the only person writing about them in the open press as if they existed today.) We learn from Mr. Suvorov (and no one else) that each direction does or will consist of four Fronts or a Fleet, and, in two of three cases, has a "Group of Tank Armies" as well. On p. 41, he assures us that "intermediate controls between the Stavka and Fronts do exist, but they are given no publicity. They (sic) are designated as high commands in the strategic directions" (emphasis added). We learn on p. 42 that the high commands of strategic directions functioned during the first half of World War II, were later abolished, and then were resurrected in the case of Vasil'yevskiy's Far Eastern Strategic Direction in 1945, which was kept secret. (This is more or less confirmed in World War II memoir literature.) But "from 1953 onwards all official mention of it [the Strategic Direction] ceased."

Do "directions" exist today? Says Mr. Suvorov, "They exist and are in operation. They are not mentioned officially, but no particular efforts are made to conceal their existence" (emphasis added). On p. 44 we learn that the Headquarters of the Western Strategic Direction (Hq GSFG) is "hardly concealed at all," and that the others are only "lightly camouflaged."

If they are not given publicity, and are not mentioned "officially" as existing in the present or future, we in the West,

without Mr. Suvorov's unreferenced sources, are hard put to accept the existence of such links above Front level with the same conviction as he. I also have further difficulty, given the very extreme compartmentalization of information within the USSR, in understanding how a GRU (military intelligence) officer, whose very orientation and experience would be thought to have been directed against foreign military and other establishments abroad, became so privy to such a wide range of information on the Soviet Armed Forces and other vital internal Soviet matters as Mr. Suvorov discloses.

Mr. Suvorov also took me to task for commenting that he had written possibly more knowledgeably and in greater detail about fortified area troops than anyone heretofore; and he cites a very good description of such forces in Vol. 2 of the *Soviet Military Encyclopedia*. My concern is not with the concept of Soviet fortified areas and the troops who manned them in the period before and during World War II. These have been discussed extensively in various open Soviet Russian-language military-oriented books and journals. The rather extensive article on p. 185, Vol. 2 of the *Soviet Military Encyclopedia* about the "Fortified Region" (*Ukreplënniy rayon*—UR) describes the increasing use of UR's in a "series of countries," including the USSR, France, Germany, and Finland, as well as by the Japanese in Manchuria. Frontages, depths, and types of fortifications, are discussed in fair detail, but they are not ascribed to the Soviets or any other country specifically. Near the end of the entry is a 10-line passage concerning the use "in the years of the Great Fatherland War" (i.e., World War II) of a number of major units, specifically for the purpose of manning "fortified regions," but there is not one—I repeat,

not one—word in the entire 90-line item to indicate the existence today of either "fortified regions" or fortified area troops in the USSR, although they may very well exist (I do not have in mind here troops of coastal defense). What the encyclopedia article does say near the end is only that "previously constructed UR's are retained even now in a series of states (Greece, Turkey, and [sic] others). Their construction and use in the system of the defense cannot be ruled out in the future."

Mr. Suvorov himself says on p. 68 of his book that the current existence of Fortified Area Troops, as well as of Airborne Assault Troops, and Spetsnaz, as (sic) "Land Force" arms of service are all, in his own words, "kept secret." He then goes on to tell us that today's UR's are either "completely new" or are refurbished types from before World War II, which "withstood Japanese attacks." (The attack would have had to happen in the pre-World War II period since the Japanese were strictly on the defensive in Manchuria in August 1945.)

The article on "Fortified Region Troops" (*Voyska ukreplënniykh rayonov*) that Mr. Suvorov lists as a "very good description of such troops," all of 12 lines in length, refers to no specific time and to no country. Also, the article refers to at least four or more kinds of troops making up these forces, seemingly generically.

My problem with Suvorov insofar as UR's are concerned involves accepting his numbers of "tens of thousands" of buried tanks (i.e., at least 20,000) and "thousands of [naval] gun turrets" (i.e., at least 2,000) employed just along the Chinese border. I have trouble not with his reporting of these installations per se (although again we have no source), it is just that his gun-tube quantities boggle—and are rejected by—this old

artilleryman's mind.

On a third point, about reductions in Soviet Armed Forces personnel: on p. 270 of his book, Suvorov claims that Khrushchev "threw 1,200,000 officers and NCO's" out of the army. In his subsequent letter, Suvorov states that if I think the 1960 law that ostensibly reduced the Soviet Armed Forces by 1,200,000 million *men* was a bad law, I should take it up with Khrushchev. If Khrushchev had actually thrown out "1,200,000 officers and NCO's" instead of merely reducing the Armed Forces by 1,200,000 *men*, I would have considered it a very good law, because it would have gone a long way toward ruining a large part of a monstrous military machine that has threatened world peace for the last four decades.

This is not the place to repeat or extend my enumeration of the countless incredible statements encountered throughout Suvorov's book. I only offer a thought for Mr. Suvorov and for his advisors, who I believe have done him a disservice. Together, they face a hard decision—whether or not he will continue to opt for sensation, at the cost of declining acceptance among serious scholars of the Soviet military scene. Personally, I consider him both knowledgeable enough in substance and quite capable enough as a writer to succeed on his own without the hyperbole and exaggeration that has tainted his otherwise interesting work to date.

JAMES T. REITZ
Falls Church, VA

THE KGB AND THE POPE

TO THE EDITORS: William Hood's review of the books by Claire Sterling and Paul Henze on the plot to kill Pope John Paul II ("Unlikely Conspiracy,"

March–April 1984) is disturbing for several reasons. While offering what amounts in retrospect to gratuitous praise to both authors for their diligence and competence, Hood attempts to impress his own logic on Sterling's and Henze's truly impressive research. His main argument against the thesis of both of these books is that the plot was too amateurishly conceived and executed to be a credible KGB undertaking. Hence, it really wasn't a plot at all. This surely is a peculiar approach for an old intelligence professional to take, in that it supports the popular but ridiculous image of the KGB as the domain of 20-foot-tall, super-efficient, perfectly indoctrinated spooks who always follow the rule book. Beyond its implicit acceptance of this imagery, Hood's position is disturbing for a more fundamental reason, which he seems unable to grasp: the possibility that part of the cover scheme for the plot may have been to make it seem exactly as amateurish as Hood paints it. Indeed, if so, it has had the intended effect of enticing Hood and some of his colleagues still in the intelligence business into dismissing as improbable the involvement by the KGB in the assassination attempt.

Does Hood think there was *no* conspiracy? His title implies that. His analysis is equivocal, demonstrating an astonishing naïveté. Only *bien pensants* in the West who shrink from contemplating the actual nature of the Soviet system have ever tried to pretend there was no conspiracy. As Henze shows in his final chapter, even the Kremlin declared the shooting of the Pope to be the result of a conspiracy, blaming it first on some vague combination of Turkish fascists and Islamic fundamentalists but then quickly pulling all of the strands together to claim that the United States, and specifically the CIA, had done it.

For their part, Sterling and Henze show in great detail how Italian investigators developed good evidence of a Bulgarian-Soviet conspiracy almost from the moment they began to investigate the shooting. Judge Ilario Martella declared at the end of Mehmet Ali Ağca's trial in the summer of 1981 that there was clear evidence of a conspiracy, and he recommended that the investigation be continued. Everything that has appeared publicly since then has been the result of that decision. We have only seen some of Judge Martella's findings, but it certainly would appear at this stage that Sterling and Henze drew correct conclusions from their separate investigations.

The KGB and its Bulgarian sub-contractors have never advanced their own defense beyond the lines they developed in the first few weeks after the Rome shooting. They keep up the same silly disinformation campaign, arguing that the CIA, with the White House behind it, mounted the plot. They embellish only by trying to demonstrate that Sterling organized the Red Brigades in Italy and Henze the Gray Wolves in Turkey. Presto! The accusers become the criminals! This is really back to Lenin: when you lie, tell the biggest whopper imaginable. Then someone might believe you. But who does?

Hood certainly does not believe that the CIA or the White House is behind the attempt on the Pope's life, but he serves Soviet purposes by absolving the KGB and the Bulgarians, and then vaguely throwing the blame on the Gray Wolves and the Turkish mafia. The only way to make this weak case seem tenable—which is the way Hood chooses—is to ignore one of the most important aspects of the Sterling-Henze analysis, namely the manner in which the Soviets exploited the political Right in Turkey for

their own purposes of subversion and encouragement of terrorism.

Henze demonstrates beyond doubt that Ağca was not a Gray Wolf, and neither Henze nor Sterling could find any organizational tie between the National Action Party (of which the Gray Wolves were the youth arm) and any of Ağca's activities. Their speculation that this party was merely used as cover for Ağca has been confirmed by revelations in Turkey during the past year; the circumstantial evidence they present of Bulgarian links to the Turkish mafia has been confirmed several times over, with further investigations and trials in Turkey and Italy showing the manner in which this entire coterie of Middle Eastern drug and arms smugglers was sponsored by Bulgaria for operations aimed at destabilizing the West. With all this going on—ignored for years by the press and apparently undiscovered by Western security authorities—is it any wonder that the Soviets thought they could get away with a jerry-built plot to get rid of the bothersome Polish Pope?

It is surprising that Hood finds this such a difficult concept to grasp. Perhaps the additional information that has come out since he wrote his review will help him develop more insight into KGB operations. Hood's model of an utterly logical and efficient KGB has never been valid: not 20 years ago, and not today. It is a poor frame of reference for understanding the very real schemes of subversion, disinformation, and—yes—assassination promoted by the Soviets in today's world.

S. ENDERS WIMBUSH
Oxford, England

TO THE EDITORS: William Hood in an essay-review in *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1984, rejects the Soviet and Bulgarian involve-

ment in the plot to kill Pope John Paul II on the grounds of the unprofessional nature of the attempt. Instead, he suspects Ağca of being "merely a psychopathic free-lance terrorist who stumbled into relatively innocent contact with Bulgarian intelligence, and who... decided *independently* to fulfill his earlier threat to kill the Pope" (emphasis added, p. 70).

In his review of Paul Henze's *The Plot to Kill the Pope* and Claire Sterling's *The Time of the Assassins*, Mr. Hood ignores the wealth of documentary evidence presented. A more careful reader would have known that Ağca acted as part of a conspiracy. This was established beyond any reasonable doubt by Judge Severino Santiapichi in his verdict issued on September 25, 1981 (see Henze, p. 20; Sterling, p. 23).

Was the plot really below the high professional standard of the Soviet and Bulgarian intelligence services? The reviewer wonders how any intelligence could have chosen a man whose "fingerprints, a physical description, and even a psychological assessment were on file with the Turkish police and with Interpol," (p. 68) his photographs splashed across the Turkish press, his confession to having murdered a Turkish journalist televised? It does not occur to Mr. Hood that all this publicity had one purpose: to establish in advance as forcefully as possible the murderer's image as a rightwing Turkish fascist in order to divert any suspicion from the actual conspirators. As Henze points out, after the attempt, Ağca's record of his rightwing affiliations was accepted without question by the entire world press. In the aftermath of the drama in St. Peter's Square, *The New York Times* headlined its story "Trail of Mehmet Ali Ağca: Six Years of Neo-Fascist Ties" (May 25, 1981).

No wonder that the three Bulgarian intelligence agents

were in no hurry to leave Rome and return to Sofia; they fell victim to their own success. Another suspect, Bekir Celenk, left London at the very last moment before Judge Ilario Martella issued a warrant for his arrest. A Turkish citizen, he sought and was granted refuge and protection in Bulgaria. Why should the Bulgarians have refused to extradite Ağca's suspected accomplice if they had nothing to do with the plot as Mr. Hood believes?

Was the attempt so amateurish? Suppose that the two bombs held by Oral Celik, identified as the second gunman in St. Peter's Square, did explode and cause panic as planned, and that Ağca escaped. Or that he did not confess and incriminate the Bulgarians. In all probability, the Bulgarian connection would have remained unknown forever. All the details meticulously gathered by both authors indicate a carefully planned and highly professional operation that miscarried only because of some unforeseen developments.

Mr. Hood's contention that the Soviets have never engaged in the murder of prominent foreign leaders (p. 69) also remains open to question. Polish Prime Minister and Commander-In-Chief, General Władysław Sikorski, was killed in a mysterious airplane crash in Gibraltar in 1943 at the time when Kim Philby was in charge of the airport's security. Henze writes about this extensively (pp. 111 and 112), but the reviewer chose to ignore the entire in-depth analysis of the vast background which includes the Turkish, Polish, Bulgarian, as well as Soviet aspects of the plot to kill the Pope.

JAN NOWAK
Annandale, VA

MR. HOOD RESPONDS: It has been my observation, and pos-

sibly that of Mr. Nowak, that even intelligence men with the same experience and professional background occasionally differ in their analysis of a secret operation even though they have access to the identical files and data. It is therefore not surprising to find persons with rather different experience disagreeing on the basis of press reports.

Mr. Nowak asks if it is not possible that the Bulgarians selected Agca as an assassin because his open association with rightwing Turkish groups would deflect suspicion from the true authors of the murder. This is a valid point. But it remains difficult to square this attempted camouflage with the open manner in which Agca alleges the Bulgarians dealt with him in Rome.

If Agca had not confessed, Mr. Nowak states, "in all probability, the Bulgarian connection would have remained unknown forever." This would be true only as long as all of the many participants cited by Agca also remained silent and as long as there were no leaks or defections from within the Bulgarian or Soviet camps. Aside from these not entirely negligible possibilities, I find it difficult to believe that any competent intelligence service would assume that any young man would contemplate a lifetime in prison without, sooner or later, striking back at those he might come to hold responsible for his plight.

Mr. Nowak's experience in the Polish resistance may well confirm the axiom that secret operations cannot safely be run on the assumption that a captured operative will remain

forever mute. It is to guard against the possibility of a captured agent telling what he knows—because of torture, a change of heart, or simple self-interest—that security practices common to all intelligence services have come into existence. *On form*, high-risk agents do not sport about in hotels run by their sponsors; they are not invited to tea in their case officer's apartment; they are not driven to the scene of an assassination by two case officers whom they know and in an automobile that could easily be traced. Such agents are handled at arm's length, rigidly compartmented from other activists, and their knowledge of their sponsor's facilities and personnel is held to the essential minimum.

Mr. Nowak suggests that if "the two bombs held by Oral Celik, identified as the second gunman in St. Peter's Square, did explode and cause panic as planned . . .," Agca might have escaped. This is of course a reasonable possibility. But what evidence is there that there were two bombs, and that Oral Celik was to detonate them? Do we have independent proof of this, or is it another of Agca's stories, and like so many of the others, subject to future editing by the author? Why is it that Celik was allegedly issued a pistol and two bombs, while Agca had to make do with only a pistol? If Agca had been issued the same equipment allegedly given to his brother in arms, Agca might have been able to make his own way out of St. Peter's Square.

The mysterious death of

General Sikorski is indeed pertinent to any discussion of KGB activity. Moreover, it brings Jan Masaryk's "suicide" (in Prague, March 1948) to mind. As far as I know, nothing has been proved in either case, but if murder was involved, the tactics in the Sikorski affair—like those used by the "umbrella man" in the assassination of Bulgarian émigré Georgi Markov—was surely a measure better than those involved in the events in Rome.

I do not know who was behind Agca in his attempt to kill the Pope. But, as stated in my review of the books by Claire Sterling and Paul Henze, the events disclosed by the authors' research into the crime did not convince me that it was an operation conducted from start to finish by a secret intelligence service. Until more evidence comes forth, and independent confirmation of Agca's allegations is published, I see no need for a rush to judgment.

Mr. Wimbush's notion of a double bluff—wherein an intelligence service deliberately commits a series of blunders so obvious that the dimwitted opposition will ignore the trail leading straight back to the perpetrators—is such a recondite contribution to counterintelligence that it is best evaluated by those with a better grasp of the subject than Mr. Wimbush attributes to me.

WILLIAM HOOD
New York, NY

MORE ID IDENTIS

TO THE EDITORS: Since publication of my supplement "Leaders of Sectors and Desks" to Robert Kitrinos's article "International Department of the CPSU" in the September-October 1984 issue, I have come across several significant new identifications and/or additional information.

1. Yevgeniy Korendyasov was noted in *Pravda* (Moscow), Sept. 30, 1984, as dealing with Senegal—in addition to Mali and the Congo. He may therefore be responsible for all of Franco-phone Africa.

2. Vladimir Travkin appears to have supplanted Konstantin Kurin as the ID's Mexican Desk man. See *Asi Es* (Mexico City), June 1, 1984.

3. Vladimir Ulasevich appears to be the ID's Canadian Desk man. See *Sovetskaya Litva* (Vilnius), Aug. 10, 1983.

4. Viktor Krasnykh appears to be the ID's Portuguese Desk man. See *ibid.*, Oct. 10, 1980. Actually Vladimir Pertsov had never been specifically noted in that capacity, and his connection with Portugal had only been inferred from his known connection with Spain.

5. Sergey Semivolos has been identified as responsible for Grenada and presumably the whole English-speaking Caribbean region within the USA/Canada sector. See an undated document of the Moscow Embassy in Grenada, "Year of Political and Academic Education," from the US Archives collection of Grenada documents.

WALLACE H. SPAULDING
McLean, VA

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An annual index for *Problems of Communism* appears in the November-December issue (No. 6) of each year except in the case of the first three volumes, which are covered in a combined index in the November-December issue (No. 6) of Vol. III. Material from the journal is also indexed in *ABC POL SCI*, *Bibliographie Internationale des Sciences Sociales* (all sections), *Current Contents*, *Economic Abstracts*, *Historical Abstracts*, *Index to US Government Periodicals*, *International Political Science Abstracts*, *Public Affairs Information Service*, *Social Sciences Citation Index*, *Social Sciences Index*, *Strategic Studies Reference Guide*, and *United States Political Science Documents*.

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Cover: A young Chinese woman in Western-style garb.
Photo by Bertrand Laforet/Gamma-Liaison.

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IN THIS ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

Prosperity, Privatization, and China's Youth

Stanley Rosen

The unfolding of sweeping economic reforms introduced in December 1978 has had a profound impact on the work of China's Communist Youth League (CYL). The concomitant elevation of higher education and technical expertise at the expense of ideology has crippled youth work in China and left CYL cadres confused, uncertain, and demoralized. Once a primary channel of party recruitment and political socialization, the CYL is now considered by most youth as irrelevant to both their careers and China's current modernization drive.

Moscow and Southern Africa

Peter Clement

The Soviet Union's relations with the Front-Line States of southern Africa are guided by considerations of prestige rather than security. In the 1980's these countries have been distancing themselves somewhat from Moscow and pursuing closer relations with the West and the Republic of South Africa. This has created some unexpected problems for Moscow and posed new questions about its stakes in the Third World.

Rise and Fall of Détente

Harry Gelman

Exploration of the factors conducive to the emergence of Soviet-American détente in the early 1970's and its subsequent decline reveals that the fundamental interests of the two superpowers are less compatible than thought in détente's heyday. Yet these relations may perhaps not need to be as tense as they have become since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Given Soviet restraint (or lack of promising opportunities for advance) in the Third World, Western publics are likely to push their governments toward some efforts to ease tensions. There survive from the détente period some instrumentalities—formal and informal—that might be revitalized to accommodate such a development.

The Soviet Empire: Alive But Not Well

Charles Gati

In the past, some East European regimes have successfully escaped from Moscow's control over their policies. Today, some of Moscow's Warsaw Pact partners—dissatisfied with the course of Soviet foreign conduct—are seeking more "elbow room" for themselves, sometimes in concert. Whether Moscow will be effective in dealing with such mini-coalitions depends on the resolution of the Soviet leadership crisis.

(Abstracts continued on reverse side)

Notes & Views

On Anniversaries in 1985

Zbigniew Brzezinski

The year 1985 marks a number of major anniversaries, the end of World War II, the 30th anniversary of the Austrian State Treaty, and the 10th anniversary of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Former US National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski reflects on the historical lessons of these major anniversaries and on their implications for European politics today.

Checklist of Communist Parties in 1984

Richard F. Staar

This list, published in cooperation with the *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1985* (Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1985), gives information on the major communist parties and movements recognized by Moscow as well as a number of "revolutionary democratic" parties viewed by the Kremlin as being at a less developed political stage. Data provided include the mid-1984 population estimates for the geographic entity in which a given party operates, the party's claimed or estimated membership, the key party leader, the last major congress or conference, the party's legal status, and its showing in the most recent national elections.

Communist International Fronts in 1984

Wallace Spaulding

This item, also published in cooperation with the *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1985*, updates information on membership and leaders of Moscow's major international communist front organizations for 1984, and summarizes the fronts' activities during the year.

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Essay-reviews

Brezhnev's Foreign Policy

William E. Griffith

As the USSR and US resume arms control negotiations, Harry Gelman's book helps to see clearly the Soviet Union and its foreign policy. This overview of the rise and decline of "détente" provides a basis for an informed Western political opinion. However, the book neglects discussion of recent developments in high-tech that strengthen the Western hand in negotiations with the Soviets.

Revamping China's Military

Shu-shin Wang

China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) is the largest army in the world. Yet it is not a potent fighting force. Much of its equipment is unsophisticated or obsolete; its strategy and tactics outdated; and most of its troops uneducated and unskilled. Since 1978, however, the Deng Xiaoping leadership has sought to modernize all facets of PLA operations, professionalize the PLA's officers and soldiers, and reassert the party's complete control over the military. Analysts disagree on whether or not opposition within the PLA will frustrate Deng's policies.

How Stalinist Was Mao's China?

Thomas P. Bernstein

Only a few years ago, during the radical phase of Mao Zedong's rule, China was embarked upon a unique ideological and developmental course, or so it seemed in the West. Mao openly questioned the relevance of the Soviet model, criticized Stalin for having exploited the peasants, and rejected the fundamental concepts of Soviet socialist construction. But if China's divergence from Soviet patterns was a central theme of earlier Western perceptions, convergence with Stalinism is the dominant theme of post-Mao reappraisals. However, a detailed comparative study of Maoism and Stalinism has yet to appear.

Prosperity, Privatization, and China's Youth

Stanley Rosen

Socialist states, particularly those with a relatively low level of economic development, are commonly faced with contradictory policy choices. The pursuit of social equality, the stress on ideological remodeling, and the attempt to fashion a "new socialist man" are all important political aims considered essential for the creation of a socialist society. But the realization of mature socialism is impossible without an expansion of productive forces and, ultimately, the industrialization of the country. This quest for a society that is both egalitarian and highly productive creates a tension between the political and economic goals of the leadership. Which values should be emphasized, and when? What type of economic development is acceptable, given ideological constraints? With what attributes should revolutionary heroes and models for emulation be endowed?

Nowhere is this tension between political ("red") and economic ("expert") goals felt more acutely than in the ideological/political organizations established to guide youth work. In the People's Republic of China (PRC) this organization is called the Communist Youth League (CYL); its primary functions are political socialization and party recruitment. Despite periodic oscillations between red and expert, youth work in China for more than a decade and a half following the Communist takeover in 1949 generally stressed the importance of both values. During the Cultural Revolution (1966–76), however, Chi-

na's "radicals" altered this equilibrium mightily as they attempted to subordinate, permanently, all other values to politics and class struggle. Within the CYL, this was initially reflected in frequent admonitions to guard against those who sought to turn the organization into "a league of all the people" (instead of a league of committed revolutionaries), "a league concerned with production," "a league to provide recreational activities," or "a marriage bureau."¹ As the ideological fervor of the Cultural Revolution heightened, and after Chinese youth (many as Red Guards) were encouraged to "overthrow those in authority taking the capitalist road," CYL activities were suspended, and the league remained more or less dormant for a dozen or so years.

But what happens when those who helped to revive the youth league make a political decision to shift the work of the country—once again seemingly permanently—to an emphasis on rapid economic development, when the previous emphasis on politics is decried as "sham Marxism"? Put somewhat crudely, can a youth league staffed primarily by ideological watchdogs be refashioned into an advocate for "whatever works" socialism? Can youth's skepticism toward any ideological commitment be overcome? Can a new standard of morality and a convincing central belief system be forged to replace the discredited radical version of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought? And can new "revolutionary" models be imposed on a youth that has witnessed numerous, acute ideological gyrations at the top of the Chinese political system?

This essay examines these questions and tries to place in perspective the party's recent, and largely unsuccessful, attempts to fashion a comprehensive youth policy. Special attention is given to fluctuations in Chinese Communist Party (CCP) policy and how such

Stanley Rosen is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Southern California (Los Angeles). He is the author of Red Guard Factionalism and the Cultural Revolution in Guangzhou (1982), and the coeditor of Policy Conflicts in Contemporary China (1985) and On Socialist Democracy and the Legal System (1985). He edits the journal Chinese Education.

¹Zhongguo Qingnian (Beijing), October 1979, pp. 12–13; Fujian Qingnian (Fuzhou), November 1978, pp. 16–17; Guangdong Qingnian (Guangzhou), April 1978, pp. 8–9.



Hu Jintao (at right), First Secretary of the Communist Youth League Central Committee, with his predecessor, Wang Zhaoguo, who is now director of the General Office of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee.

—New China Picture Company.

fluctuations have affected the scope and direction of youth work in China. In particular, this essay traces the reemergence of the youth league within the context of party reformers' efforts to revitalize league activities and broaden the appeal of the organization. However, this is not an investigation of the institutional and organizational arrangements between the CYL and the CCP. Rather, it is an analysis of the changes over time in Chinese attitudes toward and perceptions of CYL activities as reflected in the major debates and forums that have appeared in Chinese media. But these are not simply the views and perceptions of high-ranking officials; included as well are the opinions and attitudes of lower level cadres, "model" youth, "winners" and "losers" among the young people of China, and young heroes of the counterculture. The approach is chronological, beginning with the 10th CYL Congress in 1978. The main sources are national and provincial youth magazines and newspapers.

In many ways, the analysis that follows is an examination of CCP dictates and CYL responses. It is helpful at

the outset, therefore, to get some sense of the relationship between the party and the league. While in theory an independent organization having its own hierarchy that parallels the party organization at each level, in practice the youth league is wholly dominated by the party. For one thing, the party is well represented on the CYL national leadership. The immediate past CYL first secretary, Wang Zhaoguo, is a member of the party's Central Committee (CC); both the current first secretary, Hu Jintao, and at least one other secretary, Li Haifeng, are members of Central Committee organs.² Moreover, a great many CYL cadres are party members.³ For another, the youth league has little authority of its own. It has few outside sources of funding and often is unable

²See, e.g., Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, *Directory of Chinese Officials: National Level Organizations*, Washington, DC, CIA, August 1983, pp. 126, 9, 12, and 13.

³*Zhongguo Qingnian Bao* (Beijing), Sept. 13, 1984; and New China News Agency (hereafter Xinhua), July 1, 1984, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-CHI*), July 2, 1984, p. K/4.

to appropriate space for its programs. Thus, it is almost totally dependent on the party in these respects. Perhaps even more important, especially as concerns this essay, the party exerts an enormous indirect influence on CYL activities through its ability to shape the attitudes and values of Chinese youth.

In the narrative that follows, several key reasons for the weakness of the league are presented. First, the CYL's lack of success can be traced to its inability to serve two masters: the needs of youth and the shifts in party policy. While the party's economic policy has been relatively stable in recent years, there have been shifts on ideological issues. Given the nature of the CYL, it gets buffeted far more than most organizations as a result of these shifts. Changing party policies deeply affect debates within the league, further complicating the efforts of the CYL to come to terms with post-Mao "economics" or to respond to the real problems of youth.

Second, the inherent contradictions in "socialism with Chinese characteristics," in which both spiritual and material values are to be promoted equally, have made it difficult to fashion youth models who are paragons on both axes and remain believable. Inevitably there is a gap between the officially sanctioned models, who tend to embody spiritual qualities, and the values and ideals of ordinary youth, who tend to be oriented toward material success. Once again, the CYL has been unable to

bridge this gap. Finally, in the competitive environment fostered by China's stress on economic development, league membership offers no tangible benefits to those eager for upward mobility. Since university entrance, advantageous job placement, and material prosperity do not depend on membership in the CYL, youth have been indifferent to the organization.

Current CYL Problems

In December 1978, when China's reformist leaders shifted the focus of the work of the country to the Four Modernizations, they were faced with youth who had "seen through" (*kantou*) everything, and so believed in nothing. Over the course of the next five years, under the impact of the party's new policies, youth groped to find the "meaning of life." For many, the answer lay in the abandonment of ideological/political public concerns and the adoption of private values including, as some put it in interviews, "the modernization of everyday life."⁴ For others, it meant a redefinition of self-sacrifice and the role of ideology in the socialist transformation of the country. As a result, in China today youth tend to view social relations and their own futures in more individualistic terms than they did previously, often choosing as popular models young people who exhibit an independent spirit, even a lack of discipline.

If such rethinking among skeptical youth poses problems for party leaders, it is virtually crippling CYL work. Not only is the league's organizational structure incompatible with the new system of production, its activities are out of step with current youth attitudes. As the head of the ideology department of *Zhongguo Qingnian* (China Youth), the official journal of the league, has admitted, "in factories, league meetings and activities have become much less frequent and more superficial, and in most rural areas the league has ceased to function."⁵ Indeed, available statistics from published and unpublished official reports reveal the seriousness of the problems currently inhibiting CYL work. For example, in 1979 there were approximately 699,000 production brigades and 5,154,000 production teams in China's commune system. See Francis C. Tuan and Frederick W. Crook, *Planning and Statistical Systems in China's Agriculture*, Washington, DC, Foreign Agricultural Economic Report No. 181, US Department of Agriculture, 1983, pp. 8-9.

Equally important, the league is plagued by a high dropout rate. When the 10th CYL Congress met in October 1978, the league had 48 million members. Despite recruiting some 26 million new members over the next four years, by the 11th CYL Congress in December 1982 there were still only 48 million members, less than 20 percent of the total youth population of 250 million (those between 15 and 28 years of age).⁷ Nor has the

⁴This is based on discussions with Chinese students both in the United States and in the course of five visits to China from 1980 to 1984. Some might argue that although *norms* may have changed, youth *values* in fact are not so different from the pre-Cultural Revolution period. Although there is some truth to this—in that it is finally possible for youth to express rather openly their cynicism and disinterest—I would suggest, based on interviews with hundreds of Chinese students since 1973, that a fairly significant value change has indeed occurred. Unfortunately, there is nothing comparable for earlier years to the large amounts of survey data now available. I discuss the earlier period in "Education and the Political Socialization of Chinese Youth," in John N. Hawkins, Ed., *Education and Social Change in the People's Republic of China*, New York, Praeger, 1983, pp. 97-133; and in *Red Guard Factionalism and the Cultural Revolution in Guangzhou*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1982, Chaps. 1 and 2.

⁵Mary-Louise O'Callaghan, "A Streak of Individualism Emerges in China's Youth," *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), July 22, 1983.

⁶See Nov. 10, 1981, speech of Wang Jiangong, of the CYL Central Secretariat, reprinted in *Zhonggong Yanjiu* (Taipei), Aug. 15, 1982, pp. 101-17. Available statistics suggest that in 1979 there were approximately 699,000 production brigades and 5,154,000 production teams in China's commune system. See Francis C. Tuan and Frederick W. Crook, *Planning and Statistical Systems in China's Agriculture*, Washington, DC, Foreign Agricultural Economic Report No. 181, US Department of Agriculture, 1983, pp. 8-9.

⁷Xinhua, Oct. 16, 1978, trans in *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 17, 1978, p. E/2; Xinhua, Dec. 20, 1982, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 20, 1982, p. K/65; *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, Dec. 25, 1982. Some of the "missing" CYL members can be accounted for. Between the 10th and 11th CYL congresses, 2.7 million members joined the party; another 2.9 million members were "lost" (*diushi*) when they moved from their original unit (i.e., graduating students, demobilized soldiers, those who married). See *Zhonggong Yanjiu*, Aug. 15, 1982, p. 113. It is unlikely that the majority of those not accounted for could have been "retirees," since, apart from purely demographic reasons, the age limit was extended from 25 to 28 during this time. Moreover, provincial youth magazines contain many letters and discussions about the dropout phenomenon. Finally, the number of league members eliminated as "unqualified" or as "leftist sympathizers" is unknown. By mid-1984, league membership had increased slightly, to over 48.5 million. See *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, Sept. 13, 1984.

league been an effective conduit for gaining membership in the party. In Shanghai in 1979, for example, 5,270 CYL members applied to join the party; in 1980 the figure dropped by 43.8 percent, declining even further in 1981.⁸ Although 80 to 90 percent of students in Chinese universities are league members, and many of them are actively recruited by the party, only a small percentage are likely to join the CCP.⁹

The decline in the importance of the CYL is only one of many problems facing league officials. Not only has it been difficult to recruit new members, but many of those who have joined choose not to take part in the few activities the league offers. Moreover, despite the increasing concern of former youth league officials now in the central leadership, such as party General Secretary Hu Yaobang and CC Secretary Hu Qili, lower level units apparently do not consider league work particularly important. In Yunnan Province, for example, of the more than 600 middle schools with junior- and senior-high sections, only about one in six has a cadre especially assigned to handle CYL work.¹⁰ Before Gansu Province divided its local government administration from commune management, each unit corresponding to the traditional Chinese township (*xiang*) had a cadre assigned to CYL work. Under the recent reorganization, this post has been abolished. League work has been reassigned to the *xiang* party deputy secretary, a person generally around 40 years old with six or seven major functions to perform. In a province already said to have "fairly weak" (*xiangdang boruo*) rural league organizations, the situation is expected to become worse.¹¹ The remainder of this essay will trace the evolution of the league's current problems and document changing youth attitudes.

The CYL in 1978

Following a 12-year hiatus, the CYL resumed national-level activities in autumn-winter 1978. In September, *Zhongguo Qingnian* reappeared for the first time since 1966. In October, the 10th CYL National Congress was convened, replacing the 9th Congress which had been chosen in 1964. But this was still a transitional period, and the divisions within the party leadership were reflected in various leaders' attitudes toward the CYL. For example, after 70,000 copies of *Zhongguo Qingnian* had circulated on September 11, the journal was withdrawn; 10 days later it reappeared with two loose sheets: one contained an inscription by Hua Guofeng and three of Mao's poems; the other had a picture of Mao chatting with delegates to the 3rd CYL Congress in 1957.¹² Although the 11th Party Congress in August 1977 had

adopted a program to build a powerful, modern, socialist China before the end of the century, there was considerable divergence over how this should be done, with Hua stressing a major role for the "masses" and Deng Xiaoping arguing for a greater reliance on experts unencumbered with political activities.

The 10th CYL Congress in October further sent mixed signals to China's youth in a somewhat schizophrenic attempt to defend and extend the gains of the Cultural Revolution, while denouncing the "Gang of Four." Youth were admonished to "spot every kind of modern revisionism" and to be "ready to lay down their lives for the truth, which was fostered in the storms of the Cultural Revolution." Class struggle was stressed, with the division "between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, between the socialist and the capitalist roads," still forming the "principal contradiction in the new period." At the same time, youth were told that "an important criterion for judging a really politically conscious person today is whether he or she studies hard for professional competence and can master modern science and culture." On one point, however, there was no equivocation. The CYL was told that it "must accept the party's absolute leadership"—that it "should fight wherever the party orders it to fight." The questioning of party policies, which had been a feature of the Cultural Revolution years, was withdrawn in no uncertain terms.¹³

⁸From *Qingnian Yidai* (Shanghai), cited in *Chan Wang* (Hong Kong), Feb. 1, 1982, p. 22. It is interesting to note that a recent front-page report in *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao* (July 5, 1984) lamented the steady aging of the party, also using Shanghai as an example. Just after 1949, youths 25 years old and under made up 41 percent of party members in that city, but during the 1950's the figure dropped to about 20 percent. By the 1960's the figure was below 10 percent, declining further in the 1970's to around 5 percent. The 1983 figure was only 2.25 percent. Nationally, the numbers fell from 26.6 percent in 1950 to 3.36 percent in 1983. See also *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, Aug. 28, 1984.

⁹*Beijing Ribao*, Nov. 4, 1982. Overall, about 30,000 of the more than 1.2 million university and secondary technical-school students are party members. See *Xinhua*, July 11, 1984, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, July 17, 1984, p. K/2. The percentage of university students who are league members has, however, increased in recent years. In 1978, 60.4 percent of such students belonged to the league, rising to 69.2 percent and 76.2 percent in 1979 and 1980, respectively. See *Zhongguo Jiaoyu Nianjian, 1949-1981* (Education Yearbook of China, 1949-1981), Beijing, China Encyclopedia Press, 1984, p. 427. As will be argued below, however, such an impressive increase by no means indicates an equivalent concern with ideology or politics.

¹⁰*Yunnan Jiaoyu* (Kunming), February 1982, p. 2.

¹¹*Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, Nov. 10, 1983.

¹²*Dongxiang* (Hong Kong), Oct. 20, 1978, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 26, 1978, pp. N/1-3. *Dongxiang* also carried controversial articles criticizing Mao Zedong Thought as a religious cult and commenting favorably on the Tian An Men incident of April 1976 (allegedly a Deng-inspired mass demonstration—in which thousands expressed their affection in memory of Zhou Enlai, who had died that January—that became violent and had to be suppressed by police and the army. As a result, Deng was ousted from his party, government, and military positions for a second time.)

¹³*Xinhua*, Oct. 26, 1978, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 31, 1978, pp. E/1-9; *Xinhua*, Oct. 26-29, 1978, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 30, 1978, pp. E/1-18; *Xinhua*, Oct. 23, 1978, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 24, 1978, pp. E/2-9; and *Xinhua*, Oct. 16-17, 1978, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 18, 1978, pp. E/1-6. Provincial youth journals had been hammering hard at the absolute necessity for party control over the league even before the 10th CYL Congress. See *Guangdong Qingnian*, February 1978, pp. 8-9; and August 1978, pp. 7-8.



Noted Chinese mathematician Chen Jingrun, right, helps two graduate students in their study of the theory of functions in January 1979.

—China Photo Service via Eastfoto.

It is not surprising that youth remained puzzled on a variety of issues at this time. To get some sense of the magnitude of student misgivings, *Beijing Ribao* sponsored a discussion entitled "What Shall I Do for My Country?" Reportedly, some 400,000 youth took part, apparently seeking guidelines for establishing "true values" in fields ranging from politics to love. Many letters to the paper "demanded a clear answer [as] to which models young people should strive after."¹⁴ For its part, the newly restored *Zhongguo Qingnian* organized a related forum to discuss the familiar red versus expert question. At issue was whether a brilliant young mathematician, Chen Jingrun, was a suitable model for Chinese youth. As is usual in these forums, the initial letter was provocative. Of course, it was necessary to promote study achievement, the letter writer said. But how could one legitimately speak of Chen's redness?

Over the next several issues, readers debated whether making Chen a model really was "lowering the standard for redness." Although the published letters all praised

the young mathematician, some wondered, in light of Chen's elevation, where the erstwhile hero Lei Feng would now fit in the pantheon of model Chinese youth. In delicious irony, one reader objected that the study of Chen had little universal significance. While intellectuals might appreciate Chen as a model, he noted, ordinary beings were much better off with Lei Feng. Lei, after all, may not have been brilliant, but he did recognize the importance of technical expertise, and his redness was manifested in everyday acts. Before the Cultural Revolution, of course, it had been youth from intellectual backgrounds who had found little in common with Lei, an impoverished orphan whose family had been brutally exploited by landlords.¹⁵

¹⁴Xinhua, Oct. 23, 1978, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 24, 1978, pp. E/8-9

¹⁵The forum had been stimulated by an earlier article on Chen Jingrun in *Renmin Wenxue* (Beijing). See *Zhongguo Qingnian*, September 1978, pp. 28-29; October 1978, pp. 22-25; November 1978, pp. 44-50; December 1978, pp. 20-23; and January 1979, pp. 13-15.

Concurrent with this forum, *Zhongguo Qingnian* addressed the cynical, confused reactions of youth influenced by developments during the Cultural Revolution. Among the many problems addressed were the proper treatment of youth from exploiting class families, the corruption of youth values by the Gang of Four, and the role of youth in the new situation. The publication of "Awake, My Brother! (*Xinglai ba, didi*)" by Liu Xinwu, one of the main proponents of "scar literature,"¹⁶ stimulated another debate. The central character, Peng Xiaolei, has given up hope, declaring that "everything is lies, lies. I've seen through it all." By the end of the story, the protagonist has not yet decided "to return to the world," despite the fact that a party secretary he can respect has been transferred to his factory. Peng's tale struck a responsive chord with readers. While most published responses urged Peng to awake for the sake of the country, some expressed skepticism. As one youth who likened himself to Peng put it, Peng "encountered a Secretary Lu. Our unit also has a party secretary, but how can he be compared with Secretary Lu? My question is, at present there are millions upon millions of [Pengs], but are there millions upon millions of Secretary Lus?"¹⁷ Similar discussions of the *kantou* phenomenon appeared periodically in youth journals over the next several years.

Impact of the 3rd Plenum

The decisions of the 3rd Plenum of the 11th Party Congress, which met December 18–22, 1978, had a major impact on all areas of Chinese life. Most important was the decision to shift the emphasis of the party's work and the attention of the whole country to socialist modernization, which, according to the party's resolution, required both "great growth in the productive forces [and] changes in all methods of management, action, and thinking that stand in the way of such growth."¹⁸ Other initiatives included the downgrading of class struggle; support for the slogan "practice is the sole criterion for testing truth"; the linking of income to output in agriculture; and the return of some of Deng's political and economic allies to key positions.¹⁹

CYL officials responsible for youth work seem to have been unprepared for the sudden policy shift. Some complained that youth had become "so fascinated with

studying technical knowledge" that they now "refrained from speaking to political-work cadres." But party reformers seemed to ignore these cadres' pleas, insisting instead that they neither obstruct youth feverishly caught up in this new tide nor criticize such youth by labeling them "white experts."²⁰ It was indeed a difficult time for political-work cadres, who seemed to have become superfluous overnight. For example, Shanghai's Jiaotong University simply abolished its political department after determining that party committees of institutes of higher education would in future be evaluated mainly by the teaching and research work of their schools; those cadres still retained to handle political work were now incorporated within the teaching section.²¹ Moreover, some provincial committees undercut the independence of CYL cadres, declaring that "study should be at the center of all CYL activities" in schools, in order to "develop talents."²²

Under the new conditions, basic-level cadres were unsure as to which criteria should be stressed in CYL recruitment, a confusion that was reflected in local youth magazines.²³ Should academic achievement be the sole qualification for league membership? What about class origin? After all, had not party officials removed all remaining "rightist" labels in November 1978, as well as the class designations of former exploiters who had behaved themselves?

Party reformers responsible for promoting the league's new direction moved quickly to guide their uncertain colleagues in the youth league. In February 1979, *Zhongguo Qingnian* began a series entitled "CYL Work Must Be in the Service of Modernization," presenting examples of units in industry, agriculture, and education that had been able to adjust ideological/political work to the practical needs of the Four Modernizations. The message was clear: league cadres were to be trained in science, economics, and management. Promotion, it was suggested, should be determined by professional competence.²⁴ But social and political currents were moving too swiftly for many; demoralization among league cadres was common. With China's fledgling "democracy movement" at its height, featuring wall posters and tabloids questioning some of the most basic tenets of socialist China, those cadres in charge of ideological/

²⁰*Zhongguo Qingnian*, January 1979, p. 12.

²¹Radio Shanghai, Feb. 24, 1979, trans. in Joint Publications Research Service, *China Report* (Washington, DC—hereafter *JPRS*), No. 73179, Apr. 9, 1979.

²²Radio Guiyang, Apr. 5, 1979, trans. in *JPRS*, No. 73316, Apr. 26, 1979.

²³Xinhua, Nov. 16, 1978, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 17, 1978, pp. E/1–3; *Beijing Review*, Feb. 16, 1979, p. 8; *Fujian Qingnian*, December 1978, p. 20; October 1979, p. 16.

Guangdong Qingnian, April 1978, pp. 8–9.

²⁴*Zhongguo Qingnian*, February 1979, pp. 4–7; March 1979, pp. 20–21. Also see *ibid.*, January 1979, pp. 10–12.

¹⁶Some examples of this type of literature, including "Awake, My Brother!", are translated by Geremie Barmé and Bennett Lee in *The Wounded: New Stories of the Cultural Revolution 1977–78*, Hong Kong, Joint Publications, 1979, pp. 179–203.

¹⁷*Zhongguo Qingnian*, October 1978, pp. 34–41; and December 1978, pp. 24–26, 34–37.

¹⁸*Peking Review*, Dec. 29, 1978, p. 7.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 6–16.



Ma Zhongqi, right, received his Ph.D. from the Institute of High-Energy Physics in mid-1982, one of the first such degrees awarded in China since the Cultural Revolution.

—China Pictorial (Beijing), No. 1, 1983, p. 26.

political work openly demanded to know whether the party's policy still was "to foster proletarian ideology and eliminate bourgeois ideology" (*xingwu miezi*). If this policy was in fact still in place, they asked, why were so many manifestations of bourgeois ideology allowed to circulate freely in society.²⁵

A partial response came in late March–early April 1979, when the most extreme of the democracy activists were arrested and the "Four Basic Principles" (Uphold the socialist road, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the leadership of the Communist Party, and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought) were published.²⁶ CYL cadres were assured that they had "scored achievements" and that their work was appreciated. Indeed, they were told, recent developments should be taken not as a signal to abandon ideological/political work, but rather as a sign that such efforts must be strengthened.²⁷

For those in the trenches, however, such encouragement was little comfort against harsh realities. A full-page letter published in a popular magazine described the plight of two middle-school politics teachers. In the new atmosphere, students had returned to their academic studies with a vengeance, hoping to do well on the university entrance examinations. The clear exception was politics, for which students now had contempt. Even though the politics course met just two periods a week, the teachers could not guarantee that a classroom would be available in which to hold it. Their letter ended with an acknowledgment of the historic importance of the party's shift to socialist modernization and an appeal for help for all politics teachers whose work seemed to prevent their participation in that mission. The magazine offered no reply.²⁸

But if students treated political-work cadres as irrelevant in the quest for socialist modernization, party reformers were even more damaging to these cadres' self-esteem, questioning their ability, competence, understanding, and commitment. According to these critics, because the large majority of CYL cadres had been engaged in political work during the "years of upheaval," they had missed out on a real education in basic Marxist theory. Even those who supported the new slogan "practice is the sole criterion for testing truth"—and this by no means included all CYL cadres—were not exempt from criticism, since most of them were either unsure of what the slogan meant or were reluctant to carry it out. Thus, there was open concern among many CYL cadres that the latest swing of the pendulum would again land them in trouble,²⁹ with some even asking rhetorically: "Why is it that those in charge now were criticized previously, and those now criticized were in charge previously?" As a result, the CYL was becoming paralyzed.³⁰

To help overcome this paralysis, in September 1979, CYL officials launched a "tutorial" (*buke*), in part to provide a crash course in how to put into practice the party's new slogan and in part to deal with those who insisted on "remaining steadfast" against the new trends.³¹ In a long letter to *Zhongguo Qingnian*, CYL cadres offered an agenda of topics and problem areas around which the lessons should be focused: (1) In the new era, what should be the main subject of the CYL? If

²⁵*Xin Shiqi* (Beijing), September 1979, p. 42.

²⁶*Zhongguo Qingnian*, September 1979, pp. 2–3.

²⁷As a recent official document admits, the condition of politics teachers in China's secondary schools after the purge of the Gang of Four was indeterminate. Not many of the 200,000 teachers who were specifically assigned to teach politics classes had college-level training. The new reforms made many "ill at ease," and some of the most qualified simply "changed professions." See *Zhongguo Jiaoyu Nianjian 1949–1981*, p. 436.

³¹*Zhongguo Qingnian*, September 1979, pp. 2–3.

²⁵*Zhongguo Qingnian*, April 1979, pp. 22–23.

²⁶For a discussion in English of these principles, see the abridged *Renmin Ribao* editorial (Apr. 5, 1979) "Carry Forward the Revolutionary Tian An Men Spirit" that is reprinted in *Beijing Review*, Apr. 13, 1979, pp. 9–13.

²⁷*Zhongguo Qingnian*, April 1979, pp. 22–23.

it is the achievement of the Four Modernizations, how does this relate to politics? (2) How should CYL cadres reconcile the party's leadership of the league and the league's responsibility to conduct independent activities on behalf of youth? (3) How should education in the Four Basic Principles be structured? What exactly is socialism? (4) What is currently acceptable as communist morality? Is moral education necessary if "there is no one in our unit with long hair, bell-bottom trousers, or gaudy clothes"? (5) How should the principle of democratic centralism be realized within the league? (6) How can the league attract youth? And most important (7) where can the league obtain funds so that it can organize some activities?³²

Over the next few years, several of these problems were to become acute. At the end of 1979, party leaders took a major step to revitalize CYL activities and make the organization more appealing to youth. Noting that the league's prior concern with ideological training and politics was insufficient in the era of the Four Modernizations, party reformers encouraged league officials to enter the sphere of economics. As an editorial in *Zhongguo Qingnian* put it, although the CYL is a political organization engaged in political work, "the Four Modernizations is now the most important politics, overriding all other politics."³³ Articles began emphasizing the importance of material civilization and discussing how to promote the wealth not only of individual households and productive enterprises, but of the country as a whole.³⁴ Membership in the CYL, or even the party, however, did not necessarily make one "progressive" in this drive for economic development. A lengthy account published just prior to the new campaign recounted the story of a 26-year-old who because of his production skills had been democratically chosen as a workshop director in his factory. An accompanying editorial explicitly noted that this pacesetter was neither a CYL nor party member, a pointed reminder to league officials to discover, cultivate, and recruit youths of this type.³⁵

A factory in Chengdu, in Sichuan Province, at the forefront of the new reforms in enterprise autonomy, was chosen as the urban model for the new CYL to emulate. Originally, lack of interest on the part of the factory's youth had caused the CYL to become moribund. One workshop had even applied to abolish its CYL branch. However, after the league branch had shifted the focus of its activities from political concerns to work directly related to production, a new interest and excitement was

generated. The league organized activities to study scientific management and other industrial techniques, promoted competition among work groups to increase production, and devoted extra time to help youths who had lagged behind.³⁶ Other units were also publicly praised in *Zhongguo Qingnian* for concerning themselves with the "practical needs" of youth, for solving concrete problems instead of "spending the whole day making 'zealous political appeals' and holding 'ideological meetings.'"³⁷

The CYL's new emphasis on production was not restricted to urban areas. Following the establishment of the production responsibility system in the countryside—under which production teams divide land among their households and peasant families profit separately from their own crop yields³⁸—party leaders encouraged league cadres to concentrate CYL programs on speeding up agricultural development and improving the living standards of the peasantry. In keeping with usual party practices, a rural model was chosen (Dingtao County in Shandong) and a lengthy investigation report compiled to reveal current shortcomings. The report explained how league cadres had erroneously perceived the new responsibility system to be particularly damaging to CYL work, since village youth were now putting their energies into aiding their families in the cultivation of their own pieces of collectively owned land. Indeed, it had seemed to many that the decline in the political role of the league and the return to "capitalist forms of management" were occurring simultaneously. Investigation teams from the Dingtao County CYL committee fanned out to production brigades in four communes to convince skeptics that "the test for the correctness of a policy is whether or not it promotes the development of the productive forces, whether or not it is beneficial to the construction of the Four Modernizations." While it was admitted that the league branch would have much less to do, league cadres were reassured that, far from becoming expendable, their responsibilities would actually increase. The solution was simply to organize activities around a smaller group of league members, with the branch still available for timely help when needed.³⁹ Since publication of this report, there have been literally hundreds of accounts in local youth magazines on the role of the league under

³²Ibid., pp. 3–4.

³³Ibid., December 1979, pp. 2–3.

³⁴Ibid., pp. 7–9; March 1980, pp. 15–20; and May 1980, pp. 27–28.

³⁵Ibid., October 1979, pp. 2–8.

³⁶Ibid., December 1979, pp. 4–7. Background on this factory is provided in *Xin Shiqi*, August 1981, pp. 31–32.

³⁷*Zhongguo Qingnian*, January 1980, p. 21.

³⁸On the production responsibility system, see, inter alia, Tang Tsou, Marc Blecher, and Mitch Meisner, "The Responsibility System in Agriculture: Its Implementation in Xiyang and Dazhai," *Modern China* (Beverly Hills, CA), January 1982, pp. 41–103; and David Zweig, "Opposition to Change in Rural China: The System of Responsibility and People's Communes," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley), July 1983, pp. 879–900.

³⁹*Zhongguo Qingnian*, March 1980, pp. 24–26.

the production responsibility system, many seeking to address the question, "What is to be done?" (*Zenma ban*). Most accounts have emphasized the importance of the league in aiding youth to become rich.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, provincial CYL committees have acknowledged that basic-level organizations are no longer functioning (*tingdun*), are paralyzed (*tanhuan*), or, at best, are "loose" (*songsan*).⁴¹

CYL Failure to Adapt

Judging from reports in the press, neither the urban nor the rural CYL models have been duplicated on a wide scale. The failure of the league to become a successful unit of production can be traced to three factors. First, there has been a great deal of opposition within the league to the new direction. Critics have been particularly distressed by what they perceive as the lure of material benefits—namely, money—to attract youth and the equating of modernization with individual wealth. As some put it in *Zhongguo Qingnian* in April 1980:

*Since we want to achieve the Four Modernizations, why can't we organize youth to take part in voluntary communist labor? Why must everything be done in terms of collecting rewards? With economics as the new standard, what's to stop us from going further and organizing youth to sell melon seeds in front of theaters or to shine shoes outside bath houses?*⁴²

Party leaders responded by telling these critics to be realistic and recognize that voluntary labor, while a good thing, was not likely to be forthcoming; that they should not "change color" when "money" was discussed. In fact, far from placing money in opposition to the spirit of either communism or Lei Feng, they said, the accumulation of wealth would actually bring socialist China closer to communism. Finally, critics were warned not to use empty communist slogans in making demands on youth in socialist society; otherwise, in 9 cases out of 10, they would run up against a stone wall.⁴³ This debate over

the relationship between material incentives and modernization, particularly as it applies to CYL work, remained an issue, becoming in late 1983 the focus of a forum in *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao* (the CYL's daily newspaper).

Second, the league, as an organization, has no particular expertise or experience when it comes to production. Because of this, brigade officials and higher level leaders have not been interested in using the CYL for production purposes, in most cases choosing instead to ignore the organization's activities. While there are numerous reports in local youth magazines of league branches raising money by productive work and of recruits attracted to the league by the likelihood of increased income, these appear to be exceptional cases.⁴⁴ The portrait that emerges much more forcefully from published reports is one of the league as being of marginal importance both politically and as a unit of production—particularly in the countryside. For example, since it is assumed that league cadres have little to do, it is common for local party committees to use them as "trouble shooters" whenever particular problems arise. In one commune in Jinan, a CYL secretary was suddenly told to dispense with his usual work in order to take charge of family planning. Within the next two weeks, he was given a variety of specialized jobs, including that of eliminating illiteracy.⁴⁵

In some provinces, county league secretaries and commune league cadres seem to spend little time actually handling youth work. An investigation of six counties in Fujian revealed that of 30 county-level CYL cadres, 12 (40 percent) had been assigned to other tasks for a long time; of 131 league cadres in 79 communes, 120 (92 percent) were perennially engaged in agricultural construction work or were squatting in remote villages to aid production there. In one county, the work of 12 commune CYL cadres was examined for the first six months of 1980. It was discovered that, on the average, each person had put in 1.5 days a month on CYL work. The above figures applied not only to those who had been recently assigned to league work, but also included those who had been doing full-time (*zhuanzhi*) league work for seven or eight years.⁴⁶ Another report, entitled "Where Is the County CYL Secretary?" was a plaintive plea from league members who had not seen their newly assigned secretary in five years because she was always away

⁴⁰While these reports cannot all be listed, the following present a representative sample: *Guizhou Qingnian* (Guiyang), September 1981, pp. 4–6, 10; *Jilin Qingnian* (Changchun), June 1982, pp. 26–27; *Zhejiang Qingnian* (Hangzhou), July 1982, pp. 33–34; *Sichuan Qingnian* (Chengdu), August 1981, p. 17; *Fujian Qingnian*, September 1981, p. 6; *Xinjiang Qingnian* (Urumqi), October 1981, p. 8; *Heilongjiang Qingnian* (Harbin), June 1982, p. 30; *Huangjin Shidai* (Guangzhou), May 1982, p. 17; and virtually every issue of *Shanxi Qingnian* (Taiyuan) from mid-1981 to mid-1982.

⁴¹Representative reports on this problem can be found in *Hubei Qingnian* (Wuhan), October 1981, pp. 2–3; *Fujian Qingnian*, May 1982, pp. 8–9; and *Liaoning Qingnian* (Shenyang), June 1, 1982, pp. 20–23.

⁴²*Zhongguo Qingnian*, April 1980, pp. 32–33.

⁴³*Ibid*

⁴⁴See, inter alia, *Sichuan Qingnian*, February 1981, p. 19; *Shaanxi Qingnian* (Xi'an), December 1980, p. 16; *Gansu Qingnian* (Lanzhou), March 1981, pp. 10–11; *Heilongjiang Qingnian*, July 1980, p. 19; *Fujian Qingnian*, July 1981, p. 15; *Shandong Qingnian* (Jinan), April 1981, p. 8.

⁴⁵See the forum entitled "What Is the Value of the Work of Youth League Cadres?" *Jilin Qingnian*, March 1981, pp. 16–20.

⁴⁶*Fujian Qingnian*, March 1981, p. 10.

investigating remote areas and had no time for youth work.⁴⁷ And in Liaoning Province, a 1980 study of 103 county and commune CYL secretaries revealed that 52 of them performed league work one-third of the time; of the others, such work occupied one-fourth or one-fifth of their time, with some doing less than one month of CYL work a year. The situation was similar in Henan Province.

The situation may be even more grave than these figures suggest. While *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao* reports an increase in the number of full-time CYL cadres from 150,000 at the time of the 10th CYL Congress in 1978 to over 184,000 by December 1982,⁴⁸ in light of the examples above, this is not necessarily an indication that local-level appointees are doing much youth work. If this is the situation with full-time cadres, it is probably worse for those expected to handle youth affairs as one responsibility among several. Women CYL cadres, for example, are usually assigned family planning, health, and women's association work in addition to their league functions; for men the package most often includes militia, public security, and forestry work. With these added burdens, there is little time to organize league activities.⁴⁹ Finally, the party's cavalier attitude toward league activities can be gleaned from the many accounts of league branches signing production contracts with brigades, or of organizing fund-raising activities, only to find higher level officials reneging upon completion of the contract or refusing, under various pretexts, to turn over any money to the league branch.⁵⁰

A third reason for the weakness of the league as a production unit follows from the second. Under the responsibility system, labor power has become more important than ever. Time spent on CYL work detracts from labor performed for one's family in fields leased from the production team. Although some units provide work points as compensation for league cadres, this appears to be relatively rare. The rural reforms hit particularly hard at those provinces in which league funding depended on the proceeds garnered from voluntary labor by league members working so-called cultural land, since such voluntary labor has greatly declined.⁵¹

⁴⁷Ibid., November 1980, p. 3.

⁴⁸*Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, Oct. 28, 1980, and Dec. 16, 1982.

⁴⁹*Jilin Qingnian*, May 1982, p. 9.

⁵⁰*Shaanxi Qingnian*, April 1982, p. 25; *Fujian Qingnian*, January 1980, p. 12; and *Huangjin Shidai*, April 1981, pp. 18–19.

⁵¹Among many reports, see *Gansu Qingnian*, August 1981, p. 13; *Sichuan Qingnian*, July 1981, p. 17; *Hubei Qingnian*, December 1980, p. 18; *Shaanxi Qingnian*, August 1980, p. 46; and *Jilin Qingnian*, May 1982, p. 9, and June 1982, p. 27. Although not particularly common, cultural land is land allocated by the commune or brigade in which a part of the proceeds from voluntary labor goes to support cultural activities, such as the purchase of books or newspapers or the financing of related youth pastimes.

⁵²*Zhongguo Qingnian*, Aug. 26, 1981, p. 21.

⁵³*Hubei Qingnian*, June 1982, p. 24.

A Fading Relevance

The emphasis on production has had an interesting effect on league recruitment in the countryside. Particularly after the drive to recruit "qualified" league members was intensified in 1981, local branches have been uncertain how to proceed. As some league cadres wrote to *Zhongguo Qingnian*:

*To determine whether or not a youth met the standard of a league member, our previous practice was to find out whether or not he devoted himself to the interests of the public, loved the collective, and did his share for the construction of a socialist new countryside. Now production is contracted out to individual households. Youth are confined to the small world of a family or a household, calculating how to increase the family income and earn a larger bonus for the overfulfillment of the production quota. How can we examine whether a youth has a high degree of political awareness and possesses the collectivist spirit of devoting himself to the interests of the public?*⁵²

The party's answer was unequivocal. "Whether a rural youth can wrest high yields . . . and provide the state and the collective with more agricultural sideline products has now become a basic criterion for assessing his genuine love of the state, his concern for the collective, and whether or not he is doing his bit for the socialist cause." To take the former method of "going to work like a swarm of bees" followed by "everyone eating from the same big pot" as public-spirited and a love for the collective, while looking on devotion to one's contracted land as "calculated to further one's interest" is to use the incorrect old standard. Some places accepted the new rules with a vengeance, simplifying their recruitment decisions in the process. One method was to pass a regulation stipulating that only youth from households in which the average income per person was 300 yuan would be considered.⁵³

Although the CYL has long been weak in the countryside, current conditions appear to be worse than ever. What has caused equal concern, however, is the decline of the league even in urban units where it had traditionally been strong, for example, in the schools. Confronted by its fading relevance and the prospect of decreasing numbers, the league has addressed the problem by seeking to recruit "winners," those who are likely to make a mark in the country's modernization drive, while paying little attention to those who have been less successful. This situation is especially clear in secondary schools. A recent investigation by the schools



Young Pioneer cheerleaders at a sports meet in Shanghai.

—Liu Heung Sh'ing/Contact.

section of the Shanghai Municipal Youth League Committee discovered that only 12 percent of eligible (in terms of age) secondary-school students in Shanghai were league members. Moreover, membership in the CYL was very unevenly distributed, with the large majority to be found in "keypoint" schools,⁵⁴ schools containing both junior- and senior-high sections, and the graduating classes of senior high. In nearly 50 percent of Shanghai's secondary schools, there were fewer than 30 league members per school. League committees in many junior highs simply did not function due to small membership. The investigation also found that the CYL was making no attempt to recruit students who had simply dropped out of the Young Pioneers after their second year of junior high (age 14). Following the publication of this report, however, the Shanghai CYL committee made a concerted effort to recruit more students prior to graduation from junior high, apparently with some success.⁵⁵

At the other extreme, there have been many complaints of schools simply pulling every student in a classroom into the league en masse, most commonly in senior-high graduating classes, in the hope that league

membership will enhance a student's chances of gaining entrance to a university. Once at university, however, these members generally have no interest in taking part in league activities, a problem that has been raised in internal recruitment materials issued by universities and in letters and reports in youth magazines.⁵⁶ Thus, the league of the 1960's, to which youth reached out in hopes of being selected, has been replaced by the league of the 1980's, which must reach out to a largely indifferent youth.

At the same time, the league has paid scant attention to students not streamed into "fast" classes or to young workers not in state-run or large collectively run units. Those who have been particularly shunned are the "youth waiting for work" who some consider as "a bur-

⁵⁴"Keypoint" schools receive priority funding, are allocated the best teachers, recruit the most outstanding students, and have the highest rates of promotion to universities. See *Chinese Education* (Armonk, NY), Summer 1984.

⁵⁵Shanghai Jiaoyu, April 1982, p. 12; and *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, June 29, 1982.

⁵⁶The internal recruitment materials are from Hunan Province. Also see *Hubei Qingnian*, June 1981, p. 10; *Zhongguo Qingnian*, Aug. 26, 1981; and *Shaanxi Qingnian*, July 1981, p. 29.

den of society," "an encumbrance to the construction of the Four Modernizations," or a "fallen youth." Incredibly, it was not until August 1981 that the league branch in Guangzhou recruited its first youth engaged in the private economy; the report was treated as front-page news in the province's party daily.⁵⁷ The problem of CYL recruitment has been exacerbated by the continuing weakness of the Young Pioneers, which is still far from being the universal organization for youth aged 7 to 14 that it is intended to be.⁵⁸

Confronting the Problem

Party leaders were not unaware of the problems plaguing youth work. They recognized that the post-Cultural Revolution cynicism had not yet been dissipated and that the CYL had remained unattractive to the majority of youth. For a brief period, starting from mid-1980, these issues began to be addressed directly. Forums in youth magazines and newspapers raised such issues as "The Meaning of Life," "What Is Happiness?" and "Should Students Be Concerned with Politics?" Youths who opposed "improper practices" (*buzheng zhifeng*)—even when the perpetrators were high party officials—were lauded in the press and put up as models. An organizational reform of the CYL, which would give it some autonomy from party control and make it more appealing to youth, was said to be "imperative" (*shizai bixing*). The 3rd Session of the 5th National People's Congress (NPC—China's legislature) meeting in late August-early September, which promoted socialist democracy and advocated major political and economic reforms, contributed greatly to the general mood of change. There was a spirit of urgency, as if footdragging on vital reforms might cause a permanent alienation of the country's youth. (As will be shown below, however, by early 1981, such bold initiatives seem to have proved too controversial, and youth work reverted to the more comfortable concentration on ideological appeals.)

The meaning-of-life discussion garnered the most attention, both in China and abroad. Initiated by a letter

from Pan Xiao, a youth disillusioned by events in society and in her personal life during the 10 years of the Cultural Revolution, the discussion featured letters and opinions in *Zhongguo Qingnian* from May 1980 to March 1981. Over 60,000 letters were received by the journal. Between July 1980 and February 1981, *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao* also provided a forum for the debate, as did provincial youth magazines.⁵⁹ Pan Xiao's grievances gave flesh to the rather unarticulated, moody cynicism in Liu Xinwu's "Awake, Little Brother!" In primary school, Pan had been so excited by the deeds of such heroes as Lei Feng that she had been unable to sleep. Since then, life had become a series of disappointments. Searching for life's meaning in love, friendship, and the wisdom of the communist party had proved futile. She, too, had "seen through" everything. No longer seeking to "serve the people" or to "do her bit for the Four Modernizations program," she was writing "to fulfill the need of [her] individual character," so that "society [would not] regard [her] as an insignificant person."

Equally revealing was the forum in *Gongren Ribao* (Workers' Daily) entitled "What Is Happiness?"⁶⁰ Among the responses from readers, there was support for money, power, and the realization of one's ambitions as the key to happiness. One reader traced the success of the new economic reforms to the pursuit of wealth. Would commune members work so hard on their private plots or workers put in overtime, or cadres go hither and thither, she asked, if it did not mean more income? Even for the public-spirited, she went on, money would enable them to help others, to invest in the country's production. Thus, she concluded, even morality and social consciousness came from money. Another reader stressed the importance of power, citing the advantages accruing to commune party secretaries who apparently had little difficulty in arranging desirable work and a suitable wife for their sons.

A third forum at this time was entitled "Should Students Be Concerned with Politics?" Originating in a publication from Nankai University, the discussion spread to the whole country after *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao* began a series, under the more positive title, "How Can We Manage Well the Relationship Between Study and a Concern for Politics?"⁶¹ The early entries in the forum saw little relationship between obtaining scientific knowledge and

⁵⁷Guangzhou Ribao, Aug. 20, 1981. The problems of youth ignored by the CYL are discussed in *Gansu Ribao* (Lanzhou), Jan. 15, 1982, trans. in *JPRS*, No. 80461, Mar. 31, 1982, pp. 97–100; *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, Dec. 12, 1981; *Wenhui Bao* (Shanghai), Dec. 14, 1979; and *Beijing Ribao*, Aug. 7, 1979.

⁵⁸Problems of Young Pioneer organizations are discussed in *Yunnan Jiaoyu* (Kunming), February 1982, pp. 2–3, and September 1982, pp. 12–13; *Shandong Jiaoyu* (Jinan), November 1981, p. 10; *Jiangsu Jiaoyu* (Nanjing), May 1981, pp. 2–3, reprinted in Beijing People's University Materials, *Zhongxiaoxue Jiaoyu* (Beijing), May 1981, pp. 39–40, and February 1982, reprinted in Beijing People's University Materials, *Zhongxiaoxue Jiaoyu*, March 1982, pp. 47–48; and *Tianjin Jiaoyu*, May 1981, reprinted in Beijing People's University Materials, *Gongqingtu* (Beijing), June 1981, pp. 45–46.

⁵⁹In addition to the relevant issues of *Zhongguo Qingnian* and *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, see *Chinese Education*, Spring 1981; *Cheng Ming* (Hong Kong), August 1980, pp. 4–5; *Sichuan Qingnian*, February 1981, p. 16–17; and *Guangdong Qingnian*, August 1980, pp. 4–5.

⁶⁰A summary of the positions taken in this debate can be found in *Cheng Ming*, August 1980, pp. 20–22.

⁶¹*Ibid.*: *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, Sept. 27, Oct. 11, Nov. 8, and Dec. 18, 1980, provides some of the later entries in this series, which continued over two school terms.

studying politics. The very discussion of politics was held to be of little value. But this was a period in which the party press was remarkably open in discussing the "so-called crisis of faith" and the increasing indifference of Chinese university students to classes in Marxism-Leninism.⁶² A forum of specialists in political work at the middle-school level revealed the depth of the problem. Participants, some of whom were directly involved in the CYL, readily admitted that the majority of students were "unclear" regarding the superiority of socialism and did not have confidence in the Four Modernizations, the leadership of the party, or Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. Those who saw a real link between their own success in study and the future of the country "did not exceed 5 to 6 percent of the students." It was admitted that a bifurcation between intellectual and political work had occurred, with ideological education considered necessary for poor students, who were unlikely to make it to a university, and intellectual education reserved for those of superior academic ability. Keypoint schools in particular had ignored ideological

education. The emphasis on the importance of participation in manual labor, in the wake of the downfall of the radicals, had been virtually eliminated.⁶³

The situation was relatively clear, but complex. The CYL had not recovered its former status, and in fact was not functioning effectively in many units; youth saw politics as essentially irrelevant, not just to their own futures, but to the country's future as well; there was no convincing, central guiding ideology that could explain the meaning of life or the essence of happiness to a skeptical younger generation. If the problems could be succinctly stated, the solution was more ambiguous. There were those in the leadership who traced the youth malaise to the stultifying control exercised over the league by party organs and the lack of concern for the real interests of youth. For them, the negative feelings associated with politics and ideology stemmed not from an insufficient stress on those subjects, but from too much political control. By adopting a definition of politics more closely linked to modernization and material development, these reformers sought to reinvigorate youth work and allow the CYL greater autonomy in conducting its affairs. Their goal was to increase the prestige of the league so that outstanding youth would once again clamor to join. If the league could again appear to youth as a vital organization and an important route to social

⁶²Guangming Ribao (Beijing), Nov. 3, 1980, trans. in JPRS, No. 76910, Dec. 1, 1980, p. 116; and Renmin Ribao, Nov. 11, 1980, trans. in Inside China Mainland (Taipei), January 1981, pp. 8-11.

⁶³Jiaoyu Yanjiu (Beijing), January 1980, pp. 45-50.



Instruction at a high school in Shanghai.

—François Lochon/Gamma-Liaison.

mobility, both recruitment and socialization could be greatly enhanced.

Other leaders, particularly those specializing in political and ideological work, were not convinced that the solution lay in less control; on the contrary, in their view, it had been the very laxity in ideological/political work that had led to the current dilemma. More fearful about opening the league to independent-minded youth who found traditional political appeals irrelevant, they sought to tighten the political standards for CYL membership, to reintroduce ideological/political work into schools at all levels, and to place the league even more tightly under party control. Nonetheless, the views of the reformers held sway until the end of 1980.

Public Criticism and Party Debate

The initiatives of the reformers can be seen in the discussion of the relationship between politics and morality, the campaign to criticize improper practices, the initiation of direct local elections, and the reform of the youth league. All required a loosening of party control and therefore faced considerable resistance.

The politics-morality issue was directly related to the "improper practices" campaign. It turned on whether the slogan "Support the Leadership of the Chinese Communist Party" should be extended to include the phrase "This is the most important plank in the new morality." Those objecting to the extension complained, accurately as it turned out, that cadres engaging in corrupt activities and seeking special privileges could, using this slogan, present themselves as "the most moral of individuals," while accusing their critics of opposing leadership by the party. To prevent this, the critics insisted on a distinction between politics and morality.⁶⁴ That the issue was not merely academic became evident when improper practices by party officials became front-page news in party papers on virtually a daily basis in November 1980.

The most celebrated case, in terms of both publicity and impact, was Chen Aiwu's criticism of Wang Lei.⁶⁵ Chen, a cook at a well-known restaurant in Beijing, received national attention in October 1980 when he criticized Wang, then minister of commerce, for holding a banquet and paying only a nominal amount. In spite of various obstacles placed in his path and receiving little or no support from his colleagues, Chen was able to

bring the case before the party's powerful Central Discipline and Inspection Commission (CDIC) and eventually received public praise and recognition for his deed. His story sparked a nationwide campaign to uncover similar cases of improper practices by China's leading cadres. The case was particularly interesting because of the cleavage it revealed between party reformers and their well-entrenched opponents. The reformers looked upon such efforts by young people to improve the party's work style as an example of how socialist democracy functions. The campaign was held up to youth as an alternative to the "democracy movement," as being more efficacious than the "four greats" (*sida*—big character posters, great debates, airing one's views, and contending in a big way), which had been prevalent during the Cultural Revolution and had recently been excised from Article 45 of the Constitution.⁶⁶ This was democracy and law based on organization and order, rather than on anarchy.⁶⁷

Many leading cadres, however, saw things differently. They reacted particularly strongly to this invitation for public criticism of their activities. Wang Lei immediately offered his resignation in a telephone call to a vice-premier, complaining that he should have been informed by the CDIC of the charge against him so that it could be discussed within the party. When the vice-premier, who had suffered during the Cultural Revolution and was considered to be sympathetic to the reformers, held a press conference for Chinese reporters, he dismissed Wang Lei's infraction as trivial and chided *Renmin Ribao* for openly criticizing a government minister prior to receiving permission from central party leaders. Some CCP leaders expressed concern that such revelations could damage the prestige of the party among the masses. The newspaper, preparing to reveal a similar transgression by an even higher official, shelved its plans.⁶⁸

Other critics went further. Chen Aiwu's criticism, they protested apparently with some success, was in essence an example of the outlawed four greats and reflected a lack of organization and party discipline. Although the Discipline and Inspection Commission had drafted a Code of Conduct (*zhuzi*) in December 1980, the campaign against special privileges temporarily stopped soon thereafter. Nevertheless, this inner-party debate on the acceptability of public criticism of cadres and the use of the press to point out mistakes and shortcomings of leading party and government organizations at all lev-

⁶⁴Banyue Tan (Beijing), July 10, 1980, p. 26.

⁶⁵Details on this case can be found in *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, Nov. 4 and 8, 1980; *Cheng Ming*, December 1980, pp. 50–51, and October 1981, pp. 40–41; and *Xin Shiqi*, December 1981, pp. 11–14.

⁶⁶On developments in the democracy movement at this time, including the elimination of the four greats, see Stanley Rosen, "Guangzhou's Democracy Movement in Cultural Revolution Perspective," *The China Quarterly* (London), March 1985.

⁶⁷*Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, Nov. 4, 1980.

⁶⁸*Cheng Ming*, December 1980, pp. 50–51.

els surfaced at various times over the next year. Press criticism of improper practices burst forth again in August 1981, spearheaded once more by the whistle-blowing of Chen Aiwu, and has reappeared periodically since. One recent high-ranking official to be criticized in print, and to make a self-criticism, was Yang Bo, the minister of light industry.⁶⁹ Still, in the more conservative atmosphere of 1981, it was common for criticized cadres to take the offensive, denouncing their accusers for "impeding stability and unity."⁷⁰

CYL Spirit of Reform

The spirit of reform in autumn-winter 1980 also affected the CYL. It was openly acknowledged in CYL publications that in many places "league members do not love the league, youth do not rely on the league, the number of league members requesting withdrawal is large, and the number of youth requesting entrance is small." The reform agenda required answers to the following questions: How can we better understand the nature and tasks of the league? How should we understand and manage the relationship between the league and the party? How can we make the league really represent the interests of youth, and be of service to them? What should be the basic content and form of the league's activities?⁷¹

Many of these issues were addressed at a conference on basic-level CYL work held from October 5 to 14, 1980. Admitting that about 30 percent of the country's 2.2 million CYL branches were either loosely organized or functionally paralyzed, the participants debated such questions as league autonomy, youth interests, and cadre recruitment and training.⁷² The answers proposed called for a youth organization less concerned with ideological and moral issues, and more concerned with promoting members' personal interests and solving practical problems. Thus, educational advancement, marriage, employment, and so forth, were to become more important tasks for the CYL.⁷³

Reports in local youth magazines began to stress these service functions of the league. In one factory,



Yang Bo, China's Minister of Light Industry, shown in May 1982.

—New China Pictures Co. via Eastfoto.

some youths preferred to play soccer instead of working hard; after the league showed its concern by buying them a new ball, they were so moved they became diligent workers. Marriage-introduction bureaus and youth-service bureaus became popular. There was also a more realistic portrayal of models. One story, acknowledging the unpopularity of most youths commended by local CYL branches, traced this unpopularity in part to the desire to lavish undiluted praise on the anointed. For example, an outstanding technical worker in a Hubei factory was chosen as a model by the local CYL branch. Not content merely to stress his work ability, league cadres tried also to justify his selection in terms of his redness, as a fervent student of Marxist-Leninist and Maoist works. Other youths who knew him found this portrayal more than a trifle amusing, and reacted cynically. As he himself responded: "If I had read so many books on Marxism-Leninism, where would I find the time to study technical matters, and do innovative work?"⁷⁴

Organizationally, the league had two glaring weaknesses. As it was frequently stated in youth magazines, the problems were "one, no money; two, no power" (*yi wuqian, er wuquan*).⁷⁵ The solution required a new relationship between the party and the CYL. The issue of

⁶⁹Yang bought some watches and bicycles for friends, ate a few free dinners, and used some pull to get his daughter a more agreeable job. He blamed the Gang of Four and Mao's personality cult for negatively influencing him. See *Renmin Ribao*, Jan. 31, 1984, trans. in *FBIS—CHI*, Feb. 8, 1984, pp. K/3–6; and *The Economist* (London), Feb. 18, 1984, p. 39.

⁷⁰*Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, Nov. 4 and Dec. 11, 1980; *Shenyang Ribao*, May 9, 1981, trans. in *FBIS—CHI*, May 11, 1981, pp. S/5–6; and *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, Aug. 6, 8, and 22, and Sept. 26, 1981.

⁷¹*Zhongguo Qingnian*, November 1980, pp. 2–3.

⁷²*Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, Oct. 18, 1980.

⁷³*Ibid.*, Nov. 13, 1980, and Jan. 6, 1981; *Shanxi Qingnian*, December 1980, p. 17.

⁷⁴*Hubei Qingnian*, November 1980, p. 14; *Huangjin Shidai*, March 1981, pp. 14–15; *Shanxi Qingnian*, February 1981, p. 14; *Gansu Qingnian*, March 1981, pp. 10–11; and *Sichuan Qingnian*, February 1981, p. 19.

⁷⁵*Guangdong Qingnian*, November 1980, pp. 15–16.

league autonomy had begun to be addressed soon after the September 1980 NPC plenum. As one prominent report accompanying the launching of the reform campaign stated the problem:

The leadership of some units also only stresses one-sidedly that the CYL must be "obedient." As soon as you bring up the interests of youth, you are labeled as someone "placing the interests of the party in limbo." Apparently the interests of the party and the interests of youth are incompatible. They take the party's "absolute" leadership to the point of negating and rescinding the function of the league.⁷⁶

Throughout the remainder of 1980, *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao* forcefully addressed weaknesses in CYL work, focusing primarily on the heavy hand of the party and the unsuitability of many cadres—in terms of age, knowledge, or professional training—for league work. In Tianjin, for example, of 169 district-, county-, and bureau-level cadres, 62 percent were junior-high graduates and 11 percent were senior-high graduates.⁷⁷ Some local youth publications continued the discussion into the next year, publishing detailed accounts as well as forums on why leading league cadres and ordinary members had resigned. The blame again was placed on party policies.⁷⁸

The Reins Are Tightened

There were those in the party, however, who viewed greater independence for the CYL in less favorable terms. They had seen the dangers inherent in an organization even partially "liberated" from party control, particularly under the new forms of socialist democracy being promoted. These new forms included the direct elections for county-level people's congresses held throughout China in 1980.⁷⁹ Part of the larger process of "democratic institutionalization," the local elections were peaking in the autumn of 1980 at precisely the same time democracy activists were facing another crackdown.⁸⁰ Nevertheless, while CYL organizations

were told to take part in this "acceptable" form of democracy, it was in fact the "dissidents," taking advantage of the new provisions for independent candidates, who gained the most attention by running for office or supporting candidates in a number of highly visible constituencies. For example, in a freewheeling election campaign in Beijing University, replete with public-opinion polls and rousing speeches, the top vote getter, Hu Ping, won a seat on the People's Assembly for Haidian District on a platform stressing the importance of freedom of speech and freedom of the press.⁸¹ As Wang Xizhe, a leading democracy activist in Guangzhou (Canton), told an interviewer in late December 1980, local election candidates in Beijing's West Ward had had "quite a degree of success" in raising the case of Wei Jingsheng, the "democracy movement's" most celebrated activist, who was sentenced to 15 years in prison in October 1979.⁸²

By December 1980, however, it was clear that the strategy that had sought to accommodate youth through a loosening of controls and a direct appeal to their material interests had lost out; the dangers from "bourgeois liberalization" were too great. More conservative forces, arguing for a long-term effort to reeducate China's youth in socialist values, had prevailed. The key event was the Central Work Conference, held from December 15 to 25, with the new line set forth in a major speech by Deng Xiaoping. Deng's own conversion to a more conservative position seems to have been based on events in the last part of 1980. Although the fortunes of Deng and the party reformers had blossomed between the 3rd Plenum in December 1978 and the 3rd Session of the 5th NPC in September 1980, things had become more problematic by the end of the year. Neither Hua Guofeng, who reportedly was ready to resign as party chairman, nor Ye Jianying attended the work conference. Deng's economic reform program had run into serious problems, and the invitation to intellectuals and youth to "emancipate the mind" and discard outmoded philosophies had, in the absence of any convincing replacement, led to a search for material comforts and individual success, to further exploration of Western concepts of freedom and democracy, or, as in Pan Xiao's case, to utter confusion and hopelessness.⁸³

Deng's speech at the work conference addressed these concerns. In arguing that a period of "readjust-

⁷⁶*Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, Sept. 23, 1980; *Zhongguo Qingnian*, September 1980, pp. 4–5.

⁷⁷*Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, Oct. 11, 1980.

⁷⁸*Ibid.*, Oct. 11, Nov. 6, 22, 27, and Dec. 2, 16, 1980; *Huangjin Shidai*, January 1981, pp. 12–13; February 1981, pp. 16–17; March 1981, pp. 14–15; and April 1981, pp. 18–19.

⁷⁹For a discussion of direct county elections, see the special feature in *Beijing Review*, Feb. 25, 1980, pp. 11–19; and Brantly Womack, Ed., "Electoral Reform in China," *Chinese Law and Government* (Armonk, NY), Fall–Winter 1982–83.

⁸⁰See, e.g., the special feature on big character posters, "The Dazibao: Its Rise and Fall," in *Beijing Review*, Oct. 6, 1980, pp. 22–28. See also Rosen, "Guangzhou's Democracy Movement..."

⁸¹See *Monthly Bulletin on the Chinese Democracy Movement* (Hong Kong), April 1981, pp. 3–15; *Qishi Niandai* (Hong Kong), February 1981, pp. 15–20; and March 1981, pp. 68–90.

⁸²Wang Xizhe, "Democracy and Chinese Communism," *New Left Review* (London), January–February, 1982, pp. 62–70.

⁸³Lowell Dittmer, "China in 1981: Reform, Readjustment, Rectification," *Asian Survey*, January 1982, pp. 33–46.



Chinese young people in Western garb outside a shop on a Shanghai street in 1984.

—Sven-Erik Sjöberg/Pressens Bild AB via Photoreporters.

ment" was necessary, he placed stress on "guaranteeing stability and solidarity." This included the strengthening of political work and a renewed call to "uphold the leadership of the party." To combat the prevalent cynicism as well as the negative influence reaching China from the West, Deng spoke of the necessity of creating "a high level of spiritual as well as material civilization," which was to include "the principles of Communist thought, ideals, beliefs, virtues, and discipline, as well as comradely relations between people, and the like." As he put it, "how can socialism be built up without this kind of spiritual civilization, without Communist thought, without Communist virtue?" Deng acknowledged that some would argue that the readjustment meant the end of liberalization and a change in direction from the 3rd Plenum, that dictatorship had replaced democracy, but he discounted such sentiments, saying that "liberalization" and democracy were never intended to be extended to antiparty, antisocialist forces.⁸⁴

Although the full force of the shift was not felt until after the 6th Plenum of the 11th Central Committee in late June 1981, the change in the CYL was much more rapid. At a meeting of provincial, municipal, and autonomous region CYL secretaries convened by the CYL Central Committee from January 7 to 16, 1981, top priority was given to ideological and political work in handling the league's tasks. Using the same terminology as Deng had in attacking "bourgeois liberalization" and "putting profits first," the CYL, in order "to educate youth in the spirit of communism," adopted the slogan "learn from Lei Feng and build a new style"—which must have seemed an oxymoron to discerning readers.⁸⁵ Indeed, judging from press reports there was great skepticism that a recycled Lei Feng could be compatible with a "new style." Political-work cadres were at pains to refute those who called Lei "outdated," an "ascetic monk," a "slave," or even a "fool of the revolution." Although it was acknowledged that people of specialized learning were required to scale new heights in science and technology, "Lei Feng-type models" were still needed for tractor drivers, water control personnel, and other "ordinary workers." Even Chen Jingrun, the mathematician whose status as a model had been contested by those nostalgic for Lei Feng back in 1978, was mobilized to report that he had always been a good student of Lei's. The close link between red and expert was to be restored.⁸⁶


Within the CYL, the principal task for 1981 was to educate the membership to become "league members worthy of the name," a campaign that encouraged the withdrawal of completely inactive members and the expulsion of those who had committed serious mistakes. At the same time, party leadership was to be strengthened at the expense of league autonomy. For example, leading members of CYL organs were to be allowed to attend "relevant" meetings of party committees, so they could understand what the party was thinking and doing, and thus serve the party better. It was precisely such a limited role for the league—as a mere transmission belt for party decisions—that had been a major source of dissatisfaction in 1980.⁸⁷

⁸⁴Deng's speech is translated in *Issues and Studies* (Taipei), July 1981, pp. 101–19. Although Deng provided the first authoritative exposition of the term "spiritual civilization," it had earlier been used in Ye Jianying's September 1979 speech commemorating the 30th anniversary of the founding of the PRC and endorsed in the spring of 1980 by Li Xiannian and Hua Guofeng. Thus, it seems to mark a clear setback for the party's reformist faction. See Stuart Schram, "Economics in Command? Ideology and Policy since the Third Plenum, 1978–1984," *The China Quarterly*, September 1984, pp. 417–61; and Carol Lee Hamrin, "Competing 'Policy Packages' in Post-Mao China," *Asian Survey*, May 1984, pp. 487–518.

⁸⁵Xinhua, Jan. 19, 1981, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 22, 1981, pp. U/1–2.

⁸⁶*Beijing Ribao*, Mar. 6, 1983; and *Chinese Sociology and Anthropology* (Armonk, NY), Fall 1981, pp. 32–41; *Hongqi* (Beijing), Apr. 16, 1981, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, May 20, 1981, pp. K/14–21.

⁸⁷Radio Beijing, Feb. 19, 1981, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 20, 1981, pp. P/1–2; AFP, Feb. 9, 1981, in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 9, 1981, p. L/9; and *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, Feb. 10, 1981.



Deng Liqun, member of the Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee (CC) and head of the CC's Propaganda Department.

—New China Pictures Co. via Eastfoto.

Reemergence of Communist Morality

The emphasis on the building of a spiritual civilization was accelerated with the February 25 proposal by nine mass organizations, including the CYL Central Committee, to launch activities to promote "civilized and courteous behavior," followed three days later by the inauguration of the Five Stresses and Four Beauties (*wujiang simei*) campaign.⁸⁸ The proclivities of some youth to promote excessively the "two strivings and three oppositions (strive for democracy and freedom; oppose bureaucratism, special privileges, and feudalism) were to be curbed; the notion that a "bureaucratic class" existed within the party was ridiculed. In fact, Propaganda Department Director Deng Liqun, then a vice president of the Academy of Social Sciences and a frequent and

public defender of political-work cadres, lashed out at those who spoke of a serious "crisis of faith" among the younger generation and who wanted to "practice democracy by kicking aside the party committees"; they were, he noted, "essentially identical" with the Gang of Four.⁸⁹ As a result of these assaults, by April, most of the remaining publishers of so-called people's magazines (*minjian kanwu*) were arrested.

Following the 6th Plenum of the Party Central Committee in June, ideological/political work was, if anything, further intensified. With the demotion of Hua Guofeng and the adoption of an "authoritative assessment" criticizing Mao and excoriating his radical allies for having led China down the path of "sham Marxism,"⁹⁰ Deng Xiaoping felt secure enough to move to the left (where the military had been since January) and announce that the essence of bourgeois liberalization was the rejection of the party's leadership. For independent-minded youth, it became more difficult to justify one's uncertainty over either the direction of the country or one's own contribution to the modernization effort. Thus, according to a report in the July 11, 1981, *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, in calling for a study within the CYL of the lengthy resolution produced by the 6th plenum, Deng Liqun could state confidently: "In the past, present, and future, Comrade Mao Zedong is always our great leader and teacher."

When the 3rd Plenum of the 10th CYL Central Committee met in August, the stress was on imbuing young people with a communist morality and teaching them to love the motherland, the socialist system, and the party. Mao Zedong Thought was to be the guide for practical work. The success of the Four Modernizations, which had been made the major task of CYL work in March 1979, was hardly visible on the agenda, although the "general interest" in "pushing economic construction upward and developing production so as to improve the people's livelihood year after year" was noted.⁹¹ Party leaders had thus moved a long way from the calls for a separation of politics and morality, from the search for an autonomous role for the CYL, and from the "imperative" reform of the league said to be necessary to win back the support of youth.

⁸⁸Chan Wang, May 1, 1982, pp. 22–25; Xinhua, Mar. 27, 1981, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 30, 1981, p. L/10–12.

⁹⁰See the "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People's Republic of China," *Beijing Review*, July 6, 1981, which is also trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, July 1, 1981, pp. K/1–38. For an interesting overview of the 6th plenum and the resolution, see David S. G. Goodman, "The 6th Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP: Look Back in Anger?" *The China Quarterly*, September 1981, pp. 519–27.

⁹¹Cheng Ming, October 1981, pp. 7–14; Xinhua, Aug. 10, 1981, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 11, 1981, pp. K/1–4; and *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, July 11, 1981, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, July 27, 1981, pp. 13–15.

⁸⁸*Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, Feb. 28, 1981. This campaign was an attempt to improve interpersonal relations, which had deteriorated drastically during the Cultural Revolution.

Still, the shift to ideological/political work seems not to have been an immediate success. As one youth philosophized about the relationship between red and expert: "Those with talent can work for the Four Modernizations; those with limited capability can also contribute by doing good deeds."⁹² An investigation of more than 300 students in their first year of senior high at a keypoint secondary school in Tianjin revealed that over 90 percent were concerned only with university entrance. The majority planned to take the entrance exam two or three times; 12 admitted they would continue to try until they reached the age limit. As one student remarked, in a reference to China's campaign to encourage educated youth to go to underdeveloped areas, "I'll take the university entrance exam until it is no longer possible to do so; then, if unsuccessful, I'll go to a border area. I wouldn't have the face to remain in Tianjin."⁹³

To demonstrate that the new political emphasis was warranted, the press began to publicize negative models, some of whom came complete with the requisite diaries. The most prominent of these was Feng Daxing, who was found guilty of robbery and murder. Cited as the logical, if extreme, consequence of the "ultra-individualist mentality" then prevailing among many youths, who "grovel at the feet of the material culture of the West," Feng's diary raised some of the same points as Pan Xiao's letter had. He considered Marx, Lenin, and Mao to be "unreliable"; therefore, "regardless of communism," he believed only in himself. It followed from this, he supposedly noted in the diary, that "what belongs to others can be made mine; it is all right to reach the goal by any means." After being captured, his main concern was not repentance, but to obtain "peace for my soul." He felt unworthy only of his parents, said the official commentary accompanying the diary, "not of the party and the people who had nurtured him." What made Feng's case, and others of this type that were publicized, particularly suitable for wide dissemination was his status as a "winner." As one of the top students at Beijing Foreign Language Institute, he was a lesson to those who felt that entrance to university meant everything. His example was also to serve as a warning to those who felt that red and expert had no necessary

connection. As his diary showed, Feng had not engaged in any political studies or activities for a year. Along with some other groups at the school, the CYL committee accepted part of the responsibility for not having paid enough attention to Feng.⁹⁴

Increasing Privatization of Values

There were few major innovations in youth work in 1982; the emphasis on ideology and politics, with its stress on establishing social ethics and promoting spiritual civilization, remained prominent. Recognizing that most Chinese youth, if they bothered to consider the subject at all, viewed communism as an abstract, distant concept, the party leadership began to urge CYL officials to concentrate on patriotic values as the necessary first step to developing a communist world outlook, a policy that was more fully articulated in 1983. As Wang Zhaoguo, who had replaced Han Ying as first secretary of the CYL Central Committee in November 1982 put it at the 11th CYL Congress in December of that year, league educational efforts would center on teaching youth about Chinese contributions to civilization, the struggles against oppression before the birth of "New China," the benefits socialism had already brought, and so forth.

There was in fact a more compelling reason for this new focus on patriotism. The year had produced a series of shocks that demonstrated in a highly visible way to those outside China that even some of the most favored Chinese preferred life abroad. In July, China's top female tennis player, Hu Na, asked for political asylum in the United States; in September, Zhou Lingfei, the grandson of Lu Xun, the writer most admired in post-1949 China, decided to live in Taiwan with his new bride; in October, an air force pilot, Wu Ronggen, defected to Taiwan. There were also unconfirmed reports of two aborted attempts to divert Chinese airliners to Taiwan. Thus, league activities were to give more attention, once again, to the interests of youth, to help them solve employment, study, marriage, and recreation problems.⁹⁵ It was a relatively low-key approach, in keeping with the long-term strategy of transforming youth. However, in addition to the cases noted above, there was ample evidence of the distance still to be traveled, as well as of the general lack of urgency with which most leaders, particularly at the lower levels, continued to

⁹²Hunan Ribao (Changsha), reprinted in Beijing People's University Materials, *Sixiang Zhengzhi Jiaoyu* (Beijing), November 1981, pp. 53-54.

⁹³Tianjin Jiaoyu, 1981, pp. 6-9, reprinted in Beijing People's University Materials, *Jiaoyu Xue* (Beijing), March 1981, pp. 31-34. This article raises an interesting methodological question. Most contributors to local, and even national, journals are unknown to Western researchers. In this case, I was able to discover that the author was a political-work cadre who had sympathized with the innovations of the Cultural Revolution and had been demoted as a result. As someone less than enthusiastic about the new reforms, with an axe to grind, he had a compelling reason to argue that they were a disaster ideologically. It is interesting that such people still retained access to the open media.

⁹⁴Feng's case is discussed in a 14-part, four-and-one-half month forum in *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao* in 1982. It also appeared in numerous other places. For an English source, see *Xin Shiqi*, November 1981, trans. in *JPRS*, No. 80272, Mar. 9, 1982, pp. 10-14.

⁹⁵Xinhua, Dec. 21, 22, and 27, 1982, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 28, 1982, pp. K/1-6.

treat the "soft task" (*ruan renwu*) of league work.⁹⁶

The cynicism of youth was visible from both their own attitudes and the complaints of CYL cadres. While the latter complained that recruitment of new members had become especially difficult "now that youth were only interested in money and have become completely apathetic about politics" (*mamu de hen*), there are letters from students objecting to teachers attempting to force them to become league members. One student even allegedly resisted joining the CYL because he found those in the league worse than those outside. Perhaps one cadre summed up the prevailing atmosphere best when he referred to the icons of revolutionary progressiveness: "Some say that Zhang Side was 'demobilized,' Lei Feng was 'transferred to civilian work,' the Foolish Old Man has 'retired,' and Bethune has 'returned home'; now that it is the time for individuals to take care of themselves, who has time to study them!"⁹⁷

There were many articles detailing the trials and tribulations of "advanced elements" on all fronts. Young stu-

dents who tried to emulate Lei Feng, national models and NPC deputies opposing corruption and theft, workers given commendations for particular expertise, all were said to have been ridiculed and even beaten. Although these problems had been the subject of a continuing forum in *Zhongguo Qingnian* during the last part of 1981, there were few signs that the situation had improved in 1982. The continuation of this phenomenon was traced, in part, to the attitude of leading party cadres, who were primarily concerned about making employment and housing arrangements for their children, and preferred not to "make any waves" by backing advanced elements under attack.⁹⁸ This "laid back" style was not atypical in other contexts. A visiting American, whose English class consisted of students headed for the United States, tried to prod her charges to go beyond the words in the text, to think creatively. Finally, one frustrated student who had not uttered a word all term burst out in Chinese: "Look, I got through the Cultural Revolution by eating, working, and sleeping as if I were in a trance (*shachi, shazuo, shashui*). Why risk anything now?" The rest of the class laughed knowingly.⁹⁹

The two major forums for youth carried in the press in 1982 reflected the increasing privatization of values. The first forum, from *Zhongguo Qingnian*, considered the question, "Can Friendship Be Developed Under Conditions of Competition?" The second forum, which had a much wider readership, concerned the revolutionary hero Zhang Hua. The friendship/competition discussion sought to explore student relationships after the restoration of the university entrance examination.¹⁰⁰ As is typical, the opening segment was provocative. One youth related his fall from grace after he failed the examination for middle school. He joined 80-some other students for a humiliating half year repeating work at his primary school (the school refused to keep them any longer) before he was able to enter as the "second shift" of a regular middle school. The education bureau thought so little



Young people, following Mao's exhortation to "Walk and train yourself to be ready for war," on a march in the countryside in 1971.

—MAGNUM.

⁹⁶*Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, June 8, July 24, Sept. 28, and Nov. 16, 1982.

⁹⁷*Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, May 11 and 18, and Aug. 24, 1982, p. 3. Zhang, the Foolish Old Man, and Bethune are characters in Mao's "three well-read articles," which were extensively circulated during the Cultural Revolution. Zhang was a revolutionary martyr eulogized in "Serve the People" (1944); the Foolish Old Man (Yu Gong) stems from a Chinese fable and appears in "The Foolish Old Man Who Removed The Mountains" (1945); Norman Bethune was a Canadian doctor who came to China in 1938 and died while operating on wounded Chinese soldiers ("In Memory of Norman Bethune"—1939). See the appropriate sections in the *Selected Readings from the Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Beijing, Foreign Language Press, 1976.

⁹⁸Rosen, "Education and the Political Socialization of Chinese Youths"; and *Zhongguo Qingnian*, August through December, 1981.

⁹⁹Personal communication to author, December 1982.

¹⁰⁰*Zhongguo Qingnian*, June 1982, pp. 18–19; August 1982, pp. 24–29; September 1982, pp. 30–33; October 1982, pp. 15–17.



The young Shi Zhan says goodbye to his teacher before leaving to enroll in the Chinese University of Science and Technology in September 1980.

—New China Pictures Co. via Eastfoto.

of these students that they did not bother to issue teaching materials to the instructors. Classes were held in two dark, filthy rooms outside the school. From then on, everyone judged him as a "second shift student." He had no "face" to see his former friends, whose parents no longer allowed them to associate with him. His relatives, even his teachers, addressed him sarcastically. A second youth told how friendship was inevitably dissolved when one youth entered a keypoint school. Their competition had turned into a zero-sum game: the success of one was seen as a defeat for the other. Responses from readers were invited. Many described similar failures, offering advice to those having to cope with not being accepted to a good high school. Some admitted that competition had negatively influenced their collectivist spirit; they would provide help to poor students, but never to anyone considered a competitor.

Some stories had happy endings, even though academic competition was the driving force in a relationship. One student, for example, considered another his enemy because the second student was always top in

the class on math tests, even though his overall grades were not as high as those of the first student. What was particularly galling was that the successful student had transferred into the keypoint classroom from an ordinary class. For the less-gifted math student, the competition became a war. Then he discovered that his opponent was not particularly interested in the competition; he was devoting all his efforts toward preparing for the provincial keypoint senior-high exam. This infuriated the combative student even more. It ended happily when the math whiz suggested both try for the same provincial keypoint, and both were successful.

If the above forum showed that friendship did not necessarily have to be abandoned under competitive conditions, particularly when both friends were able to succeed, the Zhang Hua case revealed the extent to which pragmatic materialism had affected student attitudes and governed the relationship between individuals of "unequal value." It showed a rationality that even human-capital theorists might have found embarrassing. Briefly, Zhang was a 24-year-old medical student in Shaanxi Province who leaped into a nightsoil pit to rescue a 69-year-old peasant from drowning. However, along with the peasant, Zhang was overcome by methane fumes and died in the hospital after he was rescued in turn by a passing dairy worker. Posthumously hailed as a national hero for his selfless act, Zhang was the subject of an extensive media campaign—including the obligatory diary excerpts—launched in October in China's major newspapers. He was portrayed as a university student and party member who admired Lei Feng and had interests beyond his own professional success.¹⁰¹

While most discussions followed the usual practice of merely enumerating in glowing terms what other university students could learn from Zhang Hua's lofty ideals, Shanghai's *Wenhui Bao* tried a different, and in retrospect fatal, approach. Noting almost casually in an editors' note that "we may occasionally come across some objection" when learning from advanced elements, the editors published a letter from a Hangzhou youth who argued against the behavior of Zhang Hua, calling it an emotional act that in fact damaged the long-term interests of the state. For a young student with much to contribute to the Four Modernizations, in whom the state had already invested heavily, to risk his life for an old peasant was "to exchange gold for the same amount of stone." A forum under the title "Is it Worthwhile for a University Student to Risk Death to Save an Old Peas-

¹⁰¹For example, in *Guangming Ribao* there were 39 stories on Zhang Hua from October 7 to 30, and 10 stories from November 2 to 28.

ant?" was started, presumably to refute the Hangzhou youth's objection. Unexpectedly, 1,600 letters were received within a few days, with the dissenter garnering a good deal of support. Although the Zhang Hua study campaign limped along until the end of the year, and the infidel duly made a self-criticism under pressure, it seems clear that most college students found Zhang Hua's sacrifice both tragic and foolhardy.¹⁰²

New Model Youth

Following the 11th CYL Congress in December 1982, youth work in 1983 was marked by a number of significant developments. The appearance of Zhang Haidi, the most important model for youth since Lei Feng, signaled a major step forward in emulation campaigns. The youth league began a three-year rectification movement, with emphasis in the first year on strengthening basic-level rural organizations. The emphasis on patriotism as the route to acquiring a communist belief system continued. The growing acquisitiveness of Chinese youth was addressed in a lengthy newspaper forum. Finally, near the end of the year, in a sudden shift in tactics, a campaign against "spiritual pollution" was launched which, before it was reined in and circumscribed, threatened to undermine the low-key, long-range approach the party had been following to win back the affections of the country's youth.

The movement to study the example of Zhang Haidi was a significant innovation in several respects, most notably because Zhang was still alive.¹⁰³ Cynicism regarding previous models stemmed, in part, from their timely demise. Lei Feng could never be questioned about the several "original" diaries rumored to be touring the country simultaneously. Skeptics had wondered why Zhang Hua had been made a hero and a living, breathing Wang Baoan, the young dairy worker who took the same risks in successfully pulling Zhang out of the manure pit, had been essentially ignored. Their inescapable conclusion was that dead martyrs were more useful than live heroes.



Zhang Haidi, who overcame physical handicaps and callous treatment by bureaucrats to pursue higher learning; her achievements have been publicized by Chinese youth officials.

—New China Picture Company.

Zhang Haidi was unusual in other respects as well. Though 28 years old at the time of her elevation to national model, she had spent the past 20 years either in bed or in a wheelchair, her paralysis the result of a failed operation. Although she was denied schooling, Zhang had learned foreign languages and had studied medicine, painting, and music. In 1981 she passed the university entrance examination. Moreover, she used her acquired skills to aid her neighbors. But discrimination due to her disability had been overt and frequent. When she could find no one who would give her a job, she unsuccessfully attempted suicide (although this fact is virtually unmentioned in much official praise for her).¹⁰⁴

Zhang Haidi is a response to the Hu Nas and Zhou Lingfeis of China. More explicitly, she provides the answer to Pan Xiao's well-publicized question of 1980: "What is the Meaning of Life?" In a forum organized by *Zhongguo Qingnian* as part of its Zhang Haidi study campaign, readers addressed the question, "What Kind of Outlook Regarding the Value of Life Should Contemporary Youth Hold?" The accepted answer, from Zhang herself, is that "the meaning of life lies in making contributions, not in making demands." She is praised for her "communist outlook on life," her patriotism, and her

¹⁰²*Wenhui Bao*, Oct. 18, Nov. 9 and 16, and the summing up on Dec. 28, 1982. Zhang Hua is likely to be revived periodically. For example, from November 9 to 29, 1983, there were 18 articles on Zhang's sacrifice in *Guangming Ribao*. More recently, 100 students from the same PLA medical college that had produced Zhang Hua have become national models for rescuing more than a dozen tourists who had fallen from a cliff. Political-work cadres have thus argued that the Zhang Hua incident was not an aberration, but rather reflected a widespread "spirit of socialist humanism" among youth. See *Xinhua*, Feb. 25, 1984, reprinted in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 28, 1984, pp. K/6-8.

¹⁰³See, e.g., *Zhongguo Qingnian*, March-October, 1983; *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, Mar. 10 and Apr. 30, 1983; *Qishi Niandai*, June 1983, trans. in *Inside China Mainland*, July 1983, pp. 12-16; *Cheng Ming*, July 1, 1983, pp. 58-59; and *Renmin Ribao*, Mar. 8, 1983.

¹⁰⁴For Zhang's suicide attempt, see *Cheng Ming*, July 1983, pp. 58-59.

thirst for knowledge: "I really think I'd like to spend my whole life in the library."¹⁰⁵

Although Zhang is repeatedly called a Lei Feng for the 1980's, and party leaders blithely say that a communist outlook on life makes Zhang, Lei, and all advanced people alike, it is important to note the very real differences between the two models. First, Lei Feng devoted his whole life to Mao Zedong; Zhang Haidi seems unconcerned with politics or ideology. Second, if one may be perverse for a moment, the development of Lei Feng's indomitable spirit was inseparable from the exploitation by landlords in the old society; Zhang's spirit stemmed, in part, from callous treatment by bureaucrats in a socialist society. Third, Lei was content to be a rust-free screw; Zhang takes pride in her accomplishments and her independence. When advised to take advantage of her trip to Beijing to have her hair done, she rejected such advice, saying "I am what I am!"

The current model who really embodies the Lei Feng spirit has been anointed by no less a body than the Central Military Commission, headed by Deng Xiaoping and a source of much of his power. Named Zhu Boru, he is praised for the purity of his life-style, his self-sacrifice, and his obedience. Ready to go anywhere, "he lets the party make arrangements for him."¹⁰⁶ Nonetheless, it is Zhang's independence and self-confidence rather than Zhu's austerity that matches the most popular models among Chinese youth.

Obstacles to Reform

The serious attention the youth league has begun to receive is presumably due to the increasing influence of former CYL cadres such as Hu Yaobang and Hu Qili at the top of the political system. Many of the current proposals are not new, but they are being pushed with far greater energy and urgency. The foremost obstacle remains the lack of conviction of those at lower levels who are expected to implement the reforms. Work already conducted at test points, reveals continuing major weaknesses in the CYL's organizational form, schedule of activities, funding, and ability to gain access to limited space. With the new emphasis on individual families under the production responsibility system, the basic unit

for CYL activities should devolve from the brigade to the work group level. CYL activities will not be conducted during busy periods, but will be arranged so as not to interfere with production. Since league dues and meager direct allocations cannot meet league expenses, branches are being encouraged to increase CYL funding through a variety of production activities, including the cultivation of oilseed crops, the establishment of seedling nurseries, and the undertaking of various forms of sideline production. The space lost for CYL activities after the implementation of the production responsibility system may have to be restored through administrative coercion, if no other means can be found.

The crux of the CYL's problem is said to be its cadre force. Thus, the first year of the rectification has concentrated on building a strong leading group at the commune and brigade levels. This involves a variety of methods, including reliance on democratic elections, transfers of outstanding individuals from other jobs, holding of training classes, an increase in full-time cadres, and an improvement in methods of remuneration. Because the economic burden that currently falls on those devoting time to CYL work is particularly onerous, several reforms have been suggested: (1) league cadres should have reduced agricultural responsibilities within the work group; (2) those who cannot meet their production quota because of time spent on league work should not be docked work points; (3) league cadres who must take days off from production should not be penalized financially; and (4) at the end of the year, league cadres who do especially well in their work should be treated exactly the same in terms of spiritual and material rewards as other cadres.¹⁰⁷

Throughout the latter part of 1983, the press offered a wide variety of examples of compliance and deviation from reform standards. The most successful branches were those that could entice "able people" (*nengren*) to accept the post of CYL branch secretary. Fujian was singled out for special praise; in one district, over 30 percent of the new CYL branch secretaries were from specialized or keypoint households, or had high technical skills. Acclaim was also forthcoming for those CYL units that had become integrated into the economic life of the community, particularly when the league could serve as a springboard to upward mobility for ambitious youth. The key in this case was to have the league serve a gatekeeper function. Thus, there were a number of cases reported in which valued jobs in the countryside

¹⁰⁵For a reader's letter complaining that a life limited to struggle, without asking anything in return, is an unrealistic approach toward seeking happiness, see *Zhongguo Qingnian*, August 1983, p. 11. Needless to say, this letter was the subject of much criticism from other letter writers, more supportive of the Zhang Haidi model.

¹⁰⁶On Zhu Boru, see *Renmin Ribao*, July 28, 1983, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 2, 1983, pp. K11-13; *Hongqi*, June 1, 1983, trans. in *JPRS*, No. 83922, July 19, 1983, pp. 1-7; and *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, Aug. 14, 1983.

¹⁰⁷A good summary of the proposed reforms appears in Shu Hui, "Chinese Communists Unfold League Rectification to Coordinate with Rural Reforms," *Zhongguo Yanjiu*, July 15, 1983, pp. 82-89. Also see *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, May 21 and June 2, 1983.

were reserved for CYL members, sometimes only after the applicants passed an exam administered by the league. There were stories of recently returned youth who, having received their education outside the village, used their newly acquired knowledge to help local youth become rich. Other stories told of how district or other officials, after receiving letters from village youth seeking advice on how to become rich, actively encouraged the local league branch to emphasize the pursuit of wealth. The point of many of these accounts was that even a recalcitrant league branch should not be an obstacle to local youth seeking prosperity. Thus, hostile league branches could be bypassed and later transformed.¹⁰⁸

Units cited for poor policy implementation were guilty of familiar errors, stemming primarily from a refusal to consider CYL work essential. Thus, in the general reduction of cadres under the new reforms, full-time league cadres were often found to be expendable. Remuneration for CYL cadres remained a problem. The two most common methods of payment—a fixed subsidy, or a floating rate equivalent to the average income of a commune member—did not take account of work performance. This has opened the door to at least two negative tendencies. Owing to the nonproduction nature of CYL work, job performance is neither monitored nor measured. Thus, those CYL workers who have connections with cadres can in effect receive a guaranteed wage for very little work and can concentrate their efforts instead on more profitable tasks, such as sideline production. On the other hand, more dedicated CYL cadres often become quite demoralized when they see little relationship between energy expended and rewards received.

But there was a potential contradiction brewing in league work throughout 1983. Indeed, some CYL officials questioned the propriety of certain CYL practices: the appeals to the well-educated, upwardly mobile, and economically ambitious to take the lead in reviving CYL work; the constant reports in youth magazines that all young peasants shared a fervent wish—a thirst for knowledge and a thirst for wealth (*qiuzhi qiufu*); the CYL-sponsored public commendations of so-called 10,000-yuan households, with peasants chanting “making money is glorious” (*deqian guangrong*); and so forth.¹⁰⁹ In fact, the role of money and the striving for wealth were being openly discussed in *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*. Beginning in August, a forum for readers entitled “Is ‘Looking to Money’ (*xiang qian kan*)”¹¹⁰ a Correct Slogan?” considered the function of money in the country's development. The 11th CYL Congress had listed two functions for the league: “a school where young people can study communism in the course of practice, and the shock force in which young people can contribute to the Four Modernizations.” However, some

provincial CYL organs, in listing their tasks for pushing league work forward in 1983, emphasized organizational reform and economic development, with the building of spiritual civilization mentioned only in passing.¹¹¹

Opponents of the increasing stress on material over spiritual values must have felt vindicated when Deng Xiaoping, at the 2nd Plenum of the 12th Central Committee in October 1983, proclaimed that spiritual pollution cannot be allowed on the ideological front. Leading CYL cadres quickly took up the campaign, complaining that some league organizations had been ignoring theoretical study and political work. Ironically, the ferreting out of capitalist tendencies actually provided the underworked cadres with something to do. Although it is too early to assess fully the influence this campaign has had on the league, at a minimum it caused a great deal of confusion at the basic levels. Interpreted broadly by conservative local officials, pollution was taken to include any manifestations of “bourgeois” behavior, ranging from hair perms and fashionable clothes to excessive enjoyment of leisure time. More ominously, peasants who had prospered as a result of the rural reforms were accused of “putting money ahead of everything.” Guidelines were unclear, with the press at pains to distinguish what was popular (*tongsu*) from what was vulgar (*yongsu*). The campaign was narrowed very quickly to exclude the countryside and to support the desires of youth for a richer, more fulfilling life; nevertheless, it provided a sharp reminder of the conservative constituency that could be mobilized were party reformers to falter.¹¹²

Popular Heroes and Survey Data

But what of the popularity of unsanctioned models with whom youth identify, arguably an even more important indicator of youth values than are state-sponsored

¹⁰⁸Success stories are reported in *Renmin Ribao*, Aug. 17, 1983; *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, Sept. 6 and Nov. 12, 15, 26, and 29, 1983; and July 12, 24, and Aug. 14, 1984.

¹⁰⁹*Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, Aug. 30 and Oct. 11, 1983; *Banyue Tan*, Dec. 25, 1983, pp. 5–7.

¹¹⁰“Looking to money” was, of course, an unauthorized replacement for “looking to the future” (also pronounced *xiang qian kan*, but using the character for “money” instead of the one for “future”), which had been a slogan of the 3rd Plenum of the 11th Central Committee held in December 1978. Between Aug. 9, 1983, and Feb. 4, 1984, there were 13 installments of this forum in *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*. In the midst of the spiritual pollution campaign, on Nov. 12, the title of the forum was changed to “Oppose ‘Looking to Money’ for Everything.” For examples of the looking to money philosophy in practice, see *Cheng Ming*, May 1983, pp. 21–22; and July 1983, pp. 34–35.

¹¹¹*Sichuan Ribao*, Jan. 19, 1983, trans. in *FBIS—CHI*, Feb. 2, 1983, pp. Q/7–8.

¹¹²*Zhongguo Qingnian Bao*, Oct. 25 and 30, 1983; *Radio Chengdu*, Oct. 26, 1983, trans. in *FBIS—CHI*, Oct. 27, 1983, p. Q/1; *Renmin Ribao*, Nov. 17, 1983, trans. in *FBIS—CHI*, Nov. 21, 1983, pp. K/1–2; and *Los Angeles Times*, Nov. 4, 1983, and Jan. 12, 1984. Also see Thomas B. Gold “‘Just in Time!’ China Battles Spiritual Pollution on the Eve of 1984,” *Asian Survey*, September 1984, pp. 947–74.

heroes? Such heroes can be found in popular movies and books which, though produced by state film studios and published by respectable presses, often contain more lively and realistic characters than the stereotypical models anointed by the Ministry of Propaganda. There is, for example, Liu Sijia, the rebellious worker of the movie "All Colors," who was voted the most popular character by more than 3 million Chinese filmgoers. Liu dresses well, smokes, drinks, and freely expresses his own opinions. Moreover, he attacks bureaucratic rigidity with little concern for the consequences. In the popular film "Our Blood Is Always Hot," one of the leading characters turns to Christianity when the CYL is indifferent to her problems. When she has difficulty choosing between the cross and her CYL badge, an angry foreman rips off the badge. The sympathetic factory director restores her badge and leaves it to her to decide whether she will remain a Christian. Since the ending is ambiguous—Will the girl solve her problems? Will she abandon Christianity?—the film seems to say that the league no longer has an uncontested monopoly on the affections of youth. It has to prove its value in a competitive marketplace, with the consumers increasingly independent and skeptical.

A popular novel, made into an equally popular movie, entitled "Flower Wreath at the Foot of High Mountains," concerns China's "defensive counterattack against Vietnam" in 1979. The story depicts a rather believable military unit, replete with the daily complaints of junior officers and men. In one sequence, before the unit is to cross into enemy territory, an army journalist comes to interview the men, hoping to hear "noble thoughts." The deputy commander pats his breast pocket and tells his friends jokingly to open it after his death and take out his diary, which will contain all the "noble thoughts" they want. When he is gravely wounded while gathering sugar cane for his men in enemy territory, his comrades open his breast pocket only to find a picture of his wife and four-year-old son. His last wish is to die gazing at that photograph. After the battle, the whole company recommends the deputy commander for a medal, saying the sugar cane saved their lives. But the recommendation is turned down because of his undistinguished "political" record and because he broke army regulations in cutting the sugar cane.¹¹³ Widely read, this novel won an award as one of the best works of fiction in 1982.

Other popular heroes, including those recognized by the state for positive values as well as those officially excoriated, display a strong independent streak. Ye Wenfu, the poet who criticized special privileges in such poems as "General, You Can't Do That," was a popular speaker at university campuses in Beijing in 1980–81. In a speech at Beijing Teachers' University in April 1981, he revealed his long-standing impatience with Lei Feng-style models. As for his personal philosophy, he said, "The secret of my success is being faithful to my own feelings. I am what I am. I don't take advice from my friends. I don't let myself be pushed around. I want to be myself in my poetry."¹¹⁴ Those who were martyred during the Cultural Revolution, such as Yu Luo and Zhang Zhixin, are similarly admired because of their resistance to tight political control.

The declining identification with post-"Liberation" heroes, the lack of a central guiding ideology to replace what is now discredited as "sham Marxism," and the retreat to private concerns can be seen in survey data conducted by Chinese social scientists.¹¹⁵ Such surveys commonly reveal an aversion to and an avoidance of politics. They also show the tremendous pull of the urban areas. No one, it appears, wants to be a peasant or even to remain in the countryside, including rural party members and village youth. While many surveys tend to group responses into all-encompassing and ambiguous categories, there are some that provide detailed enough data to allow for more independent analysis and, in turn, quite different interpretation of the data. For example, Tables 1 and 2 reproduced on pages 26 and 27 are drawn from a survey conducted among second-year junior-high students at three ordinary schools in Wenzhou, Zhejiang Province. In Table 1, on study motivation, the authors grouped the results into three categories: individual motivation; tending toward societal motivation; and societal motivation. By amalgamating "In Order to Work," "To Gain Promotion," and "A Thirst for Knowledge" under the "tending toward societal motivation" category, the Chinese social scientists were able to argue that roughly 32 percent of the students were moving away from individual motivation. Even more misleading was their treatment of category three. Combining

¹¹³See the reports of Takashi Oka in *The Christian Science Monitor*, Apr. 18 and Oct. 11, 1983, and of O'Callaghan, loc. cit. Also see Ian Findlay's report in *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), Oct. 6, 1983, pp. 70–71. More generally, see Paul Clark, "Film-making in China: From the Cultural Revolution to 1981," *The China Quarterly*, June 1983, pp. 304–22.

¹¹⁴Cheng Ming, February 1982, trans. in *JPRS*, No. 80510, Apr. 7, 1982, pp. 59–68. Several of Ye's works appear in Helen F. Siu and Zelda Stern, Eds., *Mao's Harvest*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1983, pp. 158–71.

¹¹⁵For translations of surveys conducted by Chinese social scientists, see Stanley Rosen, Ed., "Recent Survey Data on Chinese Youth," *Chinese Education*, Winter 1984–85 (forthcoming); idem, "The Political Socialization of Chinese Youth," *ibid.*, Spring 1985 (forthcoming); and David S. K. Chu, *Sociology and Society in Contemporary China, 1979–1983*, Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1984. For an analysis of several surveys, see Alan P. L. Liu, "Opinions and Attitudes of Youth in the People's Republic of China," *Asian Survey*, September 1984, pp. 975–96; and Rosen, "Education and Political Socialization."

Table 1: Motivation for Study Among Young Students

(N = 883, with 24 not responding)

Motivation	Male		Female		Total	
	Number of responses	Percent	Number of responses	Percent	Number of responses	Percent
Four Modernizations	203	50.25	248	51.77	451	51.07
Serve the people	10	2.48	14	2.92	24	2.71
Communism	3	0.74	—	—	3	0.34
In order to work	2	0.49	4	0.83	6	0.68
For one's own future	64	15.84	55	11.48	119	13.48
For family livelihood	1	0.25	1	0.21	2	0.23
A thirst for knowledge	77	19.06	100	20.88	177	20.05
To gain promotion to next level of schooling	44	10.89	57	11.90	101	11.44

SOURCE: Fu Peisheng et al., "A Research Investigation into the Individual Psychological Traits of Young Students," *Wenzhou shizhuan xuebao*, No. 1, 1982, pp. 19–34, (reprinted in People's University Photocopied Materials series *Zhongxiaoxue jiaoyu* [Beijing], June 1982, pp. 29–44, at p. 30).

"Four Modernizations," "Serve the People," and "Communism" together produced the striking conclusion that approximately 54 percent of the respondents—thus, the main trend (*zhuliu*)—had merged their individual interest with broader social goals. Studying for the Four Modernizations, however, tells us little about a student's motivations. Those condemning Zhang Hua's sacrifice in the manure pit as irrational would have presumably ticked off this choice. More revealing are the disaggregated figures that show that only 27 of 883 (3.06 percent) chose "Communism" or "Serve the People" as their motivation for studying. Table 2 is more straightforward, showing that, aside from the heroes whose pre-1949 deeds are celebrated in primary- and secondary-school language readers, those most loved and respected are individuals in contact with the students on a daily basis (parents and teachers garnering over half the choices), surely a sign of privatization.

Unresolved Contradictions

It is evident from this analysis that the two basic functions of the youth league—political socialization and party recruitment—are being imperfectly performed at best. Recruitment has been weak because the CYL no longer offers any real opportunity for upward mobility. Moreover, with so few individuals willing to become activists, the relationships between the league, the party, and society have become tenuous. Erosion of the league's recruitment function potentially could have seri-

ous impact on future party-society relations. As Richard Solomon argued persuasively over a decade and a half ago, the critical measure in evaluating the strength of the party's links to society, and its ability to operate successfully, is not really the ratio of party to population. Rather it is the number of nonparty people willing to compete for party membership, willing to carry out the daily tasks of policy implementation in hopes of eventually being chosen for party membership. If the party attracts five competitors for each new member chosen, its effective operational cadre has increased five-fold, and it has gained control of the motive power that derives from ambitious people anxiously competing for elite status.¹¹⁶

The league's socialization function remains beset by contradictions. Is the party more concerned with accommodating youth interests or with controlling youth behavior? Is it more important to make the CYL "relevant," or to promote "communist ideology" within the organization? The inner-party debate continues, although the reform faction supported by Deng clearly has the upper hand. The recent controversial *Renmin Ribao* editorial suggesting that the writings of Marx and Lenin cannot provide solutions to "all" current problems is indicative of how far pragmatism has gone.¹¹⁷ With each new bold announcement, one listens half-expectantly for the other shoe to drop in reaction. Indeed, in a recent speech at

¹¹⁶Richard Solomon, "On Activism and Activists: Maoist Conceptions of Motivation and Political Role Linking State to Society," *The China Quarterly*, July–September, 1969, pp. 76–114.

¹¹⁷*Renmin Ribao*, Dec. 7, 1984, trans. in *FBIS–CHI*, Dec. 7, 1984, p. K/1.

the 3rd Plenum of the Central Advisory Commission in October 1984, Deng openly addressed such concerns and offered comforting words for the skeptical.¹¹⁸

Still, the contradictions are becoming even sharper, as China fashions a new socioeconomic structure in its quest for "socialism with Chinese characteristics." The CYL has been ordered to "help young people realize the importance of learning scientific, technological, and management know-how from advanced countries, including capitalist nations"; but an internal speech to cadres taking advanced training at Beijing University laments the fact that 70 to 80 students sign up for an elective course on the economics of capitalism, while only 7 or 8 students opt for a course on Marxist economics.¹¹⁹ Since the Four Modernizations drive urgently needs talented people, an overtly competitive atmosphere has been introduced between and within the nation's elite universities. When the Ministry of Education decided, in May 1984, to single out 10 universities for priority treatment (the allocation of an additional total allowance of some 100 million yuan from the state, an increase in opportunities for exchanges with the outside world, and so forth), China's academic leaders jockeyed to have their institutes included. One consequence was a three-day demonstration protest by students at Nanjing University, which had lost out. Some universities

have devised their own special programs to meet the state's demands for increasing numbers of talented young people. Beijing Normal University has made available additional financial aid for its best students, with the money to come from funds currently allocated equally throughout the student body. Once again, protests followed. Qinghua University has chosen 50 students for similarly favorable treatment, despite the open admission that some are unconcerned with politics (a startling confession since politics is currently defined as support for the Four Modernizations).¹²⁰ Indeed, students and educators increasingly question the value of education in politics. There are suggestions that the written politics examination be eliminated from the university entrance exam, in part because some highly qualified science students have done poorly on it.¹²¹ A recent

¹¹⁸Xinhua, Dec. 31, 1984, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 2, 1985, pp. K/1-6.

¹¹⁹The exhortation to help young people learn from capitalist nations is from the "Decision on Giving Full Play to the Role of the Communist Youth League in Reforming the Economic Structure," adopted by the 3rd Plenum of the 11th CYL Central Committee on Dec. 14, 1984. See Xinhua, Dec. 14, 1984, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 17, 1984, pp. K/10-17; the figures on students are contained in a report by the vice-minister of education, Peng Peiyun, on May 15, 1982 (circulated in printed form to those in education circles in Beijing), p. 11.

¹²⁰See Stanley Rosen, "Recentralization, Decentralization and Rationalization: Deng Xiaoping's Bifurcated Educational Policy," *Modern China*, July 1985, forthcoming.

¹²¹Gaojiao Zhanxian (Beijing), September 1984, pp. 28-30, and December 1984, pp. 25-26.

Table 2: Patterns of Respect Among Young Students

(Responses to the question: Who are the people you respect and love the most?)

(N = 869, with 38 not responding)

Persons respected	School A		School B		School C		Total	
	Number of responses	Percent	Number of responses	Percent	Number of responses	Percent	Number of responses	Percent
Revolutionaries of the older generation	173	32.64	81	40.10	76	55.47	330	37.97
Scientists	5	0.94	—	—	—	—	5	0.58
Teachers	110	20.75	57	28.22	30	21.90	197	22.67
Parents	184	34.72	47	23.27	24	17.52	255	29.34
The PLA	8	1.51	—	—	—	—	8	0.92
Workers	3	0.57	—	—	—	—	3	0.35
Revolutionary martyrs	3	0.57	—	—	—	—	3	0.35
Communist Party members	10	1.89	2	0.99	—	—	12	1.38
Lei Feng	2	0.38	—	—	—	—	2	0.23
Those who realize the Four Modernizations	—	—	2	0.99	—	—	2	0.23
Others	32	6.04	13	6.44	7	5.11	52	5.98

SOURCE: Fu Peisheng et al., "A Research Investigation into the Individual Psychological Traits of Young Students," *Wenzhou shizhuan xuebao*, No. 1, 1982, pp. 19-34, (reprinted in People's University Photocopied Materials series *Zhongxiaoxue jiaoyu* [Beijing], June 1982, pp. 29-44, at p. 32).

survey of Beijing middle-school students revealed that 95 percent voted politics as their least favorite course.¹²²

At the other end of the scale, employment prospects for the large majority who cannot get to university are bleak. A survey conducted by the Dalian Municipal CYL Committee in Liaoning Province acknowledges that "most factories and enterprises have reached the ceiling of hiring and are no longer in a position to hire more people; some factories are ready to lay off workers with 70 percent of their wages paid." A significant part of the league's current task, therefore, is to help prepare secondary-school students to lower their aspirations.¹²³ In Guangzhou, while the city was able to provide jobs for 50,569 "youths waiting for work" between 1979 and September 1983 (90 percent of the total number), only 7.9 percent were given jobs in the highly desirable state sector of the economy, known as "the iron rice bowl" because of the fringe benefits and security such employment entails.¹²⁴

China's newspapers daily extol the importance of intellectuals to the success of modernization; but an extensive study of factories, universities, and research institutes in Shanghai revealed that only 22 percent of leading cadres have harmonious or comparatively harmonious relations with scientific and technical personnel. The survey also revealed that 58 percent of the leaders use such personnel, but do not trust them.¹²⁵

These data are presented not to suggest that the reform package faces imminent collapse, but merely to indicate that the domestic critics who refer to the new economic reforms as "capitalist practices," to the policy of allowing some to get rich first as "polarization," and to

the open door policy as "worshiping and having blind faith in foreign things" may have plenty of ammunition and some latent support if Deng's initiatives prove unsuccessful. China's socioeconomic structure clearly is changing, and with it the values of young people.¹²⁶

What of the CYL in this highly charged atmosphere? For the reformers, the long-term solution—which requires the merging of economic, social, and political goals in youth work—must start with changes in personnel. At the basic levels, this is being attempted through the recruitment as CYL cadres of those most successful under current policies—such as those from keypoint and specialized households in the countryside. Since 1982, under Hu Yaobang's initiatives, strict new requirements regarding age and cultural level for CYL cadres have begun to be enforced. While at least 25 of Hu's former CYL subordinates have been promoted to the Central Committee, an equally impressive number are beginning to be transferred to key positions at the provincial and municipal levels; presumably, they will argue for the enhanced importance of youth work.¹²⁷ Whether they can resuscitate in the new age of materialism an organization long associated with ideological goals remains an open question.

¹²⁶Xinhua, Dec. 14, 1984, trans. in *FBIS—CHI*, Dec. 17, 1984, p. K/13. An interesting recent survey of 1,680 youth, half from Guangzhou, a coastal city very much influenced by the new reforms, and half from Chengdu in the interior, found that youth in Guangzhou, because of greater contact and knowledge, were less affected in some ways by "spiritual pollution" than were youth in Chengdu. See *Guangzhou Yanjiu*, August 1984, pp. 18–22.

¹²⁷For detailed statistics from the Young Cadres Bureau of the party Central Committee's Organization Department on the changing age and cultural level of provincial, district, and county CCP cadres, which show an increase in age and a continuing low cultural level from 1979 through 1981, see *Zugong Tongxun* (Beijing), excerpted in *Baokan Wenzhai*, Aug. 24 and Dec. 21, 1982, both p. 1. More recent statistics show that this trend has been reversed. For an argument that factional ties continue to constitute a key ladder to success, despite the publicized emphasis on such criteria as youth, education, and technical expertise, see William deB. Mills, "Generational Change in China," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November–December, 1983, pp. 16–35. Among former CYL cadres who now hold leading positions outside the capital are Gao Zhanxiang in Hebei, Wang Jiangong in Taiyuan, Shanxi Province, and Li Ruihuan in Tianjin. This information is derived from interviews (see note 4).

¹²²*Beijing Qingnian Bao*, May 22, 1984, reprinted in *Baokan Wenzhai* (Shanghai), May 29, 1984, p. 3.

¹²³*Jiaoyu Yanjiu*, March 1984, pp. 57–60.

¹²⁴*Guangzhou Yanjiu*, August 1984, pp. 36–39. Admittedly the national figure for yearly job allocations in the state sector, though steadily declining, is still over 30 percent.

¹²⁵*Keji Guanli Zixun* (city unknown), reprinted in *Baokan Wenzhai*, May 29, 1984, p. 1.

Moscow and Southern Africa

Peter Clement

While largely peripheral to Soviet global security interests, southern Africa has been central to Moscow's image in the Third World. The joint Soviet-Cuban intervention in Angola in 1975-76, more than any other Soviet foreign venture, became a symbol of the USSR's willingness and capability to project power to distant shores in support of its friends. This event, coming as it did on the heels of Washington's recognition of Moscow's military parity and superpower status during the early 1970's, transcended its African context; it marked the emergence of the Soviet Union as a global power claiming the rights and perquisites of its new status. It also reinforced Moscow's view of the region as yet another arena in the East-West competition. With the intervention in Angola, the USSR has established itself as an important actor in southern Africa, principally by providing military assistance. The development of arms supply relationships with Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia (who are among the so-called Front-Line States),¹ as well as support for insurgents in Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa, has underscored the growing role of the Soviet Union in the region.

In the 1980's, however, the USSR has had to deal with several setbacks and dilemmas. Its relations with Tanzania and Zambia have leveled off, and Robert

Mugabe's electoral victory in 1980 over Moscow's preferred candidate, Joshua Nkomo, has limited its opportunities in independent Zimbabwe. More important, the pro-Soviet governments in Angola and Mozambique, both of which are facing deteriorating security situations, signed disengagement and nonaggression accords with the Republic of South Africa, in February and March 1984, respectively. They have also sought closer economic and diplomatic relations with the West.

This article will review the course of Soviet fortunes in southern Africa during the early 1980's, focusing on Angola and Mozambique, Moscow's key clients in the region. It will also attempt to assess Soviet interests and prospects in southern Africa and the factors that may shape Soviet policy there in the near future.

Soviet Stakes in the Region

To put Moscow's current involvement in southern Africa in a proper perspective, one should briefly examine general Soviet objectives there and the resources committed to their pursuit.² Soviet policy is determined by a number of goals which have remained unchanged since the late 1950's. Moscow aims to:

- supplant or undermine United States, West European, and Chinese influence in the region in the political, economic, and military spheres;
- promote pro-Soviet or leftist change corresponding to the broad ideological imperatives of Marxism-Leninism; this bolsters Moscow's claim that "the world correlation of forces" is shifting in its favor;
- reinforce its superpower status and perceived indispensability in settling major international disputes by

²Soviet objectives in Africa and the question of targets of opportunity versus a grand design are thoroughly discussed in David E. Albright, "The USSR and Africa: Soviet Policy," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January-February 1978, pp. 20-39.

¹Soviet policies in the region have been facilitated by the creation in the mid-1970's of a loose political alliance—the Front-Line States—committed to coordinating diplomatic and economic actions against the white-minority government in Rhodesia. Its current members are Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, and it is committed to majority rule in all of southern Africa.

Peter Clement is an analyst in the Office of Soviet Analysis at the Central Intelligence Agency. He has published articles and presented conference papers on Soviet policies in the Third World. The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the official view of the Central Intelligence Agency or of the United States Government.

having a role in the resolution of problems in southern Africa;

- obtain air and naval access to counter US strategic forces, monitor US military activity, and transport assistance to friendly regimes in the region;

- win the African states' political support for its initiatives in international forums.

While Moscow's long-term objectives may also include the obstruction or denial to the West of access to southern Africa's mineral resources, Soviet behavior to date does not suggest the existence of either any immediate plans to exploit possible Western vulnerability in this respect or a long-term strategy of denial.

Moscow's pursuit of these objectives is enhanced by a number of factors. The availability of allies, in this case the Cubans and East Europeans, has enabled it to play a role in the region without necessarily committing its own personnel and resources. The Soviet Union itself has the capability to provide weaponry quickly and inexpensively, taking advantage of the Africans' security concerns. The Soviet ideological blueprint for action and organization appeals to newly independent states whose leaderships are in the process of consolidating their power. The appeal of ties to Moscow is further strengthened by the black Africans' perceptions of close relations between Washington and Pretoria.

At the same time, other factors are working against Soviet policies in southern Africa. The Republic of South Africa unquestionably dominates the region economically and militarily, and is willing to apply military and

economic pressure on its neighbors. The Front-Line States, not to mention South Africa, retain many important ties to the West. In addition, Moscow has no relations with or leverage in Pretoria and has therefore not been able to broker diplomatic solutions to conflicts in the region. The Soviet economy has also failed to serve as a successful model for African development plans and Moscow is perceived as unable or unwilling to provide meaningful economic and developmental assistance to most Third World states.

Compared to other regions of the Third World, however, southern Africa ranks relatively low as a Soviet foreign policy priority. This can be seen, in concrete terms, in the figures for Soviet economic and military assistance. These figures generally reveal a direct correlation between a region's geographic proximity to the USSR and the amount of aid extended to it.³ Nonetheless, Moscow has shown a great interest in seizing opportunities to retain and expand its influence in southern Africa. This is clearly evident from the sizable contingent of Soviet, Cuban, and Eastern European advisers in the region, particularly in Angola and Mozambique.⁴

³In the period 1954–1981, for example, the size of Soviet economic aid given to the Middle East and South Asia was far greater than to any other region, a pattern that remains fairly consistent to the present. US Department of State, *Soviet and East European Aid to the Third World*, 1981, Washington, DC, February 1983, pp. 17–19.

⁴The Soviets and East Europeans reportedly have 1,600 military and 3,900 economic advisers in Angola, and 550 and 1,800 respectively in Mozambique. There are some 9,435 Cuban economic advisers in Angola and 1,000 in Mozambique; and 1,000 military advisers in Mozambique. *Ibid.*, pp. 14, 20, 21. In 1984 there were reportedly some 25–30,000 Cuban troops in Angola. See Bernard Gwertzman, "Cuba Said to Resist Leaving Angola," *The New York Times*, May 9, 1984.



Soviet, East German, and Angolan officers at a military review in Luanda.

Angola is Moscow's most important asset in southern Africa. Moscow has gained access to valuable air and naval facilities there and a route by which it can supply assistance and training to the region's remaining liberation movements—the South West African People's Organization of Namibia (SWAPO) and the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa. Owing to their presence in Angola, the Soviets can also monitor, and potentially exploit, unrest in neighboring Zaire.

Until recently, Mozambique had greatly strengthened the Soviet Union's overall position in the region, not by giving it regular access to military facilities, but by maintaining close political ties. The Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) regime in Maputo increased its reliance on Moscow in the 1980's by asking for military assistance to counter periodic military raids by South Africa and the Pretoria-backed National Resistance of Mozambique (RENAMO or NRM).⁵ Moscow has taken advantage of its connection with Mozambique to help the liberation struggle in South Africa by furnishing assistance to Mozambique-based members of the ANC.⁶

The Soviets have sought to institutionalize their influence over the long term through a host of political and ideological ties. Apart from the Friendship and Cooperation treaties signed with Luanda and Maputo in the mid-1970's, they have established party-to-party agreements and cadre training programs that enable them to identify and cultivate future leaders in the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)—since then renamed MPLA–Party of Labor, or MPLA–PT—and FRELIMO. In addition, the large Soviet, East European, and Cuban advisory presence facilitates Moscow's influence-building efforts by creating a dependence on the technical services provided by these advisers.

From Moscow's vantage point, however, recent trends in both Angola and Mozambique are equally distressing. Since the beginning of the 1980's, Luanda and Maputo, while maintaining contacts with the Soviet bloc, have sought to expand their political and economic ties with the US and Western Europe. In both countries, these efforts were undertaken to attract much-needed investments and economic assistance, as well as to enlist Western help for pressuring Pretoria to abandon its policy of aggressive support for RENAMO and the National

Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Both initiatives strike at Moscow's key vulnerabilities—its failure to fulfill its clients' economic needs and its inability to mediate with South Africa.

Moscow's bilateral relations with Angola and Mozambique have always been plagued by friction over economic assistance. The Africans have long complained about the small size and poor quality of Soviet aid packages. Moreover, Mozambique has been refused admission to the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA), reportedly because of Soviet reluctance to bring yet another impoverished Third World state into CEMA ranks.⁷ Apart from these problems, both Angola and Mozambique have protested Moscow's violations of bilateral fishing accords, particularly when the local populace is suffering from food shortages.⁸

The Angolan Quandary

Almost a decade after Moscow and Havana helped bring the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola to power, the regime in Luanda still faces a major threat from its rivals in UNITA, despite the support of some 25–30,000 Cuban military personnel.⁹ As a result of countering a growing insurgency, bankrolling the large Cuban combat force, and compensating for losses of revenue because of the declining prices of oil—Angola's principal source of hard currency—the Angolan economy has deteriorated sharply.

The leadership in Luanda has been forced to adjust its policies and priorities to cope with this situation. While maintaining its close military relationship with the Soviet Union and Cuba, it has sought to expand its ties to the West. For example, in late 1981, Luanda opened a dialogue with the United States, which has encompassed such issues as the establishment of diplomatic relations and a resolution of the Namibian question. Angola also concluded economic accords with Portugal during the visit of President Antonio Eanes in April 1982,

⁵RENAMO was established in the mid-1970's by the Rhodesian white-minority government in an effort to counter Mozambique, which was actively supporting black guerrillas in Rhodesia. Following Rhodesia's independence, South Africa took over the support of the movement, aiming to pressure Maputo to stop backing the ANC; South Africa claims to have given up this support following the Nkomati agreement. RENAMO lacks a coherent political program and focuses its propaganda on ousting the Marxist, "foreign-dominated" government of Samora Machel. Various press accounts estimate RENAMO's size at 10–15,000.

⁶Glenn Frankel, "South African Rebels Make Comeback," *The Washington Post*, Jan. 1, 1984.

⁷William Roberts, "Bureaucracy, Shortages Afflict Angola, Mozambique," *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), May 3, 1982.

⁸Glenn Frankel, "On Day of Somnolent Solemnity, Samba Revives East Europeans," *The Washington Post*, Oct. 8, 1983.

⁹Expanded UNITA activity and the MPLA–PT's growing dependence on the Cubans are discussed in a three-part series by Fred Reed, "African Bush War," *The Washington Times*, Nov. 29–Dec. 1, 1982. See also *The Washington Post*, Dec. 19, 1982. Journalists' accounts of the upsurge in UNITA activity are borne out by MPLA statements that acknowledge the "seriousness" of the situation. See, for example, a speech by President dos Santos made on March 21, 1983, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Middle East and Africa* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-MEA*), Mar. 21, 1983, p. U/1. UNITA, which proclaimed 1983 "the year of the anti-Cuban campaign," stepped up its radio broadcasts as the fighting increased. An August 1983 report claimed that in the twelve-month period ending that month, 501 Cubans were killed and 726 wounded. See *FBIS-MEA*, Aug. 16, 1983, p. U/1.

and signed various agreements opening the way for trade with the European Economic Community.¹⁰

This gradual shift in policy did not come easily, because the MPLA-PT leadership has been split into several factions. Their differences apparently were not overcome by the granting, in December 1982 by the MPLA-PT's Central Committee, of "emergency powers" to President José Eduardo dos Santos.¹¹ When Luanda broadened its dialogue with Washington in late 1982, several pro-Soviet figures were dismissed from their party posts, including the ideology chief Ambrosio Lukoki and Ruth Lara, wife of Lucio Lara, the reputed head of the MPLA-PT's pro-Soviet faction.¹² This shake-up suggested that dos Santos's talks with Washington had met with strong resistance within the party.

From the beginning, the Soviet leadership responded to Angola's overtures to the West with a mix of blandishment and pressure. During Lucio Lara's trip to Moscow in January 1982, an unprecedented 10-year, \$2 billion economic assistance package was initialed. The timing of Lara's visit, only a few weeks after the first round of US-Angolan talks, suggests that it was designed to demonstrate Moscow's commitment to Angola and to strengthen the pro-Soviet elements within the MPLA-PT, as well as to undercut any American aid that might be offered as part of a Namibian settlement package. Soviet

Premier Nikolay Tikhonov used the occasion of the visit to express Moscow's concern about Luanda's latest foreign policy moves and warned the Angolans about the "dangers of doing business with the West."¹³ What is more, Moscow's media treatment of Lara's trip was that usually given to visits by heads of state, suggesting dissatisfaction with President dos Santos.¹⁴

An upsurge in high-level exchanges throughout 1982 reflected Moscow's desire to shore up its position in Angola and get to the bottom of increased speculation about a breakthrough on Namibia. In the wake of Lara's talks in Moscow, Cuban Foreign Minister Isodoro Malmierca met with Angolan leaders in Luanda¹⁵ and presumably presented the Soviet and Cuban position on the Namibian question. At the conclusion of his visit, on February 4, a joint communiqué was issued outlining the Cuban-Angolan stand on the presence of Cuban troops in Angola, including the conditions for their departure.¹⁶ These conditions were: the withdrawal of South African forces from Angolan territory, cessation of Pretoria's aggressive activities against Angola, and implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 on Namibian independence.¹⁷ Two months

¹³For Soviet coverage of Lara's visit, see *Pravda* (Moscow), Jan. 21-24, 1982. The large economic aid package is discussed in US Department of State, op. cit., p. 13. On the eve of the visit, *Pravda* printed a photograph and a biographic sketch of Lara on its front page, coverage usually reserved for heads of state. See *Pravda*, Jan. 18, 1982.

¹⁴*Pravda*, Jan. 18, 1982.

¹⁵Luanda Domestic Service, Feb. 1, 1982, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 2, 1982, p. U/1.

¹⁶For the text of the communiqué, see Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (hereafter *FBIS-SOV*), Feb. 7, 1982, p. K/1.

¹⁷UN Security Council Resolution 435, passed in July 1978, calls for: a cease-fire, a phased withdrawal of South African forces from Namibia, and the establishment of a UN force to oversee preparations for Namibian elections.

¹⁰See Helen Kitchen, "US Interests in Africa," *The Washington Papers*, No. 98, Washington, DC, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1983, pp. 21-22. Angola's most recent negotiations for affiliation with the EEC are mentioned in *The Economist* (London), Jan. 5-11, 1985. In 1983, Angola also established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China.

¹¹Luanda Domestic Service, Dec. 9, 1982, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Dec. 9, 1982, p. U/1.

¹²*Ibid.*



Dmitriy Ustinov, Yuriy Andropov, Konstantin Rusakov, and Andropov aide Viktor Sharapov, confer with Cuba's Defense Minister Raúl Castro in the Kremlin in December 1982.

—TASS from Sovofoto.



Angolan leader José Eduardo dos Santos, flanked by Soviet Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov and candidate Politburo member Boris Ponomarev to his left and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko to his right, upon his arrival in Moscow for consultations in May 1983.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

later, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Leonid Il'ichev spent four days in Luanda; his visit was followed by that of the East German Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer.¹⁸ In November, Lara, and subsequently Angolan Defense Minister Pedro Tonha, traveled to Havana.¹⁹ In December in Moscow, Cuban Defense Minister Raúl Castro conferred with the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Yuriy Andropov, Soviet Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov, and other top leaders.²⁰

Despite these consultations, however, Luanda continued to negotiate with the United States, sustaining Soviet suspicion and uncertainty about the direction of its poli-

cies. The April 1983 visit to the White House of Alexander "Kito" Rodrigues, a close protégé of President dos Santos, for talks on Namibia with Vice-President George Bush prompted a hasty invitation to dos Santos from Moscow.²¹ Surprisingly, during dos Santos's visit, the Soviets did not repeat their earlier warnings against dealing with the West. In a dinner speech, Premier Tikhonov hinted at Moscow's flexibility, acknowledging "the great importance that Angola attaches to the speediest just solution of the Namibian problem," as well as Moscow's "full support" for the search for a settlement.²² The Soviets had apparently decided that they

¹⁸ANGOP, Apr. 30, 1982, in *FBIS-MEA*, May 3, 1982, p. U/1

¹⁹*Pravda*, Nov. 3, 1982, and ANGOP, Nov. 17, 1982, in *FBIS-MEA*, Nov. 18, 1982, p. U/1

²⁰For Soviet media coverage of Raúl Castro's talks in Moscow, see *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Dec. 31, 1982, and Moscow Domestic Service in *FBIS-SOV*, Dec. 30, 1982, p. K/1.

²¹For comment on talks in Paris between Alexander "Kito" Rodrigues and Frank Wisner, US deputy assistant secretary for African affairs, that led up to Rodrigues's trip to Washington, see Luanda Domestic Service, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Mar. 25, 1983; Rodrigues's subsequent meeting with Bush and Secretary of State George Shultz was reported in *The New York Times*, Apr. 14, 1983, and *The Washington Post*, Apr. 15, 1983.

²²For the texts of Tikhonov's as well as dos Santos's dinner speeches, see *Pravda*, May 18, 1983; the joint communiqué was published in *Pravda*, May 21, 1983

could ill afford to antagonize dos Santos if they were to retain some influence in the event his diplomacy succeeded.

However, the fragility of dos Santos's diplomatic maneuverings—and also his increased need for Soviet military support—was underscored by the battle for Cangamba in August 1983. In retrospect, the battle represented a turning point: it (1) enhanced the claims made by Jonas Savimbi, the leader of UNITA, of UNITA's growing military ascendancy; (2) caused Luanda to refocus its energies away from diplomacy onto the battlefield; and (3) prompted Moscow and Havana to reevaluate the Angolan situation as a whole. The two-week battle for Cangamba, a large MPLA-PT garrison in central Angola, was the first major conventional assault by UNITA in the history of the civil war. Each side claimed to have inflicted nearly a thousand casualties on the other, and Luanda even accused South Africa of providing crucial air support to UNITA.²³ Although victorious, UNITA could hardly afford to lose so many men in future battles. As for the MPLA-PT, it subsequently admitted that "the People's Republic of Angola is experiencing one of the most difficult movements in its history; its people have no choice but to defend, by all available means, the motherland."²⁴ Luanda then announced the adoption of new conscription policies and the establishment of new regional military councils to bolster the regime's defenses.²⁵

While the USSR had only one straightforward decision to make, whether to increase its military assistance to Luanda, the more sensitive question had to be answered by Havana: whether it was prepared to instruct its forces to assume a more active, offensive role in the war to counter the insurgency. The issue of the Cuban forces' presence and role was becoming a source of growing friction between Angola and Cuba; Luanda, which spends much of its hard-currency earnings to underwrite the maintenance of the Cuban troops, reportedly believes that the Cubans have assumed a predominantly defensive posture and are thus reluctant to engage enemy forces.²⁶

The Soviets quickly made their decision known. Following Lara's unpublicized visit to Moscow in late August–early September 1983, shipments of Soviet arms to Angola were stepped up. Diplomats in Luanda reported a major surge in deliveries, about 10 in September alone, including new T-72 tanks, helicopters, and assorted small arms.²⁷ The Soviets may also have decided to create a new air defense line in southern Angola, since, according to broadcasts from Pretoria, Soviet SA-8 surface-to-air missiles had been deployed there that summer.²⁸

Following Moscow's move, Havana decided to augment its already significant troop presence in Angola; hints about it first appeared in September. Angolan Foreign Minister Paulo Jorge met with Jorge Risquet, Cuban Politburo member in charge of African affairs, on September 8.²⁹ Subsequently, Cuba's Deputy Foreign Minister Ricardo Alarcon told reporters in London that "Cuba is prepared to send more troops to Angola if necessary."³⁰ Meanwhile, Cuban radio broadcasts broached this sensitive and rarely-discussed topic, presumably to prepare the domestic public. On September 16, for example, Havana Domestic Service reported President dos Santos's statement that "more assistance would be requested from friendly countries if it became necessary to defend the country's sovereignty";³¹ this comment was echoed by Angola's ambassador to Cuba during a press conference in Havana.³² According to various press reports, a drawdown of Cuban forces in Ethiopia started in November and December; some of them returned to Cuba while others were moved directly to Angola.³³

To complement this military buildup in Angola, the Soviets employed more aggressive diplomacy, apparently to impress upon Pretoria the seriousness with which they viewed Angolan developments. In November, Soviet delegates to the United Nations warned the South Africans directly to desist from their policies of destabilization in southern Africa, adding that the USSR would provide Luanda "all the support it needed."³⁴ While it remains unclear whether the UN warning was given at Moscow's own initiative (or Angola's), it attested

²³The battle for Cangamba is described by AFP in *FBIS-MEA*, Aug. 16, 1983, p. U/1, and by Luanda Domestic Service, Aug. 18, 1983, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Aug. 19, 1983, p. U/1.

²⁴Dakar PANA, ANGOP editorial, Sept. 6, 1983, in *FBIS-MEA*, Sept. 9, 1983, p. U/2.

²⁵*Ibid.*

²⁶The financial costs of the Cuban troop presence have become a serious economic problem for Luanda. See Edward Girardet, "Angola—Yet to Come to Grips with Independence," *The Christian Science Monitor*, June 16, 1983, who states that "nearly two-thirds of Angola's total revenues go to defense, including the exorbitant costs of maintaining Cuba's military expeditionary force." *The New York Times*, Feb. 9, 1983, reported that much of Luanda's \$1.8–2.3 billion revenue from the Cabinda oil earnings goes to pay for the Cuban soldiers and Soviet equipment. Reports of Cuban reluctance to fight on the front lines are discussed in "Angolans Begin to Ask Just What Cubans Are Doing for Them" in the *The Christian Science Monitor*, Dec. 29, 1981, and more recently in Glenn Frankel, "Luanda Bolsters Soviet Tie: Angolan Rebels Gain Strength," *The Washington Post*, Oct. 4, 1983.

²⁷Frankel, "Luanda Bolsters...."

²⁸Johannesburg Domestic Service, Aug. 13, 1983, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Aug. 15, 1983, p. U/3.

²⁹Luanda ANGOL in French, Sept. 8, 1983, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Latin America* (hereafter *FBIS-LAM*), Sept. 12, 1983, p. Q/1.

³⁰AFP in Spanish, Sept. 22, 1983, trans. in *FBIS-LAM*, Sept. 23, 1983, p. Q/4.

³¹Havana Domestic Service, Sept. 16, 1983, trans. in *FBIS-LAM*, Sept. 19, 1983, p. Q/6.

³²Luanda Domestic Service, Sept. 22, 1983, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Sept. 22, 1983, p. U/1.

³³The Cuban drawdown in Ethiopia has been discussed in a Reuters dispatch, *The Washington Post*, Jan. 25, 1984, and by Edward Cody, "Cuba Eyeing Withdrawal of Troops from Angola," *ibid.*, Mar. 13, 1984.

³⁴Don Oberdorfer, "Soviets Warn South Africa Against Military Activity in Angola," *The Washington Post*, Jan. 5, 1984.



South African armed forces being briefed before "Operation Proteus" inside southern Angola in late 1981.

—Baudalet/Gamma-Liaison.

to growing Soviet concern about the South African threat.³⁵ Later that month, a naval task force was dispatched from the USSR to Luanda and then to Maputo, rounding the Cape in the process.³⁶

In mid-December, "operation Askari," a new South African incursion into southern Angola to push back SWAPO, added some urgency to Soviet and Cuban plans to bolster the MPLA-PT's military position. As the operation, which involved some 10,000 South African regulars, continued into January 1984, a TASS dispatch demanded the cessation of "direct and indirect aggression" by Pretoria, asserting that these actions were "directly linked to the stepped-up aggressiveness of international imperialism, first and foremost US imperialism"; it also warned that "aggression cannot go unpunished."³⁷ *Pravda* subsequently noted that Soviet-Angolan-Cuban consultations had been held on January

11 in Moscow, and that "an understanding was reached to strengthen the defense capability, independence, and territorial integrity of Angola."³⁸

The Lusaka Accord

By late January 1984, however, Angolan and therefore Soviet concerns shifted from the battlefield to the bargaining table, when the South Africans, somewhat unpredictably, initiated a round of intense diplomatic activity with the Angolans. These talks, which were facilitated by US intermediaries, focused on Pretoria's mid-December proposal for a cease-fire on the Angolan-Namibian border. They culminated in the accord signed at Lusaka, Zambia, on February 16 which called for the staged withdrawal of South African forces from southern Angola in exchange for Angola's commitment to prevent SWAPO from entering the area. A joint monitoring commission was established to police the area of disengagement and to prevent infiltration of northern Namibia by SWAPO guerrillas.

At first, Moscow reserved judgment, then expressed grudging approval of the Lusaka accord. On March 18, Soviet political commentator Aleksandr Bovin candidly laid out on Moscow television the factors that figured in

³⁵The Soviets contended that the Angolans had requested the UN message, while Luanda subsequently claimed that it had been a Soviet initiative. See John de St. Jorre, "Destabilization and Dialogue: South Africa's Emergence as a Regional Superpower," *CSIS Africa Notes*, No. 26, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, Georgetown University, Apr. 17, 1984, p. 6.

³⁶Moscow Television Service, Nov. 24, 1983, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Nov. 28, 1983, p. J/1; and *Noticias* (Havana), Dec. 2, 1983.

³⁷TASS, Jan. 5, 1984, in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 5, 1984, p. J/1.

³⁸*Pravda*, Jan. 13, 1984.

the Angolan decision to sign an agreement with South Africa; nevertheless, he criticized the accord, calling it "naive" to think that Pretoria's destabilization efforts could be stopped by "treaties and agreements." He concluded by stating that the region's fundamental problems were all linked to the existence of the white-minority government in Pretoria, implying that the armed struggle should be continued.³⁹

On March 29, CPSU General Secretary Konstantin Chernenko offered the most authoritative Soviet comment on the Lusaka accord. He implicitly expressed acceptance of South Africa's accords with Angola and Mozambique, but criticized Washington and Pretoria for exploiting African vulnerabilities in order to impose their own solutions on the region:

A complex situation is now developing in southern Africa, where the South African racist regime, with the connivance of the United States, believes itself entitled to ignore the resolutions of the UN Security Council on independence for Namibia and to carry out acts of open aggression against neighboring African states.

Using the carrot and stick method and taking advantage of the African peoples' interest in living in peace and stability, the United States and some of its allies are striving to impose their wishes on the people of southern Africa.

But the people will judge the situation in southern Africa by whether the security of the African states, which are the victims of aggression by the Republic of South Africa, is truly guaranteed, by whether the people of Namibia are able to obtain their freedom and independence, and by whether the disgraceful system of apartheid is finally ended. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it continues to come out firmly in support of Angola, Mozambique, and the other "Front-Line States," and also of the fighters for the liberation of southern Africa from colonialism and racism.⁴⁰

Perhaps most revealing was another comment in Chernenko's speech, that "no one has the right to turn back the pages of history"—an allusion to Moscow's stated belief that Washington is seeking to undo Soviet gains made around the world in the 1970's.

Soviet irritation with the Lusaka agreement stemmed from several interrelated factors: Angola's decision not only to "deal with the enemy" but to do so without consulting Moscow, and the concomitant growth of the United States's diplomatic role in the region. While

Moscow presumably had been informed about the Angolan-South African talks held in January and February, there are indications that relations between Angola and the Soviet Union may be experiencing some strain. For example, President dos Santos failed to attend Andropov's funeral in February 1984, and during a trip to Eastern Europe the following August he omitted Moscow from his itinerary, which seems unusual in view of the assistance that Angola was receiving from the Soviets at that time.

The View From Havana

The Cubans, like the Soviets, were reportedly not consulted before the signing of the Lusaka accord. This would explain the hasty invitation to President dos Santos to come to Havana, presumably to give a full account of the developments.⁴¹ During dos Santos's visit, on March 19, 1984, a joint communiqué was issued, reaffirming the two sides' adherence to the February 4, 1982, communiqué on the presence of Cuban forces in Angola.⁴² Immediately following dos Santos's trip to Havana, according to Moscow-based diplomats, Cuban Foreign Minister Malmierca made an unpublicized visit to Moscow, presumably to brief the Soviets on the Cuban-Angolan discussions.⁴³

It was probably the Lusaka agreement that induced Havana to reevaluate its position on keeping Cuban troops in Angola. On February 22, Cuba's authoritative daily *Granma* had discussed the Angolan-South African disengagement, prompting speculation among Western diplomats based in Havana that Castro might be preparing the way for an eventual withdrawal from Angola.⁴⁴ In April, the general situation in Angola was again noted in media coverage of a UNITA attack on an apartment building in the city of Huambo that claimed some 80 Cuban casualties, including 14 dead.⁴⁵

While the communiqué issued at the conclusion of dos Santos's visit to Havana seemed uncompromising, it may well have been designed to protect Havana's prestige rather than to impede a Namibian settlement. In

⁴¹For reports that the Lusaka accord took Castro by surprise, see Jay Mallin, Sr., "Angola Pact Labeled Damaging to Castro," *The Washington Times*, Apr. 13, 1984.

⁴²For the complete text of the March 19 communiqué, see Havana International Service, Mar. 20, 1984, trans. in *FBIS LAM*, Mar. 21, 1984, p. Q/1.

⁴³Richard Owens, "Angola Deal and Pretoria Pact Cause Moscow Acute Unease," in *The Times* (London), Mar. 27, 1984.

⁴⁴*Granma* (Havana), Feb. 22, 1984. For the opinions of Western diplomats based in Havana, see Pierre Cayrol's comments in a Paris AFP dispatch of Feb. 26, 1984, in *FBIS LAM*, Feb. 27, 1984, pp. Q/17-18.

⁴⁵For a Cuban account of the Huambo incident, see *Cuba Internacional* (Havana), No. 8, 1984, p. 65.

³⁹Moscow Television Service, Mar. 16, 1984, trans. in *FBIS SOV*, Mar. 19, 1984, p. K/1.

⁴⁰For the text of Chernenko's speech, see *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Moscow), Mar. 30, 1984.



Angolan leader José Eduardo dos Santos with Fidel Castro in Havana in March 1984.

—Prensa Latina.

fact, President Fidel Castro has sought to present Cuba as a constructive factor in the talks on Namibia; in a July 26 speech, for example, he expressed Cuba's desire to participate in them.⁴⁶ More important, Castro's public statements about Cuba's involvement in the talks suggest that he wants to assuage the Cuban public in the event of a breakthrough on Namibia.

Castro apparently views the Angolan problem as part of the broader issue of US-Cuban relations. The military operation against Grenada in October 1983 and American policy toward Nicaragua have heightened his concern about US intentions toward Cuba and probably prompted him to open talks with the US in July 1984 on the issue of Cuban refugees, which yielded an agreement the following December. This dialogue may lead to

discussions of other controversial topics such as Central America and Angola. Some press accounts cite hints given by the Cuban leadership that it has decided to withdraw its troops from Angola in 1985.⁴⁷

It is not clear what Moscow's response to these signs of Cuban flexibility is. Until quite recently, Soviet media had not acknowledged the US-Cuban agreement on the refugee question, which was signed during one of the periodic downturns in Soviet-Cuban relations. Several events have pointed to recent differences between Cuba and the Soviet Union: Moscow and Havana have offered conflicting versions of the Grenada episode; Fidel Castro was the only member head-of-state not to attend the CEMA meeting in Moscow in June 1984; finally, a comparatively low-level Soviet delegation was sent to Havana for last year's July 26 national holiday celebration.

Such frictions notwithstanding, Castro will have to accede to Soviet wishes on the Angolan question. He could hardly do otherwise. Without Moscow's economic assistance—valued at an annual \$4 to 5 billion—Cuba's economy would collapse; moreover, Cuba's defense capability depends almost entirely on Soviet military aid. However, if increased Cuban involvement in Angola were to raise the possibility of increased social unrest in Cuba itself, Castro and the Soviets together might decide that its costs outweigh its benefits—which are still uncertain. Nevertheless, Soviet-Cuban tensions might be exacerbated if Castro were to believe that the USSR either had sold out in Angola, or was using the Cuban troop issue as a pawn in the bigger game of Soviet-American relations.

The Namibia Angle

The situation arising from the implementation of the Lusaka agreement has thus brought mixed results for the Soviets.⁴⁸ They may see little need to undermine the continuing dialogue between Luanda and Pretoria, since the cease-fire and South Africa's withdrawal from southern Angola have diminished somewhat the security threat to the MPLA-PT regime. If the cease-fire holds, Luanda and the Cubans will be able to redirect their energies to combat UNITA. Although the Soviets probably have misgivings about leaving SWAPO in the lurch, preserving the regime in Luanda is their more important short-term priority.

⁴⁶For the text of Castro's speech, see Havana Domestic Service, July 26, 1984, in *FBIIS-LAM*, July 30, 1984, pp. Q/1-20. Castro recently reaffirmed his willingness to cooperate with US mediators on a Namibian settlement in an interview with US reporters; see *The Washington Post*, Feb. 6, 1985.

⁴⁷Carl J. Migdal, "Why Castro Wants to Deal with the US," *US News and World Report* (Washington, DC), July 30, 1984, pp. 77-78.

⁴⁸*Pravda*, for example, noted on May 18, 1984, that that week's Politburo session had discussed "the situation that has developed in southern Africa as a result of the support given by the current US administration to the policies of the Pretoria racists."

At the same time, the Soviets have been concerned about the direction that Luanda's talks with Washington and Pretoria have taken on the issue of Namibia. Indeed, on August 3, 1984, Angolan Deputy Foreign Minister Venâncio da Moura publicly stated that his government had "accepted the principle" of a gradual Cuban withdrawal from his country.⁴⁹ This formulation was somewhat more explicit than the February 4, 1982, Angolan-Cuban communiqué. Within a month of making his statement, da Moura was in Moscow for talks with his Soviet counterpart, Il'ichev, which TASS characterized as "businesslike and friendly,"⁵⁰ suggesting that some differences emerged, possibly over da Moura's comments on the Cuban troop withdrawal.

Angola's commitment to the Lusaka accords could

⁴⁹Luanda Domestic Service, Aug. 3, 1984, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Aug. 6, 1984, p. U/1.

⁵⁰*Izvestiya*, Aug. 29, 1984.



Jonas Malheiro Savimbi, leader of the forces of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), photographed in December 1983.

—Philippe Chatenay/SIPA—Special Features.

only heighten Moscow's concern about Luanda's intentions, especially in conjunction with Mozambican President Samora Machel's agreement with South Africa signed at Nkomati in March 1984, in which it was agreed that all ANC military elements were to be ousted from Mozambique. The Soviets may fear a similar development in Angola. Nevertheless, the recent buildup in Angola of Soviet equipment and Cuban combat forces, as well as high-level Cuban declarations of willingness "to fight at the side of the Angolan people until final victory is achieved," suggest that more offensives against UNITA are in preparation.⁵¹ A serious setback for UNITA could strengthen arguments within the MPLA-PT to carry on fighting—with the help of Cuban forces—and thus dash the Namibian negotiations. A limited MPLA-PT victory or a stalemate, on the other hand, might persuade Luanda of the intractability of the UNITA problem; while continuing the armed struggle would remain an option, the growing economic deterioration of the country would make it, at best, a risky one.

The recent increase in Soviet contacts with SWAPO's leaders suggests that Moscow may be trying to warn them against the temptation to strike a deal with Pretoria. During his May 1984 talks with SWAPO's President Sam Nujoma in Algiers, Politburo candidate member Eduard Shevardnadze stressed Moscow's "support for the peoples of southern Africa for the liquidation of racism and apartheid and for the granting of independence to the people of Namibia *with SWAPO at its head*"—reinforcing the view that Moscow is opposed to a power-sharing solution in Namibia.⁵² Nujoma subsequently met with Castro in Havana on June 25.⁵³ At the same time, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Il'ichev invited his SWAPO counterpart to discuss "the situation in Angola and a Namibia settlement."⁵⁴ The Soviet press seized upon the breakdown of talks between SWAPO and the South Africans in late July to question Pretoria's commitment to pulling out its remaining forces from southern Angola.⁵⁵ It stressed Washington's role in "inciting" South Africa to insist on linking Namibian independence to a Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola. For its part, Pretoria continued charging Moscow with pressuring SWAPO to block the negotiations. A May 27 Johannesburg radio broadcast, for example, had reported that a request was made by a "Soviet representative" that Nujoma not sign the document issued at the

⁵¹For example, see comments by Cuban Politburo member Risquet on Cuban losses in and commitment to Angola made during a ceremony at Huambo, quoted by Havana International Service on June 11, 1984, trans. in *FBIS-LAM*, June 12, 1984, p. Q/1.

⁵²Moscow Domestic Service, May 29, 1984, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, May 30, 1984, p. CC/12.

⁵³Havana Domestic Service, June 25, 1984, trans. in *FBIS-LAM*, June 25, 1984, p. Q/2.

⁵⁴*Izvestiya*, June 29, 1984.

⁵⁵*Pravda*, July 31, 1984.



Sam Nujoma, president of the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO), meets with East German party and state leader Erich Honecker in Luanda in February 1979.

—ADN Zentralbild via Eastfoto.

conclusion of SWAPO's talks with the other Namibian parties that had just taken place in Lusaka.⁵⁶

Perhaps to remind Angolan negotiators subtly of the many interests at stake in a Namibian settlement, the Soviets hosted Nujoma for a high-profile, two-week visit in October 1984—a time when the Angolans were elaborating a new position on Namibia with visiting US diplomats. During his trip, Nujoma met with Central Committee Secretary Boris Ponomarev, as well as Deputy Foreign Minister Nikita Ryzhov.⁵⁷ *Pravda* published an interview with Nujoma entitled "We Believe in Victory"; it noted US and South African efforts to "stall" Namibian independence and quoted Nujoma as saying that "under such circumstances, the only way out is to seek independence by force of arms."⁵⁸

The manner in which the new Angolan negotiating position was made public in November 1984 suggested that, once again, Luanda was not closely coordinating its actions with Havana and Moscow. Key points of its position surfaced in the Western press in early November.⁵⁹ The Cuban daily *Granma* also released a detailed account of Luanda's points on November 15—the first such public disclosure of the fact that in the Namibian talks Luanda was negotiating a specific timetable for Cuba's limited withdrawal from Angola.⁶⁰ Two days later, *Pravda* also acknowledged it in an account attributed to *Granma*.⁶¹ On November 22, the Luanda Domestic Service made public the Angolan government's official position by broadcasting the text of the letter—without giving its date—that had been sent to the secretary general of the United Nations.⁶² By disclosing the fine print

of the dos Santos proposal, both Moscow and Havana appear to have tacitly accepted some linkage between the presence of Cuban troops in Angola and a Namibian settlement.⁶³

In retrospect, it appears that the Soviets and Cubans may have decided that dos Santos's tactic of going public was a useful maneuver, despite its implicit acceptance of linkage. Apart from placing the burden of sustaining the negotiations on Pretoria, it similarly pressured the United States to substantiate its claim to objectivity in mediating between South Africa and the black African states. It also strengthened Luanda's position by demonstrating its willingness to make concessions—to send home some 20,000 Cubans—for the sake of reaching an agreement on Namibia.

Indeed, the move appeared to catch Pretoria by surprise. The South Africans responded with a statement that *all* the Cubans would have to leave Angola, and within a three-month rather than a three-year period.⁶⁴ Moreover, by disclosing its position and moving the US-brokered talks out of private back channels, Luanda complicated the negotiating process since both sides find it more difficult to make concessions without losing face. Moscow and Havana may also hope that the publicity will lock dos Santos into his current position, and thus limit his flexibility as the negotiations develop.

Given the Soviets' displeasure at being excluded from the Rhodesian independence talks, it is possible that they might prefer a protracted military stalemate in Namibia since this would allow them to establish a more influential position among SWAPO hard-liners. A peaceful settlement could reduce a Namibian government's need for Soviet arms—thereby diminishing Soviet influence—especially if SWAPO chose to emulate the generally pragmatic policies of Zimbabwe's Mugabe.

Setback in Mozambique

Mozambique's close proximity to South Africa has proved a mixed blessing for the Soviets. While permitting

⁵⁶Johannesburg Domestic Service, May 27, 1984, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, June 1, 1984, p. U/3.

⁵⁷TASS, Oct. 22, 1984, in *FBIS-SOV*, Oct. 23, 1984, p. J/1 and *Izvestiya*, Oct. 26, 1984.

⁵⁸*Pravda*, Oct. 10, 1984.

⁵⁹Bernard Gwertzman, "Angola Reportedly Offers a Cut in Cuban Troops," *The New York Times*, Nov. 3, 1984.

⁶⁰*Granma*, Nov. 15, 1984.

⁶¹*Pravda*, Nov. 17, 1984.

⁶²Luanda Domestic Service in *FBIS-MEA*, Nov. 23, 1984, p. U/1.

⁶³In brief, dos Santos's proposal calls for the phased withdrawal of 20,000 Cuban troops from southern Angola over the three-year period following the initiation of UNSCR 435 and South Africa's reduction of its military presence in Namibia to 1,500 troops.

⁶⁴*The Washington Post*, Nov. 26, 1984.

Moscow to give direct support to the African National Congress's struggle against the Pretoria regime, it has also exposed Maputo to the constant threat of direct South African action in retaliation for its harboring the ANC. But it is the rapid expansion of RENAMO's activities that has gradually transformed Mozambique's security problem into a full-fledged crisis.

Since 1981–82, the RENAMO insurgency has spread into almost all of Mozambique's 10 provinces.⁶⁵ RENAMO's modus operandi is a mix of hit-and-run tactics, economic sabotage, intimidation, and exploitation of popular dissatisfaction with government policies. Its guerrillas have destroyed roads, bridges, and rail lines, causing severe economic dislocation in the countryside. By damaging the Beira-Mutare pipeline—the main fuel supply line for Zimbabwe—several times since October 1981, RENAMO demonstrated its ability to disrupt neighboring states as well. Botswana, Malawi, Swaziland, and Zambia are also vulnerable to such sabotage, since their sole access to the sea—excluding routes through South Africa—is through Mozambique.

As the RENAMO movement strengthened, Soviet and Mozambican officials have been consulting with increasing frequency in order to assess the military situation. In May 1982, for example, Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov, Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov, and Admiral Sergey Gorshkov hosted the Mozambican Chief of Staff General Sebastiao M'bote and Finance Minister Marcelino dos Santos.⁶⁶ The following month, General Aleksey Yepishev, chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, toured military facilities in Mozambique and declared that Moscow "will give every support" to Mozambican political and military needs.⁶⁷ He may have had other motives for his visit. One analyst noted that "it is difficult to surmise whether Yepishev's concern was for the cohesion of the Mozambican military or for the military agreement Maputo signed with Portugal in April."⁶⁸ To underscore their support, the Soviets dispatched several vessels to Mozambique for a "working visit."⁶⁹

With the deterioration of the military situation in late 1982, Moscow—and Havana—apparently began to reassess and reshape its posture in Mozambique. In November, at the time of Brezhnev's funeral, President Machel met with Defense Minister Ustinov and Marshals Ogarkov and Sergey Sokolov,⁷⁰ following their talks, Gen-

eral Nikolay Zotov, chief of the Main Directorate for Foreign Military Assistance of the General Staff, was dispatched to Mozambique for an on-the-ground appraisal. The Mozambican media reported that he had "offered advice on methods for training local forces against the public threats posed by bandit groups."⁷¹

At the same time, radical steps, including the introduction of Cuban combat forces, were probably considered to stabilize the situation. Cuba's Vice-President Juan Almeida publicly voiced Havana's willingness to provide additional "technical and advisory support."⁷² Also, Cuban Defense Minister Raúl Castro met in Moscow with Soviet General Secretary Andropov, Marshal Ustinov, and Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko to discuss the situation in southern Africa.⁷³ Rumors within the diplomatic community of an imminent Cuban move into Mozambique gained additional credence when Mozambican Minister of Foreign Affairs Joaquim Alberto Chissano told reporters that "increased military assistance from the socialist countries would be sought" if measures were not taken to "restrain Pretoria's aggressive policies."⁷⁴ Such comments were not taken lightly by the South Africans, who warned Maputo that the introduction of Cuban troops would be "unacceptable."⁷⁵ In retrospect, it appears that Maputo may have been posturing, in an attempt to persuade Pretoria to rein in the RENAMO insurgents, at least temporarily.

Shows of Soviet support and solidarity continued in 1983. In March, Machel stopped over in Moscow en route to the summit meeting of the Nonaligned Movement being held in New Delhi, and met privately with Andropov, Gromyko, and Ustinov.⁷⁶ In May, a South African air attack against suspected ANC camps near Maputo prompted a rare TASS statement on Mozambique: "The Soviet Union considers it necessary to declare once again its solidarity with the People's Mozambique, its invariable support for the Mozambican people in their indomitable struggle against the forces of imperialism, colonialism, and racism."⁷⁷

The Soviet media had paid little attention to the RENAMO problem until the situation in Mozambique deteriorated significantly in late 1982. In the first important statement, on November 29, 1982, a Radio Moscow

⁷⁰TASS, Nov. 16, 1982, in *FBIS-SOV*, Nov. 17, 1982, p. K/1.

⁷¹Maputo Domestic Service, Dec. 26, 1982, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Dec. 28, 1982, p. U/2, and Jan. 2, 1983, in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 5, 1983, p. U/2.

⁷²Havana Domestic Service, Dec. 28, 1982, trans. in *FBIS-LAM*, Dec. 29, 1982, p. Q/3.

⁷³See note 19.

⁷⁴See de St. Jorre, loc. cit., p. 3.

⁷⁵Ibid.

⁷⁶*Pravda*, Mar. 6, 1983. For the complete text of their communiqué, see *FBIS-SOV*, Mar. 7, 1983, pp. J/1–5. It is noteworthy that Machel, unlike Tikhonov, did not mention the United States when describing "imperialist" activities in southern Africa.

⁷⁷TASS, May 27, 1983, in *FBIS-SOV*, May 31, 1983, p. J/1.

⁶⁵The growing RENAMO threat is discussed by Jay Ross in a three-part series, "Mozambique: The Hidden War," *The Washington Post*, Apr. 6–8, 1984.

⁶⁶*Krasnaya Zvezda*, May 27, 1982.

⁶⁷Ibid., June 6, 1982, p. 3.

⁶⁸Seth Singleton, "The Shared Tactical Goals of South Africa and the Soviet Union," in *CSIS Africa Notes*, No. 12, Apr. 26, 1983.

⁶⁹Maputo Domestic Service, June 22, 1982, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, June 23, 1982, p. U/1.

commentator said that RENAMO "in terms of numbers and weapons, is already on a par with the UNITA bands operating in Angola."⁷⁸ An *Izvestiya* article in December openly acknowledged that RENAMO was operating "in 7 of 10 provinces" and had over 10,000 members.⁷⁹ In March 1983, an issue of the Soviet weekly *New Times* carried a cover story on the history of RENAMO entitled "Behind the Mask: South Africa's Undeclared War Against Mozambique." Apart from its acknowledgment of the growing RENAMO threat, the article's most significant revelation was that "Soviet pilots" had played a role in "preventing Beira port from being paralyzed" by the insurgents.⁸⁰

The Soviets suffered their first casualties (or at least their first acknowledged ones) in the Mozambican insurgency during the summer of 1983. In an attack on the Morrua mine in Zambezia Province, RENAMO killed two Soviet economic technicians and took two dozen others hostage. The kidnapping was intended to draw attention to the Soviet and East European presence in Mozambique, since one of RENAMO's key criticisms of the Machel regime has been that it is dominated by foreign Communists.⁸¹

The onset of a calamitous famine in 1983 further aggravated the economic situation and added a sense of urgency to President Machel's search for solutions. Despite Soviet statements of solidarity and continued military assistance, Machel decided to seek peace with Pretoria. He made a successful tour of Western Europe in the fall, during which Portuguese and American officials may have facilitated his efforts to make discreet contact with the South Africans. Then, in late December 1983, Machel surprised most observers by announcing that high-level talks with Pretoria had begun on December 20; his goal, he acknowledged, was to create a *modus vivendi* in southern Africa.⁸² After detailed negotiations, the two sides met at the border town of Nkomati on March 16, 1984, to sign a formal nonaggression pact; the pact stipulated that neither side would allow its territory to be used to prepare acts of violence against the other. Equally important to Maputo were subsequent agreements on economic and financial assistance, trade, and tourism, and on joint operation of the crucial Cabora Bassa hydroelectric project.⁸³

⁷⁸Radio Moscow in English to Africa, Nov. 29, 1982, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Nov. 30, 1982, p. J/2.

⁷⁹*Izvestiya*, Dec. 9, 1982.

⁸⁰*New Times* (Moscow), No. 10, March 1983, pp. 26-28.

⁸¹Glenn Frankel, "Mozambique Confirms Rebels Killed 2 Soviets, Kidnapped 24," *The Washington Post*, Aug. 25, 1983.

⁸²*Noticias* (Maputo), Dec. 22, 1983.

⁸³For a detailed account of the factors that led President Machel to Nkomati, see de St. Jorre, loc. cit., pp. 1-3.



Samora Moisés Machel, Chairman of the FRELIMO party and President of the People's Republic of Mozambique, meets with Soviet Politburo member and Minister of Defense Dmitry Ustinov (second from right) in Moscow in March 1983. To Ustinov's right is Chief of Staff Nikolay Ogarkov.

—TASS from Sovfoto.



South African Prime Minister Pieter Botha and Mozambican President Samora Machel at ceremonies in connection with the signing of the Nkomati accord between the two countries on March 16, 1984.

—Embassy of South Africa.

Moscow's Response to Nkomati

Although Machel had revealed Maputo's intentions to reach a rapprochement with Pretoria in December 1983, the Soviet media virtually ignored the talks until the signing of the Nkomati agreement. This represented a clear, albeit implicit, expression of Moscow's dissatisfaction. Moscow viewed the Nkomati accord as a direct criticism of its economic assistance programs. In a rather defensive interview with the Maputo daily *Notícias*, Soviet Ambassador Yuriy Sepelev attacked "those who spread calumnies and intrigues" about Soviet-Mozambican cooperation. Noting that the USSR had been blamed for Mozambique's difficulties, the Ambassador argued that the root problem was the "distorted economy" inherited from the Portuguese in 1975. He then detailed recent Soviet extensions of economic aid and credits.⁸⁴

An article in the June 24 issue of *Sel'skaya Zhizn'*, commemorating the anniversary of Mozambican independence, stated that "the young republic relies on the experience and fraternal support of the countries of the socialist community, particularly the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic, and Bulgaria, in overcoming numerous difficulties in socioeconomic development." The article also noted the "subversive actions" of South African and CIA-armed RENAMO bandits, but did not mention the Nkomati accords.⁸⁵ The placement of the commemorative piece in a national paper that deals chiefly with agricultural issues, rather than in *Pravda* where it had appeared in previous years, indicated Moscow's displeasure with Mozambique.

The Nkomati agreement represented a setback for Soviet prestige and interests. Apart from providing opportu-

⁸⁴AFP, Apr. 18, 1984, in *FBIS-MEA*, Apr. 19, 1984, p. U/2.

⁸⁵*Sel'skaya Zhizn'* (Moscow), June 24, 1984.

nities for Western inroads into a "socialist-oriented" state, the accord seriously diminished the already limited capabilities of the ANC, and it could potentially obstruct Moscow's longer term objective of undermining the white-minority regime in Pretoria. Still, the Soviets have acquiesced to President Machel's decision, partly because their stake in Mozambique is much smaller than that in Angola. Whereas a joint Soviet-Cuban intervention had brought to power—and is sustaining—the MPLA-PT, Moscow did not play a comparable role in FRELIMO's rise to power. Thus, Soviet prestige is not as clearly linked to the fortunes of the Machel regime.

Despite their displeasure with the turn of events in Maputo, the Soviets have not written off Mozambique. An article about it in the April 30, 1984, issue of *Pravda* highlighted Maputo's continued commitment to socialism, while referring somewhat skeptically to the prospects of the Nkomati accords.⁸⁶

Soviet Prospects

Apart from the damage it inflicted on Soviet prestige, the Nkomati agreement has not seriously altered the basic underpinnings of Soviet-Mozambican relations. Inasmuch as the accords have not diminished Maputo's need for military assistance to neutralize or defeat RENAMO, Moscow remains a key factor in President Machel's policy calculations. Indeed, future military cooperation was discussed at a June meeting in Moscow between Soviet officials Ustinov, Ogarkov, and Yepishev and the Mozambican deputy defense minister.⁸⁷ Moreover, despite their opposition to Machel's policies, the Soviets continue to give him high-level attention. While in Moscow to attend Andropov's funeral in February 1984, for example, Machel met with Politburo member Tikhonov and Deputy Foreign Minister Il'ichev; *Pravda* noted in its accounts of the talks that the "prospects for further development of relations are favorable."⁸⁸

Still, recent events have probably heightened Moscow's uncertainty about the future of its relationship with Mozambique. In October 1984, indirect talks be-

tween the Machel government and RENAMO, with Pretoria serving as intermediary, led to speculation that Maputo might be seeking a political settlement with the anti-Soviet RENAMO forces.⁸⁹ Not surprisingly, the Soviet media stepped up their attacks on the Nkomati accords and highlighted alleged South African efforts to resupply RENAMO with arms, which would be a violation of the agreement.⁹⁰

Although the negotiations with RENAMO have since broken down, another trend that disturbs the Soviets—the growing US-Mozambican cooperation—continues. In January 1985, for example, Washington and Maputo announced the beginning of "a limited military relationship." The United States reportedly will offer \$1 million in nonlethal military assistance and \$150,000 for training Mozambican forces. (During 1984, the US had also provided some \$22 million worth of food assistance.)⁹¹ Should this trend continue, the Soviet position in Maputo could be slowly eroded.

Nonetheless, Moscow is likely to maintain close military ties with Maputo, even as the latter continues to court the West. Despite its recent dealings with Washington, Mozambique remains dependent on Soviet military aid; this will enable the USSR to monitor developments in the region, exploit possible differences within FRELIMO's leadership, and promote suspicions in Mozambique regarding South African and US policies.



Mozambique's leader Samora Moisés Machel meets with Soviet leader Konstantin Chernenko in Moscow at the February 1984 funeral of Yuriy Andropov.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

⁸⁶On April 30, 1984, *Pravda* wrote about the accords that "time will show how events develop."

⁸⁷*Krasnaya Zvezda*, June 28, 1984.

⁸⁸*Pravda*, Feb. 16, 1984.

⁸⁹Alan Cowell, "Mozambique Truce Accord Reached," *The New York Times*, Oct. 4, 1984.

⁹⁰See, for example, the articles by I. Tarutin, "Racists Maneuvering," *Pravda*, Nov. 19, 1984, and "Beneath the Cover of Peacemaking: South Africa Continues Subversive Activities Against Mozambique," *ibid.*, Dec. 17, 1984; and Y. Bochkaryov, "Southern Africa: Out to Destabilize," *New Times*, No. 49, December 1984, pp. 12-13.

⁹¹*The Washington Post*, Jan. 16, 1985, and Maputo Domestic Service, trans. in FBIS—MEA, Jan. 16, 1985, p. U/1.

By maintaining close relations with Mozambique, the Soviets will be well-placed in the event of new hostilities between Maputo and Pretoria.

In Angola, raising the military ante may be Moscow's easiest option. The Kremlin leaders probably view a continued military stalemate—which perpetuates Luanda's dependence on the USSR—as preferable to a settlement that might be seen as a Soviet capitulation under US pressure. More difficult for Moscow might be a situation in which the dos Santos regime accepts Washington's proposals on Namibia and agrees to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, as part of a Namibian settlement package. Angola's willingness to send back the Cubans would also presume a resolution of the UNITA problem; most important, of course, would be the manner in which Luanda sought to resolve the UNITA issue. If, for example, the MPLA-PT believed that the settlement had effectively severed UNITA's lifeline to Pretoria, it might opt for a military solution, despite the Cubans' departure. Moscow might not be sanguine about Luanda's chances of success, but such a course would increase Angola's dependence on Soviet military assistance and advisory support. Still, this scenario would hardly be ideal from Moscow's vantage point: while it might prolong the military stalemate and thus avert a Soviet loss of influence in Angola, it would also require the USSR to increase significantly its stake in a growingly shaky investment. UNITA's declared policy of focusing its attacks on economic targets, such as oil refineries and diamond mines, might further increase the regime's economic troubles.

If, on the other hand, dos Santos seeks to gain domestic stability through some form of a power-sharing arrangement with UNITA, Moscow's position would become even more uncertain. Much would depend on Savimbi's role in a coalition government. While Savimbi himself has declared that when his party is brought into the government, he wants "the socialist states to play a role in Angola's future," one of UNITA's stated goals is to oust the Soviets and Cubans.⁹²

The possibility of a Soviet-inspired coup against dos Santos cannot be ruled out entirely. However, given the complexity of factors—race, tribe, ideology, and personality—that shape MPLA-PT politics, the Soviets could not be certain that even a successful coup would have the result they desire. For example, if Lara, a mu-

latto, came to power by overthrowing dos Santos, a black, racial tensions that have long existed within the MPLA-PT might be further exacerbated; new divisions might also be created in the military. All this would only serve to strengthen UNITA's position. Of course, a failed coup attempt could also leave Moscow with very little influence. Moreover, a Soviet-sponsored coup attempt aimed at subverting a Namibian accord supported by most Africans could also jeopardize Soviet equities and credibility throughout black Africa. More important, a coup would not take Angola out of the economic and security crisis that had originally prompted it to respond to South African diplomatic overtures. If the USSR succeeds in destroying the recent South African-Angolan diplomatic gains, Pretoria might resume military and political pressure on Luanda.

Moscow might consider another alternative, such as offering its "cooperation" to Luanda, in exchange for guarantees that a coalition government made up of representatives from both the MPLA-PT and UNITA would retain its leftist orientation and its close ties to the USSR. The Soviets could then continue to play a role in Angola, albeit a lesser one, through their military assistance program. In such a situation, Moscow would probably seek to put a positive face on the settlement, noting Luanda's continued leftist orientation, Washington's recognition of the MPLA-PT (albeit in a coalition with UNITA), and the pure intentions of the Cubans—claiming that they had first eliminated the South African security threat and then left when asked to do so. In this situation, the Namibian settlement would be portrayed as a victory for the Cubans and the MPLA-PT. If SWAPO won the election, the Soviets would most probably continue to cultivate Luanda, and also turn their attention to independent Namibia in pursuit of new opportunities for influence and penetration.

There exists some evidence that Moscow may be preparing for such an eventuality. Increasing candor in the Soviet press in late 1983 and throughout 1984⁹³ about Angola's precarious security situation suggests Moscow's recognition that the MPLA-PT will have to take some dramatic steps to salvage its increasingly untenable position. Alternatively, such accounts may signal Moscow's view that the Angolan problem is a long-term one, and that the USSR might be compelled to sustain its sizable commitment for years to come.

⁹²Philippe Chatenay, "UNITA's Czech Hostage Adventure," *Le Point* (Paris), July 2, 1984, pp. 28-29.

⁹³These have included: "60 percent of the country's bridges and 90 percent of its transport facilities have been destroyed by the aggressors," Sergey Kulik, "Angola '84: A Year for Defense and Production," *Komsomol'skaya Pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 3, 1984; "tens of thousands of teenagers were drafted in January 1984," *ibid*; "Luanda is experiencing a shortage of food and other essentials as its population has doubled due to the influx of

refugees from the south," Vyacheslav Molev, "People's Angola: The Struggle Continues—Victory is Inevitable," *Za Rubezhom* (Moscow), No. 44, Oct. 28-Nov. 3, 1983, pp. 12-13; and "not only the territorial integrity but also the independence of the young republic have been endangered," A. Dolgov, "Insidious Designs," *New Times*, No. 37, October 1983, pp. 20-21. Also, see reports from the war zone by a Soviet journalist, N. Semenov, "Angola: A Repulse for the Interventionists," *Aziya i Afrika Segodnya* (Moscow), No. 5, May 1984, pp. 16-18, and *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (Moscow), Aug. 23, 1984.

Other Regional Efforts

While Angola and Mozambique remain central to Moscow's position in southern Africa, the Soviets have concurrently sought to improve their relations with the other states in the region. It is likely that these efforts have been given new impetus by the growing uncertainty in Moscow about its position in Angola and Mozambique.

Zimbabwe. The Soviets have gradually developed ties to the Mugabe government of Zimbabwe which, immediately following independence, were quite limited because of Moscow's support for Mugabe's rival, Nkomo. Since 1981 the two countries have signed a number of accords on media, culture, and trade. In July 1983, they reached an agreement to establish a TASS link in Zimbabwe, as part of Harare's efforts to present reporting of world events from both Eastern and Western perspectives. After a long delay, Zimbabwe appears to be ready to open an embassy in Moscow. Moreover, Prime Minister Mugabe may soon make his first visit to the USSR, which he had shunned during a tour of Eastern Europe in 1981.⁹⁴

In their efforts to bolster their position, the Soviets have also sought to highlight and exploit differences between Washington and Harare. For example, they gave extensive media coverage to the reduction of US economic aid to Zimbabwe, following the latter's abstention in the UN vote of condemnation of the USSR for the Korean airliner shootdown in September 1983.⁹⁵ The Soviets seem to have been encouraged by Mugabe's professed commitment to Marxism-Leninism. In August 1984, Moscow sent a delegation to the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union's (ZANU) 2nd party congress, described by *Pravda* as an "important stage in Zimbabwe's development along the path of independence and social progress."⁹⁶

While Moscow does not currently have a military relationship with Zimbabwe, security problems there could create a need for Soviet assistance. New tensions could develop as Prime Minister Mugabe moves to establish a one-party state; also, unrest could flare up again in Matabeleland, giving South Africa an opportunity to meddle. Indeed, in June 1984, Zimbabwe's security officials disclosed evidence of Pretoria's exploitation and ex-

acerbation of tensions in Matabeleland in the preceding two years.⁹⁷ Given this security problem, the appeal of relatively cheap Soviet arms and quick delivery could lead Mugabe to overcome his wariness of the USSR.

Zambia. In Zambia, on the other hand, Moscow's position did not improve substantially when major arms deals were signed in 1979-80.⁹⁸ While the USSR has been able to send advisers and maintenance personnel to Lusaka together with a shipment of MiG-21's, it has not been able to translate this into political influence. Perhaps because most of Zambia's security problems disappeared following the establishment of independent Zimbabwe, President Kenneth Kaunda apparently does not perceive himself as beholden to the USSR and has adhered to his long-standing policy of nonalignment. Indeed, Kaunda's desire to be a regional peacemaker and his willingness to negotiate with Pretoria—which have been underscored by his role in facilitating the negotiations that led to the Lusaka accord, and similar talks with SWAPO—reflect a divergence between current Zambian and Soviet interests, and perhaps also their long-term objectives.

Still, the Soviets have succeeded in establishing links with various groups in Zambia. Apart from setting up the standard Friendship Society in Lusaka, the CPSU has signed an interparty accord with Zambia's ruling United National Independence Party. This has led to a number of party-to-party exchanges and delegation visits since 1981.⁹⁹ Moscow probably views this as a useful mechanism for identifying and cultivating Kaunda's successors within the ruling elite.

Lesotho. With the loss of access to the ANC via Mozambique, the Soviets have stepped up efforts to maintain friendly relations with other states contiguous to South Africa, especially Lesotho which is surrounded by South Africa on all sides. Since 1983, Lesotho's Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan has made a somewhat dramatic "turn to the East" in order to attract international attention to his country's problems and to elicit additional foreign aid. Moscow has taken advantage of Jonathan's initiative. A Soviet delegation headed by a member of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations visited Maseru in June 1984 to discuss eco-

⁹⁴See David E. Albright, "New Trends in Soviet Policy Towards Africa," *CSIS Africa Notes*, No. 27, April 1984, p. 5.

⁹⁵*Pravda*, Sept. 15, 1983, for a discussion of the "profound differences" that emerged during Prime Minister Mugabe's talks with President Ronald Reagan in September.

⁹⁶See the CPSU message to the ZANU party congress in *Pravda*, Aug. 8, 1984.

⁹⁷Glenn Frankel, "Zimbabwe Spells Out its Case on South African Support of Rebels," *The Washington Post*, June 23, 1984.

⁹⁸For an accounting of Soviet hardware in the Zambian military inventory, see International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1983/84*, London, 1983, p. 75.

⁹⁹See *Pravda*, Mar. 15, 1984, on a Soviet party delegation visit to Lusaka as part of an interparty accord; see also *Izvestiya*, Oct. 4, 1984, for an account of a Zambian parliamentary delegation's visit to the USSR.

conomic and technical cooperation.¹⁰⁰ In August in Moscow, Lesotho's minister of information and broadcasting signed an accord on media cooperation with TASS.¹⁰¹ In the near future, Soviet officials and technicians will most probably be posted to Lesotho to oversee the implementation of these accords. Prime Minister Jonathan acknowledged the departure of 38 students for the USSR in late August of last year.¹⁰² In September, Lesotho's Minister of Foreign Affairs Vincent Montsi Makhele visited the USSR at the invitation of the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Asian and African Countries.¹⁰³ Nonetheless, Pretoria's pressure on Maseru to halt the ANC's activities in Lesotho, together with its support for the insurgents of the Lesotho Liberation Army which is reportedly based in South Africa, will probably deter Jonathan from expanding his country's ties to the Soviet Union any more, lest his relations with Pretoria deteriorate even further.¹⁰⁴

Alternative Tactics. In addition to traditional diplomacy, the Soviets continue to employ propaganda and disinformation in their bid for influence in southern Africa. These efforts generally play on black African fears of Pretoria and seek to undermine US negotiation efforts. Moscow has broadcast disinformation about alleged US-UNITA collaboration in Angola, in order to raise doubts about Washington's intentions in its dialogue with the MPLA-PT.¹⁰⁵ It has also spread disinformation that portrays Washington and Pretoria as military and political allies. In December 1983, for instance, a story surfaced in the Zimbabwe *Herald* alleging US plans to test and deploy cruise missiles in South Africa; it was later exposed as a Soviet hoax and the newspaper disclaimed it. The *Herald* again fell prey to Soviet forgeries about Washington's recruitment of helicopter pilots to serve in South Africa and about US offers to sell F-5 fighter aircraft to Pretoria.¹⁰⁶

The Soviets may also be reconsidering their tactics in South Africa itself. Soviet academics recently told visiting American scholars that the USSR is regaining interest in groups other than the banned ANC, for example, the

United Democratic Front (UDF), a legal multiracial association of several hundred groups in South Africa.¹⁰⁷ An article in the Soviet scholarly journal *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya* recently described the UDF as being "consonant in many respects" with the ANC program. It argued, moreover, that the reason why Pretoria has recently moderated its policies in southern Africa was because it had to concentrate on combatting the growing struggle for liberation within its own borders.¹⁰⁸

Establishing Priorities for 1980's

In a broader context of Soviet foreign policy, the current situation in Angola and Mozambique reflects the growing Soviet problem of dealing with client states that face insurgencies. It is ironic that the Soviets, who have supported world revolution and national liberation movements, now find their "revolutionary" clients besieged by new "liberators." For example, the regimes in Angola and Mozambique, as well as Afghanistan, Kampuchea, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua, are facing growing insurgency movements. The Soviet Union has been forced to assume the unfamiliar and uncomfortable role of a counterinsurgency power in some Third World states.

In the 1970's, the Soviet Union exploited opportunities in the Third World, establishing a network of allies and clients, which seemed to portend greater gains. In some cases, however, these "victories" have thrust upon the Soviets obligations and burdens similar to those carried in the past by Western powers. Moscow has now been saddled with the task of propping up dictatorial regimes that are being challenged by domestic rivals and foreign powers. In addition, it faces the difficulties inherent in attempts to foster the Soviet economic blueprint on less developed Third World countries. The Soviets have so far underestimated the intractability of such problems, and may have underrated the willingness of hostile regional powers—or of the United States—to increase the costs of sustaining a Soviet empire in the Third World.

By the time these negative trends were becoming apparent in the early 1980's, Soviet policymaking was further complicated by economic and political problems at home.¹⁰⁹ Slow economic growth, and especially a hard-

¹⁰⁰Maseru Domestic Service, June 14, 1984, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, June 15, 1984, p. U/2.

¹⁰¹*Izvestiya*, Aug. 7, 1984.

¹⁰²Maseru Domestic Service, Aug. 22, 1984, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Aug. 23, 1984, p. U/2.

¹⁰³*Pravda*, Sept. 6, 1984.

¹⁰⁴Simon Jenkins, "Destabilization in Southern Africa," *The Economist*, July 16, 1983, p. 23.

¹⁰⁵See, for example, Radio Moscow in Zulu to southern Africa, "US Behind Ship Bombing in Angolan Port," trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 2, 1984, p. J/1; also a broadcast of the Moscow World Service, Jan. 2, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 3, 1985, p. J/1.

¹⁰⁶These disinformation efforts are discussed by Glenn Frankel, "Officials See Soviets Between the Lines of Phony Stories About US in Africa," *The Washington Post*, Dec. 3, 1983. For a study of Moscow's propaganda and disinformation operations, see Richard Schultz and Roy Godson, *Dezinformatsiya*, New York, Pergamon-Brassey's, 1984.

¹⁰⁷Reuters, July 24, 1984, citing Helen Kitchen, director of the African Studies Program, Washington, DC, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University.

¹⁰⁸A. Urnov, "The South African Knot," *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya* (Moscow), No. 5, May 1984, pp. 118-21.

¹⁰⁹The costs of Moscow's relations with the Third World—and the dilemmas they pose for Soviet policy—are discussed by Stephen Sestanovich in "Do the Soviets Feel Pinched by Third World Adventurism," *The Washington Post*, May 20, 1984.

currency shortfall, led Moscow to cut back its economic assistance to several allies and clients. For example, in an attempt to increase its hard-currency earnings in the open market, Soviet oil shipments to East European states were reduced by about 10 percent.¹¹⁰ This could hardly be encouraging to much less important clients like Angola and Mozambique, and may have contributed to their decisions during this period to broaden their economic ties to the West.

The foreign policy implications of these economic trends for Moscow's Third World clients have been debated at the highest levels of the CPSU. Various statements made in 1982 and 1983 by the then General Secretary Andropov and Politburo member Chernenko suggest that the issue of Soviet commitments to Third World states was a point of contention. Andropov, in his address to a Central Committee Plenum in December 1982 rather weakly stated that "the Soviet people wish the young states great success in consolidating their independence and in their fight for prosperity and progress." He made pointed references to the "difficult period of national self-assertion and social development" faced by young states, adding that they "are hampered by their colonial heritage of backwardness, internal strife, and conflict."¹¹¹

In his address to the foreign visitors to the plenum, Chernenko was more strident: "We warmly greet the representatives of revolutionary-democratic parties and national liberation movements and organizations battling against imperialism and neocolonialism. In this heroic struggle, comrades, we are with you."¹¹² TASS later reproduced an article by Chernenko on the CPSU's fidelity to proletarian internationalism, in which he stressed that "our party has always been opposed to the emasculation of the meaning of the concept of internationalism, to playing down its combative, active, pointed anti-capitalist character."¹¹³

Similarly, Viktor Grishin, head of the Moscow party organization and a member of the Politburo, had sounded a hard line in November 1982: "Loyal to the principles of internationalism, the CPSU and the Soviet people have done and will continue to do all in their power to support foreign class brethren who have chosen the road of building a new society—from Cuba in the west to Vietnam in the east."¹¹⁴

General Secretary Andropov used the June 1983 Central Committee Plenum to elaborate further his position on this question:

*It is one thing to proclaim socialism as one's goal and another thing to build it. A certain level of productive forces, culture, and social consciousness is needed for that. Socialist countries express solidarity with these progressive countries, render assistance to them in the spheres of politics and culture, and promote the strengthening of their defense. We contribute, to the extent of our ability, to their economic development as well. But, on the whole, their economic development, just as the entire social progress of these countries, can be, of course, only the result of the work of their peoples and a correct policy of their leadership.*¹¹⁵

Andropov's comments suggest not only that there were limits to the economic support that emerging states could expect from Moscow, but also that these states would be well-advised to examine the level of their development before calling themselves socialist.

An examination of Soviet academic writings on the Third World reveals a parallel debate between "pragmatic gradualists" and "orthodox ideologues" on the issue of Soviet relationships with developing countries.¹¹⁶ One Soviet scholar has argued that Moscow should be more concerned with providing an attractive model of "effective socioeconomic growth" and "just social relations" in its efforts to further socialist revolutions. This line implicitly favors a longer view of pro-Soviet change in the Third World, while focusing more immediately on the resolution of economic problems at home.¹¹⁷

Of course, the major analytical problem with a given debate lies in distinguishing between a discussion of the issue itself and a pretext behind which high-level political rivals maneuver to best one another in the succession struggle. Chernenko, as noted above, appeared to be criticizing Andropov's "weak" support for Soviet friends in the Third World. After becoming general secretary himself, however, Chernenko softened his position. Addressing a meeting on the new party program in April 1984, Chernenko stated that the main text of the program should be devoted to questions of the country's internal development, "for it is upon a solution to them

¹¹⁰Michael Dobbs, "Burdened Soviets Plan to Cut Back Energy Sales to Eastern Bloc by 10%," *The Washington Post*, Dec. 11, 1982.

¹¹¹For the text of Andropov's speech, see *FBIS-SOV*, Dec. 21, 1982, pp. P/1-11.

¹¹²*FBIS-SOV*, Dec. 21, 1982, pp. P/12-13.

¹¹³TASS, Jan. 4, 1983, in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 4, 1983, p. R/1.

¹¹⁴Moscow Domestic Service, Nov. 5, 1982, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Nov. 8, 1982, pp. O/2-12.

¹¹⁵*Pravda*, June 16, 1983.

¹¹⁶The current state of this long-standing debate is discussed in Tom Zamostny, "Moscow and the Third World: Recent Trends in Soviet Academic Writing on the Third World," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), Vol. XXXVI, No. 2, April 1984, pp. 223-35. This issue has also been the subject of several works by Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier, most recently, *The Soviet Union and the Third World: An Economic Bind*, New York, Praeger, 1983.

¹¹⁷Zamostny, loc. cit., p. 231. For the original article, see Yu. Novopashin, "The Influence of Real Socialism on the World Revolutionary Process: Methodological Aspects," *Voprosy filosofii* (Moscow), No. 8, 1982.



At left, Capt. M. Sokolov, head of a group of Soviets who pilot ships in the harbor of Maputo, seen with Mozambican captains J. Nencembe and S. Niyantombo in April 1983; at right, D. Keirun, a member of the council of the joint Soviet-Mozambique fishing company MOSOPESCA, with P. Zenin, a Soviet fish-packing specialist.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

that our successes in foreign policy and in the struggle for peace depend in the long term, as does the progress of competition with capitalism as a whole."¹¹⁸ This shift would suggest either that Chernenko's views changed after he assumed the responsibilities of leadership, or that his earlier position was merely tactical, designed to expose the vulnerability of his principal rival within the leadership.

While analysts cannot be certain of the context and meaning of these debates, it is possible to identify trends in Moscow's record of assistance to its Third World friends in the 1980's that may be a reflection of these debates. In Angola, for example, Moscow has recently made major new economic and military aid commitments. Apart from the 10-year, \$2 billion economic aid package signed in January 1982, the Soviets delivered some \$800 million worth of military hardware in 1983, and are probably sustaining these levels to support the MPLA-PT in the war with UNITA.¹¹⁹

At the same time, however, one could argue that the Soviet record in Mozambique reflects a decision to "draw the line" and to minimize the commitment of resources. For example, Moscow has made no effort to in-

crease its economic assistance at this time of great hardship in Mozambique. One is struck by the marked contrast between the high-profile Soviet response to the famine in Ethiopia—Moscow's key African client—and the virtual disregard to famine in Mozambique. The Soviets seem satisfied to keep their hand in Mozambique by giving primary military assistance.

In looking at these examples, it would appear that several diverse considerations are shaping Moscow's response to the needs of its Third World clients. In the case of Angola, the Soviets are not only bolstering an embattled client, but have demonstrated their resolve to counter the diplomacy of a US administration that they perceive as attempting to push them back around the globe. In the case of Ethiopia, the Soviets have sought to consolidate their relationship with this important ally that sits astride the geostrategic Horn of Africa. Viewed against these priority areas, Mozambique may be perceived as a less important, and potentially risky, investment, given its close proximity to South Africa.¹²⁰

An important aspect of the challenge to the Soviet Union in southern Africa lies in the classic clash of patron and client priorities. Angola, Mozambique, the Soviet Union, and Cuba may have similar political and ideological objectives, but they bring different perspectives and priorities to their relationships. Faced with security problems threatening their very survival, the regimes in Luanda and Maputo have had to make some difficult policy choices. Indeed, President Machel's deci-

¹¹⁸For the text of Chernenko's address, see *Pravda*, Apr. 25, 1984.

¹¹⁹US Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power 1984*, Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, 1984, p. 119. Similarly, Moscow has been willing to increase its assistance to the beleaguered Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. In addition to raising levels of arms deliveries, the Soviets have also begun to provide Managua with oil, as much as 52 percent of its current consumption needs, according to a Sandinista spokesperson. (See Reuters, Sept. 7, 1984, which cites the official Nicaraguan news agency.) At the same time, the USSR has been unwilling to make an open-ended commitment to Managua and has sought to maintain a low profile there. The Soviets' strategy in Nicaragua is discussed in Peter Clement, "Moscow and Nicaragua: The Two Sides of Soviet Policy," *Comparative Strategy* (New York), Vol. V, No. 1, 1985.

¹²⁰As for Nicaragua, the Soviets probably see a relatively low-cost opportunity to bolster a revolutionary regime in Washington's backyard, diverting US attention and resources away from areas of greater security interest to the USSR.

sion to make peace with Pretoria and President dos Santos's willingness to compromise on a resolution to the Angola-Namibia tangle underscore a fundamental reality of international relations: sovereign states are guided first and foremost by self-interest.

Moscow, which views the situation in southern Africa in the broader context of superpower rivalry with the United States, has little at stake save its prestige; it can afford to take the long view of any negative trend or setback. Luanda and Maputo, on the other hand, must shape their policies in light of the day-to-day reality of South Africa's military and economic predominance. For Havana, prestige is a factor, but the Cuban troop presence in Africa is an issue that pulls at Cuban policy from opposite directions. On the one hand, Havana derives financial benefits from its involvement in Africa.¹²¹ On the

other hand, a drawn-out war, with its rising numbers of casualties and flagging morale, could have adverse effects on Cuba itself.

The clash of these complex and at times contradictory factors is best exemplified by the current situation in Angola. Moscow has significantly increased its military and economic assistance to the MPLA-PT over the past three years, and yet its position is as tenuous and uncertain as ever. While it gratefully accepts this indispensable assistance, Luanda continues to negotiate with Pretoria and Washington. One may assume, therefore, that the Angolans are seeking to resolve the interrelated problems of Angola's security and Namibia's independence while taking on the challenge of peaceful economic development.

In Angola the Soviets have found themselves in the unusual position of attempting to preserve the status quo, that is, a manageable level of instability and tension. But the Soviets are hamstrung by not having diplomatic relations with all of the regional adversaries, which gives Washington an advantage in brokering many bilat-

¹²¹For a discussion of current and anticipated economic benefits for Cuba, see Sergio Roca, "Economic Aspects of Cuban Involvement in Africa," in Carmelo Mesa-Lago and June S. Belkin, Eds., *Cuba in Africa*, Latin American Monograph and Document Series, No. 3, Pittsburgh, PA, Center for Latin American Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 1982, pp. 165-172.



Rioting in Lenasia, the Indian quarter of Johannesburg, in September 1984 over new voting procedures that would allow South Africa's "coloureds" greater voting rights than the black population.

—David Barrit/Gamma-Liaison.

eral negotiations. Indeed, the United States, by working on a regional settlement and a degree of normalization of relations between Pretoria and its black African neighbors, has become the force of change there.

On another level, it is ironic that Pretoria's aggressive behavior, which initially facilitated Soviet influence-building in the region, has now led the Angolans and Mozambicans to consider policies incompatible with Soviet interests. As Pretoria shifts to diplomacy—albeit one backed by a military fist—it could present the USSR with even greater challenges. Even if peaceful diplomacy fails, the USSR will face difficult choices in Angola, where growing UNITA success could force Moscow to choose between greater involvement in the counter-insurgency—more arms and Cubans—and the demise of the MPLA-PT regime.

Nonetheless, the recent setback in Mozambique and the continuing problems in Angola do not portend an end to Moscow's involvement in southern Africa. As one analyst of Soviet foreign policy recently noted:

Soviet strategists fully appreciate that (1) southern Africa is NOT important per se to the Soviet Union; (2) it is important to the West; (3) the United States is caught be-

*tween moral opposition to apartheid and the economic and perceived strategic benefits of the status quo.*¹²²

The very existence of a white-minority regime in the region's most populous state will continue to spawn new opportunities for the Soviets. This was underscored in September 1984 by the rioting that followed the creation of a three-chamber parliament—giving limited representation to Coloureds and Asians but not to Blacks—in Pretoria. Should Pretoria engage its neighbors in peaceful negotiations, Moscow's position may be challenged further as black regimes move to salvage their own positions in the region. On the other hand, if diplomacy fails and Pretoria maintains or increases its policy of "destabilization," initiating a new cycle of tension between itself and the black African states, Moscow's role among the Front-Line States will be considerably enhanced. Thus, Soviet opportunities in southern Africa will depend, to a large degree, on decisions made in Pretoria.

¹²²Singleton, loc. cit., p. 1.

Rise and Fall of Détente

Harry Gelman

There is a widespread tendency in the United States and elsewhere in the West to focus only on the immediate in Soviet-American relations. In view of the pessimism about this relationship that has evolved in recent years, it is difficult to recall the state of mind that prevailed within the US elite at the high point of détente, say between the spring of 1972 and the fall of 1973, when a consensus in the United States had come to expect a steady broadening of the Soviet-American relationship, periodically reinforced by summits and agreements, in which "cooperation" would more and more predominate over "competition."¹ It has also become easy to forget that the shift from that optimistic period to the less promising present did not occur overnight with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan or the election of Ronald Reagan. Although these events undeniably brought qualitative changes to the relationship, it is some 10 years since the Soviets began their interventions in Africa, more than 10 years since the passage of the Jackson and Stevenson amendments by the US Congress and the Soviet renunciation of the trade agreement with the United States, and nearly 12 years since the Soviet-American crisis during the Yom Kippur war in the Middle East.

Given this problem of foreshortened perspective, it is important in seeking to assess current prospects for some improvement in US-Soviet relations to try to reconstruct in some detail the factors that contributed to the rise and subsequent fall of détente over the last 15 years. In this context, four general questions raised by the détente experience and the present predicament of superpower relations seem particularly important. First, was the decay of détente inevitable? That is, did détente collapse because elites of the two societies held

opposing assumptions about the goals of the relationship from the outset? And, if so, to what extent were these conflicting notions avoidable exaggerations and mistakes, illusions and misunderstandings—as is often suggested—and to what extent were they, rather, the inescapable product of incompatibilities of national interest? Second, to what extent do the changes introduced into the relationship since the end of the 1970's represent the passing of a watershed—a sharp break with what went before—and what aspects merely represent the culmination of a long, incremental process of erosion? Third, what, if anything, remains today from the wreckage of the brief détente of the early 1970's? And finally, what should one consider "normal" for the Soviet-American relationship—the atmosphere of 1972, or that of 1984? If the answer is "neither," then we must ask what mix of attributes found in the two periods is normal, and thus what features of the post-détente era must be expected to last indefinitely and what features might, in principle, be changed for the better.

Motives for Détente

To begin with, it should be noted that although there were some points of symmetry in the motives that drew Washington and Moscow into détente, the practical inducements that each side perceived did differ considerably. On the Soviet side, the Brezhnev leadership's approach to the United States in the early 1970's was impelled by a mixture of considerations. Four factors

Harry Gelman is a Senior Staff Member of the Rand Corporation (Santa Monica, CA) and a former Assistant National Intelligence Officer for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. He is the author of The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Detente (1984), and has published widely on Soviet foreign policy and Sino-Soviet relations.

¹This assumption was initially more widely shared than is generally recognized. For example, William Casey, currently director of the US Central Intelligence Agency, played in 1974, as chairman and president of the Export-Import Bank, a major role in defending the principle of extending large credits to the Soviet Union when this principle first began to lose support in the US Congress.



Signing of the Protocol of the first session of the Joint Soviet-American Trade Commission in Moscow, August 1, 1972: at left, US Secretary of Commerce Peter Peterson; at right, Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade Nikolay Patolichev.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

were probably of particular importance in persuading the Politburo that it had an interest in expanding bilateral dealings with the United States:

- the leadership's extraordinary anxiety about China at the start of the decade;
- the Politburo decision that the problems of the Soviet economy made manifest by its disappointing performance of 1969 required a much more vigorous effort to expand importation of Western, particularly American, technology and capital;²
- a growing awareness that Moscow's new *Westpolitik*, which emerged in 1969–70 and was aimed at furthering the long-term Soviet goal of convening a European security conference that would legitimize Soviet gains of World War II and possibly open the way for insinuation of greater Soviet influence into Western Europe, could not reach fulfillment without specific new Soviet negotiations with the United States;

● and finally, the Soviet discovery of an interest in reaching strategic arms agreements with the United States that would constrain US deployment in areas of American technological advantage while adequately protecting those strategic programs to which the Soviets gave priority.

In each of these realms, Soviet hopes and expectations about what might be obtained from the United States experienced a sharp rise in the first years of the 1970's and a long decline thereafter.

On the American side, the impulse to expand relations with the USSR was also channeled by a set of specific circumstances, many—although not all—of which have likewise now long since vanished. Perhaps the most important of these conditioning factors was the Vietnam war, which had envenomed American society, destroyed the American foreign policy consensus, increasingly hemmed in the presidency, created growing political constraints on all US military programs, and offered the Soviet Union an irresistible opportunity to seize on the negative worldwide reaction to promote the erosion of American influence and the advance of Soviet influence

²On the economic factor, see Harry Gelman, *The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Détente*, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 1984, pp. 124–26, 129–31.

with a multitude of audiences. At the same time, not the least important consequence of the war was to strengthen the illusion—adhered to with astonishing tenacity by distinguished Americans from Averell Harriman to Henry Kissinger—that given sufficient inducement, the Soviet Union both could and would get the United States out of its predicament on terms short of total defeat.³

In addition, the American leadership was pointed into more intimate dealings with the Soviets by a confluence of other specific considerations. Attempts to negotiate constraints on Soviet strategic nuclear programs seemed increasingly desirable as US concern over the third generation of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) grew; moreover, such negotiations seemed increasingly possible as Soviet concern over the US advantage in anti-ballistic missile (ABM) technology became more evident. A geopolitical windfall at the turn of the decade—the emergence of Sino-Soviet military confrontation and the opening of Sino-American dealings—simultaneously seemed to offer another major point of negotiating leverage upon the USSR. Creation of a broad, incrementally growing arms control regime with the Soviet Union, which built on earlier partial agreements such as the test ban treaty, had the added attraction of offering Washington an opportunity to counteract the enervating domestic effects of the Vietnamese war by appealing to a latent tradition of bipartisan support for efforts to reduce tensions.

The movement of the Brandt government of West Germany into dealings with the East in 1969–70 meanwhile had both created new opportunities that the United States could seek to exploit through negotiations with the USSR on European issues, and increased the potential political penalties in Europe for not doing so. Some sections of the US business community anticipated important profits from investment in and trade with the Soviet Union, although on the whole this economic motive was a much less important factor for the United States than it was for the Soviets. And finally, there was Mr. Kissinger's well-known vision of remaking the Soviet perception of self-interest, of enticing the

USSR into a network of relationships with the United States that would inhibit Soviet expansionist behavior in the world arena.

Process of Mutual Disillusionment

Détente progressively unravelled as each of the two sides incrementally discovered that it could not obtain from the other the really enormous concessions needed to realize its own wish list. The process of disillusionment on both sides, which began as early as the fall of 1973, became mutually reinforcing.

The Soviets found, above all, that the United States was unwilling to make the huge transfers of capital and technology that the Soviet leaders had apparently envisaged at the onset of détente. In addition, the Politburo learned that the United States was unwilling to side with the USSR against China; that important elements in the US polity viewed détente as sanctioning a degree of intrusion into the internal control practices of the Soviet dictatorship that the Soviet oligarchs regarded as threatening to their legitimacy and therefore as intolerable; and that the United States was unwilling to accept as consistent with détente those specific Soviet military advantages in the overall central and regional strategic match-ups that the Soviets regarded as both natural and essential to their interests.

Finally, the Politburo found that the United States was also unwilling to legitimize under the umbrella of détente what Moscow regarded as the natural process through which the USSR intended to supplant American influence wherever possible in different parts of the world and incrementally to reverse the many geopolitical advantages the US retained over the Soviet Union as a great power on the world scene. On the other hand, the Kremlin leaders themselves regarded as illegitimate and deeply resented the US role in supplanting Soviet influence in Egypt after 1973, as well as the subsequent US refusal to alleviate Soviet regional weakness by accepting the Soviet Union as coarbiter in the Middle East.

Meanwhile, the Americans gradually found that the Soviets lacked sufficient leverage on Vietnam to bring about a lasting compromise settlement in Indochina, had no intention of spending their political capital with Hanoi in pursuit of this chimerical purpose, and in fact were unwilling to refrain, at the height of the détente period, from supplying Hanoi with the military materiel used to cast aside the supposed settlement and to bring about the eventual humiliating defeat of the United States.⁴ This American discovery during the first half of the 1970's was followed, toward the close of the decade, by the galling realization that the Soviets had ensconced

³Reflecting this rather pathetic bipartisan craving for a *diabolus ex machina*, Mr. Kissinger states that "in all my conversations with [Ambassador] Dobrynin I stressed that a fundamental improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations presupposed Soviet cooperation in settling the [Vietnam] war." Henry Kissinger, *White House Years*, Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1979, p. 266.

⁴Some months after the signing of the 1973 Paris Peace Agreement on Vietnam, when Soviet and North Vietnamese conduct began the process of violation of the Agreement that was ultimately to culminate in its destruction and the American debacle, Kissinger felt obliged to tell Dobrynin that "a continuation of substantial Soviet deliveries of military supplies [to Hanoi] would be considered an unfriendly act; a new offensive by Hanoi would have the profoundest consequences for U.S.-Soviet relations." Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1982, pp. 317–18.

themselves in the former US military facilities in southern Vietnam.⁵

The Americans also discovered that, despite the hopes fostered by some US leaders, the SALT I Interim Agreement did not resolve the threat to the retaliatory capability of the United States originally perceived as latent in certain of the Soviet third-generation ICBM's. Instead, this agreement was eventually found to have allowed the replacement of these weapons with a fourth generation of ICBM's, which posed an even greater threat.⁶ The disruption of the US arms control consensus that resulted from this belated discovery gave impetus to the subsequent growth of disagreement in the United States over the acceptability of a SALT II treaty that also did not resolve the issue of the threat posed by increased Soviet missile accuracy and throw-weight.

In addition, the Soviet achievement in the first half of the 1970's of what is generally called a "robust" parity in strategic capabilities was followed, in the second half, by what turned out to be a sustained and successful unilateral Soviet effort to build a more decisive theater nuclear superiority in Europe to supplement the substantial existing local Soviet advantage in conventional forces.⁷ Concern over trends in the European military balance therefore tended to reinforce the growing anxiety in the United States about the purposes underlying the Soviet buildup of intercontinental strategic weapons.

The net result, by the end of the decade, was a profound schism in the US elite, with one group questioning the assumptions of the other—once more broadly shared—about the efficacy and legitimacy of arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. The political effects of disillusionment under this heading were greatly magnified by disappointment with Soviet conduct in other policy realms, so that the ratification of SALT II was ultimately defeated by a mixture of factors, some of which had little to do directly with arms control or the nuclear force balance. By the time that America entered the post-détente era of the 1980's, the arms control

process with the Soviet Union had thus become not only far more problematic in its own right but also far more isolated from surrounding sources of mutual confidence. The role of arms control had been transformed from that of "centerpiece" in a broadening relationship with the Soviet Union to that of an increasingly precarious vestige of stability in a widening sea of mutual hostility.

Soviet Third World Offensive

The major factor whose effects coincided with the growth of the arms control debate in the United States in the second half of the 1970's and ultimately helped to prevent the ratification of SALT II was of course the major expansion of the Soviet military and political presence in different parts of the world—in particular in Africa, Southeast Asia, and Southwest Asia. This presence grew partly through the incremental broadening of the scope of Soviet naval and air operations to more and more distant areas, and partly through the associated process of Soviet arms assistance to radical nationalist ("liberation") movements or to newly independent states in territories formerly dominated by the West.

Such efforts to expand the Soviet geopolitical position around the world could always be interpreted in at least three ways. On one level, this behavior could be seen as nothing more than the natural endeavor of a latecomer to catch up, analogous to the behavior of imperialist Germany in Africa prior to World War I. On another level, it could be interpreted as reflecting the equally natural desire of the Soviet Union to achieve real equality in stature with the other superpower, the United States—which had long enjoyed (and for that matter, still enjoys) a world presence and power-projection capability not matched by the USSR. These first two explanations for Soviet conduct were repeatedly adduced in some quarters in the United States to demonstrate the nonthreatening nature of successive Soviet actions and their compatibility with détente. Those who took this view also tended to see little pattern in Soviet efforts to exploit instability in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, and treated them instead as isolated regional events, each of which should be of relatively minor concern to the United States.

However, superimposed on these two interpretations was a third one, engendered both by Soviet rhetoric and by some actions of the Soviet leaders. This view, which under the impact of events became fairly widely held in the United States by the end of the 1970's, saw the Soviet impulse to expand as part of an internally driven, perpetual contest with the West and the US, to which all other purposes and relationships were subordinated—a

⁵Beginning some four years after the American withdrawal, the Soviet military establishment incrementally attained benefits in Vietnam that it had long coveted: the right to use and develop large naval support facilities at the former US base at Cam Ranh Bay, to build and operate electronic facilities there, to use Vietnamese airfields to stage long-range naval reconnaissance flights from the Soviet Far East, and finally, to base Soviet medium bombers and fighters at Cam Ranh Bay. *The New York Times*, Mar. 29 and July 9, 1979; *The Washington Post*, Dec. 21, 1983; *Jane's Defense Weekly* (London), July 21, 1984.

⁶That is to say, the SS-18 (which replaced the third-generation SS-9); the SS-19 (which replaced the SS-11); and the SS-17 (which replaced the SS-13).

⁷On the present European balance in long-range nuclear weapons, see The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1984-85*, IISS, London, 1984, Table 2, pp. 136-37. On the European balance in conventional weapons, this same publication states: "The numerical balance—particularly in equipment—continues to move gradually in favor of the East. At the same time, the West has largely lost the technological edge in conventional equipment which allowed NATO to believe that quality could substitute for numbers." *Ibid.*, p. 151.

quasi-religious struggle impelled by the central myth under which the Soviet leadership seeks legitimacy. In effect, Moscow came to be seen as pursuing a zero-sum game that precluded acceptance of any point of final equilibrium or settlement with the main opponent; in this interpretation, the purported Soviet quest for "equality" was in fact a never-ending drive to supplant.⁸

The existence of such an impulse was suggested and advertised, *inter alia*, by official Soviet rhetoric asserting it the unalterable and inevitable duty of the USSR to come to the aid of "revolutionary and national liberation movements."⁹ To be sure, the Soviets never behaved as though this meant unqualified support for all such movements; Moscow always was highly selective in fulfilling this supposed obligation, being in practice guided almost exclusively by considerations of Realpolitik and calculations of net Soviet advantage in the struggle with the USSR's principal rivals. However, at no point in the evolution of Soviet-American bilateral dealings in the 1970's did the Soviets cease to make clear that neither détente nor peaceful coexistence would be allowed to halt Moscow's efforts to change the world at the expense of the United States.¹⁰ The Soviet leaders evidently did not see how the Soviet position in the world could possibly be improved unless that of the opponent were whittled down; moreover, they apparently saw US behavior in Egypt and elsewhere in the Near East in the mid-1970's as an indication that the Americans mirrored this outlook.

It is difficult to believe that the members of the Politburo were oblivious to the effects of Soviet behavior in the Third World upon public opinion in the United States, in particular its contribution to the rightward evolution of the American polity late in the decade. But insofar as they gave consideration to restraint at all, the Soviets apparently saw any potential sacrifice of opportunities for gain as inadequately compensated—when matched against benefits derived from a relationship with the US that became less and less rewarding as the decade went on.

Throughout the Nixon, Ford, and Carter presidencies, the Soviet leaders sought to maintain a wall between the bilateral Soviet-US relationship and the interaction of the two powers in the world arena, i.e., to reject American attempts at "linkage," which would have held aspects of the bilateral relationship hostage to Soviet behavior elsewhere. In retrospect, this Soviet effort was destined to fail. If Soviet behavior could not adapt to the conception of détente held by the American public, then those aspects of détente that the Soviet leaders wished to preserve could not survive. This was especially true because of the wounded state of the American presidency from 1973 on, which rendered all dealings with the So-

viet Union vulnerable to attack from both the Left (in 1974) and the Right (thereafter).

The spectacular series of Soviet advances in the Third World between 1975 and 1979 were particularly traumatic for much of the American public because they coincided with a series of extraordinary American humiliations, from the evacuation of Saigon in 1975 to the seizure of the US embassy in Tehran in 1979. Although the Soviets were certainly not responsible for all American misfortunes, they exulted in them and openly sought, with varying degrees of success, to profit from them.¹¹ The two sets of phenomena became increasingly linked in the world's perceptions, with much of the American public—and the Soviets themselves—seeming to share the Chinese judgment at the time that the United States was a "retreating wave" on the world scene, and that the Soviet Union was an "advancing wave."¹² As a consequence, by the end of the 1970's a sizable majority in the United States had come to see the advent of détente as having opened the way for an explosion of Soviet efforts to wrest advantages from an internally and externally stricken America in several different spheres simultaneously.

The more profound effects of the clash of interests of the two powers in the Third World were indirect.¹³ Concern over deployments that enhanced Soviet power in

⁸For a more extended discussion of this point, see Gelman, *op. cit.*, pp. 32–38, 214–18.

⁹As early as 1974, Defense Minister Andrey Grechko asserted, with considerable hyperbole: "At the present stage the historic function of the Soviet armed forces is not restricted merely to their function in defending our Motherland and other socialist countries. In its foreign policy activity, the Soviet state actively, purposefully opposes the export of counterrevolution and the policy of oppression, supports the national liberation struggle, and resolutely resists imperialist aggression in whatever distant region of our planet it may appear." A. Grechko, "The Leading Role of the CPSU in Building the Army of a Developed Socialist Society," *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* (Moscow), May 1974.

¹⁰To do so, argued one Soviet writer midway through the 1970's, would translate détente into the "preservation of the status quo," whereby "imperialism could continue unhindered its tyranny in the areas remaining in its sphere of influence." B. Pyadyshev, "Opponents of Détente from Miami," *Za Rubezhem* (Moscow), Oct. 30, 1975, pp. 15–16.

¹¹Particularly striking was Soviet behavior in response to the seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran. Itself lacking a good opening to the new Iranian regime, the Soviet leadership sought to gain one by fanning the flames of Iranian hostility toward the United States, and therefore it hailed the takeover of the US Embassy, at first quite explicitly, in the broadcasts of an "unofficial" radio station based in the USSR and under Soviet control. See the discussion in Gelman, *op. cit.*, pp. 36, and 229 fn. 16.

¹²As a *Renmin Ribao* editorial of May 9, 1975, put it: "The Soviet social-imperialists, harboring ambitious dreams and stretching their hands everywhere . . . are leaving no stone unturned in their efforts to replace the U.S. imperialists at a time when the latter are becoming increasingly vulnerable and strategically passive." Reprinted in *Peking Review*, May 16, 1975, p. 8. On Nov. 4, 1977, *Peking Review* stated: "The Soviet Union has decided to employ an offensive strategy to . . . weaken and supplant U.S. influence in all parts of the world in its attempt to establish its own world hegemony." This last-cited commentary quoted Brezhnev as having declared: "Strengthening its economic and defense potential has enabled the Soviet Union to launch an active and successful offensive in the international arena." Brezhnev speech at anniversary celebration of the Academy of Sciences, *Pravda* (Moscow), Oct. 8, 1975.

¹³There were also some direct effects. The conflict of Soviet and American interests in the Third World was largely responsible for the demise of such bilateral negotiating initiatives of the early Carter administration as the Conventional Arms Transfer and Indian Ocean talks.

both strategic and European contexts, resentment at US humiliations, and anger at the obstacles created for Jewish emigration from the USSR were all given focus in the public mind by a series of specific, dramatic, visible events around the world that cumulatively seemed to confirm the hostility of Soviet intentions, creating a pattern much more readily perceived by a wide audience than the abstruse calculations and complex allegations of defense analysts about the military balance.

The China Factor?

Some have suggested that Moscow's increased efforts to expand the Soviet presence and influence in the Third World after 1975 was prompted, in part, by chagrin over its failure to head off or rupture the new American relationship with China. In this view, disappointment with the unwillingness of the United States to forgo its China connection combined with other factors to disillusion the Soviets with the results of détente and thus helped to influence Moscow to launch an offensive in the Third World.¹⁴ This interpretation seems to me implausible on several grounds.

It was, of course, evident from the outset—that is,

from the time of the extended crisis on the Sino-Soviet border in the spring and summer of 1969—that US relations with China were a paramount Soviet concern. The USSR was intent at that point on avoiding excessive difficulties with the United States during a period of military confrontation with China. Thereafter, Moscow pursued three goals: (1) to minimize the ability of the United States to derive leverage in Soviet-American dealings from Sino-Soviet difficulties; (2) to head off any US movement toward military alignment with China against the Soviet Union; and (3) if possible, to induce Washington instead to align itself with Moscow against the interests of Beijing.¹⁵

Soviet anxieties under these headings produced a variety of actions in the 1970's. At the outset, when the US détente with the USSR and the American opening with China were developing simultaneously, the Soviets were apparently sufficiently exercised about the possibility of Sino-American collaboration to make some marginal concessions in dealings with the United States, notably

¹⁴See William G. Hyland, *Soviet-American Relations: A New Cold War?* R-2763-FF/RC, Santa Monica, CA, The Rand Corporation, May 1981, p. 25.

¹⁵See Harry Gelman, *The Soviet Far East Buildup and Soviet Risk-Taking Against China*, R-2943-AF, Santa Monica, CA, The Rand Corporation, August 1982, pp. 46–52.



Chinese (nearest the camera) and Soviet border guards confront one another in June 1969 on Damanskiy Island in the Ussuri River (known in China as Zhenbao Island).

—Xinhua via Eastfoto.



Soviet party and state leader Leonid Brezhnev and US President Gerald Ford toast each other at a banquet on November 24, 1974, in Vladivostok.

—David Hume Kennerly/FPG.

by accelerating the negotiations resulting in the signing of the Berlin Quadripartite Agreement in July 1971.¹⁶ After that summer, however, the situation in the Sino-Soviet-American triangle never again demonstrably educated tactical concessions from Moscow. Instead, the Soviets resorted to a long series of warnings and appeals to the United States—warnings against US conclusion of a “military alliance” with China, and appeals to Washington to reach some sort of understanding with Moscow, formal or informal, directed against Beijing.

The appeals for cooperation against China seem to have been concentrated in the first half of the decade, when a large measure of détente still existed. Two requests for formal written agreements with anti-Chinese intent were particularly notable: one was made in 1970, during the SALT I negotiations; the other, in 1974, in the final weeks of the Nixon presidency.¹⁷ Warnings against US collaboration with China against the Soviet Union, on the other hand, recurred throughout the decade as détente dwindled. Toward the end of the 1970's, when the United States, in reaction to Soviet behavior in other areas and to the general decay of détente, finally did be-

gin to seek a significant degree of security cooperation with the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union went so far as to warn publicly that this could adversely affect arms control negotiations.¹⁸ Here, for once, Moscow appeared to subscribe to “linkage.”

Nevertheless, it is anachronistic to suggest that this turn in American policy late in the decade was responsible for stimulating Soviet activism in the Third World beginning in 1975. Although Washington would not accept a security relationship with the USSR directed against China, Brezhnev's warnings against a US “military alliance” with the PRC addressed a contingency that was never, in fact, a real possibility during Kissinger's tenure in office. Despite extensive Sino-American exchanges of information and views during the Nixon and Ford administrations, it does not appear that such security measures as US arms sales to the PRC, naval port visits, and joint contingency planning—let alone the creation of an “alliance” with China—were under active consideration in this period.¹⁹ American policy did not begin to move in this direction until the second half of the Carter administration, and this shift from 1978 on—the incremen-

¹⁶Hyland, op. cit., p. 25; Kissinger, *White House Years*, 766–67.

¹⁷On the Soviet 1970 proposal, see John Newhouse, *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT*, New York, Holt, Rinehard & Winston, 1973, p. 189; also Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 547–48. On the Soviet 1974 suggestion, see Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, pp. 1173–74; also Richard Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*, New York, Grosset & Dunlap, 1978, p. 1030.

¹⁸*Pravda*, June 17, 1978. In January 1979, the Soviets did briefly hold up the final stages of the SALT II negotiations in response to the visit of Deng Xiaoping to the United States.

¹⁹In addition, of course, it must be remembered that at no point in Sino-American dealings has the PRC in fact indicated willingness to accept a relationship approximating a formal “alliance” with the United States.

tal triumph of the perspective on the strategic triangle held by National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski over that held by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance—was itself propelled in large part by the American reaction to the Soviet offensive in the Third World.

It is reasonable to suppose that despite their repeated expressions of concern about the Sino-American relationship in private contacts with US leaders,²⁰ the Soviet leaders were well aware of the evidence that the Kissinger-Nixon policy toward China was a limited one, and that it was amply balanced by American interest in reaching agreements with the Soviet Union. Indeed, the bulk of Soviet published comment between 1971 and 1975—particularly after the signing of the SALT I agreement in May 1972—suggested a growing inclination to assume that the United States would not wish to jeopardize the arms control process and other overriding American interests by entering into a close security relationship with Beijing.²¹ It should also be remembered that even as late as November 1974, when détente had already begun to decline, the Chinese leaders were dealt a humiliation when the United States consented to hold a summit meeting with Brezhnev at Vladivostok. The Soviets had chosen this site, adjacent to China, with precisely that effect in mind, and can only have been gratified and reassured by the Ford administration's acquiescence in this slight to Beijing.

It could be argued, to be sure, that the Soviets were disturbed in this period not by an expectation that the United States would line up with China against the Soviet Union, but rather by the repeated confirmation that Washington would not consent to an arrangement with Moscow directed against China. It would be farfetched to conclude, however, that Kissinger's refusal to depart from the course he steered between the two powers sufficed to incite the Soviet leadership to undertake greater activity in the Third World against American interests.

The Stevenson Amendment

It seems likely to me that a much more potent factor in reinforcing the Politburo inclination to seize on the opportunities that began to open up in the Third World af-



US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko in Moscow on March 24, 1974.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

ter 1975 was the December 1974 passage by the US Congress of the Stevenson Amendment to the Export-Import Bank bill, an action that limited to US\$300 million the total that the Bank could guarantee in loans to the Soviet Union over the following four years without seeking further Congressional approval, and that banned the use of any of this money for the development or production of energy. From the Soviet perspective, this event was a real turning point abruptly ending hopes that America might furnish decisive help to the Soviet economy. Immediately at issue was the prospect of extremely large loans from the US to the Soviet Union over the next few years for the Yakutsk/North Star Siberian energy development projects. These capital transfers and the associated technology inputs were probably the biggest single dividend the Politburo had anticipated from the détente relationship. The passage of this legislation under the nose of a preoccupied Secretary of State Kissinger rendered moot an elaborate tripartite compromise that he had worked out with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko and Senator Henry Jackson granting the Soviets most-favored-nation status under the Trade Act in return for certain Soviet concessions over Jewish emigration. The Soviet response was to disavow the emigration compromise and to abrogate the October 1972 trade agreement with the United States,

²⁰See, e.g., Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 524, 766; idem, *Years of Upheaval*, pp. 233, 294–95, 1173–74.

²¹In August 1971, speaking privately to the Yugoslav ambassador in the wake of the announcement of President Nixon's forthcoming trip to China, Brezhnev is said to have asserted that "the Americans, regardless of all Nixon's demagoguery and maneuvers, know very well that China is not, and cannot be, a real partner of the United States in the modern world. This role can only be filled by the Soviet Union." Slobodan Stankovic, "Michunovich Describes Yugoslav-Soviet Disagreements," RFE–RL, *Radio Free Europe Research* (Munich), RAD Background Report 187, Sept. 20, 1982.

indignantly proclaiming that the USSR could never be bribed to permit interference in Soviet internal affairs.²² One suspects, however, that the problem was that henceforth the bribe would always be too small.

The reasons why the US Congress took this step in 1974 are of continuing interest today because they vividly suggest that American and Soviet expectations from the relationship are always likely to be out of phase. The American legislature, in addition to being influenced by certain more extraneous considerations,²³ was fundamentally opposed to the evident intent of the American executive-branch leadership to make large credits available promptly to the USSR as an inducement for subsequent Soviet good behavior. Various parts of the coalition in the American elite that forced through the Stevenson Amendment were disturbed at Soviet behavior in the Arab-Israeli crisis before and during the October 1973 war, were angry at Soviet encouragement and applause for the Arab oil embargo, were annoyed at Soviet continuation of very substantial arms shipments to Vietnam, or were concerned that once very large credits were transferred to the USSR, the Soviet debtor could exercise political leverage over the American creditor by threatening to delay repayment. In general, this coalition was determined to ensure that all future credits to Moscow somehow be made contingent upon *prior* good Soviet behavior in all arenas.²⁴

It seems unlikely, however, that the Soviet leadership, for its part, was ever willing to contemplate such a bargain, either explicit or tacit, with the US elite. The Soviets apparently expected large American economic assistance as a down payment in a relationship that the Soviet leaders would, at most, evaluate on an ad hoc basis to determine what, if any, acts of political restraint the returns from that relationship might from time to time justify. The members of the Politburo apparently never dreamed that the agreements concluded with the United States in 1972 and 1973 implied a general commitment to desist from pursuing perpetual struggle for competitive advantage with the Americans. They therefore saw nothing inconsistent between the sweeping ritualistic promises recorded in May 1972 and such actions as their public and private efforts, the following year, to

induce the Arabs to wield the "oil weapon" against the West.²⁵ They were evidently surprised that American resentment over this behavior contributed to Washington's withdrawal from what Moscow saw as American obligations under the détente bargain.

But, quite apart from whose action caused whose reaction, it is questionable whether—even if the Stevenson Amendment had not passed—the economic benefits at stake would have sufficed to induce the Soviet leaders to refrain from exploiting the qualitatively new opportunities that emerged after 1975 in Africa and elsewhere. However, this we will never know.

The 1970's in Retrospect

Initial misconceptions on both sides, then, did seem to have played an important—albeit not exclusive—role in bringing about détente's demise in the 1970's. Brezhnev, for his part, misjudged the ability of the US presidency to deliver on the American side of the tacit bargain reached in 1971–72.²⁶ He also underestimated the capacity of a rampaging American pluralism to veto executive commitments. For this reason, he misjudged the readiness of the United States either to provide the kind of economic help envisioned by the Soviet Union at the start of the decade or to accept the kind of strategic arms agreement that was tolerable to the USSR at the close of the decade. At the same time, he greatly overestimated the willingness of the US public to accept with equanimity the successive challenges and injuries to American interests—in the Third World and in global and regional military balances—that he and his colleagues regarded as essential to Soviet interests and as a legitimate part of the détente understanding.

American leaders, for their part, erred in supposing that the Soviet Union could or would—as part of the détente bargain—deliver to the United States an acceptable and lasting compromise in Vietnam. They also erred in supposing, or at any rate in suggesting to the

²²It will be recalled that a document on "basic principles" of Soviet-US relations signed at the 1972 summit pledged both sides to refrain "from efforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly." The context had seemed to refer to behavior of all kinds, and not merely weapons deployments. See "Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington, DC), June 26, 1972, pp. 898–99.

²³It is difficult to estimate with confidence Brezhnev's perception of the quid that he was offering in return for the American quo, since various concessions emerged and then vanished incrementally. One may surmise, however, that in 1972 he may have seen four such elements as most important: (1) those limited constraints on previously existing Soviet deployment programs for third-generation ICBM's that he accepted in SALT I; (2) the embarrassments that he was forced to accept in dealings with Vietnam and Egypt in the spring and summer of 1972 as a result of his dealings with the United States; (3) his temporary consent to allow expanded Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union; and (4) his temporary moderation of the customary vehemence of Soviet propaganda attacks on the United States.

²²*The Washington Post*, Dec. 19, 1974; *The New York Times*, Jan. 15, 1975.

²³There can be little doubt that major sections of the Congress and the press were, in addition to all else, interested in using the occasion as part of a more general campaign to attack and constrict the powers of the presidency in the immediate aftermath of Watergate. For some of those involved, the pros and cons of the Soviet-American relationship were secondary to this endeavor.

²⁴It is worth stressing that this was a coalition in which liberal forces played a major role, enforcing their will to defeat an effort by essentially conservative political elements to hand over large sums of money to the Soviet Union. On this remarkable role reversal a decade ago, see Gelman, op. cit., pp. 148–51, 250 n. 68, and 251 n. 69.

US Congress, that SALT I could prevent the growth of the Soviet threat to American land-based retaliatory capabilities. They erred, too, in their hopes that the Soviet leaders could be induced to display restraint in the Third World as the result of the construction of a network of relationships with the United States. Finally and most decisively, they erred in assuming that construction of such a network of inducements would be politically possible in the United States in the absence of far more prior Soviet restraint than the Politburo was willing to consider.

However, beyond these initial errors on both sides, the role of historical accident in undermining détente should not be underestimated. A long list of fortuitous developments that were not foreseen in 1970—Watergate, the death of Portuguese dictator Antônio de Oliveira Salazar and its consequences in Africa, the revolutions in Addis Ababa and Kabul, the fall of the Shah, Pol Pot's disastrous pugnacity toward Vietnam after 1975—impacted from different sides and in different ways on the relationship between the superpowers during the 1970's and progressively exacerbated their underlying conflict of interests.

Finally, in view of the extent to which those interests continue to conflict, one should have no illusions about the possibilities for the relationship in the 1970's had the

two sides not begun the decade with separate sets of faulty assumptions. If mutual expectations had been significantly lower, the ultimate disillusionment and bitterness would have been less; but by the same token, far less would have been attempted. What attitude would the American leadership have adopted in 1970 had it known with certainty that any hopes of inducing Soviet restraint in the Third World were foredoomed? What attitude would Brezhnev have taken in 1970 had he known that his hope of decisive American help for the Soviet economy was misplaced?

In short, given the objective outside factors that impinged on the relationship in the 1970's, and given the inescapable asymmetries in the attitudes and goals of the Soviet Union and the United States—especially Moscow's assumptions about the military requirements of Soviet security and about its right and duty to help change the global "correlation of forces" in the USSR's favor—it seems highly probable that under any circumstances the competitive aspects of the relationship would have strongly predominated over the cooperative aspects. Even if optimistic illusions associated with détente had not been fostered (only to be killed), the atmosphere by the end of the decade would very probably have been rather harsh in any case—perhaps analogous to that prevailing in the late 1960's.



A column of Soviet armor in Kabul in January 1980 at the outset of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

—Hubert Van Es/Photoreporters.



US President Jimmy Carter, second from left (flanked at his right by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and at his left by National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski), meets with Chinese Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping in Washington in February 1979.

—China Photo Service via Eastfoto.

The US and the Post-Détente Era

Relations between the superpowers need not, however, have deteriorated as far as they have in the years since late 1979, during what might be termed the "post-détente era." This period has clearly witnessed a further exacerbation of bilateral tensions.

On the American side, this trend stems from the American reaction to the invasion of Afghanistan and the decisive victory of the point of view represented by Zbigniew Brzezinski. As suggested earlier, there seems little doubt that this tipping of the scales within the Carter administration coincided with the culmination of a broader shift within the American polity that had been going on throughout the late 1970's. This hardening of attitudes regarding Soviet behavior affected not only the US elite but also popular opinion, and in turn played its part in the election of Ronald Reagan. The increasing Soviet pessimism about prospects for the bilateral relationship that Moscow evidenced in the 1980's doubtless derived as much from a recognition of this underlying shift in the American center of political gravity as from

perceptions about the personal world view of the new American president.

This shift was reflected from the start—that is, since 1980—in both demonstrative American gestures and in more basic, secular changes that have become more and more important as time went on. Some of the punitive steps taken against the USSR in 1980, while regarded as infuriating and injurious by Moscow, did not in themselves represent fundamental and long-lasting changes in US behavior. The announced rationale for many of the more notable moves against Soviet interests in President Carter's last year was that of imposing "sanctions," that is, they were conceived as ad hoc responses aimed at punishing specific Soviet acts, with the extremely faint hope of getting the Soviets to undo what they had done (e.g., to get out of Afghanistan), and with the somewhat greater hope of inhibiting future Soviet misdeeds. Many of these steps were either intrinsically one-time in nature (the boycott of the Moscow Olympic Games) or were at least posed as theoretically reversible upon evidence of better Soviet conduct (the elimination of Aeroflot landing rights, the embargo on grain sales).

At the same time, the political reaction that the invasion of Afghanistan evoked within the Carter administration and among the public also tended to reinforce strongly certain longer-term shifts in US policy already under way, trends of greater import to Soviet interests than the "sanctions." They included, among other things, the collapse of support for the ratification of SALT II, the trend toward heightened US military spending, and the tendency of the United States to seek security cooperation with China.

It seems likely that one of the chief Soviet grievances against Mr. Reagan is that he has sought to extend and institutionalize this broad underlying shift in the American posture that began under his predecessor. The late-Carter period rationale of "punishing" specific Soviet acts in an empirical spirit has now been overlaid by assumptions about an unending struggle against the Soviet Union and what are now judged to be long-term requirements dictated by the hostile essence of the relationship. These assumptions bear a strong resemblance to those that have impelled Soviet competitive behavior against the United States in the world arena for many years.²⁷

One characteristic of this new American posture, particularly in the first two years of the Reagan administration, was a degree of sustained stridence in rhetorical denunciation of the Soviet Union that the Soviet oligarchs had not heard for many years. Although they

may have expected more reserve in propaganda emanating from the highest level, the Soviet leaders were probably affronted primarily because this rhetoric appeared to be consciously employed as part of a broad effort to undo the gains registered by the Soviet Union over the United States in the 1970's. On the one hand, the attacks on the USSR were used to muster public support for large increases in expenditures for strategic and conventional weapons programs that were openly advertised, at least initially, as intended to restore American military superiority. On the other hand, the same attacks were used, in effect, as tacit justification for a new American refusal to accept as a basis for future strategic arms control agreements certain of those existing Soviet advantages that had been previously accepted and, in the Soviet view, legitimized during the 1970's in SALT I and SALT II.

In addition, the United States in the post-détente era has sought to impose America's new zero-sum view of the relationship with the Soviet Union upon Washington's European allies. This was reflected in the unsuccessful attempt to compel the West Europeans to abandon their gas pipeline deal with the Soviets, and more generally in the greatly intensified and sustained efforts to induce the West as a whole to constrict the flow of technology and scientific ideas to the East. At the same time, the effort to limit Western inputs into the growth of Soviet military strength has merged with a much vaguer and inconsistently applied desire to minimize Western help to the Soviet economy as a whole, on the general grounds that any easing of Soviet economic dilemmas must also ease constraints on resources available to the Soviet military. In broadest terms, the present administration has manifested to the Soviet leaders an aspiration to wage economic warfare against them, albeit on a scale greatly exceeding Washington's actual political capabilities.²⁸

Finally, the last four years have also seen specific American efforts to offset Soviet interests in three major

²⁷Specific examples of the tendency of the Reagan administration to strive to reduce asymmetries that appear to give the Soviet Union an important tactical advantage include the decay in American adherence to the doctrine of mutual assured destruction, which many consider to have been long rejected by the Soviet Union; the effort to impose a sharper strategic focus upon control over trade with the USSR, in response to Soviet central coordination of foreign trade activities for strategic purposes; the effort to enforce greater secrecy controls upon the American government and upon American research, in emulation of Soviet practice; the effort to compete more vigorously with the KGB by allowing a longer leash to US covert action; and the sporadic effort to limit the access of Soviet spokesmen to the United States and to the American media, in response to similar Soviet constraints on American spokesmen.

²⁸One of the reasons this goal is not often avowed explicitly—in addition to the impossibility of getting America's allies to accept it—is its incompatibility with the US domestic political realities that induced Mr. Reagan first to abandon the Carter boycott on grain shipments to the USSR and then to conclude the new "boycott-proof" long-term grain agreement with the Soviet Union (see fn. 52 below).



A US-manufactured VAX II computer bound for the Soviet Union at Stockholm's airport where it was intercepted as a strategic item.

—Arne Jönsson/Pressens Bild AB via Photoreporters.



At left, a young woman in the crowd that demonstrated in Bonn in October 1983 against deployment of new US nuclear weapons in West Germany (behind her, the Soviet flag); at right, the first U.S. Pershing missiles arrive at the Mutlangen base of the United States in West Germany's Baden-Württemberg Province on November 24, 1983, the day after the Bundestag voted to accept deployment.

—Christopher Morris/BLACK STAR and François Lochon-Pierre Perrin/Gamma-Liaison.

geographic areas, in each case carrying through on initiatives already begun under the Carter administration, and hence enjoying a broader consensus in the United States than have some other features of the Reagan program.

In Europe, the Reagan administration has carried forward the train of events inaugurated with the NATO double-track decision of December 1979, when the Atlantic alliance resolved to deploy intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in order to restore the credibility of Western strategic deterrence in Europe—threatened by the Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles there—unless negotiations could remove that threat. The Soviet Union proved unwilling to give up the military and political advantages inherent in the SS-20 deployments, and despite an enormous Soviet political campaign and great domestic tumult in Western Europe, was ultimately unable to prevent the start of the Western INF counter-deployment.²⁹

In Japan, the Reagan administration has found it possible to continue and enlarge the trend of heightened Japanese military cooperation with the United States begun by the Carter administration. This trend, which significantly helps US military capabilities against the Soviet

Union in the Western Pacific, gained impetus from the continued Soviet militarization of the southern Kuriles (claimed by Japan), and from the threat perceived by Japan in Soviet SS-20 deployments in Asia.³⁰

And with China, despite an initial crisis in Sino-American relations occasioned in part by President Reagan's ideologically motivated inclinations toward Taiwan, the US government ultimately found it possible to reestablish the trend of unacknowledged security cooperation with the PRC inaugurated by his predecessor. The United States was able to do this partly because Mr. Reagan shifted his priorities, but—more important—because the Soviet Union's policies attacking Chinese geopolitical interests in Asia made it impossible for Beijing to abandon its loose security connection with America despite its desire to reduce tensions with Moscow.³¹ In all three cases, therefore—with Europe, Japan, and China—the post-détente era has witnessed specific American achievements in the regional competition with the Soviet Union that have been facilitated by Moscow's pursuit of its own military priorities and by its heavy-handed behavior.

²⁹See, e.g., Tetsuya Kataoka, "Japan's Northern Threat," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March–April 1984, esp. pp. 4–9.

³¹In Beijing in December 1984 Soviet First Deputy Premier Ivan Arkhipov initiated agreements by the Soviet Union to help China modernize some industrial plants built with Soviet help in the 1950's and to engage in various forms of scientific and technological cooperation with the PRC. The visit, however, brought no apparent movement on the fundamental geopolitical issues that continue to divide the two countries. See *The New York Times*, Dec. 29, 1984. For a discussion of the two contrasting aspects of Chinese relations with the USSR, see Harry Gelman, "Soviet Policy Towards China," *Survey* (London), Autumn–Winter 1983, pp. 165–75.

²⁹In this connection, the key events were the reelection in the spring of 1983—despite crude Soviet efforts to prevent it—of the West German coalition pledged to carry out the INF deployment, and the subsequent November 1983 vote in the Bundestag to do so. It is true, of course, that since deployment started, the USSR clearly has not given up the effort to halt it, particularly in view of the conditional nature of the Netherlands' commitment to deploy cruise missiles and the ongoing political struggle in Belgium over when—and whether—to begin deployment in that country. See, e.g., *The Baltimore Sun*, Jan. 30, 1985.

СПИРИТИЧЕСКИЙ СЕАНС В ПЕНТАГОНЕ



A cartoon from the Soviet humor magazine *Krokodil* (No. 17, 1984), captioned "A Seance at the Pentagon," shows a Hitler-like spectre holding a banner that reads "Anticommunism."

—Sovfoto.

Soviet Response

The Soviet leadership's response to all these developments has been to reaffirm the policies that have been perceived as threatening by each of its various adversaries, and to assert heightened defiance of them all, beginning, of course, with the United States. The Moscow oligarchy has deployed against the United States a degree and volume of propaganda vituperation not heard since the 1950's, and far surpassing Mr. Reagan in rhetorical extravagance. The American President was repeatedly compared with Adolf Hitler, and incessantly charged with leading the world toward "the flames of nuclear war."³² This rhetoric was not moderated, but, on the contrary, further elevated after Mr. Reagan began to moderate his own attacks on the USSR in 1983. It is clear that this Soviet language was intended, at least in

large part, to frighten Western publics and thereby pressure Western governments to make concessions to the Soviet Union. In addition, the propaganda campaign was evidently pressed by certain segments of the Soviet elite, particularly in the military establishment, as tacit justification for apparently controversial claims in resource allocation.³³

The exceptionally noisy and savage Soviet rhetoric of the last few years may also have reflected heightened internal and external stresses placed on the Kremlin leadership. The grave and mounting problems of the Soviet economy have been exacerbated by the heightened challenge of the Reagan military program. The Soviet oligarchs have also been compelled to deal in the early 1980's with an apparently unendable war in Afghanistan, a severe challenge to the stability of their position in Poland, and the previously mentioned setbacks to Soviet hopes of blocking INF deployment and of drawing China away from its orientation toward the United States. The tensions created by these multiple pressures were dramatized in both the confusion and the pugnacity displayed by the leadership in the aftermath of the Soviet Union's September 1983 destruction of a South Korean airliner.³⁴

These pressures have arisen at a time of at least temporary deterioration in the effectiveness of Politburo leadership. The semi-paralysis of policy characteristic of Leonid Brezhnev's last years, as his health worsened, has been followed, since his death, by an interregnum of two successive ailing general secretaries and an increasing perception, both at home and abroad, of policy deadlock, inertia, and vacillation. The perceived physical and political weakness of Konstantin Chernenko engendered in the Soviet Union in 1984 a growing malaise associated with a sense of exceptional weakness and division at the center. Many Soviets, particularly in the military, appeared to regard this prolonged dearth of vigorous leadership as damaging to the national interest. This "time of troubles" for the Kremlin in the early 1980's contrasted sharply with the simultaneous partial recovery in the status of the US presidency.

³²See, e.g., Vladimir E. Shlapentokh, "Moscow's War Propaganda and Soviet Public Opinion," *Problems of Communism*, September–October 1984, pp. 88–94.

³³Particularly noteworthy was a 1981 article by Chief of the General Staff Nikolay Ogarkov in which he went so far as to criticize "party propaganda" explicitly for not having done enough to inculcate in the Soviet population awareness of the danger of war. N. Ogarkov, "Guarding Peaceful Endeavor," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 10, July 1981, pp. 80–91.

³⁴Soviet confusion was displayed in many ways: notably, in the five-day delay before explicitly acknowledging that the USSR had shot down the Korean airliner; in the use of two conflicting public explanations (that the shutdown was justified because the airliner was allegedly on an espionage mission, and that it was justified because the airliner had allegedly been mistaken for a US military reconnaissance plane); and in somewhat discordant statements made by one or two Soviet officials abroad in the weeks following the incident. Soviet pugnacity was of course reflected, among other things, in the vehement refusal to apologize or admit error.

Arms Control Impasse

A major symptom of the deterioration of superpower relations after late 1979 was the grinding to a halt of the arms control process, the principal remnant of détente that had endured through the second half of the 1970's. The decay of this process was in fact far advanced by the time of the signing of the SALT II agreement in June 1979. Ratification of this treaty was threatened from the outset by the unwillingness of major sections of the US elite to accept certain aspects of the bargain that had been concluded—particularly the failure of SALT II to place greater constraints upon Soviet land-based ICBM's and upon the Soviet advantage in throw-weight (perceived as posing a growing threat to US retaliatory capabilities) or to avoid what some saw as intolerable ambiguities in some of the provisions regarding verification. In an environment of growing concern over Soviet military adventures in the Third World and geopolitical advances, and of simultaneous US humiliations, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan put an effective end to the already dwindling chances for ratification of SALT II, and contributed to the election of an American president who had during his campaign termed that treaty fatally flawed.

Meanwhile, the NATO dual-track decision on INF deployment in Europe, adopted in the same month that Soviet airborne forces began landing in Kabul, set in motion decisive changes in Soviet arms control priorities. After having reluctantly persuaded themselves that the Alliance was serious and that there was a real possibility that the Pershing II's and cruise missiles would some day arrive, the Soviets in the first half of the 1980's shifted the emphasis of their negotiating efforts to the prevention of these deployments.

This shift in priorities was facilitated by the long delay in the presentation of a US negotiating position in the strategic arms reduction talks (START), and by the eventual Soviet discovery that this position projected cuts in Soviet land-based missile capabilities that the Soviet leaders considered out of the question. Expecting little from START over the short term, the Soviets became more and more inclined to make these negotiations hostage to satisfaction of their demands regarding INF. Defeated on the INF front in late 1983, Moscow opted, for the time being, to suspend both sets of negotiations. Nuclear talks regarding both intercontinental strategic weapons and intermediate-range weapons thus remained in abeyance throughout 1984, ostensibly awaiting satisfaction of the Soviet demand that the Western INF deployments be undone as a prerequisite to resumption of talks, but in fact awaiting a Politburo deci-



Chief Soviet arms negotiator Yuliy Kvitsinskiy boarding an airliner in Geneva after breaking off the INF talks with the United States there in November 1983.

—UPI.

sion on how and when to climb down from an untenable position.

In these circumstances, the existing arms control regime established through the series of agreements signed in the détente era of the 1970's has begun to erode. The SALT II treaty, whose provisions, although unratified, the United States unilaterally undertook to respect, will expire at the end of 1985, and the United States has already indicated plans for a second new ICBM—the Midgetman—which would require changes in any renegotiated treaty. The Soviets, for their part, have already begun to diverge more and more significantly from the letter and spirit of the existing unratified treaty. They have done so by declining to make certain reductions specified by the treaty; by developing and deploying, contrary to the treaty provisions, two new ICBM's (the SS-24 and the SS-25); and perhaps most strikingly, by displaying a more and more cavalier atti-



Soviet Chief of Staff Nikolay Ogarkov at a September 9, 1983, press conference at the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs at which he briefed Soviet and foreign journalists on the shooting-down of Korean Air Lines flight 007; with Ogarkov is Leonid Zamyatin, head of the International Information Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

tude toward the ludicrously ambiguous provisions of the treaty regarding telemetry encryption.³⁵

At the same time, the viability of the ABM (anti-ballistic missile) treaty, which had long ago been ratified by both sides and which for a decade had been regarded as the more successful half of SALT I, was being increasingly threatened both by American plans and by Soviet transgressions. The future American challenge to the treaty is inherent in US plans for space defense. The Soviet nibbling at existing ABM treaty obligations is implicit in the USSR's development of new SAM (surface-to-air missile) systems that may have capabilities against strategic ballistic missiles, in Soviet development of rapidly deployable components for a new ABM system, and especially in the Soviet construction of a large new radar of a kind and in a place (central Siberia, far removed from the Soviet periphery) apparently banned by the treaty.³⁶

³⁵The SALT II "Common Understanding" on this subject is one of the best examples to date of an arms control provision setting forth criteria so inherently ambiguous as to virtually dictate contemptuous circumvention in the absence of good political reasons, outside the treaty itself, not to engage in such actions. That is, this provision, because of its really exceptional ambiguity, was especially dependent on an atmosphere of goodwill to induce a degree of Soviet voluntary compliance in interpretation sufficient to satisfy the United States. In June 1979, it was therefore already becoming an anachronism, and shortly became much more so. United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (hereafter, ACDA), *Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1982, p. 266.

Whatever implications this gradual process of mutual preparation to jettison commitments and understandings reached in the 1970's may have for the military balance, this feature of the post-détente era is likely to be increasingly nerve-wracking for Western populations. Moreover, the threat to stability perceived in the growing shakiness of the arms control structure is generally seen as greatly exacerbated by new technological developments with grave implications for arms control—most notably, in the short run, the advent of the cruise missile with its possibly insoluble problems of verification.

At the same time, the experiences and revelations of the post-détente period have probably made it even more difficult to assemble an adequate consensus in the American elite and public in support of whatever new arms control structure the US government may seek to create with the Soviets to replace the old one. Evidence suggesting that the Soviets are in fact already violating the ABM treaty is likely to become an increasingly important factor in future internal US political struggles over the acceptability of arms control formulas reached in any new negotiations with the Soviet Union. This is all the more likely to be the case in view of the strong conviction in many (although not all) quarters in the United States that the Soviet Union had previously flagrantly violated at least one earlier arms control agreement, the 1972 Bacteriological Weapons Convention ratified by Moscow in 1975, by manufacturing and transferring to Vietnam mycotoxins for use in Indochina.³⁷ Thus, one of the striking new features of the post-détente era has been a significant enlargement of the portion of the US elite and public that is inclined to believe that the Soviet Union does, in fact, violate arms control agreements.

Against this background, the chief pressure on Moscow to reach a new compromise arrangement with Washington is likely to come from a perception of Soviet technological inferiority to the United States in the new realm of space defense. As in the early 1970's, the United States is again seeking to use Soviet awareness of a potential American advantage in strategic defense as a lever by which to force Soviet concessions regarding the strategic offense. Meanwhile, the chief pressure on the American side, as before, is likely to come from the growth of public apprehension in the United States and allied countries. In view of the objective difficulties, it is by no means clear whether these two factors will be sufficient to produce a viable new agreement in the arms control talks scheduled to begin in March 1985.

³⁶See Michael Krepon, "Both Sides Are Hedging," *Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC), Fall 1984, pp. 153–72, esp. pp. 158, 161–62.

³⁷See, e.g., US Department of State, *Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan*, Special Report No. 98, Washington, DC, Mar. 22, 1982; and J. H. Turnbull, "Yellow Rain," *Defence* (Eton, England), No. 14, May 1983, pp. 265–70.

Slowdown in Soviet Gains

Another distinctive feature of the post-1979 era has been a noticeable general slowdown in the previously rapid multiplication of Soviet military and political footholds around the world. The Soviets have been principally concerned about defending and consolidating the main geopolitical advances staked out by the USSR in the late 1970's, notably in Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and Indochina. In Africa, their position has been somewhat weakened, at least for the time being, as a result of diplomatic agreements signed by South Africa with Angola and Mozambique. In the Middle East, where Soviet political leverage had already been gravely hampered since Moscow's estrangement from Sadat's Egypt and the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli treaty in 1979, the Soviet Union for a time seemed humiliated by its inability to prevent the Israeli conquest of southern Lebanon or the arrival of the Western powers in Beirut. In Afghanistan, the Soviets are widely perceived to have become bogged

down since 1980 in a seemingly endless punitive war against the local population. In the Far East, despite a steady increase in their theater nuclear advantage and a gradual expansion in their new military position in Cam Ranh Bay,³⁸ the Soviet Union has been forced to deal in the 1980's with increasingly adverse reactions from local states—notably Japan, China, and the ASEAN countries—to these very military advantages. Even in the Caribbean and Central America, where since 1979 they have contemplated the prospect of risk-free advances in Soviet influence as a result of Cuban exacerbation of US difficulties, by mid-decade this prospect, while still fairly promising, had become much less of a sure thing.

As in the past, many in the United States have heavily overemphasized voluntaristic explanations for what has seemed to be a sudden change in Soviet fortunes around the world. Observers who in the late 1970's had

³⁸Symbolic, in this regard, was the arrival of Badger medium bombers at Cam Ranh Bay in November 1983. *The Washington Post*, Dec. 21, 1983; Xinhua News Agency, Dec. 22, 1983.



Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko in Geneva in January 1985 for a meeting with US Secretary of State George Shultz at which the two agreed to resume arms control negotiations between their countries; at his left is Soviet arms negotiator Viktor Karpov, and to his right, Soviet Ambassador to the US Anatoliy Dobrynin, deputy foreign minister Georgiy Korniyenko, Vasiliy Markov, and Aleksei Obukhov.

—Peter Jordan/Gamma-Liaison.

persisted in seeing evidence of a "master plan" in the succession of Soviet advances in Africa, Afghanistan, and Southeast Asia now perceived evidence of a deliberate Soviet decision to hold back from efforts to advance. Some who in the immediate wake of the invasion of Afghanistan had conjured up visions of imminent further such Soviet invasions in the crude style of Hitler, now saw the Soviet Politburo as being newly and inexplicably inhibited from executing such plans. President Reagan did not hesitate to cite the Soviets' failure to make new additions to their orbit as evidence of the success of his policies; and even some Americans who are not supporters of Mr. Reagan have seemed to believe that the general posture of the Reagan administration has dissuaded the Soviet leadership from adventurist initiatives it would otherwise have taken. The Soviet failure to take violent action to halt the 1982 Israeli advance to Beirut or the expulsion of the PLO from that city was sometimes cited as an example of such allegedly unwonted Soviet caution. Such views appear to me to exaggerate considerably both the extent of the Reagan administration's inhibiting influence upon Soviet behavior and the extent to which the stagnation of Soviet fortunes in the Third World over the last few years can in fact be attributed to any new Soviet inhibitions.

There is little doubt, of course, that the Soviets do face some important new problems and constraints. For example, Soviet military manpower, particularly ground forces manpower, has been increasingly stretched by the competing demands created by the recent growth of the list of adversaries. The Soviet leaders, in addition to satisfying the ongoing requirements of their buildup against China in the east and NATO in the west, felt obliged to hold very large forces in constant readiness to crush the Poles during 1980 and 1981 should the need have arisen, and have also, of course, believed it necessary to allocate more than 100,000 troops on a permanent basis for the war against the Afghans. It is possible, as some Chinese analysts contend, that the Politburo has considered itself "pinned down" by the Afghan war, in the sense that it has been constrained more than hitherto from making large new commitments of Soviet ground force resources in additional theaters. In addition, there is some evidence, persuasively put forward by Stephen Sestanovich and others, to suggest that since Brezhnev's death the Soviet regime has become at least somewhat more pessimistic about the economic and political cost/benefit ratio of commitments to Third World regimes in marginal situations.³⁹ And Charles Wolf and

some Rand colleagues have also produced evidence suggesting that the effective burden on the Soviet economy of supporting the Soviet empire—including the cost of subsidizing countries such as Cuba and Vietnam for strategic and political reasons—has finally grown to proportions that are likely to give Soviet leaders reason for caution in assuming additional such burdens.⁴⁰

However, although these inhibiting considerations may indeed play some role in Soviet thinking, particularly in marginal situations, there is little reason to doubt that the primary cause of the recent slowdown in the advance of Soviet fortunes has been the same factor that was the primary cause of the rapid Soviet advance in the late 1970's: the scope of perceived opportunities. The wave of favorable circumstances that began a decade ago, permitting decisive Soviet exploitation, has receded. The Soviet leaders are well aware that past advances have been predicated upon openings created by domestic and international instability and violence, and that the Soviet Union is at a great disadvantage in competing with the West in economic dealings with the Third World states in the absence of such turmoil. But they have reason to be confident that more such instability and new such opportunities will be generated somewhere in Asia and Africa before the 1980's are over, as they have already been generated in Lebanon and Central America. In such countries as the Philippines and Pakistan, where severe threats to the stability of the American position now exist, the Soviet leaders may already see the seeds of future opportunities. In 1984, Moscow already showed signs of increased activity and some modest improvement of its position in the Middle East, building in part on the Western fiasco in Lebanon.⁴¹ In sum, there is little reason to assume that the Politburo believes that the long-term effort to expand Soviet presence and influence on the world scene at the expense of the West and the United States must come to a halt, or that it has ceased to pay dividends.

Until the next dramatic evidence of Soviet advance does materialize, however, the perception of a near-stagnation of Soviet fortunes around the world is likely over time to cause a gradual dilution of the American consensus that the Reagan administration has sought to mobilize against the USSR. The slackening since 1980 of the wave of Soviet advances has contrasted vividly with American official rhetoric, and thus has slowly eroded the broad consensus that had supported Mr.

³⁹Stephen Sestanovich, "Do Soviets Feel Pinched by Third World Adventurism?" *Guardian* (Manchester), June 17, 1984.

⁴⁰Charles Wolf, Jr., et al., *The Costs of the Soviet Empire*, R-3073/1-NA, Santa Monica, CA, The Rand Corporation, September 1983.

⁴¹Among other things, the Soviets have concluded major new arms deals with Kuwait, Jordan, and Morocco, and are in the process of restoring normal diplomatic relations with Egypt.

Carter's new posture toward Moscow in his last year in office and has gradually added to the pressure on the Reagan administration to find ways of coming to agreements with Moscow.

Principal Legacies

Given these changes in the five years of the post-détente era, what has endured from the preceding decade? I would cite five salient developments.

First, several new Soviet-American institutional relationships that came into existence in the last decade still remain in being, although their value remains limited in present circumstances. Perhaps the one with the greatest potential importance for the future is the joint Standing Consultative Commission, which has dealt with matters of arms control interpretation and compliance since ratification of SALT I. Although now virtually paralyzed—like most Soviet-American forums—by mutual distrust and the halt in the arms control process, this institution is an important structural innovation and could be useful to both sides in the future.⁴²

In addition, certain other arms control-related venues established as a consequence of initiatives taken in the 1970's continue to exist, notably the mutual balanced force reduction (MBFR) negotiations in Vienna and the Stockholm talks regarding "confidence-building measures" (CBM's). Although both are presently little more than propaganda battlefields—in the case of MBFR, largely because of the Soviet Union's unwillingness to acknowledge its existing conventional force advantages in Europe, and in the case of the Stockholm conference, because of the Soviet preference for generalized mutual pledges with asymmetrical effects on Western interests rather than for concrete and binding CBM's—they remain available instrumentalities should the Soviet posture some day be modified.

Beyond this, an important channel remains from the network of informal contacts between the United States and the Soviet Union that had enormously expanded in

the 1970's. This network has in recent years been constricted by the worsening of the bilateral atmosphere, by the Reagan administration's attempts to impose reciprocity with regard to some contacts,⁴³ and by certain recent Soviet efforts to tighten security controls over all Western communications and contacts with the Soviet population.⁴⁴ Nevertheless, the continued existence of these informal contacts remains a modest factor making for political stability in the relationship, even though the Soviet Union has always been far more interested in expanding such contacts in the US to press the Soviet viewpoint upon the American elite than in allowing American views to reach Soviet policymakers.

Finally, it is noteworthy that one aspect of the Soviet-American trade relationship has endured since the 1970's and, indeed, has become more firmly institutionalized in the post-détente era. This is, of course, American grain exports to the USSR, resulting from the growing realization in Moscow during the last decade that Soviet agriculture was unlikely in the foreseeable future to be able to supply the feed needed to expand meat production. A long-term grain-sales agreement negotiated in the Carter administration was partially breached by the boycott imposed by President Carter in 1980, but it has now been succeeded by a "boycott-proof" agreement reached with Moscow by the Reagan administration.⁴⁵ Although an extraordinary anomaly in the overall posture of that administration toward the USSR, this permanent grain trade is now also a modest element of stability in the relationship.⁴⁶

Next are two trends of the 1970's that continue to hamper Soviet competitive efforts against the United States. The first of these is the previously mentioned fact that Soviet encirclement of China has continued to fuel Sino-Soviet antagonism and has impelled China to maintain a degree of security association with the United

⁴³E.g., Washington has imposed reciprocal restrictions on the movements of Soviet journalists and some Soviet diplomats in the United States (*The New York Times*, Nov. 21, 1983), and has periodically sought, with very mixed success, to impose limitations on the ability of Soviet visitors such as USA Institute Director Georgiy Arbatov to conduct propaganda in the United States (*ibid.*, Apr. 20, 1983). In general, the enormous asymmetries between the United States and the Soviet Union make such efforts to enforce reciprocity far more difficult for Washington than for Moscow.

⁴⁴E.g., in 1982 the Soviet authorities sharply curtailed phone links between the USSR and the West and eliminated all automatic dialing in such links (*ibid.*, July 2 and Sept. 4, 1982). In 1984 the Soviets issued legislation greatly expanding and rendering even more vague and sweeping the definition of information considered state secret (*ibid.*, Feb. 4, 1984), and putting citizens at risk of punishment for giving, without official permission, shelter, transportation or any other unspecified "services" to any foreigners (*Los Angeles Times*, June 14, 1984).

⁴⁵The new five-year grain agreement, signed in August 1983, pledged the US government not to exercise "any discretionary authority available to it under United States law to control exports of the commodities" bought by the Soviets under the agreement. *The New York Times*, Aug. 26, 1983.

⁴⁶US Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade Lionel Olmer visited the Soviet Union in January 1985 for talks on the state of trade relations between the two countries.

⁴²Article XIII of the May 1972 ABM treaty provided that the Soviet Union and the United States should subsequently establish a Standing Consultative Commission charged, among other things, with considering questions of compliance with the treaty, possible cases of interference with national technical means of verification, and any related "ambiguous situations." ACDA, *op. cit.*, pp. 141–42. The SCC was then set up by a Memorandum of Understanding between the two countries in December 1972. *Department of State Bulletin*, Jan. 15, 1973, pp. 60–61. It was given jurisdiction over the SALT I Interim Agreement as well as the ABM treaty, and its jurisdiction was extended to SALT II under Article XVII of the SALT II treaty. The SCC was thus intended to meet periodically to resolve compliance questions behind the scenes and with a minimum of publicity. It seems fair to say that its ability to perform this function to the satisfaction of the United States has deteriorated radically in recent years, largely because of the evolution of Soviet reactions to US complaints into a posture of stonewalling as the political relationship deteriorated.



Nikolay Tikhonov, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, receives Dwayne Andreas, chairman of the board of directors of the US grain firm Archer-Daniels-Midland and cochairman of the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council, in the Kremlin on November 29, 1984.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

States.⁴⁷ The net effect has been to guarantee that a considerable portion of Soviet military efforts continues to be directed against China and away from the United States and its European allies. At the same time, the US association with China probably continues to create a sense of encirclement in much of the Soviet elite, and to feed Soviet bitterness and pugnacity toward the United States. All these mutual, interlocking effects are likely to go on for some time.

The other trend of the 1970's adverse to Soviet interests that has continued in the 1980's is the malaise in the Soviet economy, the first symptoms of which had originally helped impel the Soviet leadership to seek a remedy by associating with the United States. The secular decline in the rate of growth of the Soviet economy—which began to gather speed not long after December 1974, when the Soviets in effect lost hope for an American remedy to this problem—today impinges on three major aspects of the Soviet competition with the

United States. Soviet economic difficulties render the burden of military spending increasingly onerous, and make the prospect of heightened superpower arms competition a grim one. Soviet technological backwardness in most nonmilitary areas of production helps make the Soviet Union a marginal factor in a world economic system dominated by the capitalist industrial powers, and also makes it difficult for the USSR to consolidate some of those Third World gains it initially staked out through the provision of security assistance. Finally, as suggested earlier, Soviet economic constraints are apparently increasing the effective burden of supporting the Soviet empire, and may be making Soviet leaders somewhat more cautious about assuming large new burdens in marginal cases for the sake of political and strategic benefits.

Finally, two major countervailing trends inaugurated in the 1970's apparently continue to favor Soviet competitive interests against the United States. First, despite all that has been said thus far, the qualitative change in the late 1970's that saw the Soviet Union's emergence as a much more visible competitor to the United States in more distant parts of the world has not been undone. Despite some ebbing of Soviet fortunes in certain places from the high tide of advance registered in the last decade, the Soviet geopolitical presence remains much more far-flung than before the détente era, and it is likely to continue to be so. The USSR has not been forced to abandon the most important of the new bridgeheads established in the 1970's—in Ethiopia, Aden, Afghanistan, and Indochina—and there seems little reason to expect it to do so in this decade. The Soviet Union continues to strive to consolidate and, if possible, improve these positions.

All of these places, along with the earlier bridgehead established in Cuba, are linked to the gradually growing deployment of Soviet military and naval strength into previously unbroached regions, from the South China Sea to the Red Sea to the Khyber Pass to the Gulf of Mexico. The effort to continue this long-term process is in turn linked to extensive programs of naval construction and weapons building. It is true that in all major respects, the Soviet Union's political presence, geopolitical weight, and power-projection capabilities in distant regions around the world remain inferior to those of the United States. But this very fact appears to render Soviet leaders determined to persevere in efforts to build on what was accomplished in the 1970's, where safe opportunities permit. These realities seem to ensure that whatever fortunes befall Soviet efforts in the future, the United States and the Soviet Union will remain geopolitically engaged across a broader canvas than was the case before the 1970's, and that this worldwide in-

⁴⁷This relationship was most recently exemplified by the January 1985 visit of General John W. Vessey, Jr., chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, to China. For an account, see *The Washington Post*, Jan. 12, 1985.

teraction will remain an essential aspect of the bilateral relationship.

Second, along with this enlarged global presence, the Soviets thus far appear to retain in the post-détente era the essence of the advances they registered in the last decade in the central strategic and regional nuclear balances. The 1970's was not only a period in which the Soviet Union attained what is generally termed a "robust" overall parity with the United States in strategic nuclear capabilities, but also a time during which the USSR established and enlarged an important advantage in theater nuclear capabilities in both Europe and Asia. Although the Soviets are undoubtedly concerned at the prospect that the United States will attempt to use its technological advantages to undo the Soviet central strategic gains of the 1970's, they seem grimly determined to make every sacrifice necessary to prevent this from happening. In Europe, despite the violent Soviet objections to NATO's limited INF deployments begun in 1983, the Soviets have every reason to believe that they will retain a considerable advantage in intermediate-range nuclear delivery capability even after these deployments

are completed.⁴⁸ In Asia, where the Soviet nuclear advantage has always been much greater, the Soviet SS-20 building program, accelerated since 1982,⁴⁹ appears designed to guarantee to the USSR a decisive theater nuclear edge whatever contingencies may emerge from future Chinese or American deployments.

These present realities, which reflect the Soviet sense of what is required to adequately serve Soviet security, seem to guarantee continued tension between the Soviet Union and those of its adversaries—notably the United States and China—who find this degree of Soviet insurance unacceptable and threatening. Beyond this, the evident Soviet desire to retain simultaneously all three existing sets of nuclear force ratios is likely to come into increasing conflict with the exigencies of a revived arms control process, particularly as the superpowers move to link in some fashion negotiations on central and regional systems, in accordance with the preliminary agreement reached in Geneva this January.

Conclusions

What does all this suggest for the future? First, it would appear that neither the atmosphere of 1972 nor that of 1984 is "normal" for the Soviet-American relationship. That relationship is likely to be extremely competitive in the foreseeable future, and there is little ground for hope that bilateral cooperation can diminish the competition to secondary importance or make the relationship, on the whole, a "friendly" one, as was being suggested in 1972. This generalization will probably hold true regardless of the personalities who lead the United States and the Soviet Union over the rest of this decade. The relationship is essentially adversarial, and this underlying reality is probably not subject to change by US policy. At the same time, the degree of tension seen in the last few years is highly abnormal and untypical, and can possibly be significantly reduced. But whether this will in fact happen will depend upon the interplay of many variables, some of which can indeed be



The Soviet aircraft carrier "Minsk" cruises in the Pacific in November 1982.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

⁴⁸Indeed, as one authoritative figure has noted, the NATO decision to limit INF deployment goals to 572 warheads on Pershing II and cruise missiles was driven by a reluctance to seek full European nuclear parity with the Soviet Union, since a higher goal might suggest "an attempt to establish a 'Eurostrategic balance' and thus to decouple the US strategic deterrent from Europe." See James A. Thomson, "The LRTNF Decision: Evolution of US Theatre Nuclear Policy, 1975-1979," *International Affairs* (London), Autumn 1984, pp. 601-14.

The Soviet advantage in short-range warheads in Europe is, of course, even greater, and is likely to remain so. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1984-85*, Table 2, pp. 136-37.

⁴⁹In May 1983 the Western press reported that there was evidence that the USSR was now building at least ten new regimental bases in Siberia to accommodate more than 100 new SS-20 missiles. These bases—said to be in various stages of completion—would, when finished, approximately double the existing number of deployed SS-20's in Asia. *Los Angeles Times*, May 8, 1983; and *The New York Times*, May 8, 1983.

affected by the US posture and negotiating position, but some of which will be beyond the control of any American government.

Second, the most important underlying cause of the present tension is not the behavior of the Reagan administration, although it can be criticized for several reasons. Rather, it is the assertive dynamism of the Soviet regime striving to press outward on the world scene, and the associated peculiar Soviet view of the military requirements essential to Soviet security. These factors—internally generated by a combination of historical, geopolitical, and ideological considerations—were critical in the destruction of détente in the 1970's and in the sea change in American public opinion that helped bring the Reagan administration to power.

Consequently, although the November 1984 reelection of President Reagan may have some effect on the Soviet-American atmosphere over the rest of this decade, the ultimate outcome of the prolonged leadership succession struggle that has been going on in Moscow since at least 1982 will probably have a much greater effect. Given the virtual certainty of continued intense competition between the superpowers in the world arena, much will depend upon whether personalities come to the fore in the Soviet leadership who are willing to modify the present Soviet view of acceptable geopolitical compromise, a view that proved fundamentally unacceptable to the majority in both American political parties in the last decade.

Although the content of the Soviet-American arms control agreements concluded in the 1970's appears, on balance, to have played at best only a marginal role in restraining strategic nuclear competition, the arms control *process*—the ritual sequence of negotiate/sign/negotiate—appears to have played a much larger role as a talisman of stability for the multitudes. Although the implications of the agreements reached became a matter of increasing disputation within the US elite, the fact that agreements were being reached remained the essential matter for millions in the United States and in the West who had neither knowledge of nor interest in the minutiae involved. The effective end, for the time being, of this cycle of negotiation—signalled by the US failure to ratify SALT II at the close of the 1970's and then confirmed by the Soviet walkout from negotiations four years later—was thus a traumatic political event of major proportions, quite apart from the concrete consequences for the strategic balance. This change, the most important one brought by the demise of détente, is increas-

ingly unacceptable to the American consensus. The Reagan administration has therefore been under growing domestic pressure to reach, in its second term, some agreement in new talks with the USSR. Hence, the planned talks on strategic defense, strategic arms, and theater nuclear weapons.

At the same time, the political viability of any nuclear negotiations that the two powers may undertake in the future will always remain highly vulnerable to the political consequences of a successful advance by one of the parties at the expense of the other in the world arena. This generalization appears especially likely to be true in the United States, and to be relatively independent of the preferences of any particular American government. Regardless of the degree of urgency attached to arms control and the desire of part of the US elite to protect this process at almost any cost, no American nuclear agreement with the Soviet Union, whatever its terms, would be likely to be ratified in the next few years if the USSR in the same period somehow found it possible to achieve dominant influence over the government of, say, Pakistan or Iran. Even if linkage is formally excluded from the negotiating process, it is always likely to exercise a tacit but decisive role in the US ratification process. All major Soviet-American bilateral negotiations should therefore be understood to have an unstated global political aspect.

The fact that no major Soviet geopolitical advances have in fact occurred since 1980 appears to stem much more from happenstance than from any fundamental change in Soviet attitudes. Thus, this relative quiescence could change without notice at any time. Although the Soviet leaders feel somewhat burdened by their war in Afghanistan, and are also likely to be somewhat reluctant to assume major new economic burdens for the sake of new Third World clients, there is still no evidence, and little reason to believe, that they are willing to accept the status quo in the overall division of political forces in the world, which still greatly favors the United States. Moscow therefore continues to await major new geopolitical opportunities, and is unlikely to be willing to sacrifice such an opening—should one present itself at acceptable risk—for the sake of any bilateral agreement with the United States. In addition to all other impediments, therefore, the Soviet-American relationship will always be vulnerable to independent factors that may unexpectedly open to the USSR new avenues of opportunity.

Soviet Empire: Alive But Not Well

Charles Gati

Give or take a few months, four decades have passed since the Soviet bloc that Stalin conceived began to take shape. During these 40 turbulent years, two types of challenges have confronted Soviet authority over Eastern Europe. First, Moscow has had to cope with popular movements, riots, uprisings, and revolutions such as those that erupted in East Berlin (1953), Poznan (1956), Budapest (1956), Warsaw (1968), Prague (1968), several Polish cities (1970 and 1976), and most recently—and most dramatically—throughout Poland under the banner of the Solidarity movement (1980–81). When facing more or less spontaneous challenges of this type—popular movements seeking freedom, economic well-being, as well as independence—Moscow, acting directly or indirectly, invariably managed to reestablish most or all of its authority. Second, the Soviet Union has had to cope with regime claims such as those that were advanced by Yugoslavia (1948), Albania (1961), and Romania (1964). When facing more or less controlled challenges of this type—demands by a single communist party leadership for autonomy—Moscow invariably failed to reestablish its authority.

Although both popular outbursts and individual regime claims for autonomy are bound to occur again, Moscow must also find a way to cope with a third and different challenge: the growing dissatisfaction and assertiveness of its essentially loyal allies in the Warsaw Pact. In the mid-1980's—for the first time acting concurrently, though not conspiratorially—several like-

minded regimes have come to see the need to make a renewed effort to trim excessive Soviet influence over their policies. Lacking in the dramatic quality of past confrontations and rooted in a common desire for more “elbow room” rather than real independence, the primary challenge today in Eastern Europe is a subtle attempt by several regimes to reach out to Europe without offending or provoking the Soviet Union; indeed, it is an attempt to move toward the West without appearing to move away from the East. By so trying to square the circle, the East European regimes hope to reap Western economic benefits and gain a measure of respectability at home—and keep Moscow satisfied as well. At a deeper level, they are responding to a sense of European identity and consciousness that has been growing on the continent, east and west. But by proceeding cautiously and by affirming their commitment to the Soviet bloc, that is, to “socialist internationalism,” the East European regimes are also responding to the most fundamental political fact of life in the region: their continued dependence on Soviet power for survival.

What are the recent causes and manifestations of this maneuver by East Europe's leaderships? At a time of Soviet leadership changes, is Moscow likely to tolerate a further erosion of its authority in the region? If so, are we witnessing the gradual “decline” of the Soviet empire or merely a new phase in its evolution?

Causes of Regime Discontent

The current East European maneuver, which is spearheaded by Hungary, Romania, and the German Democratic Republic (GDR), reflects East European apprehensions about the direction of Soviet economic policy toward Eastern Europe since the early 1980's and about the direction of Soviet foreign policy generally.

Charles Gati, who specializes in Soviet-East European relations, is Professor of Political Science at Union College (Schenectady, NY), as well as Visiting Professor of Political Science and Senior Fellow of the Research Institute on International Change at Columbia University (New York).



Marshal Viktor Kulikov, second from left, Commander-in-Chief of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty Member States, at a meeting of the Committee of the Defense Ministers of the Warsaw Pact, held on December 3, 1984, in Budapest.

—Interfoto MTI/Eastfoto.

As for the direction of Soviet conduct abroad, a large segment of the East European communist elites appears to have grown critical of Moscow's lack of diplomatic skill and mistaken priorities. Without disagreeing with broad Soviet foreign policy objectives, they are particularly disturbed by the Soviet Union's heavy-handed treatment of Afghanistan; its inability to improve not only party-to-party but also state-to-state relations with China; and, above all, its clumsy and counterproductive handling of, and subsequent withdrawal from, the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) talks in Geneva in late 1983. Although only the Romanian government has addressed these issues directly in public, extensive contacts with Hungarian, East German, and Polish functionaries indicate that, from their perspective too, Soviet conduct appears plagued by miscalculations and missteps.

While granting that the Soviet Union had to do "something" about Afghanistan in 1979, these functionaries wonder if the Kremlin accurately estimated the difficulties the Soviet armed forces would encounter. They wonder if the political and economic costs of the operation will not ultimately exceed the presumed benefits of military victory. Like many a Western observer, they wonder if Afghanistan will turn out to have been "Moscow's Vietnam." Without having specific measures in mind, they speculate whether the Soviet Union should not adopt an "alternative" to the policy it is presently pursuing there. In their view, then, Moscow has allowed

itself to be bogged down in a war that it cannot easily win and from which it now cannot extricate itself—but for which Eastern Europe has also had to pay in terms of Western diplomatic complaints and economic penalties.

East European political elites seem to be equally nonplussed over Soviet policy toward China. They applaud the recent improvement in state-to-state relations between China and the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as well,¹ but they are dissatisfied with the slow pace of the normalization process. Although they share Moscow's suspicions over China's rapprochement with the United States and Western Europe, and believe that Chinese attacks on Soviet "hegemonism" have been unnecessarily harsh, they find the Soviet position altogether inconsistent. If the issue is ideology, they ask, then why does Moscow respond in the same way to present-day Chinese statements and policies as it once did to Mao's statements and policies? If, on the other hand, the primary issue is power rather than ideology, then why cannot Moscow find a diplomatic formula to ease tensions between the two countries? In the East Europeans' view, then, it is primarily though not exclusively the Kremlin's inflexibility that stands in the way of at least partial rec-

¹For the improvement in Sino-Soviet relations, see *The New York Times*, Dec. 30, 1984. On January 20, 1985, Xinhua reported the departure of a high-level Chinese trade delegation to Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland to sign economic agreements with those states. See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC), Jan. 23, 1985, p. H/2.

conciliation. In the meantime, all of the East European regimes, with the exception of Romania, feel compelled to emulate publicly the Soviet posture toward China which they regard as deeply flawed and believe to be rooted in the Soviet leaderships' grudge against a former—more tractable—ally.

Closer to home, the East European political elites appear especially critical of Soviet policies toward Western Europe in general and of Soviet handling of the INF talks in particular. Rightly or wrongly, it is widely believed among these elites that the Soviet Union could have prevented the deployment of Pershing II ballistic and Tomahawk cruise missiles in Western Europe.² They maintain that a more subtle Soviet diplomatic effort—to encourage West European hopes about substantial Soviet concessions—would have so altered the political balance in the Netherlands, Belgium, and even the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) that the installation of US missiles would have had to be canceled or at least postponed. By first threatening to withdraw from the Geneva INF talks (if the missiles were deployed) and then actually withdrawing (when the missiles were deployed), the Kremlin made it easier for the United States to accomplish that which the Soviet leaders so vigorously and indeed vehemently sought to circumvent. In other words, in the East Europeans' view, Moscow should have temporized, not so much in order to conclude an agreement but in order to keep the Atlantic alliance guessing—and divided.

The common element in the East European elites' critique of Soviet conduct toward Afghanistan, China, and the INF talks is an increasing concern, mixed with condescension, about the recent lack of subtlety in the Kremlin's approach to the outside world. In a critique reminiscent of West European reservations about US foreign policy, East European functionaries think of their Soviet ally as being unduly heavy-handed, inflexible, much too self-righteous and clumsy, and insufficiently appreciative of the merits of quiet diplomacy. They are concerned, clearly, because an intransigent Soviet policy creates an unfavorable atmosphere for the expansion of their own economic, cultural, and political relations with the West, particularly with Western Europe.

The expansion of economic relations with the West is an especially urgent priority for Eastern Europe now, and it is so perceived by all of the regimes in the Soviet bloc (with the possible exception of Czechoslovakia). The main reason for the urgency—and the second general

cause of unease with Soviet conduct—is that since the early 1980's, Soviet subsidies to Eastern Europe have steadily declined and there has been a concurrent—and steep—deterioration in Eastern Europe's terms of trade with the Soviet Union. While acknowledging that the Soviet Union has its own economic problems, the East European regimes nevertheless resent getting less in the 1980's than they did in the middle and late 1970's. With a feeling of indignation, they wonder whether the Soviet Union could not afford to do more for them if it did not waste its resources fighting an elusive enemy in Afghanistan, keeping a vast army along its Chinese border, and installing modern and expensive intermediate-range missiles in the GDR and Czechoslovakia.

The essential facts are quite simple and well-known. To alleviate the impact on its East European allies of the sudden rise in the world market price of energy in the early 1970's, Moscow agreed to provide oil and gas to the East European countries at a price that would only gradually catch up with the prices other countries were paying on the world market. Because of cheap energy as well as the overpricing of East European manufactures, Eastern Europe is estimated to have received an implicit Soviet subsidy amounting to US\$5.8 billion a year in the 1974–78 period, about \$11.6 billion in 1979, about \$17.8 billion in 1980, and about \$18.7 billion in 1981. The average subsidy for 1982–84 is thought to have dropped to \$12.1 billion per year, reaching about \$10 to \$11 billion in 1984.³ Although some Western economists consider these staggering estimates excessive, there is no disagreement about either the existence of Soviet subsidies in the 1970's or their decline since 1981.⁴ Due to the decline and then seeming disappearance of Soviet energy subsidies in 1984, the overall amount has sharply decreased. Concurrently, the steady deterioration in the terms of Soviet–East European trade—by approximately 20 percent since 1980—means that the East European regimes must sell more of their products in exchange for the same amount of goods received from the Soviet Union. A simple (although admittedly extreme) example illustrates the extraordinary change that has taken place. In 1974, Hungary sold 800 “Ikarus” buses to the Soviet Union in order to purchase 1 million tons of Soviet oil. In 1981, it had to sell 2,300 “Ikarus” buses for 1 million tons of So-

³See Michael Marrese and Jan Vanous, *Implicit Subsidies and Non-Market Benefits in Soviet Trade with Eastern Europe*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1982. More recent information is derived from periodic reports by Wharton Econometrics, Washington, DC. See also Charles Wolf, Jr., et al. *The Costs of the Soviet Empire*, R3073–1–NA, Santa Monica, CA, The Rand Corporation, 1983.

⁴For an excellent analysis of Soviet–East European economic relations, see Paul Marer, “The Political Economy of Soviet Relations with Eastern Europe,” in Sarah M. Terry, Ed., *Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1984, pp. 155–88; Marer (p. 179) speaks of a “net cumulative subsidy of about \$14 billion” in 1971–78.

²Even that most loyal ally of the USSR, the Czechoslovak government, appeared less than eager to receive Soviet missiles in retaliation for the INF deployments. See RFE–RL, *Radio Free Europe Research* (Munich—hereafter *RFE Research*), Dec. 23, 1983, Czechoslovak Situation Report 21/83.


viet oil. By 1984, the "price" of the same amount of Soviet oil may have reached 4,000 "Ikarus" buses.⁵

From a purely economic point of view as well as from the Soviet perspective, changes in Soviet-East European trade relations are fully warranted. The Soviet Union has to cope with its own serious economic stringencies. Keeping up with the United States in the military competition is expensive. The availability of cheap Soviet energy has substantially declined in recent years, while the costs of producing new oil have significantly risen.⁶ Why should Moscow not receive the world-market price at

long last for the energy its allies so desperately need? The answer from the East Europeans is that they made an implicit contract with the Soviet Union in the 1970's. That contract, or understanding, called for Moscow to protect the East European states from the worst effects of international economic turbulence in exchange for which the East European regimes would maintain do-

⁵Magyarország (Budapest), July 31, 1983. The figure for 1984 is the author's rough estimate.

⁶John P. Hardt, "Soviet Energy Policy in Eastern Europe," in Terry, op. cit., pp. 210-12.



Buses produced at the "Ikarus" factory in Budapest (top) are exported to the Soviet Union in exchange for energy; the first stage of the Volovetskaya pumping station (bottom) on the Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod main line that will ship Soviet natural gas to Eastern Europe.

—Interfoto MTI/Eastfoto and TASS from Sovfoto.

mestic stability and support Soviet foreign policy objectives. To the extent that, with the notable exception of Poland, there has been relative peace and quiet in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union is blamed for reneging on this tacit understanding with the East European leadership.⁷

Given the decreasing advantage that the East Europeans derive from the Soviet economic connection and their assumption that the Kremlin is assigning decreasing priority to their problems, combined with misgivings about heavy-handed Soviet behavior elsewhere, the East European regimes have ample reason in the mid-1980's to ponder how they will be able to maintain domestic peace as well as support Soviet foreign policy objectives. Thus they have reason to reconsider their relations both with the Soviet Union and the West.

Manifestations of Concern

Precisely because the current maneuver by several East European governments—the process of inching toward the West—is so incremental, its public manifestations are only occasional and frequently subtle. In fact, one indicator of this trend—the relative share of East European trade with noncommunist countries (see Table 1)—shows a decline since 1981, though this is hardly due to political intent in Eastern Europe or even Western Europe. Indeed, it is a function of the region's still-growing hard-currency debt (see Table 2), which has made Western credit available to Eastern Europe only on a selective basis since the Polish crisis of 1980–81. Every country in the area, but especially Romania and Hungary, has made it a top priority to reduce Western imports in order to save hard currency, and Poland has been all but unable to renew its once-extensive commercial ties with the West.

Notwithstanding the temporary setback in East European trade with the West, other trends point to rising political dissonance in the bloc, especially in the GDR, Hungary, and Romania.

Most surprising, and potentially significant, has been the apparent breakdown of synchronization between Soviet and East German approaches toward the Federal Republic.⁸ Beginning in November 1983 and continuing after the INF talks had collapsed, the GDR turned out to

Table 1. East European Foreign Trade with Noncommunist Countries

(Percent of total foreign trade)

	Exports	Imports
1960	27.6	28.5
1970	30.9	32.5
1980	36.3	38.5
1981	36.0	34.5
1982	33.8	29.6
1983	31.5	27.2

SOURCE: Adapted by the author from the US Central Intelligence Agency, *Handbook of Economic Statistics, 1984*, CPAS 84–10002, Washington, DC, September 1984, p. 102. Data for 1983 is preliminary.

Table 2. Hard-Currency Debt to the West

(in current US dollars, billions)

	1970	1975	1980	1981	1984
Bulgaria	0.7	2.1	2.5	2.1	2.5
Czechoslovakia	0.6	1.2	3.4	3.4	4.1
GDR	1.4	4.8	11.2	11.0	12.3
Hungary	0.6	2.3	5.8	6.2	8.2
Poland	1.1	7.7	22.0	23.2	27.0
Romania	1.6	3.1	9.3	9.7	8.4
TOTAL	6.0	21.2	54.2	55.6	62.5

SOURCE: Jan Vanous, Centrally Planned Economies Service, Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, Washington, DC.

be only a reluctant supporter of a vehement and vociferous Soviet-led Warsaw Pact campaign against NATO aggressiveness and, later, West German "revanchism."⁹ Although all East European leaders, except Nicolae Ceaușescu of Romania, added their denunciations and innuendoes, the GDR's Erich Honecker (as well as Hungary's János Kádár) made a point of pleading for restraint. Honecker asked for a "coalition of reason" in both German states, adding that such a coalition would serve the interests of "the German people"—a formulation contrary to the GDR claim positing the existence of two German nations since the formation of the GDR in 1949.¹⁰ Echoing Kádár's favorite phrase, Honecker also appealed to the "small- and medium-sized states" of Europe to do what they can to "limit the damage" to intra-European cooperation caused by Soviet-American tensions.¹¹

⁷For an up-to-date discussion of East European expectations vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, see F. Stephen Larrabee, *Challenge to Soviet Interests in Eastern Europe: Romania, Hungary and East Germany*, RAND, forthcoming.

⁸Charles Gati, "East Europe's Communists Are Tugging at Russia's Leash," *The Washington Post*, Outlook Section, July 8, 1984. Ronald D. Asmus has written several perceptive reports on the subject, including "Moscow's Campaign Against East-West German Relations," *RFE Research*, Aug. 29, 1984, RAD Background Report No. 160.

⁹Moscow initiated the campaign in late spring 1984, accusing the Bonn government of seeking to revise Europe's postwar borders and of trying to "erode the socialist system in the GDR." For particularly salient examples, see *Pravda* (Moscow), July 27 and Aug. 2, 1984, and *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Aug. 11, 1984.

¹⁰RFE Research, Apr. 30, 1984, RAD Background Report No. 68.

¹¹For a survey of the dispute between East Berlin and Moscow over relations with Bonn, see *RFE Research*, Aug. 31, 1984, RAD Background Report No. 158.



Erich Honecker, left, East German party and state leader, met with Helmut Kohl, West German chancellor, in Moscow in February 1984 at the time of the funeral of Soviet leader Yuriy Andropov.

—Jürgens.

Some actions by the GDR were also out of phase with the Soviet campaign against the FRG. In the first half of 1984, the GDR allowed an estimated 25,000 people to leave for West Germany. In July 1984, at the height of the virulent Soviet campaign against the Federal Republic, the two German states reached an agreement that provided for new West German bank credits in exchange for East German concessions concerning emigration, family reunification cases, and the like.¹² Although the GDR's "concessions" were rather minor, the fact that a deal was struck at this time signaled Honecker's desire to distance himself from the latest Soviet position.

True, it is quite possible that, before November 1983, the GDR might have been encouraged by Moscow to feign tolerance toward the unofficial East German peace movement and present itself to the West in other ways too as a state dedicated to peace and harmony in Europe. There might well have been collusion between

Moscow and East Berlin in an effort to make the West German peace activists believe that both Washington and Moscow were under pressure from their respective allies.¹³ Granted the utility of such "fraternal cooperation" prior to the collapse of the INF talks, it is still all but impossible to find similar reasons or, indeed, any rationale from the Soviet perspective for continued dissonance in 1984. Hence, the likely explanation for what happened last year and continues in 1985 is that Honecker, having earlier received either mixed or confusing signals from Moscow and eager to take advantage of leadership disarray in the Kremlin, decided to pursue the inter-German dialogue on his own.

Soviet attacks on the "limited détente" between East and West Germany, and East Germany's spirited defense of it, lend credence to this interpretation.¹⁴ Although Soviet newspapers focused on Bonn's aggressive intentions, the real target was East Berlin. An article in *Pravda* stressed that the relationship between the two German states must be evaluated in the context of general East-West relations and cannot be isolated from them. It reminded East Berlin of NATO's present "crusade against socialism" and of Bonn's desire to "solicit concessions on matters of principle that affect the GDR's sovereignty." Another *Pravda* piece, which repeated some of the same accusations, was meant to underline Moscow's anxiety. It was an unsigned editorial (and hence fully authoritative and official), and it made mention of the Deutsche Mark 950-million credit deal that the two Germanies had just concluded. The editorial expressed specific reservations about travel concessions which, it claimed, would only serve to allow Bonn to have "new channels for political and ideological influence."

At first, the GDR rather vigorously defended its position. Obviously responding to the July 27 *Pravda* article in its August 1 issue, *Neues Deutschland* maintained that Bonn was being pressured both by "revanchist" forces and by "realistic" elements and that it was not self-evident which side would turn out to be more influential. Of course, this was precisely the argument on which Moscow had based its own policies toward the FRG a year or so earlier—but now the situation was said to be different and the old policy was considered untimely and inoperative. In its article, *Neues Deutschland* also asserted that both German states were "independent in their internal and external affairs."

¹²On July 26, 1984, the GDR reached a US\$330 million (950,000,000 Deutsche Mark) credit agreement with the FRG. See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Eastern Europe* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-EEU*), July 26, 1984, p. E/1.

¹³Pedro Ramet, "Church and Peace in the GDR," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July-August 1984, pp. 44-57; also Ronald D. Asmus, "Is There a Peace Movement in the GDR?" *Orbis* (Philadelphia), Summer 1983, pp. 301-41.

¹⁴Lev Bezymenskiy, "In the Shadow of American Missiles," *Pravda*, July 27, 1983; and "On the Wrong Track," *ibid.*, Aug. 2, 1984.

When, under growing Soviet pressure, Honecker ultimately postponed his visit scheduled for September 1984 to the Federal Republic, it was not clear for how long and to what extent the East Germans would place their "internationalist obligations" ahead of their self-interest.¹⁵ Down but not out, Honecker showed up in maverick Romania on the 40th anniversary of that country's liberation—the only top communist leader from the Soviet bloc to do so.¹⁶ This not-so-subtle expression of displeasure with Moscow notwithstanding, East Berlin shied away from engaging Moscow any further in public disagreements. The compromise they appear to have reached allowed the GDR to improve ties with the Federal Republic and thus continue the dialogue in the spirit of the Helsinki process, on condition that East Berlin proceed slowly, without publicity and summitry, and calibrate each step along the way so as not to embarrass the Soviet Union or counter its policies toward the West.

Ironically but not surprisingly, Hungary—once the object of East Germany's ire for Kádár's reformist experiments—became the primary defender and promoter of Honecker's course. Indeed, it was an authoritative Hungarian statement issued at the beginning of 1984 that gave a much-needed ideological rationale for the GDR's (and Hungary's) approach to European cooperation.¹⁷ Written by Mátyás Szűrös, a Hungarian Politburo member and Central Committee secretary in charge of foreign policy, and published in the official party monthly, *Társadalmi Szemle*, the article rejected the traditional (read Soviet) view according to which the "national interests [of the East European states] necessarily had to play a secondary role and generally had to be subordinated to interests and objectives that were seen as common ones." Szűrös added: "There is no question of this kind of subordination today." He also argued against "uniform solutions," calling instead for "methods that make optimum allowance for [national] characteristics." Turning directly to the realm of foreign policy, Szűrös maintained that, in the absence of a world communist movement with a recognized center, each East European country had the right to take advantage of "specific possibilities." Alluding to one of the "specific possibilities," Szűrös wrote: "Historical traditions and contemporary characteristics do make it possible for relations between a particular socialist and capitalist country to flourish [even] when the general trend is one of deterioration of East-West relations and of a narrowing of contacts."

So much for a common front against imperialist machinations! Whether or not Szűrös—formerly Hungarian ambassador to Moscow as well as to East Berlin—sent a copy of his article to Honecker will probably never be known, but the East Germans certainly

found his arguments useful and convincing. Indeed, when—in the aftermath of a predictable rebuttal by two Prague diehards published in the Czechoslovak party daily *Rudé Právo* and the Soviet foreign affairs weekly *Novoye Vremya*¹⁸—Szűrös reiterated his views in the form of an interview,¹⁹ *Neues Deutschland* promptly reprinted it in full.²⁰ In subsequent articles, too, the Hungarians sought to encourage the GDR's *Westpolitik*, praising Honecker's meetings with the leaders of Sweden, Greece, and Italy, and enthusiastically endorsing his proclaimed preference for diplomatic solutions.²¹

That the normally so very circumspect Kádár regime allowed itself to be embroiled in a debate over the relative merits of international and national obligations was the result of a conscious decision. The original Szűrös article was intended to serve four major objectives. First, it was to signal to the Hungarian party apparatus and to the country's attentive public the regime's recognition of the need to back up the economic reform movement at home with an activist foreign policy based to a greater extent than before on the country's national interest.²² Second, it was to signal to the Soviet Union that while Hungary would remain a loyal ally and fulfill its bloc obligations, it must also look West both for economic reasons and for the purpose of satisfying the public's urge to belong to "Europe." Third, it was to signal to West European governments—to the Federal Republic and Austria in particular—the Kádár regime's commitment to the Western connection even at a time of high tension between the Soviet Union and the United States. Fourth, it was to signal to some of the more orthodox Warsaw Pact states, especially neighboring Czechoslovakia, Hungary's pride in its achievements and its growing impatience with innuendoes questioning the validity of its socialist path.

¹⁵See Ronald D. Asmus, "A Postmortem on Honecker's Visit," *RFE Research*, Oct. 17, 1984, RAD Background Report No. 191.

¹⁶*FBIS-EEU*, Aug. 24, 1984, pp. H/3–6. En route to Romania, Honecker sent a telegram of greetings to Gustav Husák while flying over Czechoslovak territory. *Ibid.*, Aug. 22, 1984, p. D/6.

¹⁷Mátyás Szűrös, "The Reciprocal Effect of the National and the International in the Development of Socialism in Hungary," *Társadalmi Szemle* (Budapest), January 1984, pp. 13–21.

¹⁸Michael Stefanak and Ivan Hlivka, "The National and the International in the Policy of the KSC," *Rudé Právo* (Prague), Mar. 30, 1984; "On the National and the International," *Novoye Vremya* (Moscow), No. 16, April 1984.

¹⁹*Magyar Hírlap* (Budapest), Apr. 4, 1984.

²⁰*Neues Deutschland*, Apr. 12, 1984.

²¹See Tibor Thurzó, "GDR Diplomacy: A Sense of Responsibility and Activity," *Népszava* (Budapest), July 26, 1984; and Jenő Bocskor, "East German Foreign Relations: a Multilateral Dialogue," *Magyarország*, Aug. 5, 1984.

²²On the relationship between Hungarian domestic policies and pressures for increased contacts with the West, see Rudolf L. Tökés, "Hungarian Reform Imperatives," *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1984, pp. 1–23.



Romania's team at the summer 1984 Olympic Games in Los Angeles. Unlike other Warsaw Pact members, Romania decided not to join the Soviet-led boycott of the Games.

—Eddie Adams/Photoreporters.

As for Romania, it has continued to live up to its reputation as the Soviet bloc's leading maverick. It continues to irritate Moscow by maintaining fraternal ties with China regardless of the state of Sino-Soviet relations; by differing from Soviet positions on a multitude of issues, including Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and the Middle East; and by refusing to join the Soviet-ordained boycott of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games. Also, unlike Honecker and Bulgarian leader Todor Zhivkov, Ceausescu did visit the Federal Republic in October 1984.²³ In addition, Romania remains the only Warsaw Pact state to have officially and publicly opposed both NATO INF deployments and Soviet counterdeployments. Thus, it is a fair guess that the Romanian regime is pleased with the emerging East Berlin–Budapest maneuver. One leading member of the Romanian Communist Party's Political Executive Committee (Politburo) is known to have approached a Hungarian official and informally inquired about the possibility of coordinated political activity.

However intriguing such a constellation might be, Ceausescu's leadership style precludes consistent cooperation with the other East European states in the Warsaw Pact. Romania suffers not only from a deep economic crisis but also from the consequences of Ceausescu's apparent megalomania. It has come to be that the President's closest associates, including Polit-

buro members, feel obliged to make recommendations or advance fresh initiatives as if they had been devised by Ceausescu, for only then do these proposals have a chance of being seriously considered. The resulting alienation of the political elite has led to a paralysis of the decision-making process that no amount of posturing can hide or overcome.²⁴ The problem is further exacerbated by the President's unwillingness or inability to offer any rationale for his frequent tactical shifts in policy, which seem unrelated to his own professed strategic direction, and by his excessive preoccupation with prestige and protocol at the expense of substance. The upshot of these developments is that Romania's long-standing and potentially still significant position as the semi-independent member of the Warsaw Pact has lost much of the attraction it might have once had for the other East European leaderships. Moreover, as long as the harsh Romanian treatment of the large Hungarian minority in Transylvania continues, Kádár will find it impossible to make common cause consistently with Ceausescu—and he is unlikely to do so under any circumstances.

Among the other Warsaw Pact members, the Polish regime—overwhelmed by seemingly insoluble economic problems, facing popular hostility, and mired in factional infighting—remains on the sidelines. Czechoslovakia and, to a lesser extent, Bulgaria continue to back Soviet orthodoxy.²⁵ Thus, the most that can be expected is East European mini-coalitions countering Moscow on some specific issues.

Judging by the admittedly sketchy evidence available about the proceedings of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA), including the 1984 summit meeting in Moscow, such a mini-coalition appears to have come into being, with Romania, Hungary, and the GDR together pressing Moscow for concessions on the present CEMA price structure and on a variety of energy-related issues.²⁶ If they can further harmonize their views, act concurrently and yet unobtrusively, and place political topics on the agenda of the bloc's multi-

²³For an analysis of the cancellation of the Honecker and Zhivkov visits, see *RFE Research*, Oct. 19, 1984, RAD Background Report No. 189.

²⁴For an evaluation of Ceausescu's recent leadership, see Trond Gilberg, "Romania's Growing Difficulties," *Current History* (Philadelphia), November 1984, pp. 375–89.

²⁵While Czechoslovak official statements echo the Soviet position, Bulgarian statements are more circumspect. For example, during the Sofia celebrations marking the 40th anniversary of socialist Bulgaria's founding, Mikhail Gorbachëv, the leader of the Soviet delegation spoke of West German "revanchism"; Zhivkov avoided any such references and repeated his suggestion to turn the "Balkan Peninsula into a zone free from nuclear weapons." *RFE Research*, Oct. 5, 1985, Bulgarian Situation Report 12/84.

²⁶See *RFE Research*, June 15, 1984, Aug. 31, 1984, Oct. 19, 1984, RAD Background Report Nos. 94, 95, 155, and 189. More recently, these countries appeared to differ with Moscow over the terms for renewing the Warsaw pact treaty; see *The New York Times*, Mar. 7, 1985.

lateral institutions, they could also press Moscow for sufficient "elbow room" in order to protect their Western connections from the vicissitudes of Soviet-American relations. Of course, the central question is how the Soviet Union is likely to treat such a maneuver, however unobtrusive, by a coadjutant East European mini-coalition.

Soviet Dilemmas

There is every reason to assume that Moscow is deeply concerned about the "Europeanization" of East European communism.²⁷ At the same time, it is not self-evident that this is a process which Moscow can readily arrest or contain. For as James F. Brown once astutely observed,²⁸ the Soviet Union pursues two competing, if not altogether contradictory, objectives in Eastern Europe. On the one hand, it seeks *bloc cohesion*—strict conformity with its own values, patterns, and policies. This goal, if realized, would help legitimize the Soviet ex-

perience at home and enhance the power of the Soviet Union abroad; its implementation, however, would almost certainly entail the use of coercive measures, including Soviet military intervention. To avoid that eventuality, and for other reasons as well, Moscow has as its other goal the *viability* of the East European regimes and indeed the *stability* of the region as a whole. A viable and stable Eastern Europe would, among other benefits, enhance the appeal of Soviet foreign policy to the West, the Third World, and the more independent-minded and presently anti-Soviet communist parties throughout the world.

But the elusive goal of East European stability also demands a high price from the Soviet Union. Short of granting the region independence, an option Moscow is not considering, there are only two noncoercive ways to obtain a measure of stability. One is to allow the East European regimes to attempt economic policies of a kind that produce consumer satisfaction by transforming "gulag communism" into "goulash communism." The other way is for the regimes to adopt political approaches of a kind that satisfy national or even nationalist aspirations by being informed less by Soviet values and interests than by each country's own customs and traditions. In short, the alternatives are bloc cohesion enforced by Soviet military power and economic subsi-

²⁷See Charles Gati, "The 'Europeanization' of Communism?" *Foreign Affairs* (New York), April 1977, pp. 539–53.

²⁸J. F. Brown, *Relations Between the Soviet Union and Its East European Allies: A Survey*, Santa Monica, CA, The Rand Corporation, 1975.



A summit meeting of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance convenes in Moscow in June 1984 after many postponements.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

dies or a modicum of East European stability made possible by Soviet tolerance of "goulash communism," "national communism," or some combination of the two.

In the abstract, Moscow does not object to "goulash communism." True, there are Soviet—and East European—diehards who regard excessive reliance on consumer satisfaction as a "petty-bourgeois" deviation. Such stale complaints aside, all communist regimes would like nothing better than economic well-being, partly to demonstrate the superiority of centrally-planned economic systems and mainly to take the edge off popular economic and political discontent. The problem is not only that Soviet-type economies have not done well in Eastern Europe; it is also that they are seen not to have done well because the populations in Eastern Europe tend to assess their prevailing living standards less by comparing them with their own past than by comparing them to present living standards in such countries as the Federal Republic, Austria, or Finland. To achieve anything approaching that kind of consumer satisfaction, however, would presumably require larger Soviet subsidies, a reformist course on the Hungarian (or Chinese) pattern, and a political opening to the West to encourage credit, investments, and transfer of advanced technology—measures that entail considerable economic restructuring and political risk. Therefore, despite official endorsements of "goulash communism," the policies that might lead to consumer satisfaction and hence to political stability are, in fact, abhorrent to most Soviet and many East European leaders.

The Soviets Union is also concerned about stability obtained by paying more than lip service to the East Europeans' national or nationalist aspirations. While Moscow does encourage nationalism in the Third World or Western Europe—wherever it might spark anti-American or anti-Western sentiments—it is certainly less favorably disposed toward East European expressions of nationalism. When the GDR celebrates the 500th anniversary of Martin Luther's birth, or Czechoslovakia takes pride in its national hockey team's victories, that's fine. When successive Polish regimes feel compelled to accommodate themselves to the traditional influence of the Catholic Church, that's fine, too, provided that the regime retains its capacity to inhibit and, if necessary, to control the Church's activities. But, in the Soviet view, respect for national values must not entail any policy aimed at fulfilling the region's traditional longing to be accepted by, and indeed to rejoin, the European community. For, as long as the Soviet Union itself is not perceived as belonging to the European community, East European desire to belong is suggestive of anti-Soviet tendencies.

Herein lies the essential reason for the current tug of

war between the proprietors of power in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. As several East European regimes now see it, they must, for the sake of domestic political stability, actively, if cautiously, inch toward the West. They certainly do not want Soviet interventions; they cannot, as Poland found out, count on sufficient Soviet economic help; and most of them worry about the unforeseeable consequences of market-oriented reforms. The only alternative they see in the mid-1980's, then, is a gradual opening to the West, which, despite obvious risks, offers the promise of public approval. From a Soviet perspective, however, the reasons for such an opening are less compelling. Unlike their junior allies—even the Poles, the Czechs, or the East Germans—many Russians remain genuinely afraid of Western influences. The Soviet leaders also appear to be less apprehensive about, and possibly even to underestimate, the region's persistent instability and the major sources of that instability—nationalist and economic pressures. The Soviet leaders' attitude is also shared by the typical Soviet tourist visiting Warsaw, let alone Budapest, when he asks: "Why are these people complaining when they live better than we do?" It seems that even after 40 years of experience, Moscow cannot accept the fact that East Europeans judge the performance of their political and economic order by European and not by Soviet standards.

Of course, the Soviet Union has gone to considerable lengths to have peace and quiet, if not genuine stability, in Eastern Europe. It has long tried to steer a middle course between the objectives of cohesion and stability, bending now in one direction and then in another and hoping all along that the problem or problems will some day, somehow, disappear.

"When the Cat's Away...."

Whether Moscow can continue to muddle through in this way in the years ahead depends as much or more on its capacity to shape a *properly calibrated* policy toward the region than on economic conditions. The evidence of the post-Stalin era (see Table 3) indicates a significant correlation between the unity or lack of unity of the Soviet leadership, on the one hand, and East European popular movements and regime assertiveness, on the other. Specifically, it has been all but impossible for the Soviet Union to pursue its two competing goals of bloc cohesion and East European stability in a judicious and calibrated fashion at times of unsettled leadership in the Kremlin. Under such circumstances, the Soviet leaders, preoccupied with the struggle for power, have tended to send mixed signals to their East European cli-

Table 3. Kremlin Politics and Eastern Europe

State of Soviet leadership

East European Assertiveness

Periods of relative turbulence	Periods of relative tranquility	Popular movements	Regime demands for autonomy
1953–57		East Berlin, 1953 Poznan, 1956 Warsaw, 1956 Budapest, 1956	Poland, 1956 Hungary, 1956
	1957–64		Albania, 1961 to present
1964–69		Warsaw, 1968 Prague, 1968	Romania, 1964 to present Hungary, 1968 to present Czechoslovakia, 1968
	1969–79	Polish cities, 1970 and 1976	
1979 to present		Poland Solidarity, 1980–81	Mini-coalitions, 1983 to present

ents. Sensing confusion in the Kremlin, East Europeans—leaders and people alike—have then tried to use the opportunity to shift the balance of decision-making authority to their side. “When the cat’s away, the mice will play.”

Of the three periods of Soviet leadership turbulence that have occurred so far, the volatile and highly personalized struggle for power in 1953–57 resulted in several popular upheavals and considerable elite disorientation in Eastern Europe.²⁹ To recall briefly, this was the time when Lavrentiy Beria was reportedly rethinking the “German question”; when at first Georgiy Malenkov and then Nikita Khrushchev advocated a “new course” for Eastern Europe; when Khrushchev and Anastas Mikoyan urged, while Vyacheslav Molotov and others opposed, reconciliation with “national communist” Yugoslavia; when a divided Soviet leadership felt it needed Tito’s blessing to invade Hungary; and when a visibly shaken Kremlin first tried to obstruct and then grudgingly accepted Władysław Gomułka’s appointment as Poland’s new leader.

Apparent confusion in Moscow led to unparalleled factional infighting in the East European communist parties, especially in Poland and Hungary. Sensing divisions at the top in Eastern Europe, no wonder that large seg-

ments of the attentive public, led by intellectuals, and subsequently the people as well gained courage and expressed their long-suppressed convictions.³⁰ Of course, in the end they did not get their way, for the Soviet leaders, facing the prospective disintegration of their empire, managed to pull themselves together and reestablish their authority. For about seven years after the defeat of the “anti-party” group in 1957, they appear to have united behind Khrushchev and followed a rather calibrated policy toward Eastern Europe, one that stressed the goal of cohesion without necessarily stifling every national experiment.³¹

The second—certainly far less volatile—period of Kremlin turbulence began in 1964 as a palace conspiracy against Khrushchev and continued until 1969 or so with intense jockeying for position after his ouster (pri-

²⁹Of the vast literature on Soviet politics in the mid-1950’s, the East European connection is explored most usefully in Veljko Mićunović, *Moscow Diary*, Garden City, NY, Doubleday, 1980, and in Strobe Talbot, Trans. and Ed., *Khrushchev Remembers*, Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1970.

³⁰For two excellent books on Poland and Hungary in 1956, see Flora Lewis, *A Case History of Hope*, Garden City, NY, Doubleday, 1958; and Ferenc A. Vali, *Rift and Revolt in Hungary*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1961.

³¹Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1967.



At left, representatives of the Solidarity trade union with Polish party leader Stanisław Kania in Gdansk on December 30, 1980; above, Kania with Soviet party leader Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow on October 30, 1980.

—TASS from Sovfoto; Jean Claude Francolon and Daniel Simon/Gamma-Liaison.

marily between Leonid Brezhnev and Aleksey Kosygin).³² As long as his colleagues refused to give him the kind of extensive authority that Khrushchev had had between 1957 and 1964, Brezhnev was only *primus inter pares*. During the early Brezhnev years, then, Soviet policy in Eastern Europe once again lacked a sure hand. While Khrushchev's confusing on-again, off-again campaign for CEMA integration was an important factor in Romania's 1964 declaration of semi-independence, the Kremlin preoccupation with Khrushchev's ouster in that year allowed Romania to make stick its claim for a measure of autonomy in the Warsaw Pact.

The Hungarian and Czechoslovak reform movements, which also started in the mid-1960's, received considerable stimulation from the ongoing Soviet debate about economic reform.³³ It is highly instructive that most Czechoslovak leaders were under the strong impression that what they were doing met with Soviet approval. Even after their economic reform movement became the political "Prague Spring" in 1968, many of them contin-

ued to believe—and they had reason to believe—that the "Soviet comrades" at least understood and probably supported their efforts for "socialism with a human face." In point of fact, according to Zdeněk Mlynář's vivid testimony and other evidence,³⁴ some of the Soviet leaders did. Even if one accepts the premise that the Czechoslovak reformists around Alexander Dubček were somewhat naive about Soviet intentions, they operated on the basis of frequent consultations with Kremlin leaders at the highest level—and received contradictory signals.

The third, current period of Kremlin leadership turbu-

³²See, e.g., Michel Tatu, *Power in the Kremlin: From Khrushchev to Kosygin*, New York, Viking, 1969.

³³On the mid-1960's Soviet economic reform debates, see Fyodor I. Kushnirsky, "The Limits of Soviet Economic Reform," *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1984, pp. 33–43.

³⁴See Zdeněk Mlynář's, *Nightfrost in Prague*, New York, Karz Publishers, 1980; and for a systematic treatment of differing Soviet positions concerning Czechoslovakia, see Jiri Valenta, *Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968: Anatomy of a Decision*, Baltimore and London, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979.

lence can be traced to about 1979, when Brezhnev's illnesses and absences became chronic. Eventually an intense struggle to succeed him developed between Yuriy Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko. Andropov's rule was short-lived, and Chernenko's rule as *primus inter pares* in the Politburo (as his mentor Brezhnev once was) turned out to be of even shorter duration. This power struggle has been taking place at a time of economic stagnation affecting the entire bloc. For the first time, concerned about a recurrence of a "time of troubles" in the Kremlin, several East European leaders had allowed their preference for or against a specific contender to succeed Brezhnev to come out, with Ceaușescu reportedly opting for Chernenko, and Andropov receiving the endorsements of Kádár and Czechoslovakia's Gustav Husák.³⁵ As Moscow may see it, the East European regimes, once compelled to accept taxation without representation, have come around to seeking representation without taxation.

In addition to fostering the incipient mini-coalition described earlier in this article, the absence of a firm leadership in the Kremlin had affected adversely the management of the crisis of 1980–81 by the Polish regime. What must be regarded as the paralysis of power in the Kremlin had a profoundly unsettling influence on the Polish leadership, which for almost 18 long months could not decide what it should or should not do.³⁶ It goes without saying that the rise of Solidarity was primarily a function of internal developments, both economic and political. It is also true that the Polish party has always tended to be deeply divided, probably more so than any other ruling communist party in the world. One can further assume that Moscow, anxious to avoid fighting two wars at the same time (in Afghanistan and Poland) and concerned about Western sanctions, preferred not to intervene militarily if at all possible. Finally, it is quite likely that the Kremlin kept postponing

the decision to act in the hope of further exacerbating the Polish crisis—that it waited for the political order to become chaotic and economic conditions to become unbearable so that the likes of General Wojciech Jaruzelski—surely a "moderate" by Soviet standards—would at last see no alternative to a comprehensive and brutal crackdown.

Yet, the question still remains: Why did the Kremlin tolerate such an extraordinary display of pluralism for a year and a half? What kind of Leninist leadership would hesitate for so long to protect the Soviet empire from such a fundamental challenge to its existence? Indeed, did Moscow seek only to intimidate Poland by completing all preparations for intervention in December 1980 and again in March 1981, or did the preparations for, and subsequent cancellations of, military action indicate vacillation and drift, an inability to take a decisive step?

In my opinion, there is no question but that all Soviet leaders knew what they wanted. In one way or another, they were determined that Poland must remain in the fold. But for well over a year they could not decide how to achieve that goal, primarily because no Soviet leader wanted to be held responsible for the failure of either policy option: accepting the process of "socialist renewal" or ordering an end to it. Responsibility for a failed option would have spelled political defeat for its proponent, and hence no Soviet leader—and certainly none of the contenders for the top position—was willing to press for the adoption of a high-risk alternative. Put another way, an in-between policy of muddling through was a political imperative dictated by political ambitions permeating the intrigue-filled atmosphere of the Kremlin at that time.

Therefore, it is as misleading to assign "prudence" to the Soviet leaders for having waited as long as they did as it is to shout "deception" every time they appear to have emitted confusing signals. Given Brezhnev's incapacitating illnesses, the by then irregular participation of Mikhail Suslov (de facto "second" secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and East European troubleshooter), in the decision-making process, and the intense struggle for succession under way, any but the most cautious or circumspect policy in Eastern Europe was politically unpalatable. Indeed, the ultimate decision to instigate an internal coup that would reestablish communist authority was adopted precisely because it entailed fewer risks than the alternative of direct Soviet military intervention. More important, the fact that such an internal coup was not attempted earlier must be understood as a symptom of Soviet immobility, which, in turn, exacerbated divisions within the Polish party and generated false hopes among the Polish people as well.

³⁵See, e.g., "Hungary's Hope for Continuity," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Feb. 29, 1984; and *RFE Research*, Dec. 8, 1982, Romanian Situation Report 21/82.

³⁶Both before and after the December 1981 "crackdown," Soviet treatment of Poland was marked by a good deal of vacillation and apparently confusing signals. For an early analysis of Soviet options and immobilism, see Charles Gati, "Polish Futures, Western Options," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1982/83, pp. 292–308. The release of Lech Wałęsa from house arrest in November 1982, less than 24 hours after Brezhnev's death, prompted Warsaw wits to make up the following story: Andropov, the new Kremlin chief, calls Jaruzelski: "On whose authority did you release Wałęsa?" Jaruzelski: "I'd discussed the matter with Comrade Brezhnev." Andropov: "And what did our beloved Leonid Il'ich tell you?" Jaruzelski: "He said and I quote: 'you may release that no good Pole only over my dead body.' " More recently, the public trial of four security police officers charged with the Rev. Jerzy Popiełuszko's murder was also seen in Poland as a function of General Jaruzelski's ability "to take advantage of what many believe to be disarray in the Kremlin as a result of a struggle to succeed Konstantin U. Chernenko as the Soviet leader." *The New York Times*, Feb. 9, 1985. That at least some Soviet leaders disapproved of such a public trial was indicated by a TASS report, which identified the four security police officers only as "four citizens" who "attributed their act" to their desire to prevent Father Popiełuszko from pursuing "activities harmful to the state." *Ibid.*

Conclusions

As far as the Soviet Union and its reluctant East European allies are concerned, there is something to be said for the old aphorism that "the foreign policy of large countries is a function of domestic political conditions, and the foreign policy of small countries is a function of external conditions." To the extent that this is a valid observation, it should be stressed that neither regime nor popular defiance and assertiveness in Eastern Europe vis-à-vis the Soviet Union has ever been *caused* by immobility in the Kremlin. Rather, they are due to repression, the gap between economic promise and performance, and the absence of autonomy. These deep-rooted, substantive, and systemic causes of pervasive discontent and defiance generate *crises* mainly when East Europeans sense division and drift in Moscow; when they believe that they can get away with "more"—usually more independence—than they might be able to do when the Soviet leadership appears less preoccupied with the struggle for power. In short, Kremlin turbulence does not create crises in Eastern Europe, it turns inherent instability into explicit regime demands or popular explosions.

Even with Mikhail Gorbachëv at the helm, it is quite

likely that the GDR, Hungary, Romania, and possibly Poland, acting alone or together, may succeed in obtaining more "elbow room" from the Kremlin and move inch by inch toward the West. That expectation is based on two assumptions. One is that Gorbachëv *will not* be an unchallengeable leader in the near future—with authority comparable to Khrushchev's between 1957 and 1964 or to Brezhnev's between 1969 and 1979—who could properly calibrate the Kremlin's East European policy. The other assumption is that at least some of the East European leaders seeking more "elbow room" *will* have sufficient authority, experience, and finesse to calibrate the processes of change in their own countries; and that they will not allow popular sentiments to push them beyond the limits of Soviet tolerance. Even if these assumptions, and the forecast of gradual "Europeanization" based on them, turn out to be accurate, it remains wishful thinking to anticipate the "collapse" of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe. Diversity is not independence; tolerance is not liberty. While Soviet–East European relations are almost certainly entering a new phase, and one or more mini-coalitions are posing a very serious challenge to Moscow's concept of bloc cohesion, the empire, though rather unwell, is still alive.

On Anniversaries in 1985

EDITORS' NOTE: The Year 1985 brings a host of fateful anniversaries: the 40th of the Yalta Conference, of the end of World War II, of the establishment of the United Nations, and, of course, of the introduction of atomic weapons. It is the 30th anniversary of the Austrian State Treaty, of West German entry into NATO, and of the formation of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. It is also the 10th anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski has kindly responded to questions by Sophia Sluzar, Senior Text Editor of Problems of Communism, on the major anniversaries relating to postwar Europe and their implications for East-West relations today.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Let us begin with Yalta. Many people, and especially the East Europeans, view Yalta as a Western, and particularly American, sellout of Eastern Europe to the USSR. Is this a just estimate and could a better agreement have been reached at the time? Would it be correct to say that the USSR has succeeded in imposing its interpretation of the Yalta provisions on the rest of the world? Also, do you see the Yalta Conference as bringing about the division of Germany?

ZB: It is important to differentiate between the formal and the substantive consequences of Yalta. The formal consequence was an alleged agreement, which President Roosevelt even presented to a joint session of Congress as evidence of a consensus among the Big Three powers regarding postwar peace arrangements. In fact, he knew better at the time and, in effect, was misleading the American public. Both Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt returned from Yalta with deep misgivings regarding the future and a gnawing realization that a conflict over the fate of all of Europe was developing. At Yalta, by obtaining Stalin's signature to a com-

mitment on behalf of democracy in eastern Europe they pacified their consciences, but by leaving the execution of the agreement to Stalin's tender mercies they foreshadowed and in effect acknowledged Soviet control over eastern Europe.

To be sure, that control had been conceded in a preliminary fashion already in Tehran, back in November-December 1943, and by 1945 it was a physical fact, with the Soviet armies present in eastern Europe. Nonetheless, the Anglo-Americans refused to test Soviet willingness to make concessions, despite overwhelming Soviet weakness and American strength. We do not know whether the Soviets would have yielded, but we *do* know that they were not tested. The West showed neither foresight nor courage, and this is why Yalta is not only a symbol of the subsequent division of Europe but a major historical blot on the record of Anglo-American leadership.

The division of Germany was the natural outcome of the differences that subsequently surfaced regarding the future of the rest of Europe. Through Yalta, Stalin continued to hope that he would get a free hand in all of Europe. At Yalta, he began to sense that the West would contest him, and that contest emerged already in July 1945 at Potsdam and became very sharp and overt within a year thereafter.

The Austrian State Treaty—by which the occupation forces, Soviet and Western, were withdrawn upon Austria's promise of perpetual neutrality—evidently holds a special attraction for East Europeans. Can you foresee certain circumstances under which Hungary, for

Zbigniew Brzezinski was Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from 1977 to 1981. He is currently Herbert Lehman Professor of Government at Columbia University (New York) and Senior Adviser to the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University (Washington, DC). His most recent book is Power and Principle (1983).

example, could achieve a similar arrangement (as it could not in 1956)?

ZB: No one in 1953, prior to Stalin's death, would have forecast the Austrian Peace Treaty of 1955. Yet within two years, following considerable turmoil within the Soviet Union, and after persistent and intelligent Western negotiating, the Soviets did agree to an arrangement that clearly is compatible with the wishes of the Austrian people and acceptable to both the East and the West.

Accordingly, there is a not-so-hidden lesson in that experience: the Soviet leadership is about to enter a phase of great uncertainty and possible internal turmoil, and the West could find itself in a position gradually to begin to negotiate arrangements for other parts of central Europe that would be more conducive to stability and more acceptable to the people concerned. But the West will have to be imaginative about it and look for new formulas. I doubt that the Soviets will agree to the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact, but perhaps a formula could be found for combining membership in the Warsaw Pact with special security and de facto quasi-neutrality arrangements for some of the Pact's members.

The division of Germany became crystallized in 1955 with the FRG's entry into NATO and the GDR's entry into the Warsaw Pact. Can you foresee a peaceful resolution of the division?

ZB: Over time and through a gradual process I can foresee the creation of a situation which, without it even being so designated, would be tantamount to a loose confederation of the two German states. This may not be a reunification in the formal sense, and it may even involve continued membership of these two German states in rival systems of alliance, and yet it could involve much more organic national unity than now seems feasible. A loose confederation of the two German states, perhaps associated with some special security arrangements, would not be destabilizing to the rest of Europe.

The Helsinki Final Act has been described by some as the European peace settlement that never took place after World War II. Is this how you see it?

ZB: The Helsinki Final Act is a preliminary peace agreement. From the standpoint of the West, it is a major accomplishment in two critically important areas: (1) By acknowledging the territorial status quo in Europe, it deprives the Soviet Union of the opportunity to pose as the defender of the existing territorial status quo. In other words, the Poles and the Czechs need to be less

alarmed about the possibility that peaceful change in Europe might reopen the issue of existing territorial arrangements and reawaken German territorial aspirations. The Helsinki Final Act commits all parties to the existing frontiers and that enhances the sense of security in Europe without which peaceful evolution to a better East-West relationship is impossible. (2) The Helsinki Final Act legitimizes Western interest in the internal affairs of Eastern Europe by making human rights an international norm. In other words, democratization and pluralization of the communist states is compatible with and indeed even mandated by what the Helsinki Final Act postulates.

Comparisons between Yalta and Helsinki seem almost inevitable. How would you contrast these two meetings?

ZB: The fundamental difference between Yalta and Helsinki is that Helsinki focused on the tangible and the achievable; Yalta was rhetorically on the high ground but in effect it was a testimony to Western weakness and shallowness. Roosevelt, for example, began his negotiations regarding the future of Poland by telling Stalin that he cared neither for existing Polish frontiers nor for, in effect, an independent Polish government. Hardly the best way to obtain a satisfactory bargain when dealing with what in any case was a ruthless and brutal dictator. Roosevelt did not succeed in ingratiating himself with Stalin; he simply earned Stalin's quiet contempt.

The Soviet government has always stressed the importance of propaganda. What themes is the Soviet Union likely to stress with regard to the various anniversaries in 1985 and why?

ZB: The Soviets will make a special effort to elevate V-E Day into a joint American-Soviet festival for the purpose of publicly flagellating Germany. The aim in this is to weaken West Germany's commitment to the West, so that subsequently the Soviet Union will have a freer hand in its overtures for a separate German-Soviet accommodation.

Is there anything novel about this Soviet approach?

ZB: I do not discern any particularly novel aspect to these efforts. The Soviets are still determined to detach Western Europe from the United States and to decouple American security from that of Western Europe. Their goal remains to create a situation in which Western Europe is de facto subordinated to the Soviet Union. This has been the steady and persistent Soviet objective since 1945.

Looking back over the last 40 years, what could the West or the United States have done differently with regard to the Soviet Union?

ZB: This would require an entire book and can only be answered in a cryptic telegraphic fashion: (1) The West should have been tougher at Yalta and Potsdam, though one cannot be certain how much could have been obtained. (2) The West should have pressed the Soviets more during the East German uprising of 1953, to see whether more significant concessions could not be obtained. (3) The West could have explored more fully post-Stalin overtures by Beria and Malenkov regarding the possible neutralization of Germany, as the beginning to a larger neutralization of central Europe. (4) The West could have been more responsive to the Rapacki plan of 1956-57, again in order to see whether some neutrali-

zation in central Europe might not be contrived. (5) At the same time, the West should have been more inclined to back the Hungarians in 1956, in order to see whether an Austrian status for Hungary might not be attainable. (6) The West should not have been as indifferent as it was to the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968. (7) The West could have been more forthcoming with economic assistance to Poland before the crackdown by the regime against Solidarity, because there was a fleeting chance that a compromise solution might emerge between the regime and Solidarity, especially if sweetened by credits that might have made some mutual accommodation relatively easier to attain.

But all of these are "ifs" and cannot be argued with any degree of certainty. They do illustrate, however, a central point: the West has not exactly been most active or imaginative in its policy toward the East.

Checklist of Communist Parties in 1984

EDITORS' NOTE: By arrangement with Richard F. Staar and the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford, CA, we present the latest version of the "Checklist of Communist Parties," covering developments in 1984. This Checklist continues a series presented in Hoover's Yearbook on International Communist Affairs (YICA) since 1976, and jointly published with Problems of Communism since 1981. The current list is a slightly modified version of that which is to appear in the 1985 edition of the YICA. The authors and editors welcome corrections, additions, or amendments. Such contributions may be addressed to the Editors, Problems of Communism, 301 4th Street, SW, Washington, DC 20547, USA.

Richard F. Staar

IN AN ARTICLE published in the September 1984 issue of *Agitator*, Vadim Zagladin, first deputy chief of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, said that 95 countries of the world have communist parties, with a total combined membership of "almost 80 million." The number of countries was two less than—and the total membership the same as—Zagladin had reported in 1983.¹ Judging from the lack of any concrete information during the year confirming the existence of communist movements in North Yemen (Sanaa) and Somalia, it is assumed that these are the two countries whose parties Zagladin has dropped from the rolls.

¹"International Life: Communists on the Leading Edge of the Struggle," *Agitator* (Moscow), No. 17, September 1984, p. 39; also reported in *Pravda* (Moscow), June 5, 1984; cf. Zagladin interview on Moscow domestic television on Sept. 27, 1983, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter FBIS-SOV), Sept. 30, 1983, p. CC/1.

Richard F. Staar, a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution (Stanford, CA), has resumed editorship of the Yearbook on International Communist Affairs after having served as US Ambassador to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks in Vienna from 1981 to 1983. His monograph on Soviet foreign policy will appear in May 1985. He is indebted to Dennis L. Bark, John B. Dunlop, Thomas H. Henriksen, Ramon H. Myers, James H. Noyes, William E. Ratliff, and Margit N. Grigory—all members of the Yearbook editorial board—for their contributions to this essay.

The monthly magazine Problems of Peace and Socialism (the English-language edition of which is published in Toronto and London under the title *World Marxist Review*) continues to serve as the sole international press organ that speaks for the majority of communist parties. The journal sponsored a conference in Prague on December 4–6, 1984, with representatives from 91 parties reportedly in attendance. Names of two of these parties were not listed, at their request (presumably because they operate underground).² It is noteworthy that the French and Yugoslav parties did not send delegations to this meeting of Soviet-line and independent Marxist parties. Of the 89 parties listed, nine do not qualify as full-fledged communist movements by Moscow's definition: the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola—Party of Labor, the National Liberation Front of Bahrain, the Benin People's Revolutionary Party, the Congolese Labor Party, the Workers' Party of Ethiopia, the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party, the Independence Congress Party of Madagascar, and the Yemen Socialist Party (South Yemen). With the exception of the Madagascan party, all are "revolutionary democratic" movements by Moscow's definition, and all except those in Bahrain, Kampuchea, and Madagascar qualify for the higher category of "vanguard revolutionary democratic" regimes, i.e., ruling parties that Moscow

²"Communiqué on the Results of the Work of the International Magazine *Problems of Peace and Socialism*," Moscow TASS in English, Dec. 7, 1984, in FBIS-SOV, Dec. 10, 1984, p. BB/1; also listed in *Rudé právo* (Prague), Dec. 7, 1984.

feels may develop over time into full-fledged communist parties.³

The Prague meeting heard calls for a world conference of communist and workers' parties, the last having been held in 1969 in Moscow. The delegate from Argentina, Oscar Arevalo, stated that 12 Latin American parties at a meeting in Buenos Aires on July 6-7, 1984, had proposed such a "world forum." East German party leader Erich Honecker also referred to this suggestion at a plenum of his ruling Socialist Unity Party on November 22 and indicated a willingness to initiate "consultation about a world meeting of communist and workers' parties."⁴ The CPSU has been somewhat less than forthright in promoting such a new world congress. It is a matter of record that many independent-minded communist parties—e.g., the Dutch, French, Italian, Japanese, Swedish, and Yugoslav parties, not to mention the Albanian, Chinese, and North Korean—are likely to boycott any such meeting. However, the Polish party daily claims that "more than 60 parties are now in favor of holding such a [world] congress."⁵

Despite this lack of unity in the world communist movement, it is still useful to enumerate the parties that the CPSU recognizes as communist or on the road to becoming communist parties. The Checklist identifies what are believed to be the 95 countries alluded to by Zagladin and their communist parties. In some states—Australia, India, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Spain, and Sweden—Moscow evidently recognizes two competing communist organizations even though it may feel much closer to one, as in the case of Spain's new Communist Party.⁶ Several movements operate on geographic territories that have no national sovereignty—e.g., Guadeloupe, Martinique, Palestine, Puerto Rico, Réunion, and West Berlin. Also listed are 10 of the approximately 20 "revolutionary democratic" movements—those in Afghanistan, Angola, Bahrain, Benin, Congo, Ethiopia, Grenada, Kampuchea, Mozambique, and South Yemen. In Ethiopia, the Commission for the Organization of the Party of the Working People of Ethiopia transformed itself into the Workers'

Party of Ethiopia, a step toward full-fledged acceptance by Moscow as a ruling communist movement. Finally, in italics, are a variety of significant communist movements *not recognized* by Moscow (often pro-Beijing), such as the Democratic Kampuchean (or Kampuchean Communist) party of Pol Pot.

The parties are listed by geographic region, with Africa now treated separately from the Middle East. Where the name is not simply "Communist Party of . . .," we provide the acronym of the party name, keyed to a "Legend of Acronyms" at the end of the Checklist. With only a handful of exceptions, indicated by footnotes, the population estimates are as of mid-1984 and from a single source, *The World Factbook—Nineteen Hundred and Eighty-Four*.⁷ The latest party membership figures are either official claims or an estimate as of December 31, 1984, provided by the author of the individual country profile in the *YICA*. Other columns in the Checklist provide the name of the party's leader; the date of the most recent national conference or congress of the party; its legal status (legal, outlawed, ruling, or unrecognized); and its results in the most recent national elections (where relevant).

Claimed membership of the Chinese Communist Party remains unchanged at 40 million, although the current verification campaign reportedly may reduce the total by some 400,000.⁸ The CPSU reports a gain of 213,000 members, whereas the Polish United Workers' Party reportedly continues to lose members—it is down nearly 1 million members since the summer of 1980. Over the past two years the Yugoslav League of Communists grew by 346,000, reversing a declining trend. The Soviet claim of 120,000 members for the Afghan party seems suspect, particularly when it is further asserted that 60 percent of these individuals, or 72,000, serve in the armed forces (Western estimates put the *total* indigenous military at about 35,000).⁹ Communist parties in a number of West European countries report declines in membership from the levels reported in last year's Checklist. The French party lost some 100,000; the Italian, some 30,000; the Austrian, an estimated 4,000. Only in Greece and Portugal were gains registered (an estimated 14,500 and 13,000 respectively).

There were a few notable changes in the leadership of the communist movements during 1984—including the election of Konstantin Chernenko to replace the deceased Yuriy Andropov in the Soviet Union, of

³A list of 20 such "vanguard parties" appears in Richard F. Staar, *USSR Foreign Policies After Détente*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, forthcoming in May 1985, Table 1.3. See also, Wallace Spaulding, "Checklist of the 'National Liberation Movement,'" *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March-April 1982, pp. 77-82.

⁴DYN agency report (Buenos Aires), July 7, 1984, and ADN report (East Berlin), Nov. 22, 1984—both cited by Kevin Devlin, "New Moves for a World Communist Conference," RFE-RL, *Radio Free Europe Research* (Munich—hereafter *RFE Research*), Dec. 20, 1984, RAD Background Report, No. 221, pp. 2-3.

⁵See Sylwester Szafarz in *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), Feb. 24, 1984, cited by Devlin, loc. cit. Emphasis added.

⁶The older Communist Party of Spain (PCE) is criticized for having "lost its positions catastrophically as a consequence of its deviation from Marxism-Leninism and its orientation toward so-called Eurocommunism." See V. Zagladin in *Rudé právo*, Aug. 18, 1983, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 23, 1984, p. BB/5.

⁷US Central Intelligence Agency, CR WF 84-001, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1984.

⁸*The Washington Times*, Dec. 10, 1984.

⁹"Triumph in Kabul," *Pravda*, Jan. 11, 1985; cf. Edward Girardet, "After 5 Years, Afghan War Is Bleak," *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), Dec. 27, 1984, p. 28.

Checklist of Communist Parties in 1984

CHECKLIST OF COMMUNIST PARTIES IN 1984

L—legal; O—outlawed; R—ruling; U—unrecognized.

Subsaharan Africa ^a	Mid-1984 population ^b	Party membership	Party leader ^c	Last congress	Legal status	Percentage of vote; seats in legislature ^d
A. Angola (MPLA-PT)	7,770,000	31,000 claim ^e	José Eduardo dos Santos	1st Ext., Dec. 1980	R	— (1980); all 203 approved by MPLA
B. Benin (PRPB)	3,910,000	200 claim	Mathieu Kerekou	2nd, Nov. 1979	R	— (1984); all 196 approved by PRPB
C. Congo (PCT)	1,745,000	8,685 est.	Denis Sassou Ngouesso (Chairman)	3rd, Jul. 27–30, 1984	R	95.0 (1984); all 153 approved by PCT
D. Ethiopia (WPE)	31,998,000	30,000 est. ^f	Mengistu Haile Marian	1st, Const., Sep. 6–10, 1984	R	n/a
1. Lesotho	1,474,000	No current data	Jacob M. Kena	No data	U ^g	n/a
E. Mozambique (FRELIMO)	13,413,000	130,000 claim	Samora Moisés Machel	4th, Apr. 1983	R	— (1977); all 226 approved by FRELIMO
2. Nigeria (SWPP)	88,148,000	No current data	(Idi) Dapo Fatogun	1st, Dec. 1965	O	(1983)
3. Réunion	535,000	10,000 claim 2,000 est.	Paul Vergès	5th, Jul. 1980	L	32.73 (1983); 16 of 45, none in Paris ^h
4. Senegal (PIT)	6,541,000	No current data	Amath Dansoko ⁱ	2nd, Sep. 28–30, 1984	L	0.5 (1983); none
5. South Africa	31,688,000	No current data	Moses Mabhida	6th Conf., Dec. 1984, in London	O	n/a
6. Sudan	21,103,000	1,500 est.	Muhammad Ibrahim Nugud Mansur	4th, Oct. 1967	O	n/a
The Americas ^a	Mid-1984 population ^b	Party membership	Party leader ^c	Last congress	Legal status	Percentage of vote; seats in legislature ^d
7. Argentina	30,097,000	200,000 claim 70,000 est.	Athos Fava	Ext., Sep. 1983	L	1.3 (1983); none
8. Bolivia	6,037,000	300 est.	Jorge Kolle Cueto	4th, Apr. 1979	L	— (1980); none
9. Brazil	134,380,000	8,000 est.	Giocondo Dias	7th, (Natl. Mtg.) Jan. 1984	U	(1982) ^j
10. Canada	25,142,000	2,500 est.	William Kashtan	25th, Feb. 1982	L	0.05 (1984); none
11. Chile	11,655,000	20,000 est.	Luís Corvalán	16th, June 1984	O	n/a
12. Colombia	28,248,000	12,000 est.	Gilberto Vieira	14h, Nov. 6–11, 1984	L	1.2 (1982); 3 of 199

^aArabic numerals indicate the 95 countries in which Moscow apparently recognizes the existence of communist parties. Listed with capital letters "A" through "J" are 10 significant "revolutionary democratic" parties (a majority of them ruling), organizations on the verge of evolving into full-fledged communist parties. In italics are several other important rival communist organizations, often pro-Beijing, that are not recognized by Moscow.

^bPopulation figures are estimated totals in July 1984, from US Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook Nineteen Hundred and Eighty-Four*, CR WF 84-001, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, April 1984, except where more precise data are available.

^cNormally the party secretary general or general secretary, except where some other official is the most important person, in which case his position is noted in parentheses.

^dAn em-dash indicates that the communist party was legal and presumably participated in the election but the percentage of the vote received is not known. Where the party did not participate, the year of the most recent election (where the legislature still sits) is given in parentheses. In some cases, data from pre-1984 elections have been updated since last year's Checklist.

^eThe MPLA-PT claims more than 15,000 members and more than 15,000 candidate members.

^fReports on the WPE Constituent Congress in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* of Sept. 11, 1984, spoke of 13,000 to 15,000 paid party cadres.

^gThe 1970 ban on the Communist Party of Lesotho was partially lifted in 1984 so that it can take part in coming elections. *Rand Daily Mail* (Johannesburg), Oct. 2, 1984.

^hThe Réunion Communist Party won 29.8 percent of the vote and one deputy in elections to the European Parliament in June 1984; its share of the vote in December 1984 elections to some of the territory's cantons was only 25.5 percent.

ⁱAt the September 1984 Congress, the PIT "promoted" Seydou Cissoko to party chairman and elected Amath Dansoko general secretary.

^jThe communist party itself was not allowed to run, but it elected several of its members on the list of the Brazilian Democratic Movement.

The Americas ^a (cont.)	Mid-1984 population ^b	Party membership	Party leader ^c	Last congress	Legal status	Percentage of vote; seats in legislature ^d
13. Costa Rica (PVP)	2,693,000	10,000 claim 3,500 est.	Humberto Vargas Carbonell	14th, Apr. 8, 1984; 15th, Sep. 15–16, 1984	L	3.2 (1982); 4 of 57 via United People's Coalition
(PPC) ^k		No current data	Manuel Mora Valverde	14th, Mar. 10–11, 1984	L	n/a
14. Cuba	9,995,000	434,143 claim	Fidel Castro Ruz	2nd, Dec. 1981	R	— (1981); all 499 approved by PCC
15. Dominican Republic	6,416,000	500–1,000 est.	Narciso Isa Conde	3rd, Mar. 15–17, 1980	L	7.1 (1982); none
16. Ecuador	9,091,000	500 est.	René Mauge Mosquera	10th, Nov. 1981	L	3.6 (1984); 2 of 71 to Broad Left Front, and 4.0 to Mosquera for president
17. El Salvador	4,829,000	500 est. ^l	Shafik Jorge Handal	6th, Aug. 1970	O	(1984)
F. Grenada (MBPM)	113,000	No current data	Kenrick Radix	n/a	L	5.0 (1984); none
18. Guadeloupe	332,000	3,000 est.	Guy Daninthe	8th, Apr. 27–29, 1984	L	22.6 (1983); 11 of 41 and 1 in Paris
19. Guatemala (PGT)	7,956,000	750 est.	Carlos González	4th, Dec. 1969	O	(1984)
20. Guyana (PPP)	837,000	200–300 est.	Cheddi Jagan	21st, Jul.–Aug. 1982	L	19.5 (1980); 10 of 65
21. Haiti (PUCH)	5,805,000	No current data	René Theodore	1st, late 1978 or early 1979	O	(1984)
22. Honduras	4,424,000	No current data	Rigoberto Padilla Rush ^m	3rd, Mar. 1977	O	(1981)
23. Jamaica (WPJ)	2,338,000	50 est.	Trevor Munroe	3rd, Dec. 14–21, 1984	L	Boycotted 1983 elections
24. Martinique	330,000	1,000 est.	Armand Nicolas	8th, Nov. 1983	L	9.07 (1983); 4 of 41, none in Paris
25. Mexico (PSUM)	77,659,000	40,800 claim	Pablo Gómez Alvarez	2nd, Aug. 1983	L	4.3 (1982); 17 of 400
26. Nicaragua (PSN)	2,914,000	250 est.	Luis Sánchez Sancho	10th, Oct. 1973	L	1.3 (1984); 2 of 96
G. (FSLN)		4,000 claim	Bayardo Arce Castano (Coord. Pol. Committee)		R	67.0 (1984); 61 of 96
27. Panama (PPP)	2,101,000	35,000 claim ⁿ 750 est.	Rubén Darío Souza	6th, Feb. 1980	L	— (1984); none
28. Paraguay	3,623,000	3,500 est.	Antonio Maidana (arrested 1980)	3rd, Apr. 1971	O	(1973)
29. Peru	19,157,000	5,000 est.	Jorge del Prado	8th, Ext., Jan. 1982	L	2.8 (1980); 2 of 60
30. Puerto Rico	3,197,000	125 est.	Franklin Irizaray	Unknown	L	— (1984); none
31. United States of America	236,413,000	17,500 claim	Gus Hall	23rd, Nov. 1983	L	0.01 (1984); none
32. Uruguay	2,926,000	7,500 est.	Rodney Arismendi	20th, Dec. 1970	O ^o	6.0 (1984); none
33. Venezuela	18,552,000	4,000 est.	Jésus Faría	6th, Aug. 1980	L	2.0 (1983); 3 of 195 ^p

^kManuel Mora Valverde was ousted from the leadership of the PVP by Humberto Vargas Carbonell in December 1983 and responded by holding a rump 14th congress of a "Costa Rican People's Party" in March 1984.

^lThe Armed Forces of Liberation, associated with the Salvadoran CP, have an estimated 1,500 combatants. See *Time* (New York), Apr. 9, 1984. The Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front, in which the Salvadoran Communist Party is a minor member, makes an exaggerated claim of 50,000 members.

^mRush was reportedly expelled from the Central Committee and the post of secretary general because he allegedly operated "abroad" in comfort while the party suffered in Honduras. See *Vanguardia Revolucionaria* (clandestine in Honduras), Oct. 9, 1984.

ⁿThis claim relates to the number of supporters signing petitions to register the party in anticipation of the 1984 presidential election.

^oThe Uruguayan Communist Party is not formally legal, but it was allowed to participate in the 1984 elections as a member of the Broad Front Coalition, winning 6 percent of the votes (altogether, the Front won 21 percent).

^pDuring May 1984 municipal elections, the United Left Coalition, in which the Venezuelan Communist Party participated, polled 4.5 percent of the vote in Caracas, compared to 7.3 percent for the (Marxist) Movement Toward Socialism. See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Latin America* (Washington, DC), May 29, 1984, p. 41.

Checklist of Communist Parties in 1984

Asia and Pacific ^a	Mid-1984 population ^b	Party membership	Party leader ^c	Last congress	Legal status	Percentage of vote; seats in legislature ^d
H. Afghanistan (PDPA)	14,448,000	120,000 claim	Babrak Karmal	Natl. conf., Mar. 1982	R	n/a
34. Australia (SPA)	15,462,000	150 est. 1,000 est.	Judy Munday Peter Dudley Symon	28th, Nov. 4, 1984 5th, Sep. 28–Oct. 1, 1984	L L	— (1984); none — (1984); none
35. Bangladesh	99,585,000	3,000 est.	Muhammed Farhad	3rd, Feb. 1980	L	— (1981)
36. Burma	36,196,000	3,000 claim	Thakin Ba Thein Tin (Chairman)	2nd, Jul. 1945	O	n/a
37. China	1,034,907,000	Over 40 million claim ^a	Hu Yaobang	12th, Sep. 1982	R	— (1981); all 3,202 approved by CCP
38. India (CPI) (CPM)	746,388,000	478,500 claim 270,500 claim	C. Rajeswara Rao E.M.S. Namboodiripad	12th, Mar. 1982 11th, Jan. 1982	L L	— (1984); 6 of 544 5.80 (1984); 22 of 544
39. Indonesia	169,442,000	250 est. (exile) ^f	Sadiatjaya Sudiman ^g	7th Ext., Apr. 1962	O	n/a
40. Japan	118,896,000	480,000 claim	Tetsuzo Fuwa	16th, Jul. 1982	L	9.4 (1984); 26 of 511
H. Kampuchea (KPRP) (DK)	6,118,000	700 est. <i>No current data</i>	Heng Samrin <i>Pol Pot</i>	4th, May 1981 <i>Unknown</i>	R O	99.0 (1981); all 117 <i>n/a</i>
41. Korea (North) (KWP)	19,630,000	3,000,000 claim	Kim Il-song	6th, Oct. 1980	R	100 (1982); all 615 approved by KWP
42. Laos (LPRP)	3,732,000	35,000 est.	Kaysone Phomvihane	3rd, Apr. 1982	R	n/a
43. Malaysia (CPM) (MCP) ^h	15,330,000	1,100 est. ⁱ 800 est.	Chin Peng <i>Ah Leng</i>	1965 <i>Unknown</i>	O O	n/a n/a
44. Mongolia (MPRP)	1,860,000	76,240 claim	Dzhambiin Batmunkh	18th, May 1981	R	99.0 (1981); all 370 approved by MPRP
45. Nepal	16,578,000	5,000 est. ^v	Man Mohan Adhikary	3rd, 1968	O	n/a
46. New Zealand (CPNZ) (SUP)	3,238,000	50 est. 100 est.	Richard C. Wolfe George Jackson	Jan. 1979 6th, Oct. 1982	L L	— (1984); none 0.5 (1984); none
47. Pakistan	96,628,000	200 est.	Imam Ali Nazish	1st, cland., 1976	O	n/a
48. Philippines (PKP) (CPP/NPA)	55,528,000	400 est. 30,000 claim 7,500 est.	Felicismo Macapagal <i>Rafael Baylosis</i>	8th, 1980 <i>Unknown</i>	U O	(1984) (1984) ^w
49. Sri Lanka	15,925,000	6,000 est.	Kattorge P. Silva	12th, Jan. 27–29, 1984	L	1.9 (1977); 1 of 168 ^x
50. Thailand	51,724,000	1,200 est.	Virat Angkhathavorn (active leader)	5th, cland., Feb. 1984	O	n/a
51. Vietnam	59,030,000	1,730,214 claim	Le Duan	5th, Mar. 1982	R	97.9 (1981); all 496 approved by VCP

^aGeneral Secretary Hu has suggested that re-registration of party members may reduce the rolls by some 400,000. *The Washington Times*, Dec. 10, 1984.

^fThe party is split between a pro-Beijing faction (with 200 members) and a pro-Moscow faction (50).

^gSudiman presumably is in Moscow. The leader of the pro-Beijing faction is Jusuf Adjitorop, who has long been in Beijing.

^hThe Communist Party of Malaya, which does not recognize the separation of Singapore from Malaysia, has an estimated 200 additional members in Singapore.

ⁱThe Malaysian Communist Party has separated itself from the CPM (with its ethnic Chinese focus) to make an appeal as Marxist party for all nationalities in Malaysia.

^vFor all factions, with pro-Beijing and neutralist elements in the majority.

^wThe CPP, through the National Democratic Front, urged a mass boycott of the 1984 elections.

^xWon in a January 1981 by-election.

Eastern Europe and USSR ^a	Mid-1984 population ^b	Party membership	Party leader ^c	Last congress	Legal status	Percentage of vote; seats in legislature ^d
52. Albania (PPSh)	2,906,000	122,000 claim	Enver Hoxha	8th, Nov. 1981	R	99.9 (1982); all 250 to Democratic Front
53. Bulgaria	8,969,000	825,876 claim	Todor Zhivkov	12th, Mar.—Apr. 1981	R	99.9 (1981); all 400 to Fatherland Front
54. Czechoslovakia	15,420,000	1,623,000 claim	Gustáv Husák	16th, Apr. 1981	R	99.0 (1981); all 350 to National Front
55. Germany (East) (SED)	16,717,000	2,202,277 claim	Erich Honecker	10th, Apr. 1981	R	99.9 (1981); all 500 to National Front
56. Hungary (MSzMP)	10,681,000	232,000 claim	János Kádár	12th, Mar. 1980	R	99.3 (1980); all 352 to Patriotic People's Front
57. Poland (PZPR)	36,887,000	2,186,000 claim	Wojciech Jaruzelski	Ext. 9th, Jul. 1981	R	99.5 (1980); all 460 to Fatherland Front
58. Romania	22,683,000	3,400,000 claim	Nicolae Ceaușescu	13th, Nov. 19–22, 1984	R	98.5 (1980); all 369 to Front of Socialist Democracy and Unity
59. USSR	274,860,000	18,500,000 claim	Konstantin Chernenko	26th, Mar. 1981	R	99.9 (1984); all 1,500 approved by CPSU
60. Yugoslavia (SKJ)	22,997,000	2,500,000 claim	Đimce Belovski (Sec. of Presidium)	12th, Jun. 1982	R	— (1982); all 308 to Socialist Alliance
Middle East ^a	Mid-1984 population ^b	Party membership	Party leader ^c	Last congress	Legal status	Percentage of vote; seats in legislature ^d
61. Algeria (PAGS)	21,351,000	450 est.	Sadiq Hadjeres	6th, Feb. 1952	O	(1982)
I. Bahrain (NLF/B)	409,000	Negligible	Yusuf al-Hassan al-Ajjai	Unknown	O	n/a
62. Egypt	47,049,000 ^y	500 est.	Farid Mujahid	Unknown	O	(1979)
63. Iran (Tudeh)	43,820,000	2,000 est.	Nureddin Kianuri ^z	1965	O	3.0 (1980); none
64. Iraq	15,000,000	No current data	Aziz Muhammad	3rd, May 1976	O	— (1984)
65. Israel	4,235,000 ^{aa}	1,500 est.	Meir Vilner	19th, Feb. 1981	L	3.4 (1984); 4 of 120
66. Jordan	2,689,000	1,000 est.	Faiq Muhammad Warrad	2nd, Dec. 1983	O	n/a
67. Lebanon	2,601,000	15,000 claim	George Hawi	4th, 1979	L	— (1972); none
68. Morocco (PPS)	23,565,000	2,000 est.	'Ali Yata	3rd, Mar. 1983	L	2.3 (1984); 2 of 306
69. Palestine CP	4,500,000	200 est.	Bashir al-Barghuti (?)	1st, 1984 (?)	O	n/a
70. Saudi Arabia	10,794,000	Negligible	Ahmad Musa	2nd, Aug. 1984	O	n/a
71. Syria	10,075,000	5,000 est.	Khalid Bakdash	5th, May 1980	L	0.0 (1981); none
72. Tunisia	6,970,000 ^{bb}	2,000 est.	Muhammad Harmel	8th, Feb. 1981	L	0.78 (1981); none
J. Yemen—Aden (YSP)	2,147,000	26,000 claim	Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani	2nd, Ext., Oct. 1980	R	— (1978); all 111 approved by YSP

^yThe New York Times, June 20, 1984.^zKianuri is in prison; Ali Khavari is the provisional party leader in exile.^{aa}Includes the population of East Jerusalem.^{bb}From results of 1984 census.

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Western Europe ^a	Mid-1984 population ^b	Party membership	Party leader ^c	Last congress	Legal status	Percentage of vote; seats in legislature ^d
73. Austria	7,579,000	12,000 est.	Franz Muhri	25th, Jan. 13–15, 1984	L	0.66 (1983); none
74. Belgium	9,872,000	10,000 est.	Louis van Geyt	24th, Mar. & Dec. 1982	L	2.3 (1981); 2 of 212
75. Cyprus (AKEL)	662,000	14,000 claim	Ezekias Papaioannou	15th, May 1982	L	32.8 (1981); 12 of 35 Greek Cypriot seats
76. Denmark	5,112,000	10,000 est.	Poul Emanuel	27th, May 1983	L	0.7 (1984); none
77. Finland	4,873,000	50,000 claim	Arvo Aalto	20th, May 25–27, 1984	L	14.0 (1983); 27 of 200
78. France	55,600,000 ^{cc}	610,000 claim	Georges Marchais	24th, Feb. 1982	L	16.2 (1981); 44 of 491 ^{dd}
79. Germany (West)	59,387,000 (excl. W. Berlin)	50,482 claim	Herbert Mies	7th, Jan. 6–8, 1984	L	0.2 (1983); none
80. Great Britain	56,023,000	16,000 est.	Gordon McLennan	38th, Nov. 1983	L	0.03 (1983); none
81. Greece (KKE)	9,984,000	42,000 est.	Kharilaos Florakis	11th, Dec. 1982	L	10.9 (1981); 13 of 300 ^{ee}
(KKE-I)		12,000 est.	Yiannis Baniias	3rd, May 1982	L	1.3 (1981); none ^{ff}
82. Iceland (AB)	239,000	3,000 est.	Svavar Gestsson	Bienn. cong., Nov. 1983	L	17.3 (1983); 10 of 60
83. Ireland	3,575,000	500 est.	John Stewart	18th, May 1982	L	— (1982); none
84. Italy	56,998,000	1,700,000 claim	Alessandro Natta	16th, Mar. 1983	L	29.9 (1983); 198 of 630 ^{gg}
85. Luxembourg	366,000	600 est.	René Urbany	24th, Feb. 4–5, 1984	L	5.0 (1979); 2 of 59
86. Malta	329,599 ^{hh}	100 est.	Anthony Vassallo	Ext., May 18–25, 1984	L	1.0 (1981); none
87. Netherlands	14,437,000	10,000 est.	Elli Izeboud	Ext., Feb. 4, 5, 12, and 27, 1984	L	1.9 (1982); 3 of 150
88. Norway	4,145,000	500 est.	Hans I. Kleven	18th, Mar. 30–Apr. 2, 1984	L	0.3 (1981); none
(AKP)		1,000 est.	Paal Steigan	3rd, Apr. 1983	L	0.7 (1981); none
89. Portugal	10,045,000	200,000 est.	Alvaro Cunhal	10th, Dec. 1983	L	18.0 (1983); 44 of 250
90. San Marino	22,000	300 est.	Ermenegildo Gasperoni	10th, 1980	L	24.3 (1983); 15 of 60
91. Spain (PCE) (PC)	38,435,000	84,000 est. 25,000 claim	Gerardo Iglesias Ignacio Gallego	11th, Dec. 1983 1st, Jan. 13–15, 1984	L L	3.8 (1982); 4 of 350 n/a
92. Sweden (VPK)	8,335,000	17,500 claim	Lars Werner	26th, Nov. 1981	L	5.6 (1982); 20 of 349
(APK)		5,000 claim	Rolf Hagel	27th, 1983	L	0.1 (1982); none
93. Switzerland (PdAS)	6,477,000	4,500 est.	Armand Magnin	12th, May 1983	L	0.9 (1983); 1 of 200
94. Turkey	50,207,000	Negligible	Haydar Kutlu	5th, Oct. or Nov. 1983	O	(1983)
95. West Berlin (SEW)	2,000,000	4,500 est.	Horst Schmitt	7th, May 25–27, 1984	L	0.7 (1981); none

^{cc}From the 1982 census.

^{dd}The PCF won only 11.2 percent of the French vote in the June 1984 elections to the European Parliament. Subsequent public opinion polling confirmed the slump in communist support to 11 percent of the French electorate. *U.S. News and World Report* (Washington, DC), Feb. 18, 1985, p. 30.

^{ee}The KKE won 11.6 percent of the Greek vote in the June 1984 elections to the European Parliament.

^{ff}The KKE-I won 3.4 percent of the Greek vote in the June 1984 elections to the European Parliament.

^{gg}The Italian Communist Party won 33.3 percent of the Italian vote in the June 1984 elections to the European Parliament, against 33.0 for the Christian Democrats.

^{hh}Malta Central Statistical Office.

LEGEND OF ACRONYMS

AB	People's Alliance	PCT	Congolese Labor Party
AKEL	Progressive Party of the Working People	PdAS	Swiss Party of Labor
AKP	Communist Workers' Party	PDPA	People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
APK	Communist Workers' Party	PGT	Guatemalan Party of Labor
CPM	Communist Party of Malaya	PIT	Party of Independence and Labor
CPM	Communist Party (Marxist)	PPC	Costa Rican People's Party
CPNZ	Communist Party of New Zealand	PPP	People's Party of Panama
CPP/NPA	Communist Party of the Philippines/ New People's Army	PPP	People's Progressive Party (Guyana)
DK	Democratic Kampuchea (former Khmer Rouge, a.k.a. Kampuchean Communist Party)	PPS	Party of Progress and Socialism
FSLN	Sandinista Front for National Liberation	PPSh	Albanian Party of Labor
FRELIMO	Front for the Liberation of Mozambique	PRPB	People's Revolutionary Party of Benin
KKE	Greek Communist Party	PSN	Socialist Party of Nicaragua
KKE-I	Greek Communist Party (Interior)	PSUM	Unified Socialist Party of Mexico
KPRP	Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party	PUCH	Unified Party of Haitian Communists
KWP	Korean Workers' Party	PVP	Popular Vanguard Party
LPRP	Lao People's Revolutionary Party	PZPR	Polish United Workers' Party
MBPM	Maurice Bishop Patriotic Movement	RVP	Revolutionary People's Party
MCP	Malaysian Communist Party	SED	Socialist Unity Party
MPLA-PT	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola—Party of Labor	SEW	Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin
MPRP	Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party	SKJ	League of Communists of Yugoslavia
MSzMP	Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party	SPA	Socialist Party of Australia
NLF/B	National Liberation Front/Bahrain	SUP	Socialist Unity Party
PAGS	Socialist Vanguard Party	SWPP	Socialist Working People's Party
PC	Communist Party (Spain)	VPK	Left Party Communist
PCE	Communist Party of Spain	WPE	Workers' Party of Ethiopia
		WPJ	Workers' Party of Jamaica
		YSP	Yemen Socialist Party
		ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union

Alessandro Natta to replace the deceased Italian party leader Enrico Berlinguer, and of Dzhambiin Batmunkh to replace an allegedly ailing Yumjaagiyn Tsendenbal in Mongolia. In Senegal, Seydou Cissoko was "promoted" to chairman of the Party of Independence and Labor and replaced as general secretary by Amath Dansoko at the party congress in September.¹⁰

There were 30-odd national conferences or congresses of communist movements during 1984, two in the case of the Popular Vanguard Party in Costa Rica. Of particular note was the national conference of the ruling party in Angola, attended by some 500 delegates from all of the country's 18 provinces and dedicated to preparations for the December 1985 party congress.¹¹ The Workers' Party of Ethiopia held its founding congress in September, attended by 1,742 delegates.¹²

By and large there was little change in the legal status of communist movements during 1984. Communist or-

ganizations in Iraq and Honduras became illegal, while the party in Uruguay moved closer to legal status. Communist parties continued to rule 15 countries (with these parties accounting for about 75 million of the total 80 million communists enumerated by Zagladin). Of these countries, 10 belong to the "socialist commonwealth" as well as holding full membership in the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA). This mostly pro-Soviet core is outweighed in membership by the Chinese, plus the Albanian, Laotian, North Korean, and Yugoslav parties. Elsewhere, communists left government coalitions in France and Bolivia; only in Martinique and San Marino do communists now serve as minority members of governing coalitions.

Pro forma elections resulted in near-unanimous votes for the ruling parties in Benin, the Congo, and the Soviet Union. The Sandinista Front of National Liberation recorded a 67.0 percent showing and garnered 61 of 96 seats in November 4 elections marred by withdrawal of some opposition forces and by an ongoing anti-government insurgency. In more genuinely democratic settings, communist parties fared less well. The two Indian communist parties were unable to withstand Rajiv

¹⁰Curiously, the December 1984 issue of *World Marxist Review* (Toronto) carries an article by Cissoko, with him still identified as General Secretary.

¹¹"MPLA Conference," *ibid.*, Jan. 15, 1985.

¹²*The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*, Sept. 11, 1984.

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Gandhi's landslide victory: the Communist Party of India's representation in the Lok Sabha declined from 12 to 6, while the Communist Party (Marxist) lost 14 of its 36 seats. The Communist Party of Réunion saw its share of the vote decline from 32.73 percent in the 1983 assembly elections, to 29.8 percent in the June 1984 elections to the European Parliament, to 25.5 percent in cantonal elections in December 1984. In Denmark, the communist share dropped from 1.1 to 0.7 percent. Also in European Parliament balloting, the French Communist Party slipped to 11 percent of the French vote, but the Italian Communist Party scored its first electoral plurality, with 33.3 percent of the vote compared to 33.0 percent for the Christian Democrats. In Ecuador, party leader René Mauge Mosquera polled 4 percent as a presidential candidate of the Broad Left Front, and the Front won 3.6 percent of the vote for the legislature, both gains from the 3.2 won by the leftist Popular Democratic Union in the 1979 national elections. In Uruguay, the local communist party won some 6 percent of the vote when it was permitted to run within the Broad Front coalition.

We turn now to some highlights of developments in the various geographic areas.

Africa (Subsaharan). The most significant development in this region was the founding of a Workers' Party of Ethiopia after five years of preparation. Newly elected secretary general of the WPE, Mengistu Haile Mariam stated, in a speech transmitted by Addis Ababa Radio domestic service on September 6, 1984, that "the objective of our future struggle is the building of socialism."¹³ Seven of the 11 members of the WPE Politburo are military men. The number of Cubans propping up the Mengistu regime had dropped from some 20,000 in 1977 to about 5,000 as of early 1985,¹⁴ conceivably in connection with their transfer to Angola.

The Zimbabwe African National Union elected President Robert Mugabe to the vacant position of first secretary at its 5th Congress, in August. Mugabe pledged to transform the country into a one-party socialist state along Marxist-Leninist lines,¹⁵ which could possibly raise its status to that of a "revolutionary democratic" regime in Moscow's eyes. He later announced that the first general elections since independence five years ago would be held in March 1985.¹⁶ In July, the Congolese Labor Party held a congress at which it reelected its secretary general and added five of his supporters to the Polit-

buro. In Mozambique, President Samora Machel, who also heads the ruling FRELIMO party, dismissed three hard-line Marxists from his cabinet in June, the first signs of a split in the leadership in 15 years. The dismissed officials were in charge of interior, security, and natural resources.

As a result of an agreement signed between Mozambique and South Africa at Nkomati on March 16, 1984, the African National Congress apparently lost its staging bases in Mozambique.¹⁷ Although the South African Communist Party (SACP) insurgents have been reduced to several hundred, the party reportedly held a 6th Congress in London in December. This gathering described the party's role in the "revolutionary union" headed by the African National Congress (controlled by the SACP), adopted a new party statute, and elected a new central committee, with Moses Mabhida retained as secretary general.¹⁸

The Americas. There were three major regional conferences of communist parties during the year, all dutifully attacking as warlike the policies of US President Ronald Reagan and giving unanimous support for the Soviet policy line. On March 2-4, 12 parties, mostly from the Caribbean, met in Guyana; on June 11-13, a larger group from 21 countries in Central America and the Caribbean met in Havana; and on July 6-7, 13 parties, mostly from the South American continent, met in Buenos Aires.¹⁹ In Cuba, the ruling communist party has scheduled its 3rd Congress for December 1985.²⁰ A long-range development policy being worked out with the Soviet bloc should receive formal approval at that time. Havana continues to be dependent on outside assistance—drawing an estimated US\$4 billion in economic aid and another US\$1 billion in military assistance from the Soviet Union alone during 1984.²¹

Elections in Nicaragua have already been mentioned above. A member of the ruling Sandinista junta has openly acknowledged that the country's ruling ideology is Marxism-Leninism.²² Despite a deteriorating economy

¹⁷B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., "U.S. Is Planning to Aid Mozambique's Military," *The New York Times*, Jan. 17, 1985.

¹⁸TASS dispatch from London, "A Forum of Communists," *Pravda*, Jan. 8, 1985.

¹⁹On the meeting in Guyana, see *Mirror* (Georgetown), Mar. 11, 1984; on the Havana meeting, *Granma* (Havana), English edition, July 1, 1984; and on the meeting in Buenos Aires, *Noticias Argentinas* (Buenos Aires), July 6, 1984, and *Pravda*, Aug. 8, 1984.

²⁰*Pravda*, Dec. 29, 1984.

²¹*The New York Times*, May 2, 1984; and Central Intelligence Agency, *Handbook of Economic Statistics 1984*, CPAS 84-10002, Washington, DC, September 1984, Table 86, p. 117.

²²See comments by Bayardo Arce Castano, Coordinator of the Political Committee of the FSLN, at a meeting with the pro-Soviet Nicaragua Socialist Party in Managua. Transcript published in *La Vanguardia* (Barcelona), July 31, 1984.

¹³Trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Middle East & Africa* (Washington, DC), Sept. 18, 1984, p. R/38.

¹⁴*The Washington Post*, Feb. 6, 1985.

¹⁵*The New York Times*, Aug. 9, 1984.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, Jan. 24, 1985.

and a foreign debt of more than US\$4 billion, Nicaragua continues to serve as a conduit for military equipment going to communist guerrillas in El Salvador.²³ The latter, numbering an estimated 6,000 to 8,000,²⁴ boycotted the Salvadoran presidential election and runoff in March and May, and continue acts of sabotage. It is too early to tell whether the dialogue initiated between the guerrillas and President José Napoleon Duarte on October 15 in the village of La Palma will bring some relief from the fighting that has taken an estimated 50,000 lives during the past five years.

In Peru, the Maoist Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) group continues to resort to terror, having already caused some 5,000 deaths (approximately equal to its estimated total membership). The more orthodox Peruvian Communist Party operates through the (Marxist) United Left Coalition, which is now the second largest political group in the country. Chile, too, has experienced considerable violence, with the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) and the Manuel Rodríguez Patriotic Front both maintaining unofficial links with the communist party. The latter recently issued a leaflet calling upon the Chilean armed forces to oppose the Pinochet government.²⁵ Forced into clandestine existence, the communists belong to the Popular Democratic Movement, which preaches both violence and non-violent struggle. By contrast, the likelihood of violence in Colombia was apparently reduced as a result of agreements for a cease-fire between the government and major leftist insurgents, first of all the 15,000-member Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC), which is associated with the Communist Party of Colombia.²⁶

In Grenada, the Maurice Bishop Patriotic Movement (successor to the New Jewel Movement) participated in the November elections, winning only 5 percent of the vote. In Venezuelan municipal elections, the largest Marxist group, the Movement Toward Socialism, was able to garner only 4 percent of the vote. This poor showing by the Left may have occasioned a visit by a delegation from the CPSU to Caracas in December.²⁷ (The results in Uruguay have already been noted).

Asia and the Pacific. The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party announced on October 20, 1984, that besides continuing its successful "responsi-

bility system" reforms in the countryside, it intends to press forward with urban economic reforms as well. Party cadres are to be instructed to develop new "guidance" planning, make better use of price and tax levers, remove the government from management, and raise the technological and managerial standards in all urban enterprises.²⁸ Just before year's end, Soviet First Deputy Premier I. V. Arkhipov signed in Beijing three major economic agreements aimed at increasing the volume of trade between the USSR and China and providing new Soviet investment, technology, and economic advisers.²⁹ Although political relations still remain tense because of Moscow's refusal to comply with Beijing's three major demands—removal of troops from China's northern border, withdrawal from Afghanistan, and cessation of aid to Vietnam in its program of subjugating Kampuchea—this important economic pact will likely remove some of the chill from relations between the Soviet and Chinese communists.

On December 21, Deng Xiaoping and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher signed a treaty legitimizing the return of Hong Kong to China in 1997 under the principle of "one country—two systems." Deng would doubtless like to achieve a similar arrangement with regard to Taiwan.

North Korea continues to seek improved economic relations with its immediate neighbors and other states. In September, Pyongyang invited Japan Socialist Party Chairman Masashi Ishibashi for a visit looking toward expanded economic relations between Pyongyang and Tokyo.³⁰ Talks between North and South Korea in November were temporarily disrupted by a Soviet defection in the demilitarized zone dividing the two states, but are expected to resume. On September 8, North Korea announced a new joint venture law which is more extensive than similar Chinese legislation in spelling out protections and remittance procedures for the investment and earnings of would-be Western partners.³¹

In the Philippines, insurgents of the New People's Army, the armed wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines (Marxist-Leninist) killed more than 60 government troops in ambushes at the time of the March elections (the CPP, through the National Democratic Front, had opted to boycott the elections). Estimates of the precise strength of the NPA vary greatly, but all observers agree that its military activities have greatly ex-

²³On Nicaragua's role in supplying the Salvadoran insurgents, see the report of a briefing in Washington by Gen. Paul F. Gorman, commander of the United States Southern Command. *The New York Times*, Aug. 9, 1984.

²⁴*Ibid.*, Jan. 9, 1985.

²⁵Gaston Vargas, "Two Words," Moscow Radio in Spanish to Chile, Dec. 14, 1984 in *FBIS-SOV*, Dec. 17, 1984, p. K/3.

²⁶*The New York Times*, Apr. 3, 1984.

²⁷TASS report in *Pravda*, Dec. 15, 1984.

²⁸*Beijing Review*, Oct. 29, 1984, pp. 3–16, documents section. See also Robert Delfs, "Free-market Communism," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), Oct. 25, 1984.

²⁹*The New York Times*, Dec. 30, 1984.

³⁰Charles Smith, "A Thaw in the North?" *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Oct. 4, 1984.

³¹"Pyongyang Warns of Capitalist Contamination While Seeking Trade With West," *Vantage Point: Developments in North Korea* (Seoul), October 1984, p. 14. For the text of the new law, see *ibid.*, pp. 15–18.

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panded, with operations at company strength carried out in a number of areas.³²

Despite Vietnam's appalling economic problems,³³ Hanoi's communist leadership continued to display steadfast determination to bring Indochina under its hegemony. With strong backing from the USSR, which now supplies advanced Mi-24 "Hind" combat helicopters, Su-22 swing-wing fighter aircraft, missile attack boats, tanks, and a variety of surface-to-air missiles, Vietnamese troops began a concerted winter offensive in late December 1984 aimed at crushing Cambodian guerrilla resistance forces located around four major refugee camps on the Cambodian-Thai border. The Vietnamese apparently wanted first to destroy the viability of the noncommunist forces of former premier Son Sann and of Norodom Sihanouk, with the aim of leaving only the Democratic Kampuchean forces of discredited Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot as an alternative to the Heng Samrin regime backed by Hanoi.³⁴

In Afghanistan, despite Soviet tactics of "migratory genocide" in which between 250,000 and 1 million Afghans have died and nearly 4 million have been driven to seek refuge in Pakistan or Iran, mujahidin resistance to the Soviet-backed Babrak Karmal regime continues five years later. Even though Soviet forces carpet bomb villages and assault valleys with helicopter-borne commandos, there are still strong mujahidin bases less than 10 miles from Kabul, and the guerrillas are learning to use SAM-7 anti-aircraft missiles and small ground-to-ground rockets.³⁵

Eastern Europe and the USSR. The deaths of General Secretary Andropov in February and of Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov in December underscored the passing of the "old guard" from the CPSU leadership, a development that was only postponed for a time by the designation of an ailing Konstantin Chernenko (from that same generation) to replace Andropov. The young (born in 1931) Mikhail Gorbachëv has evidently moved into the vulnerable position of heir apparent and deputy to Chernenko. His prime contender is Grigoriy Romanov (born in 1923), who was brought to Moscow by Andropov and seems to share the late General Secre-

tary's commitment to police methods discipline, and expansion of military and industrial power. He reportedly controls the defense establishment and heavy industry, which places him in a strong position. Aging leadership is also an issue in Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the German Democratic Republic.

Moscow continues its efforts to control and coordinate the activities of its East European allies through the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA). At a mid-June CEMA summit, the Soviet attempt to integrate member economies more closely met with opposition from several countries desiring better economic relations with the West. In the autumn, Moscow prevailed on East Germany's Erich Honecker and Bulgaria's Todor Zhivkov to cancel visits to the Federal Republic of Germany, but Romania's Nicolae Ceaușescu went ahead with his visit to Bonn in October.

Poland continues to be Moscow's biggest headache in Eastern Europe. The unique phenomenon of a career military officer serving as head of the Polish party and government may well be troubling to traditionalist party leaders in Moscow. This may explain the presence in Warsaw of an 800-man Soviet military mission, under Soviet General S. F. Shcheglov.³⁶ Moscow would presumably prefer to have someone with greater experience in the management of party affairs heading the Polish party, which currently seems in considerable disarray. In the summer of 1980, the party claimed 3,149,000 members and candidate members. Over the next two years, it lost almost 800,000 members, and by December 1983, it claimed only 2,186,000.³⁷

The Middle East. The ruling Yemen Socialist Party in South Yemen claimed an increase of 7,000 in its membership and strengthened its military/economic ties with the Soviet Union. Elsewhere in the region, communists were able to participate in only two elections, retaining their four seats in Israel's legislature and increasing their representation in Morocco's to two. In Iran and Iraq, local communists remained hostage to a war situation over which they have no control. Iran's Tudeh party remains banned, its leader Nureddin Kianuri in prison. The splintered movement in Egypt witnessed the arrest and trials of its leaders.³⁸ Only in Lebanon and "Palestine" were there signs of some activism on the

³²See Guy Sacerdoti, "Red 'Army' on the March," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 28, 1984.

³³David Jenkins, "A Country Adrift . . .," *ibid.*, Nov. 8, 1984.

³⁴Author of the *YICA* profile on Vietnam Douglas Pike reports that in the 1980's, Soviet arms aid to Vietnam flowed at a rate of US\$1 billion a year, about three times the flow of USSR aid to Vietnam during the Vietnam war.

³⁵"Afghan Rebels Grow Stronger As War Wears On," *San Francisco Sunday Examiner & Chronicle*, Dec. 30, 1984; and Craig Karp, *A 5-Year Summary: Afghan Resistance and Soviet Occupation*, Special Report No. 118, US Department of State, Washington, DC, December 1984.

³⁶Article by General Leon Dubicki, a defector from Poland, in *The Wall Street Journal* (New York), June 4, 1984.

³⁷*Nowe drogi* (Warsaw), May 1984. Adam Schaff, a noted Polish communist ideologist, was expelled from the party in 1984 on the grounds that his interpretation of Marxism-Leninism was incompatible with party membership. See *The New York Times*, June 30, 1984.

³⁸See Amnesty International, *International Report—Egypt: Violation of Human Rights*, London, 1983, pp. 3, 5, 7.

part of local communists.³⁹ A TASS dispatch from Beirut reported on a "declaration" issued by (unspecified) "fraternal" parties from Arab countries, which contained the predictable anti-American/anti-Israeli propaganda;⁴⁰ the statement presumably originated from a meeting in either Damascus or Beirut.

Although signs of local communist activity in North Yemen are nonexistent, Moscow has continued its efforts to cultivate the Sanaa government. The Soviet Union has supplied 75 percent of the equipment for North Yemen's air force, 85–90 percent for its army, and almost 70 percent for its navy. In October, North Yemen's President, Colonel 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, visited Moscow, where he signed a 20-year treaty of friendship and cooperation with the USSR.⁴¹

Western Europe. The well-advertised "opening to the Left" appears to be moribund for now in both France and Italy. At mid-year, French Communists withdrew from the coalition government of socialist François Mitterrand. In Italy, socialist Prime Minister Bettino Craxi turned down the request of Italian communists for one of that country's two seats on the executive commission of the Common Market.⁴² On Cyprus, the Progressive Party of the Working People (AKEL) was notified by President Spyros Kyprianou that his Democratic Party would no longer cooperate with the communists.⁴³

The region is still affected by Eurocommunism. In Finland, the communist party expelled all pro-Soviet

hard-liners from the Central Committee on May 26, 1984, a move likely to be on the agenda of an extraordinary congress scheduled for March 1985. The CPSU's concern with this situation was evident in an article by M. Kostikov and V. Mikhailov in *Pravda* of December 13, 1984. A major split in the Norwegian party appears to be the reason for calling an extraordinary congress of that movement for the spring of 1985. The Communist Party of Great Britain is involved in a possible bifurcation, resulting from the expulsion of 22 Communists for "factional ultra-left propaganda."⁴⁴ In the Netherlands, a hard core of orthodox Marxist-Leninists left the party in February to form an Alliance of Communists in the Netherlands.⁴⁵ The Greeks and Spaniards each have two parties, one loyal to Moscow, the other not. The Spanish split occurred in January 1984 with the formation of the rival Partido Comunista, which absorbed pro-Soviet dissidents who had earlier left or been expelled from the PCE. PCE Secretary General Gerardo Iglesias condemned the break-away group as an "exercise in dead theory" and accused it of serving the interests of the Right by "sowing confusion and dividing the working class."⁴⁶ Even in the French party one now finds signs of disaffection with the Soviets. Only the Austrian, Cypriot, Danish, Luxembourg, West German, and Portuguese parties echo fully Moscow's line.⁴⁷

⁴⁴*Morning Star* (London), Dec. 18, 1984.

⁴⁵Some 350 members of this break-away group attended a meeting on October 6–7, 1984, convened to prepare for a founding party congress in October 1985.

⁴⁶Kevin Devlin, "Spain's Other Communist Party," *RFE-RL, RFE Research*, Feb. 10, 1984, RAD Background Report, 8/84; also *The New York Times*, Jan. 16, 1984, and *The Washington Post*, Jan. 18, 1984. As Devlin observed, Moscow and Prague sent official delegations, although the Soviet ambassador to Madrid, Yuriy Bubinin (who had attended the PCE Congress in December 1983), was notably absent, suggesting a wish to play both horses in Spain. Devlin likens Moscow's behavior to the CPSU's dispatch of a delegation to the 1977 founding congress of the pro-Soviet splinter Communist Workers' Party in Sweden and continued relations with it, as well as with the Left Communist Party despite the latter's protests.

⁴⁷*The Economist*, June 2, 1984, pp. 36–37.

³⁹On the Lebanese party, see "Appeal of the Lebanese Communists," *Pravda*, Jan. 1, 1985. Regarding the Palestine Communist Party, its ability to "function most openly" is viewed as "one of the curiosities of the Israeli occupation." Al-Barghuti, jailed for 8 years under Jordanian rule, now edits a weekly party newspaper, *al-Tali'ah* (The Vanguard), in East Jerusalem. See *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, Feb. 12, 1984.

⁴⁰TASS dispatch from Beirut, "Declaration of Communist and Workers' Parties of the Arab Countries," July 19, 1984.

⁴¹*Pravda*, Oct. 11, 1984.

⁴²*Est et Ouest* (Paris), September 1984, pp. 7–10; and *The Wall Street Journal*, Jan. 2, 1985.

⁴³TASS report over Moscow Radio, Dec. 23, 1984, in *FBIS-SOV*, Dec. 31, 1984, p. G/4.

Communist Fronts in 1984

Wallace Spaulding

ALTHOUGH 1984 was not a year of major changes in the organization and activity of the leading Soviet-line international front groups, it is important to track Moscow's ongoing utilization of such instrumentalities to promote Soviet foreign policy objectives.

In recent years there have been annual consultative meetings of representatives of most or all of the 10 major front groups. In February 1984, the International Organization of Journalists (IOJ) hosted such a meeting in Prague, apparently attended by representatives of all major fronts except the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL),¹ which had also missed similar gatherings in 1982 and 1983.² However, in October, the IADL itself showed new signs of life with its 12th Congress, attended by some 600 delegates—apparently the largest front meeting of 1984.³

Among other groups attending the 1984 consultative meeting were three minor fronts which were also listed in attendance at the previous two annual consultative meetings and thereby appear to be striving to project a separate identity—the World Federation of Teachers' Unions (a trade union international belonging to the World Federation of Trade Unions—WFTU); the International Institute of Peace (the World Peace Council's research body); and the Organization of Solidarity with the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (AALAPSO or OSPAL). Although the last-mentioned group appears to

be an extension of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) into Latin America, it also has its own links to other fronts through its president, Susumo Ozaki of Japan, who is a vice-president of the IADL,⁴ and through its secretary general, Melba Hernandez of Cuba, who is a member of the Presidential Committee of the World Peace Council.⁵

The most noteworthy personnel changes in the major international fronts during 1984 occurred in the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), the International Union of Students (IUS), and AAPSO. In February, Vilmos Cserveny of Hungary became secretary general of the WFDY, succeeding fellow countryman Miklos Barabas, who was given the job of secretary general of the Hungarian National Peace Movement.⁶ At the 14th IUS Congress in April, Georgios Michaelides of Cyprus replaced India's Srinivasan Kunalan as secretary general, with Miroslav Stepan of Czechoslovakia remaining the president.⁷ In addition, in late December, it was announced that Ahmad Hamrush had been nominated to succeed the ailing Abd-al-Rahman Sharqawi as AAPSO's president, a slot allocated to an Egyptian by the rules of the organization.⁸

It is also interesting that WFTU President Sándor Gáspár was replaced as secretary general of the Hungarian National Council of Trade Unions by Lajos Mehes and given the presidency of the latter body instead.⁹ Such a job shift is generally regarded as a graceful demotion, and I assume it to be related to his liberal tendencies, previously noted by me.¹⁰ Gáspár also lost his position as Hungary's representative on the WFTU Gen-

¹Radio Prague, Feb. 26, 1984.

²*Flashes from the Trade Unions* (Prague), Mar. 23, 1982, and Oct. 21, 1983.

³*Ibid.*, Nov. 9, 1984. If the IADL is to be more active, it will still be under the old leadership, as Joe Nordman (France) was reelected president and Amar Bentoumi (Algeria) was reelected secretary general.

⁴*Barricada* (Managua), July 18, 1984.

⁵*New Perspectives* (Helsinki), No. 4, 1984, p. 2.

⁶Radio Budapest, Feb. 19, 1984.

Prague CTK, Apr. 16, 1984; and Sofia BTA, Apr. 11–16, 1984.

⁸*Al-Jumhuriyah* (Cairo), Dec. 30, 1984.

⁹*Hungarian Trade Union News* (Budapest), March 1984, p. 2.

¹⁰See my section "International Communist Organizations" in Robert Wesson, Ed., *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1983* (hereafter, *YICA 1983*), Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1984, p. 397.

Colonel Spaulding, USAR (ret.), is a Washington-based observer of international Communist affairs. He holds a doctorate in international relations from the University of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia) and is a graduate of the US Army War College (Carlisle, PA).

Table 1. Major International Communist Front Organizations

	Year founded	Head-quarters	Claimed membership	Affiliates	Countries
World Peace Council	1949	Helsinki	No data	No data	142
World Federation of Trade Unions	1945	Prague	Ca. 206 million	92 ^a	81
Women's International Democratic Federation	1945	East Berlin	Over 200 million	135 ^b	117 ^b
World Federation of Democratic Youth	1945	Budapest	Over 150 million	Over 270	123
Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization	1957	Cairo	No data	87	No data
International Union of Students	1946	Prague	Over 10 million	120 (?) ^c	112 (?) ^c
World Federation of Scientific Workers	1946	London	Ca. 500,000 ^d	ca. 40 ^d	Over 70
International Organization of Journalists	1946	Prague	Over 180,000	No data	Over 120
Christian Peace Conference	1958	Prague	No data	No data	At least 80
International Association of Democratic Lawyers	1946	Brussels	Ca. 25,000	No data	Nearly 80

^a*Flashes from the Trade Unions* (Prague), Nov. 2, 1984.

^b*Women of the Whole World* (East Berlin), No. 1, 1984, p. 5.

^cNational student unions from Malawi, Lesotho, and Papua-New Guinea were admitted as new members at the April IUS Congress. Sofia BTA, Apr. 16, 1984.

^dRadio Prague, Mar. 14, 1984.

eral Council to the aforementioned Mehes,¹¹ the job evidently going with the secretary generalship of the national organization.

There were also a number of changes at the vice-presidential level in the front organizations during the year. Rodolfo Mechina replaced the deceased Amerigo Terenzi as Italian vice-president of the WPC,¹² but it is not known who, if anyone yet, has replaced the deceased Argentinian WPC vice-president Alfredo Varela. A Syrian, A. al-Asad, was noted as a vice-president of AAPSO in April, bringing the total of AAPSO vice-presidents to nine on the eve of its Sixth Congress.¹³ That congress, in Algiers in May, reelected the ailing Abd-al-Rahman Sharqawi as president and Nuri Abd-al-Razzaq Husayn of Iraq as secretary general, and provided slots for 17 vice-presidents—four from "liberation movements," seven from African countries, and six from Asian countries—an expansion almost entirely in the African sphere.¹⁴ Three new WFDY vice-presidents were also noted during the year: Nguyen Van Ky of Vietnam, Li Jong Gun of North Korea, and Binoy Viswam of India.¹⁵ The IADL Congress in October added a South African vice-presidential slot, which it filled with Archie Gumede.¹⁶

In the front secretariats, Miguel Gonzalez Regas replaced fellow Colombian Oscar Gonzalez as one of the two deputy secretaries general of the WFDY; also, Andre

Gerhardt (Poland), Joe Sims (USA), Jackie Selibi (South Africa), Konstantin Stathis (Greece), Mihai Botorog (Romania), and Freddy Fernández (Venezuela) were identified as new secretaries.¹⁷ Dev Kumar Ganguli replaced fellow Indian K. G. Srivastava as one of the WFTU's five secretaries.¹⁸ Elson Concepción (country unknown) was noted as the new secretary for Latin America of the International Organization of Journalists, possibly replacing either Miguel Arteaga (Cuba) or Leopoldo Fernandez Vargas (Colombia).¹⁹ Similarly, Phil Spillman (country unknown) and Pavi Aarolainen (Finland) apparently joined the World Peace Council Secretariat during the year, while Denmark's Carl Rosschou left that body.²⁰ Finally, it was revealed that Archpriest Georgiy Goncharov was the "representative of the Russian Orthodox Church at the CPC [Christian Peace Conference] Central Office in Prague."²¹ This suggests that the Russian CPC Deputy Secretary General, Archimandrite Sergey Fomin, may not actually be resident at CPC headquarters and that it is actually Goncharov who gives the on-the-spot Soviet guidance there normally provided at an international communist front's headquarters.²²

During 1984 there were modest additions to previous information regarding the membership and affiliates of the major fronts. These are noted, with source information, in the accompanying Table 1, which summarizes current knowledge on the fronts.

¹¹*Népszabadság* (Budapest), April 10, 1984.

¹²*L'Unità* (Rome), Dec. 3, 1984.

¹³*Pravda* (Moscow), Apr. 24, 1984; on the number of AAPSO vice-presidents on the eve of the congress, see my section on "International Communist Organizations" in Richard F. Staar, Ed., *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1984* (hereafter, *YICA 1984*), Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1984, p. 431.

¹⁴Algiers, APS, May 31, 1984.

¹⁵*WFDY News* (Budapest), Nos. 3, 6, and 7, 1984.

¹⁶*The Star* (Johannesburg), Nov. 1, 1984.

¹⁷*WFDY News*, 1-2, 3, 6, 7, and 12, 1984.

¹⁸*Flashes from the Trade Unions*, Nov. 2, 1984.

¹⁹*I/OJ Newsletter* (Prague), No. 8, 1984.

²⁰*New Perspectives*, Nos. 2, 4, and 11, 1984.

²¹*CPC Information* (Prague), June 11, 1984.

²²On this pattern, see my "International Communist Organizations," in *YICA 1983*, p. 394.

Policies of the Fronts in 1984

What themes did these fronts pursue in their work during 1984? Throughout the year the peace theme remained paramount. The stage had been more or less set by the end of 1983, when WIDF Secretary General Mirjam Vire-Touminen declared that her organization's activity during the following year would be devoted totally to struggling for peace and against nuclear war.²³ This was followed by a WIDF "Consultative Meeting on Dis-

armament" in East Berlin in late January 1984. The action programs of both the WPC and WFDY, as well as these two organizations' largest gatherings of the year—the January WPC Presidential Committee meeting in West Berlin, the April WPC Bureau meeting in New Delhi, and the February meeting of the WFDY Executive Committee in Havana—shared this emphasis.²⁴ In addition, the 14th IUS Congress (in Sofia in April) and the 36th WFTU General Council meeting (in Sofia in October) each had a special session devoted exclusively to the peace subject, the only such special session at each gathering. "Peace" was also the primary subject for consideration at the IADL Congress in Athens, at least as indicated in the account of the event in *Pravda* of October 22, 1984, and it also seems to have dominated the 47th session of the Executive Council of the World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW) at Varna in April.²⁵

The tendency at these gatherings was to focus on American deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe as the most immediate danger to peace, but then to foster a false image of objectiv-

Table 2: Examples of the Even-handed Approach

WPC Objectives	WFTU resolution
Halt in deployment of new missiles in Europe and the dismantling of those already deployed (first point)	Halt in deployment of new missiles in Europe and the dismantling of those already deployed (first point)
Renunciation by all nuclear states of the first use of nuclear weapons (second point)	Renunciation by all nuclear states of the first use of nuclear weapons (second point)
Immediate freeze in testing, production, and storage of nuclear weapons (third point)	Total ban on nuclear weapons (third point)
Prohibition of the neutron bomb and of chemical and bacteriological weapons (fourth point)	Ban on research, manufacture, stockpiling, and use of chemical and bacteriological weapons (fourth point)
Ban on militarization of outer space (fifth point)	Ban on militarization of outer space (eighth point)
Establishment of nuclear-free zones in Nordic, Balkan, and central Europe (last part of sixth point); free Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and the Caribbean of nuclear arms (first part of ninth point)	Creation of nuclear-free zones in different regions of the world (seventh point)

In sharp contrast to this even-handed approach was the following statement that came out of the April WPC Bureau meeting in New Delhi: "The WPC considers that under prevailing conditions, the struggle to end the deployment of the new US nuclear missile weapons and to dismantle and withdraw those already deployed is the main task for the planet's peace movement."²⁶ This was one of the stronger statements on the subject by any front organization, but similar sentiments were also expressed by the January WPC Presidential Committee

²³East Berlin ADN, Dec. 30, 1983.

²⁴See WPC, *1984 Objectives of the Program of Action*, Helsinki, n.d., pp. 5–6, 17–18; *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), Jan. 23–25 and Feb. 9–10, 1984; and *Pravda*, Apr. 10, 1984.

²⁵Sofia BTA, Apr. 10, 1984.

²⁶This shift from a one-sided to a more "equal" approach was already discernible in 1983. See my section on "International Communist Organizations" in *YICA 1984*, pp. 434–35. The even greater intertwining of these two approaches during 1984 may have reflected a more indecisive Soviet leadership.

²⁷Loc. cit.; and *World Trade Union Movement* (Prague), No. 12, 1984, p. 19.

²⁸*Pravda*, Apr. 10, 1984.

meeting in West Berlin, the March–April WFDY Youth Peace Meeting in Copenhagen, the April WFTU Bureau meeting in Paris, and the June CPC Presidential Board meeting in Warsaw.²⁹ It was also emphasized in the WPC's call for an early-December "week of action" involving demonstrations outside US diplomatic and military installations abroad, the implementation of which in such irrelevant (to the issue at hand) places as Kabul gave ample evidence of the contrived nature of the campaign.³⁰ Finally, the row between official delegations from the USSR and Eastern Europe, on the one hand, and the representatives of more truly neutral "equal responsibility" peace groups, on the other, at the July European Nuclear Disarmament (END) meeting in Perugia over 59 East-bloc dissidents who were not able to attend the gathering is illustrative.³¹ These dissidents could certainly have approved the "equal" propositions enumerated in the WPC *Objectives* and the WFTU resolution cited above, and their linkage of these with human rights and civil rights issues is, ironically, mirrored in the WPC document, whose twelfth point is: "to defend human rights and the rights of the people to struggle against . . . the political practices of repressive regimes."³²

The issue of development in the Third World was an important secondary emphasis during the year. This could be seen especially in the October WFTU General Council meeting, where "the role of trade unions in solving economic problems of developing countries" was the first item on the agenda and appeared to be the theme most publicized.³³ The "right to development" was just behind the "right of peace and security" as an emphasis at the 12th IADL Congress.³⁴ The 6th AAPSO Congress related the arms race to economic backwardness, just as the WPC *Objectives* cited the arms race and the threat of nuclear war as hindrances to the creation of a "New International Economic Order" (NIEO).³⁵ An NIEO, in which the allegedly unequal relationships between the developed and underdeveloped worlds would be replaced by ones of "equality and mutual benefit" as specifically manifested in "Socialist"—Third World relationships, is in fact the stated objective of the fronts.³⁶ Singled out for attack are the transnational corporations (accused of engaging in "plunder") and the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (accused of imposing "draconian conditions" on their borrowers).³⁷ In April the WPC cosponsored a seminar in Katmandu specifically devoted to the NIEO.

There was also much activity focused on youth during the year, in preparation for the World Youth Festival, cosponsored by WFDY and IUS and scheduled for Moscow in the summer of 1985 (designated as International Youth Year by the UN). Three large preparatory committee meetings were held: in Havana in February,

in Sofia in April, and in Moscow in November. This third meeting, attended by 517 delegates from 117 countries, was addressed by the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Konstantin Chernenko, and by Boris Ponomarev, CPSU secretary and alternate Politburo member and de facto chief of the CPSU's International Department—an indication of the importance Moscow attaches to this effort. The November meeting also saw the establishment of a Permanent Commission of 43 representatives to act as a coordinating body between the Soviet preparatory committee and like committees already set up in 87 other countries.³⁸ Tying in with this youth emphasis was a series of sketches of various WFDY affiliates that were published in *World Marxist Review*, beginning with the April 1984 issue.

The IADL, WPC, WFTU, WIDF, WFDY, AAPSO, and IUS participated in the sponsorship of an International Conference of Solidarity with Nicaragua and for Peace in Central America, held in Lisbon in May. This same group, minus the WIDF and IUS, staged a conference on Korean unification, held in Paris in March.³⁹ Other topics treated by the fronts in a significant manner during the year were: an attack on South Africa's "apartheid regime" at a meeting in Harare in May, cosponsored by the WFTU; a meeting of solidarity with the "liberation struggle" in South Africa and Namibia, held in Cologne in October, sponsored by the International Committee on Southern Africa, a joint group of the WPC and AAPSO; support of Greek Cypriots against the Turks, at a meeting in Nicosia in November, supported by the WPC; a meeting discussing a New International Information Order (to give the Third World "fair treatment" in the media) held in Kabul in November–December, sponsored by AAPSO. Commentary on the Middle East and traditional attacks on Israel were less evident in 1984, but AAPSO at its 6th Congress was able to get PLO leader Yasir Arafat to address the opening session, and the IOJ's International Committee on Defense of Journalists (meeting at Varna in August) appears to have concentrated on Palestine.⁴⁰

²⁹*Flashes from the Trade Unions*, Feb. 10, 1984; *Berlingske Tidende* (Copenhagen), Apr. 2, 1984; *Flashes from the Trade Unions*, Apr. 27, 1984; and *CPC Information*, June 11, 1984.

³⁰See Moscow TASS, Dec. 12, 1984; and *Pacific Tribune* (Vancouver), Nov. 21, 1984.

³¹*La Stampa* (Rome), July 19, 1984; and *Corriere della Sera* (Milan), July 19, 1984.

³²WPC, 1984 *Objectives*, p. 19.

³³*World Trade Union Movement*, No. 12, 1984, p. 4.

³⁴*Flashes from the Trade Unions*, Nov. 9, 1984.

³⁵Moscow TASS, May 31, 1984; cf. Point 10, WPC, 1984 *Objectives*, p. 18.

³⁶See *Flashes from the Trade Unions*, Nov. 9, 1984.

³⁷*World Trade Union Movement*, No. 12, 1984, pp. 4–5.

³⁸*People's Democracy* (New Delhi), Nov. 18, 1984.

³⁹*Peace Courier* (Helsinki), special issue, April 1984.

⁴⁰Sofia BTA, Aug. 9, 1984.

Books

Brezhnev's Foreign Policy

William E. Griffith

HARRY GELMAN. *The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Detente*. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1984.

THIS is a remarkable, indeed an essential book. What is more, it has appeared at just the right time. Since there is now some prospect of meaningful US-USSR arms control negotiations, which American public opinion clearly favors, it becomes again important for the West to see the Soviet Union, and especially its foreign policy, as clearly as possible. Harry Gelman has performed a yeoman service toward this goal. It would be difficult to improve on one of his concluding statements:

Both because of their weakness and because of their strengths, the Soviet leaders are likely to continue to be impelled to press outward, re-

sponding to their vision of their precarious legitimacy and ever-imperiled security and in the process discovering, as opportunities permit, new advantages that must be defended... (p. 218)

It follows, Gelman adds, that the Soviet "attacking compulsion" is insatiable. This is not surprising: few great powers, and fewer statesmen, have resisted opportunities.

One of the great strengths of this book is that it combines analysis of Soviet foreign policy with excellent Kremlinology. No mean feat, as anyone who has tried it can testify. Gelman is an experienced and finely-honed Kremlinologist, and his analysis of factional struggles in the Brezhnev era is, in my judgment, worthy of that done for earlier periods by Robert Conquest and Michel Tatu.¹ Space constraints forbid my summarizing his Kremlinological conclusions in great detail, so only a few must suffice. First, he rightly stresses the greater role played by the military under Leonid Brezhnev, and the institutionalization of that role through the Defense Council, from which Brezhnev excluded for

some time even such senior Central Committee secretaries as Mikhail Suslov and Andrey Kirilenko. This was, as Gelman points out, a return to Stalin's *divide et impera* policy of using Politburo committees. The Defense Council, with its institutionalized military as well as political representation, was able under Brezhnev's chairmanship to subvert and supersede the authority of the full Politburo in military matters.

Gelman also has an important section on the growing role of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee during the Brezhnev era. As he points out, this department, long headed by Boris Ponomarev, increased its role in policy formulation and direction toward Third World liberation movements and Western Europe. With respect to the latter, this became particularly noticeable during the Soviet struggle against INF deployment. (I wonder, though, whether its role remained so important once Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko became a full Politburo member.) Gelman unfortunately does not discuss the Department for Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries, of which less is known, but which clearly plays a very important and perhaps even a key role in dealing with communist parties and the states they rule. Nor

William E. Griffith is Ford Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Cambridge, MA) and Adjunct Professor of Diplomatic History at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University (Medford, MA). He is the author of numerous works on the foreign relations of Communist states, including three on Sino-Soviet relations and, most recently, *The Super-Powers and Regional Tensions: The USSR, the United States, and Europe* (1982).

¹Conquest, *Power and Policy in the USSR: the Struggle for Stalin's Succession 1945-1960*, New York, Harper and Row, 1970; Tatu, *Power in the Kremlin: From Khrushchev to Kosygin*, New York, Viking, 1969.

does he discuss differences within and among the various other bureaucracies, about which some excellent studies do exist.²

WITH RESPECT to the single main problem of Soviet (and of American) foreign policy, the Soviet-American relationship, Gelman begins by pointing out that Soviet policy is both defensive and coercive and that Soviet "détente policy" is intended in large part to further the exploitation of the Soviet competitive advantage. He adds that Moscow wants to have the United States and the rest of the world recognize the legitimacy of an expandable Soviet empire, the right of the Soviet Union to play a contin-

ually greater role in the world, and finally, the justness of asymmetrical rights in military security—what Moscow likes to call "equality and equal security"—that is, that the USSR should have military nuclear parity with all of its actual and potential nuclear opponents (thus putting the United States into a permanent position of nuclear inferiority). Moreover, in the Soviet view, the United States should not link Soviet-American relations to Soviet actions in the Third World, while the Soviet Union has the right to insist on linkage between Sino-US and Soviet-US relations. What this means, of course, as Gelman adds, is that the Soviet Union refuses to have its own military and political "overinsurance" questioned or, to put it even more clearly, that the Soviet Union tries not to accept in reality what it constantly declaims is its goal: nuclear and political parity with the United States.

The Soviets were in favor of détente with the United States, the author points out, as long as it did not affect the stream of their expansionism, in which détente was only an "island which neither halted nor changed" it (p. 116). They were for détente because of their desire to prevent or limit better American relations with China; to carry out a successful *Westpolitik* in Western Europe, especially in West Germany; and to get credits and technology transfer from the capitalist world, especially from the United States, West Germany, and Japan. But Moscow was not prepared to accept the kind of limits on its strategic buildup that would have made less great the US public's fear of and reaction to it. Moreover, after the early 1970's the Soviets began, as Gelman analyzes it, to fear that the profits of détente they had hoped for were being eroded. Notably, the Jackson and Stevenson amendments effectively blocked US Export-Import Bank

credits and technology transfer in return for which the Soviets had, surprisingly, been ready to allow much larger Jewish emigration. Also, Anwar al-Sadat and Henry Kissinger maneuvered the Soviets out of Egypt.

Then came 1975, the key year in the decline of détente. Although Moscow's hopes in Portugal were disappointed, it thought it had won in Angola and Mozambique. Moreover, the Clark amendment stopped Kissinger's attempt to prevent the Soviet-Cuban-MPLA victory in Angola. This and the inglorious American evacuation of its embassy in South Vietnam probably convinced Moscow that America's imperial will was permanently diminished. Gelman also makes the valuable, often neglected, point that Brezhnev's failure at his November 1974 meeting in Vladivostok with President Gerald Ford to get any compensation for the NATO Forward-Based Systems (FBS) in Western Europe probably contributed greatly to the Soviet decision to begin a large-scale SS-20 buildup targeted on Western Europe, minimally to compensate for FBS.

Gelman then analyzes the events of the next two years, 1978 and 1979, which marked at least the temporary interment of détente. The Soviet involvement in Ethiopia in 1978 enabled National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski to go to Beijing and negotiate there with Deng Xiaoping on the steps that resulted in Sino-US diplomatic normalization. The Soviet-Vietnamese friendship treaty of November 1978, which Hanoi needed in order to get Soviet aid and deter China's interference with Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea, marked the attainment of a long hoped for Soviet objective: the southern encirclement of China and the establishment of Soviet air and naval bases at Danang and Cam Ranh Bay athwart the US air and

²For the International Department's role in Sino-Soviet relations, see Gilbert Rozman, "Moscow's China Watchers in the Post-Mao Era: The Response to a Changing China," *The China Quarterly* (London), June 1983; William E. Griffith, "Sino-Soviet Rapprochement?" *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March-April 1983, and "Sino-Soviet Relations in the Asian Quadrangle," a paper delivered at the 13th Sino-US Conference on Mainland China, Taipei, June 11-17, 1984 (publication forthcoming in the conference proceedings). On Soviet-East European relations, see Michael J. Sodaro, "In the Shadow of the Missiles: East German and Soviet Perceptions of West German Foreign Policy," Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, George Washington University (Washington, DC), unpub. ms.; Ronald Asmus, "The Moscow-East Berlin-Bonn Triangle: The Dialectics of Détente and Discord," *Orbis* (Philadelphia), forthcoming; Fred Oldenburg, "Are Moscow's Shadows Lengthening?" *Deutschland Archiv* (Cologne), August 1984; and Eberhard Schultz and Peter Danylow, *Bewegung in der Deutschen Frage?* (Movement on the German Question?), Bonn, Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik, No. 33, 1984. Controversy over East-West relations has involved very high levels of the Liaison Department and of the international departments of the Hungarian and Czechoslovak Central Committee Secretariats: see Mátyás Szűrös (Secretary for International Affairs, Hungarian CC Secretariat), "Interaction of the National and the International in Hungarian Policy," *Társadalmi Szemle* (Budapest), January 1984, tr. in *The New Hungarian Quarterly* (Budapest), Spring 1984; M. Stefanák and I. Hlivka (Chief and Deputy Chief, International Department, Czechoslovak CC Secretariat), "The National and International in the Policy of the KSC," *Rudé právo* (Prague) Mar. 30, 1984; O. V. Borisov (pseud. for O. B. Rakhmanin, First Deputy Chief, Department for Liaison, CPSU CC Secretariat), "A Union of a New Type," *Voprosy istorii KPSS* (Moscow), No. 4, 1984. (Rakhmanin has been one of the strongest polemicists against the Chinese; see Rozman and Griffith.) For the CPSU CC International Department, see Robert W. Kitrinos, "International Department of the CPSU," *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1984.

sea lanes from the Philippines to the Indian Ocean, Diego Garcia, and the Persian Gulf. Finally, there came the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, which was meant, as Gelman rightly puts it, to protect Soviet offensive gains in the area. (So much for "defensive" versus "offensive" arguments about it.) What Moscow had not expected, but what its actions then precipitated, was President Jimmy Carter's reversal of American policy—a move to catch up with, not lead, US public opinion, and one which, given Moscow's policies, would have happened sooner or later anyhow, albeit perhaps not so infelicitously.

THROUGHOUT his analysis, Gelman ties in domestic and foreign policy in the Soviet Union and the United States. As he puts it:

By resorting instinctively to preemptive repression in response to the domestic threat it felt détente posed, the Soviet leadership in the end undercut its ability to exploit the many asymmetrical vulnerabilities that détente simultaneously exposed in American society. (p. 173)

In his final chapter, Gelman surveys the problems of Brezhnev's later years: the growing economic crisis; Brezhnev's declining health and his consequent boosting of his client Konstantin Chernenko; the successful challenge to this arrangement mounted by Yuriy Andropov, who replaced first Suslov and eventually Brezhnev himself. Although the book was finished before Andropov's death, Gelman struck just the right concluding note about Andropov's policies: discipline and reform and, if necessary, discipline before reform. His balance sheet of Brezhnev's achievements is favorable: much greater Soviet military power, including maintenance of the SS-20 advantage; Soviet gains in

Afghanistan and Indochina; containment of the Polish and Chinese dangers, largely by military intimidation; and the firm maintenance of the monopoly of power by the Politburo aristocracy. Not at all a bad record of achievement, one might think.

WHY, THEN, does it seem less impressive today? Primarily, in my judgment, because the global "correlation of forces" has by now begun to change in favor of the United States and against the Soviet Union. This is so, I think, for two "subjective" and one "objective" reasons. The first was the decision of the Reagan administration simultaneously to break the inflationary spiral, refuel economic growth, and increase US military power. Whatever the domestic costs, these three objectives appear to have been achieved. More important, their achievement is recognized by opinion-forming strata in the United States and abroad, including (albeit unadmittedly) in the camp of "real existing socialism." Conversely, the Soviet Union has come to be perceived not as a future to be emulated but as a military power to be feared, and the latter less than before. (The collapse of Soviet prestige among Parisian *rive gauche* intellectuals is slowly but surely spreading throughout Europe and the Third World as well.) Moscow's apparent decision to cut its losses in Mozambique and turn Samora Machel over to the non-too-tender mercies of the South Africans has confirmed a new trend that Gelman does not discuss and could hardly have been expected to foresee, namely, the erosion of Soviet influence in southern Africa.

The second new development, which has also largely occurred after Gelman finished his book, is something that is still in part only adumbrated and may not come off at all. If it does, it will be of major impor-

tance for the global correlation of forces. I refer to the already successful agricultural reform in China, Deng Xiaoping's recently announced decision to extend the reform to urban areas, and the ideological absolutization of these policies by Beijing's recent proclamation that Marxism and Leninism cannot solve all of China's problems. If China's modernization continues on this path, and it can do so successfully only if massive importation of capitalist technology goes on, China will become more powerful and therefore less intimidated by the USSR. It will also become more tied economically with Japan and the West. Although the recent visit of First Deputy Premier Ivan Arkhipov to Beijing again demonstrates that China is peripherally reciprocating Soviet desires for a partial Sino-Soviet détente, Moscow shows no signs of making concessions to Beijing or to Tokyo on the key issues separating it from China and Japan—Indochina and the southern Kuriles respectively. It thus seems that Moscow has committed basically the same error with Beijing and Tokyo that, as Gelman points out, it has with Washington: its appetite having grown with eating, Moscow is not prepared to rein it in.

A THIRD, "objective," development underlies the other two and is, in my judgment, the principal characteristic of the present epoch: the revolution in high technology, or high-tech. (Gelman unfortunately does not discuss this issue at all.) Briefly, the world is in the grip of a revolution in microelectronics and biotechnics more rapid, pervasive, and important than the Industrial Revolution itself. In this revolution the United States and Japan are increasingly getting ahead in nonmilitary high-tech, and the United States is getting farther ahead in military high-tech. It is unclear whether

Western Europe will be able to overcome its high-tech backwardness vis-à-vis the United States and Japan. States of the Pacific rim (South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore) are keeping the pace. The Soviet Union, and even such a developed socialist state as East Germany, are falling more and more behind and can hope to bridge this high-tech gap only by economic reforms even more drastic than less developed China is undertaking, with the resultant risk of loss of political control. (That the Soviet Union is a multinational state makes such reforms even more difficult.)

The Soviet Union today is not collapsing, nor is it likely to collapse soon. But it does seem likely to have an economic growth rate for the near future of around two percent. Uniquely among developed countries, its mortality rates for males and infants are rising, because of pandemic alcoholism and inferior medical care. Its Muslim population is growing five times as fast as its non-Muslim population and is subject to infection by Islamic fundamentalism. These phenomena do not make rapid Soviet high-tech progress very likely.

It is in the military field that Soviet high-tech backwardness is the most serious problem for Moscow. One need only review the June 1982 losses inflicted by the Israeli air force on Syria's air force and anti-aircraft missiles to understand that electronic counter-measures (ECM) and counter-counter-measures (ECCM) have revolutionized conventional air combat. Precision-guided munitions (PGM) are doing the same for ground combat. The accuracy of intercontinental and intermediate-range ballistic missiles on both sides is such that the competition is shifting to command-control-communication and intelligence (C³I), where ECM and ECCM can only be degraded by elaborate, highly sophisti-

cated hardening. Finally, the Soviet volte face on its refusal to resume arms control negotiations until NATO's INF deployment was dismantled was the result not only of President Ronald Reagan's landslide reelection but also, and probably even more, of Moscow's concern about Reagan's strategic defense initiative (SDI), often called "star wars." Whether or not SDI will work, or should, is for the present not the issue. Rather, without some major unilateral US limitation on its SDI capability (which the Soviets probably exaggerate as Russians always have exaggerated Western technological advantage), the US military high-tech advantage will, in fact, regardless of Reagan's wishes, reestablish qualitative US military superiority. This will be so not only because US military and nonmilitary high-tech is superior to that of the Soviet Union but especially because capitalist high-tech is increasingly becoming multinationalized in ownership, management, and research and development—leading to interpenetration and rapid spinoff. This gives the United States payoffs for its own military high-tech.

THUS, in addition to the asymmetrical vulnerabilities of which Gelman rightly speaks with respect to the United States, the Soviet Union is developing several asymmetrical vulnerabilities itself. Moreover, while the US vulnerabilities are largely connected with political will, the Soviet ones are related more to technological capability and ideological appeal. Under circumstances of such double asymmetry, can arms control negotiations succeed? Gelman's conclusion with regard to this policy question seems to me balanced, judicious, and sensible. He writes:

Nothing that has been said here is intended to imply that a civil bilateral relationship with the Soviet Union is

unfeasible or that arms control agreements with the Soviet Union are innately undesirable. On the contrary, a continual search for the possibility that areas of compromisable interest exist is highly desirable, both to preserve and reinforce the Western consensus and periodically to probe the evolution of attitudes within the Politburo. What is essential, however, is to strive to ensure that this search does not undermine sober expectations about the enduring nature of Soviet competitive urges. . . . It is the responsibility of Western elites to be willing to look steadily at the totality of Soviet behavior, to raise the political costs of venturesome Soviet conduct, to strive as best they can to narrow the avenues of Soviet opportunity, and in general to so conduct themselves as to encourage the valuable Leninist trait of prudence in the face of adverse circumstances. (pp. 217–18)

GELMAN'S BOOK does not focus on the truly decisive change that has occurred in international politics as a result of the introduction of nuclear weapons. That the United States and the Soviet Union can destroy each other, most of the rest of the Northern Hemisphere, and perhaps much of the Southern as well, does seem to me to be a clear and present danger. And, what is far more important, it is so perceived by the rest of the world. Gelman writes of the great differences in West European and US perceptions of the Soviet Union. Differences on this topic within the US are almost as great. It would seem to follow that the rulers of both the Soviet Union and the United States have increasingly had to take into account—due to their own fears and their estimates of the fears of others—this new factor of rising public fear of nuclear destructibility. (That this increase of fear is, I think, unjustified, is irrelevant.) We

should also not underestimate the effect of the fear of nuclear war on, for example, educated West European and American youth: the peace and nuclear freeze movements are declining, but the Labour Party in Britain and the Social Democratic Party in West Germany no longer support the NATO deterrent consensus. The Reagan administration, too, has felt it desirable, indeed probably necessary, to adjust to the greater US public support for arms control negotiations.

Because it was written before this development, Gelman's book does not show that the climate in the West on Soviet-American relations is once again changing. This does not mean that "détente" is again just around the corner; far from it. Nor does it mean that Reagan is transforming himself into a Carter; even farther from it. Nevertheless, a successful American and NATO policy toward the Soviet Union cannot disregard these changes in Western public opinion, for that would be the politics of the impossible. Thus, in addition to Gelman's reasons for

arms control negotiations, there is another one: the necessity—if only because it is unavoidable—that Western governments respond to the desire of their publics, including now the American public, that such negotiations with the Soviet Union be seriously undertaken.

There is one other, more controversial reason for such talks, and for détente itself. While détente's opponents in the West fear lest it destabilize the West and favor the East, its opponents in the East fear that it will destabilize the East by spreading Western influence there. Indeed, the latter has occurred, whereas the West does not seem all that destabilized by 1985 (although it seemed in more danger of becoming so in 1982 when Mr. Gelman finished his book). Pierre Hassner has set forth the classic analysis of why détente is both stabilizing and destabilizing.³ An optimist might with some reason conclude that the West has shown itself better at the détente game than the East. A pessimist might conclude that Leo Labedz was right when he called it a

game of "competitive decadence." But a moderate pessimist might well think that the Soviet Union is more threatened with decay than the United States, especially in this age of the high-tech revolution. One thing does seem clear: neither the Soviet nor the American leaderships can indefinitely resist pressures for the resumption of détente. Therefore, since this game cannot or should not be avoided, it behooves the West to play it as well as it can.

Fortunately for the West, and especially for the United States, the high-tech correlation of forces is indeed changing in its favor—and forms an important compensating factor, should public opinion again threaten to impede a realistic, prudent policy toward Moscow. Gelman's book provides an indispensable background for such a policy, and his concluding recommendations provide an excellent précis.

³Pierre Hassner, "Europe: Old Conflicts, New Rules," *Orbis*, Fall 1973, and "Europe from Cold War to Hot Peace," *Défense nationale* (Paris), March 1973.

Revamping China's Military

Shu-shin Wang

THOMAS C. ROBERTS. *The Chinese People's Militia and the Doctrine of People's War*. Washington, DC, National Defense University Press, 1983.

DAVID G. MULLER, JR. *China as a Maritime Power*. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1983.

HARLAN W. JENCKS. *From Muskets to Missiles: Politics and Professionalism in the Chinese Army, 1945-1981*. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1982.

THE CHINESE People's Liberation Army (PLA) is the largest army in the world, totaling some 4.23 million personnel—3.5 million ground forces, 330,000 naval forces, and 400,000 air force.¹ Yet, the PLA is not a potent fighting force. Its equipment is generally unsophisticated or obsolete; its tactics and strategy outdated. For the most part, its troops are insufficiently trained and

uneducated. Morale is said to be low and indiscipline high. Politically, the PLA is encumbered by factional conflict and bureaucracy.²

To overcome these substantial shortcomings, Deng Xiaoping, China's most powerful leader, has taken steps to reform the military, calling for the modernization of all facets of PLA operations, mission, and equipment, as well as for the professionalization of PLA officers and soldiers. More important, he has attempted to reassert the party's absolute control over the army.³ How successful has Deng been? Has China modified its military strategy? To what extent, and in which facets, has the army modernized? Is the party once again in complete control of the military? The answers to these questions are extremely important to the understanding of China's political and military development.

ANY assessment of the PLA's changing role, of course, must begin

with an examination of the PLA's past. For decades, China's defense policy was dominated by Mao Zedong's theory of People's War. This doctrine, as Thomas Roberts and Harlan Jencks both point out, emphasizes people rather than weapons and relies on protracted, guerrilla warfare and the tactic of "luring the enemy in deep."⁴ To be effective, such a defense requires a combined force of field armies, local forces, and militia. Colonel Roberts, former associate research fellow at the National Defense University and subsequently army attaché at the American Embassy in Beijing, focuses on the third component of these forces, the Chinese militia, examining its organization, mission, equipment, training, and relationship with the regular forces of the PLA.

Roberts's study is notable not so much for its assessment of the militia's role in People's War—he deems it crucial—but for its emphasis on the continuing importance of the People's War doctrine in Chinese defense strategy. Indeed, according to Roberts, "analysis of the evolution of PRC militia policy in the years from 1973 to 1981 leaves no doubt that People's War doctrine, with its component strategy of 'luring deep,' remains the keystone of planning for the ground defense of China..." (p. 109). But Roberts supports his

¹See *The World Journal* (New York), Jul. 30, 1978; *Ming Pao Daily* (Hong Kong—in Chinese), Jul. 8, 1981; *The Washington Post*, Oct. 28, 1982; *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), Oct. 29, 1982; and *The Gazette* (Montreal), Jan. 27, 1983.

²For details, see *The Gazette*, May 13, 1981; *Wenhui Bao* (Shanghai), May 17, 1981; *Cheng Ming* (Hong Kong), Jan. 1, 1982, p. 15; *Jiefangjun Bao* (Beijing), Aug. 12, 1982, Jan. 12, 1983, and Jan. 10 and Apr. 20, 1984; *The Japan Times* (Tokyo), Oct. 21, 1982; *Renmin Ribao* (Beijing), Nov. 5, 1982, and Jan. 5 and 9 and Apr. 4 and 20, 1984; *China Times* (Washington, DC), Apr. 23, 1983, and Mar. 28, 1984; and *Ming Pao Daily*, Oct. 31, 1983.

³See *The Gazette*, Sept. 9, 1980; *Renmin Ribao*, Jul. 5, 1981, Mar. 6, 1983, and Feb. 1, 1984; *Ta Kung Pao* (Hong Kong), Jan. 20, 1982; *Hsing Tao Daily* (Hong Kong—in Chinese), Feb. 5, 1982, and Jul. 29, 1983; *New China News Agency* (hereafter *Xinhua*), Mar. 13, and Jul. 27, 1982; and *China Times*, Mar. 21, 1984.

⁴See Roberts, p. 2, and Jencks, p. 259.

Shu-shin Wang, an Adjunct Assistant Professor of Political Science at West Virginia University (Morgantown), is the author of a number of articles on Chinese politics. He is currently working on a book on party-army relations in the People's Republic of China from 1977 to 1983.

thesis with material that is outdated; his conclusion, which is based on an examination of the development of the militia from the early to the mid- and late 1970's, seems sound for that period. Mao was still alive, and the Gang of Four led by Mao's wife, Jiang Qing, attempted to use urban militia as a means to seize power. Even after Mao's death in September 1976 and the downfall of the Gang of Four a month later, China's political and military power was controlled either by Maoists, like Hua Guofeng, or by conservatives, like Ye Jianying.⁵ Given such a political climate, it was inevitable that Chinese leaders would emphasize People's War and its militia component.

This situation changed dramatically after 1978. Deng outmaneuvered his Maoist rivals at the 3rd Plenum of the 11th Party Congress in December 1978 and consolidated his control of the party at the next party congress in September 1982. Moreover, the PLA's poor showing in the border war against Vietnam in February 1979 exposed serious weaknesses in China's combat capability, as the Chinese military relied primarily on "human wave" tactics to overrun Vietnamese positions. Although China achieved some limited goals in the war, it paid a great price—high costs and heavy casualties.⁶

These factors accelerated Deng's reforms of the army. First, he and

his supporters revised the concept of People's War, stressing the need to accommodate "modern conditions," in particular the relationship between people and weapons in a modern military: "In modern warfare," Deng noted, "the quantity of the armed forces should be decreased, not increased."⁷ Next, they downgraded the role of the militia to a minor position in China's military strategy, deeming it useless in a nuclear war. At present, only on-duty or border militia (one part of the armed militia) is highly trained and well-equipped. Otherwise, the organizations of the common militia and the basic militia are very loose or exist in name only; militiamen receive virtually no military training, and most are not armed.⁸ Finally, Deng and his colleagues accelerated the development of China's strategic weapons. Defense Minister Zhang Aiping, the prime mover in this regard and a staunch supporter of Deng, has persistently advocated concentrating military spending on China's nuclear arsenal and strategic missiles in order to hasten the modernization of the PRC's national defense.⁹ Indeed, China has done so. For example, in 1982 it successfully test-fired its first submarine-based ballistic missile, moving China closer to a nuclear capability at sea; and in 1984 it launched its first communications satellite, which potentially can be used for military purposes.

This is not to say, however, that China has completely abandoned the doctrine of People's War. Indeed, as noted in *Beijing Review* in August 1982, no matter how advanced Chinese weapons and military equipment become, China "will persist in People's War... and further enrich and develop [it] in light of the new situations and modes of operation."¹⁰ In my opinion, this indicates not that the current emphasis on "People's War under modern conditions" is nothing really new, as Jencks contends (p. 259), but that China is now evolving a more sophisticated two-pronged deterrent—using its strategic weapons to deter a nuclear war, and using its huge population and vast territory to deter a conventional war.

A CHANGE in Chinese naval strategy occurred a few years earlier than that in the ground forces. David Muller, a commander in the United States Navy, has contributed considerably to our understanding of China's emergence as a maritime power. Commander Muller analyzes the evolution of China's merchant marine and naval strategy since 1945, and provides useful information for further analysis. This is a pioneering work, and it is highly readable.

Prior to the appearance of Muller's study, few, if any, would have thought of China as a maritime power. Before the mid-1970's, China's merchant marine and navy were not highly developed. The Chinese navy lacked tradition, and both services saw their missions curtailed because of China's excessive isolationism during the Cultural Revolution, as well as the leftists' penchant for People's War at Sea (pp. 47, 119, and 155). After Deng's ascend-

⁵See Shu-shin Wang, "Party-Army Relationship in the People's Republic of China, 1959-1977: Ideological Conflict and Power Struggles Between Political and Military Elites," Ph.D. diss., West Virginia University, 1977, University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, MI, 1978. See also Parris H. Chang, "Chinese Politics: Deng's Turbulent Quest," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January-February 1981, pp. 1-21.

⁶For details, see *Jiefangjun Bao*, Mar. 26, 1979; *Ming Pao Monthly* (Hong Kong—in Chinese), April 1979, pp. 19-26; *The Trend Monthly* (Hong Kong), March 1980, p. 9; *The Gazette*, Sept. 28, 1981; *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong—hereafter *FEER*), June 11, 1982, p. 24; *The Economist* (London), Mar. 12, 1983, p. 47; *The Perspective* (Hong Kong), June 16, 1983, p. 50; and *China Times*, Apr. 14, 1984.

⁷Cited in *Ta Kung Pao*, Aug. 2, 1982.

⁸In the past two months, I have interviewed more than 30 Chinese people who recently emigrated to Canada and the United States from China. It is interesting to note that in their opinion, China's militia is not as important as before.

⁹See *Ta Kung Pao*, Nov. 11, 1981; Zhang Aiping, "Several Questions Concerning the Modernization of China's National Defense," *Hongqi* (Beijing), Mar. 1, 1983, pp. 21-24, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-CHI*), Mar. 17, 1983, pp. K/6-7; *Xinhua*, Mar. 3, 1983; *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto), Mar. 4, 1983; *Ming Pao Daily*, Mar. 31, 1983; and *FEER*, Apr. 7, 1983, p. 21.

¹⁰Cited in *Beijing Review*, Aug. 2, 1982, p. 20.

ancy, however, China moved from an isolationist to an open-door economic policy, and the Chinese navy changed from a People's War at Sea to a modern warfare doctrine (pp. 151, 158, 160, 168, 172, 184, and 188). By the early 1980's, China had become one of the largest merchant shipping powers in the world (p. 233), and its navy (in terms of personnel the third largest in the world, behind the United States and the Soviet Union) was already strong enough to undertake a variety of missions in support of China's regional interests and objectives (p. 224).

Muller stresses that China's development as a maritime power is only beginning (p. 1). In the future, he contends, Chinese leaders will further strengthen China's sea power in order to help modernize China's economy, explore for offshore oil, develop China's fishing industry, protect and promote China's maritime economic and territorial interests (including the islands in the South China Sea), deal with Soviet military expansion in the Far East, and "liberate" Taiwan (pp. 1-2 and 191).

Muller's optimistic appraisal seems justified. To bolster its merchant marine, China has developed its shipbuilding industry considerably. In 1982, Chinese shipyards built 1 million tons of merchant ships, an 11.9 percent increase over the previous year; by 1983, China had built up its merchant marine from an old, decrepit fleet totaling about 1 million tons into a modern fleet of some 10 to 11 million tons.¹¹ This rapid expansion of the merchant marine will undoubtedly contribute significantly to the development of the navy, which is already the beneficiary of a vigorous building program of submarines, destroyers, frigates, fast-attack

aircraft, amphibious vessels, and support ships. In 1983, China built its first nuclear submarine equipped with guided missiles. That same year, under the leadership of Liu Huaqing, the commander of the navy and a Deng loyalist, China established three special research committees for naval development, revealed plans to build over the next decade five aircraft carriers and a dozen submarines equipped with nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles, and announced its decision to modernize its two biggest classes of surface warships—the Luta-class missile destroyer and the Jiangnan-class missile frigate, both with new electronic warfare equipment, missiles, and helicopters.¹²

Even so, owing to lingering technological weaknesses, the Chinese navy is still deployed in a coastal-defensive rather than a blue-water offensive posture. For example, the navy has no long-range submarines, no anti-submarine missiles, no operational surface-to-air missile system, and no up-to-date ship radar, electronics, and communications equipment.¹³ To deal with the growing Soviet presence in Asia, China will no doubt continue its recent efforts to import some of this sophisticated technology and advanced equipment from the United States.¹⁴ Oth-

erwise, it will be unable to keep abreast of the rapidly changing Soviet force projections in the region.

HARLAN JENCKS, a research associate at the Center for Chinese Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, and a major in the US Army Reserve, focuses on the broader issues of military modernization and professionalization and party-army relations. According to Jencks, China's military modernization depends on the country's overall economic and technological development; its military professionalization is increasingly characterized by apolitical behavior on the part of the PLA's officer corps; and its party-army relationship is marked by the persistent loyalty of the army to the party.

Jencks's emphasis on the importance of technological-economic development in China's military modernization coincides with the PRC's long-term economic strategy. In the view of Deng and his supporters, without the modernization of agriculture, industry, and science and technology, the modernization of national defense cannot be realized.¹⁵ Thus, the pragmatists have accorded economic and technological modernization highest priority in their modernization program.

However, Jencks's conclusions on the characteristics of China's military professionalism and party-army relations are oversimplified and not entirely consistent with the facts. Unless China changes the nature of its political and military systems, which seems unlikely, the Chinese military cannot avoid involvement in politics. On the one hand, the army is the pillar of the party. Mao's dictum that

¹²For details, see *China Times*, Jul. 30 and Nov. 26, 1983; *Renmin Ribao*, Nov. 8, 1983; *The Gazette*, Nov. 26, 1983; and *Ming Pao Daily*, Nov. 29, 1983.

¹³As for the weaknesses of the Chinese navy, see *The Gazette*, Oct. 19, 1981; Richard Breeze, "The Wide, Blue Yonder," *FEER*, June 11, 1982, pp. 21-26; *Hsing Pao Daily* (Hong Kong—in Chinese), Jan. 29, 1983; and *China Times*, Apr. 20 and Jul. 23, 1983.

¹⁴The United States and China recently reached an agreement (though have not yet signed contracts) on the sale of military equipment to help modernize China's destroyer fleet. The items to be purchased are modern towed sonars, Mark 46 torpedoes, the Phalanx close-in (rapid-firing) weapons system, and gas turbine engines. The Chinese also agreed to an April 1985 port call by three American destroyers to Shanghai, the US Navy's first such port call since the communist takeover in 1949. See Daniel Southerland and Fred Hiatt, "U.S. Arms Sales to Help China Modernize Navy," *The Washington Post*, Jan. 12, 1985.

¹⁵See Jiefangjun Bao, Feb. 1, 1978; *The New York Times*, Feb. 4, 1978; *The Christian Science Monitor*, June 11, 1981 and Feb. 1, 1982; and *Business Week* (New York), Sept. 28, 1981, p. 55.

¹¹See *The Gazette*, Dec. 22, 1982, and Nov. 14, 1983.

"political power grows out of the barrel of a gun" is still meaningful today. The recent record suggests that some powerful military men played an important role in the arrest of the Gang of Four in 1976, in Deng's second rehabilitation in 1977, and in Deng's defeat of Hua Guofeng and the consolidation of his control between 1978 and 1982.¹⁶ On the other hand, the army serves many functions: a fighting force, a political force, and an economic production force (p. 254). PLA officers and men have participated in almost all of the more than 80 political campaigns the party has launched since 1949 and are at present thoroughly involved in the first stage of the party's rectification campaign.¹⁷

Jencks also seems to underestimate the Chinese military's interest in political activities and political power.¹⁸ Take the career of Li Desheng for example. Li is a Politburo member and the commander of the Shenyang Military Region. During the Cultural Revolution (1966–76), he strongly supported the leftists and was promoted to party vice-chairman by Mao and his wife, Jiang Qing, at the 10th Party Congress in 1973. After Mao's death and the downfall of the Gang of Four, he established a close relationship with Hua and Ye Jianying, at the time two of China's most prominent leaders. When Deng regained power for the second time in 1977, Li gradually sided with him. In recent years, Li has repeatedly ex-

pressed his strong support for Deng and has severely criticized Deng's leftist opponents.¹⁹

The critical role played by PLA officers in the establishment of the provincial revolutionary committees in 1967 and the rebuilding of the provincial party committees in 1970 are further examples of military involvement in politics. In fact, in each of these events, military men in effect controlled all local power. When Mao ordered them to return to the barracks immediately after Lin Biao's demise in 1971, however, many military men used various tactics to retain their civilian posts. The party was able to reverse this situation completely only in 1980, when it implemented a series of reorganizations of the provincial party committees and finally abolished the provincial revolutionary committees.²⁰

Despite Mao's dictum that "the party commands the gun and the gun shall never be allowed to command the party,"²¹ the army's loyalty to the party has tended to be relative rather than absolute. For his part, Mao relied heavily on "divide and rule" tactics to control the army, compromising on certain issues if necessary. Deng has followed Mao's lead in this, primarily because there are still many factions within the army. Although Deng has been able to replace a large number of his opponents in the PLA with his supporters, the army remains the most potent center of opposition to his pragmatic policies—the downgrad-

ing of Mao's role in the Chinese revolution; the emphasis on economic liberalization, in particular the production responsibility system; the reemergence of the preeminence of intellectuals; the soft-peddling of class struggle; the sidestepping of the army's special role in society; and the extensive use of a system of mandatory retirement as an important component of the effort to consolidate the party.²²

In view of the Chinese Communist movement in the past 30 years, five hypotheses about party-army relations can be verified. First, the more intraparty conflict, the harder it is for the party to control the army; second, the more intra-army conflict, the easier it is for the party to control the army; third, the greater the intraparty conflict, the greater the importance of the army's role in the conflict; fourth, the greater the intraparty cohesion, the less the army's role in the policy-making process; and fifth, the greater the incompatibility of political goals between party and army, the harder it is to reconcile differences among the various groups and factions.²³

ALTHOUGH Jencks provides a broad overview of almost all aspects of the Chinese military system since 1945, many statements in *From Muskets to Missiles* are ambiguous, contradictory, or wrong. For example, Jencks includes Ye Jianying in his list of "top PLA leaders" who have avoided involvement in politics (p. 29). Actually, Marshal Ye (age 86) is highly political. According to

¹⁶See Chang, loc. cit., p. 3; Ellis Joffe and Gerald Segal, "The Chinese Army and Professionalism," *Problems of Communism*, November–December 1978, pp. 1–11; and Richard D. Nethercut, "Leadership in China: Rivalry, Reform, and Renewal," *Problems of Communism*, March–April 1983, pp. 30–35.

¹⁷See *FBIS—CHI*, Dec. 6, 1984, pp. K/1–3.

¹⁸*China Times*, Jul. 30, 1983.

¹⁹See *The World Journal*, Nov. 19, 1982; *Ming Pao Daily*, Apr. 16, 1983; *China Times*, Apr. 16 and May 6, 1983; and *Renmin Ribao*, Apr. 13 and Jul. 4, 1983. Deng probably views Li's opportunism as an extremely dangerous threat to a

smooth transition of power to his successors, Hu and Zhao. Thus, in my opinion, Deng will likely remove Li from his powerful position when the time is ripe.

²⁰For details, see Zhang Yanwu, "China's Local Military Men and the Impact of Their Behavior on China's Political Future," *Ming Pao Monthly*, March 1980, pp. 2–11; *Renmin Ribao*, Sept. 11, 1980; and David S. G. Goodman, "The Provincial Revolutionary Committee in the People's Republic of China, 1967–1979: An Obituary," *The China Quarterly* (London), March 1981, pp. 49–78.

²¹Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Military Writings*, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1963, p. 272.

²²For details, see *Chung Pao Monthly* (Hong Kong—in Chinese), October 1980, pp. 15–17; *Ming Pao Monthly*, May 1981, p. 9; *Cheng Ming*, Jan. 1, 1982, pp. 11–17; *Jiefangjun Bao*, Apr. 25, 1982, Jan. 12, 1983, and Jan. 10 and May 13, 1984; *Jiefang Ribao* (Shanghai), Aug. 28, 1982; *Ming Pao Daily*, Sept. 8, 1982; *FEER*, Sept. 10, 1982, pp. 14–15; *Renmin Ribao*, Oct. 20 and Nov. 5, 1982; and *China Times*, Oct. 15 and Nov. 11, 1983, and Jan. 16 and May 15 and 25, 1984.

²³Cited in Wang, op. cit., p. 440.

Ellis Joffe, Ye "undoubtedly views himself (and is viewed by others in China) not solely as a representative of the military, but as a national leader whose concerns are not restricted by institutional boundaries."²⁴ Moreover, Ye has become the leader of the opposition to Deng's pragmatic policies. Although he was forced to resign his post as chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress—China's head of state—in 1983, Ye retains the vice-chairmanship of both the party's Military Affairs Commission (MAC) and the state's Central Military Commission, as well as membership on the Politburo and its Standing Committee. Recently, Ye has had to make certain concessions to Deng, and his public image and prestige seem to be diminishing somewhat.²⁵

Jencks also claims that the PLA high command "surely welcomed and encouraged" what he terms the reversal of the "radical revision" of 1977–79,²⁶ which, he notes, is "hardly evidence" of "fundamental civil-military conflict" (p. 126). From 1979 to 1981, however, many mid- and high-level military officers did strongly oppose Deng's new political line and policies in part because they still deeply believed in Mao's revolutionary line and in part because Deng's new policies damaged their vested interests.²⁷

The author compounds this misperception when he observes that "there appear to be virtually no radical Maoists (or 'Whateverists,' as they are currently called) among either commanders or commissars, especially in the main forces" (p. 245). He bases this judgment in part on official statements which "claim that when the 'gang of four' attempted to 'encourage ultra-democracy and ferret out capitalist-roaders' in the PLA in 1976, they met with solid resistance from all ranks at all levels" (p. 245). Jencks's account is misleading for two reasons. First, he confuses the radical Maoists and the "Whateverists." In official Chinese parlance, "radical Maoists" refer to the Gang of Four (Jiang Qing, Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan) and their followers, while the "Whateverists" refer to Hua Guofeng, Wang Dongxing, Wu De, Ji Dengkui, and their followers.²⁸ Second, and more important, 70 percent of the officers above the rank of deputy division commander were appointed during the Cultural Revolution; it is these officers who so far have constituted a major obstacle to Deng's pragmatic policies in the army.²⁹ Is it possible, under such circumstances, that there were no radical Maoists at the

commander and commissar levels when the Gang of Four were arrested by Hua and his supporters in October 1976? Finally, owing to Jiang Qing's incredible notoriety, her enemies were virtually everywhere. Thus, by 1976, rapidly increasing numbers of anti-Jiang forces could be found in the party, the government, the army, and the society.³⁰ Is it not understandable that many radical Maoists in the army dared not stand up to support Jiang?

A RELATED area of some controversy is how to assess the interplay of ideology, military ethics, and power politics in party-army relations. In his examination of three of the most important party-military confrontations in PRC history, Jencks claims that Peng Dehuai, Luo Ruiping, and Lin Biao "were all purged when they lost out in struggles for political power" (p. 253). Of the three, however, only Lin seems to fit neatly into the author's categorization. Peng's dismissal appears more the result of an ideological conflict than of a power struggle. He strongly opposed Mao's Three Red Banners policy—the general line of socialist construction,³¹ the Great Leap Forward, and the people's commune—and insisted on the modernization of China's military. There is no concrete evidence that Peng intended to seize political power from Mao in the late 1950's, although Roderick MacFarquhar has speculated, wrongly I think, that he may have been used for this purpose by Zhang Wentien, an ambitious and politically astute alternate

²⁷For details, see *Hua-Ch'iao Jih-Pao* (New York), June 2, 1979; *Renmin Ribao*, Sept. 10, 1979, Oct. 27 and Dec. 19, 1980, and Feb. 11, 1981; *Jiefangjun Bao*, June 2, 1980; *Beijing Ribao*, Jan. 15, 1981; *The World Journal*, Jan. 17, 1981; *The Economist*, Mar. 21, 1981, p. 43; Joint Publications Research Service, *China Report* (Washington, DC—hereafter *JPRS*), No. 77826, Apr. 14, 1981, p. 45; *JPRS*, No. 78709, Aug. 10, 1981, pp. 17-18, 50-53, and 71-74; *JPRS*, No. 79210, Oct. 15, 1981, pp. 25-28; *JPRS*, No. 79391, Nov. 6, 1981, pp. 43 and 47-49; *JPRS*, No. 79457, Nov. 17, 1981, pp. 59-61; *JPRS*, No. 80020, Feb. 3, 1982, pp. 60-61; *JPRS*, No. 80051, Feb. 8, 1982, pp. 50-51; *Ming Pao Daily*, Apr. 24 and Jul. 8, 1981; *Xinhua*, Apr. 28, 1981; *The Christian Science Monitor*, May 11, 1981; and *Cheng Ming*, Oct. 1, 1981, pp. 8-11.

²⁸See Chang, loc. cit., for a comprehensive listing of the various factions in China between 1977 and 1981.

²⁹See *Cheng Ming*, Apr. 1, 1981, pp. 7-8; *Ming Pao Monthly*, May 1981, p. 11; *Business Week*, Sept. 28, 1981, p. 55; and *JPRS*, No. 79457, Nov. 17, 1981, p. 61.

³⁰Chao Tsun, "The Downfall of the Gang of Four," *Ming Pao Monthly*, November 1976, pp. 6-7.

³¹The general line stressed the simultaneous development of industry and agriculture through the simultaneous use of both modern and traditional methods of production. See, e.g., Jürgen Domes, *Socialism in the Chinese Countryside: Rural Societal Policies in the People's Republic of China 1949-1979*, Montreal, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1980, p. 24.

²⁴Ellis Joffe, "Party and Military in China: Professionalism in Command?" *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1983, p. 56.

²⁵See *China Times*, Oct. 18, 1983. Ye apparently has had to concede not only to Deng's efforts to purge the ranks of the military, but also to Deng's open-door policy and economic reforms. See also John F. Burns, "40 High Officers Retire in China in Army Shake-Up," *The New York Times*, Dec. 31, 1984.

²⁶The so-called reversal of the radical revision of 1977-79 to which Jencks alludes probably refers to Deng and his followers' June 1979 replacement of Hua Guofeng's ambitious 10-year economic plan (1976-85) with a plan of their own. In other words, according to Jencks, the PLA supported Deng's scrapping of Hua's economic plan and welcomed the new economic policies. As a matter of fact, a large number of military men opposed Deng's new policies.

Politburo member.³² Luo seems to fall somewhere in the middle: like Peng, he opposed the People's War doctrine and advocated the modernization of the PLA; on the other hand, he sided with Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, both victims during the Cultural Revolution.

This raises the more general issue of how military leaders are likely to resolve conflicts with party leaders in the future. Unfortunately, Jencks's study sheds little light on this topic. For one thing, the China Jencks sees is one in which serious "conflict" between the army and the party is unlikely. Military and party leaders may "quarrel over power or specific policies or priorities," but this apparently is not critical since "civilian and military men who share [the] 'revisionist' perspective appear to be in unchallenged control of China" (p. 268). According to this logic, military opposition to Deng's pragmatic policies is defined only as a quarrel. What then constitutes a conflict—only some unspecified type of military coup d'état Jencks refers to on page 256?

For another, Jencks advises against "making predictions with respect to individuals" since it is "hazardous" and "unnecessary" to do so (p. 268). But in China today politics is highly dynamic: the rule of man is still more important than the rule of law; and differentiation of functions and specialization among party, government, and army are just being developed. Thus, the study of personality of Chinese leaders remains an important element in our understanding of China's political development. Take Deng Xiaoping for example. Few would deny that Deng has

moved China along a markedly different course than had either Mao Zedong or Hua Guofeng, even though he, like them, still strongly insists on the "four upholds"—the socialist road, the people's democratic dictatorship, the leading role of the party, and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought.³³

WHAT has Deng's different course meant for the Chinese military? What measures has he taken to reform the army? And how successful has he been? Deng's main objectives have been to eliminate leftists, conservatives, and incompetents from the PLA, strengthen modern military training, revise outdated military tactics and strategy, regularize army procedures, and improve military equipment.³⁴ He has made some progress. He has managed to purge, or force into retirement, a large number of his political opponents from the army;³⁵ provide specialized

scientific and technical training to both officers and troops; accelerate the production of strategic nuclear weapons; revise the People's War doctrine to accommodate modern conditions; reinstate insignia of rank; and replace some types of obsolete weapons with Chinese-made new ones.³⁶ He has also converted the Railroad Engineer Corps, comprising some 170,000 workers, to civilian status.

Yet, many problems persist. Despite Deng's efforts to reinvigorate the PLA leadership by promoting many younger and middle-aged cadres to high posts, most of the high-ranking military officers are old-timers. For example, the average age of the MAC chairman (Deng) and vice-chairmen is 81.8, and the average age of the commanders of the 11 military regions is close to 70. Moreover, although most of the top military leaders at the central and local levels are Deng loyalists, there is still considerable resistance from both leftists and conservatives throughout the PLA.³⁷ While they outwardly support Deng, they privately refuse to endorse his political line or carry out his policies either inside or outside the army. Indeed, Deng sees the persistence of Maoists in the PLA as one of China's most pressing problems: "If we cannot solve this problem before we die, our country will be in a great turmoil."³⁸

³³For details, see Hongqi, Jul. 16, 1983, pp. 2-6; Deng Xiaoping, "Suggestions on the Drafting of the Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China (March 1980-June 1981)," *Beijing Review*, Aug. 1, 1983, p. 23; and Deng Xiaoping, "On the Reform of the System of Party and State Leadership (August 18, 1980)," *Beijing Review*, Oct. 3, 1983, pp. 14-15.

³⁴For details, see Cheng Ming, Dec. 1, 1981, pp. 9-10, and Apr. 1, 1983, pp. 7-9; *Renmin Ribao*, Jul. 24, 1982, Feb. 25, Jul. 13, and Oct. 27, 1983, and Mar. 1 and Apr. 4, 1984; *Jiefangjun Bao*, Feb. 22, 1983, and May 18, 1984; *China Times*, Feb. 26, June 27, Aug. 1 and 5, and Nov. 28, 1983, and Feb. 6 and 24, Mar. 3 and 27, and May 5, 15, 23, and 26, 1984; *Ming Pao Daily*, Mar. 21, May 2, Jul. 16 and 25, Aug. 1, Sept. 20, and Nov. 23, 1983; *Xinhua*, May 6, Jul. 13, and Nov. 20, 1983; *International Daily News* (Toronto), Sept. 12, 1983; *The New York Times*, Sept. 22, 1983, and Apr. 9 and 10, 1984; *The Gazette*, Oct. 28, 1983; *Sino-American Daily News* (San Francisco), Oct. 20, 1983; and *Hsing Tao Daily*, Jul. 29 and Oct. 29, 1983.

³⁵For example, in what has been called in the American press the "most important shake-up in China's General Staff in years," 40 top officers at the corps level or above (i.e., equivalent to three-star generals and above) were forced into retirement. According to a previously unpublished speech (made public on Dec. 29, 1984, but delivered to an Oct. 22, 1984, session of the party's Central Advisory Commission), Deng emphasized the need to promote people in their 30's and 40's, though he acknowledged that asking "old cadres to give up their positions to young people . . . is a very big problem." "Yet," he said, "we have to do this. We must move along this road." See Burns, loc. cit.

³⁶For details, see *Ta Kung Pao*, Jan. 20, 1982, and Jul. 27, 1983; *Hsing Tao Daily*, Feb. 5, 1982; *Renmin Ribao*, Jul. 24, 1982, Mar. 6, 1983, and Apr. 4, 1984; *Beijing Review*, Aug. 2, 1982, pp. 19-23, and *Beijing Review*, Aug. 9, 1982, pp. 5-6; *The New York Times*, Oct. 18, 1982; *Jiefangjun Bao*, Feb. 22, 1983; *China Times*, Feb. 26, June 6, and Sept. 23, 1983, and Feb. 6 and 23, Apr. 9 and 20, and May 26, 1984; and *Ming Pao Daily*, May 2, Jul. 25, and Oct. 1, 1983. In addition, China has manufactured the F-89, which has the ability to engage in air operations in bad weather and at night. See *International Daily News*, Feb. 29, 1984; and *China Times*, Apr. 16, 1984.

³⁷See *FEER*, Apr. 7, 1983, p. 20; *Renmin Ribao*, Apr. 1, 1984; *China Times*, May 14 and 15, 1984; and *Jiefangjun Bao*, May 15 and 18, 1984.

³⁸Cited in *China Times*, Sept. 3, 1983.

³²See Roderick MacFarquhar, *The Origins of the Cultural Revolution: 2: The Great Leap Forward 1958-1960*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1983, pp. 204-5. Judging from the data and analysis put forward in the Union Research Institute's seminal study *The Case of Peng Teh-huai, 1959-1968* (Hong Kong, URI, 1968), I see no concrete evidence to support such a speculation.

The pace of the effort to upgrade the educational and professional standards of the Chinese military has not been as speedy as Deng would have hoped. The bulk of enlisted men (80 percent) come from peasant backgrounds, and approximately two-thirds of the officers are still unqualified (many have only an elementary-school education).³⁹ The process of modernizing PLA weaponry has also proceeded slowly. This is due in part to the enormity of the task and the relative scarcity of key resources; it is also due in part to the policy preferences of the current leadership. According to a number of American military experts, it would take US\$80–100 billion to help the Chinese army in its initial modernization program and to equip it with US weapons.⁴⁰ Even if China could afford such an outlay, and it cannot, it is unlikely that Chinese leaders would purchase massive

amounts of foreign equipment. At present, Deng and his supporters prefer to develop China's own weapons system, importing only certain types of sophisticated weaponry and technology deemed essential.⁴¹ As a result, PLA weaponry and equipment will most likely improve only gradually.

DENG is now 80 years old. The longer he lives, the better it is for his protégés Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, the persistence of his policies, and political stability in China. At present, Deng alone has both the prestige and the ability to dominate the party, the government, and the army. Thus, after he dies, China's domestic situation will likely change. The groups that make up Deng's faction may splinter, and opposition to the Hu and Zhao forces may increase. Given such circumstances, the army may be able to exert considerable pressure on Deng's suc-

cessors to change their pragmatic policies. In any event, China's political stability will be based on a collective leadership and depend on compromise among the various groups and factions.

It is in light of such prospects that Deng has directed the current program of modernization and professionalization of the PLA. Much will depend on the ongoing consolidation and rectification of the party (1983–1986)—and the PLA has been assigned a major role⁴²—as well as the reform of the economy and of the Chinese educational system. But no matter how ardently Deng tries to diminish the PLA's power and prestige, the military will continue to play a decisive role in China's political future, and the party's control over the army will remain relative and not absolute.

³⁹FEER, Apr. 23, 1982, p. 15; *Jiefangjun Bao*, Apr. 20, 1983; *Hsing Tao Daily*, Apr. 23, 1983; and *International Daily News*, Sept. 12, 1983.

⁴⁰JPRS, No. 78709, Aug. 10, 1981, p. 73.

⁴¹Zhang, loc. cit., p. 22; and Yu Qiuli, "Modernization of National Defense and Building of People's Army," *Beijing Review*, Aug. 1, 1983, p. 15.

⁴²See FBIS-CHI, Dec. 6, 1984, pp. K/1–3. See also, "First-Phase Party Rectification Units in PLA Uphold Principle of Self-Education, Score Fine Results in Totally Negating the 'Cultural Revolution' from Theory to Practice," *Renmin Ribao*, Dec. 5, 1984, trans. in FBIS-CHI, Dec. 10, 1984, pp. K/1–5.

How Stalinist Was Mao's China?

Thomas P. Bernstein

MARK SELDEN and VICTOR LIPPIT, Eds. *The Transition to Socialism in China*. Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1982.

VICTOR NEE and DAVID MOZINGO, Eds. *State and Society in Contemporary China*. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1983.

ANITA CHAN, RICHARD MADSEN, and JONATHAN UNGER. *Chen Village: The Recent History of a Peasant Village in Mao's China*. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1984.

VIVIENNE SHUE. *Peasant China in Transition: The Dynamics of Development Toward Socialism, 1949-56*. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1980.

SPECTACULAR shifts in direction have marked the history of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Only a few years ago, during the radical phase of Mao Zedong's rule, China was embarked upon a unique ideological and developmental course, or so it seemed in the West. Western scholars heralded China's exceptionalism, a key component of which

was a socialist transformation that appeared to differ sharply from that followed in the Soviet Union. The PRC's conscious deviation from Soviet patterns was traced to Mao's questioning of the relevance of the Soviet model in the mid-1950's, his criticism of Stalin (for example, for having exploited the peasants), his rejection of fundamental concepts of Soviet socialist construction, and his open condemnation in the 1960's of "Khrushchev's Phony Communism." For Mao, the Soviet Union became China's "teacher by way of negative example," and he outlined specific steps that China must take in order to avoid following the revisionist errors of its northern neighbor.¹

Much of the Maoist critique of the Soviet Union appeared to be aimed at the Stalinist core of the Soviet system and not merely at Nikita Khrushchev's innovations. As Maoists articulated an alternative socialist vision, they sought to implement policies that Stalin had jettisoned early on as being utopian, such as egalitarianism. Maoist social and political goals went hand in hand with an economic approach that also seemed to diverge from that of the Stalin era in its stated emphasis on balanced and decentral-

ized development and on a cooperative relationship with the peasants. Many outside observers, including some of the authors under review here, saw Mao as grappling seriously with the core deficiencies of Marxist-Leninist systems, notably their tendency toward bureaucratic elitism and atrophy of popular participation.

IF CHINA'S divergence from Soviet patterns was a central theme of Western scholarship of the radical era (1958-1976), convergence is a central theme of post-Mao reappraisals. Indeed, as Mark Selden and Victor Lippit put it in their introduction, "at critical junctures, notably during the socialist high tide [that is, the collectivization of 1955-56], the Great Leap Forward, and the Cultural Revolution periods, certain striking similarities between Maoist and Stalinist politics may be observed . . ." (p. 14).² This new image is based on revelations made public by Chinese leaders during a sweeping critique of the leftist era that began in December 1978, when the historic 3rd Plenum of the 11th Central Committee inaugurated the current reform period.

This critique, the findings of which are reflected in various articles in both the Selden-Lippit and Victor Nee-David Mozingo anthologies, charges that in terms of economic

Thomas P. Bernstein teaches Chinese politics and comparative communism at Columbia University (New York). He has written on collective agriculture in China and Russia, and is the author of a book on Chinese youth, *Up to the Mountains and Down to the Villages: The Transfer of Youth from Urban to Rural China* (1977).

¹See "On Khrushchev's Phony Communism and its Historical Lessons for the World," in A. Doak Barnett, *China After Mao*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1967, pp. 123-95. See also Moss Roberts et al., Eds., *A Critique of Soviet Political Economy by Mao Tse-tung*, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1977.

²The editors attribute this formulation to one of their contributors, Edward Friedman.

policy, rather than having pursued balanced development, Mao's China actually gave absolute priority to heavy industry, followed a Stalinist extensive growth strategy of relying on huge investment rates, and squeezed the peasants via price scissors and procurements. The critique further charges that Mao's much-vaunted class struggle waged against elitist bureaucrats produced not a more egalitarian or participatory socialism, but a society dominated by an arbitrary and abusive bureaucracy, whose special privileges, often secured through the "back door," were similar to those enjoyed by the Soviet elite. Perhaps most telling, the critique asserts that terror was a hallmark of the radical Maoist era, especially of the Cultural Revolution, defined now as lasting not for three but for ten years (1966–76). Repression did not simply consist of uncontrolled violence perpetrated by fanatical Red Guards or of the well-known Chinese practice of thought reform, but of a wide-ranging "Soviet-style" police and prison camp terror, the full dimensions of which have yet to be adequately understood.³

One of the most remarkable features of this turnabout in perception has been a surfacing of the contrast between the stated intent and the actual outcome of Maoist innovations. "One is arrested by the gnawing realization," concludes Andrew Walder in his study of the Maoist legacy in Chinese industry, "that the only 'Maoist experiment' that ever existed was to be found in the intellectual reconstructions of Western observers" (Selden-Lippit, p. 235). Ironically, most Western scholars missed what Mao himself had found in 1959, namely, that Stalinism

could be an unanticipated outcome of radical initiatives. During a moderate phase of the Great Leap Forward, Mao spoke as follows of the people's communes, formerly viewed widely as a radical departure from Soviet orthodoxy:

*We should make a comparison between Stalin's agricultural policies and our own. Stalin had too much enthusiasm. With the peasants, he drained the pond to catch the fish. Right now, we have the same illness.*⁴

It was not just with regard to communes that Maoist practices unintentionally came to resemble Stalinism. Walder, writing in Selden-Lippit on Maoist experiments with workers' participation, wage egalitarianism, and management reform, concludes that the results ran "in precisely the opposite direction from that which Maoists intended and Western observers expected" (p. 220). Instead of leading to greater worker participation, "power became concentrated completely in the hands of a single administrator at each level of the factory, especially after 1967" (p. 221). Thus, intent notwithstanding, rather than constituting "a genuine departure from Soviet patterns established under Stalin," Maoist efforts at reform actually intensified, not alleviated, "the problems characteristic of centralized Soviet-style economies" (p. 216). With regard to the Chinese system as a whole, Tang Tsou, writing in Nee-Mozingo, also takes note of unanticipated consequences:

Mao's successors were forced to ask the fundamental question why a movement for class and human liberation had developed into one of

the most oppressive systems in Chinese history—what the Chinese communists call "feudal fascism." (p. 56)

And in the same volume, Maurice Meisner views the cult of Mao Zedong, in intensity an analogue to the Stalin cult, as a "grotesque outcome of a movement that had been launched under a doctrine that demanded the restoration to society of the powers usurped from it by the state" (p. 125).

THIS CHANGE in perception raises a host of questions. Was convergence with Stalinism the dominant trend of the radical era, or was it only one of several competing currents? Stated somewhat differently, is the current perception essentially a reaction to an earlier, distorted picture of Maoist China, or a valid, substantive reappraisal made possible by new research and the release of previously unavailable data? After all, only a cursory glance reveals major differences between the Maoist and Stalinist eras at least on the level of events. There is simply no Soviet equivalent to Mao's mobilization of the masses against the party as an institution during the Cultural Revolution. To be sure, Soviet specialists have found that leftist, populist pressures, especially against bourgeois intellectuals, made themselves felt "from below" during the Soviet First Five-Year Plan (1928–1932), pressures that resembled those of the Chinese Cultural Revolution.⁵ But their scope, scale, duration, and impact were so modest as to constitute a difference in kind, not just degree. However, the leftist outbreaks in both the Soviet Union and the Chinese Cultural Revolution were encouraged or initiated "from above."

³Accounts of prison experiences during the Cultural Revolution era have emerged in Chinese fiction. See, e.g., Wang Ruowang, "Hunger Trilogy," *Shouhuo* (Shanghai), No. 1, 1980, pp. 116–73.

⁴"Mao Tse-tung's Speeches at the Chengchow Conference," February and March 1959, *Chinese Law and Government* (Armonk, NY), Winter 1976–77, p. 18.

⁵See Sheila Fitzpatrick, Ed., *Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1928–31*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1978, esp. Fitzpatrick's chapter, "Cultural Revolution as Class War."

The point to be made here is that there were many roads to Stalinism. Indeed, it was Mao's *un*-Stalinist mobilization of the Red Guards that contributed to the emergence of a Stalin-type personal despotism. But why did it happen? Why did stated ideological intent diverge so far from actual outcome? Moreover, if convergence with Stalinism was the dominant trend of the Maoist era, what happened to differences in revolutionary origins, to which much attention has been paid in Western literature, and which were thought to have decisively influenced post-revolutionary developments in China?⁶ What, in other words, became of the Yan'an model of "mass-line" state-society relations after 1949 or after 1957?⁷ How could Maoism have degenerated into a "feudal-fascist dictatorship," as a Chinese post-Mao label would have it, one eerily reminiscent of Nikolay Bukharin's charge that Stalin was engaged in the "military-feudal exploitation of the peasants"?⁸

These questions are only partially answered in the books under review. For one thing, determining the extent of convergence of the two systems requires full-fledged comparison and explanation of similarities and differences. But this is not a task undertaken in these studies, which deal with China alone. The

Selden-Lippit and Nee-Mozingo anthologies implicitly or explicitly only *raise* the question of the extent to which Stalinist tendencies arose in China. For another, these volumes do not provide the reader with a fully worked out definition of Stalinism. Rather, the term is used as a way of calling attention to the growth in China of abusive state power. Stalinism is taken to mean a despotic, all-powerful bureaucratic state that relies on coercion and terror. To Selden and Lippit, who are disillusioned by Maoism but continue to search for a morally acceptable socialism, Stalinism is the very antithesis of what they want. Their ideal is a socialism in which the form of state or cooperative ownership is invested with the substance of popular control. By this definition, it would seem that there are no socialist systems anywhere, with the possible exception of Yugoslavia. Certainly China does not qualify. The issue they pose, then, is why, how, and to what extent state power in China grew to Stalinist dimensions.

Not all authors in the anthologies, however, agree that Chinese state power did become overwhelming, abusive, and exploitative. Victor Nee, for instance, writing on the rural militia, argues that local power—an important theme in modern Chinese history—served to check the reach of national power, particularly during the Cultural Revolution. While Nee is not able to show that local leaders could "blunt and even sabotage unpopular policies" (p. 243)—his only example coming from the highly unusual circumstances of the Cultural Revolution—he does show that in the rural areas personal ties and patronage networks affected the way in which the state wielded power. David Mozingo, moreover, suggests that because of the involvement of the military in politics, the Chinese party-state was less than monolithic. Whereas in the Soviet Union power

was transferred early on from party soldiers to party bureaucrats, in China, he notes, this process was not completed, enabling the military to play a much more independent political role.

This raises important questions about differences in Stalin's and Mao's power. After the Great Purge (1936–38), Stalin was beyond challenge; his lieutenants fought only among themselves. Mao, by contrast, withstood several serious challenges to his leadership, most notably that by Lin Biao, his designated successor, in 1971. To be sure, Mao prevailed and was able a few years after Lin's fall to transfer long-entrenched regional military commanders. But a full-scale comparative analysis of top-level power relations is needed before deciding whether it is valid to assign the Stalinist label to Mao.

IF THE dominant theme in the two anthologies is that Mao's China did come to resemble Stalin's despotic regime, why and how did this resemblance come about? Four explanations emerge. The first two focus on the roots of total state power; the last two on its perpetuation. First, Tang Tsou attributes the emergence of an all-powerful state to the enormous crisis China faced in the first half of the 20th century, a crisis that led to a search for and acceptance of totalistic solutions. Tsou also points to Mao's own penchant for dictatorship, which emerged as early as 1942 in Yan'an, when Mao attacked pluralism, demanding complete conformity from writers, and implicitly, therefore, from all professional groups.⁹

A second explanation focuses on international factors and is sug-

⁶See Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolution*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1979, for a structural analysis of this point.

⁷The ideal of the "mass line" style of leadership was "from the masses, to the masses." Leaders were to take the "scattered and unsystematic" ideas of the masses, study them, shape them into coherent and systematic ideas, and then go back to the masses to explain and put them into action. This process was to be repeated endlessly, the ideas becoming "more correct" with each cycle. See Mark Selden, *The Yan'an Way in Revolutionary China*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1971, pp. 275–76.

⁸See, e.g., Leonard Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, 2nd. Ed., Rev., New York, Random House, 1970, p. 377. For an in-depth study of Bukharin's views on collectivization and the peasantry, see Stephen Cohen, *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Political Biography*, New York, Knopf, 1973.

⁹For a thoughtful analysis of Mao's dealings with writers during the Yan'an period, see Jonathan D. Spence, *The Gate of Heavenly Peace: The Chinese and Their Revolution, 1895–1980*, New York, Viking Press, 1981.

gested separately in Selden-Lippit by the Japanese economist Kojima Reiitsu and the American political scientist Edward Friedman. Threats from the United States and later the Soviet Union, they contend, were at least in part responsible for the growth of overwhelming state power. This is a thesis that deserves fuller, comparative analysis. China, after all, is not the only instance of a revolutionary system whose leaders, because of real or perceived foreign threats, develop a siege mentality, and thus rationalize repression and totalitarian mobilization. In his stimulating essay, "Maoism, Titoism, Stalinism," Friedman explores this foreign-domestic linkage by focusing on Mao's opposition to Titoist political currents that had emerged within the Chinese leadership in 1949. He did this, according to Friedman, in order to demonstrate his loyalty to Stalin and to secure Soviet assistance, but in a context in which Mao regarded Tito's acceptance of American support, coming at a time when China faced intense American hostility, as a form of betrayal. The same reasoning led Mao to oppose Khrushchev's 1955 reconciliation with Tito and to continue on a Stalinist course.

Friedman's argument reinforces an old explanation, namely, that Chinese Stalinism originated during the years of the Sino-Soviet alliance. Friedman sees Mao as embarking on a unique course only during the Great Leap Forward, for the Leap's "campaign politics, moral incentives, and despecialization would be found neither in Titoism nor in Stalinism" (p. 196). In a chapter in the Nee-Mozingo volume, however, Friedman offers a somewhat different view, charging Mao with being "guilty of Stalinism starting in 1957" (p. 168), when Mao launched the antirightist terror campaign against those who had spoken out too boldly during the liberal Hundred Flowers episode.

Mao's reaction to this sprouting of so many "poisonous weeds" culminated in his 1962 thesis, "never forget class struggle," which was not dissimilar to Stalin's call for the sharpening of the class struggle in the 1930's.

A third explanation looks at the institutions created as a result of the emulation of Soviet industrialization strategy. Several authors note that the resulting fusion of economic, political, and bureaucratic power enormously strengthened the state, a situation that radical Maoist assaults were unable to change. Indeed, Mao himself complained in early 1961 that even though he had been talking about reversing the priority given to heavy industry for five years, state plans had not changed.¹⁰ Even after Mao's complaint, heavy industry continued to be accorded priority, despite the post-Leap slogan "Agriculture as the Foundation."¹¹

The fourth explanation concerns the Maoist failure to change China's Soviet-style economy, a failure that was due not only to the power of competing interests but also to the programmatic limitations of Maoism. As Dorothy Solinger suggests (in the Nee-Mozingo volume), one of the fundamental reasons why Maoists did not get very far in making changes was that they rejected the one antidote to bureaucratic power that would have made a difference—the market. Assorted political leaders and economists favored modest expansion in the scope of

the market at various points in the 1950's and 1960's, but they did not prevail. For Mao, the market was revisionism incarnate. As Solinger notes, moreover, hostility to commerce is both a legacy of traditional China and a part of the Marxist tradition; the two strands merged in Mao's thought. Having rejected the market as a potential mechanism to bring about needed change, Maoists could only experiment with administrative decentralization, relying on a vigorous cadre force indoctrinated in Maoist values as well as in class struggle.

But implementation was chaotic, taking place in an environment of factional struggle, violence, and intolerance. Most important, as Walder stresses, Maoists did not really know how to attain what they wanted. They groped for more equality and greater worker participation but lacked an understanding of how to achieve these goals. Walder asserts that the goals of increasing participation and equality were not in themselves utopian. However, bringing them about would have required measures congruent with worker interests. The collapse of the work ethic could have been avoided if, for instance, equality had not been promoted simply by freezing wages, which in turn created new inequalities, especially among young workers. Radicals failed to think through the consequences of their policies. In the final analysis, Mao's own limitations as a radical thinker were at fault.¹²

IF ANY aspect of Maoist state-society relations was thought to have been the very antithesis of Stalinism,

¹⁰See *Mao Zedong Sixiang Wansui* (Long Live Mao Zedong Thought), 1967 Compilation, Taipei, Institute of International Relations, 1974, pp. 258–59.

¹¹It is interesting to note that during the current reform period, a fundamental shift in investment priorities among the three sectors of heavy and light industry plus agriculture has also not been achieved, though policy has aimed in the direction of such a shift. This points to the existence of powerful, conservative interests in favor of heavy industry, and calls for comparison with the Soviet case, for example, Khrushchev's struggle with the "steel eaters." See, e.g., Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, *How the Soviet Union Is Governed*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1979, pp. 225–26.

¹²Walder suggests that Mao was actually only critical of the later, conservative Stalin, but not of the Stalin of the "revolution from above" who believed in strong leadership buttressed by commitment. Friedman, writing in Nee-Mozingo, also quotes Chinese critics who see Stalinist elements in Mao's thought.

it was the rural one. But here, too, post-Mao "revisionists" see convergence. In language reminiscent of Alec Nove's essay on Soviet "Peasants and Officials,"¹³ William Hinton, the well-known author of a highly sympathetic account of rural revolution, *Fanshen*, observes in the Selden-Lippit volume:

In the real order that determines priorities in China, peasants occupy the lowest rung, just as they always have historically. Any official at any level takes precedence over a peasant... Anything created by a peasant who lives in the administrative sphere of a higher official, if it will enhance the latter's career, can be moved, removed, manipulated, or expropriated by that official just as if he were the lord of a feudal fief. (p. 114)

As Friedman sees it, and Selden concurs, the turn to Stalinism in rural China came in 1955, during all-out collectivization, for it was then that "Mao abandoned his prior policy of voluntary, gradual cooperativization, a policy which still held late in July 1955, for an embrace of Stalin's policy of forced, rapid collectivization" (Selden-Lippit, p. 184). This switch to coercive collectivization came about, argues Selden in a detailed analysis of socialist transformation, because of the state's need for accumulation, itself the product of overambitious industrialization targets. In so doing, Mao opted for the Stalinist approach of social engineering from the top down, tragically extinguishing the democratic possibilities of the cooperative movement, and leading to greatly enhanced arbitrary state power over local communities. Selden supports his case with rich

data, for example, on the destruction of rural handicrafts (pp. 53–54), thereby establishing a little known similarity with the Soviet case.¹⁴ In the "conflict between a state bent on centralizing resources for efficient modern processing and export and the handicraft industry," he notes, "the state won" (p. 53). He further argues that the land of the middle peasants was expropriated during the high tide and that long-term consequences were income stagnation and the discrediting of socialist ideals.¹⁵ This line of argument, incidentally, is quite similar to that offered by Chinese leaders after 1978.

In analyzing Chinese collectivization, Selden notes that it differed from its Soviet counterpart in that violence, resistance, and killing were largely absent. The Chinese case, he concludes, was one of "nonviolent coercion." But such a qualification raises doubt as to the appropriateness of the Stalinist label, for violence was at the core of the Soviet collectivization process. Indeed, in analyzing not only Soviet collectivization but the entire Stalin era, Moshe Lewin concludes: "For a good quarter of a century, extracting grain from the peasants amounted to a permanent state of warfare against them and was understood as such by both sides."¹⁶

That Chinese collectivization was largely free from violence was due to

a number of reasons. Unlike their counterparts in the Soviet Union, the Chinese Communists had fairly strong local party organizations and a measure of local support. Mao's agrarian policy was not as inimical to peasants' interests as was Stalin's. To be sure, as Kojima points out, extraction was a major issue in China; and similar to the Soviet case in 1932–33, it was carried to the point of famine at least once, in 1959–60. But even then, the cause lay in extraordinary miscalculations rather than in a deliberate "war" against the peasants.¹⁷ The point that emerges is that both Soviet and Chinese collectivization belong to the same class of events: they are instances of state-induced change in which agriculture was subordinated to state purposes. But within this broad similarity, the differences were so substantial that subsuming both under the heading of "Stalinism" distorts reality.

Friedman and Selden both view the collectivization drive in 1955 as a watershed in PRC history. Before then, they contend, the establishment of agricultural producers' cooperatives (APC's) was essentially voluntary and aligned with peasants' material interests, though marred occasionally by resort to coercion. But, notes Selden, the "high tide—great leap strategies, for all their originality and boldness, and for all the genuinely heroic achievements of millions of workers and peasants, set back the prospects of socialism." Thereafter, continues Selden, for many Chinese, the "mutual benefit" of the "promise of socialism in general and cooperation in particular" gave way to the "permanent sacrifice of the individual to the Party and state and the perpetual deepening of

¹⁴For a discussion of the destruction of handicrafts in the USSR, see K. C. Yeh, "Soviet and Communist Chinese Industrialization Strategies," in Donald W. Treadgold, Ed., *Soviet and Chinese Communism: Similarities and Differences*, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1967, p. 339. Selden's findings on Chinese handicrafts supersede Yeh's earlier research which had held that "the Chinese tried to preserve the handicraft industries and to encourage them to expand." See *ibid.* and corresponding footnote.

¹⁵The current restoration of household farming may be seen as a response to the underlying rural crisis caused by collectivization. But also see the discussion of Chen Village in this essay.

¹⁶Moshe Lewin, "Taking Grain": Soviet Policies of Agricultural Procurements before the War," in D. Abramsky, Ed., *Essays in Honour of E. H. Carr*, London, Macmillan, 1974, p. 282.

¹⁷For an analysis of the Chinese famine in light of the Soviet experience, see T. P. Bernstein, "Stalinism, Famine, and Chinese Peasants: Grain Procurements during the Great Leap Forward," *Theory and Society* (Amsterdam), May 1984, pp. 339–77.

¹³Alec Nove, "Peasants and Officials," in Jerzy F. Karcz, Ed., *Soviet and East European Agriculture*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1967, pp. 57–76.

class struggle" (p. 86). By decoupling revolutionary change from the promise of cooperation and mutual prosperity, the Maoists altered, negatively, the course of socialist transformation in China (p. 87).

Selden's thesis is certainly thought-provoking. But is it accurate? From a purely theoretical point of view, the feasibility of truly voluntary collectivization is questionable, if only because peasants' fear of "free riders" would necessitate leadership and organizational pressures to overcome their reluctance to join in a collective undertaking.¹⁸ Moreover, Vivienne Shue's *Peasant China in Transition*, a thoroughly researched study of socialist transformation from land reform to collectivization, and based on data from Hunan and Hubei provinces, provides empirical evidence that suggests that the pre-1955 transformation was not really voluntary. She does note that the party rejected the use of force against peasants, treating cadre "commandism" as a serious deviation from party policy. But voluntariness was constrained by class struggle against designated enemies, which must have had an impact on the motivations of those not so attacked. Chinese leaders succeeded, she concludes, because they were able gradually and skillfully to cut off all but the socialist option for change. As rural trade, marketing, and credit were socialized, the route to smallholder prosperity was increasingly limited, leaving peasants with no alternative except accommodation. Material incentives made such accommodation more attractive than it otherwise would have been, but Shue's rich material on the implementation of various economic policies makes it clear that this manipulative process prohibited peasants from making a

genuine choice. Thus, Shue sees the "high tide" of collectivization not as a significant departure from earlier party policy, but as the culmination of the preparatory period of cutting off smallholder options. It was based on Mao's belief that local cadres were willing and anxious to move ahead quickly and that poor peasants were eager to get hold of middle peasants' assets. A fundamental difference from the Soviet case therefore lies in the Chinese capacity to tap intravillage cleavages, whereas in the Soviet Union, village conflicts tended to be muted by the overriding salience of state-peasant conflict.¹⁹

STATE-PEASANT relations in the 1960's and 1970's, the heyday of Maoist radicalism, are explored in *Chen Village*, coauthored by three American sociologists, Anita Chan, Richard Madsen, and Jonathan Unger. This study of a village in southern Guangdong Province is based on interviews with 26 former residents who migrated to Hong Kong, most but not all illegally. Twelve were peasants, born and raised in the village; 14 were recent graduates of junior- and senior-high schools who had been "sent down" to the countryside from Guangzhou (Canton) in 1964.²⁰ The authors detail the impact on the village of the various campaigns that were a hallmark of the Maoist era, tracing village activities from the socialist education movements of 1963-66, through the Cultural Revolution

proper (1966-69), to the numerous follow-up campaigns of the last years of Mao's rule. What makes this study so valuable is that it shows how national policies translated themselves into the world of village politics, interacting with local conflicts, interests, and cleavages.

Chen Village is not typical of all of rural China, a point the authors recognize. It is not only the proximity to Hong Kong that makes for a difference, but also that post-Mao generalizations about rural China during the radical era do not fully apply to this case. Instead of being passive victims of a pattern of unrelieved leftist oppression,²¹ the authors found that a good many peasants were in fact committed to Maoism, though only for a few years. And instead of experiencing the economic stagnation which is said to have characterized rural China between 1957 and 1977, Chen Village prospered, as peasant incomes from the collective sector doubled between 1964 and 1968. However, incomes then declined by a third, remaining below the high of the 1960's until after Mao's death in 1976 (p. 247).

Three issues of comparative interest emerge. The first concerns the Soviet and Chinese imposition of arbitrary and irrational directives. In the Soviet case, such directives were a central theme of the entire Stalin period and a major cause of peasant dissatisfaction. In the Chinese case, assuming Chen Village is somewhat typical at least in this regard, irrational directives were a periodic problem, as during the Great Leap Forward and again in the 1970's. To be sure, the Maoist period witnessed endless higher-level interventions into the affairs of Chen Brigade and its constituent production teams. Sometimes this intervention came in

¹⁹See also Thomas P. Bernstein, "The State and Collective Farming in the Soviet Union and China," in Raymond Hopkins et al., Eds., *Food, Politics, and Agricultural Development*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1979, pp. 73-106.

²⁰The practice of "sending down" Chinese urban dwellers to the countryside was an important part of the party's overall policy to reduce urban unemployment while promoting rural revolution and development. See Thomas P. Bernstein, *Up to the Mountains and Down to the Villages: The Transfer of Youth from Urban to Rural China*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1977.

²¹For one such wholesale indictment, see Li Xuechang, "Leftist Errors in Village Work," *Shanghai Shehui Kexue*, No. 1, 1981, pp. 26-32.

¹⁸See the discussion in Samuel L. Popkin, *The Rational Peasant*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1979.

very direct form, as from February 1965 to December 1966, when a work team of 13 members lived with the peasants, carrying on the "Big" Four Cleanups campaign (politics, economics, ideology, organization) against cadre corruption. In this case, the aim was to mobilize peasants to expose the misdeeds of their leaders, in the process educating the former and purifying the latter. Other campaigns aimed at promoting class struggle, "cleansing class ranks," and curtailing private economic activity. But in addition to political goals, campaigns also aimed at increasing output by getting peasants to work harder, to adopt better work methods, and to carry out important infrastructural projects, such as land improvement.²²

A central finding of this study is that the peasants in Chen Village responded to higher level interventions so long as these campaigns were linked with efforts to increase concrete material payoffs. This linkage existed in the years of increasing prosperity, 1964–68, but was later severed. Campaigns became more and more arbitrary, resulting in the imposition of requirements that peasants grow unsuitable crops and curtail essential sideline occupations and private plots. The authors sum up this change as follows:

In the Four Cleanups the peasants had discovered that the time-consuming projects demanded by the workteam were in the village's own interest. After the Four Cleanups workteam had left, they had

continued to innovate and to engage in labor-intensive projects to improve the village infrastructure. Now, however, they were relearning to distrust all higher-level claims and to resent the imposition of new policies from outside. As of the mid-1970s, most of the Chens just wanted the state to leave their teams alone. (pp. 240–41)

A second issue is extraction or procurement. In Selden-Lippit, Kojima argues that peasants bore the burden of national accumulation in the early and middle 1960's. But in Chen Village, procurement does not seem to have been an issue in the early 1960's. Perhaps this was due to the village's poverty; it had so little to sell to the state. However, even after production increased, and the village began to prosper, state procurement did not seem particularly burdensome. In fact, it was resisted and resisted only in the early 1970's, when the state, in a fashion familiar to students of Stalinist grain practices, kept adding to existing quotas, asking for "Loyalty Grain," "Aid Vietnam Grain," and "Prepare for War" grain (that is, against the Soviet Union). Local reserves were also supposed to be built up, adding to the pressure on consumption. Whereas the quest for grain under Stalin was the central factor defining regime-peasant relations, in Chen Village, this quest became painful only at times.

A third point concerns peasant commitment. As the authors report, even by the mid-1960's, communist ideology had little impact on peasant attitudes in Chen Village. Thus, in the fall of 1965, the work team there received instructions that its "principal mission" was to teach peasants the "sacred virtue and power" of Mao Zedong Thought (p. 74). To help accomplish this task, the work team conducted mandatory five-day intensive training sessions on Mao's

teachings and installed a broadcast system with some 30 speakers. Young people embraced the new faith. The genuinely true believers were the urban youths who had been sent down from Guangzhou. Peasant youths were also eager, but a bit less so, owing to familial obligations that inhibited them from challenging their elders. (Richard Madsen's essay on peasant youths in the Nee-Mozingo volume is a telling analysis of how these cross pressures worked themselves out.) But they too, as well as older peasants, were excited by the Maoist vision of a "relatively egalitarian society bound together by selfless commitment to the common good" (Madsen in Nee-Mozingo, p. 251). It was a commitment that had a tinge of religion, both in its ceremonial and in its witchhunting propensities. It thus had a coercive aspect, but it was also based on self-interest. Commitment was strong among peasants who lacked labor power and hence depended on the collective. And it was based on the prosperity of 1964–68:

The Mao study, the broadcasts, the contests, praise, and criticism resulted in a greater work discipline. People felt under greater pressure to conform; but they also believed in the power of Mao's teaching to give them better lives, just so long as they faithfully obeyed his words. (pp. 86–87)

The authors' findings that normative commitment existed, even in a context of coercive intolerance, comes as something of a surprise. After all, since 1978, the Chinese have been telling the outside world that Cultural Revolution Maoism was nothing more than a contrived fraud imposed upon an unwilling society. One explanation for the upsurge of commitment in Chen Village, which the authors touch on, is that it was

²²Chen Village, of course, proceeded apace from land reform after "liberation" through lower and higher collectivization to communization during the Great Leap Forward. But the Leap had a disastrous effect on the village, as it did almost everywhere in the Chinese countryside. When many of the Leap's policies were either discarded or reversed in 1961, Chen Village, as a whole, was designated a "production brigade" and was divided into five production teams, each composed of 40 or so families. See *Chen Village*, pp. 24–27.

an analogue to a millenarian movement. But the main reason is peasant self-interest. As William Parish and Martin Whyte suggested several years ago and as the current authors agree, peasant commitment hinged on the extent to which ideology was congruent with peasant or local interests.²³ Changes in the 1970's validate this point. As prosperity declined and outside intervention became more irrational and extreme, peasant devotion and belief declined. Events such as the fall of Lin Biao reportedly dealt "a shattering blow" to the beliefs of young people (Madsen in Nee-Mozingo, p. 260). Indeed, peasant alienation from the regime increased greatly in the 1970's. It was a case of burnout, which undoubtedly figured as a key factor necessitating the post-Mao retreat away from collectivism.

The 1970's, as well as the Great Leap Forward of 1958-60, were periods in which the state's alienating impact resembled the Stalinist pattern. But what is different is that at least in this village, there was a period in which quite a few peasants apparently embraced Maoism, though a Maoism premised on material incentives, namely, the furtherance of local prosperity. In the Soviet Union, by contrast, except for the patriotic surge during World War II, it appears doubtful that serious commitment to the regime existed at any

time in the Stalinist village, apart from a few fringe elements or outsiders. In making this comparative point, it must be observed, however, that there are virtually no studies of Soviet villages during the Stalin period that provide a similarly detailed exposition of the interplay of national policies with local village politics.²⁴ But to the extent that the existing picture of Soviet villages is accurate, it seems that the kind of upsurge in commitment that swept through Chen Village is unique to China.

THE DECLINE in support that occurred in Chen Village and the increasingly coercive and abusive stance of the state were not confined to rural China. One common source of declining support in both the Chinese countryside and the city can be found in the lack of opportunity for upward mobility. Peasants in China were bound to the land in a way far less easy to circumvent than in Russia, where large-scale migration had occurred even when the regime sought to restrict it. Perhaps even more damaging, workers' chances to be promoted declined in China, as Walder indicates, and urban youths,

instead of having a chance to move up through the educational system, were sent by the millions to the villages to become peasants. (Many of the "sent down youths" in Guangdong, including those in Chen Village, became disillusioned and fled to Hong Kong for this reason.) Workers and peasants in Stalin's Russia, by contrast, had numerous avenues for upward mobility, generated by industrialization, purges, and war. Stalin created an achievement-oriented educational system and proved willing to absorb the technically trained into the party, thereby generating powerful sources of support.²⁵ In Maoist China, however, trends were going in the opposite direction. Mao's quest for "revolutionary successors" led to a destructive assault on educational excellence, on opportunity, and on the intelligentsia, leading on the whole to a major loss of support and legitimacy. In the case of mobility, the differences between the two systems were profound.

The Maoist era, then, differed in substantial ways from its Stalinist counterpart. To be sure, there were substantial areas of convergence, but it is only detailed comparison that can reveal the extent of similarity and the extent to which common underlying forces tending towards convergence operated. This is a task that remains to be undertaken.

²⁴For one exception, see Fedor Belov, *The History of a Soviet Collective Farm*, New York, Praeger, 1955. Soviet specialists are increasingly interested in understanding mass responses to Stalinism. See, e.g., Robert T. Manning, *The Collective Farm Peasantry and the Local Administration: Peasant Letters of Complaint in Belyi Raion in 1937*, Pittsburgh, PA, Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 1984. For a fictional, though insightful, account of the local scene, see Fyodor Abramov's *The New Life: A Day on a Collective Farm*, New York, Grove Press, 1963.

²⁵Sheila Fitzpatrick, "Stalin and the Making of a New Elite, 1929-39," *Slavic Review* (Stanford, CA), September 1979, pp. 377-402.

²³William L. Parish and Martin King Whyte, *Village and Family in Contemporary China*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1978, p. 334.

Correspondence

NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to The Editors, Problems of Communism, US Information Agency, 301 4th Street, SW, Washington, DC 20547, USA.

SOVIET DEFENSE SPENDING

TO THE EDITORS: Donald Burton, in his article "Estimating Soviet Defense Spending" (*Problems of Communism*, March–April 1983), comments on "some recent criticisms of CIA estimates of Soviet military spending." In the course of his discussion, he attempts to demonstrate that the estimates of real Soviet weapons growth for the years 1960–79 reported in my book *False Science: Underestimating the Soviet Arms Buildup* and the methodology used to derive them are defective. He tries to show that my criticism of the CIA's method is misguided and, by inference, that my own estimates must therefore be incorrect.

The decisive link in his chain of argument is the assertion that my estimates are derived by adjusting the CIA statistics 6 percent a year for improvement in weapons technology. This is not the case. My ruble estimates for Soviet weapons expenditures in 1960–70 are calculated from real weapons output statistics in 1960 and 1970, and are extrapolated to 1979 without utilizing any information on the presumed rate of intervintage technological progress. My dollar estimates are derived directly from the ruble estimates by adjusting the latter for index

number relativity. Thus, Burton's argument falls through, and he ends up merely reasserting, not proving, the soundness of CIA methods and estimates.

Burton's faith in the reliability of the agency's direct-costing methodology is based on his belief that the CIA correctly counts Soviet weapons, accurately determines their qualitative characteristics, and—for its dollar estimates—properly values all equipment with prices obtained from the US Department of Defense. However, he does not substantiate these assertions.

Indeed, he overlooks inconsistencies in the classified literature between the CIA's statistics on weapons delivery and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) data on weapons production, and neglects to alert the reader to the extreme volatility of the CIA's real weapons growth series. He misleadingly asserts that the CIA can accurately assess qualitative improvements in Soviet weapons through the magical use of "parameters" of "initial operating capability" (pp. 88–89). He fails to disclose that the Agency's estimates are adjusted with learning curve procedures that are disputed by the Defense Intelligence Agency. He tells us that CIA's dollar-cost estimates are correct even though the underlying dollar prices do not always correspond with documented Department of Defense acquisition costs. Instead of demonstrating that the CIA's data on weapons prices in rubles are really sufficiently extensive to sustain his strong inferences about hidden infla-

tion, he merely says that that Agency's price sample is extensive (and fails to reveal that this is true only for the subperiod 1967–73). Instead of admitting that the merit of the CIA's direct-costing method was disproved by data obtained directly from the books of the Soviet Ministry of Defense, which showed that Soviet weapons outlays in 1970 were at least treble what CIA had previously estimated for that year, he lamely contends that the CIA would have revised its procurement estimate for 1970 upward from 5.5 billion to 17 billion rubles even if this revision had not been forced upon it by the "new information."

Acceptance of the CIA's estimates thus requires two acts of faith. One must believe without demonstration that the Agency possesses the data required to ensure accurate direct costing, and that the contradictions seemingly besetting its estimates have scientifically valid explanations that for unspecified reasons the CIA chooses not to disclose.

The merit of my own estimates rests in their correspondence with DIA statistics on weapons production, weapons characteristics, and battle order; their consistency with the "new information"; their congruence with the tapestry of Soviet economic statistics; the fact that the behavior they imply seems reasonable given other evidence of a Soviet military buildup; and the way they resolve diverse anomalies besetting the CIA's estimates.

My own estimates follow accepted economic practice. I start by computing "best" benchmark estimates for 1960

and 1970—years for which weapons production statistics derived from official data correspond either with the CIA's direct-cost calculations or with information obtained from the books of the Soviet Ministry of Defense. On the basis of these computations it can be shown that Soviet weapons outlays in 1960 (valued at 1955 ruble prices) lie at the lower end of a narrow range between 5 billion and 6.3 billion rubles, and that procurement expenditures for 1970 (valued at 1970 prices) fall toward the upper end of a similarly narrow range between 16.3 billion and 18.5 billion rubles.

The large change in nominal weapons outlays between any set of points in the estimate intervals for 1960 and for 1970 shows that the assessment of the real rate of growth of Soviet weapons procurement for 1960–70 depends primarily on contending evaluations of the behavior of Soviet weapons prices during the 1960's. The evidence carefully assembled in *False Science* is relatively unequivocal on this important point.

The official Soviet wholesale price index for the machine-building and metalworking industries shows ruble prices falling 1.4 percent a year from 1960 to 1970, and corresponding data generated during the 1967 price reform indicated no price change in either direction for the years 1955–67. Given the small discrepancy between these sources and the possibility that adjustments made by Soviet statisticians for qualitative improvement may have been excessive, I deduced that my benchmark estimates were

probably accurate measures of real outlays at constant 1955 and/or 1970 prices but could deviate by as much as 1.5 percent a year in either direction. This yielded estimates of growth in real weapons procurement of between 10.3 and 14.6 percent a year, with a mean of 12.5 percent (or 0.1 percent below William Lee's estimate in *The Estimation of Soviet Defense Expenditures, 1955-75: An Unconventional Approach*, New York, Praeger, 1977).

This core finding enabled me to infer that the weapons growth trend was highly correlated with official Soviet noncivilian machinebuilding statistics adjusted for nondefense outlays, and to use this correspondence to extrapolate post-1970 weapons procurement trends. The results obtained in this way are consistent with statistics on the machinebuilding labor force derived by the Defense Intelligence Agency (Major General Schuyler Bissell, Deputy Director, DIA, "Economic Assessment of the Soviet Union and China," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China—1983*, June 29 and September 20, 1983, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1983, p. 78) and with official Soviet statistics on real civilian machinebuilding growth incorporated (without significant adjustment) in the CIA's own Soviet national income series (CIA, *USSR: Measures of Economic Growth and Development, 1950-1980*, Studies Prepared for the Use of the Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, Dec. 8, 1982, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1982, Table A12, pp. 79-81; Table 1, p. 243; and Table A1, p. 354).

My estimates of double-digit percentage rates for real growth in weapons procurement are also compatible with Department of Defense and Defense Intelligence Agency

data on weapons production in 1974-83, valued at constant 1974 dollar prices, which indicate that the Soviets cumulatively outproduced the US by 177 percent (Caspar Weinberger, *Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1984*, Washington, DC, February 1, 1983, Table I.B.1, p. 24; *Soviet Military Power*, 1982, Washington, DC, US Department of Defense, 1982, pp. 12-14; *Soviet Military Power*, 1983, pp. 78-80; *Soviet Military Power*, 1984, pp. 98-99; and Steven Rosefielde, "The Soviet Arms Buildup: An Economic Analysis of Its Size, Scope, and Sustainability," unpublished manuscript, November 1984).

CIA statistics place the disparity at 35.4 percent, i.e., four-fifths less (See CIA, *Soviet Defense Procurement Trends and Prospects*, Testimony of Donald Burton Before the Subcommittee on Armed Forces of the US Senate, November 1, 1979; DDI Testimony Before the Subcommittee on International Trade, Finance and Security Economics, of the Joint Economic Committee, Sept. 20, 1983; and Rosefielde, "The Soviet Arms Buildup..."). My estimates are consistent with Soviet civilian machinebuilding trends, as well as with plausible theories of Soviet intent.

These estimates also serve the useful function of pinpointing a principal vulnerability of the CIA's methodology: the treatment of technological growth. In chapters 4 and 7-11 of *False Science*, I show that the cost-estimating relationships used by the CIA do not take proper account of intervintage technological progress in Soviet weapons, and that if proper allowance were made for this factor, the Agency's estimates would not only correspond closely with my own, but would no longer exhibit 12 major behavioral anomalies documented in chapter 18 of *False Science*. This finding has now been sub-

stantiated further by a detailed analysis of Department of Defense statistics on weapons production and battle order that reveals that the CIA's real arms procurement series cannot possibly reflect properly the improvements in Soviet weapons technology (Rosefielde, "The Soviet Arms Buildup...").

Burton's critique of my estimates does not attempt to evaluate rigorously the logical foundations of my method, the suitability and reliability of the data used to derive them, or the collateral evidence that established their merit. He is also unconvincing in countering the inferences that I draw—from contradictions between the CIA's pre- and postrevision estimates—about the unreliability of direct costing and the CIA's underestimation of improvement in weapons quality. His explanation that the Agency's admitted 200-percent costing underestimate for 1960-70 was not caused by undetected improvements in Soviet weaponry, but by the use of outdated physical and technical assessments that underestimated the growth of real costs, misses the mark and concedes my point. Rising real costs (in constant 1970 pre-revision prices—i.e., essentially 1955 prices) necessarily imply that Soviet weapons were qualitatively improved and that the Agency's direct costing method is downward biased, unless it can be shown, as Burton fails to do, that factor productivity in the military machinebuilding sector fell rapidly and continuously throughout the 1960's.

The evidence adduced against my dollar estimates is less recondite. Burton attempts to show that the magnitude of my tactical fighter aircraft estimates is implausibly high by asserting that the CIA's average unit cost estimates for Soviet and American aircraft are already on a par, so that any further adjustment for intervintage technological progress would illogically imply

that Soviet fighter aircraft are more expensive than their American counterparts.

This assertion is backed up by the claim that the unit cost of the average Soviet fighter grew 7 percent a year from 1950 to 1982 on account of technological improvements. The exact rate is neither here nor there because, as was pointed out earlier, my own estimates are computed by extrapolation and do not depend on the Agency's estimates. Nonetheless, if the unit cost of Soviet aircraft has risen to the US level because of technological gains, my hypothesis that the principal flaw in the Agency's method is the underestimation of intervintage technological progress would be called into question.

It is easily demonstrated, however, that Burton's contention cannot be correct. Official Department of Defense statistics contained in the table previously cited from Caspar Weinberger's *Annual Report to the Congress FY '84* reveals that the Soviets produced twice as many fighter aircraft as the US over the period 1974-79. If the CIA actually estimated the average unit cost of a Soviet fighter to be "somewhat more than that of US aircraft in the 1980's" (p. 89), the cumulative dollar value of Soviet aircraft built in 1974-79 should exceed that of US counterparts by roughly two to one. Yet, CIA estimates reported by Burton himself to the Joint Economic Committee of Congress flatly contradict this implication. Instead of trailing total Soviet aircraft costs by a factor of two to one, US tactical aircraft costs exceed those of the Soviets by 8.5 percent—34.4 billion to 31.7 billion dollars, measured in 1978 prices (Rosefielde, *False Science*... , Table 13.8, p. 178). Thus, the Agency's dollar costs per unit do not obviously contradict my hypothesis that the major shortcoming of direct costing is the underestimation of intervintage technological progress.

The evidence that Burton adduces to substantiate the CIA's assertion that most of the change in the ruble cost of Soviet weapons between 1960 and 1970 is explained by hidden price inflation—instead of by real growth (as the official Soviet price reform data indicate)—is very imprecise. He argues vaguely that "hidden" inflation was driven by "open" input cost inflation, and asserts that weapons' subsidies were terminated in 1967. No guidance is provided concerning the comparative size of these causes, but Burton clearly implies that the subsidy effect is significant.

This implication is easily disproved. According to Pëtr Sokolov, the source Burton cites (P. Sokolov, Ed., *Politicheskaya ekonomika: Sotsializm—pervaya faza kommunisticheskogo sposoba proizvodstva* [Political Economy: Socialism—The First Phase of the Communist Method of Production], Moscow, Voenizdat, trans. in Joint Publications Research Service, *USSR Report* [Washington, DC], JPRS 63693-2, December 1974, p. 287), Soviet weapons prices included a "profit charge" of approximately 12 percent after 1967, but not before. The CIA's prerevision estimate of 5.2 billion rubles in Soviet weapons outlays in 1970 (valued at 1955 prices) should therefore have been increased to 5.8 billion rubles on this account. The difference between these figures, 0.6 billion rubles, explains 5 percent of the disparity between the agency prerevision and postrevision ruble estimates for 1970. The subsidy effect thus is very small, and provides only the scantest support for Burton's hypothesis of hidden inflation. The effect could easily have been offset by increases in factor productivity that lowered unit costs a comparable amount.

Moreover, his theory implies improbable price behavior. Burton maintains that hidden

inflation in the military machinebuilding sector corresponds with the rate he estimates for machinebuilding generally—i.e., 4 percent a year. This assertion however is strongly contradicted by the 11–12.9 percent Paasche rate of hidden weapons inflation (using 1970 quantity weights) implied by his statistics for 1960–70, and by the 9.0 percent rate implied by the CIA's latest estimates for the 1970's.

These rates are not only implausible in their own right, but are strikingly inconsistent with the CIA's estimates for civilian machinebuilding, which indicate the absence of any hidden inflation for 1960–80 (Rosefielde, "The Strong Separability of Defense and Civilian Growth Potentials: A Reassessment of Soviet Growth Prospects in the 1980s," a paper presented at the 15th Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Kansas City, Oct. 22, 1983, Table 10). The Agency thus is in the incongruous position of arguing either that the Soviet Ministry of Defense is the principal victim of hidden inflation or that similar rates of hidden inflation occur throughout the economy but have not yet been taken into account. The latter alternative provides an escape route of sorts, but would necessarily imply that the real gross national product of the Soviet Union fell continuously in absolute terms during the entire course of the 1970's. The implausibility of this implication demonstrates the tenuousness of Burton's position.

Burton also assails my estimates on intuitive grounds, contending that they are extreme because they do not lie midway between Franklyn Holzman's and William Lee's estimates as do the CIA's estimates (p. 86). At the same time, he implies that Soviet weapons outlays, according to my calculations, grow many times faster than the Agency's estimate of the growth of Soviet

GNP—and that this disparity renders them suspect.

Arguments of these sorts are irrelevant. CIA estimates show Soviet civilian machinebuilding, especially consumer machinebuilding, to be growing several times faster than GNP. If these civilian rates are plausible, why rule out rapid weapons-production growth on intuitive grounds? Similarly, if the scientific evidence favors one set of estimates, why reject them because they violate some fanciful golden mean?

The dollar and ruble weapons series I compute measure real growth because they are valued at constant, factor-scarcity-based transaction prices, given rational, purchasers' preferences. The dollar prices reflect scarcities in a workably competitive regime (the United States); the ruble prices take account of scarcities through the average-factor-cost conventions governing Soviet price formation. As a consequence, both series can be used validly to compare the level and trend of US and Soviet real weapons values. The ruble series may additionally be employed to measure the Soviet defense burden, understood as the share of national income spent on national security services—a concept that merely describes the pattern of social consumption, and tells us little either about the static opportunity costs of defense or about weapons growth potential.

Real dollar estimates of Soviet weapons growth calculated in this way reflect weapons utility under the usual axioms of purchasers' rationality because dollar prices formed in a workably competitive environment take adequate account of the forces of supply and demand. The weapons utilities in question do not precisely pertain to American preferences (because US military leaders do not select the Soviet output mix) or to Soviet preferences (because these preferences do not determine prevailing US

market prices). They represent, instead, the conditional utility that would have prevailed had the US acquired the Soviet weapons mix without greatly altering domestic US weapons prices.

Utility defined in this way has its obvious limitations, but it implies nonetheless that changes in real Soviet weapons values are positively, monotonically, and ordinally correlated with changes in military utility. Similarly, with regard to international comparison, dollar estimates may slightly overstate or understate the value of Soviet weapons (because had the US purchased the Soviet mix, the price of specified weapons would have varied in accordance with demand, short-run supply constraints, and economies of scale, i.e., learning), but should for the most part correctly indicate ordinal disparities in weapon utilities.

The same line of argument holds for ruble estimates, but must be qualified because the relationship between specific demand and utility is mediated through the accounting conventions of the Soviet pricing system. This difficulty obscures, but does not alter, their basic meaning.

Although the mathematical conditions required to assure that real values for Soviet weapons are ordinally transitive indicators of weapons utilities are rigorously developed in chapter 16 of *False Science*, Burton dismisses this demonstration without attempting to expose its flaws. He contends that dollar estimates measure costs, not values, and therefore are properly employed only for the calculation of "the overall size and direction of Soviet defense programs in resource terms" (p. 85). He also maintains that ruble estimates are indicators of cost, not value, and serve solely as measures of the economic burden of defense, which he misdefines as "the capabilities of the Soviet economy for sustaining the

current military buildup (and, conversely, economic incentives for seeking arms restraints) ..." (p. 85).

The theoretical premises Burton relies on to deny that dollar estimates are valid ordinally transitive indicators of weapons utility are not meticulously elaborated, but from the tenor of his remarks they appear to involve two unstated premises: first, the vague layman's notion that goods may "cost" more than they are "worth"; and second, the notion that weapons utility can only be appraised in terms of their scenario-dependent military effectiveness.

The adage that goods may cost more than they are worth means, in the present context, that goods are not produced at least cost, do not precisely reflect consumers' preferences, and/or are sold above their marginal cost because the market is not in competitive equilibrium. There can be no doubt that the market for defense goods is imperfect, and that actual weapons utilities therefore are less than they might be. This deficiency however in no way implies that dollar prices are grossly distorted by excess profits; that relative prices of weapons are biased; that the ratio of actual to potential utility of the US weapons mix diverges systematically from the same ratio for the Soviet mix; or that real weapons estimates are not ordinally transitive indicators of military utility. "Cost" may exceed "value"—as Burton appears to believe—but disparities of this sort neither prove his contention that dollar estimates measure real resource costs more faithfully than they measure utility, nor disprove my inference derived from neoclassical utility theory that they are legitimate ordinal measures of weapons utility.

Similarly, while it is a truism that the ex post military utility of weapons is scenario-dependent, assessments of comparative military power can be

validly made for cases where the scenario's impact is expected to be neutral. In these instances, theory clearly teaches that if the dollar value of the Soviet battle order exceeds that of the US battle order, the potential military utility of Soviet forces is correspondingly greater.

Burton's interpretation of the CIA's and my ruble estimates is even more strained. The defect here is not the separation of costs from values, but the unstated assumption that Soviet accounting prices are based on average factor costs and therefore do not reflect utilities. This assumption overlooks the fact that the Soviet leadership determines the structure of gross national product and the Ministry of Defense determines the weapons mix. Utility considerations affect weapons characteristics and the weapons mix just as much as factor costs affect prices, and as a consequence it is improper on theoretical grounds to assume, as Burton does, that real weapons statistics reflect competitive factor costs better than they do utilities of the system's leadership.

Both the ruble and dollar estimates of real weapons growth that I compute indicate that the Soviet arms buildup is likely to continue at a near double-digit pace for the foreseeable future, the CIA's latest revisions notwithstanding. Similarly, my dollar estimates of the Soviet and US battle orders demonstrate that the military balance, which was nearly on a par in 1974, has shifted decisively in the Soviet Union's favor (Rosefielde, "The Soviet Arms Buildup..."). These findings imply that the cumulative arms procurement disparity for 1960-79 and the quality-adjusted imbalance in real battle order today are likely to widen further during the 1980's; that Soviet GNP will grow more rapidly than the CIA presently forecasts; and that the share of GNP originating in the defense sector

will increase apace. Whether this process will require the diversion of resources from civilian to defense use is a further issue that depends on the comparative dynamic productivity potential of the military machinebuilding and civilian sectors of the Soviet economy. Indications are that a modest diversion of resources to military use will occur, but will not seriously limit the Soviets' capacity to extend their arms buildup (Rosefielde, "The Soviet Arms Buildup...").

Burton disputes these conclusions (p. 86), contending that even if my estimates were correct, they reflect cost, not utility, and thus imply neither widening asymmetries in mili-

tary power nor a sustainable increase in the Soviet defense burden. Here, as before, his judgments are undermined by his defective grasp of utility theory and his faulty understanding of the determinants of economic growth.

An annotated version of my comments documenting all assertions made herein was sent to Mr. Burton and is available from me on request. For an expanded treatment of these themes, see the forthcoming second edition of *False Science*.

STEVEN S. ROSEFIELDE
University of North Carolina
Chapel Hill, NC

TO THE EDITORS: Donald Burton's allegations in *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1983, that I overestimate Soviet military expenditures are false. Few, if any, individuals inside or outside the United States Government are more familiar with the evidence that my estimates are right on the mark than Mr. Burton, who directed the US Central Intelligence Agency's own flawed estimating procedure for more than a decade.

Every fact and figure that has caused the CIA to revise its estimates of Soviet military outlays in the last decade has only confirmed my estimates. In particular, in 1975 the CIA discovered that Soviet military outlays in 1970 were at least 50 billion rubles, not the 24 billion rubles that the CIA had previously estimated. As Mr. Burton now admits, these new data indicated that the CIA had greatly underestimated not only the magnitude but also

the rate of growth of Soviet military outlays. My own estimates, made before receipt of the new data, corresponded quite neatly with that new information (see the accompanying table). And Mr. Burton contends that I overestimate Soviet defense expenditures?!

If one starts with the CIA's prerevision estimate of 24 billion rubles for Soviet military outlays in 1970 and subtracts the CIA's estimate of Soviet research and development (R&D) expenditures for that year, one arrives at about 17 billion rubles, or a bit less than the published Soviet "defense" budget of 17.9 billion rubles in 1970. In fact, for more than 15 years the CIA consistently estimated Soviet military outlays, without R&D, at essentially the same level as the published Soviet "defense" budget (which does not include R&D and from which procurement of weaponry had been removed during the Korean War).

Table 1: Soviet Military Outlays, 1970 and 1972

Year	(billions of rubles)	
	Soviet data	Prior Lee estimates
1970	50	43-49
1972	58	51-58

In terms of the Soviet budget, intelligence data for 1970 and 1972 showed 32–33 percent of the Soviet budget going to the military. My estimates put the share at 30–32 percent. By contrast, if one compares the CIA's pre-revision estimate of 24 billion rubles in Soviet military outlays in 1970 (see William Colby, then the CIA director, in US Congress, *Allocations of Resources in the Soviet Union and China*, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee, Executive Session, April 12, 1974, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1974, figure on p. 68) with the declared Soviet state budget for 1970 of 154.6 billion rubles (*Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1970* [The National Economy of the USSR in 1970], Moscow, Statistika, 1971, p. 730), one finds that defense got something like 15.5 percent of the budget.

And what of the record since 1972? In November 1979, Mr. Burton testified before Congress that the CIA estimated Soviet military outlays for 1977 at 53–58 billion rubles (US Senate, *Soviet Defense Expenditures and Related Programs*, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on General Procurement of the Committee of the Armed Services, Nov. 1, 1979, Feb. 4, 1980, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1980, p. 130). Having doubled its estimates for 1970 from 24 billion to 45 billion rubles, plus or minus 5 billion, the CIA now had the Soviets spending less (53–58 billion rubles) in 1977 than in 1972, when Soviet military outlays were reportedly 58 billion!

But the situation is worse than that, because actual CIA estimates have been lower than Mr. Burton claims. This is because the CIA has persisted in using its "building block" method. The CIA estimates are derived from a computer-assisted model for which the

CIA's own acronym is "SCAM." In late 1975, when the CIA decided to revise its estimates to try to reflect new Soviet data, it ignored my pleas that they simultaneously correct the "building block" methodology fed into SCAM.

For seven years after its 1976 revision of its own estimates, the CIA alleged that SCAM was estimating the growth of Soviet military outlays at 4 to 5 percent a year. Mr. Burton repeats this claim on page 88 of his article in *Problems of Communism*: "The most recent ruble estimates still show a long-term upward growth trend since the late 1950's of some 4–5 percent per year in real terms."

However, the revised CIA estimates published in the 1976–79 period themselves showed a (mid-point) growth rate of only 3.7–3.8 percent a year since 1965, not Mr. Burton's alleged 4–5 percent a year. In his testimony before Senator Harry F. Byrd's Subcommittee on General Procurement in November 1979 cited above, Mr. Burton indirectly admitted as much when he said:

Our analysis of uncertainties in our methodologies indicates that if the computer growth rate is in error, it is likely to be low rather than high. Therefore, we express our estimate as a range, 4 to 5 percent, to highlight the uncertainty.

Indeed! Thanks to an April 30, 1983, press release of the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress issued by Chairman William Proxmire, and to a paper delivered by Myron Rush at a conference sponsored by the United States Information Agency in February 1983, we now know that the growth indicated by the CIA model has been much lower all along. From 1976 on, good old SCAM computed the growth of Soviet military expenditures not at 3.8 or 4–5 percent a year but at only 2 percent a year.

The latter rate of growth for total defense outlays implies zero—or perhaps even declining—growth in weapons procurement outlays. Why? Because SCAM will show some growth in operating costs. Then, too, military R&D also shows a substantial rate of growth in CIA's SCAM. These two factors easily account for the entire 2 percent annual growth in total outlays. That implies *no* growth in procurement after 1975–76 in CIA's SCAM.

It is easy to approximate the likely product of CIA's SCAM in the 1970's. Begin with the mid-point of the revised CIA estimate for 1970, 45 billion rubles plus or minus 5 billion; grant 3.8 percent annual growth for 1970–76 (although this too may be fictitious); and then add SCAM's magnificent 2 percent growth rate for 1976–80. Result: according to the CIA's SCAM, the Soviets spent about 61–63 billion rubles on the military in 1980, in the CIA's "rubles" (more on these "rubles" below). This is nearly 12 percent of the CIA's estimate of 525 billion rubles for Soviet GNP in 1980, and hence is compatible with the CIA position that the Soviets have been spending 11–13 percent of their GNP on defense.

If, however, we choose to treat the CIA's "1970 rubles" as Soviet rubles, translating 1970 prices into current prices as the Soviets do, the CIA's SCAM implies that Soviet military outlays in 1980 were about 55 billion rubles in 1980 prices. By remarkable coincidence, this is about 19 percent of the Soviet 1980 budget, nearly the same share that the CIA estimated for 1970 prior to 1976, i.e., before it raised procurement estimates from 24 to 45 billion rubles.

Once again my own estimates are considerably higher than the product of CIA's SCAM. My estimates for 1980 are 105 to 124 billion rubles in 1970 prices and 91 to 109 bil-

lion rubles in 1980 prices (these estimates are from my report *Trends in Soviet Defense Expenditures*, Analytical Assessments Co., Los Angeles, AAC-TR 10001/79, updated and converted to current rubles from data in the 1980 volume of *Narodnoye khozyaystvo*). The mid-point of my estimates in 1980 prices—or 100 billion rubles—is one-third of the Soviet 1980 budget, or about the same share of the budget as indicated in 1970 and 1972, for which we have hard data on Soviet military outlays. My estimates for 1980 are not "overestimates." They are right on the mark.

If this is not the case, it behooves Mr. Burton and the CIA to explain the political processes by which the late Mr. Brezhnev, Chairman of the USSR Defense Council, reduced the military's share of the USSR budget from about 33 percent in 1972 to about 19 percent in 1980. Equally it behooves them to explain how the Soviets accomplished the military buildup of the 1970's while spending such a diminishing share of the Soviet budget and with very little growth in procurement outlays. Implicitly, the CIA is back to its previous myth of a super-efficient Soviet defense sector that grinds out more and more technologically sophisticated weapons each year at the same cost.

Furthermore, in 1970, 50 billion rubles was about 12 percent of Soviet GNP. In 1980, 61 billion rubles for the Soviet military was no more than 10 percent of Soviet GNP (in 1970 prices). Yet the CIA claims its estimates are 11 to 13, or 12 to 14 percent of Soviet GNP. On the other hand, the CIA's GNP accounts published in 1982 allocate no more than 2–4 percent of Soviet GNP to the Soviet military in 1980 (CIA, *USSR: Measures of Economic Growth and Development, 1950–1980*, Studies Prepared for the Use of the Joint Economic Committee, US

Congress, Dec. 8, 1982, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1982, p. 67).

Contrary to Mr. Burton's allegations that the CIA occupies the middle ground, its revised estimates are as much at odds with the realities of the 1970's—Soviet political processes, the military buildup, the abundant evidence from Soviet economic data—as its prior estimates were at odds with the realities of the 1960's.

When Mr. Burton denies the role of the new Soviet data on military expenses in the CIA's sharp 1976 revision of its previous estimates for 1970 (p. 87), he is rewriting history à la George Orwell's 1984. The unexpected arrival of this data finally forced the CIA to double its estimates for Soviet military outlays and to more than triple its estimates for the procurement component thereof. Already around 1972, I had brought to Mr. Burton's attention Soviet studies of machinery and equipment ruble/dollar ratios indicating that the CIA was underestimating Soviet procurement outlays by more than a factor of three. At the time, he summarily rejected the Soviet calculations because, he said, the Soviets did not know how to calculate ruble/dollar ratios.

By the time the new data were received, the CIA did have some of the new price data that Mr. Burton now alleges were the basis of the entire revision. But the CIA was talking about raising its estimates by only 4 to 5 billion rubles, not by 20 to 25 billion. Moreover, CIA analysts were quite confident that only a minor adjustment was required by the new price data to which Mr. Burton refers, because they had twisted the new data on 1972 down from 58 billion rubles to about 30 billion rubles for total Soviet military outlays in that year.

In his note, Mr. Burton reveals one of the factors that likely contributes to the CIA's persistent underestimates of

Soviet military outlays:

The final piece of the puzzle fell into place in 1975 with the receipt of information revealing that estimates of military RDT&E expenditures were much too low, and permitting more confident estimates (p. 87).

For many years prior to 1975, my estimates put total Soviet outlays for R&D at least 50 percent higher than the reported Soviet outlays for "science"—which the CIA had stubbornly accepted at face value for two decades despite conflicting evidence. The new information on the scale of Soviet R&D outlays required no change in my estimates.

Mr. Burton alleges that my procurement estimates are invalid because one Mr. Abbott, in an unpublished CIA paper, arrived at different results using my methods. Not having seen this "demonstration" of the error of my ways, it is difficult to respond. However, Mr. Burton offers one clue to what Mr. Abbott probably did: start out with the wrong number. Mr. Burton refers to figures from Soviet input-output tables which give a substantially lower (by 18 to 30 billion rubles) value of the gross output of Soviet machinery—data that he surmises may not have been available to me.

In fact, I did have access to these input-output data. But as I demonstrated at some length in my book (*The Estimation of Soviet Defense Expenditures, 1955–75*, New York, Praeger, 1977, pp. 40–42, 59–60, 62–64, 67–68, 76, and 232–33), the Soviets have distorted their input-output table data on machinery output to disguise the true magnitude of Soviet military procurement outlays. If Mr. Abbott began his calculations with data understating total machine-building output by 18 to 30 billion rubles, his results are likely to be wrong.

I need not go into the long

history of my attempts to get the CIA to acknowledge that its "constant rubles" are not Soviet "constant rubles." Mr. Burton finally admitted as much in his November 1979 testimony before Senator Harry Byrd's Subcommittee on General Procurement. In a word, CIA prices are only its own constructs and not prices the Soviets use for military outlays. Estimates of Soviet defense expenditures in Soviet ruble prices tell us a great deal about Soviet objectives, policies, and national priorities. Such prices may be used to calculate the burden of defense on the Soviet economy and provide essential insight into the willingness of Soviet leaders to build up their military power at the expense of economic growth and domestic consumption. When CIA "rubles" are used for these purposes, the results are erroneous, misleading, even irrelevant, despite the fact that the CIA is generally viewed as the definitive US government source for estimates of Soviet defense expenditures.

WILLIAM T. LEE
Alexandria, VA

MR. BURTON RESPONDS: It comes as no surprise that the arguments put forth in my review of William Lee's and Stephen Rosefielde's estimates of Soviet defense spending have had no effect on either one's views. Lee continues to use his machine-building residual methodology and Rosefielde seems even more convinced of the validity of his methodology, whatever that may be. In the face of all evidence to the contrary, both remain wedded to the unorthodox view that the Soviet constant-price series are valid indices of real economic activities. But this, too, is not surprising in view of the importance of such an assumption to their respective methodologies.

Lee's discovery that the actual rate of growth of the CIA esti-

mates for the years after 1976 was lower all along than the 4–5 percent rate that the CIA was proclaiming requires some explanation. The explanation is also pertinent to understanding the CIA's recent downward revision of its estimates. This brings us back to the nature of the direct-costing methodology and the interpretation of its results.

The 4–5 percent growth rate was a long-term rate deriving from physical evidence regarding observed programs and activities. Rather than being constant from year to year, the annual rates of growth making up this long-term trend formed a cyclical pattern over time, reflecting the phasing in and out of major weapons procurement programs. Thus, the calculated reduction in the annual growth rates after 1976 that Lee refers to was both expected and consistent with the long-term trend.

The long-term estimate was buttressed by the expenditure implications of the intelligence projections of Soviet procurement programs for the early 1980's. Like the estimates of past and current programs, these, too, were based largely on direct evidence: the production program already in progress, the new weapons observed in the final stages of development, and the identification of new production capacity available for their manufacture. But they included an important additional assumption: that the planned programs would be executed according to the rational production schedules that had been characteristic of Soviet procurement programs in the past.

The projections at the time showed a sharp acceleration beginning in 1980 that was in keeping with the long-term trend. Although the Soviets were obviously encountering mounting difficulties with their economy, there was no evidence of difficulty with any of their military programs. The most prudent forecast under these conditions seemed to be to anticipate implementation of the planned programs as in the past, unless

or until evidence to the contrary should arise.

I am removed now from direct involvement in estimating Soviet defense spending for some five years, and have not even held a security clearance for almost two years. While I have not been privy to any intelligence information on the subject, it seems obvious—given the direct-costing methodology and published data on slowing growth of Soviet defense spending—that at least some of the major new weapons production programs that the Soviets had planned for the 1980's must have fallen behind schedule for one reason or another, or have been put on hold or abandoned. In any case, it is important to note that the slowdown in the growth of military procurements is a real one, not just a monetary phenomenon.

How are we to interpret this slowdown? Perhaps the first thing to ascertain is its timing. Most of the open-source reporting that I have seen on the subject dates the change in the rate of growth of Soviet military procurements back to 1977, when the annual rate first showed a decline. This seems wrong to me, since the Soviets continued throughout the decade of the 1970's to develop new weapons and build new capacity for their production. The pattern of the last half of the 1970's was thus consonant with the long-term growth in Soviet defense spending dating all the way back to Stalin's time. The secular change did not take place until the 1980's, when the tempo of the programs planned in the 1970's fell behind expectations.

The reasons for the slowdown in the 1980's (as opposed to the cyclical slowdown in the late 1970's) are less easy to come by. The concurrent slowdown in the Soviet economy would seem to point to resource constraints. Or they may be having difficulties mastering the new technologies embodied in their new weapons, causing interruptions in the production schedules that had proceeded so

smoothly in the past. A detailed analysis of the nature of the interruptions should provide important clues in this respect. Which programs have been abandoned? Which put on hold? Which are simply not meeting production schedules? Given the unsettled political situation since Brezhnev's death, it seems unlikely that the shortfalls in production reflect a reduction of the political power of the military. One thing seems clear: given the Soviet rhetoric against the US in the early 1980's, the slowdown was not intended as a peace overture.

Finally, what can be said about the effects of the slowdown in the Soviet defense spending increases on the military investment balance between the US and the USSR, i.e., the comparative levels of new weapons procurements of the two countries? Can we not take some comfort from the recent trend? Unfortunately, the answer is, precious little. It is important to remember that it is the level of expenditures, not the rate of their growth, that is more important in drawing investment balances. The Soviet decline is in the rate of growth, not in the level of expenditures (which has been affected only at the margin). The focus in the Western news media on the decline in the rate of growth of Soviet defense spending is fostering a false sense of security; the annual levels of Soviet weapons procurements remain enormous, substantially higher than those of the United States, even after the large increases in the latter country's defense spending in recent years. Redressing this imbalance would take much more than an erosion of a few percentage points in the annual growth rate of Soviet outlays.

Rosefielde's comments raise some new misconceptions regarding the US intelligence community's estimates of Soviet defense spending. His discussion is misleading in implying substantial differences between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelli-

gence Agency on matters relating to military-economic estimates. Unless things have changed since my involvement in these matters, these simply do not exist. With respect to production estimates, both have access to the same evidence, and when differences do arise, they are almost always reconciled in short order. The direct-costing operation is actually a joint enterprise with close cooperation on the costing of individual weapons systems. The DIA uses the resulting dollar-cost and constant-price ruble estimates as its own.

The notion that the DIA has production estimates that are inconsistent with its dollar and ruble cost estimates is simply in error. The only difference that I am aware of between the CIA and the DIA is the latter's use, in addition, of a current-price ruble estimate that it calculates on its own and which it explains as differing from the constant-price estimate because of price inflation.

The attempt to disprove my contention that the CIA/DIA unit costs for Soviet fighters of the 1980's are higher than those of the US fighters is typical of Rosefielde's analytic methods. As he notes, this issue is critical to him because if it is true, his own adjustments yield costs for Soviet aircraft that defy credibility, at some three times the costs of US fighters of comparable capabilities. As proof that I must not be telling the truth, he compares dollar-cost and quantity balances for the period 1974–79 to show that the estimated costs for Soviet fighters must actually be substantially lower than those for US fighters. The fact is that these data are not germane to his argument, inasmuch as the bulk of the Soviet aircraft in production after 1982 are completely new models that were not in production in the 1974–79 period. The US aircraft being produced in the 1980's, on the other hand, are essentially those introduced in the earlier period. The unit-cost estimates reflect the enhanced

technical characteristics of the new Soviet models and are higher than those for any of the late US models.

As a closing point, I feel compelled to express the feeling that any military man who has ever pondered such matters must find Rosefielde's theoretical discourse equating military utility and costs of production within any one country, let alone between countries, quite naive. Economists versed in the weapons acquisition process and defense accounting practices in the United States would be similarly critical. Finally, students of the Soviet economy and of Soviet military-industrial practices and decision-making would find the cost/military utility relationship in the USSR even more tenuous than that in this country.

DONALD F. BURTON
McLean, VA

UKRAINIAN FAMINE

TO THE EDITORS: The article "Famine and Nationalism in Soviet Ukraine" by James E. Mace (*Problems of Communism*, May–June 1984, pp. 37–50) surveys information about the famine of 1932–33 and considers its causes. It concludes that 7.5 million people in Ukraine died prematurely from this famine (p. 39) and charges the Soviet government (or more exactly Stalin) with "genocide" and "creating a famine by act of policy" (p. 37), implying that this genocide was carried out with the "motive" (p. 40) of weakening nationalism. "The famine," Mace writes, "seemed to represent a means used by Stalin to impose a 'final solution' on the most pressing nationality problem in the Soviet Union" (p. 37). "Placed in this context," the author argues, "the famine of 1933 makes sense as one of a series of policies designed to neutralize Ukrainians as a political factor, indeed as a social organism in

the Soviet Union" (p. 49).

I certainly have no intention of defending Soviet agrarian, social, or, national policy in this period, which I consider to have been inexcusable, but as a historian working on this period I must register my concern about the standard of academic discussion of this very important topic, which in my opinion has seriously deteriorated in recent years. Dr. Mace's contribution adds to this deterioration. I would like to address two questions of importance: (1) the scale of the famine, and (2) the causes of the famine and whether it was related to the issue of Ukrainian nationalism.

Mace's treatment of the scale of the famine consists of three parts: a survey of eyewitness accounts and reports, the demographic conclusions of Sergei Maksudov, and Mace's own "more accurate" demographic estimates.

Mace gives the impression that all eyewitness accounts by victims, repentant perpetrators, and journalists support his analysis of the scale and causes of the famine, and that it is only a few incorrigible Stalinists, like Walter Duranty and Louis Fischer, who deny this picture and attempt to "aid the Soviet state in suppressing the story" (p. 38). This is far from true. There was no uniform picture of the scale and causes of the famine. Among the evaluations of eyewitnesses and experts listed by Dana Dalrymple ("The Soviet Famine of 1932-4," *Soviet Studies* [Glasgow], No. 3, 1964, p. 259), the scale of excess mortalities varies between 1 and 10 million, with an average of 5.5 million. Most of these figures refer to the *entire* Soviet Union, and so the appropriate figure for Ukraine would probably be about 3.5 to 4 million. These sources as a whole indicate a scale of mortality that is about half the level claimed by Mace.

Space does not permit me to analyze all of these eyewitness and expert evaluations here. I would only point out that eyewitness

evaluations are often found to be exaggerated and that most of the expert evaluations listed by Dalrymple and Mace were made from a less certain data base than is now available. This last point may be illustrated from the work of William Henry Chamberlin and of Naum Jasny—two of the most authoritative of the experts listed.

Dalrymple cites Chamberlin as the authority for evaluations of 4 million and over 7.5 million deaths (loc. cit., p. 259). However, the 7.5 million figure is one that Chamberlin heard but did not himself believe (see his article in *Foreign Affairs* [New York], April 1935, p. 432). In his well-known book *Russia's Iron Age* (London, Duckworth, 1935), Chamberlin makes an evaluation of "not less than three or four million" (p. 88), but many years later, after the results of the 1939 census and Frank Lorimer's analysis of the demographic data, Chamberlin became noticeably more cautious in his assessment of famine mortality and referred more vaguely to "several millions" (see W.H. Chamberlin, *Beyond Containment*, Chicago, IL, H. Regnery Co., 1953, p. 188).

The case of Naum Jasny is even more dramatic. Jasny's evaluation of 5.5 million excess deaths in the famine, listed by Dalrymple, was made in 1949 and was based to a large part on assigning all of Lorimer's calculated excess mortality to the famine (N. Jasny, *The Socialized Agriculture of the USSR: Plans and Performance*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1949, pp. 552-53). Years later, after Jasny had carried out his famous evaluation of the size and significance of the labor camps and had worked more on Soviet economic development, he clearly had revised his earlier estimates quite substantially, from 5.5 million to "hundreds of thousands, perhaps more than a million," who "died in the winter of 1932/33" (N. Jasny, *Soviet Industrialization, 1928-1952*, Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press,

1961, pp. 110-11).

Dalrymple has produced a misleading survey of famine evaluations by giving so much weight to early, subjective, demographically ill-informed evaluations and by ignoring later, better-informed evaluations. Mace has made matters worse by implying that Dalrymple and his sources support an evaluation of the famine twice as large as they do.

Mace relies heavily on Maksudov's analysis of the scale of mortality and of the geography of the famine. Lack of space prevents me from presenting a full analysis of Maksudov's complex mortality estimates here. His major faults are that he places too much reliance on the official 1931 population estimate (which he mistakenly considers to have been a census), and on the population projections that he makes using uncorrected official data. If these serious errors are taken into account, Maksudov's 7.5 million losses (excluding children) would fall to roughly the same figure as that estimated by Lorimer 26 years earlier, i.e., 4.8 to 5.5 million, for the entire 1926-39 intercensal period (see F. Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects*, Geneva, League of Nations, 1946, pp. 231-36).

Maksudov's analysis of the geography of the famine is a useful contribution to our understanding, but Dr. Mace grossly exaggerates what it shows. Professor Maksudov used the age structure of the population as recorded in the 1959 census for different regions to compare the number of survivors of the generation born between 1930 and 1934 with the number of survivors born between 1935 and 1939 for the different regions. He concentrated on females, the less mobile sex, and he has shown that whereas for Ukraine, the 1930-34 female survivors number 83 percent of the 1935-39 survivors, in the RSFSR, the proportion was 92.7 percent. This does appear to be a reflection of the relative levels

of the demographic crisis as experienced in Ukraine and in the RSFSR. However, we should note that it is a reflection not just of excess mortality, but also of birth deficits, and we should also attempt to quantify the significance of this. Given normal aging processes and the observed increase in birthrates in the late 1930's (particularly after the prohibition of abortion), it is not surprising that the 1930-34 cohort of survivors is less numerous than the 1935-39 cohort. Now, in order to bring the Ukrainian ratio up to the same level as the RSFSR ratio, we would need to add an additional quantity equivalent to 10 percent of the 1935-39 Ukrainian cohort, i.e., about 210,000. If we were to add in the males, the addition required would reach about 500,000. This, Maksudov's data would indicate, is the magnitude of the differential population loss (mortality plus birth deficit) in Ukraine by those cohorts born between 1930 and 1934 (which we would expect to be the most vulnerable). In order to account for a Ukrainian famine excess mortality of 7.5 million, we would have to assume that mortality in the other, less vulnerable, age groups accounted for well over 15 times as much excess mortality as in the most vulnerable age groups. This is highly unlikely. Maksudov's indications of the geography of the famine indirectly show that the number of famine victims in Ukraine was much lower than is claimed by Mace.

What Mace claims to be "a more accurate estimate of Ukrainian population loss" is in fact an extremely crude set of population projections. No consideration is taken of the age and sex structure of the population, as in the methods used by Lorimer, Maksudov, and Yuriy Avksent'yevich Korchak-Cherpukovskiy, or of changes in birthrates. A highly dubious series of annual growth rates for the period 1926 to 1931 is used to calculate a "probable Ukrainian population of

34,165,000 on the eve of the famine (1931)" (p. 38).

By deflating the 1939 Ukrainian population figure (28.1 million) with the annual growth rates current in 1958–59, Mace estimated a 1934 population figure for the Ukraine of 26.21 million. The discrepancy between Mace's 1934 estimated figure of 26.21 million and his 1932 "probable" figure is 7.95 million. Mace assumes that a quarter of a million died in dekulakization and another quarter of a million in the repressions of 1936–39, and hence he is left with "almost 7.5 million Ukrainians who died in the famine" (p. 39).

The problems with these figures and this procedure are numerous. Mace's probable Ukrainian population in 1931 is already 2.5 million larger than the 31.6 million official Soviet population projection for July 1, 1931 (*Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR* [The National Economy of the USSR], Moscow, Statistika, 1932, p. 403). And the latter figure is itself already greatly exaggerated. Mace's figure probably exaggerates reality by 3 to 3.5 million.

On the other hand, his 1934 estimate is far too low. The following table summarizes reported crude birthrates, crude death rates, and growth rates; the levels implicit in Mace's es-

timation; and a set of what I consider more realistic estimates. Using the more realistic growth rate of 8 per thousand, instead of 13.9 per thousand, one would arrive at a 1934 estimated Ukrainian population of about 1 million more than that estimated by Mace. Overall, Mace's "more accurate demographic estimation" needs to be reduced by between 4 and 4.5 million to be compatible with the official demographic data. This would result in a level of 3 to 3.5 million Ukrainian deaths. I think that this is still likely to be overestimated because the official crude death rate figures are probably underestimated.

Concerning Mace's other calculations, it is clear that the extent of assimilation of Ukrainians into the Russian nationality explains most of the apparent discrepancy.

With respect to the causes of the famine, Mace provides little analysis other than to note the obvious fact that it came about "primarily as a result of excessive grain procurements" (p. 44). The reason for the excessive grain procurements is what we need to analyze, and Mace offers nothing except the assertion that "one cannot understand the famine without understanding the turnabout in Soviet nationalities policy—from seeking to foster to seeking to

absorb national cultures.... The famine must therefore be understood within the context of an attempt to impose a final solution on the 'Ukrainian problem' as it had hitherto existed" (p. 49). The reason why one should accept this interpretation is never explained in the article other than in terms of coincidence: "Since it coincided with far-reaching changes in Soviet nationality policy, and since the areas affected were inhabited by groups most resistant to the new policy, the famine seemed to represent a means used by Stalin to impose a 'final solution' on the most pressing nationality problem in the Soviet Union" (p. 37).

This is highly unsatisfactory and appears to me to be confusing consequences with causes. Western historiography on the famine of 1932–33 normally places great emphasis on the serious nature of the grain problem in the late 1920's and early 1930's. There is much debate about the causes of the grain problem: the real level of production, the impact of the agrarian revolution, the pricing policy, the impact of collectivization, the procurement policy, the real domestic requirements, the level of stocks, the strategy of promoting grain exports, the necessary level of strategic reserves for the army, the level of reserves in general, the effect of the weather in specific years, etc. But it is generally agreed that it was the grain problem, Soviet conceptions of it, and the methods adopted in the attempt to solve it—in the actual climatic and political circumstances of the 1927–32 period—that produced the crisis and famine of 1932–33 in Ukraine, the North Caucasus, and the Volga area. It was not the famine itself as much as the methods that were used in the attempt to solve the grain problem that are seen as having the major historical and political significance. (See the work of Moshe Lewin, Jerzy Karcz, R.W. Davies, Dana Dalrymple, and the Soviet histo-

rian Yu. A. Moshkov for accounts of the grain problem, and of grain procurement policies and their significance.) Under this interpretation, the reversal in the nationalities policy in the Ukraine, like the famine itself, was simply one of the consequences of the critical grain problem. Mace offers nothing to challenge this view, and he, therefore, has little basis for his implication that the famine was created in order to weaken Ukrainian nationalism. This, of course, is not to deny that Ukrainian nationalism was in fact weakened as a consequence of the action taken in connection with the famine.

S.G. WHEATCROFT
Centre for Russian and
East European Studies
University of Birmingham

MR. MACE RESPONDS: If I am to respond to S.G. Wheatcroft's charge that I have contributed to a lowering of the level of scholarly discussion, I must begin by saying something about the previous level of the discussion. With the exception of several works by Ukrainian émigré scholars, which our profession has completely ignored, Dana Dalrymple's pioneering study published 20 years ago is about all we have, and it was primarily concerned with merely establishing the fact that the famine took place.

Mr. Dalrymple limited himself mainly (but by no means completely) to Western journalistic accounts; made no use of demography; had no knowledge of Soviet nationality policy; and did not even have the tools to consider whether there might be a link between the famine and considerations of nationality policy. His mortality estimate was derived by simply averaging the estimates that had been given by the various journalists whom he cited. His interpretation was derived solely from well-known facts about the decline in productivity accompanying the forced collectivization of agriculture and the Soviet state's de-

Annual Growth of Population in Ukraine
(per thousand population)

	Year (s)	Crude birth-rate	Crude death rate	Growth rate
Official data	1926	42.1	18.1	+24.0
	1927	40.3	17.8	+22.5
	1928	37.8		
	1929	35.2		
	1930	32.8		
	1940	27.3	14.3	+13.0
	1958	21.0	6.9	+14.1
	1959	20.9	7.3	+13.4
Mace estimate and implicit assumptions	1934–39	(21.0)	(7.1)	+13.9
Wheatcroft estimate and assumption	1934–39	(24.0)	(16.0)	+ 8.0

mand for grain.

Until recently, there was little if any further discussion of the problem. How could my attempt to go beyond this valuable but rudimentary work done two decades ago contribute to the level of discussion of this issue? How can one lower the level of an issue if practically no discussion of it is taking place? Even if I my judgments were to prove wrong, it would seem that the very act of raising the issue could only serve to raise the level of discussion, if only by provoking Dr. Wheatcroft's response.

In his letter, Wheatcroft accuses me of misusing eyewitness accounts and reports of the famine. He is correct in stating that the estimates cited in the first installment of Dalrymple's pioneering work range from 1 to 10 million and average 5.5 million. Had he read the second installment of Dalrymple's work, "The Soviet Famine of 1932-34: Some Further References," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), April 1965, pp. 471-74, he would have found the range even greater, since Dr. William Horsley Gannt of Johns Hopkins medical school, who was in the Soviet Union working with Pavlov in the 1930's, reported being told by Soviet officials that perhaps as many as 15 million had died in the famine.

Of course, there were a number of accounts, ranging from the type that states: "I saw people starving and think a million people must have perished" to those that state: "Soviet official X told me that in region Y the number of dead has been estimated at Z million." It would seem obvious that the latter type of account should have somewhat greater weight than the former, and the latter type tends toward higher figures than does the former. For example, Adam Tawdul in *The New York American* of August 18, 1935, reported that Mykola Skrypnyk, shortly before his death, told him that eight to nine million persons had died during the famine in Ukraine and the North

Caucasus; on August 19, Tawdul related the report of another official that 1 to 2 million had perished in the Volga Basin. Interestingly, Walter Duranty, whose reports in *The New York Times* during that period leave much to be desired, and whom Dalrymple lists as having estimated 2 million dead, told the British Embassy in Moscow that he thought the figure of 10 million famine dead an entirely credible figure (British Foreign Office reports from Mr. Strang to Sir John Simon, Sept. 26, 1933). Although Duranty failed to tell whence he obtained this figure, he had a reputation for having much better access to Soviet officialdom and a much better knowledge of Soviet reality than his journalistic record would indicate. It would therefore seem likely that these rather high figures circulated in the Soviet Union at the time. Their accuracy, of course, remains an open question because of widespread violations of official regulations prohibiting unregistered burials (which would seem necessary to an accurate tabulation), but a simple averaging of the figures offered by those whom Dalrymple cited (and his list of citations is by no means exhaustive) does not, as Dr. Wheatcroft would have it, place an upward limit on mortality figures for the famine. Perhaps Chamberlin, who heard the figure of 7.5 million but did not believe it, should have. Perhaps Naum Jasny, who calculated a mortality figure in the hundreds of thousands, was wrong.

Next, Dr. Wheatcroft accuses me of overreliance on Sergei Maksudov's work, which I rely upon primarily for demographic evidence of the geography of the famine. I have no idea where he gets the notion that Maksudov mistook the 1931 population estimate for a census, but this is simply not true (one may either read Maksudov's work or ask him; I did both and fear that Wheatcroft did neither). As to whether Maksudov relies excessively on this estimate and on uncorrected data, Wheatcroft

makes an assertion but not an argument. I shall have to leave it to Maksudov to refute whatever argument Dr. Wheatcroft may choose to make.

As for Frank Lorimer's estimate, 4,800,000 excess deaths is only a partial figure intended to cover persons age 12 or older at the time the 1939 census was taken (Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects*, Geneva, League of Nations, 1946, p. 236) and not a lower variant for all excess mortality in 1926-39. Lorimer's total estimate of 5,522,000 excess deaths for the period (p. 133) leaves room for only 678,000 total excess deaths in the entire under-12 age group, a gross underestimation given the fact that infants are abnormally susceptible to famine and other harsh living conditions. The principal difference between Lorimer's estimate and Maksudov's higher one is in the latter's more realistic estimate of the number of excess deaths in the under-12 age group.

Now, Maksudov compares the number of survivors of three generations, those born in 1925-29, in 1930-34, and in 1935-39, not just two as Wheatcroft states. Since the figures are from the 1959 census and rural females do change their place of residence (even if less frequently than their male and urban counterparts), any abnormal trough in the age structure of the population corresponding to the group born in 1930-34 would tend to become less marked over the course of time. Thus, an abnormal trough in the age structure of the Ukrainian SSR (pre-1939 borders) observed in 1959, a full quarter-century after the event responsible for it, might well be brought up to the USSR average by adding half a million males and females to that age group, as Wheatcroft suggests, but this would certainly not be enough to account for the mortality that caused the trough in the first place, since it becomes shallower over time. An indication of how deep this trough was

initially may be gained from the fact that Ukrainian schoolteachers with whom I have spoken tell of village schools that were closed in the late 1930's because all the children who would have been of school age had perished from famine in their infancy.

Maksudov observes this trough throughout the Ukrainian SSR of the period (except for Chernihiv oblast, where—survivors indicate—local forests served to reduce mortality by providing the population alternative means of sustenance), throughout the Kuban and Don regions, to a less marked degree in parts of the Volga Basin, in Kazakhstan (where mass mortality began earlier, for other reasons, and thus may be excluded from our analysis), and in one oblast of Western Siberia (an anomaly probably explained by the fact that the "Ural-Siberian" method of collectivization began there and agricultural policies were carried out with exceptional vigor there in succeeding years).

I disagree with Maksudov's assumption that net interrepublic migration was zero, and for this reason I believe that his assignment of 4.5 million famine victims to the Ukrainian SSR is too low. While significant numbers of Ukrainians fled to other republics, official attempts to curtail this movement and to return to the Ukrainian SSR those who had fled probably meant that this movement of population out of Ukraine was greatly exceeded by officially sponsored settlement of villagers from outside the republic in villages depopulated by the famine.

With this last point in mind, I made some rough calculations based on the number of ethnic Ukrainians in the USSR (which also would include the roughly 30 percent of the Kuban population that was Ukrainian) and came up with a probable mortality figure of 7.5 million, uncorrected for changes in national identification or for probable falsification of the 1939 census. I also presented a second figure,

based on comparisons with the growth of Byelorussians, yielding a mortality estimate of 6.7 million. Neither was intended to be other than what I called them—i.e., “rough estimates”—and they were presented in order to show that the true figure could easily be well in excess of Maksudov's minimum of 4.5 million. Given the dubious nature of Soviet population figures in the 1930's—especially those of the 1939 census (in view of the suppression of the 1937 census)—I do not believe it possible to render more than a rough estimate.

In earlier works I have hazarded a guess of 5 to 7 million Ukrainian famine victims as a conservative estimate. However, 5 million would seem an excessively low minimum for ethnic Ukrainians if we take into account (1) the great probability that the number of non-Ukrainian victims in the Ukrainian SSR was more than offset by Ukrainian victims in the equally famine-devastated North Caucasus (then 30 percent Ukrainian, with Ukrainians concentrated in the countryside); (2) the fact that migration to Ukraine, being encouraged by the government, probably far exceeded migration out of Ukraine, which the authorities did everything in their power to prevent; and (3) mortality among the aged, a group almost as vulnerable to famine as the very young, who (actuarially speaking) would likely have died natural deaths by 1939 and whose somewhat premature demise in 1933 would therefore not be reflected in the 1939 census.

On the other side, there is the problem of changes in national identification. Since Ukrainization remained official policy even in Ukrainian communities outside the Ukrainian SSR until 1933, seven of the twelve years between the census of December 1926 and January 1939 were characterized by de-Russification, and only five years, by Russification—too brief a period for any assimilatory policy to

show significant results. However, the different criterion of nationality employed in 1939 undoubtedly served to reduce the total number of Ukrainians from what it would have been had the 1926 yardstick been used. To what extent this was offset by inflation of the results of the 1939 census is impossible to quantify, but it seems unlikely that this factor, which Wheatcroft inaccurately alludes to as assimilation, could have affected much more than a million persons, leaving us with a figure in the range of 6 to 7 million Ukrainian famine victims, which is roughly consistent with an estimate of 8 to 11 million famine victims for the USSR as a whole.

Wheatcroft also challenges the population growth figures upon which my estimate is based. Administrative estimates, based upon the compilation of reports for the rayon level, might not be absolutely accurate, but they are the best indicators we have to go on. At least, there is no reason to consider them less accurate than the lower figures from Gosplan that he suggests he used. Indeed, since Ukrainians were concentrated in the countryside, where birthrates and the natural rate of population growth were higher than in the Ukrainian SSR as a whole, it is quite likely that calculations based on these rates for the entire republic population would tend to understate population growth. The same is true for the lower assumed growth rate employed to calculate natural population growth in 1934–38, since, as Wheatcroft points out, the birthrate ceased to decline in the 1930's and began to increase, indicating a higher rate of growth than my assumption, and implying an even greater number of famine victims than would my own rough calculations.

In order to fill out Wheatcroft's table on the natural rate of population growth in the Ukrainian SSR, in 1927–31, I reproduce here a table from V.I. Naulko, *Ethnichnyi sklad*

Natural Rate of Population Growth in the Ukrainian SSR in 1927–1931

(per thousand population)

	1927	1928	1929	1930	1931
Birthrate	40.3	38.0	35.3	32.9	30.5
Mortality rate	17.8	16.5	17.6	17.9	16.0
Natural growth	22.5	21.5	17.7	15.6	14.5

SOURCES: For 1926–27, Lorimer, op. cit., p. 81; for 1927–29, M.B. Ptukha, *Ocherki po statistike naseleniya* (Outline Statistics on Population), Moscow, Statistika, 1960, p. 447; for 1940, 1958–59, *Naseleniye SSSR, 1973: Statisticheskii sbornik* (The Population of the USSR, 1973: Statistical Compilation), Moscow, Statistika, 1975, p. 71.

naselelnya Ukrains'koi RSR. Statystyko - kartohrafichne doslidzhennya (The Ethnic Composition of the Population of the Ukrainian SSR: A Statistical-Cartographic Inquiry), Kiev, Naukova Dumka, 1965, p. 84. The reader may note how similar these figures—which Dr. Wheatcroft considers dubious—are to the partial figure he himself presents. As for my allegedly implicit assumption of a mortality rate of 7.1 per 1000 annually in 1934–38, the annual growth figure of 13.9 per 1000 which I (explicitly) assumed, fits perfectly well into the trend of the period, whether we assume an annual average mortality rate of 16.0 and birthrate of 29.9 per 1000 or a birthrate of 30.5 and a mortality rate of 15.6 per 1000. Wheatcroft's own assumption of a birthrate of 24.0 per 1000, necessary to his derivation of the surprisingly low 8 per 1000 figure of annual natural population growth sharply contradicts his own statement (made in explanation of the fact that there were more persons born in 1935–39 than in 1930–34) that birthrates increased in the late 1930's, particularly after the adoption of anti-abortion legislation. If birthrates in 1935–39 were higher than those in 1930–34, the former could not possibly have averaged 24 per 1000 given the much higher rates for 1930 and 1931. However, a moderately lower natural rate of population growth for the years 1934–39, say 13.0 per 1000, is certainly an assump-

tion within the realm of the possible. This would produce a lowering of the estimate of famine mortality by about 210,000, and we might revise upward the number of Ukrainian victims of other repressions so as to lower our famine mortality by another 200,000. We would still be left with an estimate of more than 7 million Ukrainians having died in the famine.

In order to reach an irreducible minimum, let us assume that 1.5 million persons who would have been counted as Ukrainians in 1926 were counted as Russians in 1939 (an extraordinarily high figure equal to one-half the total number of Ukrainians residing in the North Caucasus in 1926); that in every other aspect the 1939 census was as accurate in counting Ukrainians as was the 1926 census; that no person who died in the famine would otherwise have been dead by 1939; and that the natural rate of population growth for Ukrainians in the USSR was zero during the famine. This irreducible minimum would be over 5.5 million Ukrainians. Needless to say, not all these conditions pertained, and the real figure must have been substantially higher.

Wheatcroft is correct in stating that in any attempt to analyze why the famine took place, one needs to examine the reason for excessive procurements. I was under the assumption that this is precisely what my article attempted to do. Rather than repeat my argu-

ment, to which there seems to be little in the way of response, let us consider what Wheatcroft does say.

In the first place, he refers to Western historiography of the famine. With the obvious exception of Dalrymple's work of 1964-65, I am at a loss in understanding just what historiography he means. Surely not Mose Lewin's monograph, which concludes at Stalin's March 1930 "Dizziness from Success" speech, over two years before the beginning of the famine. Lewin's article on grain procurement (" 'Taking Grain': Soviet Policies of Agricultural Procurement before the War," in S. Abramsky and B. Williams, Eds., *Essays in Honour of E.H. Carr*, Hamden, CT, Archon Books, 1974, pp. 281-323) devotes less than a full page to the famine (pp. 295-96), hardly a major appraisal. Regardless of other indisputable merits of this article, about all Lewin says concerning the famine is to refer the reader to Dalrymple and to repeat a few points of the latter's interpretation. Jerzy Karcz's "Thoughts on the Grain Problems," (*Soviet Studies*, April 1967, pp. 399-434) deals exclusively with the Soviet state's inability to induce the peasantry to part voluntarily with the grain it produced and with the crucial role this grain crisis of the late 1920's played in the Soviet decision to introduce forced wholesale collectivization of agriculture as a more effective instrument of extraction. He, too, tells us nothing of the famine. If R.W. Davies has continued his study of the Soviet countryside past 1930, I have certainly not seen it. And if one wants to refer to Soviet scholarship, I would suggest that on the famine the Soviet Ukrainian works cited in my article are far more useful than Moshkov, but that no Soviet works are particularly forthcoming on this issue. Therefore, when it comes to non-émigré historiography of the famine, Dalrymple's article is about all that we have.

Dalrymple's main thesis was that a man-made famine took place in the USSR and that millions died because of excessive grain procurements ("The Soviet Famine of 1932-34," *Soviet Studies*, January 1964, pp. 264-65). Having little information on the precise territories affected or the time it ended (he—like Ewald Ammende before him—was taken in by accounts in the Hearst press in 1935, which were "updated" to indicate that the famine continued into 1934, whereas any of the numerous eyewitnesses who came to the West after World War II would have told him that the famine actually ended in 1933), Dalrymple adopted the obvious interpretation: that the state carried out excessive procurements because of a generalized need for more grain.

Robert Conquest and I had the opportunity to discuss this issue with Dr. Dalrymple at a public forum in the fall of 1983. Without abandoning his earlier interpretation, Dalrymple conceded, "it may be that the coincidence of the famine and other forms of repression against Ukrainians warrant the more severe charge of genocide" (Robert Conquest, Dana Dalrymple, James Mace, Michael Novak, *The Man-Made Famine in Ukraine*, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC, 1984, p. 16).

From this alone, it would seem that the jury is still out. What, in Dr. Conquest's opinion and mine, tips the scales away from the interpretation attributing the famine to the government's generalized determination to get grain and in the direction of the interpretation that understands the famine also as an instrument of nationality policy is the fact that the famine stopped at the Byelorussian-Ukrainian border in the north and the Russo-Ukrainian border in the northeast (though not, of course, along the border with the largely Cossack areas east of Ukraine). As Conquest put it during our discussion: "Not only were peas-

ants not allowed out [of Ukraine] to find food, but when they did leave, they were not allowed to return with food. A physical blockade prevented anyone from bringing even a few loaves into Ukraine. This is a clear sign that there was a definite intention to localize the famine in Ukraine, and there was no famine on the other side [of the border].... There is a total difference on either side of the border" (ibid., p. 22). I have made this same point on a number of occasions, including in the article that Dr. Wheatcroft has chosen to criticize. This would seem a crucial issue that he seems to overlook, except to assert that both the famine and accompanying reversal of Soviet nationalities policy are derivative of the all-important grain problem.

The reversal of Soviet nationality policy can be seen as a consequence of collectivization only in a very limited sense. Stalin (*Sochineniya* [Works], Moscow, Gosizdat, 1946, Vol. 7, p. 72) believed that "the nationality problem is by its essence a problem of the peasantry." In the traditional context of the Russian Empire, this made sense because outside Russia proper Russians tended to be concentrated in the cities and non-Russians in the countryside. *Korenizatsiya* (indigenization) thus was a policy designed to placate non-Russians who were mainly in the countryside, and was complementary to the New Economic Policy (1921-27) of placating the peasantry in economic terms. The abandonment of the latter policy and its replacement by the forced collectivization of agriculture meant that the state could not hope to placate the peasantry, including, of course, the non-Russian peasantry, and the national concessions earlier made to rural-based nations lost much of their political justification. Hence, attacks upon the leadership of non-Russian communist parties began about the same time as collectivization (1929-30), and soon thereafter (1930 on) began the mass ar-

rests of so-called "bourgeois nationalists," i.e., political, cultural, and religious figures, who had hitherto worked in relative freedom (sometimes with state support) but were now equated with treasonable plotters seeking to dismember the Soviet Union. As I argued in my article, the famine constituted the culmination of this process among groups considered most troublesome (the Ukrainians, Cossacks, and Volga Germans), a culmination that took the form of a body blow against the demographic basis of these groups, the so-called "rural masses."

It is, of course, true that the state sought to obtain as much grain as possible to finance a rapid industrialization, and this provided a major impetus for the compulsory collectivization of agriculture. It might plausibly be argued that it was this desire for grain that led the state to starve millions of its citizens to death, were it not for the fact that the geography of the famine does not bear out this interpretation. For example, a cursory examination of the age structure of rural females in Kharkiv oblast (on the Russo-Ukrainian border) indicates an abnormally small number of individuals who would have been born during or immediately before the famine. Directly opposite this oblast, on the Russian side, is Belgorod oblast, and here no such anomaly is to be seen. This yardstick, first applied by Maksudov, gives clear indication that Kharkiv oblast was deeply affected by the famine, but Belgorod oblast was not. On the other hand, the famine affected even grain-deficit areas in Ukraine, where sugar beets was the main crop. Obviously, the state's desire for grain could not plausibly have motivated it to leave grain producing regions like Belgorod oblast alone, while creating a condition of mass starvation in sugar regions like Vynnytsya oblast. And if Dr. Wheatcroft doubts the reliability of Maksudov's work as an indicator of the geography of the famine—and he does not directly challenge it on this

ground—there are a significant number of survivors now living in the West who will bear this out. Some, in fact, now reside in Great Britain, and I would be most happy to place Dr. Wheatcroft in touch with some of them.

However, to deny independent historical and political importance to the complete reversal of Soviet nationality policy—i.e., a complete change in the national-administrative structure and nature of the Soviet state—cannot seem other than myopic. To deny such importance to the deaths of millions—and this is equally true whether one accepts Wheatcroft's figures or mine—through the hitherto unknown instrumentality of a man-made famine, is simply unconscionable. To deny that I have failed to challenge the view that the famine was merely a consequence of the state's generalized desire for grain simply ignores the main argument of my article. It would seem that Dr. Wheatcroft has attempted to refute an argument without understanding it or the development upon which it is based, the reversal of Soviet nationality policy in the 1930's.

JAMES E. MACE

Ukrainian Research Institute
Harvard University
Cambridge, MA

DIFFERING VIEWS ON KAMPUCHEA

TO THE EDITORS: In an essay in *Problems of Communism* (July-August 1984) reviewing two books on Kampuchea co-edited by me, Mr. Kishore Mahbubani incorrectly claims that in Dr. David Chandler's 1977 testimony to the US Congress, "one does not find any description of Khmer Rouge atrocities" (p. 70). Dr. Chandler in fact accused the Khmer Rouge of "murder, face-to-face, and in large numbers," noting also: "I am certain that many of my friends...have been killed," "because of the

jobs they held under the old regime, or because they didn't take the revolutionary side." "People with higher education, money, authority, even with Western-style clothes were seen as traitors. Thousands of these people, it seems, were killed in the early days of the regime or were allowed to die." (The precise bibliographical citation to this testimony is as follows: US Congress House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, *Human Rights in Cambodia*, Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations, May 3, 1977, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1977, pp. 14, 16, 44. Also, reprinted on pp. 63-66 of these hearings is Dr. Chandler's article "Transformation in Cambodia: The Most Radically Altered Country in the World" originally printed in *Commonweal*, Apr. 1, 1977, which contains more details about the violence and harsh conditions to which Pol Pot's regime subjected its people. Mr. Mahbubani owes Dr. Chandler an apology.

A misprint in one of the books reviewed, which seems to have misled Mr. Mahbubani on another point, should be corrected here. The phrase "pro-revolutionary institutions" on page 7 of *Revolution and Its Aftermath in Kampuchea* should read "pre-revolutionary institutions."

A second error is Mr. Mahbubani's own. He states (p. 68) that Hou Yuon, the author of two of the chapters in *Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea, 1942-81*, was killed by Pol Pot "before 1975." This is incorrect, as is demonstrated on p. 390 of that book. Hou Yuon opposed the 1975 evacuation of Phnom Penh and other Pol Pot policies, and was killed some time afterward. Since the book was completed, I have also seen the diary of a Pol Pot cadre, which notes: "In 1975 we dealt with the contemptible Hou Yuon."

Mr. Mahbubani chides me, saying, "Kiernan significantly fails to mention" Timothy Carney's 1977 statement that "the case for a national rural tinderbox" in Kampuchea in the 1960's "'remains to be proved'" (p. 69). Let us assume for the moment that I stated, which I did not, that the case had already been proved. Would I have been remiss in failing to note Carney's views? If so, then Mr. Mahbubani, by his own criterion, is equally guilty for failing to note the points on which Carney agrees with me.

Let us look at the facts. I described Carney's essay as "thoughtful" (*Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea*, p. 306). In the footnote to which Mr. Mahbubani refers, I noted a matter that "Carney had correctly pointed out," and recommended "Carney's valuable book" (ibid., p. 85). Mr. Mahbubani complains that I refer "approvingly" to the work of Hou Yuon and Hu Nim, but he "significantly fails to mention" that I did the same for Carney's work. The idea of praising a good book with which one may nevertheless disagree appears to be unthinkable to Mr. Mahbubani. He demonstrates his own level of scholarly independence when he gives a potted history of the 1970-75 war (p. 68) that omits any mention of the 1970 US invasion or of the massive bombardment of Kampuchea in 1969-73.

Mr. Mahbubani claims (p. 70) that Khmer Rouge "refusal to accept...domination over Indochina" by Hanoi makes it "not surprising that the Vietnamese should show a preference for recruiting former Khmer Rouge cadres into the Heng Samrin regime." Does he realize what he is saying? I am equally confounded by his implication (p. 71) that events since 1982 disprove my description in 1980, of the situation in 1980 (*Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea*, p. 385).

In his attacks on "those who sympathize with communist revolutions" (p. 69), Mr. Mahbubani "significantly fails to mention" the important role played by Singaporean diplomats such as himself in maintaining the Khmer Rouge's Democratic Kampuchea as an alternative government in the UN since its overthrow in 1979. What he rightly calls "one of the most horrendous periods of communist rule the world has ever seen" (p. 68) continues to haunt the Khmer people in more ways than one. The tragedy of Kampuchea is that the only forces resisting a Khmer Rouge return are those of Vietnam and Heng Samrin.

BEN KIERNAN
Monash University
Victoria, Australia

TO THE EDITORS: I have just read Mr. Kishore Mahbubani's review, in the July-August 1984 *Problems of Communism*, of two books on Cambodia to which I contributed. I generally disagree with Mr. Mahbubani's views and have presented my own perceptions elsewhere, in particular in my book *Cambodia 1975-1982* (Boston, South End Press, 1983). Here I would only like to clarify several inaccuracies in his essay.

For one, it is hardly legitimate to treat Pen Sovan simply as the "one leader...who tried to steer a course just a little independent of his Vietnamese masters" (p. 69). Indeed, until his overthrow, Pen Sovan was considered by all "experts" to be Vietnam's man in Cambodia, and it was only when he was dismissed that they suddenly decided he must have been loyal to someone else and therefore ousted at Vietnam's behest.

It is also inaccurate to state that "Cambodia has never been a threat to Vietnam" (p. 72). Cambodia threatened Vietnam, and increasingly, under Pol Pot, and whatever the accuracy of Nguyen Co

Thach's alleged remarks to Stephen Solarz regarding Hanoi's primary concern with the "Chinese threat" (p. 70, n. 9), some degree of Vietnamese military retaliation was justified by the repeated Cambodian attacks across the Vietnamese border during 1977-78.

MICHAEL VICKERY
University of Adelaide
South Australia

TO THE EDITORS: Kishore Mahbubani's essay "Cambodia: Myths and Realities" in the July-August 1984 issue of *Problems of Communism* is a disservice to the academic community. He resorts to polemical and unscholarly methods in reviewing two recent books on Kampuchea—David Chandler and Ben Kiernan's *Revolution and its Aftermath in Kampuchea* and Ben Kiernan and Chanthou Boua's *Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea*. These volumes—which are edited by the leading Kampuchean specialists in the English-speaking world—deserved better.

Two examples demonstrate Mr. Mahbubani's approach. First, on p. 70 he takes David Chandler to task for failing to denounce the excesses of the Pol Pot regime and for neglecting an important source, François Ponchaud's *Cambodia, Year Zero*. But Chandler's testimony was given in May 1977, and he could hardly have been expected to consult a book published a year later. Moreover, in 1977 the nature and extent of atrocities being committed in Kampuchea by Pol Pot was not an easily established fact, as my review of the early literature pointed out (see "New Evidence on Kampuchea," *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1981, pp. 91-96).

Similarly, Ben Kiernan is criticized for his observations, made in 1980, that he could not find evidence of Vietnamese settlement in eastern

Kampuchea; Mahbubani implies that Kiernan overlooked documentary evidence, but the documents referred to (p. 71) were in fact issued only in May and September 1982 and did not become available to outside analysts until even later that year. Thus, Kiernan could hardly be faulted for failing to take them into account in 1980.

Such tactics detract from Mahbubani's own arguments that Vietnam dominates Kampuchea via a program of settlement and that the current Phnom Penh regime is a puppet of Hanoi. Indeed, they impede the important effort to comprehend historical background to the present situation in Kampuchea.

CARLYLE A. THAYER
Faculty of Military Studies
University of New South Wales
Canberra, Australia

MR. MAHBUBANI RESPONDS: While I am grateful to the three writers for drawing my attention to certain factual errors I made, I am astonished that notwithstanding all the evidence presented in my review, Benjamin Kiernan continues to insist that "the only forces resisting a Khmer Rouge return are those of Vietnam and Heng Samrin." How can Heng Samrin "resist" the return of the Khmer Rouge when both he individually and one-third of his regime are former Khmer Rouge cadres? A three-member group representing the Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights of New York concluded after a visit to the Thai-Cambodian border in early November 1984 that both the Vietnamese Government and the Heng Samrin regime officials were widely involved in the arrest and torture of Cambodian citizens. This was because "a disproportionate number of people in the police and security apparatus [of the Heng Samrin regime] are ex-Khmer Rouge" (*The New York Times*,

CORRECTIONS

A sentence in Young C. Kim's article "North Korean Foreign Policy," published in the January-February 1985 issue of *Problems of Communism*, was rendered incorrectly. The sentence beginning 13 lines from the top of column 1 on page 12 should read:

"Indeed, there are indications that the North Korean government has been groping for a more pragmatic way of dealing with the South, the pursuit of which would not be incompatible with the resort to assassination of South Korean officials should the opportunity present itself."

Also, on page 16, columns 1 and 2 were inadvertently reversed.

Nov. 15, 1984). If all the Khmer Rouge cadres agreed tomorrow to accept the Vietnamese domination of Cambodia, Hanoi would happily accept all these cadres notwithstanding what they might have done in the past. The evidence speaks for itself. The biggest criticism to be made of the two volumes I reviewed (each co-edited by Mr. Kiernan) is that this central point of the linkage between Vietnam and the Khmer Rouge is ignored.

Kiernan's selective quoting from my review prevents him from understanding how the Vietnamese preference for absorbing Khmer Rouge cadres (significantly, Kiernan decides not to challenge this point in his letter) is linked to the Khmer Rouge refusal to accept Vietnamese domination of Indochina. He should re-read my paragraph in full. The point I was making was that since the Vietnamese Communists and the Khmer Rouge did not split for ideological reasons, it was not surprising that the Vietnamese should show a preference for absorbing former Khmer Rouge cadres, who belong to the same ilk.

Both Kiernan and Carlyle Thayer have tried to defend David Chandler. To my surprise, Kiernan does this by referring to the same congressional testimony that I cited. Kiernan is right: there is a "description of Khmer Rouge

atrocities" in Chandler's testimony. However, it is a "description" that Chandler put in because he wished to suggest that American bombing, rather than the Khmer Rouge leaders, were really responsible for these atrocities. The reaction of a Congressman who was present at the hearing gives us a profound insight into Chandler's testimony. Congressman William F. Goodling said to Chandler: "I know you are not trying to oversimplify it and say the slaughter of one million or two million people—however many million people were slaughtered—is justified, but I cannot understand how you think we should sit back and not speak out while this is going on..." (p. 18). Chandler did not respond to Goodling. Do I owe Chandler an apology? I invite the reader to decide after reading Chandler's testimony in full.

Thayer's defense of Chandler is disingenuous. François Ponchaud's book may not have been published in 1977, but long before the book appeared, Ponchaud made the same points in a series of articles published in *Le Monde* in 1976. Chandler, whom I acknowledged in my review to be one of the best scholars on Cambodia, must surely have been aware of these articles.

Thayer and Kiernan correctly state that Kiernan writing in 1980/81 would not have

had access to the documents issued in 1982 by the Heng Samrin regime. That is a fair point. Still, some questions remain. How is it that Kiernan, in his "extensive travels" in Cambodia, failed to notice any Vietnamese settlers? They did not start arriving only in 1982. Also, why has Kiernan not publicly conceded that he was wrong in his earlier assessment that Vietnam would not send settlers into Cambodia?

Michael Vickery states that the repeated Cambodian attacks across the Vietnamese border during 1977-78 justified some degree of Viet-

namese military retaliation. Perhaps. The real question is: Does it justify the invasion and occupation of Cambodia for over six years? The Pol Pot regime also conducted similar attacks across the Thai-Cambodian border. Would Vickery also claim that Thailand had a right to invade and occupy Cambodia?

Finally, I need to respond to Kiernan's finest polemical point: that Singapore diplomats like myself have helped to defend Democratic Kampuchea's seat at the United Nations. Perhaps Kiernan is unaware that no

country, not even Vietnam, has challenged the seat of Democratic Kampuchea at the United Nations in the last two years. Why? This is because the international community, unlike Kiernan, is not deceived by Vietnamese propaganda. Each year (by increasing votes, so far), the United Nations has endorsed resolutions sponsored by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) calling for the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces and the restoration of Cambodian independence. The ASEAN-proposed resolution also calls for the

Cambodians to be allowed to decide their own future, in the confidence that if given a real choice, they will choose neither the Khmer Rouge nor the current Vietnamese occupation. Why does Kiernan have so little faith in the ability of the Cambodians to determine their own future that he would prefer to entrust their fate to the hands of both the Vietnamese and former Khmer Rouge cadres?

KISHORE MAHBUBANI
New York

On March 11, 1985, when this issue of *Problems of Communism* was in page proofs, Radio Moscow reported the death of party General Secretary Konstantin Chernenko and, shortly thereafter, announced the selection of Mikhail Gorbachëv as his successor. The contents of this issue, by and large, reflect perceptions prior to these events, although the texts of several articles were amended slightly in light of Chernenko's passing.—Eds.

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Problems of Communism

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Book Reviews

Douglas Pike

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Philip R. Nel

Deborah Duff Milenkovitch



GORBACHEV

Archie Brown

Leadership Change in China's Provinces

William deB. Mills

State and Society in South Yemen

Norman Cigar

Notes & Views

Conspiring to Kill the Pope

Paul B. Henze

Problems of Communism

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An annual index for *Problems of Communism* appears in the November-December issue (No. 6) of each year except in the case of the first three volumes, which are covered in a combined index in the November-December issue (No. 6) of Vol. III. Material from the journal is also indexed in *ABC POL SCI*, *Bibliographie Internationale des Sciences Sociales* (all sections), *Current Contents*, *Economic Abstracts*, *Historical Abstracts*, *Index to US Government Periodicals*, *International Political Science Abstracts*, *Public Affairs Information Service*, *Social Sciences Citation Index*, *Social Sciences Index*, *Strategic Studies Reference Guide*, and *United States Political Science Documents*.

It is with sorrow that we report the death on April 13 of Clarke Kawakami, former Senior Text Editor of *Problems of Communism*. He will be missed and well remembered by all.

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Cover: Mikhail Gorbachëv, at the March 13, 1985, funeral of predecessor Konstantin Chernenko; to his right, Nikolay Tikhonov and Andrey Gromyko; behind him, Viktor Grishin. Photo by APN via Gamma-Liaison.

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IN THIS ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

Gorbachëv: New Man in the Kremlin

Archie Brown

Analysis of Mikhail Gorbachëv's rise to the top shows that while he made good connections along the way, his remarkable ability was of decisive importance. As general secretary, his priority is to effect radical improvement in the Soviet economy, and he appears to have an open mind on the question of far-reaching economic reform, even though in the short term, reform may be quite modest. In foreign policy, diplomatic initiatives on several fronts may be expected. In the view of the author, though the responsibilities on Gorbachëv's shoulders are immense, the Soviet leadership this time has chosen the man best fitted to carry them.

Leadership Change in China's Provinces

William deB. Mills

In the spring of 1983, in a centrally mandated process that seemed to occur with astounding speed and lack of rancor, some 950 of China's 1,350 top provincial leaders retired and were replaced by about 160 officials. The purpose of this streamlining was to create a younger, better educated, and more efficient provincial leadership that owed allegiance to the center. Despite undeniably impressive results, however, there was local resistance to central policies. Critical in overcoming this resistance was the center's direct involvement in implementing the change and its willingness to compromise with local leaders.

State and Society in South Yemen

Norman Cigar

The Islamic society of South Yemen has proven surprisingly resistant to attempts at social transformation by the Marxist-Leninist ruling Yemeni Socialist Party. Given this societal resistance, YSP Secretary General Ali Nasir Muhammad has pursued a pragmatic, gradual approach, but others (including Abd Al-Fattah Isma'il, who recently returned after five years in Moscow) favor a harder line toward social and cultural mores and institutions.

* * *

Notes & Views

Conspiring to Kill the Pope

Paul B. Henze

Thoroughgoing investigations in Turkey, Italy, and elsewhere have brought indictments directly linking Bulgarian secret agents to Mehmet Ali Ağca's attempt on the life of Pope John Paul II. There are indications that the assassination of Turkish editor Abdi İpekçi in February 1979—whether or not Ağca pulled the trigger—may have been used to prepare Ağca's cover for the subsequent shooting of the Pope.

(Abstracts continued on reverse side)

Essay-reviews

Vietnamese Voices

Douglas Pike

The history of Vietnam and its war not only has been badly told, notes the author, it has been parochially told by foreigners, be they French, American, or Chinese. Some information, frequently oversimplified and often trivialized, is told over and over, while the rest is not reported at all. What has been missing in all this is the Vietnamese view, told by Vietnamese in their own words. But the dearth of Vietnamese voices is not solely the result of foreign efforts at monopolization. It also stems from the fact that the Vietnamese have always been reluctant to write and speak about themselves to the outside world.

Cambodian Tragedy

Elizabeth Becker

By the time the Vietnamese overran Cambodia, installed Heng Samrin in Phnom Penh, and publicized the atrocities of the Pol Pot regime, Cambodian studies in the United States had been decimated. Scholars of Cambodia had mostly left the field and sought employment elsewhere. Thus, the chronicling of Cambodian developments was left to newcomers to the field who lacked full command of the subject or to oldtimers who were scarred by and embroiled in the polemics over American involvement in Indochina. Without adequate support for Cambodian studies, this situation will continue.

Soviet Fortunes in Southern Africa

Philip R. Nel

Escalating internal conflicts in the Front-Line States, economic decline and drought, Western initiatives, and relative Soviet reticence have combined to produce an unexpected reversal of Soviet prospects in southern Africa, as both Angola and Mozambique have entered into agreements with South Africa. In pursuing influence or longer term strategic goals in the region, Moscow is limited by its inability to supply client states with anything other than arms, its proclivity to take sides rather than mediate in important regional disputes, and the strong desire of African states—even "Marxist-Leninist" ones—to maintain a nonaligned posture, not least because of their need for strong economic ties with the West.

Political Economy of Socialism in Eastern Europe

Deborah Duff Milenkovitch

To understand the economies of Eastern Europe, it is necessary to explain why the various countries pursue different economic policies despite basic similarities in their political, economic, and ideological structures. Multi-country studies are often methodologically innovative in demonstrating how similar problems are treated differently in the various countries. Yet, they do not say why this is so. Single-country studies add to our substantive understanding of economic policies in a given country but neglect to place them in the broader context of the economy of socialism. A synthesis of both approaches remains to be undertaken.

Gorbachëv: New Man in the Kremlin

Archie Brown

In the 60 years between the spring of 1922 when Stalin became general secretary of the Central Committee (CC) of the Communist Party and the spring of 1982, the Soviet Union had just three general secretaries—Stalin himself, Nikita Khrushchev, and Leonid Brezhnev. In the past three years, four men have held that office—Brezhnev in the last months of his 18-year reign, Yuriy Andropov, Konstantin Chernenko, and now Mikhail Gorbachëv. If Gorbachëv lives as long as any one of his five predecessors, he can expect to be still at the helm of the Soviet Communist Party and state at the beginning of the next millenium. For that and other reasons, the choice of Gorbachëv is of exceptional significance for the Soviet Union and—given the country's role in international affairs—for the rest of the world. There is every possibility that Gorbachëv will in time become the most powerful Soviet leader since Khrushchev, though his political style is likely to be very different and his policies more carefully thought through.

Before going on to discuss Gorbachëv's path to the top, the speed of his advance, and his attributes, outlook, and priorities, it may be useful to begin by noting those respects in which Gorbachëv's election as general secretary corresponds with Soviet tradition and the respects in which it is a novel succession.

Similarities to Previous Successions

In several ways, the choice of Gorbachëv fits the pattern of elevations to the Soviet leadership. Starting with Lenin, there have been only seven undisputed top leaders in Soviet history.¹ All six of Lenin's successors were at the time they attained the top leadership position already full members of the Politburo and secretaries of the Central Committee.² That applies to Stalin who was already *general secretary* at the time of Lenin's death in

1924, though it was only *after* Lenin's death that he was able to consolidate the power of the general secretaryship to the extent that it became the top job. Chernenko's death on March 10, 1985, left only two Soviet politicians who were full members of the Politburo and secretaries of the Central Committee—Gorbachëv himself, who had held such joint membership since 1980, and Grigoriy Romanov, who had combined membership of the Politburo with that of the CC Secretariat only since 1983, even though he had been in the Politburo longer than Gorbachëv.

Second, career profile, as well as position at the time the vacancy in the general secretaryship occurs, is important, and it is of particular relevance that a serious candidate should have experience of party secretaryships at various levels of the hierarchy, including the regional and (as follows from the point made in the previous paragraph) the Central Committee level. The economic experience gained thereby should ideally include acquaintance with agriculture, and some foreign policy experience is an additional asset. Every general

¹I am excluding Georgiy Malenkov, for though in 1953–54 he was accorded a higher protocol ranking than Khrushchev, it is not clear that even then he wielded greater political power than Khrushchev, and by 1955 Khrushchev had quite evidently established a superior authority to him.

²I noted this and other prerequisites of a potential general secretary while Brezhnev was still alive. See Archie Brown, "Leadership Succession and Policy Innovation," in Archie Brown and Michael Kaser, Eds., *Soviet Policy for the 1980s*, London, Macmillan, and Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1982, pp. 232–35.

Archie Brown is a Fellow of St. Antony's College, Oxford. In the fall semester of 1985 he will be Visiting Professor of Political Science at Columbia University (New York). His most recent book, of which he is editor and co-author, is Political Culture and Communist Studies (London, 1984).



Mikhail Gorbachëv addressing a major party ideological conference on December 10, 1984.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

secretary thus far has had his institutional base in the party apparatus and has spent a greater proportion of his career in party work than in any other branch of political activity. Even Andropov is no exception to this rule, though his Ministry of Foreign Affairs and KGB experience made him the nearest thing to one. Gorbachëv had a model rise through the party hierarchy, and like Khrushchev and Brezhnev before him, he had significant knowledge of agriculture—indeed, greater expertise in this realm than any of his predecessors.

Gorbachëv's foreign policy experience before coming to the general secretaryship is not as great as was Brezhnev's, who as chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet from May 1960 until July 1964 had extensive contacts with foreign statesmen. Nor is his knowledge of the international scene likely initially to be as great as was Andropov's, who from 1951 until 1982 served successively in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as head of one of the foreign departments of the Central Committee (Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries), and as chairman of the KGB. Nor, for that matter, has Gorbachëv had the opportunity to take part in talks with an American president as

Chernenko had when he participated in the Brezhnev-Carter summit meeting in Vienna in 1979.³ Yet Gorbachëv, too, has had the opportunity to gain some foreign policy experience in addition to that which all Politburo members acquire simply by virtue of regularly attending Politburo meetings at which foreign relations and international issues figure prominently on the agenda.⁴ He undertook an eight-day visit as head of a Soviet delegation to Canada in May 1983 in addition to his earlier lower profile visits to various Western countries and to East European ones. When Chernenko became general secretary, Gorbachëv succeeded him as chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Soviet of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet. In that capacity, he made a week-long visit to Britain (cut short by

³Not that Chernenko appears to have contributed much. See Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977–81*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983, p. 343; and (for more explicit comment on this) Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President*, New York, Bantam Books, 1982, p. 246.

⁴For further elaboration of this point, see Archie Brown, "The Foreign Policy-Making Process," in Curtis Keeble, Ed., *The Soviet State: The Domestic Roots of Soviet Foreign Policy*, Aldershot, Hampshire, Gower for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1985, pp. 191–216, especially pp. 200–203.

a day because of the death of Marshal Dmitriy Ustinov) in December 1984, which confirmed his grasp of international issues and possession of diplomatic skills.

Third, this latest succession conforms to the general pattern in terms of the nationality of the party leader. Non-Russians in the top leadership team are at a disadvantage in the general secretaryship stakes. There are still, after all, more Russians in the Soviet Union than all other nationalities put together, and they are disproportionately well represented in the all-Union Central Committee apparatus. Gorbachëv, like all of his predecessors except one, is a Russian; Stalin remains the only exception to that rule.

Fourth, and perhaps more surprising, at age 54, Gorbachëv is in the age band at which a majority of general secretaries have acceded to the top job. The sight of three aged and infirm Soviet leaders in a row has somewhat obscured the fact that only two of the Soviet Union's seven leaders and six general secretaries have been older than their 50's when they became leaders of the country, and only one (Chernenko) was over 70 when he was elected general secretary. Insofar as it is possible to generalize about what is "normal" in accession to the general secretaryship when dealing with only six cases, it can be said that the 50's is the normal age band in which a Soviet leader accedes to the top post.

Difference from Previous Successions

There are, however, three even more important respects in which Gorbachëv differs from all previous incumbents of the general secretaryship. The first is in terms of *relative* age, that is, the general secretary's age in relation to his colleagues. No one before Gorbachëv has become top leader as the youngest member of both the Politburo and Central Committee Secretariat. This is of greater potential relevance to the power Gorbachëv may yet wield than is absolute age (though Stalin was the only one to become general secretary at a younger age than Gorbachëv).

Stalin, at the time of Lenin's death was only 44, but he was one of the two oldest members of the Politburo. (The other was Trotsky—also 44.) The average age of the Politburo in 1924 was only 42. Khrushchev was 58 when Stalin died in March 1953 and 59 when he was formally given the title first secretary of the Central Committee in September of that year. As such, he was a year above the average age of the Politburo. Brezhnev, at 57, was just a little below the average age of the Politburo (59) immediately following the removal of Khrushchev in 1964. Andropov, who was 68 when he succeeded Brezhnev in November 1982, was also fractionally below

the Politburo average age, which was 69 at that point.⁵ By the time Andropov died on February 9, 1984, the average age of the 12 full members of the Politburo had declined to 67, and so Chernenko, at 72, was significantly above it.

Immediately after Chernenko's death, the Politburo (by this time down to 10 voting members as a result of the death also of Marshal Ustinov in December 1984) still had an average age of 67. Of these men, five were over 70, three were in their 60's, and only two were in their 50's. Not only was Gorbachëv the youngest member of the Politburo by a full five years, he was 13 years below the average age of the voting membership. Even more remarkable, he was the youngest member of the entire top leadership team—the 21 people who in the immediate post-Chernenko period made up the full and candidate membership of the Politburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee. This is quite unprecedented and could have important implications for the future.

Though there has been a strong element of genuine collectivity of the Soviet leadership in the post-Stalin, and especially post-Khrushchev, era, every general secretary except Chernenko, who came to the leadership too late and too infirm to make much of an impact on it, has increased his powers during his time in the top post. This is especially true of those who had a lengthy period of office, though in the case of the first three of them—Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev—each man wielded less power than the previous general secretary.⁶ Though promotions to the Secretariat and to the Politburo require the approval of a majority of members of

⁵The average age of the Politburo just after Brezhnev's death was 69 if Andrey Kirilenko is counted as a member, which he formally was until released from office at the Central Committee plenary session held on Nov. 22, 1982 (see *Pravda* [Moscow], Nov. 23, 1982, p. 1). However, Kirilenko had fallen out of favor with Brezhnev and Chernenko and had in practice been dropped from the Politburo while Brezhnev was still alive. If Kirilenko is excluded from consideration, the average age of the Politburo immediately following Brezhnev's demise on Nov. 10 was exactly the same as Andropov's, 68.

⁶This point has been the subject of some misinterpretation. Writing three years before Brezhnev's death, I noted that "each General Secretary has wielded less individual power over policy than his predecessor, but within his period of office his power vis-à-vis his colleagues has grown" (Archie Brown, "The Power of the General Secretary of the CPSU," in T. H. Rigby, Archie Brown, and Peter Reddaway, Eds., *Authority, Power and Policy in the USSR*, London, Macmillan, and New York, St. Martin's Press, 1980, p. 136). Rather to my dismay, this has been treated by a number of subsequent writers as if it were, or purported to be, a general law of Soviet politics. To take a recent example, Thane Gustafson, reviewing a book by George Breslauer, refers to this generalization as "'Brown's law'" (see *Slavic Review* [Urbana, IL], Winter 1984, p. 684). In fact, this was a generalization (which I would still uphold) limited to the only three general secretaries who had held office up to that time: Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev. So far as the first point is concerned, there was no suggestion that such a trend toward declining leadership power would continue. Indeed, it seems clear that Andropov was within a year wielding a degree of power that Brezhnev did not possess for at least the first six years of his general secretaryship. The second part of the statement might, however, be extended into something approaching a law of Soviet politics. It does seem to be a *zakonomnost'* of the Soviet political system that a general secretary, granted a sufficient span of life, will over a period of time increase his power vis-à-vis his colleagues in the Politburo and Secretariat.

the Politburo itself, which gives senior members of the Politburo an opportunity to make trade-offs among potential candidates, there is no doubt that the general secretary is in a better position than anyone else to get his nominees promoted to the top leadership team. As the very title general secretary (or, in Khrushchev's time, first secretary) suggests, his supremacy within the Secretariat is more clearly institutionalized than is his position in the Politburo. A general secretary has sometimes found it easier in the early stages of his leadership to make changes in the composition of the Secretariat than in that of the voting membership of the Politburo. Gorbachëv, however, as will be noted in greater detail in the final section, has succeeded in making a dramatic impact on the composition of the Politburo little more than six weeks after becoming party leader. Even when the process of change within the Politburo is a more gradual one, a point tends to be reached at which the general secretary has a sufficient group of protégés and supporters there to make simpler the task of removing those whose presence he has earlier had to tolerate without enthusiasm. For example, there was no love lost between Leonid Brezhnev and Aleksandr Shelepin. But although Brezhnev was able to have Shelepin removed from the Central Committee Secretariat in 1967, it was not until 1975 (by which time, following other changes in the Politburo composition, the General Secretary's power had greatly increased) that Brezhnev felt strong enough to push for Shelepin's expulsion from the Politburo as well. All the signs are that Gorbachëv will continue to move very much faster than Brezhnev did.

If he lives a normal life-span, Gorbachëv may readily become the first Soviet leader to preside over an entire top leadership team that has been appointed under his chairmanship of the Politburo and Secretariat and, accordingly, during a time when he was exercising a greater influence than anyone else on the choice of candidates. At first, the pool from which he can draw people—members of the Central Committee—will be only to a very limited degree of his own choosing, but Gorbachëv is fortunate in that respect also. Whereas Andropov and Chernenko had to operate with Brezhnev's Central Committee, that elected at the 26th Party Congress in 1981 (a factor that was more of an impediment for Andropov than for Chernenko, in view of Andropov's desire for change and of Chernenko's closeness to Brezhnev), Gorbachëv has come to power within a year of the next five-yearly party congress and in time to exercise still more influence than he could before on the composition of the Central Committee which will be formally elected at that 27th congress.⁷

Thus, over the long term, Gorbachëv has quite remarkable opportunities to promote like-minded people

to senior leadership positions. In the shorter term, he will, as previous general secretaries have had to do, preserve alliances with a number of the weightiest members of the Politburo and take care not to tread on too many toes at once. But even in the short and medium term, the age structure of the Politburo and Secretariat is such that a number of changes are inevitable.

A second respect in which Gorbachëv is different from all of his predecessors as general secretary is that he alone has made his professional political career (in the Komsomol and party apparatus) entirely in the post-Stalin period. I shall look at his career in greater detail below, but the main point in the present context is that he is of a different *political generation* with different generational experience from that of all of his predecessors. Unlike them, he was not involved in any way in Stalin's purges and so is unburdened either by the guilt of having denounced others or by memories of fear of being denounced. He joined the party in 1952 while he was a student at Moscow University, and it is of some consequence that his time there (1950–55) included a period of more than two years after Stalin's death. This was a time of much freer discussion in student circles than had existed for many years. Though there was not yet the explosion of criticism that was to follow the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956, the post-Stalin "thaw" was already underway in 1954 and 1955, the "anti-cosmopolitan" campaign⁸ was being laid to rest, and the atmosphere at Moscow University had become perceptibly more relaxed.⁹ It is certainly worthy of note that Gorbachëv's early, and perhaps formative, years in Komsomol and party work were in the Khrushchev era. It was during his first year of full-time professional employment in the Komsomol that the 20th Party Congress took place, and the very first congress that Gorbachëv himself attended was the 22nd (in 1961), at which the attack on Stalin was taken further than it had been five years earlier and delivered by Khrushchev in open rather

⁷At the plenary session of the Central Committee held on Apr. 23, 1985, it was announced that the next party congress would begin on Feb. 25, 1986 (*Pravda*, Apr. 25, 1985, p. 1). Earlier there had been suggestions in the Soviet Union that the date of the 27th congress might be brought forward to late 1985. Thus, for example, in a speech delivered on Feb. 7, 1985, the First Secretary of the Georgian party organization, Eduard Shevardnadze, spoke of 1985 being "the year of the 27th Party Congress" (British Broadcasting Corporation, *Summary of World Broadcasts: USSR* (London—hereafter SWB), SU/7877/1, Feb. 16, 1985).

⁸The "anti-cosmopolitan" campaign aimed to sow distrust of everything foreign and had strongly anti-Semitic undertones. For a discussion of it, see Adam B. Ulam, *Stalin: The Man and His Era*, London, Allen Lane, 1973, pp. 678–85.

⁹On this, see the testimony of a Czech contemporary of Gorbachëv's in the Moscow University Law Faculty: Zdeněk Mlynář, *Nightfrst in Prague*, London, Hurst, 1980, p. 27. A much less convincing account of these years is provided by a Soviet emigrant who graduated from the Moscow University Law Faculty in 1950 but "fairly frequently" visited the university subsequently. He contrasts what he calls the "fairly liberal" early postwar atmosphere with the political and academic climate of 1950, but quite omits to mention the more fundamental atmospheric change produced by the death of Stalin. See Lev Yudovich, "Gorbachëv 2: First Rungs on the Ladder," in *Soviet Analyst* (Richmond, Surrey), Dec. 19, 1984, pp. 2–3.



Key Soviet leaders atop the Lenin Mausoleum in Red Square at May Day 1985 observances: from left to right, Marshall Viktor Kulikov, commander of Warsaw Pact forces; Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev, Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces; Defense Minister Marshal Sergey Sokolov; party General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachëv, Premier Nikolay Tikhonov; Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko; Politburo members Viktor Grishin, Grigoriy Romanov, Mikhail Solomentsev, Yegor Ligachëv, and Geydar Aliyev.

—Wide World.

than closed session.¹⁰ It is known, however, that Gorbachëv did not regret the fall of Khrushchev, for he was critical of Khrushchev's ill-considered agricultural reorganizations and of his maintenance in reality of the old method of arbitrary interventions from the center even when he was ostensibly decentralizing.¹¹

Different members of the same generation may hold very different views, and so there can be no question of automatically assuming in every individual case a certain political outlook on the basis of a particular generational experience. What can fairly be argued is that a Soviet

citizen who began his full-time political career in 1955 had a better chance of retaining or acquiring a relatively open mind than one who first set foot on the bottom rung of the ladder 20 years earlier.

A third feature that distinguishes Gorbachëv from previous general secretaries is his superior level of formal education. Of particular importance is his five years of study in the Law Faculty of the Soviet Union's leading university. As I noted when writing about Gorbachëv three years ago, he is remembered by some of his contemporaries as an able as well as an open-minded student.¹² Being in Moscow University brought him into contact with other students of ability, many of whom had had a more privileged pre-university education than geography and circumstances had afforded him (see the section below on his rise from kolkhoz to the Kremlin).

¹⁰For information on Gorbachëv's attendance at party congresses, see, for example, *Pravda* Mar. 12, 1985, p. 1.

¹¹This point is made in an important article published by Zdeněk Mlynář in the daily newspaper of the Italian Communist Party to which I have had access at a late stage in the writing of this article. See Zdeněk Mlynář, "My Fellow Student Mikhail Gorbachëv," *L'Unità* (Rome), Apr. 9, 1985, p. 9. Here Mlynář reveals for the first time in public not only that he and Gorbachëv were fellow students throughout Gorbachëv's five years in Moscow University, but also that they took the same courses, lived in the same student residence, and were good friends. Gorbachëv's views on Khrushchev were expressed in his last meeting with Mlynář which took place in Stavropol' in 1967. At that time, Mlynář was a rising personality in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, and in 1968 he was to become a Central Committee secretary and Politburo member. In the aftermath of the "Prague Spring," he was, however, expelled from the party, and since 1977 has lived in emigration. His portrayal of Gorbachëv is at once objective, well-informed, and favorable. Since Mlynář's own hopes for Czech communism were dashed by the Soviet intervention of 1968, he can hardly be accused of a *priori* bias in favor of a Soviet leader. His sympathetic account of Gorbachëv should stand as an important piece of evidence from one who better than anyone else now living in the West knew the younger Gorbachëv.

¹²In Brown and Kaser, *op. cit.*, p. 240. Such an assessment has now been confirmed by Mlynář (*loc. cit.*). Yudovich, who produces a determinedly negative view of Gorbachëv as a student on the basis of his own return visits to his alma mater, states, in contrast, that other students regarded Gorbachëv as "dull and badly educated" (*loc. cit.*, p. 3). The assertion that he was "dull" flies in the face of the recollections of Mlynář and others who, unlike Yudovich, were Law Faculty undergraduates at the same time as Gorbachëv, and of the testimony of practically every Western politician, businessman, and official who has met him in more recent years. So far as the assertion that he was "badly educated" is concerned, it would be surprising if he were academically as well prepared as those students who had had the privilege of an uninterrupted education in city schools. What is evident, and more to the point, is that he had a considerable capacity for learning, which he was to put to good use.

Gorbachëv: New Man in the Kremlin

There is a vast difference between five years of full-time university education in Moscow and the education picked up, often on a part-time basis, in provincial institutes by many of the older generation of leading party officials. Gorbachëv himself later added a second degree by part-time study when he received the qualification of "agronomist-economist" from the Stavropol' Agricultural Institute in 1967.¹³ Although academic degrees awarded to established party officials often owe more to their political standing than to their scholarly endeavors, Gorbachëv's life-long connection with agriculture and political interest in it, together with his intellectual curiosity, almost surely mean that in this case the degree was earned. At any rate, Canadian agricultural specialists who met with Gorbachëv in May 1983 were impressed by his detailed technical knowledge of the subject.

Gromyko's Nominating Speech

Fascinating light on Gorbachëv's qualities, as seen by Andrey Gromyko, and insight on Gromyko's view of the attributes to be looked for in a general secretary were provided by the Foreign Minister's surprisingly informal and genuinely enthusiastic speech of recommendation of Gorbachëv to the Central Committee on March 11, 1985.¹⁴ It is of interest to compare it with the nomination speeches of Gorbachëv's two immediate predecessors, Andropov and Chernenko, and to consider why Gromyko's speech was accorded a much more restricted circulation than the previous two nomination addresses.

In certain respects, the nomination speech that is the odd one out among the last three is Chernenko's nomination of Andropov at the Central Committee plenary session held on November 12, 1982.¹⁵ Whereas Nikolay Tikhonov's recommendation of Chernenko to the Central Committee on February 13, 1984,¹⁶ and Gromyko's proposal of Gorbachëv 13 months later were clearly the speeches of strong and influential supporters of the prospective general secretary, Chernenko's speech proposing Andropov was that of a senior and defeated rival. Chernenko devoted by far the greater part of his speech to praise of Brezhnev and his leadership style before informing those present that the Politburo had instructed him to propose Yuriy Andropov as general secretary. He proceeded to recommend him in terms that



There has been unusual turnover in the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the last two-and-a-half years, with the deaths of three general secretaries: at top, the November 1982 funeral of Leonid Brezhnev; at center, the February 1984 funeral of Yuriy Andropov; and at bottom, the March 1985 funeral of Konstantin Chernenko, with his successor Mikhail Gorbachëv (second from right) and Andrey Gromyko (right).

¹³*Pravda*, Mar. 12, 1985, p. 1.

¹⁴See *Materialy vneocherednogo plenuma tsentral'nogo komiteta KPSS 11 marta 1985 goda* (Materials of the Extraordinary Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee of March 11, 1985), Moscow, Politizdat, 1985, pp. 6-8.

¹⁵*Pravda*, Nov. 13, 1982, pp. 1-2.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, Feb. 14, 1984, p. 2.

exaggerated Andropov's closeness to Brezhnev, emphasizing the similarities between the two men and the prospect of continuity. There was an element both of wishful thinking and of an attempt to constrain Andropov in Chernenko's stress on how well Andropov had grasped "the Brezhnevist style of leadership, a Brezhnevist concern for the interests of the people, and a Brezhnevist relationship to cadres," and in his emphasis on Andropov's "respect for the opinion of other comrades" and his "predilection for collective work."¹⁷ In describing Andropov as "the closest comrade-in-arms of Leonid Il'ich [Brezhnev],"¹⁸ Chernenko was according him a proximity to Brezhnev that many in his audience must have known applied more precisely to Chernenko himself. In fact, of course, Andropov lost little time in distancing himself from Brezhnev, quickly adopting his own distinctive style of rule with different priorities and a more demanding personnel policy that involved quite rapid rejuvenation of, and turnover in, the ranks of party and governmental cadres.¹⁹

When Andropov died some 15 months later, Tikhonov, in a measured address to the Central Committee, devoted approximately a third of his time to warm praise of Andropov and the second half of his speech to praise of Chernenko. As a close Brezhnev associate from the 1930's, Tikhonov, not surprisingly, brought the name of his former patron back into the public view, praising Chernenko as "a true comrade-in-arms of such leaders of the Leninist type as were Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev and Yuriy Vladimirovich Andropov."²⁰ Tikhonov characterized Chernenko's attitude toward cadres as both "highly exacting and at the same time benevolent" (by implication a blend of Andropov and Brezhnev), and among Chernenko's special qualifications to which Tikhonov drew attention was the "prominent part" he had played in "the elaboration of theoretical problems of the perfecting of a developed socialist society" and in ideological work more generally.²¹

The speeches of Chernenko at the Central Committee plenum that elected Andropov and of Tikhonov at the plenum that endorsed Chernenko were made available in tens of millions of copies through their publication in *Pravda*, in other daily newspapers, and in party journals. One reason why Gromyko's speech of recommendation of Gorbachëv to the March 1985 Central Committee plenum was, in contrast, not published in *Pravda* may well be that, for the first time in Soviet history, the Central Committee elected a new general secretary on the very day (March 11) that the leadership made public the death of the previous general secretary (though Chernenko had, in fact, died at 7:20 p.m. on the previous day).²² Thus, whereas on the death of Brezhnev and Andropov, *Pravda* was able to devote entire issues to the departed leader before giving full coverage to the election of a new one, the unprecedented speed with which Gorbachëv was elected may have meant that a difficult balancing act had to be preserved in the same issue of the newspaper between due respect to the dead leader and a welcome to his successor. As it was, Gorbachëv's picture appeared on page one and Chernenko's only on page two. To have included Gromyko's speech as well might have tilted the balance too far away from the appropriate obsequies.

That there may have been some disagreement on how wide a distribution to give to Gromyko's speech was, however, suggested by the fact that, unlike the two previous nomination speeches, it did not appear in the issue of the party journal, *Partiynaya zhizn'*, which carried an account of the March plenum, though it was published in full in the Central Committee's journal *Kommunist*, which went to press six days later.²³ It was, however, not published in another Central Committee journal, *Politicheskoye samoobrazovaniye*,²⁴ which went to press two days later than *Kommunist*. There are, perhaps, four reasons for such inconsistency. In the first place, it seems fairly clear that Gromyko was not speak-

¹⁷Ibid., Nov. 13, 1982, p. 2.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹I have elaborated on these points in articles on the last two successions. See Archie Brown, "Andropov: Discipline and Reform?" in *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January-February 1983, pp. 18-31; and Brown, "The Soviet Succession: From Andropov to Chernenko," in *The World Today* (London), April 1984, pp. 134-41. In the latter article I noted that during Andropov's 15 months as general secretary there was a turnover of over a fifth of the Moscow-based members of the Council of Ministers, more than a fifth of the regional party secretaries, and over a third of the heads of department of the party's Central Committee. Immediately after Andropov's death, the full and candidate members of the Politburo and secretaries of the Central Committee consisted of 23 people. Just over a sixth of them had been brought into that inner circle during Andropov's brief tenure, and as many as a quarter of the full members of the Politburo received their promotions to voting membership during the same period.

²⁰*Pravda*, Feb. 14, 1984, p. 2.

²¹Ibid.

²²*Pravda*, Mar. 12, 1985, p. 2.

²³The relevant issues are *Partiynaya zhizn'* (Moscow), No. 6, March 1985, which went to press on March 14, and *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 5, March 1985, which went to press on March 20. Though *Partiynaya zhizn'* has a greater circulation (1,030,000) than *Kommunist* (952,000), the difference is hardly substantial enough to be decisive. The fact that Gorbachëv's supporters had had a further week in which to establish their and his enhanced authority may well be of greater consequence, and one should not totally disregard the possibly divergent wishes of the two editors. The chief editor of *Kommunist*, Richard Kosolapov, is a full member of the Central Committee and was a contemporary of Gorbachëv's at Moscow University. For biographies of Kosolapov and of the chief editor of *Partiynaya zhizn'*, Mikhail Khaldeyev, see *Yezhegodnik Bol'shoy Sovetskoy Entsiklopedii 1981* (1981 Yearbook of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo "Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya," 1981, pp. 584 and 607.

²⁴*Politicheskoye samoobrazovaniye*, like the two journals mentioned in note 23, published the nomination speeches by Chernenko and Tikhonov at the previous two successions. The journal is aimed at party propagandists and other ideological workers and has a circulation of 2,388,000.



A frail Konstantin Chernenko casts his ballot on February 24, 1985, in elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR's Russian republic.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

ing from a written text.²⁵ The style of the speech is very direct (almost a thinking aloud), and the words and phrases are those of everyday discourse. It may be that the almost total absence of official language rendered the speech inappropriate for such wide distribution as its predecessors. Second, the speech is very frank and provides several hitherto undisclosed details about Gorbachëv's duties under Chernenko's general secreta-

ryship. Third, the assessment of Gorbachëv is eulogistic and gives every impression of sincerity. To give full publicity in the mass-circulation newspapers to such praise of Gorbachëv from the normally low-key Gromyko (who is highly respected in the Soviet Union and whose responsibility for the conduct of Soviet foreign policy keeps him very much in the public eye) might have seemed too much like the launching of a personality cult of the new general secretary. Fourth (and related to the third point), since the authority and prestige of a general secretary can be an important political resource, and enhance his actual power, the possibility should not be excluded that different parts of the Central Committee apparatus have different views on how fast and how far Gorbachëv's authority should be strengthened and that this may reflect varying assessments of what they take to be his policy preferences and priorities. While the exclusion of Gromyko's speech from the newspapers is understandable for the reasons given above, the fact that only one out of three party journals—all of which published the speeches nominating Gorbachëv's two predecessors—included it is perhaps revealing of diversity of view within the higher party echelons.

Perhaps because it appeared originally only in booklet form, Gromyko's speech has attracted little or no Western attention up to the present, but it is certainly worth bringing out a number of its salient features. It is noteworthy that Gromyko referred to Chernenko only once—in the context of his absence through illness from the Politburo—choosing instead to devote the whole of his speech to outlining Gorbachëv's qualifications for the general secretaryship. Like Chernenko and Tikhonov, in their speeches nominating Gorbachëv's two predecessors, Gromyko observed that he was proposing Gorbachëv's election to the Central Committee on the instructions of the Politburo.²⁶ He suggested by implication that Gorbachëv may have been running the Secretariat of the Central Committee for some considerable time. As Gromyko put it: "He led the Secretariat (*On vël Sekretariat*), as is known." Gromyko followed that remark with the sentence: "He also took the chair at sessions of the Politburo in the absence of Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko."²⁷ This was the first definitive confirmation that Gorbachëv had indeed been chairing the Politburo when Chernenko was too ill to attend. But the fact that Gromyko did not relate Gorbachëv's leading of the Secretariat (as distinct from his chairmanship of the Politburo) specifically to Chernenko's absence through illness in the last months of his leadership sug-

²⁵Gromyko almost certainly had no time in which to prepare a complete written text. From mid-morning until mid-afternoon of March 11 (including a luncheon at which he made a speech on Soviet-French relations) he was engaged in discussions with the French Minister for External Affairs, Roland Dumas. Thus, between the Politburo meeting that chose Gorbachëv and which must have been held either in the late evening of March 10 or, more probably, early in the morning of March 11, and the Central Committee plenary session in the late afternoon of the 11th, Gromyko was fully occupied.

²⁶*Materialy vneocherednogo plenuma tsentral'nogo komiteta . . .*, p. 6.

²⁷*Ibid.*

gests that Gorbachëv may have been in day-to-day charge of the Secretariat for much of Chernenko's general secretaryship.

In the first reference, so far as I am aware, by one Soviet leader to another's abilities as a chairman, Gromyko remarked apropos of Gorbachëv's chairmanship of the Politburo: "Without any exaggeration, he conducted himself brilliantly."²⁸ Gromyko made no reference to ideology or to the economy or to any other branch of domestic policy, but singled out for praise the degree of flexibility and lack of dogma in Gorbachëv's approach to problems. As he put it:

*You know, it often happens that problems—both internal and external—are very difficult to consider if you are guided by the law of "black and white." There may be intermediate colors, intermediate links, and intermediate decisions. And Mikhail Sergeyevich [Gorbachëv] is always able to come up with such decisions that correspond with the party line.*²⁹

Gromyko also drew attention to one of Gorbachëv's attributes that he said was "perhaps a little clearer to me, in the performance of my duties, than to certain other comrades"—namely, how well and quickly Gorbachëv grasped the essence of developments taking place in other countries and in the international arena. Characterizing in general terms Gorbachëv's foreign policy orientation, Gromyko said: "He always defends the point of view that the holy of holies for us all is to struggle for the cause of peace and to maintain our defense at the necessary level."³⁰

To put them with the maximum brevity, these and other attributes of Gorbachëv on which Gromyko enlarges can be summarized in 10 points that are revealing both of Gromyko's own desiderata (though not necessarily in this order) for the office of general secretary and of Gorbachëv's qualifications in his eyes for this post: (1) experience of party work at various levels, including the regional level and the Secretariat of the Central Committee; (2) skill in chairmanship (of the Politburo and Secretariat); (3) keen intelligence; (4) grasp of international issues; (5) strong convictions and directness; (6) political sensitivity (not seeing everything in "black and white" terms); (7) an analytical mind and ability to draw conclusions after dividing a problem into its component parts; (8) broad erudition; (9) organizational ability; and (10) capacity to establish a rapport, and common language, with others.³¹

From Kolkhoz to Kremlin

Assessments of Gorbachëv's route to joint membership of the Politburo and Secretariat have previously appeared in academic writing,³² but it is now possible, while summarizing what was already known, to add some details.³³

Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachëv was born on March 2, 1931, in the village of Privol'noye in the Krasnogvardeyskiy district of Stavropol' region (*kray*) to the northwest of the city of Stavropol'. Both his parents and his grandparents were peasants. His father was killed in the war, and he was brought up mainly by his grandparents.³⁴ If Gorbachëv was too young to fight in World War II (he was only 10 years of age when Hitler's armies invaded the Soviet Union), he was by no means too young to suffer the war's consequences. Not only did he lose his father, but he was in a part of the country that was for several months under German occupation (August 1942–January 1943) and for even longer close to the front.³⁵ Moreover, since the Soviet forces that relieved the city of Stavropol' came from the south, it is possible that Gorbachëv's native district was under German occupation for somewhat longer. Finally, because of an acute shortage of adult male labor in the Russian countryside during these war years, children, including Gorbachëv, had to spend time working in the fields, and thus did not receive regular schooling.

His education in the early postwar years was also, in all probability, disrupted. There is some uncertainty about how much time Gorbachëv spent as a manual

³²See my contributions to Brown and Kaser, op. cit., esp. pp. 240–42 and 269–70; Jerry F. Hough, "Soviet Succession: Issues and Personalities," *Problems of Communism*, September–October 1982, esp. pp. 35–37; and Hough, "Andropov's First Year," *ibid.*, November–December 1983, esp. pp. 61–63.

³³I draw upon Soviet published sources, conversations with contemporaries of Gorbachëv's in Moscow University, and conversations and interviews with some of those who met Gorbachëv in Canada and Britain in 1983 and 1984—especially his British hosts. These conversations were on a non-attributable basis, but where the same points have appeared in the press, I cite such sources. Since not all press comment on Gorbachëv's visit to Britain was accurate, I try to cite only those published points that I have been able to verify independently.

³⁴The information about Gorbachëv's father and grandparents emerged in his conversations in Britain.

³⁵The impact of this on Gorbachëv must have been all the greater because of the extreme brutality of German soldiers at the Russian front where (as is too often forgotten) they behaved incomparably worse than on the Western front. On this brutality, and its ideological underpinnings, see an important forthcoming study by Omer Bartov, *The Eastern Front, 1941–45, German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare*, London, Macmillan, 1985. See also the two major volumes by John Erickson, *The Road to Stalingrad*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1975, and *The Road to Berlin*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983. Mlynář does not provide any confirmation for the suggestion that Gorbachëv may have lived for a time in an area under German occupation, but he writes of him having lived through the war "near the Caucasian front" and of the war as "a fundamental experience for him," which he had known as a source of suffering for the civilian population (Mlynář, loc. cit.). For the occupation of Stavropol' city, see *Boľshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya* (The Great Soviet Encyclopedia), 3rd ed., Vol. 24, I, Moscow, Izdatel'stvo "Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya," 1976, pp. 393.

²⁸*Ibid.*

²⁹*Ibid.*, p. 7.

³⁰*Ibid.*, p. 8.

³¹*Ibid.*, pp. 6–8.

worker and how much time at school between 1946 and 1950. His official biographies in central newspapers and reference books state that he began work in 1946 at the age of 15 as an assistant to a combine harvester operator in a machine-tractor station.³⁶ Yet Jerry Hough has drawn attention to a biography in a Stavropol' local newspaper that suggests that Gorbachëv remained at school until 1950 and worked in the machine-tractor station only during school holidays.³⁷ Before one accepts the local, rather than the national, version of the biography as the whole story, however, it is worth noting that several of Gorbachëv's Moscow University contemporaries have remarked that one of the things that made him unusual was that he had already received, and sometimes wore, the insignia of the Order of Red Banner of Labor.³⁸ It seems highly unlikely that such an award would have been given to a schoolboy whose working experience was restricted to school holidays.³⁹

What needs to be remembered is the appalling devastation of industry and agriculture and disruption of education and much else caused by the war—still very evident in the early postwar years—and the fact that 10-year schooling was at that time the exception rather than the rule in the countryside. Though the precise timing and proportions remain a minor mystery, it seems most likely that Gorbachëv spent *part* of the period between 1946 and 1950 as a full-time worker and *part* of it at school. Indeed, the recently published evidence of Zdeňek Mlynář makes it clear that it was the fact that he was an *exemplary worker* (with insignia to prove it) which, together with his obvious intelligence, earned him a place at Moscow University. Mlynář is quite categorical that Gorbachëv did not belong to either of the two main groups of students in Moscow University—in terms of background—at that time. That is to say, he was neither an ex-soldier nor someone who had come straight to university from secondary school.⁴⁰

Gorbachëv was 19 when he began his studies at Moscow University in September 1950, and he re-

mained there until June 1955 (the normal span of a Soviet first degree course), when he received his law degree. Given the time and place of his pre-university education and the fact that he arrived as a new student in Moscow at the height of the anti-cosmopolitan campaign, it is hardly surprising that he did not have an opportunity to learn foreign languages, and so the myth should not be perpetuated that when he was in Britain he was "answering even difficult questions *with ease in excellent English*."⁴¹ He joined the Communist Party in 1952 and was active in the Komsomol. As *komsorg kursa* (the Komsomol leader of his particular student year in the Law Faculty), he served also on the faculty committee of the Komsomol. But Gorbachëv's Komsomol duties do not appear to have been on so high and exacting a level as to have prevented him from being a serious, and indeed outstanding, student.⁴²

It was, nevertheless, Gorbachëv's part-time work in the Komsomol while a student that paved the way for his full-time employment in the Komsomol after graduating. He returned to his native Stavropol' region and began a rapid rise in the Komsomol organization. In 1955–56, he was deputy head of the department of propaganda and agitation of the Stavropol' regional committee (*kraykom*) of the Komsomol, and from 1956 to 1958, he served as first secretary of the Stavropol' city committee of the Komsomol. In 1958, he moved back to the regional apparatus of the Komsomol, serving as second and then first secretary of the Stavropol' Komsomol *kraykom*.

In 1962, Gorbachëv moved from Komsomol to party work and began his still more remarkable rise through the party apparatus. The speed of his advance naturally owed something to luck, especially in the form of good connections, but it clearly owed still more to his abilities and performance which impressed those senior party officials who got to know him. From 1960 until 1964, Fëdor Kulakov was first secretary of the Stavropol' party organization, and he was to become an extremely important patron of Gorbachëv. In the early 1960's, when Gorbachëv was running the regional Komsomol organization, the two men worked together closely, and it must have been on Kulakov's invitation that Gorbachëv moved into the party *kraykom* apparatus. In 1962–63, Gorbachëv was party organizer of the Stavropol' regional party organization's territorial production administration of collective and state farms, and from 1963 until 1966 he was head of the party organs department of the party *kraykom*.

³⁶See, e.g., *Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR: Desyatyy sozyv* (Deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet: 10th Convocation), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo "Izvestiya Sovetov Deputatov Trud'yashchikhsya SSSR," 1979, p. 119; *Yezhegodnik Bol'shoy Sovetskoy Entsiklopedii* 1981, p. 573; and *Pravda*, Oct. 22, 1980, p. 1. The brief official outline of Gorbachëv's career published since he became general secretary puts the point in the following terms: "Soon after the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945, at the age of 15 he began his working activity. He worked as a machine operator (*mekhanizatorom*) at a machine-tractor station." See, e.g., *Partynaya zhizn'*, No. 6, March 1985, p. 6.

³⁷See Jerry F. Hough, *Soviet Leadership in Transition*, Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, 1980, p. 58; and Hough, "Soviet Succession: Issues and Personalities," p. 35. Hough's source is *Stavropol'skaya pravda*, Feb. 6, 1979.

³⁸I first drew attention to this in Brown and Kaser, op. cit., pp. 240 and 252–53.

³⁹The memories of several Soviet scholars on Gorbachëv's Order of Red Banner of Labor find further corroboration in the article by Mlynář, who describes this decoration as "an extraordinary honor" for a 19-year-old.

⁴⁰Mlynář, loc. cit.

⁴¹*International Herald Tribune* (Paris), Mar. 12, 1985, p. 1 (emphasis added).

⁴²Thus, so far as I am aware, Gorbachëv did not hold a rank as high as that of "Komsomol secretary of Moscow University in 1954–55," which Jerry Hough attributes to him ("Soviet Succession: Issues and Personalities," p. 34). Mlynář reports that Gorbachëv passed his university examinations with distinction (loc. cit.).

In 1964, Kulakov had moved to Moscow to head the agriculture department of the Central Committee, and in 1965 he became a secretary of the Central Committee. This was helpful for Gorbachëv in more ways than one. Not only did he have a friend at court, he had one who was well-connected. Kulakov was on good terms with Chernenko (who had been a secretary of the Penza regional party committee from 1945 to 1948 at a time when Kulakov headed the agricultural department of that same *obkom*)⁴³, and, through Chernenko, with Brezhnev. This was confirmed in 1971 when Kulakov became a voting member of the Politburo while retaining his Central Committee secretaryship. It was also useful for Gorbachëv that Kulakov was replaced in Stavropol' in 1964 by a high party official on his way down—Leonid Yefremov. Yefremov had become a candidate member of the Politburo under Khrushchev in 1962 and first deputy chairman of the Bureau for Party Work in the Russian Republic (a Khrushchevian creation that was to be abolished by his successors). The Stavropol' regional party secretaryship was for Yefremov a clear demotion, and though he held that post until 1970, it was evidently his being out of favor that caused him to lose the post at the age of only 58. With a party congress to be held the following year, the leadership clearly did not want Yefremov on the Central Committee for another five years.⁴⁴

Meanwhile Gorbachëv had made himself Yefremov's obvious successor. From 1966 to 1968, he was back in city politics as first secretary of the Stavropol' *gorkom*. But already in 1968 he was evidently being groomed for the *kraykom* succession, for it was then that he was appointed second secretary of the regional party committee. His acquisition of an agricultural degree a year earlier had strengthened his qualifications for taking over as party chief of this important agricultural region. (Both Kulakov and Yefremov had also acquired such educational qualifications in the agricultural sphere.) Gorbachëv's support at the center ensured that it was indeed he who succeeded Yefremov as first secretary of

the Stavropol' *kraykom* at the early age of 39. A year later, at the 24th Party Congress, he became a full member of the Central Committee.

Gorbachëv was very successful as a regional party secretary, and the Stavropol' *kray* under his leadership achieved a particularly good agricultural performance. He evidently approved of the "link system,"⁴⁵ which had gone out of fashion under Brezhnev, and supported both in theory and in practice the giving of greater autonomy to agricultural workers to farm a particular piece of land.⁴⁶

These were years in which Gorbachëv also broadened his horizons and implemented his wish to see things for himself by taking motoring holidays with his wife through France and Italy⁴⁷—not the vacations of a conventional party secretary. It appears that he also read widely, adding to his knowledge of Russian literature (which emerged in his discussions in Britain) a reading of some of the Western books translated into Russian during the Brezhnev years. Gorbachëv told one of the British politicians with whom he had conversation that the first modern English novel he read was C. P. Snow's *Corridors of Power*, a work that must at least have provided some insight into British-style bureaucratic politics for a Soviet *kraykom* secretary. It became apparent that he had also read *Parkinson's Law* (which was published in Russian by Progress Publishers in the mid-1970's and rapidly sold out). Instantly taking up a reference by the chairman of ICI to "Parkinson's Law," Gorbachëv responded: "If you're referring to C. Northcote Parkinson, I've got news for you. He lives in Moscow now."⁴⁸ Not the happiest of omens for overstuffed ministerial bureaucracies in the Soviet Union, but entirely consistent with the views of a man who, while still first secretary of the Stavropol' *kraykom* but shortly before he became a secretary of the Central Committee, had recorded his support for the controversial Shchekino experiment designed to reward enterprises that release surplus labor.⁴⁹

⁴³On Kulakov, see *Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR: Devyaty sozyv* (Deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet: 9th Convocation), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo "Izvestiya Sovetov Deputatov Trudyashchikhsya SSSR," 1974, p. 243; and on Chernenko's earlier career, *Yezhegodnik Bol'shoy Sovetskoy Entsiklopedii* 1981, p. 608.

⁴⁴That Yefremov had blotted his copybook is indicated by the way he faded out of the reference books. He does not appear in the appropriate volume (Vol. 9) of the *Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya*, published in 1972. For very different reasons Gorbachëv does not appear in this most recent edition of the major Soviet encyclopedia. Given that the volume in which Gorbachëv should have appeared (Vol. 7) was published as recently as 1972 (though sent for typesetting on Mar. 22, 1971), this merely underlines the rapidity of his rise from relative obscurity to the leadership of his party and country. For Yefremov's career, see *Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR: Sedmoy sozyv* (Deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet: 7th Convocation), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo "Izvestiya Sovetov Deputatov Trudyashchikhsya SSSR," 1966, p. 157.

⁴⁵For a brief account of the "link" or "autonomous work-team" system (*beznyaryadnoye zveno*) see Alec Nove's chapter on agriculture in Brown and Kaser, op. cit., esp. pp. 179–80.

⁴⁶See M. Gorbachëv, "The Rural Labor Collective: Paths of Social Development," *Kommunist*, No. 2, January 1976, pp. 29–38. The support in print for the "link" system became all the more explicit once Gorbachëv had become the secretary of the Central Committee responsible for agriculture. On this, see the contributions of Nove and of Brown in Brown and Kaser, op. cit., pp. 179–80, 244–45, 269–70, and 272. See also Sidney I. Ploss, "Soviet Succession: Signs of Struggle," *Problems of Communism*, September–October 1982, p. 50. It was only under Andropov, however, as will be noted later in this article, that Gorbachëv was able to expound in some detail his personal support for the autonomous work-team in agriculture.

⁴⁷Laurence Marks, "Gorbachovs Let the Kremlin Mask Slip," in *The Observer* (London), Dec. 23, 1984, p. 4.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*

⁴⁹See M. Gorbachëv, "Leading Experience—An Important Reserve," *Kommunist*, No. 14, September 1978, p. 82.

When Fëdor Kulakov died suddenly, at the age of 60, in 1978, it was his protégé, Gorbachëv, who was brought to Moscow to succeed him as Central Committee secretary responsible for agriculture. He was then only 47, an unusually early age for anyone to join Brezhnev's top leadership team. Though Kulakov was no longer around to give support, one can be certain that he had in the course of the 1970's drawn Gorbachëv's good record in his former *kray* to the attention of his colleagues. Two of them had, moreover, a special interest in the Stavropol' region and almost certainly also supported the advancement of Gorbachëv's career—Mikhail Suslov, who had been first secretary of the Stavropol' *kraykom* from 1939 until 1944 and for whom this was still a regional base, and Yuriy Andropov, who was a native of the Stavropol' region and was said to have taken holidays there while chairman of the KGB. If that is correct, Andropov would already have become acquainted with the *kraykom* First Secretary even before Gorbachëv moved to Moscow. In outlook, Gorbachëv was much closer to Andropov than to Suslov, but a combination of political skill and personal charm enabled him to have good relations with Soviet leaders of different views.⁵⁰

Once Gorbachëv began to attend Politburo meetings in his capacity as a secretary of the Central Committee, he had an opportunity to impress those Politburo members, such as Gromyko, who had a high regard for real ability and professional competence. Indeed, only on the basis of such wide support could he, between the ages of 47 to 49, have risen to full membership of the Politburo while retaining his seat in the Secretariat: in November 1978 he became a Central Committee secretary, in November 1979 a candidate member of the Politburo, and in October 1980 a voting member of that body.

When, on the death of Brezhnev, there were two senior members of the Politburo who aspired to the general secretaryship, Gorbachëv was one of several important members of the Politburo (who included also Gromyko and Ustinov) who put their weight behind Andropov rather than Chernenko.⁵¹ The twin elements of Andropov's approach—discipline together with struggle against corruption *and* the placing of economic reform on the political agenda in a way that it had not been

since the mid-1960's—were fully in line with Gorbachëv's own thinking. He not only supported innovation in the organization of agriculture but had also, while still a regional party secretary in Stavropol', attacked indiscipline, corruption, and drunkenness, themes that were to be given an enhanced salience when Gorbachëv himself became general secretary after the Chernenko interregnum.⁵²

Gorbachëv in the Wings

In the last year of Brezhnev's life, the importance the leadership attached to agriculture—the sphere of activity that Gorbachëv supervised—was underlined by the adoption of the comprehensive "Food Program" at the May 1982 plenary session of the Central Committee.⁵³ Gorbachëv no doubt was heavily involved in its preparation and was a strong advocate of some of its main elements, such as the further development of the agro-industrial complexes and the devoting of significantly greater resources to the development of the rural infrastructure, including better roads, transport and storage facilities, and social amenities.⁵⁴ What the program failed to do, however, was to offer greater autonomy to groups of farmers, and it may be partly because of this and other limitations of this major policy statement that Gorbachëv was content not to be one of the speakers at the May plenum⁵⁵ and, in a subsequent article, to speak of Brezhnev's "leading role" in initiating and formulating the program.⁵⁶

When Andropov succeeded Brezhnev as general secretary in November 1982, he lost no time in calling for practical measures to "extend the independence (*samostoyatel'nost'*) of associations (*ob'yedineniya*) and enterprises, [and] of state and collective farms."⁵⁷ Andropov's selection apparently also made it possible for Gorbachëv to introduce elements of agricultural reform that he had not been able to include in Brezhnev's "Food Program"—in particular, the extension in principle of the "link" system (but under a new name) to the country as a whole. In a speech to an agricultural conference at Belgorod in March 1983, Gorbachëv indi-

⁵⁰It has been noted that at Suslov's funeral, Gorbachëv was the only Politburo member to stop and speak with each member of Suslov's family and that when Andropov was lying in state, Gorbachëv was the only member of the Politburo shown on Soviet television sitting with Andropov's family. See Hough, "Soviet Succession: Issues and Personalities," p. 37; and Marc D. Zlotnik, "Chernenko Succeeds," *Problems of Communism*, March–April 1984, p. 20.

⁵¹For somewhat different accounts that agree, however, on these three names, see Zhores Medvedev, *Andropov*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1983, p. 112; and Brown, "The Soviet Succession: From Andropov to Chernenko," pp. 136–37.

⁵²For an assessment of Andropov's priorities at the outset of his general secretaryship, see Brown, "Andropov: Discipline and Reform?" and for Gorbachëv's renewed emphasis on discipline, and combatting corruption and drunkenness and alcoholism, see his speech at the March 1985 plenum of the Central Committee (*Pravda*, Mar. 12, 1985, p. 3) and the reports of the Politburo meetings held on Mar. 21 and Apr. 4, 1985 (*ibid.*, Mar. 22, 1985, p. 1, and Apr. 5, 1985, p. 1).

⁵⁴M. Gorbachëv, "The Food Program and the Tasks in Bringing It to Fruition," *Kommunist*, No. 10, July 1982, p. 6.

⁵⁵*Partynaya zhizn'*, No. 11, June 1982, p. 3.

⁵⁶Gorbachëv, "The Food Program and the Tasks in Bringing It to Fruition," p. 6.

⁵⁷*Pravda*, Nov. 23, 1982, p. 1.

cated that the Politburo had recently given its approval to "the introduction of the collective contract (*kollektivnogo podryada*) in collective and state farm production."⁵⁸ He went on to make clear that this meant that autonomous work teams and brigades should be given the opportunity to make long-term contracts with their collective and state farms whereby they would have operational independence to organize their own work and distribute among themselves group income that, in turn, would be directly related to production results, though with a necessary minimum guaranteed by the parent farm to take account of years of bad weather. Such teams, said Gorbachëv, should be formed voluntarily and be allowed to elect their own leaders.⁵⁹

It would appear that this is one of a number of Soviet partial economic reforms that have not been fully implemented, and the theme of increasing both the independence and responsibility of groups of workers is one to which Gorbachëv has reverted more recently.⁶⁰ It seems fair to say that nothing short of the powers of the general secretaryship enables an innovatively inclined Soviet leader to effect radical changes in established organizational and behavioral patterns in agriculture or industry, and even with these powers at one's disposal, it is a far from straightforward task.

Under Andropov, Gorbachëv's responsibilities within the Secretariat of the Central Committee were extended from control of agriculture to general oversight of the economy as a whole, and he also became the secretarial overlord of the department of the Central Committee responsible for lower level party appointments.⁶¹ This meant that the two new secretaries of the Central Committee who had been brought in under Andropov—Nikolay Ryzhkov and Yegor Ligachëv (who headed, respectively, the Economic Department and the Department of Party Organizational Work)—and who could be presumed to be both sympathetic and responsive to Andropov's and Gorbachëv's priorities, came under Gorbachëv's jurisdiction. (Since Gorbachëv became party leader, Ryzhkov and Ligachëv have received further highly significant promotion—a point to which I shall return in the concluding section.)

The personnel changes at the top of the Soviet party hierarchy made by Andropov during his 15 months as general secretary, taken as a whole, helped to strengthen Gorbachëv's power base within the leadership. It is far from evident that Grigoriy Romanov, who

became a secretary of the Central Committee in June 1983 while remaining a full member of the Politburo, or even Geydar Aliyev, who was advanced to full membership of the Politburo in November 1982, would necessarily have leaned toward Gorbachëv rather than Chernenko when it became clear that Andropov was dying. But two others who were promoted to full membership of the Politburo under Andropov, Mikhail Solomentsev and Vitaliy Vorotnikov, were people whose careers had either stagnated or (in Vorotnikov's case) suffered a setback under Brezhnev;⁶² given the influence Chernenko was exercising in those years, they would be more than likely to favor Gorbachëv who had become the Politburo member closest to Andropov and who was, quite clearly, the man Andropov wished to succeed him.⁶³ It is also probable that Viktor Chebrikov, who had worked closely with Andropov at the KGB for 15 years and who was promoted to candidate membership of the Politburo in December 1983, would be favorably disposed toward Gorbachëv.

Taken together with the support of Ryzhkov and Ligachëv, this undoubtedly gave Gorbachëv a strong position within the top leadership team even while Andropov's health was declining. Yet, Chernenko remained the senior secretary in terms of length of time as joint member of the Politburo and Secretariat, and, during Andropov's absence through illness, he was able to regain some of the influence he was visibly losing in the earlier months of Andropov's general secretaryship. It was he who chaired Politburo meetings in Andropov's absence, and it was to him that those who were alarmed at the speed of Andropov's departure from Brezhnev's policy of "stability of cadres"⁶⁴ turned for respite when it became evident that Andropov would not recover and that the choice of successor was essentially between the elderly protégé of Brezhnev and the much younger and more vigorous protégé of Andropov. Within the top leadership team and, no doubt, within the Central Committee as a whole, there was a majority ready to settle for a quieter life.

⁶²Solomentsev had spent 12 years as a candidate member of the Politburo before being promoted to full membership at the December 1983 Central Committee plenum. Vorotnikov, after serving as first deputy chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers from 1975 until 1979, was dispatched to Cuba as Soviet ambassador (a definite demotion) and only brought back to the center in two stages by Andropov. First, after Andropov became one of the senior secretaries of the Central Committee in May 1982, he recalled Vorotnikov to clean up the Krasnodar kray after securing the removal of the corrupt Sergey Medunov. Then, in 1983, when Solomentsev succeeded Arvids Pelše as chairman of the Party Control Committee, Vorotnikov was given Solomentsev's previous job of chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers.

⁶³That Andropov, even from his sickbed, still had his hands on the levers of power in late 1983 is indicated by the four changes made to the top leadership team at the December plenum and by his remarkably authoritative speech, written in the first person, and read to the plenary session in his absence (see *Pravda*, Dec. 27, 1983, pp. 1–2).

⁶⁴See note 19.

⁵⁸*Ibid.*, Mar. 20, 1983, p. 2.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*

⁶⁰That is a point to which I shall return when discussing Gorbachëv's policy orientations in the final section of this article.

⁶¹Some of the evidence for this is collected by Jerry Hough in his "Andropov's First Year," and by Marc Zlotnik in "Chernenko Succeeds."



Politburo member Geydar Aliyev addresses the April 22, 1985, party gathering marking the 115th anniversary of Lenin's birth; at the right in the second row is the new party general secretary, Mikhail Gorbachëv; to Aliyev's right is Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi.

—Wide World.

It seems likely that Gorbachëv and his supporters recognized that there was a majority for Chernenko and did not push his candidacy too hard. Instead, they used his strong power base as a bargaining position to ensure that his responsibilities would be still further extended and that he would become the number two man in the Chernenko Politburo and Chernenko's heir apparent. That is not to say that the succession to Chernenko was definitively settled at the same time as the succession to Andropov, for no Politburo can bind its successors. It could not have been known then how long Chernenko would live, which other members of the Politburo would die or fall into political disfavor in the meantime, and, hence, what would be the composition of the selectorate that would choose Chernenko's successor when the time came. There was at least enough uncertainty to give any waverers within the leadership who were not firmly committed either to Chernenko or to Gorbachëv, but who might themselves nurture aspirations to the top job, an incentive to support the older man.

That some of those close to Chernenko may not have been wholly reconciled to Gorbachëv's number two position was suggested by the rather peculiar treatment of his speech to the Central Committee plenum on February 13, 1984, which elected Chernenko to the general secretaryship. The official communiqué from the ple-

num, published in *Pravda* and the other daily newspapers the following day, did not so much as mention the fact that Gorbachëv had addressed the Central Committee members. It was only when the proceedings of the plenum appeared in booklet form and in the pages of party journals such as *Kommunist*⁶⁵ and *Partiynaya zhizn'*⁶⁶ several days later that the text of Gorbachëv's address was published. His short speech was notable both for its emphasis on the fact that the party would continue on the course worked out by the 26th Party Congress and by the November 1982 and June and December 1983 plenums of the Central Committee (that is to say, emphasizing preponderantly the course set in the Andropov period) and for its expression of his conviction that members of the Central Committee would act "in the spirit of unity and cohesion" that had characterized the February 1984 plenum.

The strength of Gorbachëv's position was made still clearer in April 1984 when it was he who proposed Chernenko for the chairmanship of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The main emphasis of Gorbachëv's speech was on how the experience of the past few years had shown the necessity of combining

⁶⁵*Kommunist*, No. 3, February 1984, p. 14.

⁶⁶*Partiynaya zhizn'*, No. 5, March 1984, p. 12.

the posts of general secretary and head of state in view of the party's leading role within Soviet society and the part played by the general secretary in the conduct of foreign policy.⁶⁷ When Andropov had become general secretary, there was just one precedent—that of Brezhnev—for the general secretary combining the party leadership with the chairmanship of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and it was for only the last five years of his 18 years as general secretary that Brezhnev was also the Presidium chairman. That there was still some doubt after Brezhnev's death as to whether this was not too much authority to place in the hands of one man was indicated by the fact that it was not at the first meeting of the Supreme Soviet after Andropov became general secretary (the one held in late November 1982) but only in June 1983 that he became head of state. The elevation of Chernenko to the chairmanship of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet within two months of his becoming general secretary, and the terms in which Gorbachëv proposed him, have surely made the combination of these posts a firmly established convention. It is to be expected that at the first meeting of the Supreme Soviet to be held during his general secretaryship, Gorbachëv will become chairman of the Presidium, just as it can be taken for granted that (like Andropov and Chernenko before him) he has been acting as chairman of the Defense Council from the outset of his party leadership.

Apart from his role in proposing Chernenko as head of state, Gorbachëv's number two position within the party was evident early on in Chernenko's general secretaryship from his additional responsibilities—negotiated, no doubt, at the time of the succession. Gorbachëv took over from Chernenko the chairmanship of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Soviet of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet,⁶⁸ becoming at the same time the overseer of international affairs within the Central Committee Secretariat. He also became secretarial overlord of ideology and culture.⁶⁹ Thus, he was accorded what

was, in effect, the old Suslov portfolio but without having to relinquish his responsibilities for the economy and party cadres—a stronger position than even Suslov ever had and which was made possible by the fact that he was one of only two senior secretaries⁷⁰ (the general secretary apart) throughout Chernenko's 13 months as party leader. The other was Romanov, who appeared to be supervising both the Administrative Organs Department of the Central Committee (which in turn oversees the military and the KGB) and the Defense Industry Department.⁷¹

One institutional interest with which Gorbachëv has had few links hitherto is the military. He was too young to serve in the armed forces during the war, and the time when he reached military age was one in which demobilization was taking precedence over recruitment. This could have been a disadvantage for him as compared with Romanov who served in the Soviet army from 1941 until 1945⁷² and whose official duties in the Secretariat preserved his links with the military. But the fact



The medals of Marshal Dmitriy Ustinov, Politburo member and minister of defense, on display at the Kremlin wall where his ashes were interred on December 24, 1984.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

⁶⁷*Pravda*, Apr. 12, 1984, p. 1.

⁶⁸Gorbachëv has had varied experience of Supreme Soviet work. Before taking over the Foreign Affairs Commission chairmanship, he was from 1970 to 1974 a member of the Nature Conservation Commission, from 1974 to 1979 chairman of the Commission for Youth Affairs, and from 1979 to 1984 chairman of the Legislative Proposals Commission of the Soviet of the Union.

⁶⁹The fullest confirmation of this came when Gorbachëv made a major speech on Dec. 10, 1984, to the All-Union Conference on "The Perfecting of Developed Socialism and the Ideological Work of the Party in the Light of the Decisions of the June (1983) Plenum of the Central Committee."

⁷⁰Or *super-secretaries*—those who combine their secretaryship with full Politburo membership and so qualify to supervise several departments of the Central Committee and one or more of the other secretaries.

⁷¹It was, for example, Romanov who chaired Marshal Dmitriy Ustinov's funeral commission and who made the principal funeral speech. See *Pravda*, Dec. 22, 1984, p. 1, and Dec. 25, 1984, p. 1.

⁷²See *Deputy Verkhovnoyego Soveta SSSR: Desyatyy sozyv*, p. 379.



British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher with Soviet Politburo member Mikhail Gorbachëv during his visit to London in December 1984.

—Sagansky-Spooner/Gamma-Liaison.

that the military remains under firm party control has been clearer than ever in recent years, and there is no evidence that the army played any part in the elevation to the general secretaryship of either Chernenko or Gorbachëv.⁷³ One succession earlier, Ustinov had been a strong supporter of Andropov, but Ustinov was essentially a civilian (albeit one with quite exceptional military experience), and in the context of the succession, his party standing was more important than was his office as minister of defense. The fact that there is not the slightest reason to suppose that his successor, Marshal Sergey Sokolov, played any role in the election of Gorbachëv merely underlines this. It may have been helpful for Gorbachëv that the assertive Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov was replaced in early September 1984 as chief of the General Staff by Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev.⁷⁴ Ogarkov's demotion put him out of the running for the succession to Ustinov as minister of defense. Ustinov died on December 20, 1984, and had been seriously ill since October.⁷⁵ He was still in the public eye in September and must have played a part, and possibly the leading part, in the removal of Ogarkov as chief of staff. But this merely underlines the fact that the Soviet top

brass have been even more firmly subordinated to the civilian party leadership in the post-Brezhnev era than under Brezhnev (who had closer connections with senior officers, dating from the war, than had any of his successors).

When Gorbachëv made his December 1984 visit to Britain, his position as number two man within the Soviet leadership was so strong that it was unlikely that his British stay would be of decisive importance to his leadership prospects. Nevertheless, he accepted an element of risk inasmuch as by engaging in discussions with a wide variety of British politicians—including the Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher—and by bringing himself within focus of the Western mass media, he was guaranteeing that if he made serious mistakes they would be widely publicized. In fact, however, he so much impressed all who met him both with his ability and personality that the visit could only have strengthened his already strong position in Moscow, not least in the eyes of the Soviet foreign policy establishment.⁷⁶ Commentary in the British mass media, while not always on the most serious level, was overwhelmingly favorable. Even Mrs. Thatcher delivered an accolade that she has accorded no other Soviet leader: "I like Mr. Gorbachëv. We can do business together."⁷⁷ And one of the British politicians with the broadest international experience, Dennis Healey, former defense minister and chancellor of the exchequer and now shadow foreign secretary, described Gorbachëv as "a man of exceptional charm" who was "frank and flexible with a composure full of inner strength."⁷⁸ Healey, whose discussions with Soviet leaders stretch back to Khrushchev, added: "For all who met him in Britain, he left one puzzling question: how can a man who appears so genuinely nice and human run the Soviet system?" The answer, he suggested, might lie in the "immense authority" that Gorbachëv had impressed on those who met him.⁷⁹

⁷⁶The Soviet press, radio, and television accorded extensive coverage to Gorbachëv's visit to Britain and reported a number of the positive comments of British politicians and businessmen and the British media on the way it was going. See *SWB*, Dec. 17–24, 1984.

⁷⁷*Financial Times* (London), Dec. 22, 1984, p. 26.

⁷⁸Dennis Healey, "Gorbachev Face to Face," *Newsweek* (New York), Mar. 25, 1985, p. 15. This tallies with the following recollection of Mlynář: "Gorbachëv the student was not only very intelligent and gifted, he was an open man, whose intelligence never carried over to arrogance; he wanted—and was able—to listen to the opinions of all he spoke to. Loyal and personally honest, he won an informal and spontaneous authority.... He was conscious of himself as a man who knows that everything he has, he possesses thanks to his own powers, his own talent, his own hard work, and that he has gained nothing via protection or social origin" (loc. cit.).

⁷⁹*Ibid.* Those British politicians who found it easy to establish a rapport with Gorbachëv did not, however, mistake charm for weakness. One who spent a lot of time with Gorbachëv in Britain in his capacity as chairman of the British branch of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the Conservative Member of Parliament Peter Temple-Morris, observed later: "He is a serious and cultivated man with a great deal of style. Nevertheless, he is as tough as old boots—that's important to remember" (*Newsweek*, Mar. 25, 1985, p. 10).

⁷³At Chernenko's funeral, in a break with tradition, the top military men did not appear (presumably because they were not invited) with the party leaders on the Lenin mausoleum.

⁷⁴*Krasnaya Zvezda* (Moscow), Sept. 7, 1984, p. 1.

⁷⁵*Pravda*, Dec. 22, 1984, pp. 1–2.

Gorbachëv's strong position in Moscow was reflected also in the extent to which Chernenko, though accorded constant praise in the Soviet mass media and treated in the speeches of other Soviet politicians as the ultimate authority, was operating with Andropov's agenda. He, too, had to take up the themes of discipline and reform, and though they were pursued with less vigor and expounded with less urgency than by Andropov, they became more pronounced as Chernenko's health weakened and as Gorbachëv's influence grew. This was reflected in some of Chernenko's later speeches and articles,⁸⁰ as well as in the further disciplinary action taken against Chernenko's former colleague from Moldavian days, Nikolay Shchëlokov, who had been dismissed from his post as minister of internal affairs under Andropov in December 1982 and expelled from the Central Committee in June 1983, and who as far into Chernenko's general secretaryship as November 1984 was additionally stripped of his rank of army general.⁸¹ Shchëlokov died the following month and was rumored to have committed suicide.⁸²

There were numerous other signs during the last months of Chernenko's life of Gorbachëv's enhanced authority and of the fact that he had a clearly established lead over any potential party rival. For certain purposes, protocol demanded that Tikhonov, as chairman of the Council of Ministers, should take precedence over Gorbachëv. Thus, when the leaders gave speeches to their RSFSR Supreme Soviet constituents in ascending order of rank, the last three speeches were given by Gorbachëv, Tikhonov, and Chernenko (in absentia)⁸³, the same order in which they had made their USSR Supreme Soviet speeches a year earlier.⁸⁴ The leaders' acceptances of their Supreme Soviet nominations were printed in the same order of importance (with Gorbachëv in third place after Tikhonov, who, at the age of 79 and with a background of ministerial work, was not, of course, a remotely conceivable candidate for the succession to Chernenko) and, in terms of number of constituency nominations of leaders as published by *Pravda*, Gorbachëv was actually put on a par with Tikhonov, with only Chernenko receiving more nominations and all other Politburo members getting fewer.⁸⁵

When these various esoteric signs are taken in conjunction with Gromyko's statements, quoted earlier, that Gorbachëv had already been "leading" the Secretariat and chairing the Politburo during Chernenko's lifetime, it can be seen that Gorbachëv had the succession firmly within his grasp before Chernenko died. The very fact, furthermore, that the Soviet Union had had three leaders in a row who were for lengthy periods incapable of carrying out all of their public functions had made Gorbachëv's relative youth—considered a handicap dur-

ing the two previous successions—into a positive asset. Thus, while there may well be those within the top leadership team and the Central Committee who are apprehensive lest Gorbachëv's new broom should sweep them aside, or lest he should encourage too much policy innovation, there is little reason to doubt Gromyko's assertion that the Politburo members were unanimous in nominating Gorbachëv⁸⁶ since it is not the custom for Soviet politicians to oppose directly what is clearly the winning side.

Gorbachëv as General Secretary

What is the political climate in which Gorbachëv has come to power, and what can be said of his policy orientations, priorities, leadership style, and personnel changes, as well as future prospects?

The political climate in the Soviet Union today is more conducive to policy innovation than it has frequently been in the past. In Soviet terms, there are both "objective" and "subjective" reasons for this. Objectively, there has been the slowdown in economic growth rate, and this is being openly analyzed by Soviet scholars.⁸⁷ The ordinary Soviet citizen may be unfamiliar with the statistics, but is only too well aware of the problems that remain to be overcome. In the international arena, there is the dilemma posed by the significant increase in American military expenditure, by a general worsening of relations with the United States and with Western Europe dating from the late 1970's, and by relatively static relations with China and Japan, which by the time of Chernenko's death, had improved only marginally. Subjectively, there is the fact that Andropov had raised expectations of qualitative improvements in the economy and of a greater sense of purpose in Soviet society, and there was some popular frustration that under Chernenko the country seemed to be marking time again. There is widespread public support for a revival of

⁸⁰See, for example, Chernenko's speech to the conference of People's Controllers, *Pravda*, Oct. 6, 1984, pp. 1-2; his article, "To Meet the Demands of Developed Socialism," in *Kommunist*, No. 18, December 1984, pp. 3-21; and his RSFSR Supreme Soviet election speech, read for him in his absence (through illness) little more than two weeks before his death, in *Pravda*, Feb. 23, 1985, pp. 1-2.

⁸¹For the dates during which Chernenko and Shchëlokov worked together in Moldavia, see *Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta: Desyatyy sozyv*, pp. 475 and 494. For the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet decree depriving Shchëlokov of his military rank for bringing discredit to it and for abuse of office, see *Vedomosti verkhovnogo soveta SSSR* (Moscow), No. 46, Nov. 14, 1984, p. 860.

⁸²*The Times* (London), Dec. 19, 1984, p. 12.

⁸³*Pravda*, Feb. 21, 1985, p. 2; Feb. 22, 1985, p. 2; and Feb. 23, 1985, pp. 1-2.

⁸⁴*Ibid.*, Mar. 1, 1984, p. 2; Mar. 2, 1984, p. 2; and Mar. 3, 1984, pp. 1-2.

⁸⁵*Ibid.*, Jan. 4, 1985, pp. 1-2.

⁸⁶*Materialy vneocherednogo plenuma tsentral'nogo komiteta KPSS* . . . , p. 8.

⁸⁷See, notably, M. I. Piskotin, *Sotsializm i gosudarstvennoye upravleniye* (Socialism and State Administration), Moscow, Nauka, 1984.

détente (which the more sophisticated Soviet party intellectuals recognize would have to be accompanied by more clearly defined "rules of the game") and a readiness to welcome more Soviet diplomatic initiatives as distinct from mere reactions to events.

On the specific issue of economic reform, it is of great importance to recognize that a shift of opinion has taken place within the Soviet party intelligentsia, so that while argument continues, far more people now accept that minor tinkering with the economic mechanism is not enough. There is, however, resistance from powerful sections of the party and state apparatus to reducing the powers of ministries and giving greater autonomy to industrial associations and enterprises and still greater resistance to incorporating market elements within the economic system. But from the very top of the party hierarchy, and not least from Gorbachëv himself, there has been encouragement to social scientists to be less slow and timid in tackling "the resolution of the key theoretical problems of our development."⁸⁸

The *short-term* changes that actually take place are unlikely to be as far-reaching as some of the proposals that have been published by Soviet scholars. But while Gorbachëv was already exercising influence on the broad lines of economic policy under Andropov and Chernenko, encouragement was given to the reform-oriented Institute of Economics and Organization of Industrial Production of the Siberian Division of the Academy of Sciences, based in Novosibirsk. At the June 1983 plenary session, two economic institutes were singled out for criticism by Chernenko in his speech, and it is difficult to say how much of an influence Gorbachëv had over that, though it is very likely that he had some. Chernenko criticized, on the one hand, the relatively conservative Institute of Economics of the Academy of Sciences in Moscow and the much more reformist Central Institute of Economics and Mathematics (TsEMI). The common thread in the criticism, however, would appear to be that neither institute was sufficiently closely in touch with real economic life or was offering enough practical guidance to policymakers—a charge that could not be leveled against the Novosibirsk Institute, which works in close cooperation with industry, as can be seen from the pages of its monthly journal, *EKO*. Academician Abel Aganbegyan of Novosibirsk appears to be in good standing with Gorbachëv,⁸⁹ and it is worth recalling that the frank critique by his Institute colleague Academician Tat'yana Zaslavskaya of the obstacles to

economic progress in the Soviet Union and of the deficiencies of Soviet social science in producing a "fully elaborated 'model' for the new economic mechanism"⁹⁰ was delivered to a closed seminar under the joint auspices of the economic departments of the party's Central Committee, the State Planning Committee (Gosplan), and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.⁹¹

Interesting though Zaslavskaya's paper is, it should not distract attention (as it has tended to) from works officially published in the Soviet Union that are no less open-minded and innovative. On the issue of economic reform, these have in the last few years included the works of jurists and political scientists as well as economists.⁹² One significant example is a book published in September 1984 (which appears to have been quite overlooked by Western scholars) written by the chief editor of the journal, *Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo*, Mikhail Piskotin. Entitled *Socialism and State Administration*,⁹³ this work records the secular decline in the Soviet economic growth rate from the 1950's to the early 1980's and observes that the decline has "deeper causes than simple mistakes in the work of particular organs of government, a low level of exactingness, or negligence in moral-educational work."⁹⁴ It is impossible to do justice to Piskotin's quite lengthy and closely argued book in a few lines, but it is worth noting his emphasis on the fact that the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers did not consider their July 14, 1983, joint resolution on the broadening of the rights of production associations and enterprises to be a "full and final solution of the problem of strengthening the independence of the primary economic unit."⁹⁵ Piskotin criticizes "market socialism" but, significantly, is not opposed to every use of the market mechanism. As he puts it: "Market socialism does not exist wherever there is a market and commodity-production relations, but only where this market becomes the sole or main regulator of the economy."⁹⁶ Accordingly, he is sympathetic to the Hungarian economic reform, though he stresses that this experience is "impossible to transfer mechanistically to the conditions of the Soviet Union."⁹⁷

⁸⁸"The Novosibirsk Report," *Survey* (London), Spring 1984, p. 100.

⁹¹Philip Hanson, "The Novosibirsk Report: Comment," *ibid.*, p. 83.

⁹²I have drawn attention to some of them in my article, "Political Science in the Soviet Union: A New Stage of Development?" in *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), July 1984, pp. 317–44, esp. pp. 334–35.

⁹³*Sotsializm i gosudarstvennoye upravleniye*, op. cit.

⁹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 147.

⁹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 157.

⁹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 161. Gorbachëv's positive evaluation of the Hungarian economic reform may be inferred from an editorial published in *Pravda* less than three weeks after his succession which speaks of Hungary's "bold, innovative, and at the same time realistic, approach to the working-out of plans for socioeconomic development" (*Pravda*, Mar. 30, 1985, p. 1).

⁸⁹M. S. Gorbachëv, *Zhivoye tvorchestvo naroda* (The Living Creation of the People), Moscow, Politizdat, 1984. This was a speech delivered on Dec. 10, 1984, to the All-Union Conference on "The Perfecting of Developed Socialism and the Ideological Work of the Party...."

⁹⁰See his articles in *Pravda*, July 14, 1984, p. 2; and *Trud* (Moscow), Aug. 28, 1984, p. 2.

Even more radical calls for economic and, indeed, political reform have come from a sector head in the Institute of State and Law, Boris Kurashvili,⁹⁸ who has laid great stress on the need for "democratization of the state administration," and has noted that many of those working in the state apparatus consider the present ministerial system—a product, essentially, of the 1930's—to be the only system possible. Kurashvili profoundly disagrees with such a view but recognizes that reform will meet with the opposition of "conservative and inactive elements in the state apparatus."⁹⁹

Whether Gorbachëv will follow the advice of the advocates of more far-reaching economic reform will depend not upon him alone, but upon the strength of the various interest groups involved (above all, in the apparatus), many of whom are opposed to reform. The opposition is to be found not only within the state administration, for at every level of the party apparatus there are departments that work closely with the ministerial network and whose functionaries tend to view issues through the same lenses. Already under Andropov and even under Chernenko, it was clear that within the top party leadership there were those acutely aware of current problems, and who had a more open mind about ways of tackling them than had many lower level officials. Certainly, Gorbachëv himself has given every indication of willingness to listen to constructive proposals for within-system change, and those jurists with ideas for reform should not have too much difficulty of access. It is worth noting in that connection that the director of the Institute of State and Law in Moscow, Academician Vladimir Kudryavtsev (under whose guidance a more sociological approach to the study of law has been encouraged in the Institute over the past decade) was one of the speakers at the RSFSR Supreme Soviet election meeting addressed by Gorbachëv on February 20, 1985.¹⁰⁰

Though Gorbachëv's speeches generally repay close study, the one that is more revealing of all those he has made to date in respect of the insight it affords on his

policy orientation and priorities is his speech to the conference on ideological work in December 1984. Though what was published from it in the mass media made interesting reading,¹⁰¹ it was less than half of what Gorbachëv actually said. In directing attention to some of the salient points from the speech, I draw in the following paragraphs exclusively from the parts that were not published in *Pravda*. These include some of the most innovative passages and those most revealing of Gorbachëv's style—and at the same time the least known because of their more limited circulation.¹⁰²

On the economy, Gorbachëv directly referred to the "slowdown of economic growth at the end of the 1970's and beginning of the 1980's" and said that this was to be explained "not only by the coincidence of a number of unfavorable factors but also by the fact that the necessity of changes in some aspects of production relationships was not discovered in good time."¹⁰³ This particular argument is very much in line with the views of economic reformers such as Piskotin and Zaslavskaya, as is his attention to the problem of the correspondence of production relations and productive forces.¹⁰⁴ Gorbachëv himself insists that "the correspondence of production relations to productive forces is not reproduced just by itself, but demands constant, purposeful work in the perfecting of the entire economic system of socialism."¹⁰⁵ While he observes that the dialectical relationship between production relations and productive forces cannot under socialism be an antagonistic one, he also notes that the unwarranted preservation of "obsolete elements in production relations may bring about a deterioration of the economic and social situation."¹⁰⁶

Among the practical economic issues touched upon by Gorbachëv in his December 1984 speech were those of commodity-monetary relations and the need for "serious scientific recommendations on the application in contemporary conditions of such economic levers as price, cost, profit, credit, and certain others";¹⁰⁷ the built-in conservatism of much of existing investment policy;¹⁰⁸ and the importance of improving distribution relations, since "this is a most sensitive sphere that exercises an active influence not only on production but also on the consciousness and the mood of people."¹⁰⁹

⁹⁸See B. P. Kurashvili, "State Administration of the National Economy: Prospects for Development," *Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo* (Moscow), No. 6, 1982, pp. 38–48; Kurashvili, "Objective Laws of State Administration," *ibid.*, No. 10, 1983, pp. 36–44; and Kurashvili, "The Fates of Branch Management," *EKO* (Novosibirsk), No. 10, 1983, pp. 34–57.

⁹⁹Kurashvili, "Objective Laws..."

¹⁰⁰*Pravda*, Feb. 21, 1985, p. 2. One of the scholars whose advice Piskotin acknowledges in the introduction to his recent book is Zaslavskaya. Both he, in that book, and Zaslavskaya in her 1983 report single out for special praise the work of Kurashvili. This is a good example of the kind of opinion grouping or informal group that is of great importance in Soviet politics. These three scholars are, of course, just part of a much wider opinion grouping with broadly similar views on the direction the Soviet economy and Soviet society should be taking. Needless to say, there are informal groups of conservatives and dogmatists as well as of reformers. For a pioneering discussion of the group phenomenon in the USSR by a Soviet scholar, see A. V. Obolonskiy, "Formal and Informal Groups in the State Administrative Apparatus," *Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo*, No. 5, 1983, pp. 28–35. See also Brown, "Political Science in the Soviet Union," esp. pp. 332–33 and 335.

¹⁰¹See, e.g., *Pravda*, Dec. 11, 1984, p. 2.

¹⁰²Gorbachëv, *Zhivoye tvorchestvo naroda*. The print-run of this Politizdat booklet is 100,000 which is, of course, substantial, but not to be compared with *Pravda*, which has a circulation of over 10 million. The booklet very rapidly sold out.

¹⁰³*ibid.*, pp. 12–13.

¹⁰⁴See Piskotin, *Sotsializm i gosudarstvennoye upravleniye*; and "The Novosibirsk Report."

¹⁰⁵Gorbachëv, *Zhivoye tvorchestvo naroda*, p. 12.

¹⁰⁶*ibid.*, p. 13.

¹⁰⁷*ibid.*, p. 14.

¹⁰⁸*ibid.*, p. 22.

¹⁰⁹*ibid.*, p. 31.

In his references to the social sciences, Gorbachëv's interest in theoretical issues comes out strongly, but so does his insistence that theory should lead to practical benefit. Thus, he observes:

*Not all research institutions work in close connection with practice. Some scholars at times are not able to part company with obsolete conceptions and stereotypes. Their theoretical investigations not infrequently are fitted into preconceived schemes, and they revolve in a circle of scholastic reasoning.*¹¹⁰

Later in the same speech he referred to the force of inertia and to the attempt "to squeeze new phenomena into the Procrustean bed of moribund conceptions."¹¹¹ The tone and content of Gorbachëv's remarks make clear that he is no friend of dogmatists and that reform-minded social scientists can expect encouragement under his leadership, provided they devote attention to "the problems of perfecting developed socialism." This, for Gorbachëv, is "the pressing demand of the times, the basic criterion for evaluating the activity of social scientists."¹¹²

It was of greater importance than has generally been recognized that under Andropov there was a shift from Brezhnev's somewhat complacent view of "developed socialism" to the standpoint that the Soviet Union was only "at the beginning" of the stage of developed socialism, a shift that emphasized existing shortcomings and how much scope there was for improving (or in Soviet terms, "perfecting") both the economic and the political system. In his December speech, Gorbachëv did not neglect the political system and made much use of the term, "self-management" (*samoupravleniye*),¹¹³ urging that the various levels and units within the political system be given more space (*prostor*) within which to operate. He attacked attempts to regulate all and everything from the center and stressed the importance of "every link of the political system" exercising its own functions.¹¹⁴ In a significant passage, he observed: "A qualified leadership not only does not limit but, on the contrary, opens up space for initiative of people, of work collectives, and of local organs."¹¹⁵

As general secretary, Gorbachëv has returned to the theme of devolving greater responsibility and financial autonomy to enterprises and to brigades of workers. In a speech to a meeting of economic managers and special-

ists in April of this year he spoke of the need to release managers from the fetters of superfluous instructions, arguing that economic management was now at a level where accountability to higher organs could be decisively decreased. This would free them from "the paper chase" and simultaneously contribute to "the reduction of the managerial apparatus."¹¹⁶ On brigades, Gorbachëv observed that a considerable number had gone over to "a progressive method of work," but there were still many that were going over to financial autonomy only slowly and in which labor productivity was rising only slightly.¹¹⁷

It is tempting to see Gorbachëv's emphasis on devolution of responsibilities and financial autonomy from the center to industrial associations and enterprises in part as a result of the fact that he has a clearer idea of what life is actually like for a provincial factory manager than some of those who have been in the Central Committee apparatus for far longer. Not only has he evidently paid attention to the findings of Academician Aganbegyan and his colleagues on such matters, he has very recent memories of the frustrations of regional life for a highly intelligent official or manager who feels that his abilities are constantly being reined in. (It is the less able officials and managers who feel more comfortable with less responsibility.) It is, indeed, yet another unusual feature of the Gorbachëv succession that the present general secretary should have worked in Moscow for a mere six-and-a-half years. This has its undoubted advantages. It is one reason why there is a breath of real life in Gorbachëv's speeches, a sense of how people are living and working far from the confines of the Central Committee building. Like Andropov, Gorbachëv stresses discipline—"Ultimately, everything stems from a high degree of exactingness toward people, toward leading cadres, toward all of us, comrades"¹¹⁸—however, he knows that this cannot be achieved by exhortation or by cadres policy alone, but has to be built into the economic mechanism.

An important theme for Gorbachëv has been that of the need for the party to give people more information. It is of interest in that connection that the length of the published *Politburo* communiqués has increased since Gorbachëv took over. But to change the habits of a lifetime within the party as a whole is not easy. In his December speech, Gorbachëv quoted a letter from a party member in Minsk who expresses his satisfaction and that of his colleagues with the publication of information

¹¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 11.

¹¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 41.

¹¹²*Ibid.*, p. 11.

¹¹³See, e.g., *Ibid.*, pp. 14–15.

¹¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 16.

¹¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 17.

¹¹⁶"Initiative, Organization, Effectiveness—Speech of M. S. Gorbachëv," *Pravda*, Apr. 12, 1985, pp. 1–2.

¹¹⁷*Ibid.*

¹¹⁸*Ibid.*

about Politburo meetings (a practice that Andropov began), but who goes on to point out that "often we members of the party are better informed about the activity of the Politburo of the Central Committee than about the work of the bureau of the primary party organization or of the district committee!"¹¹⁹ Gorbachëv's response was: "A true observation, and it must be given every attention."¹²⁰

Gorbachëv clearly has political as well as economic changes in mind. But to attempt to foist upon him notions of pluralistic democracy would be wrong and misleading. Pluralism is simply not on the political agenda in the Soviet Union. Economic reform is, and even if the next installment of it should fall short of the demands of the situation and of Soviet economic reformers (though they, of course, are not all of one mind), the evidence available on Gorbachëv suggests that he at least will not be deterred by conservatism or, as his power base grows stronger, by vested interests from taking the reform further. If it be true that the Soviet Union is at present a military but not an economic superpower, Gorbachëv's domestic policy can be summarized by saying that he intends to give the highest priority to ensuring that the USSR becomes the second while, in common with other Soviet leaders, remaining determined that it should not cease to be the first. It can, indeed, be argued that for the Soviet Union to maintain its military superpower status, it must increase its economic efficiency and its capacity to generate and diffuse the most advanced technology.

In personnel policy, it is already clear that the Gorbachëv period is not going to be marked by the extremely slow pace of change of the Brezhnev years, still less by the immobility at the top that characterized Chernenko's 13 months as general secretary. Gorbachëv's first six weeks as party leader saw the replacement of many officials at the republican, regional, and city level, and at the first normal Central Committee plenum over which he presided—that held on April 23, 1985—no fewer than five promotions within the top leadership team took place.¹²¹ What is more remarkable is that these included three promotions to full membership of the Politburo and all of them people who can be identified as Gorbachëv allies. No previous general secretary has ever been able to consolidate his position within the leadership so quickly.

The two most important promotions were those of Yegor Ligachëv (aged 64) and Nikolay Ryzhkov (55). Both became full Politburo members without passing

through the candidate stage (the first people to perform that feat of upward political mobility since Gromyko did it in 1973) while retaining their secretaryships of the Central Committee. The only other person in that category is Romanov, and it was, of course, because the ranks of senior secretary had become so depleted that Gorbachëv had the opportunity to promote further his colleagues who had been brought into the leadership by Andropov. The fact, however, that it was they rather than the 60-year-old Vladimir Dolgikh—to whose secretaryship of the Central Committee candidate membership of the Politburo was added at Brezhnev's last Central Committee plenum in May 1982, suggesting he was destined for senior secretaryship—who received promotion indicates how swiftly and effectively the Andropov-Gorbachëv group has overtaken the Brezhnev legates. In terms of their policy orientation, Ryzhkov and Ligachëv are also closely aligned with Gorbachëv. Ryzhkov seems to be at least as sympathetic toward innovation in economic policy and organization as the General Secretary himself, and Ligachëv has been pursuing with some vigor the policy that Andropov began and Gorbachëv favors of crackdown on corruption and ineptitude within the party apparatus and replacement of officials who do not meet the more exacting standards now being applied.

The elevation of Viktor Chebrikov (62), the KGB chairman, from candidate to full membership of the Politburo, should also strengthen Gorbachëv's position within the top leadership. Chebrikov worked closely with Andropov for 15 years,¹²² and it was during Andropov's general secretaryship that he received both of his previous major promotions—to the chairmanship of the KGB and to Politburo candidate membership.¹²³ There is every reason to suppose that Chebrikov transferred his loyalty from Andropov to Gorbachëv, the man Andropov was grooming for the succession. Chebrikov's full Politburo membership was presumably also well received at KGB headquarters, since it restores to that body the political status it enjoyed between April 1973 and May 1982 when Andropov, as KGB chief, was also a full member of the Politburo.

The promotion of Marshal Sokolov, Ustinov's successor as minister of defense, to candidate membership of the Politburo, gives the military an institutional voice once again in the highest counsels of the party. Sokolov would appear to be the only one of the five people promoted to be without links to Gorbachëv, though given his age (73) that is of no long-term significance. The fifth person to receive advancement at the April plenum

¹¹⁹Gorbachëv, *Zhivoye tvorchestvo naroda*, p. 31.

¹²⁰*Ibid.*

¹²¹*Pravda*, Apr. 24, 1985, p. 1.

¹²²See *Yezhegodnik Bol'shoy Sovetskoy Entsiklopedii* 1981, p. 608.

¹²³See *Pravda*, Dec. 18, 1982, p. 2; and Dec. 27, 1983, p. 1.



Individuals promoted at the April 23, 1985, plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: above, from left to right, three new full members of the CC CPSU Politburo—party secretaries Nikolay Ryzhkov and Yegor Ligachëv, and KGB Chairman Viktor Chebrikov—and a new candidate Politburo member, USSR Minister of Defense Marshal Sergey Sokolov; at right, new CC secretary for agriculture, Viktor Nikonov.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

was Viktor Nikonov (56) who has become a secretary of the Central Committee. As minister of agriculture for the Russian republic, he was obviously well known to Gorbachëv and had been working under his jurisdiction. He has now been elevated by Gorbachëv to a position more important than that of the minister of agriculture for the USSR as a whole, since it seems clear that he will be the agricultural overlord within the Secretariat.¹²⁴

All in all, these April plenum changes strengthen and at the same time somewhat rejuvenate the top leadership team, though Gorbachëv himself remains the youngest member. They confirm that Gorbachëv is already wielding great authority within the party and should make it easier for him to put forward and to implement those policies that he believes will meet the needs of the Soviet Union.

In the realm of foreign policy, Gorbachëv has already

demonstrated in his meetings with Western politicians visiting Moscow that detailed grasp of the issues which had impressed his British hosts last December. The speaker of the United States House of Representatives, Thomas P. (Tip) O'Neill, Jr., is but the latest to assess Gorbachëv as formidably accomplished. "About his ability, his talents, his frankness, his openness, I was tremendously impressed," he said.¹²⁵ O'Neill added that he did not perceive any major change in Soviet policy.

Policy change, however, is unlikely to be announced unilaterally¹²⁶ and is more likely to emerge in the course

¹²⁴For Nikonov's biography, see *Yezhegodnik Bol'shoy Sovetskoy Entsiklopedii* 1981, p. 592.

¹²⁵*International Herald Tribune*, Apr. 11, 1985, p. 1.

¹²⁶However, Gorbachëv did announce a Soviet unilateral moratorium due to last until November 1985 (when the position would be reviewed) on the further deployment of Soviet

of serious negotiations, should these take place. It is not surprising that so far what the outside world has seen is mainly a change of style. But Gorbachëv seems determined to improve the Soviet Union's external relations on several fronts. He has accepted invitations to visit France and the Federal Republic of Germany, and he has accepted in principle an invitation to meet with President Ronald Reagan, though the details of time and place have still at the time of writing to be decided.¹²⁷ He is likely to make a determined effort to improve relations with China, and the current leaderships in Moscow and Beijing would appear to have better prospects of moving closer together than at any time over the past two decades. Already the two countries had renewed their recognition of each other as "socialist states," and the editor of *Pravda*, in an interview given in Belgrade, has noted that more recently there has been in Chinese statements an improvement "in tone and in terminology, such as 'Comrade Gorbachëv,' which did not exist before."¹²⁸ Given Gorbachëv's acknowledged ability to argue the Soviet case flexibly and reasonably, and without resort either to dogma or to a script, the Soviet Union can well afford to be much more active diplomatically in the coming years than it has in the recent past.

Gorbachëv, who has made the journey from kolkhoz to Kremlin in record time, is about as likely to question the foundations of the system that enabled him to rise from humble origins to the highest office in the land as an American president who rose from log cabin to White House would be to question the wisdom of the Founding Fathers. He is a true believer in the Soviet system who is at the same time far from complacent about it and con-

scious of many of the ways in which it must be improved. He may yet have a greater opportunity than any individual since the death of Stalin to make an impact on it.

Gromyko said in his nomination speech that Gorbachëv was "a man of strong convictions" who "states his position frankly, whether or not it is to the liking of his interlocutor."¹²⁹ Mlynář has described Gorbachëv as one for whom convictions play a decisive role in politics: "He has never been a cynic, and he is, in character, a reformer who considers politics as a means to an end, with its objective being to meet the needs of people."¹³⁰

Gorbachëv is not, however, the kind of "conviction politician" who does not listen to what others have to say. Because of the extent to which power is shared at the top of the Soviet hierarchy, he *could* not be (especially before he became general secretary). But it is noteworthy that he listens also to specialist advisers and to his subordinates. British politicians who had extensive dealings with Gorbachëv last December observed that he had an easy relationship with the group he led. There was neither bullying from the one side nor obsequiousness from the other. Members of the group with something to say felt free to speak up, though there was never any doubt about Gorbachëv's ultimate authority.

Every Soviet leader so far has been different in political style and, to a degree, in political priorities. Already Gorbachëv has revealed some of his policy preferences, but these may become clearer as his power increases (as it surely will). His policy aims may also be modified by changing circumstances since he is a man who learns from his experiences and who is open to reason. The responsibilities and burdens placed on Gorbachëv's shoulders are immense. But this time round the Soviet selectorate has chosen the man who, of all those in their midst, seems best equipped to carry them.

medium-range missiles in Europe. This announcement came in the course of an interview of Gorbachëv by the editor of *Pravda* (see *Pravda*, Apr. 8, 1985, p. 1). In his meeting with Speaker O'Neill and other US congressmen in the Kremlin on April 10, Gorbachëv said that the United States had displayed "absolutely incomprehensible haste" in declaring its negative attitude to this "important and constructive gesture of good will." See *SWB*, SU/7923/i and SU/7923/A11-2, Apr. 12, 1985.

¹²⁷On this, see *International Herald Tribune*, Apr. 3, 1985, pp. 1-2; and *Pravda*, Apr. 8, 1985, p. 1.

¹²⁸*SWB*, SU/7920/B/1, Apr. 9, 1985.

¹²⁹*Materialy vneocherednogo plenuma tsentral'nogo komiteta KPSS . . .*, p. 6.

¹³⁰Mlynář, loc. cit.

Leadership Change in China's Provinces

William deB. Mills

If any lesson can reliably be drawn from the zigzag course of domestic politics in the People's Republic of China (PRC) since 1949 it is that no leader can leave office confident that his policies will be implemented faithfully in his absence. The apparent permanence of the recent shift in emphasis from politicization to professional expertise as the basic criterion of bureaucratic excellence, and the concomitant focus on economic development at the expense of political goals, is an illusion camouflaging a much less stable political reality. That reality includes a massive Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with some 40 million members, one-third of whom joined the party during the leftist upheavals of the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) and are therefore for reasons of both training and self-preservation likely to oppose the current stress on technical competence and economic pragmatism.¹ The potential for resentment on the part of these millions of party members is considerable, especially since these Cultural Revolution activists now see their careers threatened by the suddenly favored experts, many of whom they had personally driven out of office in the late 1960's.

¹See William deB. Mills, "Generational Change in China," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November-December 1983, pp. 16-35, esp. pp. 16-20, for a discussion of this assumption. "Generational Change in China" treats the central leadership changes that constituted the basis on which the events analyzed in the present article unfolded.

William deB. Mills is Analyst of Chinese politics for the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (Washington, DC). He has written on Chinese domestic politics and Sino-Soviet relations. His article on Sino-Soviet polemics will appear in a forthcoming issue of Journal of Northeast Asian Studies. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the US Government.

That Deng Xiaoping foresees this as a threat to the perpetuation of his policies once he steps down—which can hardly be postponed much longer, given his advanced age—has been evident since the 12th Party Congress in September 1982, for it was there that he launched his program to transfer power from veteran revolutionary leaders of his own era to a new generation of younger, better educated officials. As a result, nearly half of the members of the previous Central Committee (CC) were dropped.²

But it was not until the spring of 1983 that the seriousness and scope of Deng's commitment to bring a new generation of leaders to power before the old leadership retired became apparent. Between early March and late April, in a centrally mandated streamlining and rejuvenation process which to the outsider seemed to occur with astounding speed and lack of rancor, some 950 of China's 1,350 top provincial leaders retired and were replaced by about 160 new officials. This left China's provinces under the control of much smaller leading bodies composed of officials, who, presumably, would be both more efficient and more responsive to central policies. In brief, Deng attempted to transfer regional power to men of his own choosing to solidify the changes that had been made in the spring 1982 streamlining of the State Council apparatus³ and in the fall 1982 selection of the 12th Central Committee.

Following a summary of the leadership changes that took place during the spring of 1983 at the provincial

²See Hong Yong Lee, "China's 12th Central Committee: Rehabilitated Cadres and Technocrats," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley, CA), June 1983, pp. 673-91, and Mills, loc. cit.

³State Council reorganization is discussed in John Burns's useful background study "Reforming China's Bureaucracy, 1979-82," *Asian Survey*, June 1983, pp. 692-722, esp. pp. 707-14. In brief, according to a May 4, 1982, New China News Agency (hereafter Xinhua) report, the State Council reduced its number of vice-premiers from 13 to 2 and its number of ministries from 52 to 41. See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC—hereafter FBIS-CHN), May 4, 1982, pp. K1-5.

level, this essay will examine the experiences of two provinces—Shanxi and Hunan—in order to get some sense of the problems underlying the superficially smooth transfer of power. Shanxi has been selected because in many ways it is typical of a number of provinces: the center replaced the former leaders with its own men, who then proceeded to manage the province with little subsequent central interference. Hunan is a much more unusual case. Not only did the incumbent first secretary there retain his position, he did so despite direct and persistent high-level central intervention. In each case, however, the center revealed a willingness to compromise. In so doing, Deng rejected the Cultural Revolution model of politics by class struggle, choosing instead to coopt potential opponents in order to unify the party behind his reforms. The second part of this essay, therefore, will focus on the methods used by the center to attain this goal of party unity.

Unwieldy Provincial Leaderships

The violent overthrow of China's revolutionary generation during the Cultural Revolution set the stage for the evolution of an awkward system of leadership at the pro-

vincial level. What had emerged in 1967 and 1968 as a unitary administrative structure (with the establishment of the "three-in-one" revolutionary committees to replace the old party and state organs) gradually degenerated by 1980 into a three-tiered faction-ridden committee system composed of the party, the government, and the provincial people's congress (PPC—the province's legislature).⁴ The first major change occurred between December 1970 and August 1971 when provincial party committees were reestablished. Interestingly, the restored party committees emerged directly from within the revolutionary committees and had no separate administration of their own. Thus, there was no separation between party and state bureaucracies, as was evidenced by the fact that provincial party first secretaries served concurrently as revolutionary committee chairmen.⁵ As the 1970's unfolded, leaders of the revo-

⁴For the details of this process, see David S. G. Goodman, "The Provincial Revolutionary Committee in the People's Republic of China, 1967–1979: An Obituary," *China Quarterly* (London), March 1981, pp. 49–79. In theory, the "three-in-one" revolutionary committees were to combine "revolutionary mass organizations, the People's Liberation Army, and revolutionary leading cadres of party and government organizations" (*ibid.*, p. 49). In practice, although they initially reflected this "Maoist coalition of revolutionary forces," they increasingly came to be dominated by party-state cadres (see Table 3 in *ibid.*, p. 69).

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 72.



The rostrum at the September 10, 1982, plenary session of the 12th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, which elected a new Central Committee and the Central Advisory Commission: in the first row from left to right, Zhao Ziyang, Deng Xiaoping, and Hu Yaobang; in the second row from left to right, Li Xiannian, Ye Jianying, Chen Yun, and Xu Xiangqian.

—EASTFOTO

Leadership Change in China's Provinces

lutionary generation who had been purged during the Cultural Revolution began to regain leadership positions,⁶ a process that continued and even accelerated after Mao Zedong's death in September 1976. Finally, by early 1980, the pre-Cultural Revolution system of provincial government reemerged, replacing the revolutionary committees,⁷ as recently resurrected people's congresses were convened to elect governors and vice-governors to head the provinces' people's governments.⁸

As a result, by 1983, there were three leadership committees in each province, with rehabilitated party veterans of the revolutionary generation sitting alongside younger officials who had gained high office at the veter-

ans' expense during the years of leftist ascendancy. Of the three, the party committee appeared to be the most powerful. Totalling perhaps a dozen secretaries, including a first secretary and occasionally a second or permanent secretary, the committee was assisted by a similar number of standing committee members as well as by several dozen regular committee members. While theoretically charged with general guidance on matters of party line and principle, party secretaries in fact took over a good deal of the day-to-day administrative work from the governors and vice-governors,⁹ who constituted the second most powerful leading body. Heading a bureaucracy of some two- to three-thousand cadres, this group of roughly 12 officials was formally responsible for the day-to-day administration of government affairs. The third group was composed of the chairman and about a dozen vice-chairmen of the people's congresses in each province (or municipality or region). Although formally

⁶Goodman reports that as of "September 1975, 84% of provincial leadership cadres were serving in the same province where they had been provincial-level cadres at the start of 1966" (ibid., p. 77).

⁷For a note on this restoration and a table of new provincial government leaders, see *Beijing Review*, Feb. 4, 1980, p. 5.

⁸Basic facts on people's congresses are given in Jacques Guillerma, *The Chinese Communist Party in Power, 1949-1975*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1972, pp. 114-15. For a discussion of provincial people's congresses before the Cultural Revolution, see Frederick Teiwes, "Provincial Politics in China: Themes and Variations," in John Lindbeck, Ed., *China: Management of a Revolutionary Society*, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1971, pp. 117-25.

⁹The terms governor and vice-governor are used generically throughout this article. Included in addition to the heads of the provincial people's governments are the mayors and vice-mayors of the three provincial-level cities—Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin—as well as the chairmen and vice-chairmen of the five provincial-level autonomous regions: Xinjiang, Xizang (Tibet), Ningxia, Guangxi, and Nei Monggol (Inner Mongolia).

Figure 1: Numbers of Responsible Leaders at Provincial Level Before and After the 1983 Streamlining




Table 1: Standardizing the Size of Provincial Leadership Bodies

	Range of members in old organizations		Range of members in new organizations	
	Minimum	Maximum	Minimum	Maximum
Number of party secretaries	5	15	4	6
Members on party standing committees	13	33	8	16
Number of governors and vice-governors	9	18	4	8
Number of chairmen and vice-chairmen of standing committees of provincial people's congresses	8	22	8	15

charged with overseeing the government, this group's real power does not appear to have been commensurate with its formal position of authority.

The work of these leadership bodies suffered because of overlapping functions, disunity, aging members, and sheer inefficiency of size. Before the spring streamlining, the average provincial leadership body—defined here as being composed of the first and deputy secretaries of the party committee, the governor and vice-governors, and the chairman and vice-chairmen of the standing committee of the provincial people's congress—had 16 members. If the full party committee or full standing committee of the people's congress were included, the number would of course be considerably larger.

Streamlining and Replacement

The first objective of the reform was to slash the size of the provinces' leading bodies, which were cut by some 38 percent, from 1,082 to 669 members, as shown in Figure 1. If one excludes the provincial people's congress standing committees, the least powerful of the three groups, the percentage of reduction is even greater, fully 50 percent. Indeed, the number of party secretaries was cut in half, declining from 295 to 146, that is, from an average of 10 to 5 per province. The number of governors and vice-governors decreased by a

similar amount, from 371 to 176, or from an average 12.8 to 6.7 per province. Only the chairmen and vice-chairmen of the people's congresses managed to survive the huge cuts, decreasing by less than 17 percent, from 416 to 347, or from 14 to 12 per province.

The aim of this streamlining was twofold: to create a more efficient provincial leadership, and to narrow the variations in leadership body sizes from province to province (see Table 1). The most striking move toward uniformity of size occurred among party secretaries. Before the reform, the number varied from five in Fujian¹⁰ to 15 in Sichuan; after the reform, the range was narrowed to only four to six. But if this effort succeeded in both reducing and making uniform the size of the leaderships of the provincial party committees, it also led to a marked variation in party leaders' titles. While the 18 incumbent first secretaries who remained in office retained this title, newly appointed provincial party chiefs were entitled "secretary." With rare exceptions,¹¹ their newly appointed subordinates were entitled "deputy secretary." Why the center allowed incumbents to retain their titles is unclear, though I suspect that central leaders may have considered such a concession a harmless compromise on the road to postreform stability. At any rate, despite this confusion of party titles, through the end of 1983, at least, the leadership situation appeared stable in China's provinces.

A second goal of the reform, and one accomplished with an even greater degree of success, was removal of those incumbents who were old, uneducated, or politically suspect. In the process of reducing the total size of leadership bodies by approximately 40 percent, 72 percent of the incumbents were removed. Of the 1,082 secretaries,¹² governors and vice-governors, and PPC chairmen and vice-chairmen, only 307 kept their positions. Another 125 (12 percent) obtained other assignments, frequently at lower levels. The majority of the remaining 650 (60 percent) appear to have retired in the conventional sense of the word,¹³ while those too influential to be easily forced into retirement succeeded in trading in their leadership posts for newly created advi-

¹⁰This had been reduced from 8 to 5 on October 15, 1982.

¹¹The exceptions are Heilongjiang, which has five secretaries, Qinghai, with three secretaries, and Shandong, which has two secretaries. In each of these cases, however, it is clear which of the secretaries is the chief of the party, although he has the same title as his deputies. See, e.g., Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, *Directory of Chinese Officials: Provincial Organizations*, Washington, DC, CIA, August 1983, pp. 53, 115, and 127.

¹²If party committee standing committee members were included in this count, an additional 341 party officials just below the secretaries would be added to the 1,082 pre-reform total and an additional 187 to the postreform total.

¹³Some officials who lost their party secretarial posts and are here counted as having retired did retain membership in the provincial party committee. This is known to have occurred in Sichuan, which published a list of committee members. The extent to which officials in other provinces were downgraded from leadership posts to lower levels is uncertain, however, since most provinces have not published similar lists.

sory positions. The most important such advisory body was the Central Advisory Commission (CAC), created by Deng as an honorary halfway house for veteran leaders reluctant to relinquish their leadership roles and perquisites.¹⁴ Below the central level, numerous lesser advisory positions have been constitutionally sanctioned,¹⁵ though their actual establishment has been slow, perhaps because those veterans who avoided retirement in the spring of 1983 have seen the writing on the wall.

The creation of these veterans' advisory bodies indicates a further refinement of the Chinese conception of retirement. For one thing, it suggests that the current leadership has found it politically expedient to introduce such mechanisms to help persuade veteran leaders to relinquish formal authority. For another, it implies that these "retired" leaders will continue to influence politics as long as they stay healthy. Their military achievements during the Chinese Civil War (1946-49), as well as their three decades of political experience since then, make this virtually inevitable.

In practical terms, such an approach to retirement may be quite beneficial to China's current modernization drive. These veterans' collective knowledge of local problems and local personalities is certainly a valuable resource, for senior central officials cannot possibly have such an intimate and detailed understanding of local conditions. Thus, even though some party veterans may have remained active members of party or advisory committees, this does not detract from the stunning nature of the 1983 provincial transfer of power. Indeed, the peaceful removal over a six-week period of some 72 percent of a nation's top provincial leaders, under conditions that allow the new leaders to benefit from their predecessors' knowledge and experience, is an achievement few countries have ever matched.

The rather substantial figures on transfer and retirement conceal wide variations according to institution and level in the hierarchy. Perhaps most surprising was the relative stability of the provincial party first secretaries, 62 percent of whom (18) remained in office. Some, such as Ren Zhongyi of Guangdong and Xiang Nan of Fujian, were not expected to retire, since they were relatively recent appointees whose career patterns suggested ties to Deng Xiaoping. Others, however, such as 70-year-old Duan Junyi of Beijing and Liu Jie of Henan, resisted retirement despite public calls for the aged to



Xiang Nan (left), leader of the Fujian Provincial Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, shown in 1981 with Lu Jiaxi, President of the Chinese Academy of Sciences.

—EASTFOTO.

make way for youth and despite being elected to the CAC. Moreover, the resistance of another group of first secretaries—younger leaders with leftist ties—was something of a surprise. Most notable among this group was Hunan's Mao Zhiyong, whose fortunes will be the focus of a later section of this essay.

In contrast to party first secretaries, only three governors¹⁶ and seven PPC chairmen retained their posts. Seven of the 26 removed governors were appointed chairmen of their provincial people's congresses, a "promotion" to a nominal position of authority over the provincial government.

Below these three top positions, the picture becomes increasingly complex. Only 74 (25 percent) of China's 295 provincial party secretaries¹⁷ retained their posts. Of the 221 removed, 167 (57 percent of the original total) retired and 54 (18 percent) were transferred. Interestingly, not all of those removed were long-entrenched members of provincial party apparatuses. Some had been in their positions for just a year or so, having assumed office during a preliminary change of personnel that had taken place throughout the provinces in 1982.

¹⁶The three governors are Chan Lei of Heilongjiang, Wang Daohan of Shanghai, and Ismail Amat of Xinjiang.

¹⁷The generic term "secretary" refers to all first secretaries, second secretaries, third secretaries, permanent secretaries, secretaries, and deputy secretaries. In addition to the secretaries of various rank, standing committees also have other members who rank below the secretaries. The term "standing committee" as it is used in this essay includes all the secretaries, who together generally constitute about half the standing committee, as well as these other officials. The full party committee of a province is several times as large and, judging from its virtual invisibility in the media, may well wield very little power. The fate of the lesser members of the party committees in the spring 1983 streamlining is unclear.

¹⁴For a description of the CAC, see Mills, loc. cit., pp. 29-31. In theory, election to this body at the 12th Party Congress in September 1982 singled out veteran leaders for retirement. As of February 1984, however, four first secretaries so "honored" remained in their old posts. How these durable veterans—Duan Junyi of Beijing, Gao Yang of Hebei, Liu Jie of Henan, and Guo Feng of Liaoning—have managed to accomplish this is unclear.

¹⁵See Article 28 of the Party Constitution in *Beijing Review*, Sept. 20, 1982, p. 17.

Only about half of these 35 newly promoted secretaries retained their posts after the spring 1983 reform.

Even fewer incumbent governors and vice-governors—18 percent, or 65 of the 371 total—retained office. Of the 306 removed, 237 (64 percent of the total) retired and 69 (19 percent) were transferred. Only seven of these were transferred to posts clearly constituting a promotion. Of the other 62, 60 were sent to a PPC post and two to even less important Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference¹⁸ posts.

A considerably larger number of PPC chairmen and vice-chairmen retained office—fully 40 percent (168) of the 416 incumbents. Of the 248 removed, all but two retired, as far as can be determined from the very limited information available on individuals at this level. The exceptions were Wang Fang, who was promoted to party head of Zhejiang, and Xu Jiataun,¹⁹ who concurrently was Jiangsu provincial first secretary.

Rejuvenation and Professionalism

With aged and leftist incumbents replaced in the top leadership posts by a dramatically smaller number of officials, formal positions of authority in China's provinces were transferred to a considerable degree to a new generation of younger and better educated leaders. The average age of provincial party leaders dropped from 63 to 56, and the proportion with college educations nearly quadrupled, increasing from one-tenth to nearly two-fifths—thereby exceeding the Central Committee's new standards, announced on February 22, 1983, that one-third of provincial party leaders be college-trained and that at least one member of the party committee be no more than 55 years old.²⁰

¹⁸The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) is an advisory body composed of numerous groups outside the formal party structure, including such diverse groupings as national minorities, overseas Chinese, noncommunist political parties, religious sects, and mass organizations, among others. The CPPCC has no actual political power, although it has been called upon in recent years to lend support to the CCP in its current modernization drive. For example, in her Apr. 8, 1985, speech closing the 3rd Session of the 6th CPPCC National Committee in Beijing, Chairwoman Deng Yingchao urged members to "work hard" to "make even greater contributions to invigorating China's economy and reforming the economic structure." See Xinhua, Apr. 8, 1985, in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 10, 1985, p. K/8.

¹⁹Xu was later appointed as the first director of the Hong Kong Bureau of Xinhua (June 1983).

²⁰Xinhua, Feb. 22, 1983, in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 22, 1983, pp. K/3-4. Apparently, the new CC standards announced in February 1982 are still very much in force. In a recent interview with reporters from Hong Kong and Macao, party General Secretary Hu Yaobang noted that some 900,000 veteran cadres had already stepped down throughout the country. The number would reach 2 million next year, he said. Hu also noted that a reshuffling of the top leaders of 107 departments of the CC and the State Council, as well as of the 29 provincial, municipal, and autonomous region governments, was underway and that by June 1985 more than 70 percent of the leading cadres of these units would be under 60 years of age. See Xinhua, Apr. 9, 1985, in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 10, 1985, p. E/3. It should be noted that the ages given throughout this text are as of the streamlining of 1983.

While recognizing the rapid progress made in improving the quality of provincial leadership, one must be careful not to overstate this achievement, particularly since Chinese media made considerable effort to give the impression that the personnel changes were even more striking than they actually were. Both provincial and central media consistently distorted the magnitude of the reforms, giving only partial statistics, overlooking the relative importance of the various members of a given leadership body, and publishing biographic information only on exceptionally young or well-educated appointees. A typical report on Shanxi's new leaders, for example, singled out two of six new party officials because of their engineering backgrounds, ignoring the other four.²¹ And in another highly publicized case, a 42-year-old Western-educated chemist, Kang Beisheng, observed in an interview on Fujian radio that her election as vice-chairman of the Fujian PPC "represents the attention paid by the whole country to intellectuals."²²

But are these young technicians the founding generation of a new ruling class in China, or are they merely token members of leadership bodies controlled by party activists? Put somewhat differently, did the streamlining succeed in setting the stage for the transfer of power to a new elite composed of technocrats, or did it merely accomplish the much more modest goal of transferring power to younger leaders with traditional backgrounds? At present, at least, the latter seems to be the case (although the rate of advancement over the next five years of the young experts newly appointed to high rank—see Table 2 on page 30—will be a good indicator whether the technocrat is gaining in relative influence vis-à-vis the political cadre). While it is undeniable that China's new provincial leaders are *on average* younger and more familiar with technical subjects than were their predecessors, political careerists do not appear to have lost their predominant position to intellectuals. The clearest evidence of this is provided by the fate of party chiefs. Not only were two-thirds of the incumbents retained, but even among new appointees, no pattern of youth or exceptional professional expertise is apparent. Rather, they tend to have fairly traditional backgrounds as party or government administrators. For example, Shandong's new party chief, Su Yiran, is a rehabilitated revolutionary-generation Shandong official. Shanxi's Li Ligong and Jiangsu's Han Peixin both have administrative backgrounds. Zhejiang's Wang Fang spent most of his career in public security work.²³ These individuals may, of

²¹Shanxi radio, Mar. 21, 1983, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 22, 1983, pp. R/2-4.

²²Fujian radio, May 2, 1983, in Joint Publications Research Service, *China Report: Political, Sociological, Military* (Washington, DC—hereafter *JPRS*), No. 83583, May 31, 1983, p. 8.

²³Brief biographies of Su, Wang, Han, and Li are given in "Four Secretaries of the CCP Provincial-Level Committees," *Issues and Studies* (Taipei), June 1983, No. 6, pp. 97-100.

Table 2: Young Technocrats to Watch

Individuals singled out by the media during the 1983 streamlining of their youth and expertise.

Name	Province or Municipality	Position	Age in 1983	Specialty
Bainma Dandzin	Qinghai	Vice-Governor	52	Doctor
Kang Beisheng	Fujian	Vice-Chairman, Standing Committee, Prov. People's Congress	42	Chemist
Li Debao	Zhejiang	Vice-Governor	47	Agronomist
Li Guixian	Liaoning	Member, Party Standing Committee	46	Engineer
Li Tieying	Liaoning	Secretary, Party Committee	47	Computer specialist
Ni Tianzheng	Shanghai	Vice-Mayor	45	Engineer
Wang Lianzheng	Heilongjiang	Vice-Governor	52	Agronomist
Zhu Zhongbao	Shanghai	Vice-Mayor	50	Engineer

course, be personally predisposed to listen carefully to the advice of specialists, but power at the highest level of provincial party politics appears to remain beyond the grasp of officials with college educations and careers in technical or economic fields.

At the next level, that of provincial governor, such officials play a greater, although still minority, role. Henan's governor, He Zhubang, 50 in 1983, was graduated from the Moscow Economic Institute²⁴ and was a former head of the Henan Planning Commission. Shanxi Governor Wang Senhao, a 50-year-old former chief engineer, replaced Luo Guibo, a vice-minister of foreign affairs in the late 1950's and 1960's, who retired at age 73. Jiangsu's new governor, Gu Xiulian, was a technician and former vice-minister of the State Planning Commission.²⁵ However, while education and technical competence are now highly acclaimed assets in China, information gleaned from biographic data, though sketchy, suggests that political reliability remains a far more important qualification for high office than does technical expertise.

Provincial Responsiveness

The speed and consistency with which the streamlining was implemented suggest that the reformers were in firm control nationwide. Following the usual Chinese practice of emulating selected pilot programs, most notably in this case the model reform in Sichuan, new leading bodies were announced for all remaining provinces—two-thirds between late March and mid-April alone. Almost formulaic Xinhua releases stressing the backgrounds of the youngest and most technically skilled appointees heralded the change of leadership in most provinces.

Such an extensive transfer of power required close

central supervision and coordination. The first, and most important, order of business was reform of the provincial party apparatus. Central party control rested on three props: use of innovative institutions; central guidance during the selection of local leaders; and Central Committee review of the results. Two institutions in particular facilitated the implementation of the changes: the Young Cadres Bureau under the CC Organization Department; and the Central Guiding Group for Structural Reform. The first was apparently designed to encourage the promotion of young cadres into leadership ranks; the second was responsible for sending work teams to various provinces to guide reform efforts there. The extent of Politburo supervision is generally unknown, but in at least one case, Deng is reported to have personally "perused the name list of middle-aged and young candidates for posts in Shanghai's leading municipal body" during a visit to Shanghai in February 1983.²⁶ Ordinarily, once new leadership lists were drawn up, they were sent to Beijing for CC approval; in some cases, most notably in Shanxi, the provincial party committee met not to elect its new leadership but merely to relay a CC decision on its makeup.²⁷

That central influence, while less blatant than in the party reforms, also played a crucial role in the government case is suggested by the speed and consistency of the results of the streamlining. Settlement of the more controversial party reforms before the convening of the

²⁴Xinhua, Apr. 29, 1983.

²⁵For Wang, see Xinhua, Apr. 29, 1983, in *FBIS-CHI*, May 5, 1983, p. R/6; for Gu, see Xinhua, Apr. 29, 1983.

²⁶Shanghai radio, Apr. 20, 1983, in *JPRS* No. 83422, May 6, 1983, p. 97.

²⁷Shanxi radio, Mar. 21, 1983, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 22, 1983, pp. R/2-3. The standard language in Xinhua announcements of the formation of new party leading bodies was that they were formed "with the approval of the CCP Central Committee," as the March 23 report on Xinjiang's reform stated (in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 23, 1983, pp. T/1-2). The report noted that the decision was made "by secret ballots cast by more than 1,000 cadres who are party members at or above county and Communist Youth League levels in democratic nomination, through

people's congresses may well have enabled Dengists and their provincial allies to arrange governmental selections ahead of time. Twenty-three provinces elected government leaders between April 26 and May 5 alone, the others having selected their new leaders somewhat earlier. Consistency in terms of the number of vice-governors in each province and the virtually complete replacement of governors are indicative of the degree to which central standards were applied. Finally, the party policy recommendations for reform of provincial governments that had been announced at the 12th Party Congress the preceding fall were consistently implemented. The proceedings of the 12th congress also provided a clue to future provincial government appointments: 16 of the 26 new governors were elected to the Central Committee, 13 of them for the first time.

Despite the impressive results of provincial leadership streamlining, the steady stream of complaints in the media shortly thereafter about continued local resistance to central policies suggests that the upbeat public accounts of resounding success concealed a serious degree of opposition behind the scenes. The remainder of this essay will examine the ways in which this resistance manifested itself in two quite different provinces—Shanxi, which came under a new leadership; and Hunan, which retained a first secretary who rose to power during the last decade of Mao Zedong's life. The tactics adopted by the center to overcome this resistance will be the focus of the analysis that follows.

Shanxi: A Clean Sweep

While Chinese leaders were able to obscure the degree of opposition to the replacement of veteran leaders, media commentary on the implementation of Dengist reforms in Shanxi before and after the transfer of power reveals many of the party's techniques for eliciting regional compliance with central goals. The appearance of speed and harmony with which the media portrayed the selection of Shanxi's new leadership is belied by the complex range of techniques that had to be employed in the province to persuade local officials to implement central reforms.

observation and screening by the organization departments and with the approval of the party Central Committee after examination." The Xinhua report on Jiangxi differed, stating only that the leading body had been "readjusted" with CC "approval" (Mar. 24, 1983, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 24, 1983, p. 0/2). A March 21 Shanxi radio report of that province's reform gave a picture of much tighter central control, stating that the Shanxi party standing committee met to announce the "Central Committee's notice" on the new leadership, which had been selected "with the help of" a central work group. The standing committee meeting, attended by over 800 cadres, lasted two days and resulted in unanimous "support for the Central Committee's decision" (in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 22, 1983, p. R/2).


The essence of the streamlining process in Shanxi seems to have been the replacement of indigenous factions with leaders not just who were younger and better educated but who owed allegiance to the center. The case of new party chief Li Ligong is illustrative. Prior to his return to Shanxi from Beijing in 1981, Secretary Li had not served in his native Shanxi for some 15 years, since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1966. His background in the Communist Youth League (he served on the CYL Central Committee from 1954 to 1966)²⁸ and recent service at the center suggest ties to party General Secretary (and former CYL head) Hu Yaobang. Two of Li's three deputy secretaries are newly appointed, and the third is an incumbent who had been transferred to Shanxi from Wuhan (Hubei Province) in 1978. Moreover, the governor and four of the five vice-governors are also new.

The limited available biographic information supports Chinese claims of a younger, better educated, and more technically competent provincial leadership.²⁹ The average age of the Shanxi party standing committee dropped from 65 to 55, and the new leadership includes officials with expertise in such areas as economics, mining (in particular, coal), and chemicals, suggesting something about the province's current priorities. Rejuvenation of government leaderships was even greater—with the average age of governor and vice-governors dropping from 65 to 49, and the percentage with university education tripling from 22 to 66. At 50, Governor Want Senhao, formerly an engineer in the Ministry of Coal Industry, exemplifies this trend.

The backgrounds of members of the old leadership had been very different from those of their replacements. The pre-reform provincial party leadership, for example, consisted of 20 individuals—11 secretaries and 9 members of the standing committee of the party committee—most of whom fell into one of two groups. One group consisted of nine individuals who had been Shanxi officials before the Cultural Revolution, under party secretary Wang Qian. Wang, second secretary and governor in 1965, was purged during the Cultural Revolution but returned to power as first secretary in 1975. He remained in office until 1980, at which time he was replaced by Huo Shilian. This first group may be described as the revolutionary generation whose return to power is personified by Deng Xiaoping. The second group consisted of eight officials who gained leadership

²⁸See Wolfgang Bartke and Peter Schier, *China's New Party Leadership: Biographies and Analysis of the Twelfth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party*, Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 1985, p. 134.

²⁹Shanxi radio, Mar. 21, 1983, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 22, 1983, p. R/2; *Shanxi Ribao* (Taiyuan), Mar. 22, 1983; Xinhua, Apr. 29, 1983, in *FBIS-CHI*, May 5, 1983, p. R/6; *Shanxi Ribao*, Apr. 30, 1983, in *FBIS-CHI*, May 26, 1983, pp. R/3-4.



Wang Senhao, a senior engineer in the coal industry, who was elected governor of Shanxi Province in 1983.

—EASTFOTO.

positions in Shanxi for the first time after 1978. At least five of these were experienced officials who had been transferred to the province apparently to offset the considerable leftist influence that persisted there despite the reemergence of rehabilitated revolutionary-generation officials like Wang Qian.

Thus, by early 1983, the Shanxi leadership was fairly evenly divided between those who had *regained* power in Shanxi and those, of the same generation, who had been *transferred* to Shanxi by the center after 1978. In terms of authority, the transferred officials, led by the newly appointed first secretary Huo Shilian, the second secretary and governor Luo Guibo, and secretary Ruan Bosheng, seemed clearly dominant. Huo and Ruan were both members of the 11th CCP Central Committee (elected in 1977), the former the minister of agriculture in 1979, the latter a Jilin Province official.

Residual leftist influence in the Shanxi leadership was most prominently represented by Guo Fenglian, a 34-year-old peasant activist who rose rapidly under

Dazhai Brigade leader and CCP Politburo member Chen Yonggui. In 1968, Guo served as Brigade deputy party secretary, when Chen was both Brigade secretary and vice-chairman of the provincial revolutionary committee. Three years later, Guo joined the committee's standing committee, and in late 1973—on Chen's recommendation—he replaced Chen as Dazhai Revolutionary Committee chairman, soon after Chen had gained Politburo membership. During the mid-1970's, Chen and Guo both actively propagated the Dazhai experience through publications, speeches, and personal contacts (in particular, with visiting delegations). Another Shanxi party leader who may also have had leftist leanings was Li Shunda, who first gained public notice as a labor hero in 1946. Li subsequently was a vice-chairman in 1955 (along with Chen) of the Shanxi peasants' association preparatory committee, a "model producer" as a brigade leader in 1966, and a founding member of the Shanxi Revolutionary Committee in 1967.³⁰

The central backgrounds, low prominence, and lack of clear ties to former Shanxi leaders observable in the new leadership selected in 1983, as well as the center's involvement in their selection, suggest that Beijing was concerned primarily with establishing a leadership body that owed allegiance to it. Of the three officials retained from the old leadership body, two had relatively weak ties to the province, at least as far as political loyalties were concerned. Li Ligong, as noted above, served in Beijing for a decade and a half before coming to Shanxi in 1981; Wang Kewen, the new deputy secretary, spent the bulk of his career in Wuhan before being transferred in 1978. Only Wang Tingdong had had continuous experience in Shanxi as a party leader since the early 1970's. But Wang is neither a native of the province (having been transferred there in 1971) nor a leader of formidable stature. Indeed, in the recent reorganization, he was demoted from secretary to standing committee member. Moreover, Wang's past assignments suggest that he is a specialist in agronomy, and therefore he may have been retained for that reason. He ran a conference on agricultural construction in 1976, for example, and spoke at a national science meeting in 1978. Although several members of the new leadership apparently are Shanxi natives, they do not appear to have close links to either the Shanxi revolutionary generation or the leftists.³¹ In sum, an old, experienced team of outsiders appears to


³⁰Two other leaders—Wang Tingdong, a cadre since the late 1950's who was rehabilitated in 1970 and sent to Shanxi in 1971, and Jia Jun, a Shanxi urban youth "sent down" to the countryside, who became a cadre by 1973—are harder to evaluate, but they may also have been leftists.

³¹Even the ties to Huo Shilian and Luo Guibo seem more a function of these leaders' having been transferred by the center at roughly the same time than a function of longtime subordination to Huo and Luo. Li Ligong, Wang Kewen, and Zhang Jianmin are cases in point.

have been sent to Shanxi in 1979–80 to pave the way for a smooth transition from a chaotic situation, in which Cultural Revolution leftists were pitted against rehabilitated revolutionary-generation Shanxi natives, to a united leadership under a new generation of technically trained figures who owed primary allegiance to the center and its predominant goal of economic development.

Shanxi: Revitalizing the Bureaucracy

Beneath this seemingly smooth process, which in retrospect appears to have been so logically planned, lay a far more complex political reality. Judging from the hints in China's public media, this reality included widespread distrust of and opposition to central reforms, the overcoming of which required the application of a vast array of political techniques. Replacing the leadership with individuals more capable, more energetic, and more responsive, while doubtless crucial, was only the first step in a far-reaching effort to restructure and revitalize the regional bureaucracy—an effort that is today still barely out of the starting gate.



Li Dongye, Minister of the Metallurgical Industry, who visited the Taiyuan Iron and Steel Company of Shanxi Province in February 1983.

—EASTFOTO.

The most dramatic and no doubt most effective technique used was direct central involvement. The basic mechanism for such involvement was the work team (*gongzo zu*), which was sent to Shanxi by the Central Guiding Group for Structural Reform (*Zhongyang jigou gaige zhidao xiaozu*). Dispatched there to aid in "revolutionizing, rejuvenating, intellectualizing, and professionalizing"³² the new provincial leadership, the work team set out to ensure that the new leadership would meet with the center's approval. In Shanxi's case, this was the culmination of central efforts over a prolonged period to create a responsive provincial leadership. In fact, the announcement made by the Shanxi Party Committee of the makeup of the new party leadership was no more than a proclamation of the CC's notice, which frankly described the two previous leaders—Huo Shilian and Luo Guibo—as well as the newly appointed party head, Li Ligong, as having been "sent" by the Central Committee.³³ While the details of such direct central interference in provincial affairs tend to be concealed, numerous references to analogous cases exist. On February 10, 1983, for example, Shanxi radio noted that Minister of Metallurgical Industry Li Dongye attended a meeting at which the Taiyuan Iron and Steel Company adopted the contract management responsibility system to improve profits, an approach strongly advocated by the central leadership. Also, numerous references to the activities of discipline inspection groups—which are subordinate to the Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC)³⁴—indicate that this new hierarchy of watchdogs is playing an active role. A Shanxi discipline commission circular in early 1983, for instance, "urged party committees and discipline inspection commissions at all levels to firmly check unhealthy tendencies in housing distribution."³⁵ A few months later, Secretary Li criticized people for "taking revenge on discipline inspection cadres,"³⁶ who apparently were doing an embarrassingly good job of exposing local corruption.

Another technique employed by central reformers was the holding of meetings to study central documents. This task was backed up by numerous exhortations in the press and carried out through study classes and the use of explanation teams. Following the 12th Party Congress, for example, "party organizations at all levels" in Shanxi were reported to regard the study of the congress's documents as "the cardinal task." Despite the use of rotating study classes and explanation teams,

³²Shanxi Ribao, Mar. 22, 1983.

³³Shanxi Ribao, Mar. 21, 1983, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 22, 1983, pp. R/2–4.

³⁴See Mills, loc. cit., pp. 31–32.

³⁵Shanxi radio, Jan. 26, 1983.

³⁶Shanxi Ribao, June 10, 1983.

however, some three months later, in mid-February 1983, Shanxi media were still calling on the people of that province "to wage the struggle on two fronts,"³⁷ that is, to clear away the influence not only of "leftist ideology and the 'two whatevers',"³⁸ but of rightist ideology as well. In another context, Shanxi radio reported that a pilot rectification meeting had "conveyed the important speech of a leading central comrade."³⁹ In brief, even when central representatives were not present, their thoughts were.

A third technique was the use of pilot programs. At the meeting on Shanxi's pilot rectification program, for example, in addition to the speech of the "leading central comrade," cadres also "studied the experiences of pilot project work in Beijing and Heilongjiang."⁴⁰ In keeping with standard CCP practice, following a central decision to implement a reform nationwide, pilot programs were to be launched to test the effectiveness of the center's original conception. This allowed for modifications (perhaps to accommodate local conditions) and, if all went well, provided models for others to emulate. Party rectification, scheduled well in advance to begin in late 1983, involved a great deal of pilot work in Shanxi. An early 1983 forum on pilot rectification projects held by the Shanxi party Organization Department reported that over 200 grass-roots units in 17 departments throughout government, industry, security, universities, and communes had received work groups in late 1982 to "train a backbone force for party rectification."⁴¹

Party leaders at both the central and provincial levels also made considerable use of moral appeals, especially when trying to persuade prospective retirees to step down with a positive attitude. Calling on retirees in terms that became familiar throughout China in 1983, new party boss Li Ligong noted:

Although the veteran comrades are retiring, that does not mean they are not making revolution or working. They may have retired from their jobs, but their thinking cannot retire, and their sense of the revolution and of responsibility for it cannot weaken in the slightest. The old comrades must happily support the work of the new leadership groups with minds at ease. They must truly

³⁷Shanxi radio, Dec. 1, 1982.

³⁸The "two whatevers" refers to the Maoists' attempt to invoke Mao's sacred authority to justify their policies: "Whatever policy Chairman Mao has decided upon, we shall resolutely defend; whatever instructions the Chairman has issued, we shall steadfastly obey." Quoted in Parris Chang, "Chinese Politics: Deng's Turbulent Quest," *Problems of Communism*, January–February 1981, p. 3.

³⁹Shanxi radio, Feb. 25, 1983.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*

⁴¹*Ibid.* Other important reforms also began with pilot work. For example, the experimental reestablishment of township (*xiang*) governments in two communes, enabling reform of the commune system to be "accelerated," was reported to have been completed in early 1983. See *Shanxi Ribao*, Feb. 8, 1983.

*succeed in providing wholehearted and sincere support. Thus, they will be worthy to be called revolutionary veteran comrades and will be caring for the overall situation and thinking of the party's cause.*⁴²

Such appeals were backed up by a wide-ranging, innovative program of inducements to prospective retirees, inducements alluded to by Li in the same speech:

The new leadership groups must care for, respect, and cherish the old comrades. They must genuinely regard them as staff officers, and consult more with them when problems in work crop up.

Between the restructuring of the State Council in spring 1982 and the streamlining of personnel in mid-1983, over 470,000 veteran bureaucrats retired in China.⁴³ Many were allowed continued access to official documents and permitted to attend official meetings.⁴⁴ Others were assigned new duties. In Beijing, for example, some performed public service, forming price and service investigative teams.⁴⁵ Other inducements included retirement with full pay,⁴⁶ continued access to official cars, medical care, and retirees' clubs. A favored few were appointed advisers to the units on which they had formerly been ranking members or were elected to prestigious advisory committees being established at various levels.

Borrowing a page from the more legalistic approach of Western bureaucracies, Deng and his followers also began instituting formal criteria governing the age, tenure, and educational levels of individuals, as well as the size of leadership bodies. A Shanxi organizational work conference, for example, "demanded" that cadres under 50 years of age be given remedial training in order to raise their educational level to that of a senior high-school graduate by 1990.⁴⁷ In his report to the Shanxi Provincial People's Congress Standing Committee in the fall of 1983, Shanxi Governor Wang Senhao illustrated how such new standards were being implemented in his province.⁴⁸ According to Wang, projected structural reform of the provincial bureaucracy, which "was launched on a full scale following the election of new leading members of the provincial government in April," would reduce government work departments from 62 to 38 and trim government personnel by some 42 percent.

⁴²Shanxi radio, Sept. 27, 1983, in *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 29, 1983, pp. R/1–2.

⁴³Xinhua, Jul. 16, 1983.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*

⁴⁵Beijing radio, Apr. 23, 1983.

⁴⁶Xinhua, Jul. 16, 1983.

⁴⁷Shanxi radio, Sept. 28, 1983.

⁴⁸Shanxi radio, Sept. 21, 1983, in *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 23, 1983, pp. R/4–6.

In the 31 departments already streamlined, he noted, the number of leading officials was cut from 245 to 112; moreover, newly assigned personnel were considerably younger (by an average of seven years) and better educated (42 percent versus 13 percent with college degrees) than their predecessors.

Backing up such tactics as personal intervention by central officials, moral exhortations, pilot programs, study classes, inducements, and new legal standards was a final, powerful technique—the use of negative examples. Consider the December 1982 arrest of Huang Ruian, a former member of the Shanxi Revolutionary Committee Standing Committee, a top leadership post during the Cultural Revolution. Expelled from the party and arrested for peddling pornography and committing “many crimes in the economic, political, and cultural fields,”⁴⁹ Huang’s fate exemplifies the threat that hung over cadres who refused to toe the new political line. Coverage of the case by the Shanxi media made clear the political nature of the arrest by linking his crimes to his leftist past, labeling him a factional leader who had “actively” participated in seizing power and persecuting old cadres during the Cultural Revolution:

*It should be noticed that certain rebel leaders and beaters, smashers, and looters of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution period have turned to economic or cultural crime after collapsing politically. They thus continue to confront us. Painful lessons tell us that we must by no means underestimate their capacities and influence. At present, leading comrades in certain units lack vigilance against people of this type. The masses are very worried about this. We hope that the report openly exposing the illegal activities of rebel leader Huang Ruian will sharply awaken these politically color-blind people.*⁵⁰

Such, in brief, could be the fate of cadres with politically suspect pasts unless they wholeheartedly joined the reformist bandwagon. The handful of similar trials held publicly across China in 1982 and 1983, many of which resulted in 15- to 20-year convictions, must have sent a clear message to hesitant cadres.

Hunan: Uneasy Compromise

Hunan Province’s extraordinary continuity of leftist leadership (Hua Guofeng was a party secretary there for 12 or so years before coming to Beijing in 1971) and



Mao Zhiyong, First Secretary of the Hunan Provincial Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

—New China Picture Company.

post-Mao Zedong record of coolness toward Dengist reforms made it a likely target for a full-scale purge of leadership. Moreover, Hunan’s first secretary, Mao Zhiyong, had made repeated self-criticisms in the month preceding the spring 1983 streamlining. These self-criticisms seemed to make his demise almost inevitable. Yet, although hundreds of provincial leaders throughout China, including a number of first secretaries, lost their positions, Mao survived and remains Hunan’s first secretary to this day. An examination of the reasons for his survival (to the degree that such information can be gleaned from the scattered hints in the public media) will help illuminate the nature of central-regional relations under Deng Xiaoping.

Mao Zhiyong’s reluctance in 1978 to give even pro forma support to the fundamental Dengist slogan “practice is the sole criterion of truth” indicated his disenchantment with and lack of commitment to the extensive reforms then being advocated by Deng and his associates. Indeed, Hunan was one of the last provinces to endorse this code-phrase for pragmatism—an endorsement that took the form of a markedly unenthusiastic statement of support by Mao on December 6 of that year. Judging from the Hunan media commentary in

⁴⁹Shanxi radio, Dec. 11, 1982, in *FBIS—CHI*, Dec. 15, 1982, pp. R/2–3.

⁵⁰*Shanxi Ribao*, Dec. 12, 1982.

1981, the province also had shifted only slowly from leftist agricultural policies—with stress on grain production, egalitarianism, and centralized decision-making—to the Dengist agricultural production responsibility system, which eased restrictions on crop selection and relied on the profit motive to stimulate production.⁵¹ On March 7, 1981, for example, Hunan radio's Commentator criticized the province's leaders for leftist tendencies, accusing them of attempting "to achieve unrealistically high production quotas."⁵² A few days later, the Commentator intensified this criticism, noting that "class struggle" with its stress on egalitarianism and rejection of market forces "was overexaggerated" in Hunan.⁵³

In an apparent effort to adjust to political realities after Hua Guofeng's demotion at the 6th Plenum of the 11th CCP Central Committee in June 1981, the official provincial party daily *Hunan Ribao* published a review of the plenum's landmark reassessment of party history, taking this opportunity to lash out at residual leftism in Hunan.⁵⁴ This was highly unusual given the generally mild reaction to the resolution elsewhere. *Hunan Ribao* charged that the province had been slow to eliminate its "sincere belief in the 'two whatevers'" and had "carried out inappropriate, excessive, and even unfounded propaganda about Comrade Hua Guofeng." "We publicized some of his leftist ideas as correct," the paper continued. "We also put forward certain erroneous slogans such as the 'true light,' with the result that his new personality cult ran rampant in the province for a long time."⁵⁵

First Secretary Mao was personally implicated in this politically suspect stance, not only by virtue of his preeminent authority in Hunan, but also because of his personal ties to Hua Guofeng and because of his earlier self-criticism. Hua, an official in Chairman Mao Zedong's home county of Xiangtan (Hunan), in 1951 became on Mao's recommendation a provincial party secretary there in 1959, and Hunan first secretary in 1970. Mao Zhiyong, who, like Hua, benefited from the leftist policies of the Cultural Revolution, has run the province since 1977. He belonged to a core of Hunan leaders with similar career patterns, suggesting the existence of a tightly knit political force there. At the time of the streamlining, eight of the top 20 Hunan party and government leaders had been provincial officials since before Chairman Mao's death in 1976, five of these since 1970 or earlier—including Hunan's three top leaders, Mao Zhiyong, Second Secretary Wan Da, and Governor Sun Guozhi. Two of the 20, like Hua Guofeng, were former leaders of Xiangtan Prefecture.

Moreover, Mao Zhiyong had admitted complicity in the evolution of Hunan's political stance. In 1981, for example, he took responsibility for Hunan's "leftist

mistakes."⁵⁶ In late 1982 and early 1983, he admitted that his province had failed to measure up to central standards across virtually the full range of Dengist reform policies. On September 4, 1982, at the 12th CCP Congress, he conceded that "our understanding is still very insufficient with regard to the role of education and science in socialist modernization.... Particularly in the selection of... well-educated and professionally competent young and middle-aged cadres for leading bodies... we are lagging even farther behind."⁵⁷ At a meeting in Hunan some two-and-a-half weeks later, he made a speech in which he admitted that his province had failed not only to correct injustices committed during the Cultural Revolution but also to implement properly the agricultural responsibility system even after the landmark 11th CC 3rd Plenum in December 1978.⁵⁸ And in a speech in early 1983, he repeated a general self-indictment made in his earlier self-criticism, admitting that "for rather a long period around the time of the third plenary session we did not follow the arrangements of the Central Committee on certain major issues," such as opposing the cult of personality and eliminating leftist influences.⁵⁹

The streamlining in the spring of 1983 left Mao isolated, his closest allies having been removed from power. Of the nine party secretaries subordinate to Mao before the reform, only one—Jiao Linji, Guangzhou first secretary until his transfer to Hunan in 1980—remains in office. Governor Sun Guozhi was transferred to the less powerful post of provincial people's congress chairman, and six of the eight vice-governors retired. So did Second Secretary and Provincial Party Committee Chairman Wan Da and six PPC vice-chairmen. Moreover, a campaign to bring Hunan into line with central policies on making full use of intellectuals, promoting technical experts in industry, and preventing corruption during bureaucratic reorganization emerged in full force immediately following the streamlining.

That Mao Zhiyong survived in spite of all this is remarkable. It is also instructive. An examination of the center's tactics in dealing with Mao and his

⁵¹On the production responsibility system, see David Zweig, "Opposition to Change in Rural China: The System of Responsibility and People's Communes," *Asian Survey*, July 1983, pp. 879–900.

⁵²Hunan radio, Mar. 7, 1981.

⁵³Hunan radio, Mar. 13, 1981.

⁵⁴In this regard, it is interesting to note that the "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of our Party since the Founding of the People's Republic of China" essentially blamed Mao Zedong for the excesses that had occurred during the Cultural Revolution. See Article 22 of the Resolution in *FBIS-CHI*, July 1, 1981, p. K/8.

⁵⁵*Hunan Ribao* (Changsha), Aug. 3, 1981.

⁵⁶Beijing radio, Mar. 28, 1981; and Hunan radio, Mar. 28, 1981.

⁵⁷Xinhua, Sept. 4, 1982.

⁵⁸*Renmin Ribao* (Beijing), Sept. 28, 1982.

⁵⁹Hunan radio, Feb. 10, 1983.

unresponsive province reveals a good deal about how the Chinese political system functions under Deng's leadership. One essential point to keep in mind in this regard is that the purpose of the streamlining in Hunan was not so much to eliminate leftist leaders per se as it was to attain certain substantive policy goals, namely the acceptance and promotion of Dengist reforms. Nowhere was this distinction illustrated more clearly than in the center's efforts to rectify the mistreatment of professors at Hunan University.

Hunan: Local Stonewalling

The struggle on the part of Hunan University professors to gain better treatment broke into the open media in June 1982 when Beijing's *Guangming Ribao* published a letter of protest against maltreatment of university professors.⁶⁰ The difficulties these professors would encounter illustrate the problems Beijing has faced in gaining effective implementation of its reforms at the local level because of its need to rely on provincial-level responsiveness. The issue centered on the university administration's attitude toward intellectuals, which was said to reflect Cultural Revolution biases. In the fall of 1982, in response to the letter of protest, party officials in Changsha, Hunan's capital, sent a provincial investigation team to the university to rectify this improper attitude. While at the school, the team instead "conducted a counterinvestigation," the result of which, according to officials at the center, was that "the problems there were even more tightly covered up."⁶¹ Despite First Secretary Mao's public support for the party line calling for better treatment of intellectuals, nothing more was done until the issue reappeared in the central media several months later.

On February 24, 1983, the official CCP daily *Renmin Ribao* published another letter by two Hunan University professors criticizing the university for its continued failure to "reverse Cultural Revolution verdicts" on persecuted teachers.⁶² Mao endorsed the letter, noting that Hunan intellectual policy was still under leftist influence and thus "a prime issue determining whether we can reach political unanimity" with the Central Committee.⁶³ Two weeks later, Liu Xuechu, head of a Hunan work team sent by the CC Guiding Group on Structural Reform, visited the professors and commended them for having had "a great influence on the whole province."⁶⁴


⁶⁰*Guangming Ribao* (Beijing), June 16, 1982.

⁶¹*Renmin Ribao*, May 6, 1983.

⁶²*Ibid.*, Feb. 24, 1983.

⁶³*Ibid.*, Mar. 11, 1983.

⁶⁴Hunan radio, Mar. 31, 1983.



Wang Zhen, member of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, visited the Jianxiang Porcelain Factory in Changsha, Hunan Province, in November 1984.

—New China Picture Company.

Himself a former university official, Liu seemed to have been carefully selected as Beijing's man to provide guidance on local treatment of intellectuals. Further central pressure on the university came in the form of a visit in early April by Politburo member Wang Zhen, who stressed the role of intellectuals.⁶⁵

Apparently, Mao personally participated little in the province's dealings with the work team—judging from his failure to figure prominently in media commentary on the issue. This task he left to party Secretary Jiao Linyi, who brought provincial influence to bear. Jiao accompanied Liu to Hunan University in late March, published an article on intellectuals in the Hunan press in early April, and at an April 19 meeting announcing new leaders of the Hunan Culture Department called for a "new situation in Hunan's cultural work" to eliminate leftism.⁶⁶ By late April 1983, following appointment of the new provincial leadership, the province appeared to be giving full support to Beijing and once again sent a work team to the university.⁶⁷ In addition, provincial leaders established special organs at various levels of government to inspect treatment of intellectuals.

⁶⁵Hunan radio, Apr. 4, 1983.

⁶⁶Hunan radio, Apr. 19, 1983, in *JPRS*, No. 83422, May 6, 1983, pp. 89–90.

⁶⁷Hunan radio, Apr. 29, 1983.

Despite this intense central pressure and apparent support by the province's new leaders, Hunan University officials continued to resist reform. *Guangming Ribao* reported on May 7, for example, that during the two previous months, "the university leadership" had made "only little and slow progress" in redressing mishandled cases, which, according to Liu, still numbered over 900 in early May.⁶⁸ Nevertheless, *Renmin Ribao* was able to announce a narrow victory at this time—namely, the appointment to the university administration of the two professors who had written the letter three months earlier criticizing the university leadership.⁶⁹ Far from being critical of provincial authorities, the paper credited them with responsibility for having resolved a situation caused by a "small number of responsible cadres in the university . . . fending off the implementation of the policy on intellectuals." That Hunan University had been featured in the media for broader purposes was made clear by an announcement the same day that Hunan was conducting a review of its policy toward intellectuals, including over 40,000 teachers, throughout the province.⁷⁰

Even as *Renmin Ribao* spoke of a "breakthrough," however, it admitted that some "responsible cadres" opposed to the party's policy on intellectuals were "thinking of a comeback," causing implementation of the policy to proceed "at a snail's pace." By mid-June, the limited nature of the "breakthrough" was becoming increasingly evident, as some opponents of reform remained powerful enough to influence the local media. Hunan radio, for example, began to portray in a positive light events that had been treated negatively by newly appointed Hunan leaders and the central media.

In May, representatives of the Ministry of Machine-Building, with which the university is affiliated, joined in the work of the provincial work team, but this did not seem to deter provincial opposition to central policy, a point reinforced by commentary on Hunan radio. Toward the end of the month, the center stepped up its efforts. On May 21, *Guangming Ribao* stated that the university's "leading members have not yet corrected the erroneous ideas in their minds,"⁷¹ and on May 26, *Renmin Ribao* criticized the university's continued leftism, quoting Ministry of Machine-Building representative Xu Nianchu as saying that "the issue of Hunan University has become serious."⁷² Interestingly, the official party paper gave no indication that the problem was be-

ing solved. The next day, however, Hunan radio observed that Hunan University personnel had "gradually reached unanimity of opinion" on eliminating leftism,⁷³ a markedly more optimistic evaluation.

Another example of central-regional media disagreement occurred a few days later. A June 3 speech by Jiao Linyi in which he criticized leftism was summarized by Hunan radio as calling leftism a "problem . . . not only at Hunan University but also in some other units."⁷⁴ The central media gave a much more negative assessment in its summary of the speech. According to the *Renmin Ribao* version, Jiao noted that leftism at the university was "very serious" and "quite typical" of general attitudes throughout the province. "Regardless of whether on the economic, political, or cultural front," he is reported to have said, "Hunan is a bit more backward than other provinces in sorting out 'leftist' things."⁷⁵

Hunan: Experts in Industry

That the issue of ensuring a "proper" attitude toward intellectuals encompasses, in the center's view, far more than the academic world was clearly indicated by a May editorial in *Renmin Ribao*, which called on industrial leaders to reward experts for technical achievements and to give them political power as well.⁷⁶ Central figures toured Hunan during the spring to implement just such a policy. During visits to various industrial plants, Politburo member Wang Zhen, who had also earlier visited Hunan University, inquired into the status and role of technicians and stated unequivocally that "we must boldly select, promote, and employ experts and technical personnel."⁷⁷ Although Mao Zhiyong accompanied Wang throughout his visit, the Hunan party leader, as noted earlier, seems to have eschewed the opportunity to lend support publicly to the center's position.

Nevertheless, in the wake of the spring leadership changes and inspection by central representatives, certain symbolic steps to enhance the authority of experts and to make better use of their knowledge were reported. On April 29, with the aid of a provincial investigation team, an engineer who had been mistreated by the officials of a factory in Hengyang City was elected to the city government, and the factory leadership, which included a director of production and technology with only a primary-school education, was reorganized. Point-

⁶⁸*Guangming Ribao*, May 7, 1983.

⁶⁹*Renmin Ribao*, May 6, 1983. See also Beijing radio, May 8, 1983; and Hunan radio, May 6, 1983, in *JPRS*, No. 83539, May 24, 1983, pp. 42–43.

⁷⁰Hunan radio, May 6, 1983.

⁷¹*Guangming Ribao*, May 21, 1983.

⁷²*Renmin Ribao*, May 26, 1983.

⁷³Hunan radio, May 27, 1983.

⁷⁴Hunan radio, June 3, 1983.

⁷⁵*Renmin Ribao*, June 7, 1983, in *FBIS-CHI*, June 8, 1983, p. P/6.

⁷⁶*Renmin Ribao*, May 22, 1983.

⁷⁷Hunan radio, Apr. 4, 1983.

ing out that this case was "by no means an isolated or occasional one," *Renmin Ribao* portrayed the poorly educated leaders of this 100-man factory as consistently discriminating against its 18 university-graduate employees, even driving one in despair to flee to Hong Kong because his quiet efforts to improve technology were taken as a sign of "ideological backwardness."⁷⁸

Again, as in the Hunan University case, exposure of minor local inequities in the central press served a dual purpose. By focusing attention on the case, pro-reform elements were given vital support. Once they had won, their victory became a lesson for all other units in the country with similar problems. Following the victory of the reformers at the Hengyang factory, for example, *Renmin Ribao* did not hesitate to lecture its readers on the lessons they were to learn. "The 'leftist' influence of despising knowledge and discriminating against intellectuals cannot be underestimated," the paper stated. "In order to really implement the policies toward intellectuals, not only is it necessary to solve the ideological problems, but it is also imperative to carry out necessary reorganization. Otherwise, . . . we still cannot prevent the occurrence of similar cases." The article went on to reveal other, similar cases of injustice, and concluded by pointing out ominously that "if the intellectuals continue to be looked down upon, the four modernizations can never be realized."⁷⁹

The leftist Hong Kong daily *Ming Pao* described the case of another engineer who, after making a "technical breakthrough," was fired from his position as head of a technical research group by cadres who "looked down on technology and were jealous of talented people."⁸⁰ Following a visit by CC Secretariat member Gu Mu and newly appointed Hunan Governor Liu Zheng, the engineer was appointed deputy director of his plant, and the plant's party secretary and director were dismissed.⁸¹

Whether or not these steps will prove to be more than tokens remains unclear, however. Surely the high central investment of the leadership's time incurred by sending Politburo and CC Secretariat members to handle individual cases personally cannot be continued indefinitely. As *Ming Pao* observed, such defeats of leftists in Hunan industries remain "rare."⁸²

Hunan: Bureaucratic Corruption

Hunan has also figured prominently in central media criticism of local corruption during the ongoing nationwide bureaucratic restructuring. A CDIC circular in April 1983 calling on all levels to prevent the illegal distribution of public property to individuals by governmental units about to be abolished used Xiangtan Prefecture

as its primary example,⁸³ and several prefectural officials have been disciplined by the provincial party committee for such transgressions.⁸⁴ The rescinding of unauthorized promotions made at lower levels by Hunan's party committee was also reported in the central press.⁸⁵

While central media criticism has been carefully directed at local levels, the provincial party committee was required to submit a report to the CDIC on its handling of the Xiangtan case, suggesting that Hunan's provincial leadership remained under close central scrutiny even after the spring streamlining.

Conclusion

The similarities in the techniques employed by central reformers in the two very different cases of Shanxi and Hunan suggest certain conclusions about the nature of the political system being fashioned in post-Mao China. Unity and stability seem predominant concerns, presumably on the assumption that only these conditions will permit sustained economic development. Veteran central leaders, personally familiar with the effects of Cultural Revolution purges of political opponents, have, judging from the events of 1983, put a great deal of thought into how to remove opponents in a way that will avoid future recriminations. Some were elected to advisory bodies, at times amid considerable fanfare; others were transferred to lesser positions, such as to the vice-chairmanship of provincial people's congresses, where they could continue to hold office but be a step removed from day-to-day administration of government affairs. Even some politically undesirable figures, such as Mao Zhiyong, retained their positions—a strikingly different fate from that of officials in the 1960's, who were publicly humiliated, then summarily fired following their self-criticisms.

The streamlining of provincial leadership in the spring of 1983 and the subsequent reforms at the provincial level and below have also demonstrated a move toward the establishment of a modern bureaucratic system in which the selection, promotion, and retirement of per-

⁷⁸*Renmin Ribao*, Apr. 29, 1983, in *JPRS*, No. 83646, June 10, 1983, pp. 25–27. Such cases formed the background to more general appeals to workers to respect intellectuals, as in the *Renmin Ribao* May Day editorial on May 1, 1983, in *FBIS—CHI*, May 2, 1983, pp. K/19–20.

⁷⁹*Renmin Ribao*, May 1, 1983.

⁸⁰*Ming Pao* (Hong Kong), May 5, 1983.

⁸¹Hunan radio, May 15, 1983.

⁸²*Ming Pao*, May 5, 1983.

⁸³Xinhua, Apr. 25, 1983.

⁸⁴Hunan radio, Apr. 16, 1983.

⁸⁵*Renmin Ribao*, May 20, 1983.

sonnel is based on predictable, clearly stated regulations. The efforts over the past several years to establish limited tenure for high officials, define maximum permissible sizes for leadership bodies, and set minimum qualifications for office will, if expanded and observed in practice, go far toward establishing a predictable system of government with a life of its own, independent of individual top leaders.

Flexibility and forethought have characterized the Dengist leadership's first steps toward developing such a system. In Shanxi, the combination of role models, pilot programs, a variety of study sessions, and media instruction orchestrated in part by a central work team carried the main burden. In the more difficult case of Hunan, a stream of high-level central officials bypassed the provincial leadership and went directly to local sites where, in conjunction with detailed exposés in the central press, they publicized negative examples and resolved local issues with national implications in favor of the reformers.

Nonetheless, despite the decisive Dengist victory at the 12th Party Congress and repeated self-criticism by Mao Zhiyong thereafter, Mao survived the provincial leadership streamlining. Too young to be retired on grounds of old age and no doubt the beneficiary of residual support for Hua Guofeng, Mao also appears to have been too firmly entrenched in Hunan's leading political body to be removed without incurring both a divisive struggle and loss of control over provincial affairs, had the province been handed over to a leadership team lacking any veteran Hunan leaders. The extraordinary unity of the pre-reform Hunan leadership, in contrast to other provinces which often had leaders who had been transferred in by the center or were split by factional contests between Cultural Revolution activists and rehabilitated veterans from the early 1960's, combined with Mao's willingness to admit his errors, at least verbally support the reform program, and acquiesce in the removal of his older allies from the provincial leadership apparently convinced Beijing to give him another chance.

But even the cloud of Mao Zhiyong's continuation in office, while suggesting that real limits exist on the central reformers' ability to compel provincial compliance, may have a silver lining for the reformers. Resistance to compromise during the Cultural Revolution provoked such factional bitterness that it poisons Chinese politics

to this day. Thus, Beijing's willingness to compromise was in itself an important message. To the hundreds of thousands of opponents of reform, Mao Zhiyong indirectly served as a model. They too would be allowed to remain in office, provided they switched to Deng's side and promoted his policies. Just such a message was virtually spelled out in a recent report from another problem province, Guangxi, where the Commentator of the provincial daily defined the party's policy as "leniency for those who confess."⁸⁶ The fact that Beijing was willing to compromise in the cases of Hunan and Guangxi must make the permanent acceptance of Dengist reforms a far less distasteful and less threatening prospect for many cadres, thereby further enhancing the likelihood of political stability in a post-Deng China.

The streamlining of provincial leadership throughout China was implemented in accordance with a schedule that had been publicly announced well in advance. As one step in a long series of reforms that began at the central level in 1982 and reached the subprovincial level in earnest by mid-1983, the outwardly smooth and rapid transfer of provincial leadership was an impressive exercise of reformist power. The techniques employed suggest that Beijing's goal is the establishment of a stable political system led by a unified party operating according to a set of rules that would facilitate the self-replication of an energetic, highly professional leadership on the basis of performance—primarily economic performance. While an ambitious goal that is no doubt ultimately dependent on the rate and nature of economic growth, its short-term prospects have been greatly enhanced by the current leadership's stress on persuasion. As demonstrated by the process now being set up and refined, this system envisions remedial training for uneducated cadres, promotion of educated cadres, and retention of those who have permanently missed out on the chance for education, provided they can and will support reform efforts from this point on. While it is still too early to tell if this ambitious goal will be attained, the historic transfer of provincial authority to a new generation of younger, more professionally competent leaders greatly enhances the likelihood of success.

⁸⁶Guangxi Ribao (Nanning), June 14, 1983.

State and Society in South Yemen

Norman Cigar

The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY or South Yemen) is the only state in the Arab world with a Marxist government. While observers outside the Middle East are primarily interested in the results of the PDRY's policies because of the country's strategic location, Arabs are perhaps more interested in the success or failure of the Aden government's attempts to achieve social mobilization, as some indication of whether a Marxist model of social development has applicability in a traditional Arab environment.

Rapid social change through state intervention has been one of the PDRY government's fundamental goals since the National Liberation Front (NLF) emerged victorious over its rivals in the civil war that paralleled the struggle for independence from Great Britain. Since independence in 1967, the NLF-based regime has become more radical in stages. In 1978, after merging with two minuscule leftist organizations, the NLF was renamed the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP), an avowedly Marxist-Leninist vanguard party. However, the "Marxist-Leninist" faction, espousing the creation of a "new society," had already become dominant within the NLF by 1969.¹

The creation of a "new Yemeni man" and of a "new," "rational, socialist" society are seen by the regime as a necessity for its own internal ideological consistency, as well as for securing its legitimacy on a long-term basis

among the country's population. New social values, institutions, and relationships reflecting the new "reality" are to replace the "remnants of the past" based on "bourgeois and feudal" models. South Yemeni dissidents, on the other hand, have claimed that certain aspects of the government's social planning are primarily intended to help the government consolidate and retain power. Regardless of the motivation, the promoting and controlling of rapid change in society is of considerable importance for the PDRY government.

The Soviet Union has consistently prompted the PDRY to follow this path. For example, one Soviet observer, writing in 1978, underlined the imperative for restructuring South Yemen's society:

*The ideological function—consisting of the liquidation of the colonial heritage in the fields of education and culture, and the inculcation of a world view of the ruling classes or social groups in the consciousness of all members of society—is a vitally important activity for a government having a socialist orientation.*²

Similarly, another Soviet observer wrote in 1983:

*It is no secret that the prospects of the revolution depend to a large extent on the shaping of the national self-consciousness, the formation of a new attitude to labor, and the surmounting of tribalism and other remnants of the past and of the influence of bourgeois ideology.*³

¹Fred Halliday, "Yemen's unfinished revolution: Socialism in the South," *MERIP Reports* (New York), October 1979, p. 12.

²Valeriy Vorob'yev, *Politicheskaya i gosudarstvennaya sistema NDRI* (The Political and State System of the PDRY), Moscow, Nauka, 1978, p. 74.

³Aleksandr Gus'kov, "South Yemen on the Path of Progressive Transformations," *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'* (Moscow), October 1983, pp. 24–28.

Speaking in a more general vein, Karen Brutents, the highest ranking Soviet official specializing in Third World affairs, noted that "the problem of achieving political stability in the liberated countries and the very prospects for successful opposition to neocolonialism" are directly centered on "the task of democratizing social life in its various aspects," (i.e., restructuring society according to a Marxist model). See *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 3, February 1984, p. 111.

Norman Cigar is a Middle East Analyst in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, US Army (Washington, DC). He holds a D. Phil. from Oxford University. The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the US Government.



South Yemeni leader Ali Nasir Muhammad, third from left, with Konstantin Chernenko and Boris Ponomarev in the Kremlin on October 2, 1984.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

While promoting “progressive” change, however, Moscow has placed even greater insistence on the need for a vanguard party to oversee the restructuring of society—this as a result of the Soviet Union’s own bitter experience with other Third World “socialist” regimes.⁴

To what extent has the YSP succeeded in modifying South Yemen’s social reality to fit the model promoted through ideological pronouncements and legislation? Some aspects of PDRY society, unfortunately, remain beyond the scope of analysis, given the closed nature of the country. Local researchers have done little systematic fieldwork, while few foreign scholars have even visited the country. Nevertheless, available indicators, par-

ticularly those one can cull from the local press,⁵ offer a useful basis for a preliminary evaluation of the degree of the PDRY government’s success. Although, admittedly, social change is a slow, long-term process—and the period since independence is only a relatively short phase in South Yemen’s history—that decade and a half should be sufficient to permit one to gauge the general magnitude and direction of change. Moreover, a large share of the country’s population has known no other government, having been born, or at least having gone through its formative years, since 1967.⁶

The Aden government has tried to restructure social groups by simultaneously undermining their material bases while attacking their old values and bonds and attempting to substitute new ones. We shall examine this

⁴At first, the danger to such regimes seemed to come from the army (as in Algeria, Ghana, and Indonesia), a social force that Soviet theorists had once viewed as one of the most progressive elements in the Third World. Later, even regimes that had been able to establish a secure domestic position sometimes simply turned away from the Soviet Union (in Egypt, Somalia, Sudan, and Peru), despite treaties of friendship with Moscow (such as the PDRY signed in 1979). These experiences led Soviet writers on the Third World to focus on the need for a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party, which would both guarantee the local regime against coups and give Moscow the necessary influence to ensure the regime’s loyalty. See, e.g., S. Agayev and I. Tatarovskaya, “Paths and Stages of the Revolutionary Process in the Countries of Asia and Africa,” *Aziya i Afrika Segodnya* (Moscow), July 1978, p. 31.

With regard to South Yemen in particular, a Soviet commentary in 1978 stated: “When the left wing gained power [i.e., in 1969] its immediate tasks in the national-liberation revolution were unification of the country’s national and patriotic forces and the creation of a vanguard party of the working people.” V. Naumkin, “Southern Yemen: The Road to Progress,” *International Affairs* (Moscow), January 1978, p. 65 (emphasis added).

⁵Although the media in the PDRY are a state-controlled monopoly, the press sometimes contains surprisingly frank articles and letters to the editor. The candor in the press has been decreasing since the devastating floods of 1982–83 and the resulting economic difficulties, which apparently have made the government more sensitive to criticism. There are indications, moreover, that this outlet for discontent may become increasingly restricted. The editor of the Aden daily *14 October*, for example, recently chided those who write to express a grievance for being too critical, noting that many letters “are not grounded in an objective base” (*14 October*, Nov. 15, 1984).

⁶As of 1977, for example, 49.1 percent of all South Yemenis were 14 years of age or younger, that is, were no more than 4 years old at the time of independence. See *United Nations Demographic Yearbook*, New York, United Nations, Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, Statistical Office, 1979.

process specifically as it has affected the status accorded various social groups, and the treatment of religion, the family, women, youth, and culture. We shall also explore briefly the machinery charged with implementing state policy with regard to social mobilization and indoctrination.

Social Groups and Status

Traditionally, South Yemeni society has been characterized by hierarchical hereditary strata, with loyalties focused at the local level—on one's family, tribe, or village.⁷ Moreover, although Islam might conceivably have provided this society with a higher common denominator of loyalty, it in fact remained tied to local social hierarchies. (The sole exception to this pattern was Aden, which as a cosmopolitan entrepôt since its seizure by the British in 1839, had always offered greater opportunities for social mobility than existed in the hinterland.) Britain's policy of either installing clients as rulers or coopting existing ones in each political sub-unit outside of Aden ensured that the nationalists would turn the fight for independence against these clients and the social system they represented, as well as against the British.

In a short but violent power struggle immediately after independence in 1967, the victorious NLF eliminated the elite composed of local sultans, tribal chiefs, religious leaders, and merchants, who had sided with the British, and with them also the non-leftist nationalists who had fought against the British. This done, the new Aden regime undertook to establish control over the economic base to undermine the old social system and prevent any group outside the NLF from challenging its control over the country. However, nationalization of property (including land) and installation of central planning have been implemented only gradually. As can be seen from Table 1, a very sizable portion of South Yemen's gross domestic product still originates in the private sector—particularly in retail trade, some services, and agriculture. Although the regime wages a persistent media campaign against small businessmen, who are portrayed as "parasites" and "reactionaries," plans to shrink and eventually eliminate the private sector have been hampered by the country's economic straits. Efforts to effect economic control over the society are further inhibited by the fact that a large proportion of the country's labor force work abroad in the Gulf states.⁸

⁷In the Hadramawt (the fifth of the six province-level governorates) alone, the British found some 2,000 independent centers of authority in the 1930's. See Harold Ingrams, *Arabia and the Isles*, New York and Washington, DC, Praeger, 1966, p. 25.

Table 1: South Yemen's Gross Domestic Product by Sector

(in percent of total)

Sector	General economy		Agriculture	
	1973	1982	1973	1982
Private	61.3	48.7	60.3	58.6
Mixed and cooperative	14.1	8.5	31.1	30.7
Of which:				
Mixed	2.0	3.0		
Cooperative	12.1	5.5		
State	24.6	42.8	8.4	10.7

SOURCE: *Al-Thawri* (Aden), Oct. 15, 1983, and July 14, 1984.

The results of the effort to eliminate the "feudal class" and the "bourgeoisie" and to bring about justice through "rule by the proletariat and its class allies" have not always been clear-cut gains for the average South Yemeni. The functions and privileges of the elite that has been displaced have been assumed, to a large extent, by a "new class" comprising the regime and its clients—i.e., party cadres, directors of state firms, high-level bureaucrats, and military officers.⁹

This "new class" enjoys not only a monopoly of political power but also material advantages not available to the rest of the population. Government officials often have two houses despite a severe housing shortage for most of the population. Officials also apparently do not always differentiate between "public" property and money and the personal use of them.¹⁰ Other officials take advantage of their position to travel abroad frequently.¹¹ The taking of bribes for ordinary, as well as extraordinary, services rendered is common. Even public sewer workers are said to require bribes for fixing sewers in Aden.¹² At the lower end of the "new class," ordinary veterans of the NLF enjoy preference in acquiring government jobs, free housing, and help with their children's education (e.g., sons of veterans have precedence in entry to government schools, such as the

⁸While no statistics are kept on migration, in the mid-1970's, Aden's official estimate of migrants was 300,000. Halliday, loc. cit., p. 7. Even if the total were now closer to 200,000, this still would represent one-third of the PDY labor force.

⁹A witicism current in the PDY is: "Formerly we had six Sultans; now we have 47" (referring respectively to the six principal rulers during the British period and the current membership of the YSP Central Committee).

¹⁰See accounts in *14 October* (Aden), May 28, 1982. Some even sell government land and cars. See *Al-Haris* (Aden), September-October 1981. *Al-Haris* is a journal published for the PDY's internal security forces.

¹¹*Al-Thawri* (Aden), July 10, 1982, adds: "Some come back home only to rest and to prepare for a new trip abroad."

¹²*Ibid.*, June 12, 1982.

Police Academy, even without any other qualifications).¹³ Such perquisites help to perpetuate the position of this group on the social scale.

The state has sought to mobilize the rest of the population by establishing new mass organizations based on socioeconomic criteria to serve as new centers of loyalty. Peasants, students, women, workers, schoolchildren, writers, and other such groups all have their own organization, while the neighborhood security and administrative organs—the Popular Defense Committees—try to recruit individuals from all these categories.

Old loyalties and social patterns, however, appear to have resisted government attempts to change them, and in many instances, socialist terminology has been merely superimposed on traditional realities. One of the main goals of the state-run cooperative farm system, for example, has been to create a new relationship within the “production teams,” one that “does not depend on kinship, family, or tribal bonds.” Rather, it is supposed

to be based on “cooperative labor, the nature of land ownership, and on the commitment to build socialism.” But many production teams still consist of one or more extended families (a tribe?), which are called “cooperative families.” Apparently, it is this type of production unit that has been the most productive one.¹⁴ Family loyalty, nepotism, and personal clientism persist in the urban environment as well.¹⁵

Perhaps more serious has been the persistence of tribal loyalty. Since independence, the PDRY government has sought to replace vertical local—particularly, tribal—loyalties with “national” and “class” ones. Tribal names for individuals were banned, tribal boundaries blurred through administrative reorganizations, tribally-based organizations disbanded, and efforts made to take children outside their tribal area for schooling.¹⁶ Yet, there are indications that tribes still function—and are still treated—as political actors.¹⁷ Even though persons in the government may be “de-tribalized” and feel such

¹³*Al-Haris*, June 1982.

¹⁴*Al-Thawri*, Sept. 1, 1984.

¹⁵A letter to the labor union newspaper *Sawt Al-Ummal* (Aden) printed on June 18, 1982, complained that the sister of a bureaucrat in the Ministry of Labor, rather than the complainant, was given a job simply because of family ties. Personal connections, moreover, are needed even in such areas as obtaining medicine at a hospital. See *Al-Thawri*, Feb. 6, 1982.

¹⁶The official position is that changing the Bedouins' loyalties and way of life “will not occur directly by convincing the adults . . . which might require decades.” Rather, this is to be accomplished “by educating their children and by putting them in boarding schools In a

few years' time, they will become veritable missionaries to their parents for social and economic change.” There are now 23 such schools, with 34,000 students. The military, rather than the Ministry of Education, runs these schools. See *14 October*, Nov. 14, 1984.

¹⁷For example, six tribes in the Fifth Governorate were reported to have banded together to resist the military draft; their leaders were arrested and the tribes were punished collectively by the central government (*The Daily Telegraph* [London], Dec. 7, 1982).

Indication of the still imperfect development of a national loyalty is the reported nonchalant treatment accorded the national flag, which even government organizations in the countryside are said not to raise or to simply leave flying at all times, to deteriorate in the elements (*Al-Thawri*, June 26, 1982).



Then South Yemeni President Salim Rubayyi' Ali speaks to peasants at the Mojahad state farm in the Second Governorate, where he was chairman of the executive board.

loyalties to be ideologically unsound, they may nevertheless view their own tribe as a ready-made power base to be used for personal advancement.¹⁸

Religion

The PDRY government sees in Islam an alternative, contrasting, ideological system posing an intellectual challenge to socialism. Virtually all South Yemenis are Muslims. Islam, introduced into Southern Arabia in the 7th century A.D., struck deep roots in local society by coopting earlier tribal and regional customs. The resulting symbiosis provided mutually-reinforcing legitimacy, while permitting Islam to become relevant to people's everyday needs. Since independence, Islam has served to buttress the social and political position of a local elite that competed with the new government for power and provided the only *potential* framework for the mobilization of opposition to the regime's policies on a nationwide basis in what is otherwise a highly fragmented society.

Not unexpectedly, the goal of the PDRY government, in ideological terms, has been to establish what is called locally a "rational"—i.e., atheist—society. At first, the government promoted an aggressive anti-religious propaganda campaign, in which Islam was portrayed as oppressive and as "a remnant of the past." Violent confrontations with religious leaders were common, and a number of them were publicly humiliated, tortured, and executed.¹⁹

The widespread opposition that this initial approach aroused both domestically and abroad eventually led to a more circumspect religious policy. Rather than challenging people's basic beliefs, the government's strategy has shifted to weakening indirectly the role of Islam and religious leaders in society, seeking thereby to make religion less relevant to people's everyday lives. Thus, in 1970, the state took over the *awqaf*, or religious trust property, which formerly provided religious institutions and personnel a certain financial autonomy. Religious officials henceforth were to receive salaries from

the state.²⁰ All foreign aid for religious purposes, likewise, now must be channeled through state agencies.

Moreover, marriage and divorce no longer can be performed by a *qadi*, or religious judge, without the government's approval, while the competence of the *shari'a*, or religious code, has been drastically curtailed. Education has been secularized. Religious material is excluded from the mass media and has been replaced by expositions of Marxist doctrine. Characteristically, the PDRY is the only Arab country in which the times for daily prayers or for the month-long Ramadan fast are not published in the press.²¹ The interpretation of Islam within a framework of "liberation theology," presenting it as simply a social and political, rather than spiritual, system has been promoted. The Quran, for example, is taught in schools solely as a social and political document, and is portrayed as supporting anti-imperialism and social radicalism. Typically, the sermon delivered by a pro-government cleric—director of the section on religious affairs in the Ministry of the Interior—on a religious holy day in 1984 declared that "the essence of Islam . . . is equality and the end of class exploitation [and] the establishment of a prosperous and just life, the promotion of democracy and social justice and a society free from social contradictions and exploitative relationships."²²

Despite government policies, there are numerous indications that Islam remains central for most South Yemenis.²³ The government evidently feels this is the case; for example, it modifies work schedules during Ramadan to make allowances for those fasting.²⁴ The authorities are also sensitive to the influence of the preaching of imams, or prayer leaders, in mosques and have tried to coopt them, while reportedly cracking down on any recalcitrant ones.

Of some significance also is the reticence of Marxist government officials to openly proclaim themselves to be atheists, conscious as they are of the expected reaction of their fellow citizens, as well as that in other Arab countries. Recently, in fact, the PDRY's president, Ali Nasir Muhammad, has made it a point to project a personal image of being a practicing Muslim and has ap-

¹⁸During an internal power struggle in 1978, for example, one of the government figures, Salim Rubayyi' Ali, expected and got his strongest support from his native Third Governorate (Halliday, loc. cit., p. 17).

According to an émigré source, during a recent conflict within the ruling YSP the accusation of "tribalism" was hurled at some of the protagonists (*Al-Wahda* [Cairo], Feb. 15, 1984).

One Soviet visitor noted that even "many workers" (who, by Marxist theory, should be the least traditional segment of the population) "still have ties to the village" (Naumkin, loc. cit., p. 66).

¹⁹Such acts are chronicled in Awad Al-Arshani's *Al-Irhab al-shuyu'i fi-l-Yaman al-Janubiyya* (Communist Terrorism in South Yemen), n. p., 1978, published on behalf of one of the country's exile groups.

²⁰Halliday, loc. cit., p. 10.

²¹Indeed, one letter to the editor complained that the state-run broadcasting system had aired daytime cooking programs during Ramadan, making fasting considerably more difficult (14 October, May 17, 1982).

²²*Ibid.*, July 3, 1984.

²³That religious holidays still regulate the rhythm of everyday life may be inferred from the fact that South Yemenis want new clothes for the religious month of Ramadan (*ibid.*, July 19, 1982). Likewise, a letter to the editor asked that during Ramadan, streets be repaired and lit for the surge in travel that occurs after sunset—i.e., once the fast can be broken (*ibid.*, May 8, 1984).

²⁴One letter, however, complained that the school year having started late, final exams coincided with Ramadan, which caused difficulties, presumably with fasting, in the intense summer heat (*ibid.*, July 12, 1982).



South Yemeni President Ali Nasir Muhammad shown with local Muslim leaders.

—14 October (Aden), Dec. 8, 1983.

peared in the media receiving religious notables in his official capacity and praying in a mosque.

Readily accessible religious broadcasts from neighboring countries and the fact that so many South Yemeni migrants work in other Muslim countries doubtless undermine the Aden government's attempt to weaken belief in Islam among its citizens. Moreover, the increasing need for foreign aid from other Arab countries, particularly in the wake of the disastrous floods of 1982, has prompted the PDRY government to adopt a more conciliatory policy toward Islam at home, at least for the short run.²⁵

The Family

The regime has viewed existing family structures as a challenge to its ideology and, perhaps more important, as a stumbling block to social change and to the state's influence and control over the individual. Conflict within the family has been seen by government ideologues as an element that could facilitate the desired social change and has therefore been depicted as a "positive" factor and as "inevitable."²⁶

The household and extended family have traditionally

been the basic socioeconomic unit of both urban and rural South Yemen. The family was, and is, the repository and defender of an individual's honor and material interests, and the focus of his loyalty.²⁷ Marriage to one's cousin—designed to strengthen family ties and to preserve wealth within the family—has traditionally been strongly encouraged. Yemeni urban dwellings were typically multi-storied, capable of housing an entire extended family, thus reinforcing physical links and facilitating security in what was a harsh physical and social environment. The family has also served as a major agent of socialization, inculcating in children basic moral and social values.

From the early days of independence, the regime has described traditional family structures as both exploitative and reactionary. However, it was not until the passage of the Family Law in 1974 that a coordinated attempt was made to enforce new relationships within the family as part of a more general restructuring of society. Polygamy, arranged marriages, and the customary large dowries (which often lent to marriage the quality of an economic transaction between families) were made illegal. So were marriages between first cousins and *kafa'a*, a social custom whereby women were prevented from marrying below their family's social level.

²⁵A case in point may be the willingness throughout 1983 to announce in the local press public tenders to carry out repairs on mosques in Aden, to be financed by Kuwait.

²⁶See, e.g., 14 October, Mar. 12, 1982.

²⁷Today, with the large-scale migration of men abroad in search of work, the extended family also fulfills another important function: to protect the economic interests and honor of one's spouse(s) and children in one's absence.

This intrusive legislation is highly unsettling and runs counter to deeply-ingrained social customs, many of which have actual or perceived religious sanction. In general, South Yemenis find these laws distasteful and routinely attempt to evade them. The law on dowries, for example, is regularly bypassed.²⁸ Families, moreover, still want to arrange marriages, and "marriages of interest"—in which social status and property considerations are decisive—are said still to be the rule.²⁹ Government attempts to discourage the traditional extended family by building apartments for nuclear families are also unpopular, and large traditional families will often crowd together in their new accommodations.

Apparently, it has been difficult to change values regarding the family even among the ideological "elite." A member of the YSP Central Committee, Ali Salim Al-Bid, for example, reportedly had to be disciplined for violating the law by marrying a second wife.³⁰ Officials have reluctantly admitted that "one hears frequent cries for the revision of these laws" and have acknowledged that, under the circumstances, the laws are "unrealistic" and even "totally irrelevant."³¹

Perhaps fearing to provoke even greater discontent, the government has not felt it wise to tamper with the traditional inheritance system. Yet this is a central element in the continuation of the existing family structure, encouraging as it does first-cousin marriage and the extended family as means of avoiding the rapid division of property otherwise prescribed by Islamic inheritance law. Without a change in the inheritance system, a rapid transformation of the family is unlikely.

Women

The government views its policy on women as an integral part of plans to change society. In South Yemen, the conduct of women has traditionally been considered one of the primary measures of a family's honor. This has been accompanied by a perception of women as weaker than men in body, mind, and morals, and as beings who require protection from outside dangers as well as from their own impulses. This combination of factors has contributed to the development of a markedly circum-



Traditional dwellings in Shibam, Hadramawt.

—Sam Waagenaar/Photo Researchers.

scribed lifestyle and role in society for women. The official goal has been to change this and to achieve for women complete equality in rights and duties with men.

Accordingly, the government has placed considerable emphasis on "women's liberation." Efforts have been made to induce women to abandon the veil, to be active outside the home—at school, work, and recreational activities, and in the military—and to participate in politics through the government-sponsored Yemeni General Women's Union (YGWU), founded in 1968. During the first few years after independence, the application of measures designed to achieve these results was often in an ad hoc manner and was frequently accompanied by violence to neutralize the resistance it engendered. The subsequent Family Law of 1974 enacted a number of provisions, as noted already, that were in part expected to systematize and further encourage the emancipation of women.

These and other related measures have evoked broad opposition, even after the use of force in implementing them was diminished. Opponents have argued that the undeclared aim of the government policy on women is to

²⁸Al-Thawri, May 22, 1982, and Apr. 2, 1983. In one village, for example, the cash dowry, quite apart from the customary gifts of gold and furniture, is reported to be up to 700 Dinars, or roughly a year's wages for a young bureaucrat (14 October, Dec. 30, 1983).

²⁹14 October, Nov. 6, 1980.

³⁰Al-Siyasah (Kuwait), Feb. 9, 1981. To some extent, the government has found itself obliged to compromise with reality in this area by allowing, under special circumstances, marriage with a second wife. A fee regularizing this practice was introduced. See Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya (The Official Gazette—Aden), Jan. 19, 1981.

³¹Al-Haris, September-October 1981.



A political demonstration by women in Mukala in 1973.

—Marie-Laure de Decker/Gamma-Liaison.

undermine the family in order to control society more easily, and even those who do not necessarily oppose change in this realm have resented what they perceive as intrusion into a very private area. The government's educational program for women, for example, has been unpopular, as it has forced women to live away from home in some cases.³² Similarly, measures to promote women's joining the Popular Defense Committees have not been popular, and officials admit that the level of participation is "not encouraging at present."³³ The proportion of girls in the schools still substantially below that of boys.³⁴ The campaign to eliminate illiteracy has also generally failed to attract women, while those who have enrolled (often under pressure) show up for classes only haphazardly.³⁵

Fewer women have been brought into the labor force than was hoped, despite a labor shortage in the country.³⁶ A good part of the reason for this has been

the lack of public acceptance. In Aden and some of the larger cities, a small number of women have received a modern education and have entered the workforce as teachers, administrators, and medical personnel. Some women have even joined the national dance troupe sponsored by the Ministry of the Interior, something that would probably have been unheard of before independence. However, as one of the dancers admitted in what was probably a typical case, the price for this has been ostracism by her own family.³⁷ In general, it is still not widely accepted as proper for a woman to work, and indeed, the traditional view of women's role in society seems firmly entrenched even in Aden itself, the most sophisticated and least traditional milieu.

A recent short story by a local writer, Ali Ahmad Yahya, illustrates this graphically. A woman joins an all-male shopping line at a neighborhood cooperative in Aden. She immediately becomes the object of hostile stares by the men in the line, in the cafes, and passing by. Some ask indignantly "Don't you have a brother? . . . Why can't he shop for you? . . . What about your father?" in what is portrayed as typical reactions. In a bit of "socialist realism," the story ends with the men eventually accepting her presence after repeated visits.³⁸

Sensing the unpopularity of mandatory change, the government has retreated from its earlier arbitrary enforcement of some measures. The anti-veil campaign, for example, is said to have largely lapsed.³⁹ Even the custom of female circumcision, which is intended to decrease a woman's sexual gratification, is still legal and said still to be widespread, though its frequency may vary according to region.

The small number of women with a modern education have constituted the core of the YGWU, which, as an organization, has supported government efforts to implement the emancipatory legislation on women already enacted, as well as to introduce further measures. The YGWU's leaders have been frustrated by what they see as the slow pace of change and by their inability to bring greater influence to bear on the process. To a great extent, however, the modern education, lifestyle, and values of the YGWU's leadership make it so different from the rest of society as to militate against its becom-

³²Typically, because of "the force of custom," girls from the Fourth Governorate were not permitted by their families to attend a Pioneers' youth camp (14 October, Mar. 28, 1983).

³³Ibid., May 5, 1982. Likewise, in the City of Shibam (Fifth Governorate), of 1,129 members of ISHID, the official youth organization, only 14 were girls (ibid., Feb. 5, 1982).

³⁴A report on several districts in the Fourth Governorate, for example, revealed that girls constituted only about 11 percent of elementary-school pupils, and were very rare above the fifth grade (Al-Thawri, Feb. 11, 1984).

³⁵Ibid., May 22, 1982.

³⁶Ironically, the women's technical institutes opened in 1975 all had to be closed by 1980 because graduates could not find jobs (14 October, Apr. 17, 1980).

³⁷Al-Haris, January 1983.

³⁸14 October, Jan. 22, 1982.

³⁹Maxine Molyneux's valuable field study, *State policies and the position of women workers in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen 1967-77*, Geneva, International Labour Organization, 1982, makes the point forcefully that for women in industry some of the strictures are not salient. However, she convincingly proves that women working in industry are atypical by reason of their social and geographic origins and number. In effect, there were only 1,271 women in industry out of nearly 1 million women in the country at the time of her survey. Significantly, even a woman factory worker noted of the traditional black veil-like covering, "I don't mind wearing the *sheidar*. If I don't wear it, people will speak badly of me and say 'Look, she has no religion and no modesty'" (pp 74-75).

ing a greater force among women, even those who work in the modern sector.⁴⁰

In fact, it appears that the YGWU is becoming weaker rather than stronger. Many of the rank-and-file members, who were pressured into joining in the early days after independence, melted away once the pressure slackened. Many branches of the YGWU have simply ceased to function.⁴¹ Even the number of members still on the books may tend to give an exaggerated picture of the organization's activism.⁴²

Women's lives are changing, to be sure, but the impetus is not always provided by government-sponsored programs, and the result may run counter to the government's intent and interests. Thus, a large number of women have been reported recently to be engaging in small "black-market" operations in Aden.⁴³ This new phenomenon is attributable to bottlenecks in the production and distribution of consumer goods resulting from poor planning, which creates a situation in which substantial profits can be made from small-scale trade. In addition, the large-scale emigration of the menfolk as laborers to the Gulf countries limits the number of men available for this activity. Another aspect of change in the lives of South Yemeni women not intended by the government, and probably still fairly limited, is an observed increase in the use by women of alcohol and *qat* (a traditional mild narcotic that is consumed by chewing).⁴⁴

Youth

The PDRY's population of 2 million is a young one, with individuals 24 years of age or less accounting for 64.5 percent of the total in 1977, and probably an even greater share today. The government has been hopeful of gaining the allegiance of the country's youth, of turning it into an agent for the dissolution of the old social system and into a defender of a new, socialist society. New values have been promoted through education and indoctrination in schools, on work projects, and in the military.



As can be seen in this photo of a dormitory at the Aden Technical Institute, many students retain their Muslim prayer rugs.

— *Al-Thawri* (Aden), May 29, 1982.

The results, however, have been disappointing to the government in many respects. While some success has been achieved in undermining traditional values among a portion of youth, the result has often been ethical and cultural disorientation rather than the expected embracing of socialism. Some change, such as the reported development among South Yemeni youths of a liking for modern Western music and bands, for example, is contrary to official desires.⁴⁵ More serious, official sources complain of increasing hooliganism, drinking, the use of *qat*, vandalism, declining school discipline, and idleness among the country's youth.⁴⁶

ISHID (Democratic Yemeni Youth Union), the government organization tasked with overseeing youth affairs, seems ineffectual and is said to be largely isolated from its putative constituency.⁴⁷ A countrywide recruitment drive in 1983 reportedly increased membership from 37,561 to 52,717, but many were probably "paper" members joining to benefit from discounts on public transportation, cinema tickets, and sporting events that were offered as incentives to enroll.⁴⁸ The government,

⁴⁰A report from the Sixth Governorate (Mahra) notes that few working women there belong to the YGWU (*Al-Thawri*, Feb. 20, 1982).

⁴¹In the Fourth Governorate (Shabwa), the YGWU—which had been actively engaged in agitation, propaganda work, and demonstrations since 1973—now has many fewer members than when initially founded. Even the cadres no longer bother to travel throughout the region on their official duties as required (14 October, Jan. 30, 1982).

⁴²Perhaps not atypical is the case of a government employee on Socotra Island. Though she works as a typist in a visible position (at a police station), and is a divorcee (thus comparatively free), she had never attended a meeting of the YGWU since joining in 1980—presumably as a condition for obtaining her job (*ibid.*, May 28, 1982).

⁴³*Ibid.*, Mar. 13, 1983.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, Dec. 30, 1979.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*

⁴⁶See, e.g., *ibid.*, Feb. 12 and Apr. 12, 1982, May 12, 1984.

⁴⁷For an account of the decline in vitality and membership of ISHID in the Fourth Governorate, see *ibid.*, Feb. 5, 1982 in what is termed a "model" ISHID unit, only 69 out of an eligible student body of 900 members (*ibid.*, Nov. 28, 1983).

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, Feb. 6, 1984. Younger schoolchildren are organized into the Pioneers, but the latter number only 25,000 (*ibid.*, Feb. 6, 1984).


in fact, admits to the continued coolness toward ISHID by youth and speaks of the need to "reestablish trust."⁴⁹ Youths do not seem to have embraced the new system in general, and even in Aden, youth is said to be apathetic about cooperation with a government agency such as the Popular Defense Committees.⁵⁰

Culture

The government sees the inherited South Yemeni culture as bound too closely to Islam and to traditional social structures and thereby tending to reinforce values inimical to the Marxist system on both intellectual and political planes. There have been sustained efforts aimed at "the destruction of inherited backward cultural structures which express the class ideology of preceding reactionary, imperialist, feudal, and bourgeois political forces."⁵¹ According to official sources, culture is to be transformed into an "international proletarian" phenomenon, based on Marxist-Leninist principles. Thus, even when traditional art forms are encouraged, the content is often alien to the rich Islamic, Arab, and uniquely Yemeni flavor they once manifested.

The government's monopoly over the media, publishing, and distribution of all printed materials allows it to strictly censor and control almost everything produced locally. This control seems, however, to have stifled creativity, and the PDRY press frequently speaks of a "crisis" in culture.

Typical of the problem is the situation of the theater, a medium new to South Yemeni society. The government has placed considerable stress on the role of the theater in "creating a new life" through the presentation of "politically relevant" plays. Traveling theatrical troupes have been formed, and East European advisers have been brought in. Performances are free. However, censorship has caused the flight of talented authors, the requisite technical personnel are lacking, and financial resources



Ahmed Ali Saleh, a post-graduate of Moscow's Patrice Lumumba University, examines a work of Soviet poet Mayakovskiy in the Yemen-Soviet Friendship House in Aden.

—TASS from SOVPHOTO.

are limited. As a result the impact of this cultural medium has been less than satisfactory.⁵²

Films, television programs, press articles, and performers from the Soviet bloc—having the desired ideological tone—are used when possible in the PDRY. However, cultural productions and products from the West, from other Arab countries (particularly Egypt), and from India are more popular than the more heavily political ones from the Soviet-bloc countries.⁵³

The PDRY government feels especially uneasy about materials from the other Arab countries, since these carry messages contrary to the ones it wishes to impart—and do so in an acceptable and accessible format.⁵⁴ Moreover, the reception of radio and television broadcasts from neighboring North Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the other Gulf states, as well as the effects of the foreign media on the thousands of South Yemenis working abroad, also complicate the government's efforts to eradicate "bourgeois" cultural influences. The problem is compounded by the apparent lack of credibility of the local media among South Yemenis. One newspaper, for example, acknowledged that when international crises occur, South Yemenis turn to the BBC first.⁵⁵

The unenviable choice is between allowing the flow of unwelcome cultural influences from outside to continue or isolating the PDRY from other Arab countries at the

⁴⁹Ibid., Feb. 5, 1982. "Work camps," set up to mobilize youth, proved unpopular—particularly after accidents on public projects—and seem to have been sharply curtailed.

⁵⁰Ibid., Apr. 12, 1982.

⁵¹*Al-Thawri*, May 22, 1982.

⁵²14 October, Feb. 21 and June 4, 1982.

⁵³Of the 70 films showing in Aden in January 1984, 44 percent were from the West, 31 percent from India, 19 percent from the Arab world, and 6 percent from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. According to a local account, the showing at the government-run Cinema Club in Aden of a Soviet film was accompanied by inattention, loud conversations, and animal catcalls on the part of the youths present (14 October, Apr. 12, 1982). Following that unsuccessful screening, the Cinema Club apparently found it necessary to run the glossy Western film "All That Jazz" in order to recapture its youth audience (ibid., June 23, 1982). Recently, however, there have been discussions concerning increased cooperation with the Soviet Union in the field of film (ibid., June 13, 1984).

⁵⁴See *Al-Thawri*, May 22, 1982.

⁵⁵14 October, Feb. 6, 1984.

expense of lost economic aid and remittances. So far, the PDRY government has felt itself compelled to accept the first alternative, thus compromising its cultural policy. Indicative is the current easing in the application of the terms of the draconian State Security Law of 1975, which made it illegal for South Yemenis to talk to foreigners (particularly aimed at Arab foreigners).

The Socialist Ethic

Official efforts to inculcate a new "socialist" ethic have met with considerable indifference and resistance. The government ideal is depicted by Salih, a character in a short fictional vignette that appeared in the August 30, 1982, issue of Aden's daily *14 October*. Salih not only does his own work dutifully at the office but also performs the duties of his co-workers, who prefer to gossip; he criticizes the ticket seller on the bus for embezzling money, merchants for cheating, state-run cinema ticket-sellers for scalping, and his own wife for dumping refuse out the window. However, the other bus-riders, shoppers, moviegoers, co-workers, and even his wife all view him as a strange being, whose values are completely atypical of the society in which he lives. That 550 out of 700 workers at a public firm in Abyan were found to be absent on a workday suggests that the Salih's are the exception.⁵⁶ Those employed in the large state bureaucracy are portrayed in the mass media as equally delinquent, spending inordinate amounts of time drinking tea and gossiping.

These phenomena might be attributed to attitudes inherited from the past, were it not for the fact that South Yemenis working in neighboring countries are generally perceived to be hard workers. Perhaps their poor performance at home reflects the absence of effective material and moral incentives in the PDRY's public sector. The continued existence of the small-scale private sector in trade and services despite government limitations and scathing media campaigns attests to the persistence of a certain spirit of free enterprise in the country. The number of small entrepreneurs (or "black marketeers" as the media calls them) may, in fact, be growing.⁵⁷

Those who have grown up since independence seem to have absorbed the new socialist ethic no better than their elders. For example, secondary-school students in Aden reportedly are eager to buy "sample exam" booklets reproduced by some enterprising individual so that they can succeed with less effort.⁵⁸

In an effort to increase worker efficiency as well as to improve public health, the government has attacked the custom of chewing *qat*. However, despite legislation restricting its use to Thursday and Friday and a media



This cartoon from the Aden newspaper 14 October of June 4, 1982, is illustrative of the South Yemeni government's perspective on private vendors: the customer looks forward to a meal of broiled chicken; in the vendor's mind it is the customer who is to be devoured.

campaign against it, the use of *qat* still seems to be a widespread problem in the PDRY according to the local media; e.g., workers are said to often take Saturday (a workday) off to chew *qat*.⁵⁹ In addition, alcohol abuse is beginning to affect South Yemen—public drunkenness is becoming a nuisance, particularly in Aden.⁶⁰

Tools of Social Engineering

In pursuing its plans to transform society, the PDRY government has relied primarily on three tools: education, the YSP, and the state's administrative machinery (including the mass organizations).

⁵⁶ *Al-Thawri*, Mar. 13, 1983.

⁵⁷ See *14 October Usbu'i* (Aden), July 27, 1984. Many workers who return home from abroad apparently want to use their earnings to open a small shop or cafe or to buy a taxi, all of which runs counter to the state's long-term economic goals.

Besides clinging to entrepreneurial instincts, the South Yemenis have been resistant to a characteristic of many socialist societies—waiting patiently in queues—even though this behavior is presented by Aden media as "one of the cultural features in the lives of developed nations." See *ibid.*, July 20, 1984.

⁵⁸ *14 October*, May 21, 1984.

⁵⁹ *14 October Usbu'i*, Aug. 12, 1982. Since *qat* must be consumed fresh, the problem is restricted mostly to the First Governorate, near the mountains where it is grown. The fact that the government collects a tax on *qat* may weaken official resolve to ban it completely, as this would cut revenue.

⁶⁰ *14 October*, Jan. 30, 1984.

Table 2: Growth in Enrollment

	1970-71	1973	1981-82	1985 (proj.)
Primary school		183,742		382,555
Secondary school		6,933		32,777
University	103		3,641	

SOURCES *Al Thawri* (Aden), Oct. 15, 1983, and *Al-Masar* (Aden), February 1984.

The educational system. Since independence, there has been an impressive expansion of the country's educational system, at least in quantitative terms (see Table 2). The system has been modeled after those in Soviet-bloc countries, and heavy dosages of political indoctrination characterize the curriculum at all levels. A secondary-school curriculum organized on a "scientific socialist basis" was introduced gradually, beginning in 1975 and reportedly completed in the 1983/84 school year.⁶¹ Even the kindergartens in Aden are said now to be run on the pattern of the "socialist countries," including "political lessons" for preparing instructors.⁶² The

boarding schools designed to make settled folk out of Bedouin youth are said to be especially politicized. However, according to an account in 1979, the majority of these students did not understand the "scientific socialism" being taught.⁶³

Government planning notwithstanding, the PDRY does not seem to have had appreciably greater success than many other Arab countries in managing its educational problems. Mass illiteracy, for example, has proved resistant to change. In 1984, the government undertook yet another campaign to eliminate illiteracy, with total enrollment estimated at 218,000.⁶⁴ Similar campaigns since 1970 have not met their goals.⁶⁵ At the other end

⁶¹*Ibid.*, Dec. 1, 1983.

⁶²*Ibid.*, June 4, 1982.

⁶³*The New York Times*, May 27, 1979. Also, students of these schools often voice discontent with their treatment. One letter to the editor, for example, noted that a "serious reappraisal" is needed in the attitude of the administration of the Red Star Bedouin school (14 October, Dec. 7, 1984).

⁶⁴14 October, July 8, 1984.

⁶⁵Between 1974 and 1982, for example, only 68,505 individuals reportedly became literate through this program (14 October, June 28, 1984). In 1981/82, only 4,302 of those enrolled took the literacy exam, and just over half of those passed it (14 October *Usbu'i*, June 22, 1984).



Children at a Bedouin school during a rally in 1984.

—14 October (Aden), Nov. 14, 1984.

of the educational scale, as is true of many other Arab countries, the PDRY is said to be approaching the saturation point of university-educated people in its economy. There have been calls to downplay the prestige of a Ph.D. in nontechnical fields and to right the balance in favor of technical training.⁶⁶

The country's educational system suffers from limited financial resources. Even the favored Bedouin schools are now apparently suffering from the neglect and dilapidation common to most schools in the country.⁶⁷ The situation is compounded by the generally low level of the teachers' own education and motivation. Moreover, the government claims that most teachers are still "bourgeois" and have not yet become adequate instruments of social transformation.⁶⁸

The results are predictable. Complaints surface frequently of students who, after five or six years of schooling in villages, still cannot read or write or do not even know the letters of the alphabet.⁶⁹ Absenteeism among both students and teachers is high in the provinces. This also extends to the adult anti-illiteracy campaign, whose students, moreover, are accused of being "not receptive."⁷⁰ Although advanced training in other socialist countries may facilitate indoctrination among an influential technocratic segment of South Yemenis, an apparent bias against degrees from the Soviet bloc as opposed to those from other countries may act to reduce the numbers willing to go.⁷¹

Military service can be a complementary instrument of education in support of social change, particularly when, as in the PDRY, there is a draft system. However, though indoctrination does occur in the PDRY army, it does not appear to be very effective or well-received. Even distribution of *Al-Raya*, the official newspaper of the armed forces, seems haphazard.⁷²

The party. The YSP is the only legal forum for political activity in South Yemen. However, its projected role in initiating and controlling social change has been hindered by several weaknesses. First, the party is rather



This cartoon from the South Yemeni military newspaper *Al-Raya* of December 18, 1983, illustrates troubles encountered in getting soldiers to read it. The soldier at right is attempting to put a copy of the paper in the unit's mail carton, saying "Hey fellow! You still haven't picked up your *Al-Raya*." The other soldier replies: "Never mind! I'll pick it up another time."

small—its claimed membership only 24,000 to 28,000 out of a population base of 2 million.⁷³ The share of women in the YSP membership, in particular, has remained very limited and shows no sign of changing, even in Aden.⁷⁴ Moreover, not all "members" are necessarily committed cadres; there are indications that some of the claimed membership exists only on paper, or is inactive.⁷⁵

Keeping party members informed of the official line is itself a difficult task in the context of the PDRY's underdevelopment. The party newspaper *Al-Thawri* (*The Revolutionary*) and other government publications often

⁶⁶14 October, June 4, 1982.

⁶⁷Ibid., Jan. 30, 1984.

⁶⁸*Al-Thawri*, May 22, 1982.

⁶⁹Letters of complaint in *ibid.*, Mar. 6 and Apr. 17, 1982.

⁷⁰14 October, Oct. 22, 1980. Student resistance to the regime is also illustrated by the fact that even at the prestigious Aden Technical College only 45 percent of the students were members of ISHID (*Al-Thawri*, May 29, 1982).

⁷¹A letter to the editor, for example, notes that degrees from socialist countries are treated even in government ministries as being worth less than those obtained in the West (*Al-Thawri*, Aug. 14, 1982).

⁷²One soldier also complained that "wall-magazines," a principal means of propaganda in the PDRY military, deal only with "politics" and "matters related to foreign politics." This, he claimed, was "totally irrelevant to anything going on in the unit." In order to "influence the life of the individual," he suggested, they should deal with "everyday matters" (*Al-Raya* [Aden], Mar. 27, 1983).

⁷³Gus'kov, loc. cit., gives 24,000; *Pravda* (Moscow), Nov. 13, 1983, gives 28,000.

⁷⁴While YSP membership in Aden grew by 60 percent from 1978 to 1983 overall, the number of women members increased by only 8 percent (*Al-Thawri*, Nov. 26, 1983).

⁷⁵According to Ahmad Haydar Sa'id, a member of the YSP Central Committee of the Third Governorate, the party's leadership there has been deficient in proposing and holding meetings, leading to a general "collapse of party discipline." For example, the basic party cell of the Abyan Delta project, a high-visibility government agricultural project, failed to hold a single meeting for more than a year (*Al-Thawri*, Apr. 2, 1983).

Speaking on the YSP recently, the country's President noted that "there are still some members who hold some views which hearken back to the past. They require further attention and education from the party" (14 October, June 21, 1984).



Ali Nasir Muhammad in 1979 tries out a new telephone network for the town of Ja'ar in the Third Governorate, 80 kilometers from Aden.

—ADN-ZB from EASTFOTO.

do not reach some of the provinces.⁷⁶ Even in Aden itself, the state-controlled press is often not available due to poor distribution facilities.⁷⁷

The administrative framework. The organs of the state, including traditional means of coercion such as the police and the judicial system, are also intended to play a major role in reshaping society. However, they are far from being adequate for the task.

For example, the low level of available technology, the forbidding terrain and considerable distances involved, and a lack of trained cadres have often made police enforcement a slow and haphazard process in the countryside. In some areas of the Hadramawt, for example, the police are said to learn of crimes committed in the villages only long after they occur, and officials acknowledge that they are poorly equipped to deal with lawbreakers.⁷⁸ Even in Aden itself, moreover, there are indications that law enforcement is not sufficiently organized to deal effectively with socially related law-and-order problems.⁷⁹

⁷⁶ *Al-Thawri* does not reach the Sixth Governorate (14 October, Mar. 12, 1982). *Sawt Ummal* is not available in the Fifth Governorate (*Al-Thawri*, Feb. 20, 1982). In some parts of the Second Governorate, no newspapers, magazines, or books are available at all (14 October, Mar. 10, 1984). This is also true of Shibam, one of the larger towns of the Hadramawt, or Fifth Governorate (*Al-Thawri*, Dec. 17, 1983). Also radio and TV broadcasting outside Aden is still spotty, though this is likely to improve with time.

A new "Civil Police," whose precise mission remains unclear to this author, was established in 1983; so far it apparently exists only in the capital city.⁸⁰ The Popular Defense Committees, designed to provide neighborhood security and to supervise local social activities, likewise often do not function.⁸¹ Even the distribution of mandatory identity cards, a basic tool of administration, had not been undertaken in at least one governorate, the Fourth, more than four years after the 1977 decree instituting the system.⁸²

The judicial system also often functions erratically. The courts in the Third Governorate, for example, are so understaffed that they shut down when the judge has other business.⁸³ "A large number" of criminal cases in some areas reach court only after three or more years of waiting, by which time the records may have been lost.⁸⁴ Still other areas do not yet have secular courts at all.⁸⁵

The regular administrative apparatus is also rudimentary, particularly in the countryside. To register a wedding with the authorities in the Third Governorate, for example, requires a trip of several days by foot from the scattered villages to a single government representative in the area.⁸⁶ Disputes between individuals, such as those over land, are solved outside the framework of the official Peasant Union, without the government being able to react.⁸⁷

⁷⁷ In Aden, many of the state-run press distribution points have shut down (*Al-Thawri*, Feb. 20 and May 29, 1982).

⁷⁸ *Al-Haris*, September-October 1981.

⁷⁹ Muntazah Park, the principal recreational area in Aden, for example, is said to be the scene of gang fights among youths due to the absence of any police (14 October, Apr. 4, 1983). Drinking and fighting among youth are also said to occur openly in Aden cinemas (*Al-Thawri*, Apr. 17, 1982). In Crater, one of the sections of Aden, the police have only one car, and when fights break out they reportedly respond by saying they are "too busy" to intervene (*Al-Thawri*, May 8, 1982).

⁸⁰ Although the commander of the Civil Police claims that units exist throughout the country "under various forms," the editor of *Al-Thawri* concludes that in some cases "it simply doesn't exist" (*Al-Thawri*, July 28, 1984).

⁸¹ For example, in one locality in the Second Governorate the committee's offices are usually closed, and its activity is haphazard (14 October, Dec. 30, 1983). This is even true of some local units in Crater (14 October *Usbu'i*, Mar. 2, 1984). Claimed membership for the Popular Defense Committees as of the end of 1983 is 173,000 (*Al-Masir* [Aden], November 1983).

⁸² 14 October, July 5, 1982. Likewise, in the Fifth Governorate, the distribution of ID cards is still "continuing." In some districts of the latter governorate, none have been issued because "there is no administrative machinery there" (*ibid.*, Jan. 10, 1984). Reportedly, an ID is required for travel between governorates, and, in general, "it helps to enhance security functions and facilitates the duties of the police" (*ibid.*, June 14, 1984).

⁸³ *Al-Haris*, January 1982.

⁸⁴ 14 October, Mar. 28, 1983, discussing the Second Governorate.

⁸⁵ *Al-Haris*, September-October, 1981. In some areas, such as the town of Al-Dali, the local populace avoids bringing disputes to the government courts at all (*Al-Thawri*, Aug. 4, 1984).

⁸⁶ 14 October, June 18, 1982.

⁸⁷ *Al-Thawri*, Apr. 2, 1983. Indeed, it appears that lately the government officials designated to provide "guidance" and to "raise consciousness" are not going to the countryside, and that the "education" programs there are not being implemented (*ibid.*, Feb. 13, 1982). Likewise, Peasant Union officials in Abyan are not active and do not even go into the countryside (14 October *Usbu'i*, June 29, 1984). Even claimed membership for the Peasant Union was only 22,000 as of the end of 1983 (*Al-Masir*, November 1983).



Students photographed in March 1983 at the Yemeni Socialist Party Central Committee's Higher School of Scientific Socialism.

—TASS from SOVFOTO

Under the circumstances, even in the total absence of any popular resistance to change, the government's policies on social change would encounter major problems in being implemented. Thanks to an impressive military apparatus, the government has proved adequate to the task of dealing effectively with overt political challenges. But, lacking adequate alternative structures to carry out needed social functions, such as adjudication, administration, or the enforcement of ordinary law and order, the government will find it particularly difficult to succeed in the more complex task of reshaping the society.

Soviet Assistance

Given the general underdevelopment of the PDRY, Aden has had to rely extensively on outside guidance and participation in social development. Given the regime's socialist orientation, it has turned particularly to the Soviet bloc for help in this area. There is a substantial Soviet presence in many aspects of the local govern-

ment machinery as a result—quite apart from an extensive position in the military. Soviet and East European experts serve in positions from which they can monitor the local regime, exert their influence, and establish contacts and clients at all levels of society.

The Soviet-bloc influence is particularly evident in training programs for South Yemenis. At present, there are more than 1,200 South Yemeni students in the Soviet Union.⁸⁸ In June 1984 an agreement was signed between Havana University and Aden University, enabling graduates of the latter to go to Cuba for graduate studies. In addition, there are many Soviet and East European instructors in the PDRY. For example, about 40 percent of the teaching staff at Aden's Law School are from Soviet-bloc countries, and an East German adviser oversees the country's kindergarten program.⁸⁹ YSP members study in party schools in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, while Moscow has set up the

⁸⁸14 October *Usbu'i*, Dec. 7, 1984.

⁸⁹14 October, Nov. 10, 1983, and June 4, 1982.

Higher School of Scientific Socialism in Aden, with branches in other cities, for which the USSR and East Germany provide instructors. According to President Ali Nasir, over 20,000 individuals have attended courses.⁹⁰

The Soviets and East Germans have also trained many of the PDRY's journalists, and a new press cooperation protocol between Moscow and Aden was signed in October 1983.⁹¹ The Soviets are now building an earth station in the PDRY to link that country to the Soviet Intersputnik satellite communications net. This will bring in radio and television programs from the Eastern bloc, and will also facilitate direct communications between Moscow and Aden.⁹²

Cubans advise the Popular Defense Committees, which deal with everyday social matters as well as with security. East Germans provide personnel to work with ISHID; and a multi-team Soviet research mission is conducting fieldwork on the PDRY's cultural development programs.⁹³

Conclusion

One may draw several conclusions regarding the course of social change in the PDRY. There is, first of all, a major gap between official theory and pronouncements, on the one hand, and the actual situation, on the other. Change has been less extensive than is usually claimed or assumed, and may often be more a matter of form than of substance.

Social transformation has not been noticeably more rapid in the PDRY than elsewhere in the Arab world.⁹⁴ In some respects—e.g., veiling of women, tribal loyalty—South Yemen's society is, if anything, still more "traditional" than that in some of the other Arab states.⁹⁵ The principal exception is, of course, Aden.

This is not to say that there has been no change in South Yemeni society since 1967, even if the impetus has not always come from the government (e.g., witness the growing involvement of women in black market operations). Although societal change has been less than projected, or claimed, the Marxist-Leninist YSP regime remains committed to changing society radically and has shown a willingness to challenge traditional power bases. Severe material constraints and tactical considerations in response to general inertia explain the regime's gradual and incomplete application of its plans for society. The long-term agenda for reshaping society, however, remains—supported by ideological models and the interests of power politics. The continuing emphasis on developing a loyal party cadre, in particular, points to a long-term commitment to the creation of a regime infrastructure that will one day be able to impose its will on society. The success or failure of the YSP's growth will be a major factor in determining the regime's ability to coerce and convince. The regime already long ago succeeded in excluding other organized forces from the political process.

The pace and extent of the projected destruction of traditional social institutions and values give signs of becoming a point of contention, however, both between Moscow and Aden and within the PDRY government. The Soviet Union appears to favor a more radical policy even at the possible cost of engendering popular domestic opposition in the PDRY.⁹⁶ The Soviets seem to find irritating President Ali Nasir's more pragmatic, sometimes indirect, approach.⁹⁷

Soviet doubts may be compounded by Ali Nasir's attempts, albeit tentative, to establish better ties with his Arab neighbors and the West.⁹⁸ Ali Ba Dhib (the doctrinaire pro-Moscow secretary of the Central Committee of

⁹⁰Interview in *Al-Nahj* magazine, found as a supplement to *Al-Thawri*, May 5, 1984, p. 61.

⁹¹The PDRY's Media Institute (founded in 1980) adopted in its entirety a curriculum put together by Moscow University. The Institute is still affiliated to the latter and to two institutes in Eastern Europe, and there are Soviet and East European instructors on the faculty. Since its establishment, nearly 400 South Yemeni media workers have graduated (*Al-Raya*, Apr. 29, 1984).

⁹²14 October, Aug. 2, 1984.

⁹³One part of the mission's activities consists of compiling a tribal and ethnographic map of the Hadramawt and of Socotra Island through fieldwork in the countryside (*ibid.*, Apr. 9, 1984). This can provide the researchers with first-hand knowledge of who's who in the tribal system and how it functions, as well as facilitate the establishment of contacts. Given the continuing importance of tribal politics in the PDRY, this knowledge could be of considerable importance to those who possess it.

⁹⁴The results achieved are even more disproportionate to the effort if one takes into consideration the human suffering and loss of life that have accompanied the PDRY government's application of its plans for social change. During the first few years after independence alone, about one-fourth of the country's total population fled abroad. See Robert W. Stookey, *South Yemen, a Marxist Republic in Arabia*, Boulder, CO, and London, Westview, 1982, p. 67.

⁹⁵This is also true of some social ills, such as child labor, which is reportedly still common, for example, in Aden's markets (14 October *Usbu'i*, July 20, 1984).

⁹⁶E.g., *Pravda* of Nov. 30, 1983, assessing the potential for social change in the PDRY's Fifth Governorate, noted that "it will not be easy to reach the projected goals.... Social and cultural progress will entail a *painful break* with outmoded customs, traditions, and religious beliefs" (emphasis added). An article in *Al-Thawri* of July 28, 1984, on the other hand, stresses gradual change, noting that "any haste or arbitrary action which accompanies this process of change will only have a contrary effect."

⁹⁷A Soviet journalist visiting Aden noted, for example, that "hawkers ply their simple wares right on the sidewalk" (*Izvestiya* [Moscow], Nov. 19, 1983), hinting that the local government was lax in its enforcement of its ideological duties to shrink the private sector. Evaluating the PDRY government's policy of allowing returning workers to open a small business, a Soviet expert on the country expressed his skepticism that this was a positive process: "Naturally this [i.e., its utility] will depend on the effectiveness of state control, the state sector's strength, the strength of party influence on the state apparatus, and, ultimately, on whether the party implements its leading role in society" (see V. V. Naumkin, "Democratic Yemen on the Path of Socialist Orientation," in *Noveyshaya Istoriya Iemena, 1917–1982 gg.*, [The Recent History of Yemen, 1917–1982], Moscow, Nauka, 1984, p. 212). Admonitions to the effect that the YSP needs to pay greater attention to "the consolidation [of its] ideological, political, and organizational unity" (*Pravda*, Nov. 14, 1983) can also be interpreted as signs of Moscow's discontent with Ali Nasir's policies.

⁹⁸A major article in *Pravda* of Apr. 2, 1984, reminded readers of Saudi Arabia's allegedly continuing role in training PDRY exiles opposed to the Aden regime, indicating that a major rapprochement with Riyadh would not be correct for Aden.

the YSP), for example, lashed out at "many" who think that the PDRY should have equally good relations with all states,⁹⁹ an attack that could be read as a swipe at Ali Nasir and other would-be moderates in Aden. Quoting Ba Dhib, *Pravda* shortly thereafter subtly reminded anyone who might have forgotten that the USSR plays an important role in the PDRY's development.¹⁰⁰

Indications are that during a YSP Central Committee plenum in mid-1984, Ali Nasir was accused of "being impotent from an ideological point of view to lead the political ideology of the party." There were calls from some members that former President Abd al-Fattah Isma'il, a hard-liner, be allowed to return from Moscow, where he had been living in exile since Nasir ousted him in 1980, and a number of anti-Nasir, Isma'il supporters were also brought into the Politburo.¹⁰¹ Interviewed shortly thereafter about rumors of splits within the YSP leadership, Ali Nasir acknowledged that "it is natural if there are contradictions or conflicts," but he assured the interviewer that "the minority" would submit to "the majority."¹⁰² Such expressions of confidence notwithstanding, Nasir was forced to accept the return of Isma'il in March 1985,¹⁰³ although the duties and degree of influence of the returned party figure remain unclear as of this writing. It is increasingly evident that Ali Nasir will find it hard not to accept more input from Moscow on the PDRY's future course, even if Isma'il is not given a major role to play.

The reemerging influence of the more hard-line faction has been reflected in a marked increase in ideological material in the media in 1984, as well as in a renewed emphasis on developing the mass organizations, and especially the YSP. Isma'il and his faction were known for their desire for a more rapid building of a socialist system, with a focus on a hard line vis-à-vis private property and religion. Given his North Yemeni origins, he also promoted de-tribalization as a means of undercutting his southern rivals' power bases. Tougher enforcement and security measures accompanied his greater radicalism. Such differences over social policy could contribute to further political infighting between "radicals" and "moderates" within the YSP.



Abd al-Fattah Isma'il speaking at the 60th-anniversary observance of the Great October Socialist Revolution in Moscow's Kremlin in November 1977.

—TASS from SOVФОТО

The fact that foreign participation is so extensive, however, may add more fuel to popular opposition to government measures for social change. South Yemeni émigré organizations have seized on this factor in their propaganda efforts, portraying Aden's programs as Soviet-inspired. South Yemenis already have an ingrained mistrust of foreigners, exacerbated by a history of attempted control by outside powers. If ordinary South Yemenis do identify contemporary changes with a foreign source, this would likely encourage them to resist such changes (whether actively or passively) even more strenuously than would otherwise be the case.

The widely shared experience of employment abroad among non-Yemenis—opposed until recently by the PDRY government—may reduce the cultural and politi-

⁹⁹ *Al-Thawri*, Jan. 27, 1984.

¹⁰⁰ *Pravda*, Apr. 2, 1984.

¹⁰¹ *Al-Siyasah*, June 28, 1984, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: The Middle East and North Africa* (Washington, DC), July 2, 1984, p. C/6.

The Soviets clearly favored Isma'il's return to the PDRY, having allowed him to play an increasingly visible role in Moscow, where in early 1984 he was permitted to meet with visiting Arab politicians (see *Al-Ahram* [London], July 14, 1984).

¹⁰² According to Ali Nasir, "the question of the development of the new forms of property, that is the public and the cooperative sectors, played a big role in the debates of the Central Committee" (14 October, June 21, 1984).

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, Mar. 5, 1985.

cal fragmentation that has characterized South Yemeni society for so long and lead to a sense of an overriding South Yemeni identity. Yet, there is the possibility that this new unity could foster increasingly vocal conservative opposition to the government's social policies for the first time on a countrywide rather than localized basis. The thousands of South Yemenis working in the Gulf states may be affected by ideas of an Islamic polity emanating from Iran, or be bitten by the capitalist bug. The impact of such trends might be magnified if large numbers of workers should return to the PDRY due to an economic slowdown in the Gulf countries. The gap between their beliefs and ideals and those of the government would likely become particularly wide since those returning workers probably could not be easily re-absorbed into the PDRY's economy. Perhaps, too, the sojourn of so many men abroad will lead to South Yemeni women's entry into the domestic labor force in greater numbers, though not necessarily in activities that the government would favor.

It seems safe to expect that, for the foreseeable future, the PDRY government will continue to face a dilemma. It can, on the one hand, try to impose its own ideological blueprint on society, even though lacking the wherewithal to offer sufficient material incentives and having inadequate administrative machinery. Yet such an effort clashes with deeply held ethical values and economic interests of much of the population. The very fact of the government's increasing role and control over the individual runs counter to South Yemeni traditions of local and individual autonomy, and the discontent likely to be generated could, eventually, spill over into the political realm. Or, on the other hand, as has happened in some areas, e.g., women's affairs and private business, the government can relax the implementation of its social policies in order to mitigate opposition. However, it thereby risks seeing society develop according to patterns that could prove inimical to the ideological goals and continued stability of the regime.

In particular, for Ali Nasir the dilemma will be whether to adopt, under pressure from Moscow and hard-liners



Peasants from the village of Shu'aib in the South Yemen's Second Governorate pay a visit home after a spell of working abroad.

—Maxine Molyneux/Camera Press.

within the YSP, a more radical domestic policy and thus risk greater popular discontent or to carry on as at present in the awareness that his hard-line rivals and their Soviet backers may move to limit further his power or perhaps even replace him.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁴Such a further shift in favor of the radicals could occur at the YSP Congress scheduled for October 1985. This could put in doubt the continuation of Ali Nasir's more moderate approach to social change as well as alienate the PDRY's neighbors, thus upsetting Ali Nasir's policy of détente, which is designed to garner aid from the wealthy Gulf states.

Notes

Conspiring to Kill the Pope

Paul B. Henze

EVIDENCE continues to mount confirming the involvement of Bulgaria in the plot to assassinate Pope John Paul II. Extensive investigations in Turkey and Italy have resulted in indictments and trials in both countries. From the information released so far, it is reasonable to expect that these cases will prove Bulgarian complicity in the acts of Mehmet Ali Ağca and his accomplice Oral Çelik. However, in light of the vigorous campaign of disinformation being perpetrated by the Bulgarians and their Soviet backers, and the tendency of some less biased observers to doubt the mounting documentation, it is useful to summarize at this time the most significant of the new findings.¹

The notion that Ağca could have been a lone Muslim fanatic is now untenable. A conspiratorial network consisting of more than a dozen players has been exposed. The long and close ties of Turkish Mafia "Godfather" Abuzer Uğurlu to Bulgaria and his direct sponsorship of Ağca have now been confirmed. The same is true of Bekir Çelenk, who still enjoys asylum in Sofia despite repeated Turkish and Italian requests for his extradition.² Moreover, a check through the documenta-

tion gives a basis for some reasoned conjecture about the possible sequence of events and actions that led to Ağca's selection for the operation against the Pope.

"Progressive" Activist in Bulgarian Pay

The time-consuming and thorough reinvestigation of Ağca's confessed role in the February 1, 1979, murder of *Milliyet* editor Abdi İpekçi that was launched by the Turkish government in early 1983, clearly reveals Ağca to have been a "progressive" activist in Bulgarian pay. The investigation probed in detail into the operations of the notorious Uğurlu, in the process exposing a broad panorama of trafficking in drugs and arms through Bulgaria.³ It also revealed widespread corruption in the Turkish police, security, and customs services, and the involvement of both Bulgaria and Syria in many aspects of terrorism. Col. Hanefi Öncül, the military judge in charge of the reinvestigation, completed a 53-page report on January 16, 1984. As a result, Uğurlu and 23 other defendants were charged with having organized İpekçi's murder; they were placed on trial in Ankara on March 24, 1984. Only half of the defendants are in Turkish custody; the rest, including Ağca and his closest associates, Çelik and Yalçın Özbey, are elsewhere. As of early April 1985, the trial was still in progress, with Uğurlu also a defendant in two related trials.

¹These comments are extracted from a postscript chapter for the paperback edition of my book, *The Plot to Kill the Pope*, published in 1983 by Charles Scribners Sons, Inc., New York, and by Croom Helm, Ltd., London and Canberra. The present text is copyrighted © 1985 by the author.

²Evidence of Çelenk's complicity continues to accumulate and has been voluminously reported in the Turkish press. See, e.g., *Hürriyet* (Istanbul), Apr. 1, Sept. 1, and Nov. 6 and 11, 1984.

³US journalists and congressmen have focused increasing attention on these matters. See, e.g., Nathan Adams, "Drugs for Guns," *Reader's Digest* (Pleasantville, NY), January 1984; "Bulgarian Connection to Illicit Arms Trade is Found," *The Wall Street Journal* (New York), Aug. 10, 1984; "Drugs—the Secret Arm of the East," *Panorama* (Rome), Aug. 13, 1984; "Drugs and Terrorism, 1984," Hearings before the Subcommittee on Alcoholism and Drug Abuse of the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, US Senate, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1984; and "Bulgarian-Turkish Narcotics Connection: United States—Bulgarian Relations and International Drug Trafficking," Hearings and Markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, US House of Representatives, June 7, July 24, Sept. 26, 1984, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1984.

Paul B. Henze is a Resident Consultant at The RAND Corporation (Washington, DC). He has served on the staff of the US National Security Council, and was a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars in 1982. He is the author of *The Plot to Kill the Pope* (1983).

The Turkish investigation has helped to clarify the role in Ağca's early activities of Çelik, a school friend from Malatya,⁴ who—from Italian judge Illario Martella's investigation and Ağca's own testimony—has been identified as the mysterious "second man" in the shooting of the Pope in St. Peter's Square. The shadowy Çelik, once dramatized by a few Turkish journalists assisting in Soviet disinformation efforts as proof of Ağca's rightist orientation,⁵ turns out to have been as closely tied to Uğurlu and the Bulgarians as Ağca himself. Neither was a religious fanatic or a rightist militant. However, they also do not appear to have been working solely for money or adventure. Rather, the evidence indicates that they were working for the program implemented by Bulgaria and Syria to destabilize Turkey and that they had adopted what they termed anti-capitalist, anti-NATO, anti-Western views.

The most dramatic testimony supporting this conclusion comes from the report compiled by two Turkish judges who interrogated Ağca in Italy in the summer of 1983. This 88-page document reveals that:

- Ağca went to Syria with Teslim Töre, leader of the pro-Moscow communist Turkish People's Liberation Army, in the summer of 1978 for comprehensive training. During this training, Töre and Ağca met Bulgarian agents in Damascus and received money from them to take back to Turkey to support the subversive activities of two extreme-left labor groups.

- Working under the direct tutelage of Abuzer Uğurlu in Istanbul, Ağca, Töre, Çelik, and others established an organization with the aim of undermining "capitalism" and severing Turkey's NATO ties.

- Both as cover and to draw rightists into supporting anti-Western goals, Ağca developed a wide range of associations with members of Col. Alparslan Türkeş's Gray Wolves, but he never joined the National Action Party or became a Gray Wolf himself. He was not involved with Islamic fundamentalism.

- Uğurlu was in continual contact with Bulgarian agents working out of the Bulgarian consulate in Istanbul. He supplied arms not only to all sides in Turkey, but also—via Turkey—to both the Right and the Left in Iran.⁶

Ağca's own words, cited at length in this report, give a highly revealing picture of his activities and outlook at the time—he was then in his 21st year and nominally an economics student at Istanbul University:

In Syria . . . we were trained by Bulgarian specialists. This training involved the use of weapons, explosives, cold war concepts, how to carry out coups d'état, and

related revolutionary theory.

I met Bekir Çelenk in Abuzer's office [in Istanbul]. . . . I took part in meetings of the Gray Wolves, but I always went alone. I also followed the activity of the Maoist-leaning Turkish Peasants' and Workers' Party [Turkish initials: TIKP]. In the fall of 1978, I had contacts with a member of the Dutch Communist Party . . . to work out a relationship between this party and the TIKP. Basically, both parties were Maoist. Their activities were having the effect of dividing leftist forces. I was charged with finding out whether there were common points between these two organizations. Teslim Töre had given me this task, and he himself was acting on behalf of the Bulgarians. All these things were part of our strategy.

In saying "we," I mean Oral Çelik and Teslim Töre besides myself. This strategy was directed toward first separating Turkey from the Western powers and drawing it into the nonaligned group and then had the aim of getting it to join the Warsaw Pact. The reason for our activity was ideological. But I can also say that there was the adventure factor in addition. In that period I saw myself as a progressive . . . from a political point of view we had relations with hundreds of members of both the Right and the Left as well as the Mafia . . . [who] were to play a secondary role to our own. . . . Our goal was to fight against the Western democracies and destroy them. . . . Bulgaria was seen as the country that could help us achieve our aim. . . . Teslim Töre and Abuzer Uğurlu . . . were in partnership for different reasons: [Töre] was working for purely revolutionary reasons; [Uğurlu] to make money off the weapons traffic.

. . . even from that time I was very well-known to the Bulgarian secret services. As a matter of fact, with Abuzer Uğurlu acting as intermediary, I and other members of my organization (Oral Çelik, Teslim Töre, Yalçın Özbey) did reports for the Bulgarian authorities relating to how the Turkish state would develop in the future. . . .

Ipekçi Killing—a "Rehearsal"?

As noted, the primary objective of the Turkish reinvestigations was to clarify circumstances surround-

⁴This and other key information in the Turkish prosecutor's report are summarized in *The Wall Street Journal*, July 17, 1984.

⁵E.g., Uğur Muncu, *Ağca Dosyası*, Istanbul, Tekin Yayınevi, 1983. See Henze, *The Plot to Kill the Pope*, pp. 146-48.

⁶This report has not yet been officially released. A great deal of information from it has appeared in the Turkish press during the past year-and-a-half. Extensive textual excerpts from it were published in *Hürriyet*, Feb. 1, 1985, and analyzed in *Yeni Forum* (Ankara), Feb. 15, 1985. I published a long summary of this material in *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), Mar. 6, 1985.

ing the assassination of İpekçi. But some of the information which surfaced has implications for the plot against the Pope. In this respect, it is important to keep in mind two key findings:

- No religious motivation of any kind has come to light in the assassination of İpekçi. Muslim fundamentalism played no role. Ağca was cultivating ties in many directions, but none with Muslim fundamentalists or with Necmettin Erbakan's demagogic National Salvation Party.

- No direct links between Ağca and any key leader of the National Action Party have been uncovered in the trial of Türkeş and other leaders of that party, which began in the spring of 1981 and is yet to be concluded. The alleged (undated) letter from Ağca to Türkeş expressing loyalty to him is thus further discredited.⁷

In lengthy conversations with Turkish interrogators about the background of the İpekçi murder, Ağca insisted that he had no personal or even ideological motive for participating in it; it was simply part of the work he and his friends were doing for Uğurlu.

The one who selected us was Abuzer Uğurlu. . . . Abuzer, in order to protect himself better in his smuggling activities did not want to pick someone from the flock of people he worked with [directly]. . . . In case one of us were arrested, it would be thought of as a political crime of the kind which students were engaging in.

To Ağca's knowledge, the killing was not planned long in advance, yet Uğurlu considered it urgent:

In a meeting in his office in January 1979, Abuzer reminded us that we were committed to carry out the İpekçi assassination project by the first of February or within the first week of February and urged us to speed up the job.

Ağca's characteristic self-importance led him to describe himself as a major figure in planning the İpekçi operation—making decisions about the place and time of the attack and reconnoitering the site in the days preceding it.⁸ Yet, he now insists that he did not do the shooting, claiming that he had confessed in 1979 to protect his accomplices.

Are we to believe him? Ağca has an obvious motive in retracting his July 1979 Istanbul confession and seeking review in Turkey of his April 28, 1980, death sentence (in absentia). If that sentence can be commuted to a lesser one, he can be released in Italy for extradition to Turkey. And if he could clear himself of responsibility for

actually committing the İpekçi murder and avoid other murder charges, he could hope eventually—with reduction of sentences in both Italy and Turkey for good behavior and collaboration with the authorities—to salvage some of his life in his own country. Recent reports from Italy confirm that this is his current thinking.⁹

The issue is of more than incidental interest, relating as it does to the much larger question of whether the İpekçi assassination might not have been a dress rehearsal for an attack on the Pope already being planned. Suggestive coincidences emerge if we compare probable stages in the evolution of the latter scheme with developments directly affecting Ağca.

When Ağca and his friends were in the final phase of planning the İpekçi murder, the Pope was in Mexico taking a strong stand against liberation theology, a position sure to irritate Moscow (which pointedly failed to report the visit of John Paul II to Mexico). The success of the İpekçi caper in contributing to destabilization in Turkey without the slightest hint of involvement by Uğurlu or his Bulgarian connection must have pleased the old men in the Kremlin. The transfer to Sofia of Moscow's highly effective Ambassador to Cuba, Nikita Tolubeyev, must have been decided at about this time (Tolubeyev arrived sometime in the summer of 1979 and was recalled to Moscow in the summer of 1983, at a time when public recognition of the Bulgarian connection in the plot was growing).¹⁰

If there was a plan for action against John Paul II taking shape in Moscow in the spring of 1979, the Pope's visit to Poland in the second week of June could have caused it to crystallize. What I had not previously considered was the possibility that Ağca might already have been chosen as prospective assassin by this time. It has always seemed peculiar that following İpekçi's murder Ağca had remained in Istanbul, rather than going to a remote part of the country, or abroad. If he did not actually pull the trigger in the İpekçi assassination, there was perhaps less reason for him to flee. But might not Uğurlu and the Bulgarians have been keeping him in a holding pattern for an as yet unidentified future operation?

The circumstances of Ağca's exposure and capture on June 25, 1979, have still not been explained; e.g., the large monetary reward offered by the Turkish jour-

⁷See *The Plot to Kill the Pope*, p. 188.

⁸Ağca may have been pretending to have more knowledge than he had of the background of the İpekçi killing. One must allow for the possibility that (1) the killing was planned, at least tentatively, well before the plan was disclosed by Uğurlu to Ağca and his friends, and (2) that the real political motivation was never fully explained to them.

⁹See, e.g., a headline story in *Hürriyet*, Nov. 14, 1984.

¹⁰On Tolubeyev, see *The Plot to Kill the Pope*, pp. 102–03.

nalists' association was never claimed. Ağca was apprehended in a well-known Gray Wolf gathering place on the basis of an anonymous telephone call. He confessed almost immediately upon being taken into custody. Everything was set up to make him look like a rightist and a loner. Was he acting out a prearranged role? Is it accidental that he surfaced within two weeks of the Pope's visit to Poland?

From the available interrogation reports, Ağca makes clear that he had been assured he would be rescued and was confident enough of rescue to confess to a crime that he may not even have committed, a crime that carried a mandatory death penalty. Other rewards must have been promised, since love of adventure or leftist ideology hardly seems sufficient to justify his having taken so great a personal risk.¹¹

Ağca's confidence lasted until his trial got under way in October 1979, at which point he signaled to his sponsors that he might talk if not rescued. His escape from prison on the night of November 23, 1979, came just days before a visit of the Pope to Turkey. What we now know of Ağca's close association with the Bulgarians increases the likelihood that the letter he then wrote to *Milliyet* threatening John Paul II was composed under Bulgarian guidance, either direct or based on instructions passed to him through Uğurlu. If so, it would have been the first open move toward implementing a plan that had been in the making for nearly a year.

The next essential step would have been to strengthen the image of Ağca as a fanatic Muslim. This may explain his otherwise inexplicable trip to Iran. Curiously, according to Ağca's testimony, he finally crossed into Iran via Iğdır, near the border of Soviet Armenia, and spent several months in the small town of Mākū, in a Kurdish area of Iranian Azerbaijan before returning to Turkey, again at Iğdır.¹² While in Iran, he could have been contacted by Soviet agents. As it is, Ağca admitted to Judge Martella that during this period he was in touch with members of the Tudeh (Iranian communist) party.¹³ This is an odd association for a reputedly rightist, fanatical Muslim Turk.

After he returned from Iran, Ağca remained in Turkey for two months. Uğurlu looked out for him, provided him

money and an Indian passport in the name of Yoginder Singh, and presumably arranged for Ağca to go to Bulgaria in the company, it seems, of Çelik. Ağca crossed from Turkey to Bulgaria at the Kapikule border post at the beginning of July 1980 with the help of customs guards on both sides. (It is perhaps significant that at this time, the Solidarity movement in Poland had burgeoned to the point where the shaky Warsaw government would soon have to recognize it officially, and the Polish Pope was causing the Kremlin leaders ever greater pain.) In Bulgaria, Ağca was introduced by Çelenk to a Bulgarian security officer called "Sotir Kolev," who discussed action against the Pope. Kolev was actually Todor Ayzavov, "cashier" of the Bulgarian embassy in Rome.¹⁴ The cards were now on the table, and Ağca was doubtless flattered at being selected as a key actor in a historic drama. The Bulgarians trusted him, and he would profit handsomely. Henceforth his Turkish Mafia and Gray Wolf associates would play supporting roles, while he and Çelik—the star players—would depend directly on the Bulgarians for guidance.

The Martella Investigation

Long awaited and frequently delayed, Judge Martella's 1,243-page report was finally delivered on October 26, 1984. It summarized and analyzed more than 25,000 pages of testimony. The longest chapter—running 123 pages—was devoted to the Bulgarian connection, which it establishes beyond all reasonable doubt and in great detail.¹⁵ The Martella Report has not yet been released in its entirety, nor is the voluminous documentation upon which it is based yet open to the public. This will take place only after the completion of the trials that resulted from indictments based on the report. However, many of the details of the Martella investigation were already revealed in June 1984 in a 78-page summary by Italian State Prosecutor Antonio Albano.¹⁶

Martella's investigation drew on all relevant records of the Italian police and security services; reports of investigations in Turkey, Switzerland, Austria, West Germany, and other countries; ballistics tests and other technical

¹¹Megalomania may have been a factor, as suggested by Ağca's extraordinary appearance on Istanbul television in July 1979, but mental unbalance clearly was not. Since writing my book, I have interviewed both Turkish and Italian psychiatrists who had examined Ağca, and all agree that he is normal and mentally stable. (The notion that he was mentally retarded, was a psychopath, or suffered from schizophrenia is a common theme played on by those attempting to deny an Eastern connection in the attempt on the Pope's life.)

¹²From Turkish interrogation of Ağca in Rome, as published in *Hürriyet*, Feb. 1, 1985. Additional detail on Ağca's actions and contacts during the period between his escape and his crossing to Iran is provided in the investigation report of Col. Öncül delivered on January 16, 1984; nothing in this information conflicts with Ağca's summary.

¹³*Hürriyet*, Nov. 28, 1984.

¹⁴During his cooperative interrogation in the summer of 1982, Ağca identified "Kolev" as Ayzavov when presented with photos of the Bulgarians with whom he had dealt in Rome. Ayzavov departed from Rome on November 12, 1982, less than two weeks before the arrest of Sergei Antonov. Zhelyo Vasiliev, a third Bulgarian implicated in the plot, had already been recalled to Sofia on August 24, 1982. See Claire Sterling, *Time of the Assassins; Anatomy of an Investigation*, New York, Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1983, pp. 146–49.

¹⁵Martella's report was first summarized in *The New York Times*, Oct. 27, 1984. Key sections of the report were published in *ibid.*, Nov. 1, 1984.

¹⁶Claire Sterling gave the first and most complete account of Albano's summary in *The New York Times*, June 10, 1984.

reports; medical reports and psychiatric evaluations; press reports; testimony and depositions from an enormous range of witnesses and individuals with information bearing on the case or on the alibis of the Bulgarians and Turks implicated in it. It also includes excerpts and analysis of the extensive and detailed conversations that Martella had with Ağca and with the Turkish accomplices extradited to Italy during the investigation (Musa Serdar, Çelebi, Ömer Mersan, and Ömer Bağci), as well as interviews Martella conducted in the course of travels to Bulgaria, Turkey, and elsewhere in Europe. He gave careful attention to the alibis and claims of Sergei Antonov and the two Bulgarians who fled to Sofia. In addition, he acknowledged receiving from the Bulgarian Prosecutor General's Office "a complete indictment of Ağca addressed to the Italian judiciary," a polemical document Martella reportedly found "characterized by abnormality and partiality."¹⁷ Martella dismissed all the elaborate and deceptive alibis that the Bulgarians concocted and purveyed to Western journalists to deflect the investigation, and recommended trial of Bulgarian plotters Antonov, Zhelyo Vasiliev, and Ayvazov, and Turkish plotters Çelik, Çelebi, Çelenk, and Bağci. Only Antonov, Çelebi, and Bağci are in Italy; the others must be tried in absentia.

The most significant new information gathered in the course of Martella's investigation relates to:

- The direct and continuous participation by the three Bulgarian intelligence operatives (Antonov, Vasiliev, and Ayvazov) in preparation for the May 13, 1981, shooting in St. Peter's Square.
- Identification of Çelik as a second gunman who shot at the Pope (probably grazing the Pope's hand) but who failed to release the panic bombs he carried.
- Unusual Bulgarian advance clearance arrangements for a customs-sealed truck which did depart from the Bulgarian embassy in Rome the evening of the assassination attempt—presumably taking Çelik to asylum—or liquidation?—in Bulgaria.¹⁸
- Meetings in Bulgaria as early as July 1980 on plans for killing the Pope.
- The extensive network of seemingly rightist Turks, centered around Çelenk and Çelebi, who supported and financed Ağca (and presumably Çelik) during the months preceding the attack.

As significant as the positive information Martella collected is the total absence of any substantiation for the

allegations by Moscow, Sofia, and other sympathizers that there was Muslim, Nazi, NATO, American, fascist, or Italian-security support and manipulation of Ağca and his accomplices. Prosecutor Albano dismissed this vast outpouring of falsehood and disinformation as "archaic cold war propaganda."¹⁹

The interrogation of Ağca took a peculiar turn at the time of the June 1983 kidnaping of Emanuela Orlandi, the 15-year-old daughter of a minor Vatican official, which to this day has not been solved. As soon as he learned of this development, four days after it occurred, Ağca appears to have seen it as a belated attempt by his sponsors to bargain for his release. Consequently, on June 28, he officially retracted testimony bearing on an aborted plan to kill Lech Wałęsa during the latter's visit to Rome in January 1981. Martella made a conscious decision not to try to reach conclusions about the Wałęsa sub-plot, but meticulous analysis of data in the Martella report has led Claire Sterling to conclude that there had, indeed, been a plan to kill Wałęsa and that it involved a fourth Bulgarian—Ivan Tomov Donchev—who was probably the senior Bulgarian security officer in Rome at the time.²⁰

Martella's investigation has substantiated the thesis that Antonov was not the top Bulgarian mounting the plot and that he may have been the last to be brought in on it. Antonov's role was primarily that of a support agent, and he may not have been an agent of KDS (*Komitet na Durzhavna Sigurnost*—Committee for State Security, counterpart of the Soviet KGB), since the kind of cover position he occupied is usually reserved for members of Bulgaria's RO (*Razuznavatelen Otdel*—the equivalent of the Soviet GRU or military intelligence). Donchev stayed in the background of the plot against the Pope, but may have been the senior Bulgarian in Rome responsible for it. Ayvazov was quite clearly the principal officer charged directly with managing it.

The Martella Report confirms the pressure under which the Bulgarians in Rome were operating, but does

¹⁹Over and over again the principal Soviet "specialist" on the plot, *Literturnaya Gazeta's* "roving reporter" Yona Andronov, has contrived new "evidence" trying to prove that the two American researchers who have done the most to expose the Soviet-Bulgarian plot—Claire Sterling and myself—were themselves the architects of the assassination plot, operating under CIA orders. On Andronov's original 1983 series, see my article "Misinformation and Disinformation in the Plot to Kill the Pope," *Survey* (London), Autumn-Winter 1983, pp. 2–21. An even more imaginative Andronov series, based on a claimed three-year "investigation," appeared in 1984 (see *Literturnaya Gazeta*, Sept. 26, Oct. 3 and 10, 1984).

A curious sideplay in this disinformation effort came with the 1983 defection to the West of Oleg Bitov, a *Literturnaya Gazeta* editor, who before re-defecting in 1984, described Andronov as a KGB functionary. Bitov himself published a long article in *Literturnaya Gazeta* on Mar. 6, 1985, in which he for the first time joined the debate, repeating the entire Andronov line.

²⁰For Sterling's analysis of the Wałęsa sub-plot, see *The New York Times*, Oct. 27, 1984. On Donchev, see Sterling's *Time of the Assassins*, pp. 143, 208–10. For background, see Vittoriofranco S. Pisano, "Clandestine Operations in Italy: the Bulgarian Connection," *Conflict Quarterly* (New Brunswick), Winter 1984, pp. 28–38.

¹⁷See, e.g., *The New York Times*, Oct. 27 and Nov. 1, 1984. Also discussed in the British, Italian, and Turkish press.

¹⁸No trace has been found of Çelik. A report in *Time* (New York), Mar. 25, 1985, that Çelik has been seen in Switzerland remains to be confirmed.

not address the probable cause. As I have suggested in the original edition of my book, this was quite probably the impending death of the Primate of Poland, Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński in Warsaw.²¹

The urgency of the mission, however, is probably only one factor in the carelessness of the Bulgarians in Rome (and in many other phases of the plot as well) that is well documented by Martella. With the benefit of hindsight, one can list several other factors explaining Bulgarian shortcomings and mistakes:

- Their operational techniques did not appear careless to them—they had gotten away with them in Italy for a long time.
- They had convinced themselves that Ağca's Gray Wolf/Muslim fanatic cover would hold up, for they had already successfully exploited the Right in Turkey for leftist purposes without exposure.
- The Bulgarians in Rome, defensive about their failure when Ağca was captured, did not inform Sofia how closely implicated Antonov was; rather, they fled and left him to be caught.

This sloppiness, however, is no basis for concluding, as some have,²² that the Bulgarian security services, operating under the guidance of the KGB, could not have

mounted the plot. The evidence Martella has collected is too weighty.²³ Moreover, imagine the possibilities if Ağca had been killed or (like Çelik) had escaped. Under these circumstances Martella and his Turkish counterparts would probably not have been instructed to undertake their investigations. The Bulgarians and their backers would then have had every reason—quietly—to congratulate themselves on a highly successful intelligence operation.

But they were not so lucky. Ağca was caught, and the subsequent investigations—meticulously carried out by painstaking, dedicated Turkish and Italian jurists—have afforded us remarkable insight into the complicity of Bulgaria in the plot to kill the Pope. Without this evidence, which is increasingly being made public in ongoing judicial proceedings in Turkey and Italy, those investigating the provenance of the plot would be forced to rely on incomplete and inferential evidence, which is all that such covert operations normally afford.

²¹*The Plot to Kill the Pope*, pp. 173–74, 180.

²²See, e.g., William Hood, "Unlikely Conspiracy," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March–April 1984, pp. 67–70.

²³On this point, see *The Wall Street Journal*, Oct. 22, 1984.

Books

Vietnamese Voices

Douglas Pike

GEORGES BOUDAREL et al. *La bureaucratie au Vietnam* (The Bureaucracy in Vietnam). Paris, L'Harmattan, 1983.

NGUYEN CHI THIEN. *Flowers from Hell (Hoa Dia-Nguc)*. Translated by Huynh Sanh Thong. New Haven, CT, Yale University Southeast Asia Studies Lac Viet Series No. 1, 1984.

NGUYEN VAN CANH. *Vietnam Under Communism 1975-1982*. Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1983.

NGUYEN NGOC HUY and STEPHEN B. YOUNG. *Understanding Vietnam*. Bussum, Netherlands, DPC Information Service, 1983.

NGUYEN LONG and HARRY H. KENDALL. *After Saigon Fell: Daily Life Under the Vietnamese Communists*. Berkeley, University of California Institute of East Asian Studies, 1981.

NGUYEN NGOC NGAN, with E.E. RICHEY. *The Will of Heaven: The*

Story of One Vietnamese and the End of His World. New York, E. P. Dutton, 1982.

Cuoc Khang Chien Chong My Cuu Ngoc 1954-75; Nhung Su Kien Quan (The Anti-US Resistance War for National Salvation 1954-75: Military Events). Hanoi, People's Army Publishing House, 1980. Translated by Joint Publications Research Service (Washington, DC) as JPRS 80968, June 3, 1982.

COL. GEN. TRAN VAN TRA. *Ket Thuc Cuoc Chien Tranh 30 Nam, Tap 5: Nhung Chang Duong Lich Su Cua B-2 Thanh Dong* (Concluding the Thirty Years War, Vol. 5 of the History of the Bulwark B-2 Theater). Ho Chi Minh City, Van Nghe Publishing House, 1982. Translated by Joint Publications Research Service as JPRS 82783, February 2, 1983.

A FAMOUS American columnist once observed that the difficulty with writing about Vietnam was that everything that *could* be written about it *had* been written. He was dead wrong. Billions of words about Vietnam and its war have been dispatched in the past two decades, it is true, but almost all of them have been channeled along only a few narrow topical canyons. Vast do-

maines of the Vietnamese intellectual landscape have remained unexplored. Virtually everything every American knows about Vietnam, or thinks he knows, comes from the American press which labors under self-imposed limitations as to what constitutes news—appropriate for the front page or evening network television—and what does not. The result is that some information, frequently oversimplified, often trivial in the long reach of history, is told over and over and over, while the rest is not reported at all. If astronomy were treated in the same manner, we would know only of falling stars.

Not only has the Vietnam story to date been badly told, it has been parochially told. Reportage and interpretation have been more or less the exclusive domain of the foreigner. The Americans (and a smattering of British and Australians), and before them for a century the French, and before the French for a millenium the Chinese, have taken it upon themselves to explain Vietnam to the world, while the Vietnamese stood by more or less mute.

I should estimate that 95 percent of the Western-language books in our extensive library at the Indochina Archive at the University of California (Berkeley) were written by foreigners. Americans read these accounts—by the David Halber-

Douglas Pike, a retired US Foreign Service officer, is a specialist on Indochinese communism and the author of numerous works on the subject. He runs the Indochina Studies Program, manages the Indochina Archive, and teaches in the Department of Political Science, all at the University of California (Berkeley).

stams and the Frances Fitzgeralds¹—and think themselves informed, but what they have learned is about America not Vietnam. This monopolization has extended to the media (especially television), which never have given much space or time to interpretations by Vietnamese. And it extends to academia. In 20 years of attending what seems like an endless number of academic conferences around the world on the subject of Vietnam, rarely did I see a Vietnamese face across the table from me.

We are the poorer for it. Much of the United States's failure in Vietnam—as France's and China's before it—is traceable to the Americans not seeking out and listening with empathy to Vietnamese voices, their failure to recognize that there was selfish gain in doing so. This failure continues, and it is as imperative now as it was during the war years that Vietnamese voices be heard.

THESE thoughts were occasioned by an initial browsing through the books under review here. All eight have a common characteristic: they represent Vietnamese attempts, alone or in collaboration, to communicate with outsiders. By way of factual introduction, it is useful to begin with a thumbnail sketch of the books under review, proceeding alphabetically by author:

—*La bureaucratie au Vietnam* is a collection of essays that address the problems of "government by bureau," most of them written by important Hanoi officials. It is useful as source material and has an informative introductory essay by its French author.

—*Flowers from Hell*, a collection of poems by a North Vietnamese dissident who spent much of his life in northern prisons and reeducation camps, is a fine example of the Vietnamese tradition of poetry as contemporary history. The manuscript was smuggled out of Hanoi through the British embassy, but the author's present fate is unknown.

—*Vietnam Under Communism* examines the major sectors of the postwar Vietnam scene, including communist party politics, government leadership, foreign policy, education, and religion. It was written while the author, a former Saigon law professor and prominent member of the nationalist movement called the Dai Viet, was a fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution. It is a highly informative work that provides a good survey of postwar events in Vietnam.

—*Understanding Vietnam*, the boldest, most intellectual, and most provocative of the works reviewed here, deals with a wide range of topics, some legalistic (such as the constitutional base for the reeducation camps), some highly abstract (whither the Vietnamese spirit?). But concern for the Vietnamese psyche is the unifying theme of the book, which was written while the authors were on the faculty of Harvard Law School.

—*After Saigon Fell* is an account of day-to-day life in South Vietnam in the four years following the communist takeover, written by Nguyen Long, the former dean of Van Hanh University in Saigon. A prominent Buddhist, Long stayed on in Vietnam until 1979, then came to the United States and now lives in Los Angeles. Of all the works here, this volume gives the best picture of what life is like under the Vietnamese communists.

—*The Will of Heaven* is an autobiography of a northern Catholic school teacher who relocated to the South in 1954 during Operation Exodus, the transfer of refugees following the cease-fire after Dien Bien Phu. He then settled into a new life there, even serving in the Army of the Republic of (South) Vietnam. After the war, he spent three years in a reeducation camp before escaping to Canada.

—*Military Events* is a day/year chronology of events of the Vietnam war (1954–75) as interpreted by an unnamed Hanoi military analyst. This work is a gold mine of source material about the Vietnam war as seen day-by-day in Hanoi, although some of the "facts" set down are to be treated with caution.

—*Concluding the Thirty Years War* is an account of the war's last hurrah by General Tran Van Tra, the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) commander of the "B-2 Front," the military heartland of South Vietnam. Presumably, it is the fifth volume of a five-volume memoir, although it may be the only volume that ever sees publication. General Tra reportedly irritated his superiors with his candid account (regarded as downright insulting to the Viet Cong) and as a result was retired to a villa outside of Ho Chi Minh City. It is unlikely that we will ever get another such forthright history out of Hanoi.

It is important to note, however, that these works should be judged not so much for the form of presentation as for the perspective they represent. Thus, to say that all eight fail to achieve the goal of winning over their readers, and therefore are self-defeating, is not as serious an indictment as it would be if these were Western studies dealing with the same issues. The Vietnamese writers suffer from built-in limita-

¹See, e.g., David Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest*, New York, Random House, 1972; and Frances Fitzgerald, *Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam*, New York, Atlantic Monthly Press, 1972.

tions, but this should not be regarded as a communication failure; rather, it is a challenge to the reader to transcend the communicational barrier and achieve understanding. This can be done only if these works are read with empathy. It is in this spirit, and not as conventional literary or scholarly criticism in the Western sense, that the following comments are offered.

THE VOICES here are authentically Vietnamese, but they speak in a style of rhetoric that the reader unfamiliar with Vietnamese writing may find alien. The authors for the most part do not write in the fashion of Western scholarship. Many passages will strike the reader as intemperate, and authors at times will seem carried away by dogmatism. Not infrequently, even knowledgeable readers must struggle to comprehend; the connection between cause and effect is often remote, and inferences and conclusions simply do not always follow from the premises. The works are studded with a strange mixture of precision reporting (methods prospective boat people use to buy large quantities of sea-sickness pills without attracting police attention)² and sweeping generalizations (characterizing Soviet "control" of Vietnam as total).³ Most difficult to follow is the metaphysical meandering in which an author earnestly and at length dwells on some matter of obvious importance to him but the significance of which totally escapes the Western reader.

It is easy to dismiss such writing as wooden, awkward, or insignificant. But it would be a mistake to put this peculiarity of the writing down to ineptitude. If only it were that simple, for then it could be easily remedied. Rather, there is a

deeper problem here, one worth exploring since it is the key to understanding not only these Vietnamese voices but a Vietnam of the future.

The dearth of Vietnamese voices offering explanation is not solely the result of foreign efforts at monopolization. Nor is it merely the reflection of American ethnocentrism, manifested by a disinclination to listen with empathy to Vietnamese voices. It also stems in part from the fact that the Vietnamese have always been reluctant to write and speak to the outside world about themselves and their culture. Because of this reluctance they have not developed the necessary communicational skills required in the competition for attention. Seldom have I read writing by a Vietnamese that I would term successful trans-cultural communication. In the years I lived in Vietnam I knew several Vietnamese whom I considered wise in the full meaning of that word—a few whose wisdom I felt surpassed anything I had encountered in the West—yet none of these was able to speak persuasively to the average American. As for the North Vietnamese speaking to the outside world, they are their own worst enemy; the more Hanoi says the more it alienates, even its allies.

There seems to be a cultural deficiency afflicting the Vietnamese that inhibits them when pleading their case abroad, even when they are merely trying to explain themselves to foreigners. This characteristic clearly is traceable to various religious and secular influences in their heritage. Buddhist modesty, self-effacement, and other-worldliness tend to make such explanation unnecessary, even improper. Confucian scholarly reserve, the "island in the lake" mentality, regards such efforts as gauche and beneath one's dignity. An even stronger heritage is the practice of the politics of clandestineism: nothing is ever what it

seems and all straightforward explanation is to be eschewed if possible. This is how the Vietnamese have inevitably dealt with foreign occupiers, first Chinese then French. Finally, there is the personal Vietnamese cultural value that dictates that one does not discuss one's life and world in an objective manner with strangers. All of this adds up to the fact that, generally speaking, Vietnamese are not good trans-cultural communicators.

AT A DEEPER level, in dealing with these books, there is a more intractable problem of trans-cultural communication: these authors may write in English (or French), but they think in Vietnamese. Readers are thus confronted by a cognitive barrier—the "mind" of Vietnam, itself part of the broader East-West dilemma of conflicting patterns of thought. The problem results, of course, from differing conceptual frameworks. Western heritage is Judaic monotheism, Greek esthetics, Roman engineering and judicial thought, and as such it is Kantian, geometric, rational. The Vietnamese (and Asian) heritage is circuitous, amorphous, and multidimensional. The two systems have thrown up differing value concepts involving space, time, and causality.

From Spengler onward, scholars have wrestled with this problem of conflicting thought patterns, the major modern figures being Karl Pribram, Hajime Nakamura, F. S. C. Northrop, Karl Popper, and Lily Abegg. Their writings have identified a vast array of cognitive differences. Whereas the West is analytical, logical, and materialistic, the East is synthetic, intuitive, and spiritual. If in the West intellectualism is objective, active, and dynamic, in the East it is subjective, passive, and static. Thought patterns in the West thus are external and intellectual; the pursuit is a realism as expressed in spa-

²See Long and Kendall, *After Saigon Fell*, p. 130.

³See Chapter 11 of Canh's *Vietnam Under Communism*.

tial, rather than temporal, dimensions. The opposite is true of thought patterns in the East: they are internal and emotional, and the pursuit is escapism as expressed in temporal, rather than spatial, dimensions.

Hence in picking up any of these volumes, one is immediately plunged into the "mind" of Vietnam. It makes for tough going. The reader must regard the volume as a challenge. Comprehension may fall short. But these books should be read by anyone who hopes to fathom Vietnam's past and must be read by anyone who seeks to anticipate its future.

The eight books, to varying degrees, present yet another impediment. Most contain a generous supply of Vietnamese self-pity, along with a considerable amount of external blame-fixing, although this is scattered and incidental, not concentrated or deliberately focused. Such sentiment probably is inevitable in any writer who no longer has a city to build or a country to live in, as more than one Vietnamese émigré in this country has expressed it. Still, one is tempted to lash out at critical South Vietnamese for the endemic *attentisme* of their society that few ever sought to remedy, for their infuriating fatalism that allowed them to rationalize reality and put unwarranted faith in the eventual appearance of some unidentified mystical figure, some *bac si*, who would rescue them from themselves, or for their proclivity, after the fall, to blame their misfortune entirely on the United States. Even the deepest sympathy for the South Vietnamese plight does not remove this temptation, because these behavioral characteristics go far to explain why the South lost to a more determined foe who entertained little doubt about what it believed, who knew exactly what it meant to have. To succumb, however, would be harsh and cruel.

Only a poet, writing from the inside, seems justified in doing so. Nguyen Chi Thien's colorless flowers are from the Gulag: "Blooming in prison, sickly, starved and cold/ They reek of damp and mold, look grey as mud." Yet, he says, "Flowers from Hell/ Real blood has watered them/ Blood mixed with animal sweat, with parting tears" (p. 1).

THE VIETNAMESE have a profound consciousness of history and at times seem hagridden by their sense of the past. All of the books reviewed here give evidence of this. Nguyen Long writes confidently of the "law of independence" in effect throughout all of Vietnam's long existence, as if the rules of history were codified and enforced by some celestial court. Hanoi officials writing in the Boudarel book ascribe to lingering ancient influences blame for the failures in modern-day Vietnamese bureaucracy. Historical allusions stud Nguyen Chi Thien's poetry. General Tran Van Tra sees his B-2 Front campaign as the last act in a drama that began a thousand years earlier when the Sons of Han arrived from China to colonize Vietnam. In the Nguyen Ngoc Huy-Stephen Young book, the burden of history goes to its outer limits, to an a-rational concept of fate imbued in the Vietnamese spirit that imposes a transcendental chain of morality from past to future that none may break or overreach—which means that communism in Vietnam is doomed, by history.

These works also offer a range of interpretative contemporary history, some particularistic, some Olympian, and some revisionist. The Canh book is perhaps the broadest and most comprehensive. The author treats all the major sectors of contemporary history: party and state leadership, political mobilization and motivation, coercive institutions, economics, foreign policy, and

religion. Nguyen Long covers much of the same ground but at the microcosmic level and does it well, for he has a keen eye for the telling detail. The Ngan book is the most personalized, no more vivid than the others perhaps, but certainly more poignant.

The history we get from the Hanoi writers is extensively revisionist. Officials writing in the Boudarel book revise earlier Sino-Vietnamese history but leave most other interpretation consonant with the past. Not so with the Tra memoir and the People's Army Publishing House's *Military Events*. Both are exceptional works, highly readable, surprisingly candid, and refreshingly free of the turgid jargon of most Vietnamese Marxist writers who normally seem incapable of saying anything succinctly and interestingly. More important, these two works are highly informative, always remembering of course that the revisionism offered here is suspect.

Both works devastate many of the long (and dearly) held contentions of Vietnam war critics and of apologists for Vietnamese communism. For example, readers are told that planning for war in the South began in 1956 and was well along by 1959 when the 15th plenum met in Hanoi and ordered "armed struggle" in the South.⁴ But in the 1960's, it was maintained by Hanoi and widely accepted abroad that North Vietnam was not deeply involved in the war (beyond extending moral support), that it reacted only in 1965, to the arrival of American ground troops. Few historians dared to challenge this claim, although a number doubted it. Now we are told that Vietnamese Workers' Party Secretary Le Duan set down the blueprint for the armed struggle doctrine in August 1956 and that by October 1957

⁴*Military Events*, pp. 29-30.

there were 37 guerrilla companies organized into battalions in the South, including several in Thu Dau Mot (or Binh Duong) province outside of Saigon.⁵

We now learn, moreover, that not only was the final battle in the war fought by Northerners, but so were all the earlier ones. According to the new account, the National Liberation Front, or Viet Cong, never amounted to anything militarily, politically, or representationally.

It is also claimed that the Chinese never loomed large in the scheme of things in either the Viet Minh or Vietnam war. According to the revised version, few of the artillery shells fired at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 were Chinese-made, and Beijing was always regarded by Hanoi as a thin reed and unreliable ally. Consider the credibility once enjoyed by Senator William Fulbright and other congressional critics whose hearings for years frightened Americans with the "yellow horde" thesis, that at any moment millions of Chinese would descend into the Vietnam war. At one time, the Sino-Vietnamese relationship was described as close as "lips and teeth"; now we are told by Hanoi that what actually existed through the years was Sino-US collusion against North Vietnam.

Perhaps even more telling is the revelation that on August 2, 1964, three torpedo boats of the People's Army of Vietnam "attacked the US Destroyer Maddox . . . and chased it away."⁶ Many articles, even whole books, had been written to support what then was the Hanoi position,

that the Tonkin Gulf incident was an invention of President Lyndon Johnson manufactured to stampede Congress into supporting the war.

The revisionism here goes on and on—and obviously some of what is served up as history strays as far from the truth as the original version did. Still, there are nuggets of historical enlightenment to be mined here. Certainly, these two works make for interesting reading, which is more than can be said for most products of Hanoi printing presses.

In terms of significant contribution to historical interpretation, probably the Huy-Young book is the most important. The others provide raw material, the stuff from which the history will eventually be written.

WHAT IS lacking, as it is lacking in all retrospective accounts by either Vietnamese or Americans I have read, is an affective description of what those years in Vietnam were actually like for the general population. The Vietnamese have a term: *ky uc*; its literal meaning is "memory" or "faithful memory," but it connotes a broader idea, the remembrance of things past with a full consciousness, that is, a great, moving sense of "how it was."

Those who did not live in Vietnam during the war years picture it mentally as a place of terror in the night and sudden death, of assassinations and coups d'état, of spilled napalm and satchel charges hurled into hotel lobbies. But it was never really

so. Those things were present, it is true, but somehow they never came to dominate the lives of the hundreds of thousands of us who lived and worked in Vietnam, but did not fight there. We always kept them in perspective. The days of our years, for Vietnamese and American civilians alike, were largely given over to ordinary personal human interests which were at least equal, in commanding our attention, to the general progress of events.

It is this the-way-we-were quality that has not yet been captured. No *ky uc* account has yet been written. I know of only one work—a memoir still in manuscript by a Vietnamese woman, of which I have seen portions and about which I am sworn to silence—that promises to fill this void.

An important final impression left by these eight books is a profound sadness. It is the inevitable sadness that comes in contemplating the long pause of time, but also it is the sadness compounded of a sense of misguided good intentions, ignorance in action, and wasted heroism. Nguyen Chi Thien must be something of an artist-prophet for he predicted the ironic folly of it all very early (writing from Hanoi in 1960) in his poem "Independence Is a Myth." It could serve as the epitaph for the dashed hopes of the Vietnamese:

Independence is myth if standing fast by Uncle Mao. Freedom is prison if worshipping Grandfather Marx. Happiness is a hoax if starving for rice. (p. 5).

⁵Ibid., pp. 22 and 23.

⁶Ibid. p. 60.

Cambodian Tragedy

Elizabeth Becker

CRAIG ETCHESON. *The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea*. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1984.

MICHAEL VICKERY. *Cambodia, 1975–1984*. Boston, MA, South End Press, 1984.

DURING THE 1960's the United States government paid out millions of dollars to students learning non-European languages under the National Defense Foreign Language fellowship program. Few graduate students in Asian studies earned their advanced degrees without support from the NDFL program. But the Great Society and the Vietnam war came to an end and so did major federal support for exotic languages, such as Vietnamese or Khmer. The once burgeoning field of Indochinese studies shrank overnight. Not only the money but also the jobs and interest disappeared. Men and women with degrees in Vietnamese or Cambodian studies were forced to seek jobs outside the United States—in England, Canada, and, most often, Australia (one of the few countries where interest in Indochina grew rather than diminished after the Vietnam war). Some

of the academic experts who stayed in the United States had to find new specialties for themselves, ranging from the all-purpose international relations to women's studies. The result was a small but crucial "brain drain" in a field that has become very controversial in recent years. But if the Indochina field in general suffered, the study of contemporary Cambodia was most seriously affected. Even in the best of times, Cambodia attracted only a small number of Western scholars. After the 1975 military victory by the communist Khmer Rouge and the confusing and horrible stories about its rule, the study of contemporary Cambodia nearly disappeared.

In the years immediately following the Khmer Rouge victory much of the best work on Cambodia was published in what were openly partisan journals—the *Bulletin of the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars* and the *Southeast Asia Chronicle*. These journals were founded by scholars opposed to American involvement in Vietnam and subsequent its extension into other states of Indochina. After the war's end and the accompanying evaporation of general interest in the area, these journals were virtually alone in chronicling the actions of the communist regimes of Indochina. The few qualified scholars who were writing about Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge regime generally had opposed the United States's involve-

ment in Indochina. Thus, their work was scrutinized as much for political bias as for the contributions they were making to the understanding of Khmer Rouge rule. At the same time, American academics with little or no background on Cambodia began to write about the Khmer Rouge. As the Pol Pot regime implemented its murderous policies, and as refugees who fled across the border into Thailand told their stories of madness in Cambodia, the field burst open with controversy.

By the time the Vietnamese invaded Cambodia in December 1978 and partially opened up the country and its archives to some Western reporters and scholars, the partisanship had become ferocious. Writers and scholars accused one another of failing to state the "truth" about various aspects of Cambodia's sad history. What could be described as a subfield developed over who said what and when, and which scholar or writer was to be trusted or condemned.

Yet, despite the obvious importance of the Cambodian revolution—the frightening questions it raises about Cambodia, Asia, superpower politics, and rural revolutions—and despite reemerging public concern about Cambodia, there is still very little support in the United States for the pursuit of scholarly studies about contemporary Cambodia. By 1984, the year in which the two books under review

Elizabeth Becker is a journalist who has reported from Cambodia beginning in 1970. Her book on the Khmer Rouge and the Cambodian tragedy, *When the War Is Over*, will be published in 1985.

were published, in the United States there was not a single tenured professor of contemporary Cambodian history or politics trained in the subject. Of the three leading US scholars on contemporary Cambodia, none is presently living in the United States. Timothy Carney, who was trained at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Cornell University, is a State Department foreign service officer currently posted in the Republic of South Africa. Stephen Heder, another specialist from Cornell, is working for Amnesty International in London. David Chandler, a well-known historian, teaches at Monash University in Australia. Only Ben Kiernan, an Australian trained by Chandler, is doing active research in the field—on a grant from Monash University.

Moreover, the future holds little promise for potential newcomers. Although there is substantial money available for studies of how Indochinese refugees adapt to life in the United States, precious little is offered for research in Cambodia itself or, for that matter, among the Cambodians camped along the border with Thailand. For those scholars who nonetheless attempt to do research in Cambodia, there are also other major obstacles. To begin with, it is difficult to obtain a visa for Cambodia. And once in the country, a foreigner's movements and access to sources are restricted by the government and by the war raging between the Vietnamese occupation forces and the Cambodian resistance forces, among whom are many Khmer Rouge. The present environment works against sustained, serious, and thorough scholarship on Cambodia.

THE TWO BOOKS under review mirror the problems of Cambodian studies. While Craig Etcheson typifies the newcomer trying to fill the vacuum in American studies of

contemporary Cambodia, Michael Vickery exemplifies the brain drain and the scars left on those who have become immersed in partisan polemics about Cambodia. Etcheson writes in his introduction (p. xiii) that he spent only one summer doing most of the research and writing for his book on the roots and development of the Khmer communist movement, *The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea*. The book covers the period from 1930 to 1979. He has no previous experience with Cambodia, at least none that he mentions. Considering his limitations in time and experience, he did an admirable, if flawed, job.

Vickery's *Cambodia, 1975–1984* reflects the problems at the other extreme. Vickery has a Ph.D. in history from Yale. His thesis on the 15th- and 16th-century Khmer chronicles is considered top-notch and he is a fluent Khmer speaker. He has received various grants and temporary teaching positions in Southeast Asia and Australia, including his current research post at Adelaide University in Australia. His book is a bitter mélange of scholarship, memoirs, and polemics with other writers and scholars on Cambodia.

Both books reflect the vacuum in the United States for serious studies of Cambodia. The building blocks of any scholarly field, that is, intelligent, thought-out monographs about selected issues, are virtually nonexistent on communist Cambodia.

ETCHESON's best work can be found in the first part of his book, where he shows a confident, perceptive grasp of Khmer history, even when his account is sketchy. But as soon as he ventures into an explanation of the Khmer Rouge rule of Cambodia, the book flounders. Etcheson simply did not have the access to primary materials that would have fleshed out his subject.

Nor did he have the firsthand experience that would have guided him through the available secondary sources.

Etcheson creates six categories of ideological leanings among the wartime Khmer Rouge front—ranging from Stalinists or loyal followers of Pol Pot, to Maoists who admired the Chinese revolution and were more leftist, to national communists who were followers of Prince Norodom Sihanouk. But these categories, for the most part, are arbitrary and do not hold up under empirical scrutiny. Unfortunately, Etcheson then uses these categories to explain many of the problems of the Khmer Rouge after their victory, in his contention that it was primarily the factional struggles that account for most of these problems. He draws a static picture conveying no sense of the dynamics that propelled the Khmer Rouge rulers on their course of misery. Apparently Etcheson did not take into account material taken out of Cambodia after 1979—particularly confessions from the Tuol Sleng prison or Khmer Rouge party documents¹—or the public Vietnamese material, such as the proceedings of the 1979 trial in absentia of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary. This is a shame because his study shows that he is adept at making sense of the material he does use, and that he is able to analyze it succinctly and clearly. His discussion of the Indochina war during the 1970–75 period, for example, is quite good. He also instructively dissects the debate between author William

¹Tuol Sleng houses some 10,000 dossiers of former prisoners. These are considered the best source of evidence on the government of Democratic Kampuchea. For an example of an article that uses these documents, see Anthony Barnett, Ben Kiernan, Chanthou Boua, "Kampuchea: a Special Report, *New Statesman* (London), May 2, 1980, pp. 669–76, which describes the prison and cites Hu Nim's confession. For Ieng Sary's admission of government responsibility for Tuol Sleng, see Elizabeth Becker, "The Death Chambers of the Khmer Rouge," *The Washington Post*, Aug. 2, 1981.

Shawcross and former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and criticizes the arguments of each on valid grounds (pp. 95–103).²

Finally, Etcheson does not blame Cambodia's tragedy entirely on foreign powers—a trap into which other authors fall all too readily. He gives Cambodians ample credit for creating their own nightmare, particularly by citing peasant unrest and the split in the urban elite as major reasons for the Cambodian civil war.

VICKERY has written a personal book filled with rage—rage against journalists, against all but a few experts on Cambodia, against the American government but, sadly, precious little against the Khmer Rouge. He sets up a very complicated, and often confused, goal for himself, and that goal is to defend a two-part thesis about the Khmer Rouge regime: (1) that its first two years in power were not as awful as others have made them out to be, and (2) that the worst crimes came in the last year-and-a-half of its rule. In the course of presenting his thesis, he attacks simultaneously all the writers, experts, and journalists who have argued to the contrary, often accusing them of dishonorable political motivation. He does this, first to discredit those who hold opinions that contradict his own, and second to present the current regime of Heng Samrin as the best alternative for Cambodia.

But Vickery's approach brings about the undoing of his book. At the beginning, he cautions the reader that the book is merely a "contribution" to Cambodian history and nothing more (p. ix). The text bears this out. Rather than examine his opponents' ideas thoroughly and make his own points clearly—sup-

porting them with sustainable evidence—Vickery clutters his work with insinuation and fragments of debates about others' work and about the nature of the Khmer Rouge regime. He assumes the reader's familiarity with this material, and thereby neglects to paint a complete picture, either of Khmer Rouge rule or of the writings about it.

This is unfortunate because his political thesis is shared by a number of experts, and it deserves better treatment than he gives it. He bases much of his argument that Khmer Rouge atrocities in the early years have been exaggerated on his own study of the regional variations of Khmer Rouge rule. This is his most important scholarly contribution, found in his third chapter, but it alone cannot support his thesis. In fact, it works against it. Dramatic regional differences had been a hallmark of the Khmer Rouge movement long before it came to power. And yet, despite these differences, the regional Khmer Rouge leaders did follow central orders from Phnom Penh—from the directives to evacuate city populations to the countryside to those to liquidate people considered to be opponents of the revolution. Vickery fails to prove that there was either a qualitative or a quantitative resistance in any region to the revolutionary leaders in Phnom Penh.

This failure negates Vickery's proposition that the leaders in the East Region of the country were the only honest revolutionaries in the Khmer Rouge movement. Vickery glosses over the East Region's complicity in the massacres of the minority Islamic community of the Chams as well as the evidence that the East went along with almost every decree issued from the capital. He ignores evidence that the East shares a major responsibility for killing off Cambodian communists who returned from North Vietnam after

1970. Instead, as proof of the East's dissent, he focuses on the fact that the East was late in decreeing communal dining, an issue I find rather minor on the list of crimes of Khmer Rouge rule. Moreover, his own fine examination of regionalism suggests that other regions—the Southwest and the Northwest as well as the East—often lagged behind in implementing directives from Phnom Penh.

But we do know that the East Region did become the focus of revolutionary paranoia about the middle of 1977, the time when Vickery claims the Khmer Rouge in Phnom Penh perpetrated their truly hideous crimes (pp. 131ff and 201ff). It was then that Pol Pot began plotting and conducting a purge of the East Region in the course of preparing for war with Vietnam. As a result, some of the East Region Khmer Rouge cadres fled to Vietnam to escape execution and there formed the core of the Kampuchea National United Front for National Salvation that supported the subsequent Vietnamese invasion. The purge of the East was the bloodiest of Khmer Rouge rule. But it was preceded by purges of other regions, beginning with the purge of the North region in 1975 and 1976 and later the purge of the Northwest region. In both cases many Khmer Rouge cadres were executed. Thus, the purge of the East was a continuation of established Khmer Rouge policies, not a break with them.

To acknowledge that the East Region was not a startling exception, however, would undermine Vickery's thesis that the East Region Khmer Rouge cadres represent the best of the revolutionary tradition, precisely because it is they who escaped and came back with the Vietnamese occupation army, and now form the nucleus of the Heng Samrin regime. This "East Region thesis" first appeared during the trial of the "Pol

²See William Shawcross, *Sideshow*, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1979, and Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years*, Boston, MA, Little, Brown & Co., 1979.

Pot-leng Sary clique" in Phnom Penh in August 1979. But even the Vietnamese who masterminded this trial were not so bold as to pretend that the period from 1975 to 1977 had been anything other than murderous and criminal.

Despite such flaws, his book shows that Vickery has much to contribute to the debate about Cambodia. His sharp, impassioned, albeit savage, style is a welcome contrast to Etcheson's overly "objective" and sometimes stiff prose. And oddly enough, Vickery, who condemns journalists so roundly, is at his most eloquent when using journalistic methods. His recollections of Cambodia from the early 1960's are vivid and arresting. In his vignettes he makes penetrating if overdrawn observations about rural Cambodia,

something that is missing from nearly every other account of the Khmer Rouge.

IT WOULD be coy of me if I did not mention that in his book Vickery attacks articles I wrote in 1983.³ In his polemical fashion, he extracts from them a few points which he then proceeds to distort.

But the frustration I felt on reading Vickery's book stems not from anger but from disappointment. While I disagree with a number of his arguments, as well as with his wrong-headed and inaccurate attacks on scholars such as François Ponchaud

whom I admire, I cannot help but think that Vickery could have written a more complete book. If he had had the time, the funding, and the institutional base that scholars need, I believe that his arguments would have improved, his evidence would have been fleshed out, and he might have been able to make use of more of the available sources. In the absence of such an environment, however, the factional infighting among the scholars and writers on Cambodia will continue. While the subject is explosive, the scholarship need not be. It may not be too late for the academic community in the United States to reverse the current trend and start supporting the serious, sustained scholarship on contemporary Cambodia that is so necessary.

³"Cycle of Poverty," *The Washington Post*, Feb. 28, 1983; and "New Rulers Obscure Role of Party Under Pol Pot," *The Washington Post*, Mar. 1, 1983.

Soviet Fortunes in Southern Africa

Philip R. Nel

DAVID E. ALBRIGHT. *The USSR and Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s*. The Washington Papers, No. 101, New York, Praeger, 1983.

WINRICH KÜHNE. *Die Politik der Sowjetunion in Afrika* (The Policy of the Soviet Union in Africa). Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1983.

IT IS TOO EARLY to form a definitive judgment on the effect of recent peace initiatives in southern Africa on the fortunes of the Soviet Union in this region. What is clear, however, is that the accord between South Africa and Mozambique signed at Nkomati on March 16, 1984, the agreement between South Africa and Angola signed at Lusaka on February 16, 1984, and various other similar initiatives, have created expectations that the USSR may be running the danger of being pushed aside in Mozambique and Angola.¹ These expectations contrast starkly with assessments which appeared before 1984. While not all went as far as those which foresaw a steady increase in Soviet influence in southern Africa,² or an unfolding of a So-

viet blueprint for domination,³ most—including the two books under review—accepted the view that instability in southern Africa, exacerbated by the Republic of South Africa's alleged policy of destabilization, would create favorable opportunities for the USSR to expand its influence.

The factors that made possible a cautious yet reasonably firmly established rapprochement between South Africa and its neighbors—e.g., escalating internal conflicts, economic decline and the drought, Western initiatives, and Soviet reticence—almost miraculously peaked simultaneously. One should therefore allow for a fair element of surprise. Yet, even those commentators who offered a well-balanced treatment of the limitations under which the Soviet Union operated in Africa as a whole may have overstated the threat of a growth of Soviet influence in southern Africa.

The publications of David Albright and Winrich Kühne are good examples. As will be indicated below, both develop reasoned perspectives on the advances and limitations of

the Soviet Union in Africa. Yet, to my mind, at the time they wrote both were a bit too alarmist about prospects for the expansion of Soviet influence in southern Africa during the 1980's.

ALBRIGHT has long ago established himself as a thorough analyst of the subject, from whose detailed research many in the field continuously draw. *The USSR and Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s* provides us with a wealth of carefully collected data in support of his thesis that although the USSR made substantial gains during the 1970's, and may be presented with various opportunities in the 1980's, there are a number of constraints on its ability to exploit these.

Kühne's study is much broader in scope and traverses almost all aspects relevant to a study of Soviet policy toward Africa. With German thoroughness, he not only addresses a host of quantitative material, but also the much more complex qualitative issues such as the role of Soviet ideology, how Soviet authors view Africa, the importance or otherwise of the long-term treaties of friendship and cooperation signed by the USSR with various African governments, and the neglected question of the compatibility of Soviet activities with accepted or partially accepted norms of international law. As such, his book must surely rate as one of the most complete

Philip R. Nel is a Senior Research Officer at the Institute for the Study of Marxism, University of Stellenbosch, Republic of South Africa. He has written on the theory of Marxism, and on Soviet politics and the policy of the USSR toward Africa.

¹The *Economist* (London), Sept. 1, 1984, p. 14. On these accords and other developments in the region, see Peter Clement, "Moscow and Southern Africa," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March–April 1985, pp. 29–50.

²See, e.g., Morris Rothenberg, *The USSR and Africa: New Dimensions of Soviet Global Power*, Miami, FL, Advanced International Studies Institute, 1980.

³Jan A. du Plessis, *Soviet Blueprint for Southern Africa*, a South Africa Forum Position Paper, Vol. 5, No. 4, 1983.

studies yet, and one hopes that a translation will appear soon to make it more accessible to English-speaking scholars (a short English-language summary is provided in the book).

Because of his broader scope, Kühne can pay more attention to methodological matters than does Albright. Kühne quite correctly points out the difficulties in estimating the costs involved in Soviet military deliveries and in measuring the political influence that results from the Soviet economic and military involvement. At the same time, neither issue is "solved," nor does the author advance real suggestions for any solution, such as those made by Dan Heldman.⁴

Kühne's main methodological contribution lies in his insistence that Soviet involvement should always be judged in comparison with the still considerable Western involvement in Africa. Otherwise, one falls prey to a distorted point of view (p. 253), i.e., overestimation of the extent and importance of Soviet involvement. This comparison makes exceedingly clear the limitations of Soviet influence. Furthermore, this approach enables one to appreciate the real desire of African states (including so-called Marxist-Leninist ones) to be nonaligned, which they ensure by maintaining ties with both East and West.

One final methodological comment. Both publications, like most studies of Soviet policy toward Africa, lack a clear understanding of the relationships between the writings of Soviet academics and popular writers on the one hand, and policies being pursued by the USSR on the other. This leads to a sometimes misguided imputation of

policy declaration to one or another statement by some Soviet author, which disregards the "relative autonomy," especially of Soviet Africanists, and the extensive differences of opinion among them.⁵ In fact, it would be useful if someone undertook to compile a list of Soviet authors and publications with indication of any direct or indirect ties they might have to decision-makers.

Nevertheless, both books establish a framework that allows one to put the record of the successes and fortunes of the Soviet Union in sub-Saharan Africa into proper perspective. This can perhaps be best illustrated by summarizing both authors' viewpoints on the objectives that the Soviet Union is pursuing through its involvement, the policy instruments it has at its disposal, and the context of international norms in which it operates.

LOOKING AT Soviet objectives, Albright introduces a useful distinction between those already being pursued by Moscow, and perceived interests that may gain importance during the 1980's. The first include the desire to (1) gain local acceptance of a lasting Soviet presence in the region, (2) obtain a voice in African affairs, (3) weaken (but not eradicate) the Western position, and (4) reduce the influence of China. Because of the very general nature of these goals, one can hardly argue with this list.

The second category may be of more importance. Here Albright discusses, as does Kühne (without maintaining the above distinction), the questions of Soviet desire to gain control of southern Africa's minerals and to dominate the sea lanes around the Cape. These goals merit attention not least because they are

assumed by South Africa to be the main objectives of the Soviet Union.⁶

To be sure, Soviet leaders (and authors) have clearly indicated that they regard these two goals as important. But both Kühne and Albright emphasize that even if the USSR regards it as its objective to control resources and sea lanes, this does not imply that it regards these goals as attainable in the immediate future. A blockade of the Cape sea route as a peacetime objective can be ruled out, and even in a war situation it would entail immense, even insurmountable, logistical problems. As far as the minerals go, the Soviets are perhaps even in a better position than others to realize that all future African and South African governments, be they black or white, must ensure a steady influx of foreign currency—especially if they choose to introduce socialist economic measures internally. It is therefore unlikely, as the case of Angola proved, that they could be coaxed into denying the West access to their main export assets.

LARGE-SCALE deliveries of weapons and the provision of military training in the 1970's replaced economic aid as the main instrumentality through which the Soviet Union pursues its objectives in Africa. By now the dominance of military assistance in Soviet aid is well-documented.⁷

⁶The 1984 Defence White Paper of South Africa continues to quote Brezhnev's putative statement to this effect in a conversation with Siad Barre of Somalia. See South African Defence Force, *White Paper on Defence and Armaments Supply, 1984*, Pretoria, Government Printing House, 1984, p. 1. Brezhnev is quoted as having said: "Our aim is to gain control of the two great treasure houses on which the West depends—the energy treasure house of the Persian Gulf and the mineral treasure house of Central and Southern Africa." It is, however, highly questionable whether this quote can be authenticated. See commentary in Robert Legvold, "The Soviet Threat to Southern Africa," *International Affairs Bulletin* (Braamfontein, Transvaal), No. 1, 1984, p. 25.

⁷See e.g., Robert H. Donaldson, Ed., *The Soviet Union in the Third World*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1981; and E. J. Feuchtwanger and Peter Nailor, Eds., *The Soviet Union and the Third World*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1981.

⁴Dan C. Heldman, *The USSR and Africa: Foreign Policy Under Khrushchev*, New York, Praeger, 1981, pp. 76–105.

⁵See Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier, "The USSR, the Third World, and the Global Economy," *Problems of Communism*, July–August 1979, pp. 1–16.

Albright regards this as an indication of the financial squeeze that the Soviet Union is experiencing due to a declining economic growth rate at home. This may be part of the explanation, but Kühne emphasizes other factors as well. First, the USSR and the East European countries have shown no desire to integrate Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia into the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance, as they have done with Vietnam and Cuba—this despite Mozambique's requests to join CEMA. Second, the USSR has seemingly reconciled itself to the fact that Africa is closely tied to the "imperialist economy," and Moscow may even surreptitiously exploit this by encouraging African states to seek increased Western assistance.

Third, Soviet policymakers have indicated that they do not regard the "revolutionary process" in African countries as irreversible. The irreversibility of the revolutionary process is the main ideological determinant of the Soviet attitude toward its East European allies (the Brezhnev doctrine) and its involvement in Afghanistan. The experience of the 1960's (e.g., in Ghana) has made the USSR well aware of the reversibility of "revolution" in Africa, and accordingly has led to a more cautious approach as far as economic assistance is concerned. Finally, seen from the side of African countries, economic cooperation—limited as it is—with the East does not necessarily reflect so much a fundamental pro-Soviet attitude as the wish to counterbalance the predominance of Western economic ties. Thus, rather than being a sign of Soviet strength, it reflects Western "predominance" (Kühne, p. 135). Recognizing this, the Soviet Union probably does not expect too many pay-offs from economic aid.

Kühne has quite a few important things to say about the extent and implications of the Soviet military

presence in Africa. First, he supplies an incisive comparison between the levels of Soviet and Western aid. This comparison is, of course, difficult to make for the period after 1976 due to the fact that the arms embargo against South Africa prevents the West from publicizing its support. Yet, for the period 1967-76, the value of Soviet weapons deliveries to Africa was 15 percent below the sum of all such deliveries by France, the FRG, the United Kingdom, and the US (p. 192). For the period 1975-79, the ratio changed, with the USSR supplying 60 percent more. Recently, the ratio may have leveled, due to increased US deliveries to Egypt, Morocco, Somalia, the Sudan, Liberia, and Kenya. Kühne detects a greater willingness on the part of the USSR to supply artillery pieces, surface-to-air missiles, armored vehicles and tanks, naval vessels, and supersonic jet fighters (see Table 18 in his Addendum).

Kühne points out the economic importance of arms sales for the Soviet Union. As is well-known, the USSR does not simply hand out weapons, except in the case of some small arms for national liberation movements. In all other cases, the USSR expects its clients to pay for the deliveries, and its income from arms sales may be as high as 15 percent of total export earnings, which makes arms the most important Soviet earner of foreign exchange after oil and gold.

More important, however, are the political consequences of the high level of military involvement. Both Albright and Kühne are convinced that this involvement has been used successfully to enhance Soviet influence. But Kühne is right to raise the issue of whether this effect can be durable. The success of this policy depends on the continuation of the military conflict in which the recipient is involved: which may no longer be the case in southern Africa

judging from developments during 1984. Furthermore, the costs incurred by recipient states have seemingly reached that critical point—at least in Mozambique—where alternatives to military conflict are seriously considered. Accordingly, Kühne and Albright foresee a more defensive posture in Soviet involvement in the 1980's, something that is exemplified by the mild reaction of the USSR to the recent peace initiatives in southern Africa.

Kühne also discusses the question of Soviet base facilities in Africa. The question whether the USSR has gained, or wants to gain, such facilities hinges on the definition of "bases." The Soviet Union has gained access for intermittent use by its naval and air force contingents at facilities in the Dhalak Islands, Maputo, Beira, and Luanda, but has lost access to excellent facilities in Conakry and Berbera. Yet, this does not mean that the Soviet Union has established bridgeheads or secured genuine bases in Africa. Moreover, a number of joint communiqués issued by African and Soviet leaders have reiterated the position that Africa should be rid of foreign military bases.⁸ In this regard, attempts by the USSR to secure the Indian Ocean as a "zone of peace" should not be seen solely as a subversive "communist ploy." It might mean mere acceptance by the Soviets that the prohibition of all foreign bases is the best they can achieve.

Direct Soviet military involvement in Africa, and especially in southern Africa, is ruled out by both authors. Not only would this entail subjecting Soviet troops to completely alien conditions and an impossible logistical exercise, but the Soviet Union at present is not likely to want to risk the probable fierce Western reaction to such an action.

⁸For documentation, see Kühne, pp. 181-82.

In this regard, Kühne also asks whether the military clauses in the Soviet treaties of friendship and co-operation with Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia (the treaty with the Congo does not have a military clause) might be used as a pretext for an extension of the Brezhnev doctrine, as in the case of Afghanistan. Kühne thinks not, not only because of the African countries' lesser strategic importance to Moscow, but also because Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique are not regarded by the USSR as irreversibly Marxist-Leninist. To qualify as such, the Soviet Union has indicated, a country must have a proletarian-based vanguard party that "guides" the political and economic restructuring of the state according to the Soviet model. And nowhere in Africa does that situation obtain, except perhaps for the new Ethiopian party.

Kühne also looks at the issue of Moscow's use of African communist parties as a means of promoting Soviet policy. He highlights the very ambiguous attitude of the USSR toward indigenous communist parties. In the past, the Soviet Union did not react dramatically when African governments sought to curb the role of such parties in their countries, and in some cases (e.g., Egypt) actually increased government-to-government involvement despite such a development. Even in the case of South Africa, the USSR maintained diplomatic relations up to 1955, i.e., five years after the banning of the South African Communist Party, and even then the final break was initiated by South Africa.

THE QUESTION of the legitimacy—in the sense of international law—of Soviet activities in African conflicts is addressed by Kühne. This is a major contribution to the literature because it has become customary simply to accuse the Soviet Union of subver-

sive activities and in so doing presume an international consensus on what is subversion and what is not. Kühne reminds us that Soviet support for national liberation movements is "legitimate" in terms of majority decisions by the United Nations General Assembly and of the Organization of African Unity's program for national liberation. In addition, these formulators of international norms have legitimized armed conflict as a last, but allowable, means of securing liberation. Soviet support, especially for the South West African People's Organization in Namibia, does not violate these norms.

There are a few thorny issues involved in this last statement, of course. One is the question of whether a majority decision by the UN General Assembly may be regarded as a decree of international law. A second one is the question of when a liberation struggle qualifies as legitimate and when it does not. Does the placing of bombs in public places qualify as part of a legitimate struggle or not? Be that as it may, Kühne's discussion makes us aware of the fact that a large proportion of independent states do not regard the Soviet support for national liberation movements as inadmissible, despite their condemnation of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan.

BOTH Albright and Kühne see some opportunities for the USSR to expand its influence in Africa during the 1980's despite the reverse trend in recent years and the numerous constraints under which Moscow must operate. Albright discusses in detail its volatile position especially in Somalia, Zaire, and southern Africa. This he does after an extensive and valuable treatment of all factors conducive to instability in sub-Saharan Africa, such as the lack of effective political structures for conflict resolution, economic decline

and rising expectations, excessive militarization, and racial tensions.

Although Kühne is less inclined to regard these simply as favorable opportunities for the USSR, he does agree with Albright that southern Africa, and especially South Africa, is the one place where Soviet influence might expand due to military involvement in escalating conflicts. Both authors supply considerable evidence to support their views, not the least of which is South African policy, widely attributed to be one of destabilization, i.e., incursions into Angola and Mozambique, to which both refer.

Two assumptions support this argument. The first is that the Soviet Union is prepared to extend its military involvement in the wake of South Africa's raids and operations. So far, this has happened only to a small degree, i.e., through increased Soviet weapons deliveries and a marginal enlargement of the Cuban contingent in Angola. All in all, the USSR has not supplied the materiel and personnel to permanently discourage the South African Defence Force, which is what at least President Samora Machel of Mozambique had requested. It is therefore not as evident as both authors assume that a continuation of the South African policy would automatically enhance Soviet influence.

The second assumption may be of more importance. This entails an extension of the first, namely, that all cases of instability in southern Africa must by nature be conducive to the extension of Soviet influence. Without passing any judgment on South Africa's policy, it may be argued that it was premised on the insight that increased instability in those countries where the USSR has become the "status quo power"⁹ would un-

⁹See William I. Zartman, "The USSR in the Third World," *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1982, pp. 76-80.

dermine the Soviet position rather than enhance it. Before taking such a calculated risk, there has to be a fairly clear perception of Soviet unwillingness or inability to intervene. It can only be assumed that South African policymakers ruled out the possibility of such an intervention, a judgment proved correct by ensuing events. This brought the Soviet Union a considerable loss of face, and must have been one of the factors prompting Mozambique's Machel and Angola's José Eduardo dos Santos to enter into negotiations with Pretoria.

In addition, present trends prevailing, the Soviet Union has little chance to recoup. One way of doing so might have been to play a constructive mediating role in the present negotiating phase. But, because the USSR has aligned itself exclusively with one faction in the various

local and regional conflicts, it can hardly secure concessions from both sides, which is precisely what is needed to maintain the momentum of the peace initiatives. Consequently, it now can only watch from the sidelines—perhaps throwing in a few weapons to try to spoil the process—while other third parties arbitrate.

This leaves us with the question of the prospects for an escalation of conflict in South Africa proper. Both authors see a distinct possibility that there will be an increase in internal strife, which cannot be definitively ruled out (witness the recent upsurge of black unrest and violent police response). However, given the present disarray of the African National Congress on the question of tactics, the fundamental rift in the liberation movement between the Black Consciousness National Fo-

rum and the multi-racial United Democratic Front, and, last but not least, the awesome power of the security apparatus in South Africa, it is unlikely that we will see a large-scale military conflict developing that would facilitate a significant influx of Soviet weaponry and personnel into the region.

Whether other third parties can play a constructive role in South Africa depends to a considerable extent on their ability to avoid the Soviet mistake of becoming too closely aligned with one side in the conflict. Moreover, as Colin Legum observes in his "Preface" to the Albright work, experience has shown that Western resistance to national liberation movements elsewhere in Africa (in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Namibia) created favorable opportunities for an expansion of Soviet influence.

Political Economy of Socialism in Eastern Europe

Deborah Duff Milenkovitch

JAN ADAM, Ed. *Employment Policies in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe*. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1982.

JAROSLAV KREJCI. *National Income and Outlay in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia*. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1982.

JAN DREWNOWSKI, Ed. *Crisis in the East European Economy*. London and Canberra, Croom Helm; New York, St. Martin's Press, 1982.

THERE IS LITTLE disagreement among experts in the West concerning the general nature of the current economic problems of Eastern Europe. The experts seem to have reached a consensus that the Soviet-type model is now *finally* ready to vindicate their earlier predictions: these economies are in a long-term low-growth trajectory. This secular trend both sharpens the internal contradictions and creates new opportunities for interaction with the world at large. The prospect of systemic failure provides hope for renewal to the citizens within and for a revision of political alignments to

PAUL HARE, HUGO RADICE, and NIGEL SWAIN, Eds. *Hungary: A Decade of Economic Reform*. London, George Allen and Unwin, 1981.

STEPHEN R. SACKS. *Self-Management and Efficiency: Large Corporations in Yugoslavia*. London, Boston, Sydney, George Allen and Unwin, 1983.

the nations without. Whether these hopes are justified only time will tell. At the same time, the West is becoming increasingly aware of the diversity among the states of Eastern Europe. As the performance of the Soviet-type model breaks down, so too does the Western perception dominant since the Yalta conference of 1945, in which Eastern Europe is merely a pale carbon copy and an appendage of the Soviet Union.

At this point, two questions need answering: (1) What are the truly *general* features of a Soviet-type economy that are shared by all the historically different states of Eastern Europe? Alternatively stated, is there a political economy of socialism? (2) How can we account for the diversity among these countries—Yugoslavia, Hungary, Romania, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria—within the socialist framework, and how can this diversity help to sharpen our understanding

FRED SINGLETON and BERNARD CARTER. *The Economy of Yugoslavia*. London and Canberra, Croom Helm; New York, St. Martin's Press, 1982.

SAUL ESTRIN. *Self-Management: Economic Theory and Yugoslav Practice*. Cambridge, London, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1984.

of the features common to socialism? The books by Jan Adam, Jaroslav Krejci, and Jan Drewnowski address broad problems found throughout the East European economies; the volume edited by Paul Hare, Hugo Radice, and Nigel Swain explores Hungary's New Economic Mechanism; and the books by Stephen Sacks, Fred Singleton and Bernard Carter, and Saul Estrin examine the Yugoslav economic approach. This review will focus on their contributions of substance and method to our understanding of these two questions.

THE VOLUME edited by Adam, *Employment Policies in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe*, considers a basic paradox in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe—namely, the existence simultaneously of a labor shortage and of an underutilization of labor. The reasons for this paradox are to be found in the

Deborah Duff Milenkovitch is Professor of Economics at Barnard College (New York). She has written extensively on the Yugoslav economy and on plan and market in the economies of the other East European states.

forces of supply and demand, and are common to all the countries. Factors that influence the supply of labor include: the changing demographic variables (the numbers of new entrants to the labor force are expected to be lower in the Soviet Union and all East European countries, especially during the 1980's); the negligible possibilities for increasing the participation rates of the existing manpower; the performance of workers in the face of existing effort/reward relationships and difficulties of life outside the workplace. Factors that determine demand include: the tendency of managers to hoard labor, given strong incentives to meet output targets and uncertainty of input deliveries, while the rewards for cost-cutting are few; the planners' predilection for investing in capital goods for production rather than in equipment that might ease the extremely labor-intensive requirements of packaging, delivery, warehousing, and servicing.

The management of manpower requirements has been similar in all the countries. It consists of a combination of better planning for supplying particular kinds of labor, the use of material incentives for workers to increase output, but the provision of little incentive to the enterprises to conserve labor. These policies have not been particularly successful, because the core of the problem lies in the system itself. The contributions to the Adam volume underscore this point, thereby raising our interest in those features of the system that resist change.

To eliminate the paradox of labor shortage and underutilization, major changes in the system would be necessary. First, the enterprises would need to have a significant financial interest in using labor more economically. The principal way to stimulate such interest is to make enterprises profit-conscious. This

can be accomplished if three requirements are met: (1) enterprises must have a large degree of autonomy in their day-to-day operations; (2) meaningful prices must be set for inputs and outputs; (3) enterprises must want to maximize profits, a desire best stimulated in the socialist context by giving to the enterprises control over a significant portion of their profits.

Of these three conditions, autonomy in daily operations has been the easiest one to fulfill. It was instituted in Yugoslavia in the 1950's and in Hungary in the late 1960's.

Meaningful prices—which are useful to planners even without full enterprise autonomy—have been a much greater problem in all these countries. Such prices are necessary to establish a rationale for profits, namely, that the firm is providing goods that society wants and needs but lacks. Introduction of meaningful prices also can help to underscore the arbitrariness of the political (as opposed to economic) redistribution of profits from profit-making enterprises to enterprises and sectors of the economy favored by the political leadership. Therefore a standard is set by which government investment policy can be criticized, thus limiting the government's arbitrary power over the surplus.

Not surprisingly, allowing enterprises to use a portion of their profits for investment is the most difficult step. Ultimately, it is through the control of the surplus of society that system managers direct the system and reproduce it, as Marx had clearly perceived over a hundred years ago in his study of capitalism. If the system managers were to surrender the control over the surplus that they presently have through their control of prices and the existing centralization of profits, this would be a revolution of major proportions.

The second requirement for

eliminating the paradox of simultaneous shortage and underutilization of labor is to motivate workers at all levels to do their jobs. This calls for the carrot of material rewards and the availability of desired goods, and possibly the stick of potential unemployment for the lazy. It would certainly also require—although this is not discussed in the Adam volume—a reduction in the antagonism between the workers and the regime. System managers have tried to buy their way out of this dilemma by providing more consumer goods, but the leadership finds it difficult to procure from the system enough goods to pay the annual installments on worker demands.

It appears then that, without significant change, no major improvement in either the demand or the supply side of the labor equation can occur, and yet failure to correct either side poses problems for the regime. The Adam book demonstrates that the policies followed to date will not resolve the paradox.

IN THEIR STUDIES, Krejci and Drewnowski cast innovative nets for a better understanding of the underlying socialist system in Eastern Europe. In his *National Income and Outlay in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia*, Krejci uses national income accounts to quantify the Marxian notion of surplus. According to this definition, surplus is that portion of current production which is not necessary for the reproduction of the current labor force or for the replacement of current machinery. It can be used for augmenting capital stock, improving standards of consumption, waging wars, building pyramids, or supporting an idle class. A surplus can also be used to expand society's productive capacities and, if it were so used, could stimulate high rates of economic growth. However, if the surplus is squandered on poorly planned investment projects

and top-heavy state administration, consumption remains low over time and there is little growth in productive output.

Krejci studies the size of the surplus in three countries with different socialist structures, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia, in the years 1967 to 1978. (It is a pity that he did not include Hungary in this comparison.) He carefully develops three concepts of surplus. While one is based on East European net material product accounts, the two more useful ones come from the cost and expenditure sides of reconstructed gross national product accounts. Krejci establishes that the surplus—however measured—was higher for Czechoslovakia than for Poland or Yugoslavia but that the rate of growth for Czechoslovakia was lower. Why that was so and how it was that the smaller surplus was used more productively by Poland and Yugoslavia are the questions Krejci's work raises.

In a different vein, the authors in the book edited by Drewnowski, *Crisis in the East European Economy*, put forth their thoughts on the causes of the Polish events of 1980-81 and on the possibility that similar crises might occur in other East European countries. Peter Wiles notes that the defects of the Soviet-type system have long been known, and he asks why they led to serious problems when they did—in the late 1970's and early 1980's—rather than earlier (p. 10). There are a number of answers to this question, in addition to the ones favored by Wiles: (1) the impact of the external shocks caused by two sharp rises in the prices of raw materials in the 1970's, which were quantitatively different from previous price hikes and which fundamentally undermined the raw-materials-intensive and energy-intensive growth strategies of the East European economies; (2) the need to expand foreign

trade relations on competitive world markets in order to obtain raw materials and energy resources; (3) the exhaustion of the supply of labor that could be transferred from the agricultural sector—a development that undermined the labor-intensive growth strategy pursued in Eastern Europe; (4) the need to provide more and better consumer goods to maintain the legitimacy of the system and to motivate workers; (5) the insatiable demand for foreign capital goods because the system managers wanted shiny new equipment from abroad, and because foreign capital goods were seen as providing an alternative to systemic change; (6) in light of these five factors, the combination of concessionary prices set by producers of capital goods facing a world market depression and a Western banking system frantically trying to recycle petrodollars proved too tempting: the East European countries overborrowed from the West and found themselves unable to repay.

While these reasons are well known, Wiles underscores the importance of the human element as well. As he puts it, "there is now in all these countries a *fin de siècle* feeling: i.e., a cumulation of disappointments. Not just the economy but the whole theocratic system is no good..." (p. 11). Wiles believes that the only way to salvage the human factor is by increasing the use of market mechanisms.

Drewnowski, on the other hand, develops the notion of "economic tissue" (p. 76). Degradation of tissue, or rot, is brought about by the suppression of truth, the eradication of dissent, and the repudiation of fairness. The symptoms of rot are seen in increased reliance by all economic actors on strict procedural regulations as a strategy of self-protection, which results in faulty information, planning without facts, distorted evaluations, incompetence

of decision-makers, complexity of procedures, and rigidity of economic targets. As a consequence, common sense is eliminated from both decision-making and human relations. The only remedy is to be found in the restoration of basic human freedoms and democratic rights, according to Drewnowski. His plea is heartfelt, and the notion of rot hits the mark. Most striking, however, is that Wiles and Drewnowski, both economists, reach the conclusion that standard economic variables alone are inadequate to illuminate the real economic issues in Eastern Europe.

OFFSETTING the general bleak picture of the Soviet-type system in Eastern Europe—whether explained by resistance to fundamental systemic change, the size and uses of surplus, or tissue degradation—are the examples of successful reform of the system in Hungary and Yugoslavia. These reforms were successful not so much because they accomplished all their economic goals, but because they showed that reform of the system was possible. Significant changes permitted enterprise autonomy, meaningful prices, some degree of decentralization of investment, a liberalized discussion of real issues, and the provision of more and better consumer goods to the population.

The volume edited by Hare, Radice, and Swain, *Hungary: A Decade of Economic Reform*, focuses on the Hungarian reform. This reform has experienced alternating swings, a broad sweep in 1968 which gave much freedom to enterprises, followed by retrenchment in the mid-1970's. The pendulum swung toward reform again in 1980, and in 1982—with a diminution of the authority of the industrial ministries and their merger into a single ministry, with new mechanisms for relating domestic prices to world-

market prices, with a significant easing of regulations on the private and semi-private sectors of the economy, and with the breakup of monopoly enterprises into competing firms. Since this volume was published in 1981, it misses the full sweep of this cyclical pattern.

The contributors to this collection identify the needs for reform and its impact on labor and wages, agriculture, investment, technology transfer, and international trade. The authors of the individual sections provide a good understanding of these various areas and, at the same time, sensibly relate their specific topics to the general picture.

However, an important question is left unanswered: why did Hungary go down the path of reform while the other countries of the bloc did not? The authors seem to argue that the reform—a compromise between the competing demands of different interest groups—did not fundamentally alter the basic power relationships operating within Hungarian society. To support this interpretation, they contend that it was possible to introduce new policy instruments and confer new powers and rights on enterprises, but that measures aimed at challenging real power, for example, the breaking-up of larger enterprises to promote competition or the abolition of industrial ministries, would come to naught. (As we have seen, their predictions were not entirely accurate.) Furthermore, the process of reform was always accompanied by a broad policy of “exceptionalism”—the option for enterprises to avoid the uncomfortable consequences of market-type reform by claiming an exception. Prices would be changed, or subsidies granted, or other methods found to relieve economic pressure. As long as exceptionalism prevails, the beneficial effects of the reforms are muted and the existing power relationships reinforced.

A market-type economic reform causes the investment process to become the locus of tensions between the strengthened forces of the periphery (enterprise managers and financial managers), which have the logic of profits on their side, and the various vested interests and the general interests represented by the center, which have the logic of market failure on their side. Thus, the tension between center and periphery takes the form of a debate about the attributes of plan and market, reminiscent of the Yugoslav experience of the late 1950's and early 1960's, when exceptionalism developed to such an extent that the whole thrust of the Yugoslav economic reform was jeopardized. (A comparison of these processes in the Hare collection would have been enlightening.) Nevertheless, despite the failure of the Hungarian reform to win all at once, the resurgence of the pro-reform forces after 1980 attests to the fact that the struggle to continue reform is still going on. Thus, arguments presented in the Hare volume that the Hungarian reform changed little of fundamental significance seem to me to miss an important part of the story.

WHAT OF Yugoslavia's experience? Its unique system of self-management has fascinated observers since its establishment in the early 1950's. It demonstrates that there is a socialist alternative to both the hierarchically-organized, party-dominated, alienating work experience that characterizes the rest of Eastern Europe and to the capitalist experience described in both neo-classical and Marxist textbooks. In the 1950's, decisions about current operations were decentralized to the enterprise level, and the role of planning in the economy was significantly diminished. As is currently the case in Hungary, this reform brought about a struggle between

the center and the periphery over the use of profits, a struggle that in Yugoslavia was exacerbated by the regional dimensions of uneven development and national diversity. Eventually, a reform was adopted in 1965 that allowed enterprises to retain their profits for reinvestment. This implied having a means for transferring capital to firms with the most profitable opportunities, and banks were reorganized to serve as such financial intermediaries.

The 1965 reforms resolved the disagreements over allocation of investment but generated new tensions, both over the role of the banks in allocating funds and, within enterprises, over the new and powerful position of the managers. Enterprise management and bank management were both gaining considerable power, independent of the party. The 1974 Constitution was adopted precisely to curb this power, although its popular appeal was based on the promise to improve the unemployment situation, reduce income differentials, and replace selfish “group-capitalist” thinking with corporate-type bargaining and decision-making processes.

The constitution provided a new organizational form for enterprises. Each enterprise was broken down into its constituent parts, each of which had its own separate profit-and-loss statement. Only direct producers were to be able to earn profits and to dispose of them. Profits were to be invested by the unit that earned them, and were not to revert to the central enterprise management for allocation. Banks were also reorganized to make them conform with this new logic of control of investment by the direct producers and to reduce bank power over the flow of investment resources.

In his *Self-Management and Efficiency: Large Corporations in Yugoslavia*, Sacks describes this

new form of self-management as it developed in Yugoslavia in the 1970's. Using contemporary Western theory of divisionalized management of large corporations, Sacks assesses whether this form of reorganization is efficient in the Yugoslav context. He gives a critical appraisal of the process of forming prices for transfers between units operating under one roof, and the investment process of inter-unit lending. This fine theoretical work is supplemented with seven case studies drawn from 24 firms that Sacks visited in the late 1970's, and is placed in the context of the organizational forms and divisionalization prevailing elsewhere in Eastern Europe. In addition, he provides significant details about the industrial structure and giant corporations in Yugoslavia, which complements the findings of Saul Estrin (see below).

Singleton and Carter, in *The Economy of Yugoslavia*, convey accurately and concisely the facts and implications of the ethnic, historic, and geographic differences present in Yugoslavia, and their strong centrifugal impact on the economy. They argue that the institutional form of self-management by workers emerged as a means for resolving these differences. They go on to ask whether worker self-management resolves Yugoslavia's current economic problems. They see clearly that wide inter-industry pay differentials encourage all industries to try to attain the pay level of the highest-paid one, and thus have an inflationary impact. They rightly argue that Yugoslav unemployment rates must not be seen solely as the result of self-management. Instead, they ought to be viewed in the context of the large number of newly created industrial jobs and the demographic characteristics of the population, which vary among regions (p. 216). The authors deal less well with integrating the microeconomic

details—for instance, their analysis of excess demand for investment, which fuels Yugoslav inflation, neglects the role of interest rates that in real terms are negative.

But their most important contribution is the perspective they give on the Yugoslav system of self-management as a response to the problems of ethnic, historical, geographic, and economic diversity. This raises two further questions: Has self-management succeeded in its task of resolving Yugoslavia's problems of diversity, or has it deepened them instead? Can self-management develop in other contexts? One of the alternatives always floating through the minds of democrats and reformers in Eastern Europe is a vision of a worker-managed system somehow purified of the elements attributed to Yugoslav mismanagement, which, in their own countries, would work "well." How would such a pure worker-managed system function in the broader context of Eastern Europe? Neoclassical theory is a means of providing an answer to this question.

In his *Self-Management: Economic Theory and Yugoslav Practice*, Estrin formally models the worker-managed enterprise in an environment of considerable market concentration, clearly the relevant context for Yugoslavia and all of Eastern Europe. He notes that dynamic models which trace outcomes over time are still too primitive, and he therefore restricts himself to static efficiency (p. 6). The worker-managed enterprise rents its capital resources and makes decisions on output and employment so as to maximize income per worker. One consequence of this practice is that profitable enterprises have high incomes per worker but no incentive to take on additional workers, while workers in less profitable enterprises have lower earnings and few chances of being hired by more

profitable firms. What Estrin shows, for the period 1965-74 (when market forces were most strongly in operation), is that Yugoslav data are consistent with the predictions of this theory. In Yugoslavia, income dispersion across firms and industrial sectors is considerable, even when it is adjusted for education, occupation, skill level, or region. Estrin's careful econometric work compels facing up to some of the difficulties in the otherwise appealing system of worker self-management.

WHERE DO these books take us in our understanding of Eastern Europe? The task that lies before us is to reconcile our growing confidence that we understand the operation of the political economy of socialism with our increasing awareness that there is much diversity in Eastern Europe. What are the contributions in substance and in method of the books under review? The three multi-country studies expand our understanding of the substance of socialism somewhat, but on the whole they neither weave a new interpretation of the political economy of socialism nor point to the factors that account for differences among these countries. Their main contribution lies in methodological innovation. This is conscious in the study by Krejci, who develops and quantifies the concept of surplus as a means of identifying differences among the countries of Eastern Europe; and probably less conscious in the cases of Adam and Drewnowski, who insist on the importance of factors usually ignored in conventional economic analysis—resistance to change (Adam) and tissue degradation (Drewnowski).

The strength of the individual country studies is substantive. Sacks and Estrin use standard neoclassical methodology to explain the theory of self-management and to measure

the Yugoslav experience against theoretical results. Hare provides an able summary of the Hungarian reforms up to 1980. The major limitations of the four single-country studies lie in their failure to relate the individual national experiences to the experiences of other socialist countries and to the broad issues of

the economy of socialism.

Where do we go from here? Marx, I believe, pointed the way over one hundred years ago in his study of capitalism. Eastern Europe today offers an unparalleled opportunity to observe states with similar ideologies, property rights, and political structures, and strikingly different

national identities. Only through a careful study of individual cases in which we search for the common elements, and through the development of general theories which integrate our knowledge of the particular cases, can we come to a sharper understanding of the political economy of socialism.

Correspondence

NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to The Editors, Problems of Communism, US Information Agency, 301 4th Street, SW, Washington, DC 20547, USA.

PROSPECTS FOR THE PHILIPPINES

TO THE EDITORS: The prospects of Philippine communism is a topic recently addressed by Professor David Rosenberg in this journal (September-October 1984). Rosenberg accurately distinguishes between the pro-Soviet Philippine Communist Party (PKP) and its offshoot, the Maoist Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). In 1968, when the CPP was formed, the military threat posed by communism to the regime in Manila was nonexistent. However, since 1972, the year President Marcos declared martial law, the ranks of the New People's Army—the armed wing of the CPP—have grown. A recent estimate of armed guerrilla strength is 15,000 (*The Christian Science Monitor* [Boston], Mar. 26, 1985). The NPA has also succeeded in spreading its forces throughout the vast Philippine Archipelago. According to Fidel Ramos, acting Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the guerrillas have been able to position themselves in practically all of the 73 provinces.

The successful dispersion of the NPA prevents the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)

from concentrating their power in a limited geographic area. At present and in the foreseeable future, the guerrillas are a fact of Philippine life.

There is little doubt that the communist threat is real and, given the current economic and political malaise in the Philippines, threatens to grow. Yet, a sense of perspective is necessary. It is unlikely that the NPA will capture Manila readily. The Philippines is too large and diverse for this. Moreover, the establishment of rural bases is several steps removed from a cohesive national revolution capable of toppling the "US-Marcos dictatorship." It is one thing to convince a peasant in an isolated village of the need to resist local military abuses. It is an entirely different matter to persuade him that the defeat of Western imperialism, the removal of US bases, and the institution of a communist regime are answers to his plight.

The local orientation of the peasantry was the bane of the earlier rural-based Marxist threat, the Huk rebellion of 1946-54. In order to assess the dangers posed by the NPA, it is useful to understand the strengths and weaknesses of the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (People's Liberation Army).

Rosenberg contends that the failure of the Huks was primarily internal, i.e., that "the PKP failed because of its own basic errors of political analysis, strategy, and tactics" (p. 46). While it is clear that the bold 1950 Huk policy of attempting an early seizure of

power was both unwise and premature, it is not clear that greater Huk patience would have brought a different result.

In his classic work, *The Huk Rebellion*, Benjamin Kerkvliet contends that the Huk movement was largely conservative in nature. Despite the ideological overlay of Marxism, many Huks fought for a return to the traditional landlord-tenant relationship prevalent during the Spanish era.

Although that relationship was far from perfect, the bond of paternalism guaranteed a peasant's survival. The arrival of the Americans had changed this basic relationship. In administering its new possession, the United States established a free-trade relationship with the Philippines. For the new colony, this meant sudden access for the products of Philippine agriculture to a vast new market. This access, in turn, stimulated agricultural production, and the prospect of large profits changed the relationship between landlord and tenant. With access to the US market, the personal bond disappeared. Landowners left their farms for the glamor of Manila. In their place, overseers managed the daily operation of the estates with the goal of increasing production and efficiency. The old paternalistic rules were replaced by the profit motive.

Under these conditions, the peasants organized. Indeed, the postwar Huks traced their roots to the peasant organizational efforts of the prewar Philippines. During World War II, those early efforts provided the foundation

for their evolution into the highly effective anti-Japanese guerrilla army. After the war, the Manila government feared the political and military strength of the Huks and sought on different occasions to suppress them militarily. As tension grew in 1945-46, there were attempts at negotiation. However, as before World War II, the government remained dominated by the rich. Thus, even nominal reforms favoring peasants were impossible.

At the start of the rebellion, the Huks numbered 10,000 battle-tested veterans. Their peasant roots and loyalties made them appear almost invincible within their home territory, the provinces of Central Luzon. Yet, by 1952 their organization was shattered. Two years later, Luis Taruc, the Huk "Supremo," surrendered, while many Huks returned to their villages never to fight again.

What had happened? Certainly, the unwise and premature optimism of 1950 contributed greatly to the Huk demise. Yet, to state as Professor Rosenberg does that the cause of failure was primarily "internal" is too narrow an answer to a complex situation. Other factors, military and political, led to the Huk demise. The army, long feared by the peasants, was reformed. Abusive officers were replaced, and soldiers were commanded to respect the rights of the peasants. The armed forces were reorganized into smaller, better trained units skilled in guerrilla warfare. Their increased mobility and restraint in dealing with villagers paid both

political and military dividends.

The government also undermined the Huk program by implementing a series of reforms. The most dramatic was the Economic Development Corps, which promised to resettle landless peasants on the southern island of Mindanao. Actually, only 950 families were resettled (Kerkvliet, p. 234). Nevertheless, this and other moves had a devastating effect on Huk political support.

Another factor receiving little attention was the inability of the Huks to effectively expand the rebellion beyond the provinces of Central Luzon (ibid., pp. 212-13). Neither Rosenberg nor Kerkvliet emphasizes this aspect, although the latter acknowledges that the topic "certainly deserves more attention" (ibid., p. 23, fn 90). The peasants of Central Luzon knew and trusted the Huks from the war years of anti-Japanese resistance. This insured the Huks' effectiveness there in their struggle with the newly independent Philippine government. But Huk efforts to spread their doctrine to other regions were greeted by the insular apathy reserved for outsiders. This crucial failure of the Huks to extend their activities throughout the Philippines made the government's task far easier. Since Central Luzon was the only theater of war, government supply lines were short. In addition, the military could focus its considerable might in a comparatively small area. Eventually, the Huks ran out of room.

It is clear that the NPA has learned well from the failures of the Huk movement. In retrospect, it is no surprise that NPA cadres have downplayed ideology and emphasized local grievances. As demonstrated by the Huk experience, ideology was a small factor in motivating the vast majority of peasants sympathetic to the Huks. In addition, it is unlikely that the NPA will make a premature attempt to seize power, similar to the abortive Huk initiative of 1950. Unlike the Huks in 1946, the NPA in 1968 did not command the allegiance of 10,000 well-organized, battle-tested veterans. Molded in part

by its initial weakness, NPA policy has been both patient and opportunistic, its strength growing largely from the mistakes of the regime.

Particularly since the Aquino murder, there is a sense of inevitable collision of opposing forces. Some believe that full-scale civil war is a likely, if not imminent, prospect. Yet, once again, a sense of perspective is necessary. The Marxists may yet win, but to do so they must overcome many substantial hurdles. Despite the increase in NPA numbers, for example, the NPA is still no match for government forces, which number approximately 200,000 men (See *Far Eastern Economic Review* [Hongkong], Mar. 10, 1983, p. 12). The NPA is also outgunned. The movement is indigenous, and there is no evidence of outside support.

Less tangible but of critical import is the nature of the masses that the NPA wants to mobilize. Can local peasant grievances become the basis for a united national revolution? The Huks, who possessed fighting experience and a cohesive organizational network, could not forge such a basis.

What might happen if, for example, a democratically elected post-Marcos government concentrated its efforts on addressing the problems of the Philippine countryside? The Huk experience is informative on this point. The limited, nonrevolutionary vision of many of the rank-and-file Huks was dramatically revealed when the Philippine government introduced a series of reforms. The man responsible, Ramon Magsaysay, was one of the few officials trusted by the peasants of Central Luzon. Largely because of that trust he became a key figure in the demise of the rebels. Although many of the reforms were marginal, they gave the impression that Manila was finally listening. For many Huks, this apparent change in attitude was sufficient to persuade them to quit the rebellion.

Today, the most noteworthy improvement of the NPA over its ideological predecessor, the

Hukbalahap, has been its capacity to spread its influence, in varying degrees, throughout the archipelago. As a result, there is a stalemate. For the NPA, there are substantial problems of integration, coordination, and communication. On the battlefield, the NPA, too weak to directly challenge the military, needs time to build itself both politically and militarily. The military, although far stronger than its Marxist foe, cannot deliver the major blow because of the dispersion of its enemy.

Undoubtedly, the Aquino murder has aided the NPA. Yet, it has also increased opportunities for the moderate opposition. A dramatic increase in popular, nonviolent opposition—and pressure from Washington—has led to a number of reforms. In the May 1984 elections to the National Assembly, millions voted despite fears of governmental intimidation and fraud, and despite a well-organized boycott movement. One important election result was the emergence of a viable 60-vote opposition minority in the Assembly (see *The Wall Street Journal*, New York, Dec. 7, 1984). Elected members of the opposition now have a chance to engage in politics, and to develop programs and constituencies. Looking toward a presidential election now scheduled for 1987, the Assembly provides a means for Filipinos to assess those who would succeed Ferdinand Marcos. In addition, the leaders of the democratic opposition—criticized for their inability to cooperate with one another in the past—are now showing signs of needed cooperation. Most opposition leaders have agreed upon the need to seek a common presidential candidate should Mr. Marcos die before the 1987 presidential elections.

Despite the years of martial law, it would be a mistake to underestimate the residual strength of Philippine democracy. In the past, democracy worked well on a number of levels. Filipino voters regularly turned out incumbent presidents, and the losers, despite the power at their

command, never resorted to force to retain office.

In his analysis of the Assembly elections, Professor Rosenberg suggests that the high voter turnout and strong opposition showing was due to the following: "Filipinos will take any opportunity they have to show their opposition" (p. 27). It should also be added that Filipinos understand quite well the violent consequences of the failure of a democratic transition.

Aside from the resurgence of the Assembly, other staples of Philippine democracy are making a comeback. Press censorship has been lessened, and a procedure for presidential succession has been established. Current Philippine law mandates the transfer of power to the Speaker of the National Assembly, whose main duty will be to call presidential elections.

A great source of anxiety among Philippine observers has been the possibility that the military—which President Marcos assiduously courted and rewarded—would step into the power vacuum that would be created should he depart from power suddenly. While the danger still exists, it has been lessened somewhat due to the majority report of the Agrava Commission and the resulting trial of 25 military men, including Fabian Ver, the powerful Armed Forces Chief of Staff, and a relative and close confidant of the President. General Ver's replacement, General Fidel Ramos, is a well-regarded professional soldier who has professed his support for constitutional processes.

While the Philippine situation is grim, there is still time to avoid Professor Rosenberg's scenario of sharp political polarization and increasing violence. The closest phenomenon in Philippine history to the current NPA threat was the Huk rebellion. The failure of that revolt demonstrated powerful cultural traits and geographical factors that worked against revolutionary unity and ideological blandishments. The very fact that the NPA has been forced to play down ideology indicates the types

of problems Marxist ideologues must still confront.

In addition to the inherent problems of the radical Left, there have been a number of other developments that have strengthened the democratic center. The overwhelming participation of the Philippine electorate in the National Assembly elections demonstrated a popular preference for a peaceful response to the current crisis. In turn, the elections created a strong opposition presence in the Assembly. The chances of democracy were aided even more by signs of growing cooperation among opposition leaders, the establishment of a transition mechanism, greater freedom of the press, and the removal of the feared Ver. These developments show that democratic prospects in the Philippines are far from dead.

PETER BACHO
University of Washington
Seattle, WA

tion" in *World Politics* (Princeton, NJ), July 1982, pp. 487-505.

In fact, my argument is quite different. I quote from page 500 of that article: "I would argue that the Islamic revival that the Muslim world is experiencing seems to be having little direct impact on Soviet Muslims. For the masses, the arguments of the religious opposition of Egypt and Syria, or of the ruling groups in Iran, would be difficult to understand; predictions of some Western analysts that a protracted war in Afghanistan might heighten religious opposition in the Soviet Union⁴⁷ have not been borne out by the facts. Although there is no evidence of Muslim religious-political dissent in the U.S.S.R., this does not mean that Islam is not a social force in the Soviet Union for the overwhelming majority of Soviet Muslims. It is a social force, but it is not a political force. By recognizing the almost definitional relationship of Islam and the national culture of the Muslim regions, the regime is forestalling—possibly indefinitely—the likelihood that the religious leaders will be able to function as a political pressure group, as they did when they perceived themselves under threat in the early days of Soviet rule." (My footnote 47, it might be noted, cited an earlier article by Bennigsen, "Soviet Muslims and the World of Islam," which had appeared in *Problems of Communism* in March-April 1980.)

Thus, in fact, I share Bennigsen's belief that Islam is an important part of Central Asian culture and is a key factor in the formation of national identity; where we differ is in our assessment of the potential political impact of Soviet Muslims' Islamic identities.

MARTHA BRILL OLCOTT
Colgate University
Hamilton, NY

TO THE EDITORS: Professor Alexandre Bennigsen is an eminent proponent of one interpretation of the status of Islam in the contemporary Soviet Union. However, one can scrutinize the evi-

dence and find support for a strikingly different interpretation. A number of specific points raised by Professor Bennigsen seem perfectly plausible, but elsewhere the logic of the argument and the supporting evidence are not strong enough to justify the certainty with which he asserts such controversial opinions.

A crucial problem is what to make of the fact that millions of Soviet citizens undoubtedly still identify with Islam, at least in some sense. It is quite a leap from noting Islam's survival to assuming that Islamic loyalties now encourage serious hostility toward the Soviet regime. My reading in Tajik sources leads me to the conclusion that at least in that republic the persistence of Islam means above all the survival of ordinary folk religion, which is bad enough from the Soviet authorities' point of view, as the embodiment of "backward" attitudes, but is still far from any hint of powerful political activism. The very fact that the regime's cultural influence is less pervasive in rural areas, where the majority of Central Asian Muslims live, has not only facilitated the survival of folk Islam but has also allowed believers more leeway to meet the demands of the Soviet system while continuing to practice their religion. Various kinds of discontent may quite possibly exist, but the important question is how willing Muslims would be to advance from grumbling to political action. Given the millions of Soviet citizens victimized by the regime's coercion, Soviet Muslims may not be ready to incur the enormous risks of taking that step.

There is also the question of whether the 45 to 50 million Soviet Muslims should be treated as a monolith, all equally committed to Islam and a single perception of what that loyalty entails, all equally dissatisfied, and all ready to combine their loyalties and antagonisms in the same way. The notion that all Muslims owe their highest loyalty to a single community of all the faithful, the *'umma*, has been a pious fiction,

frequently invoked and just as frequently ignored in practice, since the first decades of Islam's existence.

Furthermore, there is the question of whether diverse notions of Islamic militance from the non-Soviet part of the *'umma* are appealing to Soviet Muslims. Many such militant movements (including those in Egypt, Syria, and Turkey) have failed thus far. Pakistan, which under Zia ul-Haq follows a variety of Islamicization, is beset with problems that may reduce its attractiveness as an exemplar for Soviet Muslims. While an Islamic revolution has taken place in Iran, that has been accomplished in the name of Shiism, a variety of Islam that has objectionable features for many Sunnis, including a large part of Iran's Sunni minority. Moreover, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni's Shiism is an innovative variety, which even some of Iran's other ayatollahs think goes too far. As for the role of Islam in the Afghan-Soviet fighting, the Afghan guerrillas are themselves divided on how much influence to accord Islam in nonspiritual matters. There is also the question of the Soviet Muslims' reaction to the fact that the war in Afghanistan has dragged on for five years. Are they impressed that the guerrillas have fought so long despite material disadvantages or do they by now consider it more important that while the guerrillas have not been defeated, neither have they won?

In some cases, the sources cited in the article do not support the assertions they are intended to buttress. A prime example of this is a quotation (pp. 28-29) from an article by Yaacov Ro'i, used to back the argument that the Soviets are worried because Islamic militance in Iran and Afghanistan has *already* stimulated increased Islamic activism among Soviet Muslims. Yet the larger passage from which that quotation is drawn (*The USSR and the Muslim World*, Winchester, MA, Allen & Unwin, 1984, pp. 167-68) argues something different. Ro'i contends that the Soviets are con-

cerned that *Western* propaganda is exploiting Islamic activism in Iran and Afghanistan. That is quite different from saying that the stimulus and the response are contained entirely within the 'umma. Even more important, Ro'i portrays the Soviets as seeing this foreign influence as a *potential* problem, rather than an extensive, existing one, and further contends that Soviet authorities will do whatever is necessary to ensure that this potential is never realized. In the sentence immediately following the passage quoted by Bennigsen, Ro'i states: "Surely, for example, the fact that the Soviets dwelt on the role of the mosques and the Muslim clergy as sources of trouble in Iran ... is evidence that Moscow has earmarked these as potential sources of danger to itself and has no intention of letting either the ... Establishment Muslim functionaries or the less easily controllable unofficial clergy ... incite believers against the regime" (p. 168).

Several of Bennigsen's major points can be interpreted in a very different light when seen in a larger context. The increased Soviet coverage of Islam since the late 1970's need not prove that the Soviets are worried about rising Islamic militance among their own citizens (p. 29). There are three other issues, all related to each other, that are extremely important and should not be omitted from the consideration of this issue.

First, during the 1970's but before the "Islamic revival" at the end of the decade, the recovery from Stalinist regimentation gave rise to the emergence of a group of Soviet scholars of Islam who were better trained than any of their predecessors since the 1920's and were allowed greater latitude to do more serious, less polemical research on Islam. The result was a spurt of studies of how Islam at home and abroad affects people's worldly ideas and way of life, a change from the older concentration on the Marxist critique of religions as opiates of the masses.

Another reason for the in-

creased number of Soviet publications on Islam since the late 1970's was the dramatic growth of Islamic political assertiveness abroad. These events also stimulated a host of publications in the United States and Western Europe, which see Islamic activism as affecting their interests even though the Western countries do not have significant Muslim populations.

Finally, an important part of the connection between the Islamic upsurge and Soviet publications about Islam is the fact that there are aspects of Islam's strength abroad that the Soviets liked very much. Between 1979 and 1982 the Soviets were hopeful that Islamic militance in Iran and elsewhere would render the useful service of ending the pro-Western orientation of those countries, including Algeria, South Yemen, and Syria, by serving as a tool that governments could use to rally mass support for programs that are in fact socialist-oriented.

Another major point of the article that looks quite different when seen in a broader context is the issue of the treatment of the Basmachi in the Central Asian press. This coverage may reflect a number of Soviet concerns, not just fear of existing Islamic assertiveness in Central Asia, which Bennigsen emphasizes (p. 39). Stories linking anti-Soviet activities and a vulnerable border with Afghanistan go back many years, to an era when Afghanistan was at peace internally and there was a *modus vivendi* between the Afghan monarchy and the Soviet government. Moreover, the Central Asian press has also given at least as much coverage to World War II as to the Basmachi. This does not apply only to the past few months (as the press anticipated the 40th anniversary of Germany's defeat); these reminders of World War II point to one of the most important messages the Soviet leadership conveys to all Soviet citizens, a message that the Basmachi stories can also support—that the Soviet Union has repeatedly been the target of vicious enemies and that there-

fore the many privations imposed on the Soviet citizens are justified by the need to make the country strong enough to defend itself against the hateful opponents.

The article portrays the Soviet emphasis on creating new secular rituals to replace traditional Islamic ones as indicative of an Islamic upsurge in the USSR (p. 41). Yet this concern over rituals is longstanding, not a recent innovation in response to a brewing crisis, and it applies to many parts of the Soviet Union, not just areas where there are many Muslims.

Some of the article's assertions are unsubstantiated. A prime example of this is Bennigsen's assertion that the growth of "parallel" Islam "may well be related to events in Iran and Afghanistan" (pp. 31–32), which he bases on the observation that published complaints about Sufi activity are particularly numerous in Turkmenistan, which borders Iran and Afghanistan. This does not take into account the generations of often violent hostility on the part of many Central Asian Turkmen tribes toward both Shiism and Persians or the fact that Turkmen on the Iranian side of the border have been hostile to the Islamic republic.

There certainly is, as the article asserts, anti-Islamic propaganda in the Soviet Union. However, there is no evidence that it is prompted in large part by fear of the influence of foreign Islamic militance. The theme of the propaganda is that Islam is an obstacle to the creation of a society in which all share socialist values. The "inadequacies" of citizens' attitudes is a problem that Soviet authorities face on many fronts, not just regarding Islam or just in the largely Muslim republics. The heart of the problem is that the CPSU's program for the creation of a new order is unworkable. Rather than admit the unsoundness of fundamental ideological assumptions and the methods of implementing them, Soviet authorities call for vigorous propaganda campaigns to make the population believe in the ideology so that it will behave ideally.

This approach is stressed in matters having no direct relation to Islam, notably the search for improved economic performance.

The article also contends that a significant shift has occurred in anti-Islamic propaganda in the wake of the invasion of Afghanistan, in that before 1980 the themes emphasized were that Islam is anti-scientific, backward, and not in keeping with socialist values, whereas since 1980 the main theme has been the importance of improving atheist propaganda among the young (p. 40). However, at least in Tajikistan this is not the case. The supposedly pre-1980 themes remain central.

Besides, Soviet sources also present Islam in terms that have important positive sides. Thus, Islam—despite its defects in Soviet eyes—also has a historical tradition in Central Asia of supporting the masses' interests and of fighting for social justice. Both scholarly and propaganda works argue that nowadays observant Muslims can and do retain their religious belief while fulfilling their duties to the Soviet system.

Social science research of necessity entails building a larger picture from fragmentary evidence. The special problems of access to sources in the case of the Soviet Union argues for particular caution in drawing conclusions.

MURIEL ATKIN
George Washington
University
Washington, DC

MR. BENNIGSEN RESPONDS: Martha Olcott insists that Islam is a social force but not a political one; however it does, she claims, figure in the Central Asians' national identity, i.e., there is a "definitional relationship" between the two. In my view, the only way one can ignore the Islamic political content of this "definitional relationship" is to ignore 13 centuries of Islamic culture in Central Asia, which then might lead one to the conclusion,

as it apparently has led Muriel Atkin, on the basis of reading Tajik newspapers, that "persistence of Islam means above all the survival of ordinary folk religion..."

It is essential here to find out exactly what it is that Olcott means, but unfortunately she does not explain. Is she claiming that Islam never had political meaning in Central Asia, or that the Soviet Marxist-Leninist experiment has succeeded—through social engineering and repression—in eliminating it? To conclude the first is a historical absurdity. To conclude the second is to ignore all of the Soviets' own evidence of concern about the political implications of letting Islam develop unchecked in their state. It seems to me that the burden of proof in this case lies with those who, like Olcott, claim that something fundamental has happened to Islam under Soviet rule, something that inclines its adherents to abandon Islam's politics while maintaining its sociology. Moreover, advocates of this line should explain how such a bifurcation can take place in Islam in the first place. Where is the evidence? Where are the historical precedents?

I am not surprised that Atkin has learned from the Tajik press of the "backward attitudes" of Soviet Muslims and that Islam constitutes only "ordinary folk religion." What does she expect to find? An open admission that Islam, despite massive Soviet efforts to wipe it out, still has Moscow worried, and that because of this worry Moscow feels obliged year after year to devote enormous resources to deal with it? Or perhaps an admission that the Soviet founding fathers were—dare one say it?—wrong in their belief that Islam in their empire would be as easy a target as Orthodoxy?

Having noted, correctly in my view, that the Soviet "program for the creation of a new order is unworkable" and that the Soviet leadership has substituted for their dead ideology "vigorous propaganda campaigns" to make the population believe what the

leaders want it to believe, Atkin uncritically accepts the Soviets' own characterization of Islam in their empire.

In what ways does Islam have political meaning in the USSR? Literally hundreds of Soviet sources in many languages over the last 15 or so years have argued that Islamic identity and national identity combine or coincide at various junctures to impede Soviet social engineering. That is one way. But the important point here is that this merging of identities either can be "definitional," as Olcott argues (which I take to mean unintentional or unconscious), or it can be cultivated for political ends. When Soviet sociologists note that a frequent exhortation from one Muslim to another is that if they are not good Muslims they cannot be good Turkmen, Kazakhs, or Avars, this has political meaning both among the Soviet Muslims themselves and in the eyes of the Soviet regime which took the trouble to record it. The relationship between Islam and nationality in this case is political and openly so.

Another indication of Islam's political content is to be found in the equally frequent complaint that Soviet Muslims' traditional practices based on Islamic belief and ritual are stalling the evolution of the "new Soviet man." Yet a third, which is seen more and more these days, is that Islam is becoming popular not only among old men and "fanatics"—which is the way Soviet specialists have portrayed Islam's appeal in the USSR for many years—but also among younger people and even intellectuals and those with higher education, that is, that Islam is becoming a successfully subversive ideology among a larger cross section of the population than before. I would be willing to bet that systematic research would show that this particular Soviet complaint dates approximately from the upheaval in Iran and the war in Afghanistan.

Finally, there is the Soviet concern that Islam in the USSR is exploitable by outside forces,

both Western and Middle Eastern. On this last point, Atkin accuses me of inappropriately using an article by Yaacov Ro'i to buttress my point that Soviet authorities are legitimately concerned about the likelihood that the Iranian situation will aggravate their "Muslim problem." Does Atkin really believe that Soviet concern about the opportunities for outside exploitation of "Islamic activism" in Afghanistan and Iran says nothing about Soviet concern with the probable resonance of such exploitation in the USSR's Muslim regions? I read Ro'i to mean that a "potential problem" is one for which there is already some evidence. Indeed, I have found plenty of evidence in the Soviet media, and a good deal of it was presented in my article (and in the Ro'i article that Atkin chose to cite). Is it conceivable that the Soviet leadership would conduct an easily documentable campaign against the dangers of spillover from Iran and Afghanistan and against the possibility that some Soviet Muslims might find something attractive in these forbidden fruits only as a preventive measure, or perhaps because they have nothing else to discuss? I think not.

All of the Soviet initiatives to eliminate the kind of impediments to their policies cited above are politically inspired, unless we are prepared to accept the view that Brezhnev-Andropov-Chernenko and company have really been only closet anthropologists who do not understand the political implications of their actions and whose real concern is Soviet Muslims' "backward attitudes." The Soviets are perfectly capable of tolerating backwardness—as in agriculture—as long as political control is not threatened.

Are Soviet Muslims themselves incapable of seeing this as a political struggle in which Islam is an important political instrument, as both Olcott and Atkin imply? I have always regarded this argument, which has surfaced often in my experience, as inherently racist. We accept without question that Catholicism in Poland or

Judaism in Israel are both simultaneously social and political forces. We are prepared to accept that Catholicism is a banner around which Lithuanians, who were still heathen in the 14th century, can rally today and that this action has important political meaning. Yet the Islam of an Uzbek, whose ancestors built Samarkand 2000 years ago, strikes these same analysts as mainly a "social" phenomenon or "folk religion."

In the 1950's and 1960's this same kind of academic silliness was observable in France. I remember well that the prevailing attitude among most intellectuals at that time was that Islam could not be taken seriously as a political force in North Africa; rather, it was viewed as a sociological remnant of the medieval past. More recently, we encountered the same sort of bias among "experts" discussing the prospects of the erstwhile Shah of Iran. Who at that time took Khomeyni and his Islam seriously as a political force?

Atkin deepens the confusion regarding the complex and multifarious political nature of Soviet Islam when she asks "how willing Muslims would be to advance from grumbling to political action." What does she mean by "political action"? Islamic *samizdat* and *magnitizdat*? There is some of that, as I documented in my article. Passing smuggled pamphlets from Afghanistan? Also documented. Inappropriate performance by many Soviet Muslims during the first months of the invasion of Afghanistan? Documented. The survival, indeed, expansion, of "parallel" Islam and the continued, perhaps heightened activity of Sufism? Plenty of evidence, from Soviet sources, exists to substantiate both. In the case of "parallel" Islam and Sufism, there can be little doubt that to engage in them is a political act. Both are subject to penalties, extreme in the case of Sufis, and every Soviet Muslim knows it. In this sense, many Soviet Muslims have already "advanced" to "political activism."

Evidence of this kind of politi-

cal commitment has been accumulating for years, and even the Soviets now acknowledge its existence. Take, for example, the item by E. Filimonov, "The Ideological and Social Essence of Religious Extremism," in issue No. 8 for 1984 of the authoritative antireligious journal *Nauka i Religiya* published in Moscow. Filimonov draws a clear distinction between religious "fanatics" and nationalism is a characteristic trend." He goes on to note Muslim "Ishan-Murid groups for whom the blending of religiosity and nationalism is a characteristic trend." He goes on to note that these "extremists" consciously violate Soviet law and engage in the "use of religion for political aims" (my emphasis). He concludes that these political trends, "especially the sectarian underground (*podpol'ye*) must be liquidated." That is pretty strong language for describing how to deal with an annoying anthropological leftover, which Marxism-Leninism is supposed to make obsolete anyway.

How else, if not in the context of Islam's political power and the Soviets' own awareness of the real danger it portends, can one understand such a comment as that by K. Shulembayev (there are many more like it), in which he notes that in their sermons, "nonregistered clerics call on all Muslims to unite against all who oppose Islam" (*Komsomol'skaya Pravda*, [Moscow], June 11, 1983). There is abundant evidence of "political activism" among Soviet Muslims in which Islam figures as a dominant or subordinate stimulus. In my view, Olcott would be well advised to reconsider her categorical statement in her July 1982 *World Politics* article that "there is no evidence of Muslim religio-political dissent in the USSR." On this she was wrong in 1982, and today such a statement simply cannot be taken seriously.

Olcott's and Atkin's confusion, I believe, stems at least in part from their use of such terms as "political force" and "political activism" to explain what is happening—or, in their view,

what is not happening—in the Muslim regions of the USSR. These terms have little precise meaning, especially in the Soviet Islamic context, and they convey the impression that the study and analysis of a highly diverse, subtle, and variegated political culture can be conducted successfully by using the theoretical tools of modern political journalism.

To believe that one must advance from "grumbling" to "political activism," and that this progression is the only one with political meaning, demonstrates a poor understanding of the nature of Islam and politics generally and of both in the Soviet context specifically. Islam, like any religious belief, has many layers of meaning and commitment, some of which are politically significant generally or contextually; "political activism" is not the only indicator of the political significance of Islam in Soviet society. To suggest that it is only through "political activism" that Islam can be seen to have political importance in Central Asia and the other Muslim regions of the USSR is to seriously oversimplify our understanding and study of these complex societies.

Moreover, inasmuch as an understanding of the dynamics of the Soviet Muslim regions has value in policy analysis, this kind of analytical simplification is dangerously misleading. One does not have to wait for a *jihad* to be proclaimed against Russian settlers in Kazakhstan or for the establishment of a public relations office by the Afghan Jamiat-e Islami in Tashkent to appreciate the political importance of Islam in the Soviet Muslim environment. But regarding the latter possibility, it is revealing to remember that both Colonel Qadhafi and Ayatollah Khomeini asked Soviet permission to open permanent missions in Tashkent, and both, not surprisingly, were turned down flat. The politics of Islam, as these incidents demonstrate clearly, is part of the broader political dynamics of Soviet Muslim regions and the empire generally. One does not have to assert that the Soviet empire is

in immediate danger of exploding—an extreme and unjustifiable view at the other end of the spectrum from those who claim that there is no Islamic political activity—to understand this. Analysts who ignore or gratuitously minimize the Soviet Islamic issue because they can find little evidence of "political activism" do so at more than their own peril.

While it would be ridiculous to deny that there are different kinds of influences in the Iranian and Afghan situations which could find resonance among Soviet Muslims, it is the Islamic message and the politics that are implicit in it that has Soviet officials most exercised. Atkin's suggestion that the Shiite dimension of the Iranian revolution would put Soviet Muslims off is not borne out by anything I have seen or heard, from any human or media source. In any case, this would make sense only if the message coming from Iran were primarily religious and if we could imagine groups of Soviet Central Asians gathered at the teahouse for intense theological debate. Neither is true. The message is essentially political, just as it is to largely Sunnite Pakistan, where there is also considerable admiration among all strata of the population for Khomeyni's political achievements.

I am not quite sure what Atkin means when she says that "the Afghan guerrillas are themselves divided on how much influence to accord Islam in nonspiritual matters," but if she is implying that Islam plays a marginal role in the war effort or that any of the important resistance movements in Afghanistan rejects the idea that Islam will be an essential ingredient in the structuring of the postwar political organization of Afghanistan, she is either misinformed or out of touch, as virtually every expert who has spent time in Afghanistan in the last five years would tell her.

Furthermore, it is clear from my conversations with various Afghan resistance leaders and political figures that most of them understand perfectly the Soviet anxiety about the infection of So-

viet Muslims with Islamic ideas, that is, with an Islamic political consciousness. Some groups—as I noted in my article—have moved to exploit this Soviet sensitivity, which they see to have an important political payoff if negotiations for a settlement ever take place. I am prepared to believe that they know something about Islam in Soviet Central Asia that Atkin does not.

Atkin may be right to believe that the appearance since the 1970's of more Soviet publications on Islam—but not specifically anti-Islamic publications, which are something quite different—stems from a variety of reasons. But I remain unconvinced, and would like to see some serious evidence to substantiate the contention that the main stimulus was not Soviet anxiety over the possibility that upheaval in the Islamic world abroad would be reflected among Soviet Muslims. Indeed, where one does, occasionally, find several approaches to the matter of Islam contained within one volume, the result can be revealing. For example, in the impressive volume *Voprosy Nauchnogo Ateizma* (Problems of Scientific Atheism), Vol. 31, Moscow, Mysl' for the Soviet Academy of Social Sciences, 1981 (printed in 23,000 copies), the first half is devoted to the dynamism of Islam outside the USSR. The arguments are serious, objective, and clearly aim to provide reliable information on Islamic trends to a select audience. In contrast, the second half, devoted to Islam in the USSR, is classic anti-Islamic propaganda, each author seemingly trying to outdo the preceding one in stressing that Islam in the USSR is retrograde and must be wiped out. Some may see this juxtaposition as mere coincidence; I, for one, do not.

Almost all Soviet media pay incessant attention to the Soviet struggle in World War II. Atkin's claim that the recent focus of Central Asian media on the Basmachi issue is simply part of this larger campaign to raise the general level of the Soviet popula-

tion's vigilance is ludicrous. One has only to note the timing of the Basmachi media initiative to see why.

Atkin appears to suggest that Turkmen Sufism is based on anti-Shiism and anti-Persianism. I have spent quite a lot of time in the last 40 years, including a fairly lengthy stint among the Turkmen of Iran in my earlier days, studying the Sufi issue. I have never encountered any source advancing this explanation. If Atkin has evidence of this trend, I would be most interested to see it.

Atkin selectively paraphrases me to say that "the main theme [in Soviet anti-Islamic propaganda] has been the importance of improving atheist propaganda among the young." I did indeed argue this, and I added in the same sentence that anti-Islamic literature increasingly focuses on "the absolute incompatibility of Islam and Marxism-Leninism." There is so much evidence of this latter approach in a variety of Soviet popular and scholarly writing in the last few years as to throw atkin's subsequent claim that "Soviet sources also present Islam in terms that have important positive sides" into question. This may be true, as noted above, when these sources discuss Islam outside the USSR, but it is seldom encountered today in reference to Soviet Islam, and it certainly is not a trend of any kind.

"Social science research of necessity entails building a larger picture from fragmentary evidence," Atkin concludes. As a social scientist, she would know about this. As a historian, I know that larger pictures can seldom be built at all, and certainly not accurately, without a firm historical foundation. When a proper historical foundation has been laid, "fragmentary evidence" fills an existing void and becomes more meaningful than it is in isolation.

But is the evidence as fragmentary as Olcott and Atkin would have us think? I simply do not agree that we are so bereft of useful research material that we are unable to reach sensible con-

clusions about political life in the Soviet Muslim regions. Nor is it the case that our historical knowledge of Central Asian development, including the importance of Islam in it and to it, need suffer, except for lack of preparation. Extrapolation of the available evidence is possible and necessary. Of course, the evidence must be used with care, as is true with all evidence, and no one can disagree with Atkin's somewhat patronizing statement that the "special problems of access to sources in the case of the Soviet Union argues for particular caution in drawing conclusions." Access, I would argue, is the lesser problem. The greater problem is understanding what is already available.

ALEXANDRE BENNIGSEN
Paris

TROTSKYITES IN SPAIN

TO THE EDITORS: Michael Sodaro, in reviewing my book *The Communist Party in Spain* in his essay "Whatever Happened to Eurocommunism?" (*Problems of Communism*, November-December 1984), writes of the "PCE's [Spanish Communist Party's] nefarious activities against Trotskyites and other rivals on the left during the Civil War" (p. 64). Since the persecution undertaken by the PCE at that time was directed against only two organizations—the anarchist National Confederation of Labor (Confederación Nacional de Trabajo) and the communist dissident Workers' Party of Marxist Unification (Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista—POUM)—the label "Trotskyite" here must refer to POUM. This repetition of a Communist falsehood, doubtless unwitting, must be corrected.

POUM was founded in 1935 when 7,000 members of the Workers' and Peasants' Bloc (Bloque Obrero y Campesino), which on the communist spectrum of the period could best be described as reflecting the views of Nikolay Bukharin, joined 250

members of the Communist Left (Izquierda Comunista), an organization that had been Trotskyite but had broken with Trotsky in 1933. POUM was sharply criticized and attacked by Trotsky; it was never a Trotskyite party. But in order to "justify" their persecution of POUM, the Communists labeled it "Trotskyite," a term that at the time seemed to offer carte blanche for any crime one wished to perpetrate.

All this is clearly explained in my book. The fact that, after nearly half a century, impartial scholars continue to repeat this Communist propaganda canard shows just how effective it was. POUM was not a member of the Fourth International (then not yet in existence) or of the Secretariat of Communist Opposition, but rather belonged to the International Bureau of Revolutionary Socialist Parties, which also included the British International Labour Party, the Italian Partito Socialista Massimalista of Angelica Balabanov, and the French Parti Ouvrier et Paysan of Marcel Pivert. It is difficult to imagine a Trotskyite group in this company.

VICTOR ALBA
Barcelona

MR. SODARO RESPONDS: Professor Alba's points concerning POUM are well-taken. In my review of his book, however, I did not say that POUM was a Trotskyite party. Rather, I was simply referring to the fact that there were pro-Trotsky elements in Spain—both in and outside of POUM—who were persecuted by the PCE during the Civil War, a fact Alba himself notes in his book. Perhaps the most prominent of these figures was Andrés Nin, who was none other than the political secretary of POUM, and whose identification with Trotsky and subsequent assassination at the hands of the communists are amply described by Professor Alba in his informative study.

MICHAEL J. SODARO
George Washington University
Washington, DC

SOVIET STRATEGIC OUTLOOK

TO THE EDITORS: I read with great interest George G. Weickhardt's article "Ustinov versus Ogarkov" in the book review section of the January-February 1985 issue of *Problems of Communism*. The piece is not so much a review as the author's interpretation of evidence about attitudes toward strategic nuclear war contained in Soviet sources, specifically in the writings of the late Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov and of former Chief of the General Staff Nikolay Ogarkov.

Weickhardt's basic thesis is that there has been a "Soviet debate between advocates of nuclear-war-fighting and those of mutual deterrence" (which groups he sees as represented by Marshals Ogarkov and Ustinov respectively) and that this debate "has recently taken a most dramatic turn, with the latter side emerging the clear victor" (by having forced Ogarkov into what is depicted as a "recantation"). Such a development, if it had indeed happened, would be of greatest political relevance. However, Weickhardt's thesis does not fit with my own conclusions from an extensive reading of Soviet source materials on security policy matters in general and of the sources that Weickhardt cites in particular.

Weickhardt adduces the following views attributable to Ustinov as evidence that the Defense Minister was a proponent of the mutual-deterrence point of view:

- Soviet doctrine does not contemplate the possibility of surviving and winning a nuclear war;
- there is no sure method of fighting a victorious nuclear war;
- only someone who is willing to commit suicide would start nuclear war;
- it is madness to count on victory in either an arms race or a nuclear war;
- one cannot disarm the ad-

versary by a (nuclear) first strike;

- the Soviet forces have everything that is needed to rebuff an attacker.

As evidence that Ogarkov regarded nuclear warfare as feasible Weickhardt notes the following views of the Soviet Marshal:

- the introduction of nuclear rocketry will lead to the development of means to counter such weapons;
- though a nuclear first strike or first use of nuclear weapons is not advocated, victory in war against the West is a definite, "objective" possibility;
- the USSR has to be prepared for the possibility that the Western "imperialists" might unleash nuclear war.

Weickhardt does note that in May 1983, Ogarkov spoke out against starting a nuclear war, terming it mutually suicidal because each side has the capability to inflict unacceptable damage after the other's first strike. But the implication of this statement is discounted by Weickhardt's assertion that Ogarkov had been forced to "recant" his previous views (p. 81).

However, the underlying assumption that previously Ogarkov had voiced confidence in Soviet ability to wage a nuclear war, and to survive and win it, is not correct. On page 47 of the very brochure of January 1982 that Weickhardt cites, Ogarkov made it quite plain that an all-out war with the West has to be feared by the USSR because such a war would be infinitely more disastrous than World War II.

On the other hand, that alleged proponent of mutual deterrence and foe of preparation for warfare, Ustinov, is on the public record with a number of statements that say it is necessary for the USSR to make contingency preparations for war, because the Western imperialists cannot be forced to renounce permanently the use of military means and therefore might decide on aggression against the Soviet Union. In such an eventuality,

one would have to be able to defend the socialist homeland successfully. In much the same vein as Ogarkov, Ustinov has explained (e.g., in *Pravda*, May 9, 1983) that decisive and fateful strikes would then be inflicted upon the Western "aggressor." In other words, successful defense is tantamount to warfare, in which the Western adversary (always cast in the role of the attacker) must be defeated so as to stop his aggression against the USSR (a country which, it is asserted, cannot but be peace-seeking by virtue of being socialist).

Following Weickhardt's patterns of interpretation, one would have to conclude, on the basis of this additional evidence, that it was Ogarkov who favored mutual deterrence and Ustinov who adhered to a war-fighting philosophy. I would, however, not make that argument, for I feel that the interpretive approach is inadequate. When a Soviet leader voices concern over what an all-out nuclear war would do to his homeland (and I have seen no responsible figure in Moscow who would not be scared), this does not mean that he wants to join the West in mutual deterrence as a basis for a common effort at war avoidance.

Such an idea would make no sense to any Soviet leader, because they all view the East-West relationship as fundamentally antagonistic. Consequently, the Western side is viewed as an adversary with whom there is an ongoing political confrontation which may, it is true, take forms less obnoxious than those of the "cold war," but which also might result in hot war in the worst case. The USSR must always be prepared for this last contingency and hence must have the capability to defend itself successfully. Since Khrushchev's downfall, any policy that would make Western-type deterrence its cornerstone has been regarded as failing to meet the basic Soviet security requirement: the ability to assure security in case of the ultimate test of an East-West war (which eventuality, to be sure, is not

sought in Moscow, even as it is considered a definite possibility).

Such thinking leaves no room for the idea that mutual deterrence and common efforts to avoid war could conceivably create a framework for East-West security and stability. Instead, the Soviet leaders seek security, including avoidance of East-West war if possible, by preparing for successful defense (which they also view as an optimum means of deterring the Western "aggressor"). This pattern of thought is clearly reflected in all Soviet writing on both defense and deterrence. Whenever a Soviet author talks about his country's security needs and security efforts, it is invariably the notion of defense that is central to all he says. That is, he puts "defense" into the very place that his Western counterpart would reserve for "deterrence."

To my knowledge, no Soviet author, whether politician or academic, has ever related "deterrence" to his own country's policies. Whenever deterrence (in any sense not coinciding with successful defense) is a subject of discussion—which, to be sure, is quite rare and indulged in only by academics—it is always Western, particularly US, policy that is being discussed. Moreover, the concept is given a very negative evaluation, indicated by the Russian words chosen to translate "deterrence," which range from the mild "*sderzhivaniye*" (meaning [anti-Soviet] restraint) to the outrageous "*ustrasheniye*" (which in English-language retractions correctly appears as "intimidation"). One cannot but conclude that deterrence as understood in the West, not only is alien to Soviet thought, but also meets with total rejection in Moscow, as has indeed been directly stated on various occasions.

The Soviet belief that successful defense prevents the West from war, poses a problem: How can that be reconciled with the simultaneous assessment (expressed, e.g., by both Ustinov and Ogarkov) that the USSR would face unacceptable damage

in the eventuality of a nuclear war? Unacceptable damage makes successful defense problematic to say the least. But it would be wrong to conclude (as Weickhardt seems to do) that, for this reason, Moscow renounces its successful-defense orientation and accepts Western mutual-deterrence philosophy. Moscow respects a Western deterrent when it is there, but it certainly does not internalize the Western concept that goes along with it.

What does this mean in practice? It means that Soviet leaders know that they cannot afford a strategic nuclear war that would involve Soviet territory, and that they therefore will adapt their behavior to the existence of the US strategic nuclear deterrent whenever it is likely to play a role. But at the same time, Soviet leaders will also direct their efforts to minimizing the relevance of the US strategic nuclear deterrent in the overall East-West context, so as to maximize the impact of the military superiority that the Soviet Union feels it has acquired in Europe and in other regional theaters.

That the USSR has theater superiority was explicitly stated by Soviet leaders such as Marshals Rodion Malinovsky and Andrey Grechko (and also by East Germany's Heinz Hoffmann) through 1976. It was only thereafter, in the context of the negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR), that the Kremlin began to realize that its demand that the "existing correlation of military forces" (which, as was occasionally indicated in private, implied some military advantage for the USSR) be preserved was increasingly alienating the very Western publics from whom Moscow was seeking political support against the alleged arms race policies of NATO. It was then decided that Moscow should advocate instead the preservation of the "existing military equilibrium," and simultaneously deny any Soviet desire for military superiority. This public policy line was first voiced in Leonid Brezhnev's Tula speech of January 1977 (to which

Weickhardt refers), and it has remained the guideline for subsequent Soviet public statements.

This change in wording, however, has not been followed by a change in practice. The Soviet armament effort in the regional theaters has not slowed down (despite already existing favorable quantitative and qualitative force ratios); nor has the USSR's basic negotiating stance at MBFR undergone a revision. When, in Bonn in May 1978, Brezhnev signed a commitment to "military parity and equilibrium" and explained to Chancellor Helmut Schmidt that he would not depart from the "existing parity in the field of medium-range systems," the Soviets had deployed only 27 SS-20 missiles armed with 81 warheads; these were to become approximately 140 missiles (with approximately 420 warheads) by the time of NATO's dual-track decision in December 1979, and had increased to 379 missiles (1,137 warheads) by late 1983, when the Western alliance finally began its counterdeployment of Pershing II and land-based cruise missiles. Yet Soviet politicians and commentators throughout this period claimed that there was parity in medium-range weapons. I should add that since 1977, the Soviet leaders have been continuously asked by Schmidt and other West European leaders to stop the SS-20 buildup, so as not to jeopardize the European balance and not to compel NATO to respond in kind.

It was Ogarkov who, on one occasion, spelled out how Soviet no-military-superiority rhetoric and the Soviet arms buildup policy fit together. In his work of January 1982, on which Weickhardt largely bases his own interpretations, Ogarkov defines military superiority as a "symbol of aggressive ambitions" (p. 20). In this sense, it is self-evident that the USSR cannot possibly strive for military superiority: being a socialist, and therefore a "peace-loving" country, which by its very social and political nature will not threaten any other country in the world, the Soviet Union cannot be accused of aggressiveness;

hence, it must be seen to be utterly incapable of seeking military superiority. But such a statement should be taken for what it is intended to be: an assertion of the Soviet claim to fundamental peacefulness—and not as an expression of preference with regard to one or another kind of force correlation.

The problem remains what Moscow can hope to achieve through theater superiority, if it is forced to respect the US deterrent at the strategic nuclear level. Is there not a risk that an East-West theater war (in which theater superiority can provide for "successful defense") might escalate into a nuclear strategic duel (in which Soviet hopes for "successful defense" are bound to be frustrated)? Is not NATO's security strategy so designed as to make clear precisely that risk?

The Soviet leaders fully realize the problem. But they want to bypass their dilemma by decoupling the European theater from the mutual-deterrence strategic nuclear relationship between the two superpowers. For this reason, they have tried to exploit arms control negotiations with the US—e.g., SALT I, SALT II, and INF—to persuade the Americans to decouple themselves strategically from their European allies. This Soviet desire surfaced openly when, at the peak of superpower détente in the summer and fall of 1972, Brezhnev and Andrey Gromyko pressed Washington for a treaty on prevention of nuclear war. Since, the Soviets argued, there was a continuing risk of East-West war in Europe which was likely to turn nuclear, both the USSR and the US would be well-advised to take precautions. They should, therefore, commit themselves to using their nuclear weapons exclusively on the territories of their European allies, leaving out each other's homelands.

If Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger had accepted the proposed deal, the Soviet leadership would have been given the assurance that in case of war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, it would not have to worry about an

escalation to strategic nuclear dimensions. As a consequence, the USSR could have contemplated exploiting its perceived theater superiority in Europe both militarily (for the purpose of "successful defense" in case of war) and politically (for the purpose of inducing the West Europeans to be more accommodating). More recently, the USSR has sought to promote decoupling through attempts to achieve escalation dominance in Europe and to gain the option of limiting European warfare to conventional weapons.

Seen against this general background, various premises underlying Weickhardt's interpretation of Ustinov's and Ogarkov's statements seem implausible. The assessment that nuclear war would be disastrous (were it to spread to engulf the Soviet Union) does not contradict the notion that war against NATO, if it should occur, should be winnable (as there is no "successful defense" short of victory), and indeed could be won (provided that both the political and military conditions for decoupling the European theater from the strategic nuclear relationship with the US were created). For the time being, though, the Soviet leaders are far from believing that they have already achieved their goal of decoupling, and therefore they have to keep in mind that war, if it were to go nuclear (as it might), will be unacceptable and hence unmanageable. Contrary to Weickhardt's assertions (which would have been quite appropriate for the earlier era of Marshal Vasily Sokolovskiy's book), there is now an expanding Soviet search for methods to keep a European war limited, should it break out. Soviet open-source writings seem to indicate an increasing expectation that this might indeed be accomplished.

In analyzing Soviet statements on security matters, one should be attentive to the context. Weickhardt fails to indicate whether a given quotation forms part of a discussion about Soviet policy or about the line followed by the Western "imperialists." It is something quite different, for

example, if the statement that one cannot possibly win an East-West war means that the USSR should not cherish such hopes or if it is part of a warning addressed to the Western side implying in fact that Soviet defensive power will frustrate any aggressive design. What Weickhardt interprets as an indication of the start of Ogarkov's departure from an alleged previous advocacy of Soviet nuclear-war-fighting capability, turns out to be in fact a warning directed at the West that the US cannot possibly hope to wage a successful nuclear war against the USSR.

Also, one should read very carefully to determine whether the statement that the Soviet forces have everything they need to rebuff an aggressor really means that they should not ask for more, as Weickhardt implies is inherent in what Ustinov has said. So far, I have been unable to check the original text, but I have seen a large number of similar Soviet statements carrying the message that the forces of the USSR were fully able to thwart any military adversary's aggressive designs without saying that the Soviet Union has enough defense capability. For example, Marshal Grechko, to whom Weickhardt rightly ascribes open advocacy of Soviet military superiority and a Soviet war-fighting orientation (this in statements made prior to Brezhnev's shift of rhetoric in early 1977), on one occasion stated: "The Soviet forces have everything they need," anticipating his successor's statement almost verbatim. However, the context makes it abundantly clear that he does not mean to say that the Soviet forces should be content with what they have and should abstain from asking for more. He instead conveys the message that constant military efforts are being made, and will continue to be made, in order to maintain an adequate Soviet defense capability (see the work by Grechko quoted by Weickhardt in note 5, p. 88).

In another place, Weickhardt simply misrepresents Soviet statements. He sees (p. 79)

Ogarkov's 1981 *Kommunist* article as saying "that the introduction of nuclear-tipped rocketry would, in accordance with Marxist dialectic, be followed by the appearance of the means of countering (*protivodeystviye*) them." The original text, however, simply carries the general message that in the course of military history the development of offensive weapons has always triggered a countervailing development of defensive weapons—with no reference to nuclear missiles whatsoever. If one wished to read something specific into the statement, one would rather be inclined to think of theater weapons, given the context.

Similarly, Grechko is summarized (p. 78) as advocating counterforce and "probably" also launch-on-warning strategies. The source indicated, however, does not say this. The only point which is made there is Grechko's call for military superiority—nothing more than the general Soviet line before 1977.

Finally, a word on the sources. It is most unlikely that a highly authoritative standard work like the *Military Encyclopedia* (which has been edited by a commission chaired by Ogarkov, to be sure, but has also come out under the imprimatur of the defense ministry as a whole) could have been used by the military man Ogarkov for purposes of veiled polemics against his military and political superior Ustinov. Even outside the pages of the *Military Encyclopedia*, it would have been extremely unusual for a Soviet military man to polemicize against his superior. There have been few such arguments even among Soviet politicians in recent years. Although in the Khrushchev period it was not uncommon for political equals to indulge in veiled esoteric policy debate, such infighting—among equals, to be sure—stopped almost totally after Brezhnev took over.

A fairly recent RAND corporation study, based on interviews with Soviet emigrants who had worked in the media, has shed light on why this has been the case. The Brezhnev team devel-

oped a strong sense of mutual solidarity vis-à-vis the public, keeping policy debates strictly within the ruling circles and prohibiting any reference in the media to the existence of such debates. In those very few cases when a Soviet politician—to be sure, only a very high-level one like, e.g., one-time Politburo member Aleksandr Shelepin—violated that rule, all other leaders quickly united against him and punished him by removing him from office. Given such circumstances, it seems inconceivable to me that a man like Ogarkov, who was clearly on a secondary echelon of power and was bound by the laws of military discipline, could have even thought of publicly challenging a member of the USSR's supreme political authority, the Politburo. It is equally unimaginable that Ogarkov could have openly defied—even in private, let alone in public—the official line solemnly proclaimed by General Secretary Brezhnev at the 26th Party Congress in February 1981 that nuclear war, given its worldwide destructiveness, cannot be waged. Brezhnev, of course, did not rule out explicitly (though perhaps he did implicitly) the need for the USSR to prepare for optimum damage limitation and the best possible chance of military success in case the US were to "impose" nuclear war on the Soviet homeland.

My letter, though already much longer than originally intended, could not go into all the intricacies of the problems raised by Weickhardt's essay. I am also aware that in the short time available, I could not check most of his citations by going back to the Soviet originals. Much of what is at issue will require further clarification on the basis of much fuller evidence. I feel, however, that I have touched on a number of points with regard to which a better understanding is needed than Weickhardt provided in his essay.

GERHARD WETTIG
Bundesinstitut für
ostwissenschaftliche und
internationale Studien, Cologne

MR. WEICKHARDT RESPONDS: I am happy that my review elicited a response from Gerhard Wettig, one of the most perceptive European analysts of East-West security problems. While we obviously disagree on the significance of the Ustinov-Ogarkov debate, we come to similar conclusions on many of the important issues. It is unfortunate, therefore, that Wettig has claimed, incorrectly, that I misread or misrepresented the Soviet sources that I cited (and which he admits he could not "check" in most cases). In this reply, I shall quote more fully from the materials in question to prove the appropriateness of my original citations, and I shall also indicate where Wettig's and my own views converge.

Wettig does not accept my premise that Soviet leaders engage in veiled debates in public, and he even denies that there was any real infighting within the top Soviet leadership during the Brezhnev era. The debate between Ustinov and Ogarkov, of course, did not flare up until Brezhnev's dotage, and Ogarkov's recantation and demotion did not occur until the reigns of Andropov and Chernenko respectively. By this time, the unity of the Brezhnev Politburo was cracking. But even in the early 1970's, three members of the Politburo—Gennadiy Voronov, Petro Shelest, and Aleksandr Shelepin—were dismissed, each of whom had challenged Brezhnev on major agricultural or security issues, sometimes in public statements. The story of these conflicts has been told at length elsewhere and need not be repeated here (see Werner G. Hahn, *The Politics of Soviet Agriculture*, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972; and Harry Gelman, *The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Detente*, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1984). Wettig also ignores the extensive evidence presented in Samuel Payne's book (*The Soviet Union and SALT*, Cambridge, MA, the MIT Press, 1980) regarding the public debates in the mid- and

late 1970's between the "arms controllers," who included Andrey Gromyko, and the "militarists," who included Marshal Andrey Grechko.

Today one need not look far in the Soviet press to discern veiled debates even among Politburo members. For example, in December 1984, Mikhail Gorbachev called for a radical transformation of the Soviet economy, this occurring shortly after Politburo member Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi had argued that market-oriented reforms might lead to unemployment and ultimately to the restoration of capitalism (cf. *Pravda* [Moscow], Dec. 11, 1984, pp. 2–3; and *Kommunist* [Moscow], No. 17, November 1984, p. 42).

My book review is also not the first work to note divergence between the statements of Soviet political leaders and Soviet military leaders on the issue of whether nuclear war is winnable (see David Holloway, *The Soviet Union and the Arms Race*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1983, Ch. 3). Nor is it the first to note that Ogarkov was out of step with civilian leaders on this issue (see William Hyland, "Kto Kogo in the Kremlin?" *Problems of Communism* [Washington, DC], January–February 1982, pp. 23–24; and Dan Strode and Rebecca Strode, "Diplomacy and Defense in Soviet National Security Policy," *International Security* [Cambridge, MA], Fall 1983, pp. 91–116).

Incidentally, Ogarkov's 1981 *Kommunist* article, cited in my book review, has also been interpreted as an open challenge to Chernenko, who was of course the leader in power when Ogarkov was later sacked as chief of the General Staff. Ogarkov's strongly worded article attacked the "carelessness, complacency, and apathy" inherent in saying that war is necessarily bad and in underestimating the threat of war. Ogarkov's article followed shortly on Chernenko's own article in *Pravda*, which had elaborately stated the case that a nuclear war could not be won and would place the future of

mankind in doubt (on this, see Martin McCauley, "Leadership and the Succession Struggle," in McCauley, Ed., *The Soviet Union After Brezhnev*, New York, Holmes & Meier, 1983, pp. 25-26; Hyland made a similar point in the article cited above).

Wettig of course initially argues that there was no substantial divergence between the views of Ustinov and Ogarkov, and that the writings of both men contain the same stock phrases—suggesting that the best deterrence is successful defense. I myself have previously recognized the ambiguities in Ogarkov's many mercurial statements on nuclear war (see "The World According to Ogarkov," *International Security*, Spring 1984, pp. 182-85). Despite these ambiguities, some of which were pointed out by Wettig, one cannot fail to discern a clear contrast between the outspoken Ogarkov's approach to nuclear war and the more circumspect approach of Ustinov, Brezhnev, and Chernenko. In trying to blur this contrast, Wettig claims, erroneously, that I misquoted Ogarkov's May 1978 *Kommunist* article (which he mis-cites as a 1981 article) on the issue of developing a means of countering nuclear-tipped missiles. Wettig claims that there is no reference to nuclear-tipped missiles in Ogarkov's discussion. However, Ogarkov, in noting that the experience of past wars attests to the fact that new offensive weapons inevitably lead to the development of corresponding countermeasures, explicitly states: "This in full measure applies also to rocket nuclear weapons, the rapid development of which has prompted military-scientific thought and practice to actively develop methods and means of countering them."

Wettig does not deny that Ogarkov's 1979 *Soviet Military Encyclopedia* entry openly advocates the possibility of Soviet victory in nuclear war. In fact, Wettig in one of his own articles cited Ogarkov's encyclopedia entry to support the contention that there were Soviet statements to the ef-

fect that "in the event of war the Soviet leadership will launch an offensive designed to exploit the element of surprise and to bring Europe to the Atlantic under Soviet control. In this offensive . . . a Soviet first use of theater nuclear weapons is not excluded" (see his "The Garthoff-Pipes Debate on Soviet Strategic Doctrine: A European Perspective," *Strategic Review* [Washington, DC], Spring 1973, p. 72).

Wettig's argument that Soviet doctrine is always cast in terms of successful defense is undercut by Ogarkov's 1982 pamphlet, *Vsegda v gotovnosti k zashchite otechestva* (Always in Readiness for Defense of the Fatherland), Moscow, Voenizdat, which is imbued with a cult of the offensive. According to Ogarkov, Soviet military science had between the two world wars developed for the first time "a fundamentally new mode for conducting aggressive offensive actions by technically equipped mass armies." Today such operations must be conducted on a theater-wide scale and can be conducted without pause. He observes that "with the establishment of strategic nuclear forces, the top-echelon military leadership has acquired the capability to significantly influence the achievement of strategic and military-political war objectives" (pp. 32-35).

Modern strategic operations involve combined operations by all the armed services and will require, according to Ogarkov's pamphlet, immense support on the home front to make good the enormous losses. Although nuclear war would admittedly be very destructive, Ogarkov implies that such losses can be made good. While an all-out war between socialism and imperialism is not inevitable, it remains a distinct possibility. In such a war Soviet soldiers must retain "the will to achieve victory over the enemy in any and all conditions" (pp. 40, 26, 45, and 50). Furthermore, surprise (read: which side launches its missiles first) "is becoming a factor of the greatest strategic importance" (p. 60). The goal of Soviet doctrine, in

sum, is not only to defend the homeland and deliver retaliatory blows, but also to "defeat the enemy under any conditions of a developing situation" (p. 58).

This pamphlet is the most comprehensive statement of Ogarkov's views on Soviet strategic doctrine, including all of its historical, economic, theoretical, and ideological aspects and the place that nuclear weapons occupy in this doctrine. The pamphlet quoted selectively from earlier Brezhnev commentary in support of some of its arguments, but it is striking that Ogarkov neither acknowledged nor quoted the contemporaneous statements by Brezhnev, Chernenko, and Ustinov that there could be no victor in nuclear war and that to start a nuclear war is madness.

Wettig claims that he can find war-fighting talk in Ustinov's writings more or less equivalent to Ogarkov's. In this connection Wettig quotes only from Ustinov's May 9, 1983, *Pravda* article, in which the Defense Minister used the standard Soviet rhetoric about a retaliatory, or second, strike: "There is no doubt that any attempt to take aggressive actions against our country will meet with a most resolute rebuff and will prove fatal to its initiators. Retribution will strike the aggressor inevitably and without delay."

While asserting that such retaliation would be fatal to the aggressor, Ustinov did not intimate in any way that the USSR could win or should risk such a war. Ogarkov, by contrast, authorized an article that appeared in *Izvestiya* on the very same day (May 9) in which he implied that the Soviet Armed Forces, through great vigilance and resolve, could emerge victorious. During the intensive initial period of the war, the Soviet forces would "take large-scale and extremely precise and energetic actions to repel the attack" from the enemy's long-range systems. "In today's conditions," he said, "such actions can be of decisive importance. . . ." He spoke further of the importance of assuring the steady functioning of the economic base

once the war had begun.

With respect to my original citation of Ustinov's statement that Soviet forces have "everything they need," I think that Wettig attributes more importance to this piece of evidence in my argument than I myself gave it. The more important thing is that Ogarkov, prior to his recantation, never renounced, and even continued to suggest, the goal of Soviet victory in nuclear war. Ustinov never discussed or even referred to the possibility of winning a nuclear war; in fact, he denied such a possibility. Ustinov also did not trumpet such Ogarkov themes as the achievement of decisive strategic and political objectives through the use of nuclear weapons and the need to inculcate in soldiers the will to achieve victory in nuclear war. The difference between Ogarkov and Ustinov is more than a semantic one. One who believes that the Soviet Union can ride out a Western nuclear attack and then advance to victory is more likely to risk war in the first place and more likely to seek redundancy in military equipment.

Contrary to Wettig's suggestion, Ustinov also does not confine his discussion of deterrence to a one-way relationship, i.e., he does not imply that Soviet nuclear weapons deter the imperialists from attacking the USSR, but not vice versa. The following statement is typical of Ustinov's rhetoric in 1982: "The Soviet Union proceeds from the assumption that preservation of the existing parity, a consistent reduction of armed strength and armaments with the guarantees of equal security for all parties are the basic criteria for the consolidation of peace. To count on victory in the arms race and especially in nuclear war is madness. And madness is dangerous. We do not need military superiority over the West. This is the unchanging approach of the USSR to this question" (D. F. Ustinov, *Serving the Country and the Communist Cause*, tr. by Penny Dole, New York, Pergamon Press, 1983, p. 42).

Ustinov says that Soviet policy rules out the possibility of Soviet victory in nuclear war. The statement is not just an admonition to the West that it should not count on victory. The idea of reciprocity and mutuality in the nuclear hostage relationship also appears in Ogarkov's recantation (which came in September, not May, 1983): "With the present development and deployment of nuclear weapons in the world, the defending nation will always retain a sufficient number of nuclear weapons to enable it to inflict on the aggressor in a retaliatory strike 'unacceptable damage' as defined in his time by the former US Secretary of Defense R. McNamara.... Therefore only suicidal persons could risk a first strike in present conditions. Nuclear war can threaten catastrophe to all civilization" (*Izvestiya*, Sept. 28, 1983). It is clear that Ogarkov is discussing not just deterrence of the Western aggressor, but the mutual risk of unacceptable damage.

In my original piece, I mentioned that Marshal Akhromeyev, Ogarkov's successor, has toed the Brezhnev-Ustinov line on nuclear war. A recent piece by Akhromeyev also implicitly acknowledges the mutuality of assured destruction in nuclear war. He says that prevention of nuclear war is essential even from a military point of view because both sides have such huge arsenals of nuclear weapons that

their use would lead to catastrophic and irremediable losses, including massive casualties. He further stated that the joint action by all nations is required to prevent such a war (*Kommunist*, No. 3, 1985, p. 60).

Wettig concludes that it is "most unlikely" or "extremely unusual" that Ogarkov would polemicize against his superior. What is most unusual is that the Politburo removed Ogarkov as chief of the General Staff, one of the most unusual events in Soviet civil-military relations since the ouster of Marshal Georgiy Zhukov in 1957. It is inconceivable that the Politburo would take such exceptional action unless Ogarkov had seriously challenged the party line on some important issue. Wettig's critique offers no alternate explanation for Ogarkov's removal.

Despite his rather broad attack on my essay, Wettig nonetheless agrees that the Soviets have in fact rejected all-out nuclear war as a viable option because they respect the American deterrent at the strategic level. Wettig also agrees that this recognition of the infeasibility of nuclear war represents a change from the days of Marshals Malinovskiy and Grechko, both of whom confidently predicted Soviet victory in nuclear war. Wettig thus implicitly admits that a fundamental change did occur in Soviet doctrine after Grechko, i.e., while Ustinov was minister of defense.

However, Wettig denies that the Soviets have "internalized" deterrence. I would certainly agree that Ogarkov never internalized the concept of mutual deterrence—indeed, I contend that this posture was forced on him from above. But I did not really contend that Ustinov and the political leadership had internalized it either. Wettig overlooks that I pointed out in my piece that Soviet acceptance of the idea of mutual assured destruction has not been accompanied by any ready willingness to accept major reductions in large MIRVed ICBM's, like the SS-18 and SS-19. Most American theorists of mutual deterrence would regard the elimination of such first-strike weapons to be a prerequisite of mutual deterrence. I also pointed out, as does Wettig, that the Soviet concept of parity is lopsided.

Wettig insists that the Soviets are attempting to escape from the dilemma of mutual deterrence at the strategic level by seeking and achieving both nuclear and conventional superiority in the European theater and in other regions. Soviet willingness to exploit such theater superiority is dependent, he concedes, on whether they can succeed in decoupling the European theater from the overall strategic balance and in establishing escalation dominance. I agree with Wettig's implicit conclusion that the West must pursue policies to preclude

Soviet attainment of these goals. I suggested in my own piece that Ogarkov's discussion in the pamphlet *Vsegda v gotovnosti* ... of the useful employment of nuclear weapons was in the context of a limited nuclear war in Europe but that the feasibility of such a war was clearly rejected by Ustinov and the CPSU. In the final analysis, Wettig also shies away from predicting that the USSR would risk a limited nuclear war in Europe. Certainly with Ogarkov out of the upper echelons of power, there will be one less advocate of such a war. In any event, Wettig seems ultimately to share my conclusion that nuclear war at both the strategic and European levels has been ruled out by Soviet strategists, at least given the current correlation of forces.

Because the USSR is so splendidly equipped for a conventional war in Europe, we cannot rule out the possibility that Soviet strategy contemplates such a war. At the same time, however, even such a cynical observer of Soviet motives as Edward Luttwak doubts that the USSR would risk a conventional war in Europe, for fear of escalation (see *The Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union*, New York, St. Martin's, 1983).

GEORGE G. WEICKHARDT
San Francisco, CA

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
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Problems of Communism

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Louise I. Shelley

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Cover: Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov in September 1983, when he was chief of the Soviet General Staff. Photo by TASS from Sovfoto

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Articles

Soviet Force Posture: Dilemmas and Directions

William E. Odom

The Soviet General Staff is engaged in its third revision of force development policy since the civil war. The current need for change in Soviet military doctrine and force structure is occasioned by new technologies, including microcircuitry and directed energy systems. Yet, the success of this latest Soviet military modernization effort will depend more than past such efforts on the nature of the West's arms control and trade policies, as well as on NATO's own force development policy.

Science and Technology in China's Defense

William T. Tow

Although China has the third largest military-industrial complex in the world, many weapons systems in its defense inventories still rely on the technology of the 1950's. One reason for this has been an almost total lack of coordination between China's military and civilian industrial systems. Another reason has been China's past ambivalence about the role of science and technology in its People's War doctrine. If China is to modernize its defense establishment, in addition to its economy, it has to resolve the contradictions between self-reliance and technology acquisition from abroad and between military doctrinal precepts of People's War and highly advanced weapons systems.

Soviet-CEMA Energy Ties

John M. Kramer

The countries of Eastern Europe, long dependent upon the USSR to bridge the gap between domestic sources of energy and local consumption, have in rapid succession experienced a sharp rise in Soviet energy prices and then a decline in the volume of crude oil shipped to them from the Soviet Union. While energy would seem to offer Moscow a means of exercising some political leverage over recalcitrant allies, use of the "oil card" is not without economic and political risks. Indeed, the Soviet Union probably sacrifices some of its own economic interests by continuing to meet—albeit to a decreasing degree—the needs of its energy-deficient partners in the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance.

Notes

Rural Reform in China: Stage Two

Joseph Fewsmith

China launched a major new stage of agricultural reform in January 1985. The goal of the new measures is to abolish "gradually" the state monopoly over the procurement and sale of farm products, encouraging peasants to negotiate sales contracts with a variety of buyers at market-determined prices. This second reform was prompted by the very success of the "responsibility system" in generating surpluses of grain (not always of the highest quality) and by a desire to stimulate diversification of agricultural production. The new policies are not without their economic and social risks for Beijing.

(Abstracts continued on reverse side)

Military Cuts in China

John Frankenstein

In mid-1985, China's leaders decreed a 25 percent reduction in force of the People's Liberation Army. A closer look at the PLA's force structure indicates that such a major personnel cut could be made by trimming relatively poorly equipped and untrained local ground force units, without compromising the effectiveness of main force divisions. The manner in which party leaders presented the cuts suggests that the Deng leadership wants a streamlined and professional defense force, within the overall context of an efficient modernization of China's economic and political institutions.

Essay-reviews

The Crime of Dissent in China

Mitchell A. Silk

Although freedom of expression has been guaranteed in each of the PRC's five constitutions, its exercise is not without limitations. At various times, Chinese citizens have been exhorted to "bloom and contend" and to speak out freely, to hold great debates, or to write big-character posters. Each time, however, the authorities moved quickly to restrict criticism. And each time, Chinese courts ruled that citizens enjoy the right to support the party's basic principles, but not the freedom to oppose them.

Soviet Justice

Louise I. Shelley

The USSR has two parallel systems of justice—the civil and the criminal. Civil law, which is what the majority of Soviet citizens encounter, is fair and accessible; criminal law, on the other hand, is harsh and often arbitrary. Moreover, any pretense of legality is discarded in the criminal trials of Soviet political and human rights activists.

Novel Views of the Soviet Cadre

Donald F. B. Jameson

Recent spy and adventure novels about the USSR bring alive the professionals who operate just below the leadership within the "Soviet ruling class" in ways that more abstract social science works simply do not. The picture that emerges is one of an elitist class that is both patriotic and self-serving.

Managing the Multinational USSR

Paul A. Goble

The published proceedings of a conference on nationality relations sponsored by the CPSU Central Committee give a mixed picture of how effectively the Soviet government deploys its considerable ideological, economic, and coercive resources in attempting to manage its complex, multinational society. In the military, there is an extensive program of Russian-language instruction designed to facilitate use of large numbers of non-Russian conscripts. In other areas—e.g., the allocation of economic resources among the national republics or the countering of Western influence—there appears to be perplexity over how best to proceed.

Soviet Force Posture: Dilemmas and Directions

William E. Odom

The Soviet General Staff has embarked upon a third revolution in military affairs in its history. The first revolution occurred in the 1920's, the second in the 1950's, and the third dates from the late 1970's and continues to this day. Each has had a major impact on Soviet economic, social, and scientific policies. Each has to date received priority over virtually all other aspects of public policy in the Soviet Union. This primacy of military affairs has become a powerful—perhaps the most powerful—constraint and determinant in Soviet political development.

Each of these revolutions has involved a major change in force development policy. Most states do not build military forces randomly, or just to be in fashion, or purely because of bureaucratic momentum. They build toward some mission, to meet some threat, in accordance with some doctrinal rationale—that is, with purpose. To speak of force development policy, then, is to speak of the rationale for developing specific kinds and sizes of forces. Why have tank divisions instead of infantry divisions? Why ICBM's, IRBM's, and ABM's? Why chemical weapons? And why a particular number of each? Why not more? Why not fewer?

William E. Odom is a Lieutenant General in the US Army and author of numerous writings on Soviet affairs, including The Soviet Volunteers: Modernization and Bureaucracy in a Public Mass Organization (1973). An earlier version of this article was presented at the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies (Washington, DC), on January 30, 1985. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the US government.

The Soviet Union has generally been very advanced in working out new rationales for force development. Its unclassified military literature is among the richest in the world, which is indicative of the existence of an even more extensive classified analysis. Even a casual familiarity with Soviet military force structure would convince a reader of Soviet military literature that there is a strong causal relationship between Soviet force development policy and actual Soviet force building. The kinds and numbers of forces cannot be wholly explained by theories positing "bureaucratic momentum" (according to which no one at the top appears able to control the military-industrial complex) or "action-reaction" (according to which the United States "acts" and the Soviet Union merely "reacts"). Someone with a plan does seem to be in charge, even if that someone does not always succeed in realizing the plan's goals. Traditionally, the Soviet General Staff has played the key role in planning Soviet force building, a role that has grown stronger with time.

Yet, despite all its previous force building successes, the General Staff today faces several new and troublesome challenges with consequences for nonmilitary areas of policy that are likely to be profound. It has succeeded in designing a doctrine and force structure for nuclear war at all levels—strategic, operational, and tactical—that the United States and its allies would find difficult to defeat. The whole Soviet economy has been giving priority to this task for well over two decades. Although the costs have been high, the yields probably appear worth the price as the Politburo assesses the change in the international correlation of forces over these decades. Nonetheless, like Sisyphus who was condemned in Hades to push a rock up a hill only to see it constantly

roll back down, the Soviet General Staff appears to see the rock of its military labor rolling back to the bottom of the hill, presenting the Soviet military with a repetition of the same task: another long-term force building. Not only will this task be costly, but it will probably place nuclear weapons modernization into a secondary role as the competition with the West shifts into areas where the Soviet Union is less well prepared to compete. Moreover, the new force building may deprive Moscow of continued success in the political and propaganda aspects of arms control negotiations by raising questions about the ostensible Soviet rationale for such negotiations.

The fundamental cause of the new task is new technology, namely, microcircuitry, directed energy systems, and genetic engineering. But Soviet success in dealing with these new challenges can be significantly affected by Western policies. They can make it easier or harder for the Soviet General Staff to roll the rock up the hill again. However, as I shall argue below, the causal relations between some Western policies and Soviet force development are not what conventional wisdom has suggested; in fact, they are the reverse in some instances. For example, contrary to the view popular in the 1970's, expanded East-West trade is likely to hurt, not help, arms control. Certain kinds of arms control agreements could actually contribute to a more rapid buildup of weapons by helping Moscow out of its force building dilemmas; some aspects of military competition, particularly in the quality of weapons, can improve the prospects for arms control agreements as well as increase Western security.

To make the case for the centrality of new technologies in Soviet force development, as well as to gain some historical perspective on the current dilemmas facing the General Staff, it is necessary to review how the Soviets have handled major changes in force development policy on two previous occasions.

The First Military Revolution

To understand Soviet military problems, one must understand Soviet military purposes. At the highest level of generality, there is little reason not to take key aspects of open Soviet military policy at face value. How do the Soviets explain publicly the need for military forces? After all, in 1917 it had been Bolshevik policy to abolish all regular forces and to replace them with a workers' militia. In the Bolsheviks' view, if the army were distinct from the working class, it could be used as an instrument of suppression. However, if

worker and soldier became synonymous, the army could hardly be used against the working class.

This policy, to be sure, was quickly reversed in 1918 when civil war broke out in Russia. But when revolution did not spread to the rest of Europe following the Bolshevik victory in the civil war, the Bolsheviks quickly found a new rationale for their regular army or an "army of a new type," as they called it. The Red Army was necessary to defend the fledgling socialist republic against international imperialism. Thus, "socialism" would have to be preserved behind the shield of the Red Army until the international correlation of forces favored the socialist camp. And this shield would be needed until true peace came with the final and decisive victory of socialism over capitalism.¹

The Soviet definition of peace is unique and incompatible with Western definitions.² Defense, in this peculiar Soviet sense, means offense. Peace means the destruction of all nonsocialist states. If that can be accomplished without interstate wars, that is, through internal revolutions, so much the better. The term "coexistence" also does not mean what most people in the West would understand by it. In fact, peaceful coexistence in the Soviet definition is a continuation of the international class struggle by other than direct military means whenever possible. This policy was conceived in the early 1920's as a strategy for avoiding war with the West, which Lenin believed the young regime would lose. It meant building domestic industrial power to support a military establishment that could prevail in a showdown. It meant maintaining "correct" relations with the advanced capitalist states in order to derive the advantages of economic interaction with them. And it meant supporting revolutions and wars of national liberation in what today is called the Third World. In other words, peaceful coexistence was a strategy for irreconcilable struggle, political and military, with capitalism. Peaceful coexistence remains Soviet policy today.³

¹ In a speech printed in *Pravda* (Moscow) on Nov. 30, 1920, Lenin stated: "As long as capitalism and socialism exist, we cannot live in peace; in the end, one or the other will triumph. . . ."

² Paul Nitze, I was delighted to see, recently discussed this difference in definitions at some length. See his "Living with the Soviets," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), pp. 360-74.

³ The policy of peaceful coexistence between socialism and capitalism was proclaimed by Nikita Khrushchev and reiterated by his successors. *Scientific Communism, A Glossary* (published in Moscow in 1975) gives the following official explication of the term: "The CPSU . . . views peaceful coexistence as a form of class struggle developing in the political, economic, and ideological spheres on the international arena. By fighting against the outbreak of another world war, and organizing and leading the worker, national liberation, and all-democratic movement, the communists . . . pave the way to the triumph of socialism in the whole world."



Prominent commanders of the Bolshevik forces in the Russian civil war, from left to right: Semën Budënnyy, Mikhail Frunze, and Kliment Voroshilov.

—SOVFOTO.

If one takes seriously this political rationale as providing the basis for Soviet military policy, then the force development of the Red Army in the 1920's and 1930's was remarkably logical and even predictable. Its development was guided by an extensive doctrinal review concerned primarily with the implications of new technologies for future war. Aviation, motorization, and chemical weapons had appeared in World War I. They portended, as Red Army theorists pointed out, a less clear distinction between the "front" and the "rear" in war. Bombing of cities, industrial plants, and military forces deep in the rear areas could be expected. Motorized forces could conduct much deeper operations. The new weapons would also require a well-trained officer corps and a literate manpower pool for military recruitment. Moreover, an adequate research and development (R&D) base and an advanced industrial capacity were imperative for the underdeveloped Soviet Union.



The doctrinal review did not go smoothly in the early 1920's. Debates on almost all aspects of military policy were acrimonious and conducted openly. Struggles within the leadership clique affected the review, particularly Leon Trotsky's removal in 1925 as Commissar of War. Mikhail Frunze, his successor, synthesized all views, capped the debate, and established the general directions of Soviet military doctrine in several short pamphlets, including *A Unified Military Doctrine and the Red Army* (1921) and *Front and Rear in Future War* (1925).⁴ The goals were not modest. The Soviet Union was committed to build military power that would ensure the eventual success of the Bolshevik revolution throughout the advanced industrialized world.

Soviet actions followed doctrine. The standing Red Army was reduced to about half a million soldiers in active units backed by a large militia force—a policy designed to save manpower in peacetime. The Red Army became a school for literacy. Officer education became a top priority, prompting the establishment of a general staff academy and a host of other measures.⁵ In active combat power, the Red Army was allowed to become quite weak. A foreign observer might have concluded that the Soviet regime was quietly disarming itself, a view that would have been as misleading about Soviet military policy as was the contemporary view that the New Economic Policy meant that the Bolsheviks were reintroducing a full-scale market economy. In reality, the Bolshevik leaders were taking a short-term risk in order to have a large, modern military force in the future.

By the mid-1930's, the regular forces were being expanded. New equipment was being produced by Soviet industry, and operational doctrine for deep operations had inspired not only the development of new tanks and airborne forces, but also a massive effort to build a modern aviation fleet. Before Stalin's purge of the Red Army's general officer corps in the late 1930's, there had accumulated a fairly large number of trained officers as a result of the military's education policy. But war came faster than Stalin had

⁴ M. V. Frunze, *Izbrannyye proizvedeniya* (Selected Works), Moscow, Voenizdat, 1957, pp. 4–21, 133–42.

⁵ Trotsky introduced "literacy" classes into the unit training programs and called the Red Army a school for literacy. Officers were encouraged to form "military scientific societies," to publish papers, and to compile their experiences from World War I and the civil war. A general staff college, later to be named the Frunze Academy, was founded for senior staff and command training. See A. Yovlev, "The Perfecting of Military Educational Institutions in 1921–26," *Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal* (Moscow), No. 2, 1976, pp. 93–98; and Dmitri Fedotoff-White, *The Growth of the Red Army*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1944.



Soviet responses to the post-World War I technological revolution in warfare, from top to bottom: an early Soviet aircraft for rapid delivery and parachuting of troops behind enemy lines; Soviet tanks lining up for a May Day parade in Moscow; Soviet bombers on their way to attacking Japanese positions in Manchuria.

—UPI/BETTMANN.

expected, and many aspects of the long-range military force development program were still incomplete. This should not, however, obscure the essential rationale that guided force development and the cluster of coherent policies that it produced. The policies were impressively perspicacious in retrospect.

Soviet military historians ascribe an orderly and "scientific" character to the process of analytical review in light of new technological, political, and economic realities, followed by doctrinal proclamations, a programmatic building of weapons and forces, and a working out of what they refer to as operational and tactical art. While they impute to this process a tidy causal chain of events that abuses the historical record in a number of ways, their writings do show both a series of actions and a record of policy intention that appear linked by more than chance correlation. In any event, this is the approach that Soviet military leaders have come to believe they should take with regard to the overall task of force development. In fact, they virtually repeated the process after World War II.

Second Military Revolution

In the late 1940's, the Soviet military found itself in a position analogous to what it had faced in the 1920's. The economy was largely destroyed by war, and the number of soldiers under arms was far too large to maintain. The educational level of all ranks was too low for modern technology. And three new technologies—nuclear weapons, rocketry, and cybernetics—appeared to affect fundamentally the nature of future war.

The Soviet response, perhaps not surprisingly, was also analogous to that of the 1920's. In the process of rebuilding the economy, the military sector was given the highest priority. Most of the active duty manpower was demobilized, bringing the force levels down to relatively small numbers. The system of military education was revamped, in order to bring about a long-term upgrading of commissioning schools and military academies. The nature of future war was redefined in light of the new technologies, and the General Staff set to work on changes in operations and tactics necessary to take these technologies into account. The flurry of activity in the late 1940's and throughout the 1950's gave birth to much of the present Soviet doctrine and force structure.

Assuming that the three technologies would change the nature of future war, Soviet theorists considered it essential that military doctrine come to grips with two central effects arising from them: the

large firepower that nuclear weapons bring to the battlefield, and the great range and accuracy in the delivery of that firepower made possible by rocketry and cybernetics.

Although a great deal has been written about Soviet doctrinal development in the 1950's and 1960's, most Western analysts tended to see Soviet doctrine as developing along lines similar to those evolving in the West in response to the same problems. However, as the Soviets themselves became more explicit and as the nature of Soviet weapons development became clearer, Western analysts began to uncover a quite different picture of that doctrinal evolution.⁶ The overall impression one gains from these later interpretations is that of a pragmatic Soviet effort to master the new weapons, to make them usable for strategic, operational, and in some instances even tactical objectives. This is not to say that there was a Soviet desire to use nuclear weapons. Rather, it is to say that the Soviets assumed that these weapons *might* be used. In that event, they wanted to know how to use them purposefully in support of war aims, rather than viscerally in a sort of hopeless retaliation or bluffing deterrence.

The post-World War II phase of Soviet force development policy was based on three key points. First, weapons of mass destruction require that one's own forces be dispersed in order to present few targets worthy of a nuclear strike. The Soviets solved this problem by echeloning their forces, that is, by spreading them out evenly to the rear so that no really large concentrations could be targeted.

Second, breaking through an enemy's defense requires a massing of maneuver forces. The solution to this problem was found in a high speed of attack, requiring the echeloned forces to move forward at 60 to 100 kilometers per day. This causes rapid accumulation of forces at the front, in close contact with the enemy's defense, and thereby permits breakthroughs and allows redispersion by deep operations into the enemy's rear.

Both of these techniques required the abandonment of a number of traditional principles of military



Marshal Vasiliy Sokolovskiy at a USSR Supreme Soviet meeting in March 1949.

—SOVFOTO.

art. In particular, the dispersion of forces made it impossible to mass them for a "main effort" in one sector. The high-speed offensive meant either breaking through where opportunities occurred or along an entire front. Placing a concentration of forces forward for a main effort would put them at risk under the enemy's tactical nuclear fire.

Third, this doctrine would remain empty theory until the equipment and weapons systems for implementing the doctrine were produced in sufficiently large numbers to make its implementation feasible. Thus, Marshal Vasiliy Sokolovskiy's 1962 volume, *Military Strategy*,⁷ was not a statement proclaiming a Soviet capability to implement this kind of combined arms offensive with nuclear weapons and rocketry support. Rather, it was a statement about the technical capabilities of the new weapons, their implications for future war, and some rough ideas about how the new problems that they presented could be resolved. So-


⁶ For more recent analysis of Soviet military doctrine, see John Erickson, "Soviet Military Operational Research: Methods and Objectives," *Strategic Review* (Washington, DC), No. 5, 1977, pp. 63-73; Peter Vigor, "Soviet Echeloning," *Military Review* (Fort Leavenworth, KS), August 1982, pp. 69-74; Amoretta Hoeber and Joseph Douglass, *Conventional War and Escalation: The Soviet View*, New York, Crane, Russak, 1981; Fritz Ermarth, "The US and the Strategic Balance," paper presented at a conference on US-Soviet Relations, Washington, DC, Mar. 18, 1983. A recent paper by Notra Trulock, III, and Daniel Goure, "Soviet Perspectives on Limited Nuclear Warfare," Washington, DC, Nov. 16-17, 1984, is notable for the sources it cites—classified Soviet materials that trace a much earlier Soviet interest in limited and discriminating use of nuclear weapons than is generally appreciated.

⁷ V. D. Sokolovskiy, *Voyennaya strategiya* (Military Strategy), Moscow, Voenizdat, 1962. The volume was published in English translation under the editorship of Harriet Fast Scott with the title *Soviet Military Strategy*, New York, Crane, Russak, 1975.

kolovskiy and his collective of contributors were actually doing what Frunze had done in the mid-1920's. They were providing a synthesis of a plethora of classified discussion, debate, and analysis that had been conducted in military circles in the 1950's. They were distilling it into a text for officer general education about the major directions and problems for Soviet force development in the future.

If one looked at the Soviet force structure as it emerged in the 1970's, one saw a growing inventory of capabilities to implement the doctrine. Therefore, it is not surprising that more and more references appeared in open Soviet military literature to techniques for conducting war, nonnuclear and nuclear, at the tactical, operational, and even strategic levels.⁸ Again, these references do not mean that the Soviets necessarily want to conduct war at the nuclear level. Rather, they indicate that the Soviets realized that such a war could actually be conducted, and that they were gaining the means to do it. Those means encompassed more than just large numbers of small-yield nuclear weapons. They include armor-protected infantry vehicles, artillery carriers, air defense carriers, engineering equipment, tactical rockets, and frontal aviation.

It is also important to note that strategic defense of Soviet territory, very much a part of the Soviet doctrine in Frunze's day, was not abandoned during the post-World War II period. It has remained a strong element in Soviet doctrine and practice. Civil defense, hardening of command and control, air defense, and ABM development have been generously supported. Whether or not these programs would be effective in an all-out war may be a matter of dispute in the West; but there is no doubt that the Soviet leadership has remained willing to commit significant resources to the pursuit of survivability of sufficient command and control, military forces, and industrial capacity and manpower to sustain a long and drawn-out campaign even if nuclear weapons were to be used massively. In other words, Soviet actions strongly suggest that the



A column of Frog tactical missiles on maneuver in the Carpathian Military District in autumn 1984.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

Soviets believe that they can evade the "assured destruction" imputed in the West to nuclear retaliatory forces.

Thus, in order to understand why we have witnessed in the last two or three decades the largest military buildup in history, we must grasp the doctrinal rationale behind it. The action-reaction theory, the bureaucratic momentum thesis, and other such explanations miss the critical rationale for the buildup. New technologies, military experience, and fundamental policy aims originating in the early years of the Bolshevik regime were its causes. Actions by the West represented constraints, not causes.

Direction of Third Military Revolution

If this is the historical record to date, what about the present dilemmas and future directions for Soviet force development? To answer this question, we must begin by looking for three kinds of evidence. First, are there any new technologies that promise to have major implications for the nature of future war? Second, is there any Soviet doctrinal writing on those implications? And, third, of course, are there weapons devel-

⁸ For older references to Soviet war-fighting capabilities, see the citations found in the sources in fn. 6. For quite recent examples, see M. A. Gareyev, *Frunze-voyennyy teoretik* (Frunze: Military Theoretician), Moscow, Voenizdat, 1985; and V. G. Reznichenko, Ed., *Taktika* (Tactics), Moscow, Voenizdat, 1984. Gareyev offers a fascinating critique of Sokolovskiy's *Military Strategy*, in which he argues that the work was essentially sound in the 1960's but that conditions of war have changed, making many of the traditional principles and concepts of military art, which Sokolovskiy had rejected, once again relevant. In other words, Gareyev is saying that earlier Soviet views on the extent to which nuclear weapons have changed the nature of war and, thus, of military art have proven to be overdrawn; Soviet doctrine is restoring many of the old principles. As my argument proceeds, the centrality of this latest change in doctrine will become apparent.

opments and organizational changes that have followed from the doctrinal changes?

There is now abundant evidence in all three categories. The new technologies are microcircuitry, directed energy systems (DES), and genetic engineering. Microcircuitry helps make possible what are called "smart weapons," that is, warheads with a variety of conventional energy munitions that are guided to targets with virtually no error, warheads that can seek a target without external assistance and can discriminate between tanks and trucks, and so on. Directed energy systems are also a part of the set of technologies required for these new families of weapons. They make ranging and guidance possible to a degree inconceivable in previous decades. Genetic engineering is less developed for weapons application, and precisely what it may yield in this area is far from clear. What is clear is that drugs for medicinal purposes could also be used for destructive purposes. New genes could be cloned for a variety of effects on the human body, from debilitating to fatal. The Soviets have made a large commitment of resources to genetic engineering, suggesting that the requirements of the Soviet General Staff affect policy in this area as well.

Interest by the Soviet military in the doctrinal implications of all three technologies dates back to the early 1970's, and possibly even earlier. When Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov was promoted to the position of chief of the General Staff in 1977, a number of other senior officers also moved into key positions, officers who were already noted for their writings about changing technologies and warfare. During the past five or six years, Soviet doctrinal writings have shown a concern for exploiting new weapons and technologies. Ogarkov himself published a notable booklet in 1982 that signaled a major shift in direction, although it did not represent a watershed of the kind seen in the 1950's.⁹ In this work, Ogarkov spelled out clearly the tasks for future force and doctrinal development, and he chided his fellow officers for being slow to exploit new technologies.

The focal point of this revision of Soviet doctrine is the "theater strategic operation." Ogarkov argues that wars before 1600 tended to be a series of regimental-sized engagements. In the 17th century they became a series of "brigade" operations, in the 18th century "division" operations, and by the close of that century, "army" operations, that is, battles involving simultane-

ous operations by two or more divisions, thus requiring an "army" headquarters and staff to coordinate and control the battle. That form of operation continued, in Ogarkov's judgment, through the 19th century until the Russo-Japanese war of 1904, when the Russian command controlled two armies simultaneously. This level of command in the Russian and Soviet lexicon is a "front," that is, two or more armies under one commander. By the end of World War II, the Soviet command structure was managing two "fronts" simultaneously as a single operation.

The task today and in the foreseeable future, Ogarkov asserts, is to master this multi-front operation or "theater strategic operation," to use the Soviet terminology.¹⁰ Geographically, it would involve an attack on a front 500 to 750 kilometers wide and proceed about 1,200 kilometers in offensive depth. The current standard Soviet doctrine for a "frontal operation" is 150 to 300 kilometers of frontage carried to a depth of 300 to 600 kilometers into the adversary's territory. Thus, two or three fronts conducting side-by-side offensive actions to at least twice the depth of a front would roughly cover an area 500 to 750 kilometers wide and reach an offensive depth of 1,200 kilometers.

Needless to say, the scale and speed of offensive operations envisioned by Ogarkov are unprecedented, and it is highly doubtful that the Soviet Armed Forces could execute a "theater strategic operation" of that magnitude today. Thus, Ogarkov's articulation of the direction of force development and doctrine should be seen as an aspiration, akin to Frunze's *Front and Rear in Future War* and Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevskiy's 1936 *Field Regulations* setting the depth of the offensive operation at 150 kilometers.¹¹ Both were stating goals in light of technological capabilities. The same was true of Sokolovskiy's 1962 volume. Although somewhat less radical, Ogarkov's little volume nonetheless sets forth incredibly demanding new offensive depths and frontages. Perhaps the geographical scale is less astonishing than the speed. There will be no pause between "frontal" operations within a "theater strategic operation," thus shortening by weeks the time estimated for reaching the 1,200-kilometer depth.¹²

The stimuli for this change in doctrine, of course, are the new technologies that permit, in theory, the communications, control, and accuracy of fire sup-

⁹ Ibid., pp. 34-35.

¹¹ M. N. Tukhachevskiy, *Izbrannyye proizvedeniya* (Selected Works), 2 volumes, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1964.

¹² Ogarkov, op. cit., pp. 35, 36.

⁹ N. V. Ogarkov, *Vsegda v gotovnosti k zashchite otechestva* (Always in Readiness for Defense of the Fatherland) Moscow, Voenizdat, 1982.

port for operations conducted on such a scale and at such a tempo. Changes in Western military doctrine, as we shall see, are also a factor. Even without these stimuli, however, it is easy to see how a Soviet strategist would seek this speed and scale. For some time, he has had the theater fire support means to strike the "full depth" of the theater—to use Soviet terms—with nuclear means. Soviet short-range ballistic missiles and frontal aviation are sufficient to execute such a fire plan.¹³ The longer Soviet ground forces require to penetrate to the "full depth" of the theater, the less effective those deep theater missile and air attacks will be because the opposing NATO forces will have time to recover, reorganize, and meet the attack. It is a matter of "leaning into the artillery" which, military commanders of maneuver forces have always known, is imperative for a successful attack. That is, attacking infantry and tanks try to get as close as possible to friendly artillery falling on enemy positions so as to cover their assault. Heretofore, Soviet ground maneuver forces have not been able to "lean into" theater fire support to the "full depth" of the theater. In a sense, Ogarkov's "theater strategic operation" represents an attempt to achieve precisely this exploitation of deep targeting within the theater.

Although Ogarkov has not spoken as explicitly of strategic defense as he has of combined arms offensive operations, this should not be taken to indicate a lack of Soviet interest in the matter in the current revolution in military doctrine. The new technologies also create new possibilities for active defenses. The assumption by the General Staff that a "theater strategic operation" can be executed implies a belief in the possibility of riding out and degrading significantly Western nuclear retaliatory attacks. Moreover, this belief has inspired efforts in comprehensive strategic defense, a Soviet "strategic defense initiative" that appears to exceed the ABM limitations now in effect.¹⁴

A great deal of organizational change took place while Ogarkov was chief of the Soviet General Staff. Much of it appears to have been directed toward anticipating not just the so-called "revolution in military affairs" created by nuclear weapons but also the lesser revolution prompted by the latest technolo-



Then Chief of the General Staff Nikolay Ogarkov at a December 5, 1983, press conference in Moscow at which he explained the Soviet position at the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force talks suspended the month before by a Soviet walk-out.

—Jean-Pierre Quittard/GAMMA-LIAISON.

gies. To get some idea of the significance of this additional shift in military affairs, we only need to read the 1984 interview with Marshal Ogarkov published in *Krasnaya Zvezda*. Conventional weapons are becoming so efficient and destructive, he said, that a global war in which nuclear weapons would not be used is a possibility.¹⁵

The trend in the West toward new, nonnuclear weapons has been under way for more than a decade. That trend, combined with shifts in US military doctrine, has clearly had a role in bringing about changes in Soviet operational doctrine. In the mid- and late 1970's, the US defense establishment began to grasp what the Sokolovskiy directions had begot in Soviet doctrine and force structure. NATO forces would be facing deeply echeloned Warsaw Pact forces that

¹³ See Stephen M. Meyer, "Soviet Theater Nuclear Forces," *Adelphi Papers*, Nos. 187 and 188, London, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1983/84, for a remarkably thorough examination of Soviet capabilities.

¹⁴ For Soviet strategic defense and space programs, see *Soviet Military Power*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1985, esp. pp. 46–52. For organizational changes in all types of Soviet divisions, see *ibid.* and also W. E. Odom, "Trends in the Balance of Military Power Between East and West," in *The Conduct of East-West Relations in the 1980s*, Part III, *Adelphi Papers*, No. 191, 1984, esp. pp. 19–20.

¹⁵ *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Moscow), May 9, 1984.

would rapidly grind down NATO defenses through successive attacks at the forward edge of the battlefield. The first echelon of Warsaw Pact divisions, and even the second, might be defeated, but as succeeding echelons—in effect, the next army—arrived, the NATO defense would be facing fresh forces while its own were diminished through attrition. The issue for American planners was whether US forces could afford to let the deeply echeloned forces arrive at the front in such a phased fashion. US Army analyses showed that if the fight were carried through long-range targeting against the follow-on echelons as a “deep battle,” while another battle occurred at the front, the follow-on forces would not arrive in good shape, and the estimated battle outcomes would begin to shift against them. That shift is a function of the effectiveness—accuracy and warhead power—of deep targeting. Tactical nuclear weapons could be used for these purposes, but the concept of echelonment was intended to make forces less vulnerable to nuclear attacks. In contrast, “smart” conventional warheads and bombs promise to be more efficient for such “deep attacks.” Moreover, as new NATO ground force weapons—higher speed tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and attack helicopters with precision guided weapons—are fielded in sufficient numbers, this change in tactics and operations promises to create opportunities for ground force counterattacks to tactical, and possibly even operational, depths.

As this new doctrine was taking inchoate shape for the US Army and Air Force under the name “AirLand Battle,” it galvanized Soviet attention. The Soviet military had to consider whether this doctrine could destroy the synchronization of deep echelonment moving into battle that is necessary to keep the tempo and to exploit breakthroughs. If weapons and forces for AirLand Battle are fielded, current Soviet doctrine is unlikely to cope adequately without changes. This has provided the second set of stimuli for major revisions of Soviet doctrine, and it is thus not surprising that Soviet authors are openly pointing out flaws in Sokolovskiy's concepts of 1962.¹⁶

One such change had received wide attention in defense circles in Europe and the United States: the so-called Operational Maneuver Group.¹⁷ It is a concept for committing the second echelon forces across the front much earlier and much deeper. In other words, the scheme seems to be to mass forward earlier to avoid a US “deep attack” and to carry a Soviet “deep attack” into NATO's rear. While attractive in theory, this concept puts even greater stress on command and control, synchronization of movements, fire support, air support, and logistics. At the same time, it may offer earlier and more vulnerable targets for the opponent. The forward massing of forces on an axis of the main effort, implicit in the “operational maneuver group” concept is precisely what the Sokolovskiy doctrine of echelonment was designed to prevent.¹⁸ The Operational Maneuver Group seems to be a return to traditional offensive doctrine but on a larger scale and at a faster pace. It is, of course, a part of Ogarkov's larger concept, the “theater strategic operation.” It should be understood as one technique in such an operation for getting maneuver forces deeper and sooner to “lean into” the long-range supporting fire.

Although the Soviet General Staff has defined fairly well the directions for future force development, taking into account both technological change and Western doctrine and forces, it still faces a number of dilemmas in attempting to realize these goals. First, it is already evident that the Soviets recognize the shortcomings in the doctrine that had guided 20 years of force development and officer training. Now, the “theater strategic operation” concept places even greater demands on the Soviet officer corps, demands that probably exceed its already impressive education and training achievements in the postwar decades. This bold and unparalleled concept of operations will undoubtedly require considerable improvements in command and staff training. Is the officer education system up to another dramatic qualitative upgrading after having just gone through perhaps the greatest one in both Russian and Soviet history?

A second dilemma is whether the Soviet scientific and technological base can support the exploitation of the new triad of technologies for military applica-

¹⁶ See Gareyev, op. cit.. Gareyev specifically mentions choosing the direction of the main effort in the traditional fashion as needing to be revived. Massing and concentrating forces on a main axis, of course, is precisely what echelonment was designed to prevent. Massed forces were too vulnerable to a nuclear strike, in the Sokolovskiy view of war. Insofar as we understand the “operational maneuver group” concept, it amounts to concentrating forces on an axis of the main effort and moving them forward ahead of the dispersed echelons of follow-on forces (see Gareyev, pp. 239–40). Gareyev's critique of Sokolovskiy has a number of other implications that go beyond the argument in this article, but the thrust is the same: pre-nuclear concepts of military art cannot be dismissed in the wholesale fashion dictated by Sokolovskiy's volume.

¹⁷ C. W. Donnelly, “The Soviet Operational Maneuver Group: A New Challenge for NATO,” *Military Review*, March 1983, pp. 43–60.

¹⁸ Gareyev, op. cit., esp. pp. 240–44. Gareyev's revision of Sokolovskiy is an explicit confirmation of my argument about the nature of the most recent changes in Soviet doctrine. A return to more traditional principles of military art—even in the age of nuclear weapons—is, Gareyev says, essential. As a colonel-general, doctor of military science, and professor, Gareyev writes with considerable authority. His book, which was tied in with the commemoration of Frunze's 100th birthday, can be taken as representing the present official line of military doctrine.



Advanced US combat equipment in operation, clockwise from top left: (1) a US Army CH-47D transporting an M198 howitzer; (2) a Ground Locator Laser Designator for fire control; (3) firing of a 155mm Copperhead projectile from the howitzer; (4) the projectile honing in on the target tank; and (5) destruction of the target.

—US Army photos.



tions. Or will it simply bog down under the demands placed on it by the military? The answer to this question is not yet clear, perhaps not even to the Soviet leadership. The 1960's and 1970's placed heavy demands on Soviet research and development capabilities, which were met in no small part by exploiting East-West economic interaction. What Soviet scientists could not develop, they usually could count on the KGB to buy or steal from the West. Today the acquisition of Western technologies is both more difficult and more necessary because of the increasing complexity of new weapons. A Soviet T-62 tank is remarkably simple compared to a T-72 or a T-80 tank to which computers, laser equipment, and more advanced metallurgical construction have been added. In rocketry, aviation, and command and control, the applied technologies are much more costly and complex to develop and involve many more ancillary technologies and products that must be developed, borrowed, or stolen from abroad.

The weapons for the future, that is, those that are highly dependent on the new technologies—microcircuitry and directed energy—can in all probability not be developed in the USSR without extensive access to Western economies and R&D communities. The “smart weapons,” or precision guided munitions, which Soviet military analysts see as changing the nature of war, rely on a variety of innovations in the use of these new technologies. Most of these innovations are being made in the West, and moving them into serial production is not easy, even for Western firms. Although espionage may give the USSR access to the new technologies, only extensive cooperative relations with Western firms that have applied them in mass production will allow the USSR to achieve a respectable indigenous production capacity. Moreover, dependence on Western sources of supply, for example on high-grade silicon, is likely to grow as the USSR develops its own production programs.

Third, can the Soviet economy handle the new production demands? This is really a twofold question. Can the economy meet both qualitative and quantitative requirements for the anticipated force development and modernization? Again, as in the case of the S&T base, the requirements of the 1970's were easier to meet. Future requirements will place higher per unit costs on industry, and the quality will have to be much higher for many items. According to the dictates of Soviet military science, new technologies cannot have a significant impact on doctrine until sufficient quantities of new weapons are available.

All three of these dilemmas must seem cruel to the Soviet leaders. After a 20-year struggle to get ahead

with forces and a doctrine for nuclear weapons and rocketry, they find themselves confronted with a new and analogous struggle to stay ahead. In many categories of forces they have achieved a clear edge. Yet, if NATO now proceeds with modernization programs that lead to fielding many systems with the new technologies, those leads may well vanish.

In Leonid Brezhnev's last years and under Yuriy Andropov's general secretaryship, it seemed that the Soviet leadership had committed itself fully to undertake yet another major modernization effort, yet another 20-year program.¹⁹ The doctrinal modifications were set forth, and there is as yet no sign that they have been discarded. The rate at which modernization will go forward, however, may well be in question. We will not know this for some time, and the answer will depend to a significant degree on Western policies. Trade policy, arms control policy, and force development policy in the United States and NATO will either complicate these dilemmas for the Soviet General Staff or ease them somewhat. Since conventional assumptions about the causal nexus in each of these policy areas are open to question, some elaboration of this point is essential.

Role of Western Policies

Since 1980 many analysts in the West have been suggesting that US policies were forcing Moscow to review its basic foreign policy premises and to revise significantly its commitment to détente. However, an assessment of Soviet gains from the détente period and the lack of attractive policy alternatives led me to conclude that while détente might offer less today to the Soviets than in the 1970's, it would still be advantageous for the USSR.²⁰ For one thing, the confluence of Soviet economic needs and a changing political climate in Europe has made it unprofitable for the USSR to continue to outdo the hard-line US policy. For another, the dilemmas in force development policy have made it necessary for the Soviet leadership to revive as much East-West trade as possible. Without this trade, the Soviet Union will have neither the S&T

¹⁹ While neither was more explicit than offering the usual public statements about providing the Soviet Armed Forces with all that they need, the clearest action implying Brezhnev's commitment came with the decision in 1975 to meet economic planning dilemmas by reducing “investment” instead of defense or consumer goods. Andropov did not alter this priority for defense even as he tried to shift resources to free up bottlenecks in energy and transportation. See Myron Rush, “Guns over Growth in Soviet Policy,” *International Security* (Cambridge, MA), Winter 1982/83, pp. 167–79.

²⁰ William E. Odorn, “Choice and Change in Soviet Politics,” *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), May-June 1983, pp. 1–21.

base nor the industrial capacity for its preferred force development path.

Détente in the 1970's facilitated Soviet force development through arms control agreements and the arms control process. SALT I did two important things for the Soviet Union. First, it ratified a large Soviet advantage in a number of strategic systems. Second, it closed off US strategic defense programs, giving the Soviets time to catch up in ABM technology. It thus permitted the General Staff not to have to choose between a mix of ICBM and ABM programs and allowed for the accelerated buildup of the ICBM force without having to fear that the United States would deploy ABM's. The Soviets took advantage of the situation to stay well ahead in ICBM's and to catch up and actually deploy the one ABM site around Moscow permitted by the 1972 ABM treaty.

Two American programs, the MX missile and the B-1 bomber, have both run afoul not because of technical limits in the SALT treaty, but because of congressional opposition to the programs generated in part by the political disputes between proponents and opponents of the SALT process and in part by debates over practicability. In the case of ABM, the United States has not deployed even the one site permitted by the treaty. Yet now, as the Soviet General Staff faces a second postwar modernization program of enormous dimensions, it sees a reviving US interest in strategic missile defense. The Soviet Union's decision in late 1984 to return to the arms negotiations was to be expected, and the primary Soviet goal will remain to defeat the US interest in ballistic-missile and space-based defenses as effectively as it had defeated ABM in 1972.²¹

Another factor, Western force development policy, can work either of two ways. If NATO does not go ahead with developing and fielding significant numbers of the more advanced conventional weapons, the degradation that the Soviets anticipate in their combined arms doctrine of the 1970's would not occur. If, on the other hand, NATO fields impressive numbers of the weapons, the nuclear issue, heretofore the center of arms control attention, would increasingly be pushed into a secondary place. This trend has been under way for some time. The megatonnage of the US arsenal has been decreasing since the 1960's as the accuracy in delivery systems in-

creased. Now, as the Soviet General Staff sees it, further technological changes could make nuclear weapons unattractive for military purposes.

There is a certain irony in seeing military force developers being more effective than arms control negotiators in reducing the explosive potential of nuclear stockpiles. There is even greater irony in seeing military force developers, through their efforts to make nuclear weapons practical for tactical and operational use, become proponents of more limited and controlled use and perhaps even nonuse of nuclear weapons. The ultimate irony, of course, would be if the West were to make arms control concessions of a kind that would facilitate the modernization of Soviet military forces while denying NATO forces such modernization.

Conclusion

Three major propositions arise from this analysis. Although they might be obvious, they are worth restating:

There is a direct relationship between arms control and trade control. For reasons not altogether clear there has been a widespread belief among Western analysts that expanded West-East trade would encourage the sort of political change in the USSR that would generate Soviet interest in effective arms control and even arms reductions. While there is little historical evidence to support this view, there is massive evidence in both Russian and Soviet history to refute it. Military imperatives have governed much of Russian economic policy at least since the time of Peter the Great, the tsar who called money the "artery of war." In the Soviet period, as has been indicated above, the same has been true even though the ideological rationale was different. Young Soviet Russia in the 1920's feared economic isolation from the West as much as anything else. By concluding the treaties of Rapallo (1922) and Berlin (1926) with Weimar Germany, Moscow avoided a Western coordinated trade policy.²² Moreover, the Red Army was able to enlist large German credits and technical assistance in the three new military technological areas of the 1920's. The Soviet aviation industry, motor and tank construction, and chemical weapons all depended centrally on

²¹ Criticisms of the Strategic Defense Initiative have been appearing almost daily in the Soviet media since its announcement by President Ronald Reagan. For some examples, see A. Bovin in *Izvestiya* (Moscow), June 18, 1985, and the article in *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Mar. 8, 1985, attributed to F. Aleksandrov.

²² Harvey L. Dyck, *Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia 1926-1933*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1966, pp. 50-63. This monograph, based on German Foreign Ministry documents, sounds surprisingly contemporary in the context of East-West trade and arms control.



A test launch of a US ballistic missile defense rocket on May 28, 1983, from Kwajalein in the Marshall Islands.

—US Army photos.

German aid. Subsequently, in World War II, the Soviet T-34 tank was considered to be the best.

The infusion of technology from defeated Germany in the aftermath of World War II gave Soviet military industry a needed boost, but that boost had begun to run down by the early 1960's. Within the decade, Western trade and credit expansion were helping to support the new Soviet military modernization. In the 1970's, the expansion became accelerated.

It may be, as many critics insist, that it is impossible to achieve a fully coordinated Western trade policy or even a narrow Western embargo on strategic technology exports. If this is true, then it means that the West can expect both a quantitative and a qualitative arms race for the indefinite future. However, a trade policy that merely slowed down the diffusion of technology and credits to the Soviet Union could have a significant effect. The trade control/arms control connection is a reality whether or not this is recognized by proponents of arms control and proponents of extensive East-West trade.²³

A qualitative arms competition between the US and the USSR is likely to make the use of nuclear weapons both less attractive militarily and less probable. The record to date suggests that the qualitative competition between the superpowers is already having this effect. As Samuel Huntington pointed out many years ago, qualitative arms races have tended to be substitutes for war; by comparison, quantitative arms races have tended to lead to war.²⁴ The point is clear, although it is at odds with contemporary conventional wisdom: some kinds of arms control are not good, even if they are effective in restraining competition. The Strategic Defense Initiative, as well as many of the US Army and the Air Force precision guided munitions and target acquisition systems, would seem to fall into the category of competition that helps to avoid war, not lead to war.

The connection between arms control and arms development is primarily a political rather than a technical matter, a form of political competition. The past decade of arms control experience is a compelling re-

²³ See Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, *Assessing the Effect of Technology Transfer on U.S./Western Security*, Washington, DC, Department of Defense, February 1985.

²⁴ Samuel Huntington, "Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results," in Carl J. Friedrich and Seymour E. Harris, Eds., *Public Policy, Yearbooks*, Vol. 8, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1958, pp. 41-80.

minder of this proposition. It is difficult to imagine that the present force levels would be higher than they are even if there had been no SALT treaties in the 1970's, and it is possible that without SALT the Soviet military edge in some categories of forces would not be as great. (It is probable that Soviet ICBM's would be less numerous and the Soviet ABM system technically less advanced.) This need not have occurred. The fault is not so much with arms control as with illusions that an essentially political matter like the East-West military balance can be depoliticized through arms control negotiations. The Western inclination to change the nuclear weapons issue from a political into a technical matter is at the root of the problem. If the West could control this tendency, the chances for successful arms control would be improved. Both the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) negotiations are examples of effective Western competition in arms control. Both sets of talks have helped to maintain NATO force levels or redress adverse trends, given Soviet intransigence on arms reductions. In both cases, the West understood Soviet force developments and gave military capabilities first place in designing Western arms control positions. In most other arms talks in the past, the West let technical factors take precedence over military and political realities.

In spite of this, the West has new prospects for success. The USSR has another force modernization task before it, one that will be very costly to execute. New technologies more than Western military policies have created this task. Yet, this gives the West a new opportunity to redress the NATO-Warsaw Pact military balance significantly. Changes in US land warfare

doctrine are concerned with ways to exploit new kinds of nonnuclear weapons. To make the doctrine effective, NATO has to field a modicum of the new weapons systems and show that it can employ them effectively. At the same time, this opportunity could escape if NATO fails to connect the doctrine rationally to its arms control and trade control policies.

It may appear to some that the West too is condemned to the fate of Sisyphus, destined to respond to military buildup after military buildup. In one respect that is true. No single strategy or weapons system will provide security indefinitely. Security is maintained through continuous efforts, frequent reviews, periodic changes in doctrine and strategies, and rhythmic acquisition of weapons and forces using new technologies. Security cannot be bought cheaply, and there are no panaceas to be had, not even in nuclear forces capabilities. There are, however, more effective and less effective approaches to building security for the West. The present juncture, understood from the dynamic perspective of past and potential Soviet force development, seems to offer rare and genuine opportunities for the West to acquire security more effectively. The West can make the Sisyphean task for the Soviet General Staff much heavier and its own task relatively lighter by understanding the rhythm of the competition and by exerting itself in ways that shape the competition. Most important, however, is that the competition be shaped into "a substitute for war," rather than "a prelude to war." The West cannot escape the military competition, but it can complete in ways that make war less likely.

Science and Technology in China's Defense

William T. Tow

Despite maintaining the world's largest ground forces, a sizable navy and air force, a growing inventory of strategic and theater nuclear forces, and a military-industrial complex exceeded only by that of the Soviet Union and United States,¹ Beijing's current pragmatic leadership faces unique challenges in shaping China's strategic destiny. Its primary concern over the next decade and a half will be how to reconcile a national heritage characterized by xenophobia, internecine bureaucratic strife, and factionalism with the need to sustain or accelerate China's current momentum in acquiring and assimilating the latest "state of the art" military knowledge and weapons components. If Chinese leaders fail to achieve an admittedly difficult balance between traditional Sinocentric concerns and the strategic requirements for closing the military technology gap with foreign powers, the People's Republic of China (PRC) may eventually lose a large share of its geopolitical independence. The key Chinese task in a strategic sense, therefore, is to create a formidable, indigenous defense infrastructure by combining the PRC's own scientific and economic programs with technological innovations from abroad.²

China's advances in defense modernization are most frequently characterized by knowledgeable Western analysts, both official and private, as "moderate" or "steadily improving but still unspec-

tacular."³ Many weapons systems in the PRC's current defense inventories still rely on the technology of the 1950's. This is due in part, of course, to economic constraints that have inhibited the growth of China's defense sector. But it is also due to traditional Chinese communist military production practices that valued simplicity over complexity. In effect, the Chinese have tended to favor "quick fix" methods for producing what they see as modern weapons systems rather than create a foundation for a more comprehensive, unified defense planning over the long term. As a result, Chinese defense planners have had little experience in coordinating production of both defense and civilian industries. This, in turn, has contributed to the creation of a redundant dual structure of civilian/military scientific and technological research and

¹ US Central Intelligence Agency analyst Sydney James has asserted, for example, that China has indeed advanced further toward military self-sufficiency than has any other Third World state, with its overall defense industry now ranking as the third largest in the world after the US and USSR, and producing a formidably wide range of weapons systems. See James, "Military Industry," in Gerald Segal and William T. Tow, Eds., *Chinese Defense Policy*, Urbana and Chicago, University of Illinois Press, 1984, p. 117.

² See especially the observations of Dennis Fred Simon, "The Role of Science and Technology in China's Foreign Policy," in Samuel S. Kim, Ed., *China and the World*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1984, pp. 293-318.

³ The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *United States Military Posture for FY 1983*, Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, 1982, pp. 42-43. Official US estimates of Chinese military spending trends are found in the testimony of Lt. Gen. James A. Williams, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), in Hearings before the US Congress Subcommittee on International Trade, Finance, and Security Economics of the Joint Economic Committee, *Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China—1982* (hereafter *Allocation of Resources* and year), June 29, 1982, Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, 1982, pp. 49, 104. Other estimates are provided by Research Institute for Peace and Security, *Asian Security 1982*, Tokyo, RIPS, 1982, p. 76, and by Leonard Sullivan, Jr., with Ellen L. Frost and David S. Holland, "Trade and Technology Transfers," in U. Alexis Johnson, George R. Packard, and Alfred D. Wilhelm, Jr., Eds., *China: Policy for the Next Decade*, Boston, Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1984, pp. 310-11.

William T. Tow is Assistant Professor at the School of International Relations, University of Southern California (Los Angeles). He is coeditor of several books on the Chinese military and Asia-Pacific security, including Chinese Defense Policy (1984).



Officers and men of the PLA in May 1985 wearing smart new uniforms with insignia.

—Lehtikuva Oy from Woodfin Camp.

development operations in which there is little spill-over from one sector to the other. Moreover, China's past failure to coordinate national research efforts with defense doctrine has produced, among other things, conspicuous gaps in military communications systems (C³I),⁴ in integrated circuit/computer production, in advanced battlefield electronics, and in engine/aircraft construction.

Whether China will succeed in transforming its strategic and conventional forces into a truly first-rate military power will be contingent on several factors. A key factor, not surprisingly, is the attitude of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership toward intellectuals. Although many technocrats seem to have advanced in the party and government hierarchies since the 12th Party Congress of September

1982, there is still some evidence suggesting a persistence of career party bureaucrats in positions of authority.⁵ But even if the party were to resolve this issue in favor of the technocrats, there is still the question of priorities in the current modernization drive. Will Chinese leaders accord military modernization sufficient priority in the PRC's overall quest for social and economic progress to develop and support a more streamlined defense force? Or will the CCP leadership continue its current dominant emphasis on agriculture and industry?

Another key factor is how effectively the military leadership can match China's current military doctrinal precepts with incoming technology and weapons systems. It is not at all self-evident that the

⁴ C³I refers to command, control, communications, and intelligence.

⁵ See, e.g., William deB. Mills, "Leadership Change in China's Provinces," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), May-June 1985, pp. 24-40.

Chinese will be able to proceed smoothly from their traditional military approach, which relied on political and psychological stratagems as well as on deception, to a doctrine more in tune with contemporary technological imperatives. One restraint is the still intensive struggle between Deng Xiaoping and his modernizers and those critics in the military leadership who oppose party efforts to streamline and restructure the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Thus far, Deng has gained the upper hand. In January 1985, for example, Yang Dezhi, the PLA's chief of the General Staff, announced the "retirement" of 40 high-ranking general staff officers, and two months later the PLA's Civil Affairs section announced the phased retirement of up to 80,000 veteran military officers.⁶ More importantly, influential Chinese leaders on both the CCP's Military Affairs Commission (MAC) and the state's Central Military Commission (CMC) have served notice that the Chinese military must be more efficient with less money. The short-term objective is to continue to reduce significantly the portion of the national budget that is earmarked for military outlays.⁷ In a sense, Deng is calculating that "weakness can be turned to advantage."⁸ In a setting where China is considerably weaker than its potential adversaries, Deng may find it easier to convince recalcitrant senior military figures, now sitting on powerless advisory bodies created in deference to their seniority, that the PRC's most urgent needs are technological and industrial progress.

Finally, the military technology assimilation process itself remains unsettled in China, due to both internal and external constraints. Internally, rivalry among various organizations, debate over how much outside

technology should be introduced into China's backward industrial base, and uncertainty as to how pure research should relate to applied knowledge in the research and development of military capabilities all complicate the science and technology (S&T) matrix as seen by Beijing's leadership. Externally, China's potential suppliers of advanced defense technology remain divided over what limitations should be imposed upon the world's largest communist nation. Strong ideological differences still exist, for example, between the United States and its allies on the one hand and Beijing on the other regarding the fate of Taiwan, the support of violent revolutions in the Third World, and how the development of market mechanisms should be pursued within a framework of national development.

Determination of the impact of science and technology on the scope and costs of PLA modernization, resolution of the innate contradiction between assimilating outside knowledge and retaining sovereign control, linking of doctrine with technical capabilities, and the surmounting of internal and external barriers to military-related S&T assimilation are all key challenges that confront the Chinese leadership. After a brief discussion of the PRC's institutional arrangements for the interplay of science and technology as it relates to the military, this essay will review the various options and barriers facing Chinese leaders in their efforts to modernize defense, then offer some speculations on how China can affect the global military balance if it manages S&T issues successfully.

S&T Institutional Arrangements

Throughout the PRC's existence, China's defense industrial system has been sharply segregated from its civilian counterpart. In recent years, however, it has become increasingly evident to Chinese leaders that such an institutional approach has failed to meet the challenge of external military threats or to utilize fully the nation's defense-related industrial infrastructure. The pragmatic leadership's remedy has involved organizational changes designed to integrate science and technology into a coordinated approach to civilian and military production, as well as efforts to bring about a break with past practices.

Traditionally, the Chinese military system had been accountable to the CCP, with the party's Military Affairs Commission acknowledged as the highest decision-making military body in China. At the 5th Plenum of the 5th National People's Congress (December 1982), however, a new governmental body—the Cen-

⁶ John F. Burns, "China Plans More Manpower Cuts in Military," *The New York Times*, Jan. 3, 1985; "Yang Dezhi on PLA Streamlining To Cut Costs," *China Daily* (Beijing), Jan. 4, 1985; "China Announces Mass Retirements in Military," *Mainichi Daily News* (Tokyo), Mar. 7, 1985; Clare Hollingworth, "Deng on Course, But Shoals Remain," *Pacific Defense Reporter* (Prahran, Australia), December 1984/January 1985, pp. 27-31.

⁷ The latest Chinese projections put the 1985 ratio of defense expenditure to the total state budget at 11.9 percent. See Beijing International Service, June 19, 1985, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-CHI*), June 21, 1985, p. K/15. Also see statement of Major General Schuyler Bissell, deputy director of DIA, in *Allocation of Resources—1983*, Part 9, June 28, 1983, Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, 1984. Bissell asserts that the PRC "believes that over the long run, industrial modernization is the only realistic alternative, with the military [leaders] having to wait for other sectors to develop first, before the high technology systems will be available to them." See also fn. 29.

⁸ Jonathan Pollack, "Rebuilding China's Great Wall: Chinese Security in the 1980s," in Paul H. B. Godwin, Ed., *The Chinese Defense Establishment*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1983, pp. 17-18. Pollack makes particularly salient comments concerning the political advantages that accrue to China's modernist faction as a result of the PRC's strategic weakness.

tral Military Commission—was established as part of Deng's plan to separate the policy jurisdictions between party and government.⁹ Deng serves as chairman of both commissions, thereby ensuring that his faction controls the Defense Ministry and China's other military organizations. One of the most significant changes that has resulted from this restructuring has been a precipitous decline in power of the General Political Department (GPD), the PLA's political arm that had served as the ideological watchdog of CCP policy.¹⁰ The GPD, now subordinate to the state rather than the party military commission, is no longer in a good position to challenge the policies of the party leadership.

In February 1983, party leaders took another step to consolidate China's defense organizational structure, merging the National Defense Industries Office (NDIO) and the National Defense Industries Committee (NDIC) with the government's National Defense Science and Technology Commission (NDSTC). The new body, known as the Commission on Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (NDSTIC), now acts as a clearinghouse for assessing defense-related research and development in the PRC and serves as the coordinating center for the PLA weapons procurement, research, and testing. Reportedly, the impact of the NDSTIC has been somewhat diluted, however, since its personnel tend to have political rather than technical or professional backgrounds and tend to lean more toward the party than toward the state military commission for decision-making guidance.¹¹

While the NDSTIC is vested with the overall authority for supervising the process of national defense industrialization, the cumbersome bureaucracies of relevant institutions, often working at cross-purposes, have largely stayed intact. For example, the Ministry of National Defense, which administratively answers to both the CMC and NDSTIC, is charged with defense budgeting, but not with the implementation of actual programs designed to run the PLA. That function is left to the PLA's General Departments: the General Staff Department; the General Political Department; and the General Logistics Department, which oversees the increasingly important aspects of testing existing PLA equipment. Moreover, six different ministries of machine building now operate outside the formal PLA structure, although they are still largely staffed by PLA personnel: Nuclear Industry, Aeronautics, Ordnance, Electronics, Space, and Shipbuilding. The net result of sustaining this variegated defense production hierarchy is that the ultimate responsibility for the success or failure of the defense industries

has rested on the shoulders of the individual, largely autonomous factory manager who has been isolated from both the more glamorous R&D institutions sponsored by the NDSTIC and the Chinese Academy of Sciences, which still jealously guards its prerogative for supervising all pure research in the country.¹²

China's topheavy defense industrial infrastructure can be traced to the PRC's experience with massive Soviet materiel and technological assistance extended between 1953 and 1959. In late 1952, shortly before Stalin's death, two machine-building ministries were created in China, one to produce civilian goods and the other to manufacture arms. The USSR closely monitored the development of heavy industry in China, supplying that sector with equipment and facilities as contracted for in technology transfer agreements. By the end of the decade, over 150 whole-plant projects were being supported with Soviet technological assistance, some 11,000 Soviet technicians were directly involved in plant start-ups and in related projects, and approximately 25,000 Chinese were dispatched to the USSR for advanced education and technical training. This heavy reliance on Soviet equipment and know-how left the Chinese with production and S&T infrastructures that had been largely shaped by Soviet planners.¹³

* There is some disagreement among analysts as to the relative importance of the two commissions and the allocation of responsibilities between them. For example, a respected Indian observer contends that of the two the CMC has been assigned more significance because the Ministry of National Defense now receives all military orders in its name. See Gidi Deshingkar, "PLA: Resister to Change," *China Report* (New Delhi), July-August/September-October 1984, p. 98. Wendy Frieman, however, argues that the MAC remains predominant because it retains responsibility for determining China's strategic concepts and for allocating resources to major manpower and hardware programs. See Frieman, "Foreign Technology and China's Weapons Acquisition Process," in Charles Lovejoy and Bruce Watson, Eds., *China and Its Military Modernization*, Boulder, CO, Westview, forthcoming.

¹⁰ The heyday of the GPD in terms of political influence was from 1977 to 1982, when it was under the guidance of party ideologue Wei Guoqing. Deng and his supporters were able to depose Wei in September 1982. The GPD's unsuccessful challenge to Deng's authority is aptly covered by Richard D. Nethercut, "Deng and the Gun: Party-Military Relations in the PRC," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley), August 1982, pp. 691-704; and idem, "Leadership in China: Rivalry, Reform, and Renewal," *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1983, pp. 30-46. Also see Research Institute for Peace and Security, *Asian Security* 1983, Tokyo, RIPS, 1983, p. 121.

¹¹ Frieman, loc. cit. Much of the following analysis is excerpted from Frieman or from Harlan W. Jencks, *From Muskets to Missiles*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1982.

¹² See John Frankenstein, "Weapon Development, Process, Program?" in Lovejoy and Watson, op. cit.; and Deshingkar, loc. cit., p. 98.

¹³ This taught Chinese leaders a lasting lesson on self-reliance when the Soviets decided to pull out of China in 1960 as ideological and diplomatic rifts between the USSR and the PRC widened. For background on the Sino-Soviet S&T relationship following Mao Zedong's ascension to power, see Denis Fred Simon, "China's Absorption of Foreign Technology: Prospects and Problems," in Norton Ginsberg and Bernard A. Lalor, Eds., *China: The 80s Era*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1984, pp. 328-29; as well as Daniel Wagner and David G. Barlow, "National Defense," in Frederica M. Bunge and Rinn-Sup Shinn, Eds., *China: A Country Study*, Washington, DC, Foreign Area Studies, The American University, September 1980, esp. pp. 494-95.

While it is fairly clear that the PRC's highly centralized defense production infrastructure has remained similar to that in the USSR, recent initiatives undertaken by Deng and the Chinese modernists reveal a determination to shake loose from such a model. In February 1985, the CCP Central Committee distributed a "National Defense Modernization" textbook to emphasize the need for CCP personnel to learn from the experiences of developed countries and to become more familiar with advanced military technology.¹⁴ The document, however, also emphasized that China "cannot blindly imitate America, the Soviet Union, and other developed countries and comprehensively run after them; it also cannot close itself to international intercourse and get bogged down."¹⁵

The "Chinese way" that is thus emerging consists of a determination to effect the integration of military and civilian production and to link military modernization to China's overall economic development. In early June 1985, the NDSTIC, along with the State Planning Commission, the State Economic Commission, and the State Scientific and Technological Commission, sponsored a planning session in Beijing to map out specific procedures for coordinating the defense-civilian production realms. Ding Henggao, minister of the NDSTIC, concluded in a statement following the conference:

The integration of the defense industry with civil industry and the transfer of military technology to civil use are not only necessary for civil industrial departments in maintaining their ability to undertake scientific research and production and fulfill their task in coordination with the defense industry; they are also effective ways to increase economic results and make more contributions to the state. When we really succeed in transferring military technology to civil use and in supporting the defense industry with civil industry, we will have a rich material foundation for the development of our defense industry.¹⁶

Just two months earlier, another authoritative article, in *Jingji Guanli* (Economic Management), called for the removal of apparently still "strict divisions" between the nation's civilian and defense enterprises

and for a similar reform to occur throughout the "entire (industrial) superstructure." Government departments were urged to work in a "unified manner" in order to strengthen macroeconomic guidance and dual production planning, and it was acknowledged that past inattention to ways products could be used for both civilian and military purposes had been too common:

We should arrange things so that, in accordance with the demands of the country, products can be used by both the military and civilians. In wartime, the industry should be able to put all of its strengths into guaranteeing the needs of the forces, while in peacetime, it should be able to make great contributions to the building of the national economy.¹⁷

The extent to which such aspirations are realized could well hinge upon how successful China's modernist leadership is in persuading nontechnical CCP personnel that they too have a long-term stake in a combined defense-civilian national modernization.

Defense S&T and Modernization

Ever since the 10-year program for China's Four Modernizations was publicly revealed in 1978, defense has vied with science and technology for third position in the country's overall modernization efforts (behind agriculture and industry). Interestingly, the majority of China's top military leaders seem to have accepted this low priority. For one thing, they apparently recognize that the PRC at present cannot afford to sustain the multibillion dollar expense needed to catapult China's weapons systems into strategic parity with the force inventories of the Soviet Union and the United States. For another, party leaders have been steadfast in their determination to match the superpowers' defense strength over the long term by creating the type of indigenous science/technology infrastructure that would enable the PRC to develop its own modern weapons inventories. Former Defense Minister Xu Xiangqian's October 1979 statement directing national defense efforts to be undertaken with existing weapons inventories, even as newer ones are being developed, has remained the CCP's policy for the gradual acquisition of

¹⁴ See *Introduction to National Defense Modernization* distributed by China Science and Technology Publishing House, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *China Report: Political, Sociological and Military Affairs* (Washington, DC—hereafter JPRS), No. 85011, Feb. 4, 1985, pp. 3–61.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

¹⁶ Quoted in Xu Jingyue, "Zhang Jingfu Attends Defense Industry Meeting," *New China News Agency* (Beijing—hereafter Xinhua), June 5, 1985, in *FBIS-CHI*, June 14, 1985, p. K/19.

¹⁷ Zhou Zhangqing, "Persist in Reform and Promote Military-Civilian Integration: A Few Ideas on Defense Industry Enterprises Changing to Integrated Military-Civilian Style Enterprises," *Jingji Guanli* (Beijing), Apr. 5, 1985, pp. 27–28, in *FBIS-CHI*, June 14, 1985, pp. K/17–19.

S&T relevant for advanced weapons design programs.¹⁸ Current Minister of Defense Zhang Aiping has reiterated this theme, stressing that the "fundamental way" to "develop and produce sophisticated military equipment" is "to rely on ourselves."¹⁹

What remains unclear is the extent to which China's defense planners have been able to delineate functions and interrelationships between ongoing military production efforts and current budget priorities, within the context of overall national development. "Mountain-topism" (*Shantou zhuyi*) and "back door clique behavior" on the part of China's decision-making elites, who tend to rely on their own political and social networks instead of operating through regular party or government channels, still constitute an integral part of domestic Chinese politics.²⁰ Integrating S&T and defense modernization elements into a strategic program designed to deter threats of "modern war" (that is, highly mechanized Soviet armies capable of being deployed across China's flat, open northern plains, or American submarine warfare capabilities) will require extensive reform of current management practices to overcome the barriers posed by Chinese elitism and bureaucratic inefficiency.

One way to ensure such integration would be to develop, or even institutionalize, better interplay between the national science budget—usually subsumed under the more general category of "social, cultural, and educational" expenditures—and defense funding. As it is, both pure and applied national research expenditures, either of a military or non-military nature, have declined following the Cultural Revolution.²¹ Indeed, the PRC's current underspending in S&T research and development would seem to contradict Chinese leaders' avowed long-term objective of matching Soviet and American military strength. Better resource management and bureaucratic reorganization would go far in correcting such deficiencies. As noted recently in the Shanghai-based journal *Shijie Jingji Daobao* (World Economic Herald) in this regard, China must "conscientiously study the condition of the organizational structure and production systems of the European and American countries [and then] formulate an outline of development for the early 21st century."²²

It is also uncertain what role an emerging generation of professional elites, who are distinguished by their understanding of foreign science and technology and its application to China's own research centers, will play in China's present modernization drive. The leadership's current emphasis on technical competence as a primary criterion for upward mobility is by no means an indication that China's young techno-

crats will continue to do well as the CCP struggles to adjust to changing conditions without undermining the basic principles of socialism, proletarian dictatorship, party leadership, and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. Inevitably, the "political cadre-cum-scientists" who attained their positions at China's universities and research institutes when ideological purity and "voluntarism" counted for far more than technical expertise will resist strong pragmatist trends to replace or retire them. Even Deng Xiaoping admitted in a recent interview with Western journalists that such opposition within the bureaucracy will obstruct China's modernization. He also noted that there are "problems with ideas of privilege, disrespect for science, overconcentration of power, and others."²³

A related issue regarding the relationship between S&T and military affairs is how the PLA "veteran officer corps" will respond to the latest series of government directives calling for the integration of the research and development (R&D) efforts by the civilian and military communities. Will the remaining "Long Marchers" or their subordinates cling to vested interests at the expense of moving toward cooperation with the civilians? Some evidence that this type of resistance still exists surfaces on occasion in the commentary of such official publications as *Jiefangjun Bao* (Liberation Army Daily) and *Renmin*

¹⁸ Harlan W. Jencks offers the most cogent analysis of this trend in *From Muskets to Missiles*, pp. 151–52. Also, see the analysis of recent statements by Deng Xiaoping concerning the adequacy of China's minimum nuclear deterrent for "buying time," in Christopher M. Clarke, "Defense Modernization," *The China Business Review* (Washington, DC), July–August 1984, pp. 40, 41; and Harvey W. Nelson, "Internal Management in the Armed Forces: Confucian Anachronism or Model for the 1980s?" in Godwin, op. cit., pp. 141–45.

¹⁹ "Zhang Aiping on National Defense Modernization," *Xinhua*, Feb. 28, 1983, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 1, 1983, pp. K/8–9. See also "Zhang Aiping Speaks on Defense Modernization," *Xinhua*, Feb. 28, 1983, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 2, 1983, pp. K/5–6; and *Hongqi* (Beijing), Mar. 1, 1983, pp. 21–24, in *JPRS*, No. 83318, Apr. 22, 1983, pp. 33–39. For a Western assessment, see Robert Delfs, "Swords Into Bicycles," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong—hereafter *FEER*), Aug. 25, 1983, pp. 91–92.

²⁰ An exceptional Western analysis of this problem is Jürgen Domes, "Intra-Elite Group Formation and Conflict in the PRC," in David S. G. Goodman, Ed., *Groups and Politics in the People's Republic of China*, Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1984, pp. 28–37. Domes contends that some key indications can be employed for recognizing intra-elite divergence from established government policies: terminological divergencies in CCP propaganda lines adopted by party or government organs under a particular elite's control, removal of specific elites from various party and governmental positions without the revoking of their party memberships, or, in more extreme cases, expulsion of certain elites from the party and the emergence of open rifts between elites.

²¹ For background, consult Richard P. Suttmeier, "'Moon-Ghetto' Problems in China's Alternative Scientific Futures," in Ginsberg and Lalor, op. cit., pp. 304–08.

²² Qian Xuesen, "On Understanding the New Scientific Revolution," *Shijie Jingji Daobao* (Shanghai), Apr. 19, 1984, in *JPRS*, No. 84019, June 27, 1984, p. 12.

²³ Interview of Deng Xiaoping by *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), in *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 24, 1980, p. C/20. Also see the comments of Leo A. Orleans, "Education, Careers, and Social Status," and Thomas Fingar, "Consequences of Catching Up," in a special section on Chinese science and technology, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (Chicago), October 1984, pp. 115–65.



Strategic missile troops pass in review on October 1, 1984, in a Beijing parade commemorating the 35th anniversary of the People's Republic of China.

—New China Pictures Company.

Ribao (People's Daily). For example, in a May 1984 article in *Jiefangjun Bao*, Deng Xiaoping is quoted as attacking "certain commands in the army" for attempting to "corrode" party directives concerning military modernization. Deng's open criticism was unpopular with many of the PLA's elites, who were doubly stung. By implication, Deng's criticism not only belittled the military's traditional role in nation-building, but also served as a cold reminder that defense modernization remains at the bottom of China's development priorities.²⁴

To be sure, Deng has extended some carrots to the PLA in order to counterbalance the many sticks of maintaining a hardline approach against PLA autonomy.²⁵ For example, he replaced civilian bureaucrat Geng Biao in November 1982 with military veteran Zhang Aiping as minister of defense, permitted more extensive military exercises, and ordered public displays of PLA military hardware on national holidays. It would be premature, however, to conclude that civil-military differences are about to be reconciled to a

point where defense-related S&T can readily span both sectors, or to assume that no important divisions between the civilians and the army will materialize under a post-Deng leadership.

S&T and the Sovereignty Problem

During 1977-82, the PLA's General Political Department—which is responsible among other things for maintaining the armed forces' discipline and morale and for publishing *Jiefangjun Bao*, the party's official PLA newspaper—served as a self-appointed watchdog over Deng's Four Modernizations program to en-

²⁴ "Enhance Party Spirit, Eliminate Factionalism," *Jiefangjun Bao* (Beijing), May 8, 1984, in *FBIS-CHI*, May 9, 1984, pp. K/14-15; "Building the Third Echelon Is a Strategic Task," *Jiefangjun Bao*, May 5, 1984, in *FBIS-CHI*, May 7, 1984, pp. K/11-12; and Colina MacDougall, "Peking Leadership Offers a Sop to China's Army after a Series of Public Rebukes," *Financial Times* (London), June 12, 1984.

²⁵ This point is well illustrated by Gerald Segal, "The Military as a Group in Chinese Politics," in Goodman, op. cit., pp. 87-88.

sure that economic planning conformed as much as possible to the orthodox tenets of Maoist theory.²⁶ Foremost among the GPD's concerns was preserving the inviolability of the Chinese state, unfettered by foreign domination. Thus, GPD officials pressed for less dependence on foreign equipment and cooperation and called for a "rectification of leadership performances."²⁷ To defuse these efforts, the CCP sought to depoliticize the PLA and to ensure the compliance of its ideologues with the ruling pragmatists' blueprint for the modernization of defense (as well as of other sectors). An important step in this strategy was the removal at the 12th Party Congress in September 1982 of Wei Guoqing as head of the GPD. Wei apparently had proven unable to keep the PLA press organs from taking too independent a line from party directives. He was replaced by Yu Qiuli, who has striven to modify the PLA's resistance to accepting foreign S&T assistance.²⁸

PLA officials have also been strikingly ineffective in lobbying for more military funding (since 1977, the military's percentage of the total national budget has declined from 17.9 to 13.1 percent)²⁹ or in establishing any real checks on the tendency of the pragmatists to assimilate foreign knowledge and acquire foreign equipment. Part of the PLA's ineffectiveness can be directly attributed to its somewhat contradictory perception of how rapidly advanced S&T should be absorbed into China's own defense infrastructure, a perception that could only have been reinforced by official party pronouncements on the role of "self-reliance" in China's current modernization drive. This was perhaps best illustrated by a 1982 essay published by *Hongqi*, the theoretical journal of the CCP Central Committee.

With our strong national defense forces, we are strong enough to defend the peaceful construction of

our people. . . . owing to our correct foreign policies, we enjoy high political prestige in the world, [but] our sources of funds are, after all, limited. . . . we must work hard and perseveringly rely on our own strength, maintain independence, and keep the initiative in our own hands. . . . We should not distort self-reliance and regard closing our country to international exchange and fighting in isolation as self-reliance. We must expand our field of vision from our country to the world on the basis of self-reliance. . . . This means, in fact, using the strong points of all countries in the world to offset our weakness.³⁰

The article concluded that two types of S&T imports were critical to China's future military and national survival: advanced equipment and equipment components; and "new and fine quality" materials that could then be "studied" by specialized task forces and reproduced internally. The article also identified three areas requiring special attention regarding the adaptation of Western technology to the Chinese context: the adoption of new principles of management and production; the assimilation of selective foreign "data and know-how"; and the application of such data and know-how to "scientific rules of operation."³¹

It is clear, given such guidelines, that the PLA has been instructed by China's current leadership to modernize in the most cost-effective way possible, seeking long-term self-reliance in defense while supplementing current Chinese military deficiencies through careful selections of foreign weapons technology. As noted above, to facilitate this policy, the CCP has moved to consolidate the machine-building industries, traditionally run by the PLA, into combined military-civilian production boards and has created new committees such as the NDSTIC to ease the military into a leaner, national (as opposed to regional), strategic decision-making infrastructure. In a sense, Deng, Zhang, and their pragmatist colleagues have attempted to induce modernization within the PLA in a way that the army was not able to do by itself.

Undoubtedly, pockets of resistance to the pragmatists' exhortations still exist. The heavy industrial sector still must resent the budget cutbacks in defense that were initiated after Lin Biao's downfall in September 1971, and various regional or district military commands are still reluctant to let go of obsolete equipment for fear that the eventual replacements may be

²⁶ See analysis of the GPD's recent history in David L. Shambaugh, "China's Defense Industries: Indigenous and Foreign Procurement," in Godwin, op. cit., pp. 47, 49; and William R. Heaton, "Professional Military Education in the People's Republic of China," in *ibid.*, pp. 123-24.

²⁷ Richard J. Latham, "The Rectification of 'Work Style': Command and Management Problems," in *ibid.*, pp. 90-91.

²⁸ Nethercut, "Deng and the Gun," pp. 691-704; and *idem*, "Leadership in China," pp. 30-46.

²⁹ Figures for China's military budget are found in Research Institute for Peace and Security, *Asian Security 1984*, Tokyo, RIPS, 1984, p. 92, and in *Allocation of Resources—1983*, pp. 172-73. According to DIA figures in the latter publication, China's announced defense expenditures rose from US\$14.9 billion (17.7 percent of the total state budget) in 1977 to \$22.3 billion (17.5 percent) in 1979, the year China invaded Vietnam, then declined in subsequent years to \$17.9 billion (15.7 percent) in 1982. Moreover, in a recent Chinese radio broadcast, the announced figure for the 1985 "ratio of defense expenditure to the total state budget" was given as 11.9 percent. See Beijing International Service, June 19, 1985, in *FBIS-CHI*, June 21, 1985, p. K/15.

³⁰ "On Questions Regarding Our Country: Economic Relations with Foreign Countries," *Hongqi*, Apr. 16, 1982, in *FBIS-CHI*, May 11, 1982, pp. K/6-7 (emphasis added).

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. K/10.

too complex for the average Chinese peasant/military conscript to operate.³² The present leadership also recognizes that the PRC's sovereignty will neither be permanently compromised by importing some advanced weapons systems in finished form, nor necessarily enhanced by pursuing "quick fix" methods (for example, reverse engineering or cannibalization) to copy such systems. Defense Minister Zhang has observed, after all, that if the PLA is content merely to copy, "we will only fall [further] behind others."³³

Western efforts to regulate technology flows into the PRC on the basis of its foreign policy and strategic behavior toward the USSR, as well as toward certain regions in the Third World, is another important dimension of the S&T/sovereignty issue. Chinese officials tend to view American pressure on Beijing to comply with international nuclear proliferation restraints as unwarranted infringements on China's sovereignty, especially when such compliance is made a precondition for entering into a nuclear energy production agreement or other accords dealing with the transfer of high technology to the Chinese.³⁴ The PRC also considers as hypocritical the United States's policy of adhering to "evenhanded" weapons transfer formulas relating to both the Mainland and Taiwan insofar as the Americans have already recognized the principle of "one China" with the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué. In essence, not only do China's pragmatists face the problem of reconciling their own institutions and traditional conceptions of sovereignty to a more effective absorptive capacity for "things foreign," but they must simultaneously and carefully assert their interpretation of sovereignty on frequently recalcitrant American and other would-be S&T suppliers without alienating them in the process.

S&T and Strategic Doctrine

Notwithstanding continued sales of conventional arms to Taiwan by the United States, or Washington's own increase in Seventh Fleet deployments off Pacific shores, the Soviet threat remains the paramount concern of Chinese military planners. The Soviets maintain nearly 1 million troops along China's northern border; have deployed 135 SS-20 missiles in the Far East, along with a number of recently deployed

"Backfire" and "Blinder" bombers capable of hitting most Chinese targets; and have opened major naval and air facilities in Vietnam, most notably at Cam Ranh Bay and Danang.³⁵ The nature of the Soviet threat—that is, the forward deployment of such a large number of highly mechanized and nuclear-capable forces that can undertake a rapid invasion—is not unlike the eventuality against which the Maoist strategy of People's War was intended to be used. Thus, this traditional strategy still has many adherents in the PLA command structure.³⁶ The PRC's continued "espousal of people's war under modern conditions," notes Paul Godwin, "represents not only a reluctance to depart from Mao's concepts of strategic defense, but also a recognition that some of the underlying principles of people's war do remain applicable to the military threat posed by the USSR."³⁷

How, then, have Chinese defense planners attempted to adapt military technology into China's overall strategic outlook? It is clear that if the classical Maoist strategy, as first expounded by Mao in "On Protracted War" in 1935, were strictly applied, military technology would play only a secondary role. A Sino-Soviet conflict, in this view, would be protracted, defensive, and fought on Chinese soil. The PLA's primary responsibility would be to develop supporting strategies and tactics for building an active defense (*jiji fangyu*) through the use of hit-and-run tactics and selective strikes along exterior lines (*wai xian*). Such tactics would be applicable to vast areas of Chinese territory and demand the quick shifting of China's defense forces in an effort to thwart a Soviet invasion of border regions such as Xinjiang and Manchuria or of other strategic areas. To be successful, such a defense would also require preventing either a surprise attack or effective use of superior combat technology, as well as disrupting the Soviet military's command and control structure. Positional warfare, in the classical Western sense, would play little or no role in this strategy, although selected Western technology could

³² For an especially comprehensive assessment of the Soviet buildup in the Far East, see Robert Y. Horiguchi, "Vigorous Soviet Buildup," *Pacific Defense Reporter*, December 1984/January 1985, pp. 33–37. Also see International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey 1984–1985*, London, IISS, 1984, esp. p. 87.

³³ This point is ably expanded upon by Banning N. Garrett and Bonnie S. Glaser in *War and Peace: The Views of Moscow and Beijing*, Berkeley, CA, Institute of International Studies, 1984, esp. pp. 120–30. Their analysis relies heavily on writings by analysts with the Beijing Institute for Strategic Studies.

³⁷ Godwin, "Mao Zedong Revised," p. 22. There has been little real deviation in Chinese strategic doctrine since the publication of a definitive *Jiefangjun Bao* article entitled "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," largely written by Mao and appearing in *Peking Review* on January 13, 1967, pp. 14–18. Most tellingly, this article contended that "no matter how modern weapons and technical equipment may advance and how complex modern warfare may be, people's war always remains our most effective weapon" (p. 14).

³² The author is indebted to Christopher M. Clarke for originally raising these observations for consideration.

³³ "Zhang Aiping on National Defense Modernization," loc. cit., pp. K/8–9.

³⁴ See Don Oberdorfer's incisive report, "Nuclear Pact with China Is Stalled in US," *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), July 16/17, 1984.



China's Soviet threat: at left, Soviet Frog tactical missiles in firing position during a drill in the Siberian Military District in January 1984; at right, soldiers drill with the BMP armored infantry combat vehicle in the Transbaikalian Military District in March 1981.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

be adapted for strengthening China's defensive credibility.

But recent revisions in the People's War doctrine have focused on the relevance of positional warfare and the need to defend China's industrial bases. Song Shilun, head of the PLA's Academy of Military Science, for example, has noted that the PLA is not capable of fighting the type of quick-shifting mobile warfare along exterior lines against invading Soviet forces envisioned in the People's War doctrine. To compensate for the PLA's limited mobility and inferior weapons, Chinese forces would have to fight positional defensive warfare during the initial stages of a war. The primary goal at this point of the battle would be to stabilize the defense. This would in turn force the enemy into a protracted war. Chinese forces, aided by mobile and guerrilla units, could then counter-attack effectively, drawing on a logistical support base secured in rear staging areas.³⁸

The defense of Chinese cities—the industrial bases on which the PLA must depend for logistical support—is also an integral component of "People's War under modern conditions." Yet, to implement this new doctrinal approach will require modern and sophisticated military equipment, modern logistics, efficient C³, and highly trained personnel. Otherwise, the PLA will be relegated to strategy and tactics more applicable to "People's War" as traditionally defined and

to the prospect of losing the PRC's industrial heartlands in the process.³⁹ China's Academy of Military Science has summarized the challenge of merging doctrinal reform with the upgrading of China's military technology:

The key issue of the modernization of our armed forces is to build them into a modernized and regularized revolutionary army through the development of military science and technology. We must think independently and not run after the foreigners, since our situation is different from those foreign countries. For example, we are still very poor. How exactly should we equip our country's army? We should fully utilize modern science and technology, encouraging the strong and avoiding the weak points. The main spirit is to think independently and lay down our policies and ways. Otherwise, we should exhaust our limited funds for equipment without being able to produce high combat effectiveness. That would be a serious mistake.⁴⁰

³⁸ Song Shilun, "Mao's Military Thinking Is the Guide to Our Army's Victories," *Hongqi*, Aug. 16, 1981, pp. 5–15, in *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 17, 1981, pp. K/10–23. Also see Godwin, "Mao Zedong Revised," pp. 30–31.

³⁹ This point is ably addressed in Deshingkar, loc. cit.

⁴⁰ "Qian Xuesen's Military Science and Technology—Report on Qian Xuesen's Conversation with the Commander of the Academy of Military Science," in *Xitong Gongcheng Lilun yu Shijian* (Beijing), No. 2, 1983, p. 1, in *JPRS*, No. 460, Sept. 29, 1983, pp. 92–93.



A Chinese guided missile unit during a drill.

— New China Pictures Company.

But the costs of procuring an extensively modernized conventional defense along Western lines with an ultimate reliance on rapid mobilization, fire power, and technological supremacy could bankrupt China if it tried to modernize at too quick a pace.⁴¹ It is almost inevitable, therefore, that Chinese leaders will attempt to leap-frog certain deficiencies in capabilities by merging a few aspects of modern warfare with a minimum nuclear deterrent. The combining of electronics and nuclear technology stands out as the probable key element in this general strategic approach.⁴² In this way, modern technology could be incorporated

into Chinese deterrent and defensive postures without losing flexibility.⁴³ Defense planners could then analyze specific situations and try to determine what the proper mix should be between self-reliance and foreign purchase, whether to plan for limited or general war, and whether to emphasize offensive or defensive military actions within the overall framework of People's War. The incorporation of updated technology into the PLA's military operations and force inventories could thus be determined on a case-by-case basis, gauged to enhance deterrent capabilities applicable to China's "empty spaces" in the north and west of the country, and to foster eventual self-reliance in the production of new weapons systems.⁴⁴

Achieving strategic doctrinal credibility through the most cost-effective means possible seems to be the operative guideline in China's current technological outlook. As GPD head Yu Qiuli recently characterized the problem, military capabilities and improved logistics are best gained by exercising "maximum efficiency over limited funds." But "new developments in weaponry and equipment," he emphasized, do not alter the two "fundamental factors determining . . . defeat or victory in war," that is, "the nature of war and the desires of the people." Under such conditions, and because China could not afford to buy from foreigners all the weapons it needed, Yu concluded that China would move to "rely on its own efforts" in developing modern armaments. "Even if we could afford it," he continued, "it is hard to acquire really advanced weapons of military value."⁴⁵

If the PRC's minimum nuclear deterrence posture were ultimately to lose credibility in the eyes of either superpower, Chinese defense planners would have to shift the focus of China's strategic outlook to one of "total war." Key components of this new strategy would be an emphasis on the swift destruction of enemy targets at an initial stage of battle; ensuring high levels of troop mobility along exterior lines; upgrading methods of stockpiling and weapons maintenance; and strengthening the PLA command and control structure through better intelligence, reconnaissance, and electronic surveillance. Recent Chi-

⁴¹ For background on dilemmas the PRC faces in opting for "quick fix" purchases of modern weapons systems in relation to costs, see Thomas Robinson, "Chinese Military Modernization in the 1980s," in US Congress Joint Economic Committee, *China Under the Four Modernizations*, Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, 1982, pp. 590-96. Also see Ronald G. Mitchell, "Chinese Defense Spending in Transition," in *ibid.*, pp. 605-10.

⁴² For a definitive PRC Academy of Military Science study on technological needs, see *Xitong Gongcheng Lilun yu Shijian*, No. 2, 1983, p. 1, in *JPRS*, No. 84439, Sept. 29, 1983, pp. 92-93. For a Western assessment of Chinese interest in high-technology warfare studies, see Tony Walker, "China Studies Lessons of Falklands Electronic Warfare," *Financial Times*, Aug. 6, 1982, and "Chinese Officers Study New Warfare," *The Japan Times* (Tokyo), Jan. 19, 1982.

⁴³ China's Academy of Military Science, for example, is reported to be weighing how the "unified battlefield" approach incorporating electronic warfare—with an emphasis on close combat firing, synchronized fire support, and precisely integrated C³I—can be incorporated into the types of combat maneuvers most closely associated with traditional PLA defensive operations.

⁴⁴ These points are especially well developed by Alfred D. Wilhelm, Jr., in "National Security—The Chinese Perspective," in Johnson, Packard, and Wilhelm, op. cit., pp. 205-08, 212-15.

⁴⁵ Interview with Yu Qiuli, "Modernization of National Defense and Building of the People's Army," *Beijing Review*, Aug. 1, 1983, pp. 14, 15.

nese writings on strategic defense have emphasized all these factors as emerging characteristics in modern warfare.⁴⁶ Yet, there is still almost no discussion in the open Chinese literature about whether defense planners will rely on indigenous PRC military capabilities or on outside military technology to fulfill these prerequisites.

Whether such uncertainty is the result of imprecise or poor planning or of lack of Western analysts' access to important information is unclear. Nonetheless, a diagnosis of recent patterns of Chinese military behavior and technological acquisition suggests a vague and unfocused series of efforts by the Chinese leadership to revise China's strategic doctrine and blueprints. For example, although the PLA established a separate strategic land-based missile wing in mid-1984, it remains uncertain what relationship this wing has with the Second Artillery Corps, which was the PRC's original strategic missile element. A PLA spokesman would say only that the new missile wing was necessary because of "rapid advances in military technology," which in turn affirmed the need for the PRC "to raise its [nuclear] attack capability."⁴⁷ China also has concentrated on building up its SSBN (ballistic-missile nuclear submarine) solid-fuel technology as well as related ballistic-missile submarine components. Although their approach may be somewhat piecemeal, it is clear that Chinese defense planners understand China's need to master a critical requirement of modern warfare: the fusing of conventional tactical firepower and C³I with nuclear components for modern warfare conditions.

A related problem confronting the PLA's central authorities is how best to disperse Chinese battlefield (tactical) nuclear weapons and delivery systems to military regional commanders who, because of deep-seated regionalism and slack central control, have traditionally been unaccustomed to compliantly accepting directives from the national command authority.⁴⁸ Yet such compliance is crucial because from the outset of any battle, the enemy's warfighting capability and strategic targets must be destroyed by such regional deployments as part of the "active defense" component of People's War under modern conditions. One of the primary objectives of such deployments is

the attrition and annihilation of China's military adversary through resistance against frontal attacks by combined nuclear and conventional counterattacks against the opponents' homeland. Such Chinese nuclear retaliation would inevitably involve the completion of highly sophisticated targeting and communications missions, including the synchronous firing of (land-based and sea-based) ballistic missiles, the coordination of advanced telecommunications and computer networks, and the use of related technology that is now available to China only through Western sources.

If China succeeds in acquiring such defense technology, most Western analysts estimate that by the end of the century Beijing could have in its arsenal approximately 150 multiple, independently targeted (MIRVed) strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDV's), which would give the PRC a significant minimum nuclear deterrent against either the USSR or the United States.⁴⁹

From a warfighting perspective, both the Chinese and their most likely antagonist in a general conflict, the Soviets, have stressed the importance of protracted war and of combat readiness for post-nuclear phases of warfare. In recent Chinese strategic writings, however, defense planners have placed increased emphasis on the development of new weapons, the recognized utility of strategic surprise, and the enlarged geographic scope as well as reduced timespans now inherent in conflicts at strategic levels. At least some military literature in the PRC is now openly concluding that such factors "indicate that in modern warfare, the battles in the *initial* stage will play a more important role than ever before in winning the initiative of the war and in its later development."⁵⁰

What remains questionable, however, is the extent to which China can incorporate the technology necessary to allow it to compete on equal terms at the outset of strategic conflict. Such a prospect seems remote as long as the PRC's military modernization program continues to be relegated to last place behind agriculture, industry, and civilian technology under the current five-year plan. The fiscal price for

⁴⁶ For example, see a remarkable document written by Zong He, a researcher for the Beijing International Strategic Problems Society, entitled "Tentative Discussion on the Characteristics of Modern Warfare," in *Shijie Zhishi* (Beijing), Aug. 1, 1983, in *JPRS*, No. 84508, Oct. 11, 1983, pp. 78-88, which addresses all of these strategic considerations in relatively sophisticated terms by Western standards.

⁴⁷ "PLA Forms Missile Group," *China Daily*, June 13, 1984.

⁴⁸ Gerald Segal, "China's Nuclear Posture for the 1980s," *Survival* (London), January/February 1981, p. 15.

⁴⁹ Analysis of China's developing SSBN deterrent is offered by Bradley Hahn, "China in the SLBM Club," *Pacific Defense Reporter*, February 1984; and David G. Muller, Jr., *China as a Maritime Power*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1983, pp. 172-75, 225-27. Hahn asserts that China felt the "absolute necessity" to obtain direct West European, US, and Japanese technical support for building its own strategic naval programs before the end of this century, while Muller cites a 1979 issue of *Jianchuan Zhishi* (Guangzhou) which speculates about second-strike nuclear deterrence capabilities of Chinese SSBN's in the event that Chinese land-based nuclear forces became neutralized.

⁵⁰ Zong He, loc. cit., p. 79 (emphasis added).

attaining those strategic and conventional weapons systems in sufficient quantity for China to seize the initial advantage in a strategic conflict against either superpower is perhaps intolerably high, considering China's present economic base. On the other hand, if Beijing were to abandon its preference for protracted warfare and pursue openly a great power military posture, the USSR might once again contemplate, as it reportedly did during 1969–71, a preemptive nuclear strike against Chinese weapons sites and/or production centers most threatening to the USSR.⁵¹

Some Western analysts fear that the liberalization of current US technology transfer policies toward China could provide Beijing with information or equipment (such as advanced computer and electronic gear) that will enable the Chinese to enhance C³I over their nuclear forces. This might encourage PLA commanders to fight the Soviets at the nuclear level, and, in turn, prompt the Soviets once more to weigh seriously the advantages of preemptive strikes against Chinese nuclear sites and installations.⁵² When in June 1985 West Germany agreed to sell the PRC four nuclear reactors, the main fear of the opponents of the sale was that German nuclear engineering assistance and spent reactor fuel sent to China as part of the agreement could be instrumental in enhancing China's own nuclear force inventories.⁵³

A Chinese strategic buildup could possibly alarm both superpowers, thereby negating whatever long-term benefits may have been gained by gradually assimilating the costs of a military buildup within the nation's overall modernization drive. Thus, an accelerated buildup would not only disrupt the Chinese leadership's current development program, it would also undermine seriously the PRC's preferred policy of maintaining a balanced approach between strategic self-reliance and strategic interdependence with other anti-Soviet forces around the world. As Thomas Robinson has speculated, the USSR may feel compelled to widen the gap of strategic capabilities between its own forces and the PLA, with the result that "China could be even more beholden to foreign assistance and military ties than is now the case."⁵⁴

The safer middle ground for China's military-force planners would be to continue developing relatively cheaper, regional "warfighting" nuclear components in the form of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM's)—primarily the CSS-2—in lieu of a much more costly and more risky array of modern conventional forces and exotic nuclear systems over the next decade. But the axioms of People's War and protracted warfare have actually compelled the Chinese to move toward development of "state-of-the-art" nuclear and conventional military technology in anticipation of China having to fight in a postnuclear milieu, complete with second-strike capabilities and intact command systems. As one Western observer has characterized the Chinese situation, "Maoist doctrine continues to be relevant, rooted in the geopolitical nature of China herself."⁵⁵

Research and Assimilation

Although China still leans unmistakably toward self-reliance in military technology, several factors have worked to mitigate the PRC's complete adherence to that goal. First, Beijing recognizes that while it struggles to narrow the S&T "learning curve" compared to more developed nations, newer and more exotic weapons systems are continually being developed and refined elsewhere, thereby widening that curve in relation to China's own capabilities over time. Similarly, as the advanced countries retain or increase their lead over the PRC in civilian technology, it becomes more likely that the PRC will fall further behind since there will inevitably be "spillover" from the foreigners' civilian sector into their national military capacity.⁵⁶

On a different plane, as the PRC increases its acquisitions of the latest technologies through co-production and special licensing arrangements with Western industrial countries, it is likely that Chinese xenophobia will somewhat decrease. Since the early 1970's, China has increasingly gained access to the international pool of technical knowledge by entering into arrangements with other nations to acquire S&T information at a volume that far exceeds its interaction with the USSR in the 1950's. In summarizing the PRC's history of tapping foreign S&T expertise,

⁵¹ During 1969–71, Soviet leaders apparently contemplated such preemption, but were forestalled by stern US warnings and by lukewarm support on the part of their Warsaw Pact allies. H. R. Haldeman mentions this episode in his memoirs, *The Ends of Power*, New York, Times Books, 1978.

⁵² See Robert G. Sutter, "Chinese Nuclear Weapons and American Interests," *Congressional Research Service Review* (Washington, DC), January 1984, pp. 9–11.

⁵³ "Beijing To Buy 4 Reactors," *The Los Angeles Times*, June 11, 1985; and Dennis Phillips, "Peking Picks KWU, Says Bonn," *China Trade Report* (Hong Kong), May 1985, p. 1.

⁵⁴ See Robinson's testimony in *China Under the Four Modernizations*, p. 591.

⁵⁵ Segal, "China's Nuclear Posture," p. 13.

⁵⁶ These arguments are weighed in sophisticated terms by Jon Sigurdson, *Technology and Science in the People's Republic of China*, Elmford, NY, Pergamon Press, 1980, pp. 4–5.

Dennis Fred Simon has noted that the "political competition" in China between the radical economic nationalists and those favoring economic intercourse with outside powers produced a "pattern of alternating shifts between periods of extreme self-reliance and selective foreign borrowing," which resulted in "the uneven pattern of industrial growth that has characterized the Chinese economy over the past 30 years."⁵⁷

Currently, as several respected Western analysts have noted, China could opt for one of two S&T military development courses. On the one hand, Chinese leaders could choose to emulate the United States, the USSR, and Gaullist France in those nations' determination to use national research and development efforts to enhance national defense and heighten their international prestige and standing. On the other hand, the PRC could opt for an approach similar to that adopted in Japan, in which research and development is closely linked to market forces. In this approach, economists and civilian technocrats predominate in society, and leaders rely on an incremental, functionally oriented strategy in which newly acquired technologies are earmarked for marketing or for long-term investment planning. According to more than one Western analyst, although China seemingly has followed the first course, there are solid indications that some Chinese leaders would like to move in the direction of the second course.⁵⁸ China's recent decision at an October 1984 Central Committee plenum meeting to lift centralized price controls and to reduce economic planning by the state indicates that Deng and his pragmatist colleagues have struck a decisive blow against tendencies favoring accelerated military expenditures at the expense of S&T development in other sectors.⁵⁹

In essence, the PLA has apparently accepted the prospect of China buying at least a few current weapons system end-products from US or other Western sources to correct its major deficiencies against a short-term Soviet combined conventional/theater nuclear threat. Leading military officials have most likely endorsed the activities of such bodies as the Chinese Working Group on Sino-American Military

Technical Cooperation Negotiations, acting under the NDSTIC, and similar Chinese delegations now bargaining with West European defense firms.⁶⁰ For example, during visits to Beijing by US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger (February and September 1983), Secretary of the Navy John Lehman (August 1984), and US Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman John Vessey (January 1985), China's military establishment asked to buy some 65 to 70 American items, including TOW anti-tank guided missiles and HAWK surface-to-air missiles. And in January 1985, the United States reportedly agreed to modernize elements of China's navy, as well as its air and anti-tank defenses.⁶¹ The quid pro quo for the PLA's acquiescence to the leadership's desire to purchase some advanced weapons components from abroad may well be greater deference to PLA missions and needs over the rest of this century.

To a great extent, the ultimate choice will be determined by external factors over which China may have limited control. The case of the Coordinating Committee of the Consultative Group on Export Controls to Communist Nations (COCOM) is illustrative in this regard. Many European COCOM members, as well as Japan, have often been reluctant to approve Chinese military purchases from the United States, for fear of antagonizing the USSR, against whom COCOM still exercises comparatively tighter controls.⁶² Some observers, however, are concerned about a different problem. Richard Holbrooke, former assistant secretary of state for East Asia and the Pacific, recently noted that COCOM now spends "the overwhelming percentage of its time reviewing applications for China; it doesn't even review exports to two of the Soviet Union's closest allies, Cuba and Vietnam."⁶³ And recent liberalization of the US Munitions Control

⁵⁷ See Richard E. Gillespie, "Marketing the PLA," *The China Business Review*, July-August 1984, pp. 34-35.

⁵⁸ See, e.g., Daniel Southerland and Fred Hiatt, "U.S. Arms Sales to Help China Modernize Navy," *The Washington Post*, Jan. 12, 1985. The potential for miscalculation in Sino-American military relations, however, was made evident soon after Vessey completed his talks with Chinese leaders. Because of unresolved issues concerning the nuclear or nonnuclear status of weapons aboard US ships, Beijing decided to cancel a long-planned port call of the *USS Midway* and an accompanying task force to Qingdao and then barred a downgraded visit of Spruance-class destroyers to Shanghai. See Nayan Chanda, "No Boat to China," *FEER*, May 30, 1985, pp. 14-15; and Julian Baum, "Proposed U.S. Navy Port Call to China Has Run Aground for Now," *The Christian Science Monitor*, May 15, 1985.

⁵⁹ Simon, "The Role of Science and Technology . . .," pp. 307-12, offers a sophisticated assessment of this policy dilemma. For Japan's COCOM diplomacy, see William T. Tow, "US-Japan Military Technology Transfers: Collaboration or Conflict?" in *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies* (Washington, DC), December 1983, pp. 14-18.

⁶⁰ Richard Holbrooke, "The Drag on Sino-U.S. Trade," *The Asian Wall Street Journal* (Hong Kong), Feb. 26, 1985.

⁵⁷ Simon, "China's Absorption . . .," p. 328. Also see A. Doak Barnett and Francois Godement, "Science and the Struggle Between Two Lines," in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Ed., *Science and Technology in the People's Republic of China*, Paris, OECD, 1977, pp. 204-16.

⁵⁸ For example, see Suttmeier, loc. cit., pp. 316-25.

⁵⁹ Jim Mann, "China Radically Alters Economy," *The Los Angeles Times*, Oct. 21, 1984; and a preliminary report by Mark Baker on Chinese increased willingness to boost fixed assets investment, "China Plans Boost to Capital Investment in Energy Transport," *Financial Times*, Aug. 17, 1984.



General John W. Vessey, Jr., Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, meets with Chinese servicemen in the Shenyang Military Region in northeastern China during a January 1985 visit.

—US Department of Defense.

List in China's case to the point where Beijing is now classified as a "friendly power" (Category V) by American security planners complicates COCOM planning even further, insofar as the US criteria now must be matched with COCOM's own lists relating to military items, atomic energy, and high technology industrial items that may have "dual use" (civilian and military) application.⁶⁴

In July 1984, the dilemma posed by this "China differential" among the Western allies was highlighted when COCOM officials announced new measures to tighten controls significantly over the export of advanced computer components to the Soviet bloc. However, no intra-Committee consensus was reached on whether to apply any such controls to China and, if so, how.⁶⁵ This merely magnified what was already an increasingly complex and often unwieldy procedure for dealing with China. Many

license applicants experience lengthy delays awaiting COCOM sanction of their products to be exported to the PRC, and some COCOM members bypass the committee's channels outright by selling certain items through backdoor channels in Hong Kong. A major source of the problem, according to US Department of Defense and other security agencies, is that COCOM is underfunded, understaffed, and under-supported by member-nations.⁶⁶ This, in turn, has

⁶⁴ See Madelyn C. Ross, "Export Controls: Where China Fits In," *The China Business Review*, May-June 1984, pp. 58-62; and Shambaugh, loc. cit., pp. 73-75.

⁶⁵ "Concern Rises over COCOM," *China Trade Report*, September 1984, pp. 12-13; and Paul Mann, "COCOM Agrees on Export of Computers," *Aviation Week & Space Technology* (New York), July 23, 1984, pp. 21-22.

⁶⁶ See, e.g., Richard N. Perle, "The Strategic Implications of West-East Technology Transfer," *Adelphi Papers*, No. 190, London, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Summer 1984, p. 24.

tended to create an "ad hoc" COCOM control system which China can manipulate to its advantage. There is new evidence, however, that trends for more uniform Western application of export controls are finally emerging.⁶⁷ But any such uniformity would inevitably be viewed by Beijing as a potential basis for infringement on its "sovereign right" to acquire S&T in the international market place.

More likely, China and the West will both discern reciprocal strategic benefits in maintaining a *laissez faire* posture toward the trade and technology transfer issue, at least for the near future. Political relations could be strengthened in ways that could temper the propensity to deal with Moscow, a third party that both the PRC and the industrial democracies distrust highly. The West also might well proceed on the assumption that the same interrelated economic and social patterns that drew Japan into the Western orbit after World War II could exercise a similar pull on China's pragmatists, who are now actively seeking highly beneficial market relationships. Thus, technology transfer could become a long-term instrument of persuasion used by the United States, Japan, and other actors increasingly dealing with China. The potential for this is evidenced by Beijing's continued efforts to reap the benefits of the 1979 and 1984 US-PRC science and technology agreements, including more predictable access to superior American physics, electronics, and nuclear power production methods.

The S&T factor, moreover, could largely offset intermittent frictions in Sino-American relations caused by the Taiwan question and by conflicting policies toward the Third World. The S&T conduit could also ameliorate ideological differences between Chinese and Western societies insofar as each side could point to positive aspects of the technology flow—for China, as a concrete indication of the efficacy of Deng's post-Maoist variant of orthodox Marxism; for the West, as an effective lure for attracting a Marxist state toward a more capitalist path.⁶⁸

The absence of consensus among members of the

Western alliance on S&T transfer to China, however, may preclude the attainment of such benefits if the West's export control policy toward Beijing becomes linked with that directed toward Moscow, or if the controls that do exist are applied inconsistently. Also, the alliance may be undermined if some of its members place short-term commercial gains above unity in their dealings with China.

The Geopolitical Outlook

Many American and European strategic planners clearly envision a gradual evolution of at least tacit Sino-Western collective defense ties formidable enough to contain Moscow's military activities in the Far East.⁶⁹ However, because of proximity to China and experience with Chinese activities in the past, these planners' Asian-Pacific counterparts remain less enthusiastic about such prospects. ASEAN leaders, for example, have sharply contested US arguments about the strategic benefits of allowing Beijing access to Western economic and technological prowess by pointing out that a prosperous, more economically advanced China would also be a militarily independent China capable of endangering the security of Southeast Asia. An independent, powerful China, they claim, might actively challenge the growing Soviet power in the region or support insurgency movements in neighboring countries more effectively than it did during the era of decolonization some two decades ago.⁷⁰ While the prospect of either China or Japan, or both, embarking on high levels of military modernization remains unattractive to many Asian states, it is anathema to the USSR. The USSR's land mass straddles the Asian continent, and Moscow has warned repeatedly that continued US or Western military-related sales to China would eventually be turned into a "high military risk" for the selling parties as well as the recipient.⁷¹

The prospects of Chinese pilots flying military patrols along the Sino-Soviet or Sino-Vietnamese borders in either Bell or Sikorsky helicopters or in advanced jet fighters co-produced by China and the United States would seem to appeal to many American strategic planners as a way to counterbalance growing Soviet and Vietnamese military power throughout East and Southeast Asia. More formidable Chinese defenses in East Asia would also serve to keep one-fourth of the USSR's total military power deployed east of the Urals, thereby lessening Moscow's opportunities to disrupt the rough military bal-

⁶⁷ See *ibid.*

⁶⁸ These points are analyzed in depth by Sullivan with Frost and Holland, *loc. cit.*, pp. 279, 315.

⁶⁹ See, e.g., Michael Pillsbury, "U.S.-China Military Ties," *Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC), Fall 1975, pp. 50-64; and the testimonies of various US Department of Defense officials in US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *The Implications of U.S.-China Military Cooperation*, Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, 1982.

⁷⁰ See, e.g., the remarks of Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad to visiting US Secretary of State George P. Shultz as reported by Bernard Gwertzman, "Shultz Warned by Malaysia on Supporting China Growth," *International Herald Tribune*, July 10, 1984.

⁷¹ For recent Soviet comments on this matter consult David Buchan, "Soviet Warning Over US Sales to China," *Financial Times*, July 2, 1984.



China's Defense Minister Zhang Aiping and US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger at Pentagon ceremonies on June 11, 1984.

—US Department of Defense.

ance now existing in central Europe. Such power calculations become strained, however, when Western analysts recall that Deng Xiaoping's economic modernization programs are specifically geared toward making China a first-rank, *independent*, and *non-aligned* global power, equidistant from both the USSR and the United States. While the PRC still probably fears Soviet military power more than that of the United States, it seems prudent to recall that a Chinese Communist ideologue of good standing still remains wary of the West's economic and political system as well.

As China moves toward procuring components directly related to its strategic missile programs, ground and air defenses, and armored mobility, Western defense planners may be forced into the uncomfortable position of revising their now confident estimates that high technology transfers to the PRC can be managed to the West's ultimate benefit. In fact, statements such as those recently attributed to Presidential Science Adviser George Keyworth that "facilitating China's missile trajectory calculations hardly compromises our own strategic interests" would seem to be, at best, premature.⁷² Washington quite obviously made the commitment to sell arms to China on the premise that the types of weapons systems involved are for defensive purposes against invading

Soviet armies. Yet, in recent diplomatic settings, Beijing has actually downgraded the possibility of a Soviet attack. This easing of Sino-Soviet tensions is seen in some quarters as cause for concern. Thomas Robinson has warned that "as China increases its military might and economic power over the next two decades," it probably "will not merely seek equality with the superpowers, but will assertively demonstrate its power beyond legitimately defensive purposes." And, according to Robinson, "the US will be partially responsible" for the resulting altered "military balance of power" in Asia.⁷³ Moreover, it is wise to recall the conceptual trap into which the USSR fell into during the 1950's, when Moscow assumed that it was possible to apply technology transfers to China so discriminately that Beijing would find it impossible to develop more threatening military capabilities from seemingly benign sources.

It is also useful to keep in mind that regardless of how China finally decides to integrate foreign technology into its military modernization efforts, the national dimension of any Chinese strategic policy will continue to be emphasized by Chinese decision-makers. Visions of Chinese leaders readily or willingly conforming to the best-case scenarios of American strategists and others favoring closer US-PRC military ties on the basis of building a new anti-Soviet collective defense system are not likely to be fulfilled. Above all, China's leaders are convinced that modern defense technology must ultimately fit into the PLA's higher purpose of preserving China's revolutionary traditions and responding to "national conditions" of culture, ideology, and politics. Within such a framework, the goal of self-reliance seems not only logical but absolutely essential to the objectives of the Chinese state. Yet, China's self-perceived historical roots do at times clash with what its leadership recognizes as a new "international situation." In this setting, China's lack of advanced technology will leave it unable to solve a host of domestic political, managerial, and logistical challenges. How well China gauges the interplay of modern strategy and technology will be largely determined by how adept that country's pragmatists will be in neutralizing domestic resistance to interacting with those external sources best able to provide China with potential instruments of power.

⁷² As quoted in "Softer Line on Hardware," *China Trade Report*, July 1983, p. 8.

⁷³ See Robinson, "Boosting China's Military: Lessons for Washington," *FEER*, June 13, 1985, p. 28. See also "A Meeting of Military Minds," *Asia Week* (Hong Kong), Jan. 25, 1985, p. 18; and RIPS, *Asian Security* 1984, pp. 98-99.

Soviet-CEMA Energy Ties

John M. Kramer

The energy crisis that socialist countries once boasted could only afflict the capitalist world is now a fact of life for the East European members of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (Comecon, or CEMA), who find themselves increasingly reliant on the Soviet Union to cover growing domestic energy gaps.¹ Much to their dismay, moreover, the USSR in 1982 abruptly announced that it would reduce the quantities of crude oil delivered to Eastern Europe in the years 1982–85 by 10 percent from planned levels.² Energy relations have broad implications for the internal political and economic welfare of the East European states, for their relations with Moscow within the CEMA context, and for their ties with nonsocialist states.

Eastern Europe possesses relatively few primary energy reserves, particularly of liquid fuels, and these have proved inadequate to meet the enormous increase in energy consumption that the region has experienced since 1945. Existing reserves in the region are distributed unevenly, with Romania possessing more than 80 percent and 40 percent, respectively, of the oil and natural gas reserves, while Poland accounts for over 90 percent of the reserves of hard coal and 40 percent of the reserves of brown coal and

lignite. East European states also use existing energy reserves very inefficiently—a consequence of their reliance upon coal with low caloric content, the use of obsolete machinery, a predominance of energy-intensive industries, and a planning system that stresses gross output over efficiency.³ Consequently, since 1960, the region has experienced a rapidly widening “energy gap” wherein indigenous energy consumption exceeds indigenous energy production. By 1979, Poland was the only state in the region that was capable of producing more energy than it consumed (see Table 1).

The resolution of the region’s energy problems has now become a primary preoccupation of CEMA. The CEMA Council has elaborated numerous initiatives to this end involving the commitment of enormous resources by member states. Not surprisingly, these initiatives have engendered considerable—often acrimonious—debate as individual states assess the merits of alternative proposals, argue about the distribution of benefits and burdens accompanying different initiatives, and generally seek to maximize their own political and economic interests, often to the detriment of their nominal partners. A Yugoslav source did not exaggerate when it characterized the decision-making process within Comecon as a “marathon struggle between national and joint interests.”⁴

¹ The Dec. 12, 1980, issue of *Népszava* (Budapest) conceded “We deluded ourselves for too long with the thought that the energy crisis only affects the capitalist workers and that its effect could not cross the border.”

² As reported in *The Washington Post*, May 24, 1982.

³ For a detailed assessment of the region’s primary energy reserves, see John Haberstroh, “Eastern Europe: Growing Energy Problems,” in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee (hereafter, JEC), *East European Economies Post-Helsinki*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1977, pp. 380–83. For comparative data illustrating how far East European states lag behind their Western counterparts in the efficient utilization of energy, see *Revista Economica* (Bucharest), July 3, 1981, in Joint Publications Research Service (Washington, DC—hereafter JPRS), No. 78756, Aug. 4, 1981, p. 70.

⁴ See Tanjug (Belgrade), Jan. 18, 1984, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Eastern Europe* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-EEU*), Jan. 19, 1984, p. AA1.

John M. Kramer is Professor of Political Science, Mary Washington College (Fredericksburg, VA). He has written widely on energy relations and environmental issues in the Soviet bloc.

Nowhere were these centrifugal forces more manifest than in the events surrounding the June 1984 summit meeting in Moscow of the leaders of the CEMA states. The meeting, first proposed by Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in 1981, had been repeatedly postponed because of numerous disputes among members—in particular, regarding the price and quantity of future exports of Soviet oil to Eastern Europe.⁵

Before exploring in more detail the current state of energy relations between Eastern Europe and the USSR, however, it is useful to trace how the situation evolved in the postwar period.

Early Energy Relations

Since the 1960's, East European states have closed their energy gaps primarily through importation from the USSR. Whereas in 1955 the USSR was still a net importer of both solid and liquid fuels from Eastern Europe, by 1960 it had become a net exporter of these fuels to the region. Between 1955 and 1960, exports of solid fuels from the USSR to Eastern Europe increased by 172 percent, and exports of liquid fuels more than quadrupled. By 1960, the USSR accounted for 52 percent and 89 percent respectively of Eastern Europe's imports of solid and liquid fuels. (However, during the 1960's, Eastern Europe did remain—largely because of exports of coal and coke from Poland and Czechoslovakia and of crude oil and petroleum products from Romania—a net exporter of both solid and liquid fuels to the world market, especially to Western Europe.)⁶

The 1960's witnessed the construction of networks of oil and natural gas pipelines and of a uniform electric power grid that considerably augmented the capacity of the USSR to export fuels and energy to Eastern Europe. The impetus for these projects, especially the oil pipeline, was largely political; they were part of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's efforts in the aftermath of the uprisings in Hungary and Poland in 1956 to replace the Stalinist system of economic exploitation of the satellites with a "socialist commonwealth" that would promote economic relations of equality and mutual advantage among the CEMA states. Soviet oil was to provide the raw-

Table 1: Eastern Europe's Energy Gap, 1979

(millions of barrels per day of oil equivalent)

Country	Consumption	Production	Energy gap
Bulgaria	0.65	0.16	0.49
Czechoslovakia	1.59	0.97	0.60
East Germany	1.74	1.17	0.57
Hungary	0.60	0.29	0.31
Poland	2.38	2.70	-0.32
Romania	1.39	1.08	0.31
Total	8.35	6.37	1.96

SOURCE: US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, *Technology and Soviet Energy Availability*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1981, Table 72, p. 304.

material base for the development of petrochemical industries in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland, thereby mirroring Khrushchev's "chemicalization" of Soviet industry.⁷ Ironically, then, Eastern Europe's energy gap—which has become such a contentious issue among the CEMA states—owes its origins in part to initiatives undertaken by the USSR to foster political harmony and economic prosperity among these states.

The first major project under this rubric was the "Druzhiba" (Friendship) oil pipeline, announced in 1958 and completed in the early 1960's. By 1967, the Druzhiba network was carrying approximately 18 million tons of crude annually from the USSR to Eastern Europe, via a northern branch to Poland and East Germany and via a southern branch to Czechoslovakia and Hungary.⁸

The Soviet Union concluded agreements with Czechoslovakia in 1966 and East Germany in 1967 providing for increased oil shipments. The agreement with the former obligated the USSR to deliver to Czechoslovakia in the period 1973–1984 five million tons of crude oil annually at a fixed price of 15 transferable rubles a ton, in exchange for a 500-million transferable-ruble credit from Czechoslovakia for Soviet purchases of machinery, materials, and consumer goods between 1966 and 1974. Apparently, the agreement also provided for additional deliveries of at least 30 million tons of oil, but the period of time and the price to be paid for such deliveries remain unpublished. Though even fewer details are publicly available regarding the agreement with East Germany, its main provisions appear to have been similar to those concluded with Czechoslovakia. Obviously, both countries have benefited enormously from the agreements, for each received 60 million tons of crude oil at

⁵ See, e.g., *The New York Times*, May 10, 1983. According to this account, the "squabbling got so loud that even those who weren't invited could hear it."

⁶ See J. G. Polach, "The Development of Energy in East Europe," in JEC, *Economic Development in Countries in Eastern Europe*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1970, pp. 348–433.

⁷ *The New York Times*, Dec. 23, 1959.

⁸ On the origins and construction of the "Druzhiba" pipeline, see Radio Free Europe (hereafter RFE), *Situation Report* (Munich), No. 5 (Czechoslovakia), Feb. 9, 1977.



A ceremony on April 1, 1964, marked the beginning of trial runs of the crude oil distillation plant at the Petro-Chemical Combine in Schwedt, the East German terminus of the Druzhba oil pipeline from the USSR.

—ADN-Zentralbild from EASTFOTO.

prices that ended up being far below world-market levels.⁹ Whether this circumstance represented a conscious decision—as some have argued—by the USSR to provide a subsidy to these countries, or whether, as is more likely, the USSR was not sufficiently prescient to predict accurately the future course of world oil prices, still remains an open question. In 1967, Czechoslovak critics bitterly alleged that the contract price agreed on was above the world market price prevailing at the time the agreement was signed.¹⁰

Exports of natural gas from the USSR to Eastern Europe developed far more slowly. The USSR began exporting small quantities of this fuel via border crossing pipelines to Poland in the late 1950's and to Czechoslovakia in 1967, but it was only with the con-

struction of the "Bratstvo" (Brotherhood) natural gas pipeline network linking gas fields in the Soviet Ukraine to Eastern and Western Europe that gas began to be shipped in any volume. In 1968 both Czechoslovakia and East Germany—in agreements similar to the ones they had earlier concluded for oil—extended loans to the USSR for the construction of natural gas pipelines in return for Soviet deliveries of this fuel after 1970. Significant deliveries of Soviet natural gas awaited the expansion of the "Bratstvo" network that occurred in the 1970's.¹¹

Finally, the European states of CEMA in the 1960's began linking their electric power grids through the "Mir" (Peace) uniform power grid network. In 1962, CEMA established a Central Dispatching Administration for the Joint Power System of CEMA Countries. The "Mir" network lowered the unit cost of transferred electricity and enhanced the capacity of these states to meet peak demands for power: in 1967 the member states exchanged approximately 8.7 billion KWH of electricity through the system compared to a meager 708 KWH exchanged among them in 1956.¹²

Expanding Dependency

With this infrastructure in place, Soviet exports of energy to Eastern Europe were able to increase substantially, growing at annual rates of 9.5 percent in 1971–75 and 6 percent in 1976–80. In absolute amounts, the USSR shipped to Eastern Europe in 1976–80 over 370 million tons of crude oil and oil products, 98 billion cubic meters of gas, 57 billion kilowatt hours of electricity, and 41 million tons of coke and coal. Exports of natural gas increased rapidly during these years as East Germany (1973), Bulgaria (1974), and Hungary (1975) began to receive shipments from the USSR. Overall, natural gas, which comprised just 3 percent of total Soviet energy exports to Eastern Europe in 1970, grew to 16 percent of these exports in 1980, while crude oil and oil products declined from 78 percent of such exports in 1970 to about 73 percent in 1980.¹³ Consequently, fuels and energy from the USSR in 1979 constituted over 90 percent of the net energy imports of Bulgaria, East Germany, and Hungary, and approximately 85 per-

⁹ For details on the agreements, see Jozef van Brabant, "The USSR and Socialist Economic Integration—A Comment," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), January 1984, pp. 129–30. See also *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Sept. 26, 1966.

¹⁰ For the "subsidy" view, see Marie Lavigne, "The Soviet Union Inside Comecon," *Soviet Studies*, April 1983, p. 138. On the Czechoslovak complaint, see Radio Prague, Nov. 7, 1967, as reported in RFE, *Situation Report*, No. 43 (Czechoslovakia), Nov. 28, 1973.

¹¹ US Central Intelligence Agency, *USSR: Development of the Gas Industry*, ER78–10393, Washington, DC, July 1978, pp. 21–22.

¹² Polach, loc. cit., pp. 405–06. See also *The New York Times*, Oct. 29, 1963.

¹³ *Pravda* (Moscow), June 27, 1979; and US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, *Technology and Soviet Energy Availability*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1981, pp. 286–90.

Table 2: East European Energy Imports, 1979

(millions of barrels per day of oil equivalent)


Country	Total Imports	Imports from the USSR	As a percent of total imports
Bulgaria	0.49	0.45	92
Czechoslovakia	0.62	0.53	85
East Germany	0.57	0.51	90
Hungary	0.31	0.30	97
Romania	0.31	0.05	16

SOURCE: US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, *Technology and Soviet Energy Availability*, Table 74, p. 306.

cent of these imports in the case of Czechoslovakia. Of course, in 1979, Poland was still a net exporter of energy, while Romania, perhaps in part because it was hesitant to compromise its "independent" political posture by becoming too economically dependent upon the USSR, kept energy imports from that source to a minimum (see Table 2).

Even while expanding energy exports to Eastern Europe in the 1970's, the USSR was admonishing its allies to rely more on indigenous reserves and on importation from the world market to close their energy gaps. In a harbinger of arguments made even more insistently in subsequent years, Soviet analysts asserted that the escalating costs of producing and transporting energy reserves located in remote and inhospitable regions of Western Siberia made their export to Eastern Europe too expensive.¹⁴ Nevertheless, at this point, the political benefits apparently outweighed the economic costs of the energy trade in Moscow's eyes.

¹⁴ See, e.g., *Voprosy Ekonomiki* (Moscow), December 1971. Also, *The New York Times* on Nov. 29, 1969, reported that an official in Czechoslovakia said that his country would get less oil from the USSR in the 1970's because "Soviet output would be shifting to Siberia."



Fitter Nikolay Login stands at the valves of the Karpaty-II pumping station of the Druzhba oil pipeline that carries Soviet oil to Eastern Europe.

—NOVOSTI from SOVFOTO.



A giant excavator in operation in 1978 at a strip mine near Belchatow, Poland, the largest brown coal mine in the world.

—CAF from EASTFOTO.

The limited data available indicate that Soviet fuel and energy exports to Eastern Europe were expected to keep growing during 1981–85. In 1979, Soviet Premier Aleksey Kosygin publicly promised that the USSR would increase these exports to the CEMA states by approximately 20 percent in the period 1981–85, although their rate of increase would be lower than, and their composition different from, exports in the two previous five-year plan periods. In particular, annual exports of crude oil were to remain at approximately the level attained in 1980, while exports of natural gas would increase substantially. In 1981–85, exports of crude oil and natural gas were to comprise 69 and 21 percent respectively of total Soviet fuel and energy exports to the region in comparison to 75 and 16 percent respectively in 1976–80.¹⁵

Authoritative statements by both East European and Soviet officials as late as 1981 provided little warning of the impending shock. For example, Erich

Honecker, the East German Socialist Unity Party leader, speaking at that party's national congress in April 1981, assured his audience that annual deliveries of oil from the USSR "have been securely agreed upon on a long-term basis."¹⁶ Shortly thereafter, the Secretary General of CEMA reiterated that "under no circumstances" would Moscow reduce oil deliveries to Eastern Europe before 1985.¹⁷

East Bloc's "Oil Shock"

In this setting, the sudden shift of Soviet policy in 1982 came as quite a jolt. From preliminary data it would appear that Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Hungary were most affected by this decision (see Table 3). Studies before the event had suggested that cuts in oil deliveries of this magnitude might cause "significant" reductions in the already low rates of economic growth in Eastern Europe,¹⁸ and *The Wall Street Journal* of February 11, 1982, opined somewhat hyperbolically that the policy "could push a number of countries in Soviet Europe to the brink of economic insolvency and political collapse."

In Eastern Europe itself, even such politically conservative and normally pro-Soviet officials as Premier Lubomír Štrougal of Czechoslovakia have expressed concern over the Soviet decision. In October 1983, Štrougal asserted that the realization of economic plans in 1984–85 will depend "to no small extent on the fulfillment of agreed upon contracts within the CEMA framework." "The experience of recent years," he added, shows that "the economies of our individual states react very sensitively to shortcomings in the development of mutual trade." Furthermore, he remarked, "any difficulties and complications in this sphere would have a chain reaction."¹⁹

That the USSR has reduced its oil exports to Poland relatively less than it has to other East European states (see Table 3) suggests that Soviet leaders may see merit in Štrougal's assessment. This is not to say that the Soviet Union has abstained completely from

¹⁵ *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), Apr. 12, 1981.

¹⁷ *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta* (Moscow), No. 45, 1981.

¹⁸ US Central Intelligence Agency, *Soviet Economic Problems and Prospects*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1977, p. 24.

¹⁹ *Rudé právo* (Prague), Oct. 19, 1983. Premier Štrougal was probably also aiming his remarks at Poland (where political turmoil and attendant economic dislocations have led to shortfalls in delivery of contracted amounts of coal exports to Czechoslovakia) and at Romania (which in 1981 failed to deliver agreed-upon amounts of electricity to Czechoslovakia). For details on these problems, see *Mlada fronta* (Prague), Jan. 8, 1982; and *Rudé právo*, Oct. 31, 1981.

¹⁶ For Kosygin's remarks, see *Pravda*, June 27, 1979. Data on exports in 1981–1985 are calculated from *Technology and Soviet Energy Availability*, Table 73, p. 305.

Table 3: Soviet Exports of Crude Oil to Selected East European States, 1981 and 1983

(in millions of tons)			
Exports to	1981	1983	1983 exports as percent of 1981
Czechoslovakia	18.1	16.0	88.3
East Germany	22.7	17.1 ^a	75.3
Hungary	7.2	6.5	90.2
Poland	13.5	12.5	92.5

^a Data in case of East Germany are for 1984.

SOURCES: For Czechoslovakia and Hungary 1981 and Poland 1983, Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, *Centrally Planned Economies Current Analysis* (Washington, DC), No. 17, Mar. 15, 1983, p. 6; for East Germany and Poland 1981, computed from data in *Trybuna ludu* (Warsaw), Mar. 13, 1984, and *Statisticheskii yezhegodnik stranchlenov Soveta Ekonomicheskoy Vzaïmopomoshchi* (Statistical Yearbook of the Member States of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance), Moscow, Statistika, 1983, pp. 345 and 359; for Czechoslovakia 1983, *Mladá fronta* (Prague), Jan. 25, 1983; for East Germany 1984, ADN (East Berlin), Sept. 5, 1984, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Eastern Europe* (Washington, DC), Sept. 6, 1984, p. E/3; for Hungary 1983, *Magyar hirlap* (Budapest), Feb. 1, 1983. Wharton estimates that the trend in Soviet exports of crude oil to Eastern Europe in 1984 was flat (see *Centrally Planned Economies Current Analysis*, Apr. 16, 1985, p. 8.)

playing its "oil card" during the crisis boiling in Poland since 1980. For example, at one point Stefan Olszowski, a member of the Politburo of the Polish United Workers' Party, warned on Polish national television that the USSR might reduce supplies of vital raw materials to Poland unless the population ceased its "anti-Soviet activities."²⁰ Indeed, a Western analyst asserts that the USSR has curtailed deliveries of petroleum to Poland whenever the latter has "stepped too far out of line." Yet, even according to this analysis, Moscow has been hesitant to aggravate an already volatile situation by too heavy-handed an action.²¹ Consequently, it would appear, the annual apportionment of Soviet energy for Eastern Europe "has progressed from being merely difficult to an agonizing balancing act which can cause painful economic and political reverberations if any miscalculations are made."²²

Whatever the calculations, the USSR has, indeed, begun to reduce its oil exports to the region. Commentaries in both the East European and Soviet press bluntly assert that this development is not temporary and that the best the Eastern Europeans can expect in the foreseeable future is some increase in exports of natural gas and electricity. For example, Oleg

Bogomolov, a prominent spokesman for the Soviet regime stated:

*It is obvious that in the case of petroleum, other raw materials and sources of energy, export has reached its limit, perhaps with the exception of natural gas and electricity. This new situation must be taken into account in the long-range strategy of the CMEA.*²³

USSR Energy Prospects

What factors led the USSR to reduce its energy exports to Eastern Europe? Is it true, for example, that Soviet oil production is insufficient simultaneously to satisfy internal demand, meet requirements for hard currency through energy exports to the world market, and continue as the primary means whereby Eastern Europe closes its energy gap? The US Central Intelligence Agency's 1977 prediction that Soviet oil production would decline sharply in the 1980's, possibly forcing the USSR to become a net importer of oil, has been questioned by other analysts both inside and outside the US government, and has even been revised by the CIA itself.²⁴ All such outside prognoses are, at best, informed judgments whose validity rests upon key assumptions that are very controversial (e.g., the size of Soviet petroleum reserves—with Western estimates ranging from the CIA's 33 billion barrels, to the US Defense Intelligence Agency's 80–85 billion barrels, to a private Swedish consulting firm's 150 billion barrels) and/or are subject to changes in Soviet policy (e.g., the overall amount and distribution of resources invested within the energy sector, or the relative success of campaigns to conserve energy or to substitute one fuel for another).²⁵

²⁰ *International Affairs* (Moscow), No. 5, 1983, p. 27. For Czechoslovak and Hungarian commentary acknowledging this state of affairs, see *Československý zahraniční obchod* (Prague), No. 3, 1984, summarized in RFE, *Situation Report*, No. 7 (Czechoslovakia), Apr. 18, 1984; and *Kulgazdaság* (Budapest), October 1983, in *JPRS*, No. EEI-84-005, Jan. 11, 1984, p. 15.

²⁴ See CIA, *Prospects for Soviet Petroleum Production*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1977. For an account of the CIA's amended prediction, see *The New York Times*, May 19, 1981. The US Defense Intelligence Agency's estimate that Soviet oil prospects were highly favorable was reported in *The New York Times*, Sept. 3, 1981. American scholar Marshall Goldman provided a critique of the CIA estimates in *The Washington Post*, Aug. 19, 1979.

²⁵ See Marshall Goldman, *The Enigma of Soviet Petroleum: Half Full or Half Empty*, Winchester, MA, Allen and Unwin, 1981; Theodore Shabad and Leslie Dienes, *The Soviet Energy System: Resource Use and Policies*, New York, Halsted Press, 1979; *Technology and Soviet Energy Availability*; and *The Wall Street Journal*, June 9, 1983. For a Soviet analysis, see *Toplivno-syevaya problema v usloviyakh sotsialisticheskoy ekonomicheskoy integratsii* (The Fuel-Raw Material Problem in Conditions of Socialist Economic Integration), Moscow, Nauka, 1979, pp. 266–92; also *Pravda*, Apr. 3, 1984, for a frank exposition of problems in the Soviet petroleum industry.

²⁰ *The New York Times*, Sept. 23, 1981.

²¹ See Marshall Goldman in *The Wall Street Journal*, Nov. 23, 1981, for examples of Soviet use of the "oil card."

²² Arthur J. Smith, "The Council of Mutual Economic Assistance in 1977: New Economic Power, New Political Perspectives and Some Old and New Problems," in JEC, *East European Economies Post-Helsinki*, p. 171.

Despite these caveats, one cannot be sanguine about the near-term prospects for substantial increases in Soviet production of either petroleum or coal. Since 1976, both industries have consistently failed to meet overall annual production targets; in fact, the target in 1985 for petroleum is about equal to, and the target for coal actually lower than the targets initially set for the production of these commodities for 1980. Further, the USSR has published estimates for petroleum output in 1990 that represent, at best, only a modest increase over the official plan target for 1985.²⁶ If the USSR were to meet its 1985 plan target, it would then probably still have approximately 20 percent less crude oil available for export than it did in 1980; this is so because of a substantial expansion over the period 1981–85 in domestic petroleum refining capacity designed to increase exports of refined products (significantly, it is primarily crude and not refined oil that Eastern Europe imports from the USSR).²⁷

Nuclear power is not likely to ease demand on Soviet liquid energy reserves in the near term. Although largely spared the environmentalists' protests common in the West, Soviet nuclear projects will require the marshalling of impressive reserves of capital, labor, and technology that will produce strains in other sectors of the economy; hence one can anticipate bottlenecks in the construction of nuclear power facilities. Recent reports in the Soviet press confirm considerable problems in the realization of targets for nuclear power.²⁸

Natural gas represents the one bright spot in Soviet energy resources. This was the only energy source in the USSR that met its production target in the Tenth Five-Year Plan (1976–80), and it is the only fuel whose production target is substantially higher in the present plan. Increases in natural gas production may well account for the entire net addition to the fuel balance during 1981–85.²⁹ As noted, exports of natural gas to Eastern Europe rose rapidly in the 1970's and in 1981–85 were planned to comprise an even larger share in total Soviet fuel and energy exports to the

region. Undoubtedly, the East European economies can utilize additional amounts of natural gas by converting to gas industrial processes and home heating presently fueled by coal or oil, although the process would be costly.

Soviet leaders, recognizing the critical importance of natural gas, have made fulfillment of its production target the highest priority in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (1981–85). In an era when economic stringency has reduced the rate of growth of investment dramatically, the current plan allocates over four-fifths of the incremental investment in industry to the energy sector, with approximately one-half of these funds destined for the natural gas sector.³⁰ In the case of gas, unlike oil, known Soviet reserves—over one-third of the proven natural gas reserves in the world—are ample to meet projected production targets. But as with oil, development of natural gas will entail surmounting serious infrastructural, locational, and environmental problems associated with Siberia, where by 1985 almost 60 percent of the total national output is to be located. To exploit these Siberian resources for both domestic and foreign markets, the USSR has undertaken a series of the largest pipeline construction projects in history—requiring considerable aid from countries in Western Europe and Japan, as well as Eastern Europe (see below), for its timely completion. Considering all of these circumstances, a careful Western analysis concludes that Soviet natural gas plans justify "some skepticism." The study suggested that a "reasonable guess" for output in 1985 is around 600 billion cubic meters, i.e., about 5 percent less than the plan target.³¹

Soviet Energy Trade with the West

Soviet willingness to export energy to Eastern Europe is affected seriously by the fact that exports of energy to capitalist countries, especially in Western Europe, are the primary source of hard currency for the USSR. This hard currency, in turn, is used for such high-priority projects as the acquisition of Western technology and machinery to modernize Soviet industry, and of grain to feed the Soviet population directly or through livestock raising.

The USSR has exported energy to Western Europe for decades, but this trade expanded greatly after

²⁶ Data on petroleum and coal production through 1985 drawn from Thane Gustafson, "Soviet Energy Policy," in JEC, *Soviet Economy in the 1980's: Problems and Prospects*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1982, p. 432. On projections for petroleum output in 1990, see *Kulgasdaság*, January 1984, in *JPRS*, No. EEI-84-030, Mar. 13, 1984, p. 11.

²⁷ *The New York Times*, Dec. 6, 1981.

²⁸ *Technology and Soviet Energy Availability*, pp. 111–44; also *Pravda*, Aug. 18, 1983, and *The New York Times*, July 26, 1983.

²⁹ See Edward Hewett, "The Near-Term Prospects for Soviet Natural Gas Industry, and the Implications for East-West Trade," in JEC, *Soviet Economy in the 1980's*, pp. 391–413.

³⁰ On investment in the energy sector, see the statement by Gosplan Chairman Nikolay Baybakov in *Izvestiya*, Nov. 18, 1981. For investment in the gas sector, see Gustafson, loc. cit., pp. 432–34.

³¹ Hewett, loc. cit., pp. 406–07.



Japanese pipelayers at a site along the rugged Tyumen section of the Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhhorod gas trunkline in March 1983.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

1970. Between 1970 and 1980, exports of Soviet oil to Western Europe rose from 33 million tons to almost 54 million tons annually; in the same period gas exports grew dramatically to approximately 20 million tons of oil equivalent. By 1981, the Soviet Union exported approximately equal amounts of natural gas to Western and to Eastern Europe, while one Western source estimates that a similar balance was realized with oil exports in 1984.³²

In 1976–81, the volume of Soviet oil exports to capitalist countries actually declined slightly, but rapidly escalating world prices for this commodity provided the USSR with almost three times as much hard currency from oil sales in 1981 as in 1976. This circumstance, combined with increases in indigenous energy production during these years, permitted the USSR to continue to expand its energy exports to Eastern Europe during the period.³³

The Soviet Union planned to increase gas exports to Western Europe considerably in the 1980's with the completion of projects to augment existing pipeline capacity. By one estimate, pipeline capacity from the USSR to Western Europe in 1985 should be at least 65 billion cubic meters, or almost 53 million tons of oil equivalent.³⁴

The Siberian gas export line—called the Yamal line, the subject of unsuccessful sanctions by the US intended to delay or prevent its construction—illustrates the magnitude of these undertakings and the role that Western technology is intended to play in them. This line will transmit natural gas from the world's largest gas field, located at Urengoy in Western Siberia, over 4,500 tortuous kilometers of Soviet territory to the Ukrainian town of Uzhhorod, where it will connect with pipelines in Czechoslovakia to bring the natural gas to Western Europe. Purchases of an anticipated US\$5 billion in wide-diameter pipe, compressor stations, and turbines from Japan and West-

³² The data on gas exports is from Edward Hewett, *Energy, Economics, and Foreign Policy in the Soviet Union*, Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1984; the estimate on oil deliveries is from *Oil and Gas Journal* (Tulsa, OK), May 13, 1985, p. 74.

³³ On Soviet trade in hard currency, see William Cooper, "Soviet-Western Trade," in *Soviet Economy in the 1980's*, pp. 454–78; and Joan Parpart Zoeter, "USSR: Hard Currency Trade and Payments," in *ibid.*, pp. 479–506.

³⁴ Hewett, "The Near-Term Prospects for Soviet Natural Gas Industry. . .," *loc. cit.*, pp. 405–06.

ern Europe make the project the largest East-West trade deal in history. East European states—Hungary, Yugoslavia, and particularly Czechoslovakia—are also participating in and providing equipment for the project. Czechoslovakia began construction in 1983 of another pipeline, to be completed by 1988, across its territory to bring Soviet gas to West Germany. The USSR will reimburse Czechoslovakia with natural gas (according to one Western estimate, Czechoslovakia could receive annually in natural gas the calorific equivalent of approximately seven million tons of high quality brown coal) for its work on the project and for pipeline transit fees.³⁵

Eventually, these pipelines could bring Soviet gas to as many as ten West European states—Austria, Belgium, Finland, Greece, Italy, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and West Germany. In January 1984, the USSR announced that the pipeline “has started functioning” and that the first natural gas exports had reached France a year ahead of schedule. Both French and American officials vigorously (and, apparently, correctly) disputed this contention. While it is true that the Soviets have completed laying the pipelines for the project on their territory, they have still not constructed most of the compressor stations needed to pump the gas through the system.³⁶

Economic recession in the West and the attendant glut of energy, especially oil—which reduced world market prices for petroleum from about \$34 per barrel in 1981 to under \$29 per barrel (and even less on the spot market) at present—have raised questions about the future amount and price of Soviet energy exports to Western Europe. Already, the Italian government has announced a “pause for reflection” regarding the terms of its contract for Soviet natural gas, and both French and West German firms have indicated their intention to renegotiate the price in their gas contracts with the USSR.³⁷

These developments arose at a particularly inopportune time for the USSR, which was in the midst of several successive disastrous grain harvests; continued to bear the burden of supporting the economies of Cuba, Afghanistan, Poland, Vietnam, and several other Soviet client states in the Third World; saw its

financially pressed East European partners generally cut off from Western credits; and was witnessing decreases in world-market prices for other important Soviet exports, such as gold and platinum. So far, the USSR has responded to the situation with respect to oil by, in the words of one Western analyst, “frantically trying to remain in the market, even at the expense of its allies.” The Soviet Union in 1982 increased by 32 percent, in 1983 by 15 percent, and in 1984 by around 6 percent the volume of its oil exports to advanced capitalist countries.³⁸

The USSR, which traditionally charges capitalist countries the world-market price for oil, has even risked alienating its political friends (and foes) in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) by engaging in a price war that saw it slash its price for crude in 1983 below the official OPEC price in a desperate attempt to retain hard-currency customers in Western Europe. Reportedly, the initiative sparked “grave concern” among OPEC officials, who thereupon initiated a “dialogue” with the USSR about honoring OPEC benchmark prices. OPEC officials are worried that in the latter 1980's the USSR—impelled by its ever greater need for hard currency—might even double its oil exports to Western countries and thereby depress world prices further.³⁹

Nevertheless, the current world energy glut, which has had such a negative impact upon Soviet oil deliveries to Eastern Europe, could conceivably benefit the region. The slack demand for energy on the world market enhances Eastern Europe's prospects of concluding barter deals on favorable terms with noncommunist states anxious to reduce surplus stocks. Lower world market prices for energy will also eventually translate into lower prices to Eastern Europe for Soviet energy (on CEMA pricing, see below).

In the meantime, there is the possibility of increased Soviet exports of natural gas to Eastern Europe, particularly if gas exports to Western Europe fall significantly below initial projections. Indeed, the USSR has proposed that the East European states participate in constructing yet another natural gas pipeline (to be named “Progress”) from Yamburg in

³⁵ For the estimate, see RFE, *Situation Report*, No. 9 (Czechoslovakia), May 19, 1983. On the participation of the East European states, see *Rudé právo*, June 18, 1982, and Aug. 4, 1983; *Hetfoi Hírek* (Budapest), Feb. 22, 1982 in *FBIS-EEU*, Mar. 15, 1982, p. F15; and *Politika* (Belgrade), Oct. 31, 1982, in *FBIS-EEU*, Nov. 5, 1982, p. I/9.

³⁶ On the controversy over the operational status of the pipeline, including the Soviet claim that it is functioning, see *The Wall Street Journal*, Jan. 19, 1984. For a detailed analysis of the pipeline project, see Jonathan Stein, *The Soviet Bloc, Energy, and Western Security*, Lexington, MA, D. C. Heath, 1983, pp. 59–84.

³⁷ *The Washington Post*, Mar. 15, 1984; and *The Wall Street Journal*, Jan. 19, 1984.

³⁸ *The Wall Street Journal*, Mar. 16, 1983; and *Oil and Gas Journal*, May 13, 1985, p. 74. These data should be taken as approximations, because the USSR since 1977 has ceased publishing information on the quantity of its energy exports, giving only value data.

A Hungarian economist explicitly links the reduction in Soviet oil exports to Eastern Europe with the increase in exports to the capitalist market. See Kulgazdaság, January 1984, loc. cit., p. 17. See also Edward Hewett, “Soviet Primary Products Export to Comecon and the West,” in R. G. Jensen, Ed., *Soviet Natural Resources in the World Economy*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1983, pp. 639–57.

³⁹ *The Wall Street Journal*, June 9, 1983.

Western Siberia to the Soviet western border to transmit annually 20–22 billion cubic meters of gas “to meet the growing needs of fraternal countries.”⁴⁰

Moreover, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that the present world energy glut might end, or that the USSR might make a conscious decision to place less reliance on hard-currency trade with the West. The first scenario might occur with economic expansion in Western Europe and/or with an intensification of conflicts in the Middle East. This scenario, with its attendant increase in world-market prices, might then permit the USSR to return to an export policy approximating the one that it pursued in the second half of the 1970’s, when rapidly escalating world prices allowed it to meet its demands for hard currency even while holding energy exports to capitalist countries relatively constant and expanding energy exports to Eastern Europe. The more autarkic scenario might arise if Soviet food output increased, if the leadership decided on a general belt-tightening for the population, or if Moscow became fearful of the political and economic costs deriving from over-reliance upon the West. The point here is not to stress the likelihood of one or another scenario, but merely to suggest that the East-West trade factor in Soviet–East European energy relations is not necessarily immutable.

Price Issues

What the East Europeans are expected (and able) to pay for Soviet energy will also determine the future course of the relationship. Between 1958 and 1975, prices in intra-Comecon trade followed the so-called “Bucharest” formula, under which prices for individual commodities were established in bilateral negotiations for a five-year period based upon the average world-market price (“cleansed” of the effects of “monopoly,” “speculation,” and other undesirable “distortions” found in the capitalist economic system) for that commodity in the preceding five-year period. In a provision that became highly relevant when world energy prices began skyrocketing after 1973, the “Bucharest” formula permitted ad hoc adjustments in contract prices if unanticipated developments in international trade necessitated them.⁴¹

Considerable controversy exists over whether the USSR or the East Europeans benefited more under

the “Bucharest formula.” A careful Western study concludes that—as the Czechs had charged in 1967—the USSR during the 1960’s consistently charged customers in Eastern Europe (excluding Yugoslavia) more for all fuels than it charged capitalist customers. The study also notes, however, that the East Europeans were simultaneously “exploiting” the USSR by paying in “soft” goods for most (but not all) Soviet goods and by charging the USSR above-world-market prices for some of their exports (e.g., Polish coal).⁴²

The rapid escalation in world energy prices after the October 1973 war between Israel and the Arab states temporarily suspended this debate and permanently ended the “Bucharest” formula. By March 1974, with the official CEMA price for oil already 80 percent below the comparable world price, the USSR demanded an immediate revision of the “Bucharest” formula. After “intensive discussions,” Moscow received a special price increase for 1975 (it reportedly tried but failed to make the increase retroactive to 1974) and established the practice of subsequent *annual* adjustments in prices based upon average world-market prices for individual commodities in the preceding five-year period.⁴³

Calculations by Marvin Jackson indicate the impact of this decision on CEMA oil prices over the period 1978–84 (see Table 4). The third column shows the CEMA price in dollars per barrel at official dollar/ruble exchange rates, and the 5th column shows a recalculation by Jackson (based on work by Hungarian foreign trade experts) to give a more realistic dollar/ruble exchange rate. On the surface, then, the oil trade has represented an economic windfall for Eastern Europe. This circumstance came about, in part, because the 1975 price formula delays reflecting increases in world-market prices for up to one year in intra-CEMA trade, and—at least through 1978—included the relatively lower world prices for oil existing before 1974.

Eastern Europe actually benefited even more than these data suggest. First, the region paid for most Soviet energy with “soft” goods that often had artificially high prices attached to them. As a Polish source frankly admits:

⁴² Polach, loc. cit., pp. 400–402, asserts that Soviet prices for fuels to Eastern Europe were above comparable world prices. Lavigne, op. cit., p. 135, argues that, overall, the USSR “lost” in its trade with Eastern Europe during these years.

On the other hand, a Hungarian source reports that as early as the 1950’s the Soviet Union would only accept “hard” goods in exchange for much of its energy exports to Eastern Europe. See *Közgazdasági Szemle* (Budapest), November 1979, cited in RFE, *Situation Report*, No. 22 (Hungary), Dec. 5, 1979.

⁴³ *The Washington Post*, Mar. 4, 1974, reports on the tensions that higher oil prices engendered within Comecon. See *The New York Times*, Jan. 25, 1975, for details of the revised price formula.

⁴⁰ See *Pravda*, July 30, 1984, for details of the proposal.

⁴¹ On the “Bucharest” formula, see Radio Free Europe, *Background Report* (Munich), No. 67 (Eastern Europe), Mar. 25, 1977; also van Brabant, op. cit., p. 138.

Table 4: Estimated Price of Soviet Oil to Eastern Europe

(US\$ per barrel)

Year	World market price (WMP)	CEMA price	Percent of WMP	"Real" CEMA price	Percent of WMP
1978	12.70	11.39	90	6.78	53
1979	17.26	13.89	80	8.23	48
1980	30.22	14.01	46	7.74	26
1981	32.50	15.67	48	8.79	27
1982	34.00	21.91	64	11.26	33
1983	29.00	25.89	89	11.52	40
1984	28.20	27.28	97	11.58	41

SOURCE: Marvin Jackson, "When Is a Price a Price? The Level and Patterns of Prices in the CMEA," Radio Free Europe, *Background Report* (Munich), No. 155 (Economics), Aug. 24, 1984. What Jackson termed a "realistic" CEMA price was derived by using the exchange rates of the Hungarian forint against the dollar and the ruble; it is an artificial but probably more realistic indicator.

*We should not be able to sell on other markets and at profitable prices a major part of our machines and systems which comprise half of our exports to the USSR. We should not be able to sell them not only due to unfavorable market trends, but also because the other markets are monopolized, because we have no marketing and services network and because of the technological standard of many products.*⁴⁴

Second, since 1974, Eastern Europe as a whole, and the individual states to different degrees, have registered a huge deficit in trade with the USSR (e.g., in 1974–80, the deficit reached 6 billion transferable rubles)—attributable primarily to increases in the price of imported Soviet raw materials. The result has been to make the Soviet Union an involuntary creditor.⁴⁵

However, other factors operate to increase the price that Eastern Europe pays for Soviet energy. First, East Europeans must also buy "soft" goods from the USSR at inflated prices in partial compensation for the losses that the latter allegedly suffers through energy sales. A Hungarian source explains: "The profits of our Soviet partner derived among other things from the fact that it was able to sell commodities which it would have been unable to sell on the world market, or at least not for the same price."⁴⁶

Second, the East Europeans purchase above-plan deliveries of Soviet petroleum (and Romania purchases all of its Soviet oil) with hard currency at world-market prices—a circumstance of increasing

salience as the USSR reduces its *planned* deliveries of crude to the region. This state of affairs may be especially relevant to Czechoslovakia and East Germany, whose leaders confront after 1984 the unpleasant prospect of losing all or part of the five million tons of crude oil that they now receive annually from the USSR at 1966 prices—or, alternatively, of paying substantially more for it.⁴⁷ Third, Moscow pays a paltry 2 percent in interest to East European states on the funds that the latter advance to the USSR in joint CEMA energy development projects (e.g., the Orenburg natural gas pipeline—see below), a rate far below those operative on international lending markets, representing a significant subsidy by the East European creditors to the USSR.⁴⁸ Fourth, the CEMA price formula works to the disadvantage of Eastern Europe in periods of declining or stabilized world-market prices for energy. Indeed, as seen in Table 4, in 1984 the CEMA price (at official dollar/ruble exchange rates) for oil approximated the world price, and may soon exceed it.⁴⁹

Any attempt to draw up a purely *economic* balance sheet of these factors ignores the likelihood that the Soviets add political "charges"—e.g., by demanding diplomatic and material support from CEMA states for Soviet foreign policy—to the total price of its energy for Eastern Europe.⁵⁰ Romania represents a good example of a nation that the Soviet Union has sought, so far unsuccessfully, to induce to make political concessions as a quid pro quo for Soviet energy.

Since 1979, limited reserves of hard currency to

⁴⁴ PAP (Warsaw), Sept. 23, 1981, in *FBIS-EEU*, Sept. 24, 1981, p. G/3.

⁴⁵ Paul Marer, "The Political Economy of Soviet Relations with Eastern Europe," in Sarah Meiklejohn Terry, Ed., *Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1984, p. 170.

Radio Warsaw (in Russian), Mar. 6, 1984, commenting on Poland's trade deficit with the USSR, reported that "as in former years, our major partner will make up this current account deficit with low-interest credits repayable over a number of years." See in *FBIS-EEU*, Mar. 6, 1984, p. G/7.

⁴⁶ *Közgazdasági Szemle*, November 1979, loc. cit.

⁴⁷ RFE, *Situation Report*, No. 23 (Czechoslovakia), Nov. 12, 1981.

⁴⁸ On the 2-percent rate in the case of the Orenburg pipeline project, see e.g., *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta*, No. 8, 1975.

⁴⁹ *Československý zahraniční obchod*, No. 3, 1984, loc. cit.

⁵⁰ This point is argued forcefully in Jan Vanous and Michael Marrese, *Soviet Subsidization of Trade with Eastern Europe—A Soviet Perspective*, Berkeley, University of California, Institute of International Affairs, 1983. Van Brabant, op. cit., pp. 129 and 137, challenges this position. Based on the evidence assembled in my present article, I incline to the former view.

purchase crude oil from the world market have led even Romania to seek crude oil from the USSR on the same advantageous terms enjoyed by other CEMA member states—i.e., payment primarily in barter with “soft,” or low-quality, goods for Soviet oil delivered at below-world-market prices. The Romanians may well point out, and are probably chagrined, that the USSR extends such preferential treatment to Yugoslavia—a country, like Romania, with a relatively independent foreign policy, and a state that is only an associate, not even a full, member of CEMA.⁵¹

In a seeming understatement, a recent Romanian commentary conceded that the results of such appeals “have not been encouraging.”⁵² The USSR has been selling Romania crude oil since 1979, albeit not in the quantities nor on the financial terms that the latter desires.⁵³ Further, the USSR has sought political advantage from this situation. At one point, Radio Moscow’s Romanian Service informed its listeners that the USSR’s “friends” in CEMA could count upon adequate deliveries of crude oil at advantageous prices—a not so subtle hint to the Romanians that the expected quid pro quo for Soviet crude would be closer political cooperation between the two sides.⁵⁴ Then in early 1984, news leaks from the Soviet Embassy in Bucharest—which the Romanians themselves emphatically deny—alleged that the USSR was supplying Romania with crude oil on “preferential conditions,” which the latter would repay “with closer foreign policy cooperation.”⁵⁵ Publicly, Bucharest responds to such pressures by reminding the USSR that Romania can turn to other sources for energy, including, in the words of Nicolae Ceaușescu, Secretary General of the Romanian Communist Party, “countries which do not belong to CEMA . . . and even to the developed capitalist countries.”⁵⁶

Regardless of how this issue of political “price” is finally (if ever) resolved, the sums that the East Europeans pay for Soviet energy clearly represent a strain on their already heavily burdened economies. Thus, in 1984, Czechoslovakia anticipated some difficulties in paying the USSR approximately three billion rubles for oil—that is, almost double what it paid in 1981 for a far larger quantity of crude oil and oil products. The

1984 oil bill comes to approximately one-half of the value of all Czechoslovak imports from the USSR and about one-quarter of the total value of imports from all sources.⁵⁷ A Hungarian economist went so far as to predict that CEMA trade was likely to “stagnate” because of the “debts and raw materials problem.”⁵⁸

East European Responses

While East Europeans acknowledge that market conditions justify higher prices for Soviet energy, they in the same breath try to minimize the extent of price increases and to hold the USSR to its export commitments. To this end they argue that the imperatives of “socialist internationalism” must constrain the USSR from maximizing its economic advantage—and thereby acting like a capitalist state—to the detriment of its socialist partners in their mutual trade. Among socialist states “the profits of an oil producer should not be too high,” one Polish official contended; another said that the future price of Soviet energy “will have to be fixed so that we do not lose and no one gains.”⁵⁹ A Czechoslovak publication argued that there was “no place” in the economic relations “of a new socialist type for nonsocialist egotism and selfishness”; rather, all socialist countries should jointly strive “for the economic progress of all countries of the socialist community and for their all around rapprochement.”⁶⁰

Beyond such lofty rhetoric, the East Europeans have also advanced a pragmatic, and probably more persuasive, argument: that precipitous price increases for and/or failure to deliver contracted amounts of vital raw materials may engender serious economic dislocations and spark political unrest that would threaten the already fragile political stability of the socialist regimes. A Hungarian commentary explicitly identified this nexus between political and economic stability:

The events in Poland show that the malfunctions of the economic system can lead to a serious social

⁵¹ *Rudé právo*, as summarized and analyzed in RFE, *Situation Report*, No. 14 (Czechoslovakia), Mar. 7, 1984. According to one Czechoslovak source, it was the high prices rather than the unwillingness of the USSR to deliver oil that accounted for reduced Czechoslovak imports of Soviet oil in the 1980's. See Radio Prague, Oct. 24, 1981, quoted in RFE, *Situation Report*, No. 22 (Czechoslovakia), Nov. 2, 1981, p. 5.

⁵² See interview with Dr. Kalman Pecsli in *NRC Handelsblad* (Rotterdam), May 23, 1984, in *FBIS-EEU*, June 12, 1984, p. AA/2.

⁵³ *The Washington Post*, Mar. 4, 1974.

⁵⁴ *Zivot strany* (Prague), Feb. 23, 1981, in RFE, *Situation Report*, No. 5 (Czechoslovakia), Mar. 16, 1981.

⁵¹ For typical expositions of the Romanian position, see *Scinteia* (Bucharest), June 9, 1979, and Oct. 17, 1980.

⁵² *Revista Economica*, Aug. 12, 1983, in *FBIS-EEU*, Sept. 8, 1983, p. AA/4.

⁵³ See RFE, *Background Report*, No. 132 (Romania), June 14, 1982.

⁵⁴ Cited in Radio Free Europe, *Situation Report*, No. 16 (Romania), Sept. 14, 1979.

⁵⁵ *Stuttgarter*, Feb. 1, 1984.

⁵⁶ *Scinteia*, Nov. 25, 1981. RFE, *Situation Report*, No. 4 (Romania), Mar. 2, 1984, provides an overall assessment of this issue.

*crisis. Economic problems obviously affect the atmosphere of society and even the stability of the political system.*⁶¹

As noted at the outset, the price and availability of Soviet fuels and energy were prominent topics at the long-postponed CEMA summit finally convened in June 1984 in Moscow. The official communiqué of the gathering, while relatively circumspect on these issues, did state that to create the "economic conditions" for the continued export of Soviet energy to Eastern Europe the latter will "gradually and consistently develop their structure of production and of export" to supply the USSR with "necessary goods . . . of high quality and of a world level of technology."⁶²

It is not yet clear how adversely the terms agreed upon at the CEMA summit will affect Eastern Europe. First, they might not be rigidly implemented. The USSR has long supplied Eastern Europe with energy

without receiving in return sufficient "hard" goods—i.e., those of a quality comparable to that of items purchasable for hard currency on world markets. One Hungarian economist has already predicted that the desire to strike a balance in trade with Eastern Europe will "compel" the USSR to "make compromises" on its demand for "hard" commodities, because Eastern Europe simply produces insufficient quantities of these commodities.⁶³

Second, individual states will likely pursue somewhat different strategies in trying to meet Moscow's terms. An optimal strategy to ease the potential economic and political dislocations associated with these payments should include measures to stimulate both economic growth (thereby providing sufficient commodities for export without lowering internal consumption) and more efficient utilization of existing energy resources (thereby reducing requirements for importation from the USSR). Realization of these ends would likely entail extensive internal economic reform and/or sufficiently close economic and political relations with Western states to generate considerable loans, credits, and transfers of technology. Given the current political climate in East-West relations (as well as uncertainty over whether the new Kremlin

⁶¹ Budapest Domestic Service, Apr. 28, 1981, in *FBIS-EEU*, May 1, 1981.

⁶² *Pravda*, June 16, 1984. Already at the 1983 CEMA Council meeting, Soviet Premier Nikolay Tikhonov had called for "mutual advantage" in the oil trade, having the East Europeans take "urgent measures" to balance trade with the USSR by supplying it with "goods intended for export", i.e., "hard" goods. See *ibid.*, Oct. 9, 1983.

⁶³ *Kulgaszdaság*, January 1984, loc. cit., p. 8.



The Soviet hosts at the June 1984 CEMA summit meeting in Moscow, where Soviet energy deliveries to Eastern Europe were a major topic on the agenda.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

leadership will tolerate economic and political experimentation), one cannot be sanguine about the prospects for any East European state implementing this strategy completely.

Czechoslovakia and Poland have indicated their intention to adhere to the dictates of the 1984 summit and coordinate both their internal and external economic policies even more closely with the USSR,⁶⁴ thereby running the risk of falling further behind international standards of productivity because of insulation from the international market. But East Germany and Hungary have made clear their desire to have close economic ties with capitalist states while simultaneously fulfilling their obligations within CEMA.⁶⁵ Criticizing CEMA as a "greenhouse for deferring adjustment," a Hungarian observer asserted:

*An inward-turning import-substituting development policy becomes impossible primarily from the side of CEMA because the partners are no longer interested in maintaining the division of labor model under which raw materials are exchanged for finished products. . . . The numerous limitations of turning inward prove that only the opposite strategy is able to provide a way out. For it is hardly debatable that for products competitive on the world market our CEMA partners will gladly supply similar products, and, if not for such products, then certainly for the hard currency that we earn by exporting competitive products.*⁶⁶

Interestingly, the official communiqué of the 1984 summit—while calling for closer cooperation within CEMA—provides support for such an "outward" course by explicitly endorsing economic cooperation with capitalist countries. And just one month after the summit, the World Bank demonstrated the utility of ties with the West by granting Hungary a US\$487 million loan to assist export industries and to develop oil resources.⁶⁷

Joint Projects

In addition to oil imports, the East European states continue to be involved in a variety of joint energy projects with the USSR, including construction of a gas pipeline from the Orenburg fields in the Urals and of a 750-kilovolt power grid. In return for participation in the Orenburg project, the East Europeans will receive over a 20-year period a volume of natural gas equal to approximately one-half the total proven natural gas reserves in their region.⁶⁸ The power grid is to link by high tension lines a complex of nuclear

power stations located in the USSR that upon completion will boost the power generating capacities of the CEMA countries by more than one-third over present levels. The first part of the project is now completed; in 1980 it provided Hungary with approximately 20 percent of the electricity consumed in that country that year. As part of the grid, in March 1979 the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland agreed to joint financing of the Khmelnytskyi nuclear power station in Ukraine. The East European participants are to finance one-half of the estimated US\$2.2 billion cost of the project, with Poland contributing more than \$600 million and Czechoslovakia over \$350 million, including the delivery of four 1,000-megawatt nuclear reactors. The participants were to be repaid for their contribution with electricity from Khmelnytskyi between 1984 and 2003, after which they could purchase electricity from the station at standard commercial rates.⁶⁹

These projects have aroused considerable controversy. The East Europeans fear further loss of national sovereignty and are not convinced that these projects represent the economically optimal method for closing their energy gaps—particularly given the irrationality of the prices affecting both domestic and foreign trade within CEMA. One critic charged that the decision to pursue a particular project "largely constitutes a political commitment without any reference to cost/benefit analysis of the project's merits."⁷⁰ Projects also encounter considerable delays, as Czechoslovak Premier Lubomír Štrougal recently complained with

⁶⁴ See, e.g., the comments of Polish Prime Minister Wojciech Jaruzelski as reported in *Trybuna ludu* (Warsaw), Dec. 27, 1983, and Czechoslovak Premier Štrougal's comments as reported in *Rudé právo*, June 23, 1984.

⁶⁵ *Népszabadság* (Budapest), Aug. 4, 1984, and *Neues Deutschland*, Aug. 16, 1984, provide typical expositions of this position. For a useful compilation of articles on this subject in the Hungarian, East German, and Soviet press, see Marvin Jackson, "When Is a Price a Price? The Level and Patterns of Prices in the CMEA," RFE, *Background Report* (Munich), No. 155 (Economics), Aug. 24, 1984.

Yet even Polish commentators acknowledge that ties to the West are "in many cases simply essential" if Poland is ever to acquire the hard currency necessary to pay off its huge debts to capitalist countries. See *Zycie Warszawy* (Warsaw), July 19, 1984, in FBIS-EEU, July 27, 1984, p. G/8.

⁶⁶ *Valóság* (Budapest), December 1983, in JPRS, No. EEI-84-070, June 13, 1984, p. 2.


⁶⁷ See report by AP, July 12, 1984.

⁶⁸ *Pravda*, July 30, 1984. For an extended discussion of the Orenburg project, see RFE, *Background Report*, No. 165 (Eastern Europe), Dec. 2, 1975.

⁶⁹ For details of this project see East Berlin radio, Apr. 1, 1979, in FBIS-EEU, Apr. 6, 1979, pp. AA/1-2. On 1980 power deliveries, see *Figyelo* (Budapest), Oct. 18, 1980, pp. 8-9.

At one point Soviet officials expressed interest in eventually expanding this system to transmit power to Western Europe as well. Similar proposals had previously floundered on the insistence of West Germany that West Berlin be included in any such project, but Soviet sources indicated that this issue was now "only a secondary question that could be resolved." See *Pravda*, June 27, 1979.

⁷⁰ Kalman Peci, *The Future of Socialist Integration*, New York, M. E. Sharpe, 1981, quoted in RFE, *Background Report*, No. 258 (Eastern Europe), Dec. 10, 1982, p. 5.



A map at the Zapadnoukrainskaya substation in December 1978 shows the 750-kilovolt electric power network being constructed to transmit energy from Vynnytsya to Albertirsa, Hungary. The network was to link up with the Mir power pool in Eastern Europe.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

respect to construction of the 750-kilovolt power grid.⁷¹

Beyond their enormous nominal costs (the totality of joint CEMA projects—many of them related to energy—envisioned for the 1980's could approach \$130 billion, with East Europeans responsible for about one-half of this amount),⁷² there are other less visible costs. We have already identified the subsidy that the East European creditors will be extending to the Soviet borrower through artificially low interest rates. Moreover, CEMA practice is to value credits and payments at their respective times of delivery, thereby devaluing the former in times of inflation.⁷³

Yet one can also argue—as do the Soviets and some Western analysts—that the USSR actually bears a disproportionate share of the costs while Eastern Europe gains a disproportionate share of the benefits from these joint projects. Soviet economists point especially to Eastern Europe's huge trade deficit with the USSR as making joint projects economically unfeasible:

*When most European CEMA countries are permanently indebted to the Soviet Union as a result of clearing their commodity trade, their deliveries to the Soviet Union under special-purpose credits no longer make any economic sense.*⁷⁴

One Western study goes so far as to assert that the "Soviets have completely abandoned a multilateral approach to solving [CEMA] energy and raw material difficulties."⁷⁵

Prospects

What are the future implications of the current state of Soviet-East European energy relations? Recent cuts in Soviet oil deliveries have already, according to some East Europeans, reduced rates of economic growth in the region.⁷⁶ Yet there seem to be few alter-

⁷¹ *Rudé právo*, Oct. 19, 1983. Strougal, too, has argued that in these projects "prices should be utilized better than to date as an objective yardstick of value." *Pravda* (Bratislava), July 3, 1981, in *FBIS-EEU*, July 13, 1981, p. AA/8.

⁷² This estimate, for projects in 1981–90, is from RFE, *Background Report*, No. 59 (Eastern Europe), Mar. 13, 1979.

⁷³ *Kulgasdaság*, January 1984, trans. loc. cit.

⁷⁴ *Planovoye khozyaystvo* (Moscow), August 1981, p. 19. Van Brabant, op. cit., p. 130, also argues that the Soviets suffered from a "sizable opportunity cost" in such projects. On this issue, see also *Financial Times* (London), Oct. 17, 1980.

⁷⁵ Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, *Centrally Planned Economies Current Analysis* (Washington, DC), No. 46, June 29, 1984, p. 3. See also *Planovoye khozyaystvo*, February 1982, pp. 93–96.

⁷⁶ See the assessment of a Hungarian economist in *Figyelo*, Oct. 13, 1983, in *JPRS*, No. 84892, Dec. 6, 1983, p. 8.

natives to relying on the Soviet Union as a supplier of the energy needed to plug the existing energy gaps of the East European economies. Further, the economic and political costs of this dependency on the USSR are high. Elites of the region confront the dilemma of determining how many of their scarce material resources they can devote to closing the energy gap without undermining their ability to maintain their populations' living standards. They have already had to allocate in payment for Soviet energy considerable resources previously devoted to internal consumption and to trade with capitalist countries. As noted, many of these resources are tied up in long-term Soviet energy projects whose economic feasibility remains uncertain.

The extent to which the USSR insists that the Eastern Europeans pay with "hard"—instead of the traditional "soft"—goods for energy represents another key variable in the relationship. Payment in "hard" goods constrains even further the capacity of the East Europeans to trade with the West and acquire the sophisticated technologies they need if they are to modernize their economies (and, concomitantly, enhance their ability to produce the very "hard" goods of which the USSR is so desirous). It also prevents the earning of the hard currency necessary to pay off enormous debts to Western creditors.

Finally, reliance upon the USSR for energy supplies—and the growing economic dependence that this entails—may reduce even more the limited political autonomy available to these states. Western analysis is divided on whether energy exports are an effective instrument by which Moscow can exert political influence in the region.⁷⁷ To be sure, the current case of Poland—where the USSR has so far used its "oil card" with discretion and thereby avoided exacerbating an already disastrous economic situation and engendering even more intense anti-Soviet feelings among the population—suggests the limited leverage that these exports may afford the Soviet Union in a crisis. And in an ironic sense, the overwhelming dependence of Eastern Europe upon Soviet energy prevents the USSR from implementing policies—for example, significantly reducing deliveries of, or substantially increasing prices for, energy supplies—that its own national interest would otherwise dictate. However, Eastern Europe's long-term and extensive dependence upon the USSR for energy effectively limits the region's room for maneuver in international politics and makes it difficult for its regimes to respond positively to initiatives (e.g., efforts at "bridge building" by the Western states) designed to enhance

their autonomy vis-à-vis the USSR. One intriguing question certain to elicit keen interest among Western (and Eastern) political observers will be whether the USSR accepts the argument of the East German and Hungarian regimes that it is precisely the demand of the USSR that it receive "hard" commodities in payment for energy that requires Moscow's trade partners to maintain an extensive economic (and, inevitably, political) intercourse with capitalist countries.

Naturally, Soviet elites confront many of the same dilemmas. In particular, the USSR has a vested interest in ensuring that the inevitable economic dislocations attendant upon managing the region's energy problems do not reach a magnitude that could spark political unrest in Eastern Europe or even in the Soviet Union itself. The USSR also faces the dilemma of how to manage relations among its nominal allies in an increasingly fragmented and conflict-ridden alliance system. Although the logic of Eastern Europe's energy problems seems in some ways to argue for increased CEMA unity, the short-run effect has been to unleash centrifugal forces that have generated numerous, frequently acrimonious disputes; criticism—not always veiled—of the USSR; and a vigorous expounding of national interest.

Eastern Europe's energy gap also raises dilemmas for Western policymakers. What hopes are there for encouraging greater independence of East European states from Moscow if the region's energy problems are likely over time to bind these regimes more closely to the USSR? Are Western interests well served if domestic production constraints in the USSR force Moscow to reduce its energy exports to Eastern Europe with likely attendant economic, and perhaps political, dislocations that could easily (as the case of Poland amply demonstrates) raise the level of international tension? On the other hand, is it wise to mitigate such constraints by providing the USSR with the sophisticated Western technology needed to exploit fully its many untapped energy reserves, when this also results in strengthening economically a major political adversary?

Given the persistent weakness in international oil markets and serious problems in Soviet petroleum extraction, energy relations within the context of CEMA will likely continue to be problematic. Despite a marked contraction in official data on this touchy subject, the relationship bears close watching.

⁷⁷ See, e.g., Thane Gustafson, "Energy and the Soviet Bloc," *International Security* (Cambridge, MA), Winter 1981–82, pp. 65–89, esp. pp. 79–80.

Notes

Rural Reform in China: Stage Two

Joseph Fewsmith

THE PROMULGATION on January 1, 1984, of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee's decision on rural work, "Document No. 1" for 1984, appeared to be the culmination and finalization of a series of dramatic changes that have swept through China's countryside since the landmark decisions of the party's Third Plenum in December 1978. By extending the term for land contracts from three to "at least" 15 years, the 1984 document legitimized and institutionalized the household-based contract responsibility system (*baogan daohu*), a form of de facto private land ownership that had been allowed to emerge in the countryside.¹ The impression that rapid rural change might finally settle into a pattern of more incremental adjustment seemed confirmed by Premier Zhao Ziyang's announcement at the June 1984 session of the National People's Congress that the focus of reform would shift to the urban areas. It was thus cause for surprise when the national rural work conference—convened in mid-December 1984—heralded a "second major reform" of the rural economy, which was spelled out in "Document No. 1" for 1985, issued on January 1 of this year.²

The core of the new reform, which may prove even more far-reaching than the measures unleashed six years ago, is the decision to "gradually abolish" the 30-year-old state monopoly over the procurement and sale of agricultural products and to inaugurate a

"comprehensive" price reform, starting in the countryside. Addressing the December rural work conference on December 21, Zhao Ziyang called on peasants to arrange production more in accordance with "market conditions" and on the government to use "economic measures" to administer rural work. Elaborating in *Hongqi*, No. 3, February 1, 1985, Zhao stated that it was necessary "to work according to the law of value, to broaden market regulation, to gradually loosen price control, and to allow the peasants to produce according to market demands." Reform of the price system, Zhao observed in December, is something "we have hoped to do but could not and dared not do for many years."³

The decision to abolish the monopoly procurement system and to institute rural price reform is part of the effort to carry out comprehensive price reform, announced by the "Decision on the Reform of the Economic Structure" adopted by the party's Third Plenum in October 1984. That measure termed price reform "the key to reform of the entire economic structure," but did not elaborate on specific measures for carrying out the reform.⁴ In January 1985, Vice-Premier Tian Jiyun stressed that rural price reform, being less complicated than urban price reform, should begin

Joseph Fewsmith is Analyst of Chinese Politics for the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (Washington, DC). He is author of Party, State, and Local Elites in Republican China: Merchant Organizations and Politics in Shanghai, 1890–1930 (1985). The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the US government.

¹ Document No. 1 for 1984 was publicized by Xinhua on Mar. 24, 1984. This report is translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-CHI*), Mar. 25, 1984, pp. K/1–7. See the colloquium on this document in *China Quarterly* (London), March 1985, pp. 104–31.

² See *Renmin Ribao* (Beijing), Jan. 2, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 2, 1985, pp. K/22–25; and the *Renmin Ribao* editorial of Dec. 31, 1984, which was apparently pegged to the close of the national rural work conference, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 3, 1985, pp. K/12–14.

³ *Renmin Ribao* Jan. 2, 1985; and Zhao Ziyang, "Loosen Control Over the Prices of Farm Products to Promote the Readjustment of the Production Structure in Rural Areas," *Hongqi* (Beijing), No. 3, Feb. 1, 1985, pp. 10–13, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *China Report: Red Flag* (Washington, DC—hereafter *JPRS-CRF*), No. 85-008, Apr. 3, 1985, pp. 14–20.

⁴ For a text, see Xinhua, Oct. 20, 1984, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 22, 1984, pp. K/1–19.

first. The prices of basic goods such as grain, edible oil, meat, and vegetables should, he said, be "readjusted step by step."⁵

This rural price reform is to be implemented by replacing the present monopoly procurement system with purchases by contracts voluntarily entered into by the peasants with a variety of procurement, processing, and other consuming organizations. Rather than having to sell their grain at a specified price to the local grain bureau, peasants are to have the option of searching out buyers—either individually or through producers' associations.⁶ Contracts with the state will be based on the "reverse ratio of 3:7" (30 percent of the grain will be purchased at the state quota price, and 70 percent will be purchased at higher—above-quota—prices), with some variation permitted to reflect the quality of the grain.⁷ Apparently the timing of when contracts are to be signed—and, consequently, the exact price for contracted grain—is subject to negotiation (more on this below).

The stated purpose of the price and procurement reform is to use economic means to guide peasants to grow higher quality and more marketable grain and/or to improve the "production mix" (i.e., the relative proportion of industrial crops, food crops, animal husbandry, and sideline industry). According to Chinese commentary, the current irrational price structure leads to excess production and waste of unwanted goods and severe shortages of needed goods. Because the monopoly procurement system provided incentives for producing grain and cotton regardless of quality, the state commercial enterprises must store "several hundred million *yuan*" (the *yuan* was a shade under US\$.50 in 1984) worth of those commodities, while the production of other commodities—silk, jute, tea, and flue-cured tobacco, among others—has stagnated.⁸ At a recent forum in Hunan Province, agriculture minister He Kang complained that only 25 percent of China's rice crop was of high quality and that the supply fell short of demand.⁹

Besides trying to encourage peasants to produce to meet market demand, the reform seeks to limit state purchases of agricultural produce and thus reduce a burden of subsidies estimated to run in the billions of *yuan* a year.¹⁰ As Tian Jiyun observed, state subsidies have led to retail prices being lower than the state purchasing price, so that "the better the agricultural harvests are, the greater the state subsidies."¹¹ The combination of the financial incentives provided by the contract responsibility system and the guaranteed purchase of produce by the state gave peasants the signal: "I will purchase whatever you grow, and I will purchase whatever quantity you are able to produce."¹² The new system of purchase contracts is aimed at limiting the state's obligation to purchase grain and forcing the peasants either to sell their surplus grain on the market or to grow other products in greater demand.

Why the New Agricultural Reforms?

Ironically, the new steps appear to have been necessitated to considerable measure by the very success of the contract responsibility system introduced in 1978 in encouraging the output of grain. In the period 1978–84, annual grain production increased by one-third—from 600 billion *jin* (or roughly 300,000 metric tons; 1 *jin* = 1.1 pound) to 800 billion *jin* (400,000 metric tons)—while cotton output increased by 150 percent.¹³ Although this growth in production only brought China up to the world average in per capita terms, it severely strained the nation's storage, transport, and processing capabilities. Moreover, production remains unbalanced, with animal husbandry and high-quality grain lagging far behind; also, some areas suffer from overabundance while others remain extremely poor. Jilin Province in the northeast has a surplus of 13 billion *jin* of corn. According to the news-weekly *Liaowang*, "even if 6 good trains were dispatched from Jilin each day with a carrying capacity of 2,500 tons each, one whole year would not be enough" to remove the surplus.¹⁴ At the other extreme, there are poor provinces such as Gansu, in the northwest, which reports that its per capita supply of

⁵ Tian Jiyun, "Actively and Steadily Carry Out Reform of the Pricing System," *Renmin Ribao*, Jan. 8, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 10, 1985, pp. K/2–9.

⁶ Hohhot radio, Feb. 13, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 15, 1985; Jinan radio, Jan. 30, 1985, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *China Report: Agriculture* (Washington, DC—hereafter *JPRS-CAG*), No. 85-009, Mar. 6, 1985, pp. 126–28.

⁷ This pricing for state grain procurement apparently began to be implemented in August 1984. See, e.g., *Sichuan Ribao* (Chengdu), Aug. 10, 1984, p. 1.

⁸ See "Positive Principle for All-Round Invigoration of the Rural Economy—On Readjusting the Rural Production Structure," *Nongmin Ribao* (Beijing), Jan. 28, 1985, p. 1, trans. in *JPRS-CAG*, No. 85-009, Mar. 6, 1985, pp. 1–2. On the dollar-*yuan* exchange rate, see *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), June 7, 1985, p. 110.

⁹ Changsha radio, Jan. 12, 1985, trans. in *JPRS-CAG*, No. 85-008, Feb. 14, 1985, pp. 70–71.

¹⁰ See *Hongqi*, No. 7, Apr. 1, 1984, in *JPRS-CRF*, No. 84-010, May 1, 1984, p. 3.

¹¹ Loc. cit.

¹² Wu Shuo, "A Talk on the Second Major Reform of the Rural Economic Structure," *Liaowang* (Beijing), No. 4, 1985, pp. 16–17, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 7, 1985, pp. K/19–22.

¹³ "There Must Be Coordinated Development of Agricultural Production," *Nongmin Ribao*, Jan. 11, 1985, trans. in *JPRS-CAG*, No. 85-010, Mar. 11, 1985, pp. 3–4.

¹⁴ Wu Shuo, loc. cit.

grain is only 540 *jīn*, some 260 *jīn* below the national average.¹⁵

Patching up the procurement system was insufficient, according Chinese commentary, because the problem was "primarily an institutional one."¹⁶ A Xinhua Commentator article asked: "Should the irrational production structure be readjusted under state plan from top to bottom, or should it be readjusted through the mechanism of the market and under the guidance of the state plan?" Terming the former a "hard and thankless task," the article opted for readjustment in accordance with the "objective law of commodity economy."¹⁷

The pressure for fundamental reform increased with last summer's record grain harvests, which exacerbated the grain storage problem. Grain bureaus in some areas apparently even refused to buy grain. Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang noted during an August 1984 visit to Hubei Province that "the rural areas are producing more, and some comrades do not know what to do with the surplus."¹⁸ Vice-Premier Yao Yilin declared during a mid-September visit to Henan Province that "the work of grain conversion cannot keep abreast of the growth of grain production."¹⁹ Local cadres apparently responded to the rural abundance by making it difficult for peasants to sell grain. On September 23, the party daily *Renmin Ribao* warned cadres against using "administrative means" to restrict grain production. Such measures, the article cautioned, would "seriously dampen the peasants' initiative in production" and adversely affect economic conditions as a whole.²⁰

One dimension of the problem was addressed at the first National Conference on the Food Industry, held in Beijing in late August and early September 1984. Vice-Premier Tian told the gathering that "the problem of being underfed has become history" and warned that future agricultural development would be constrained "unless measures were taken to develop the food industry in a big way." Tian announced that management of the industry is to be removed from the departments and regions and placed under an Association of the Food Industry. In addition, a food industry office and a food technology development corporation

are to be established under the State Economic Commission. These centralizing measures were designed to "break down the barriers of departmental and regional ownership."²¹ In a related action, the State Council approved a program aimed at increasing the annual growth rate of the food processing industry from 11 percent to 15 percent through the end of the century.²²

As the autumn progressed, the momentum for reform gathered. On November 14, the economic daily *Jingji Ribao* termed the establishment of "a new rural industrial structure" the "central task" of future reform.²³ A Commentator article in *Renmin Ribao* on December 2 called the prevailing structure "irrational," saying that it inhibited the development of rural markets, obstructed exchanges between urban and rural areas, caused marketing difficulties, and prevented the countryside from finding an "outlet for large amounts of surplus labor and growing amounts of capital." Without a "second phase" of rural reform, the article warned, prospects for growth would be limited and might even diminish as population continued to grow.²⁴

Implementation of Document No. 1 for 1985

The politically sensitive issue of rural price reform is to be approached incrementally and with great caution. Premier Zhao indicated that in 1985 the state intends to contract for 150 to 160 billion *jīn* of grain, leaving only some 10 billion *jīn* subject to market forces (the remainder of China's 800-billion-*jīn* harvest is consumed locally). Still, Zhao predicted that price differentials based on quality and local supplies would emerge. In order to protect the interest of peasants, Zhao promised that the state would purchase, if necessary, whatever amount of grain was necessary to prevent the market price from falling below the state purchasing price. At the same time, he said, the government would provide subsidies, if needed, to maintain the "basic stability" of grain prices in the urban areas.²⁵

Although it is still too early to judge the overall impact of this year's Document No. 1 on agricultural production and rural income, Chinese media have indi-

¹⁵ Lanzhou radio, Mar. 25, 1985, "Get a Good Grasp of Grain Production," trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 28, 1985, p. T/1.

¹⁶ Zhao Ziyang, "Loosen Control Over the Prices. . . ." loc. cit.

¹⁷ Xinhua, Jan. 11, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 18, 1985, pp. K/26-27.

¹⁸ Xinhua, Sept. 2, 1984, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 4, 1984, pp. K/1-3.

¹⁹ Zhengzhou radio, Sept. 14, 1984, *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 19, 1984, pp. K/7-8.

²⁰ "Please Do Not Worry About Having More Grain," trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 26, 1984, pp. K/9-10.

²¹ *Renmin Ribao*, Sept. 5, 1984, p. 1.

²² Xinhua, Aug. 26, 1984, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 28, 1984, pp. K/10-11.

²³ Trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 15, 1984, p. K/23.

²⁴ "Start the Second Phase of Rural Reform," trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 7, 1984, pp. K/9-10.

²⁵ Zhao Ziyang, "Loosen Control over the Prices of Farm Products. . . ." loc. cit.

cated several areas of concern. First, despite official intent to intervene when necessary to maintain overall price stability, official commentary has admitted that the negative effects of the new policies in some areas may be considerable. For example, a *Renmin Ribao* Commentator article and report on February 6, 1985, noted that in Weixian County of Hebei Province, "some areas with concentrated production of grain and cotton are required to reduce their grain-growing and cotton-growing areas to a fairly large extent." Local cadres and peasants were reportedly "more worried than glad" at the prospect. Cotton-growing areas of the county, which had increased from 300,000 *mu* (1 *mu* = 0.1647 acres) to 500,000 *mu* since 1984, were to be cut back to 300,000 in 1985. According to *Renmin Ribao*, cadres in the county had worked out plans "in accordance with market needs" to readjust production without reversing the rise in peasant income. The article admitted that other areas might not be so fortunate and that "it is very possible that for a time income may be reduced" in such areas.²⁶

Potentially more serious is the possibility that local cadres and peasants might abandon grain production altogether, in favor of more profitable cash cropping or other sideline activities. Thus, a Special Commentary in the agricultural daily *Nongmin Ribao* on 30 January, the day before Zhao Ziyang's *Hongqi* article on price reform appeared on the front page of party newspapers throughout the country, warned that "we must certainly not relax grain production" in the course of readjusting the agricultural structure.²⁷ In the spring, there were renewed urgings to maintain the level of grain production. On March 14, minister He Kang warned against slackening of grain production.²⁸ The same day a *Jingji Ribao* article said that "in some parts of the country, peasants have begun to show contempt for farming."²⁹ On March 19, *Renmin Ribao* ran an authoritative Commentator article entitled, "In No Way Should the Grip on Grain Production Be Relaxed."³⁰

These exhortations to maintain the level of grain production have been followed by media commentary

suggesting that the new system of contractual purchases is in fact being implemented slowly. For instance, a Xinhua Commentator article on March 16 decried the "failure to promptly put this year's grain production plan into practice, the arbitrary and excessive reduction in the acreage of land sown to grain crops, and decreases in manpower and the use of fertilizer in the grain fields."³¹ On April 25, the biweekly Beijing news magazine *Banyue Tan* called the signing of sales contracts the "glorious obligation" of the peasants.³²

This impression of slow implementation of the new contract system is borne out by reports from provincial media. On May 18, Guangzhou reported that some people have a mistaken view of the purchase contracts, saying that "they would sign the contracts if they think they are suitable and refuse if they are not. This simply will not do."³³ On April 2, Changsha radio reported that "contracts on the purchase and sale of agricultural products have been signed slowly," and on April 12, the station warned that "some places and departments have still not acted effectively in studying and implementing Document No. 1, and their actions have been slow."³⁴ On March 20, Shenyang radio said that "some people" mistakenly thought they could relax grain production, resulting in a "cold and gloomy situation in farming preparations."³⁵

The most detailed account to date of peasants and government trying to outwit each other comes from China's most populous province, Sichuan. According to an April 30 report, only 61.3 percent of the total peasant households in the province had signed contracts. Given the apparent freedom to sign contracts at economically advantageous times, the peasants there "are still watching the rise and fall of grain prices on the market and have not signed contracts even after stalling for a long time." In response, the various localities sent "tens of thousands" of party and government cadres to the rural areas to "widely publicize the significance of signing grain and oil purchase contracts." To enhance the persuasive powers of these cadres, the provincial authorities also decided to put 400 million *jin* of grain on the market, where the price of grain was high. In addition, they rewarded those peasants who had already signed purchase

²⁶ Trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 11, 1985, pp. K/15-18. In a similar account, a Feb. 1, 1985, Xinhua Commentator article reported that Dezhou Prefecture in Shandong Province would have to reduce cotton acreage from 5.5 million to 4 million *mu*, with an attendant loss in the prefecture's income from cotton of 600 million *yuan*, or some 120 *yuan* per capita (trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 4, 1985, pp. K/24-25).

²⁷ Trans. in *JPRS-CAG*, No. 85-009, Mar. 6, 1985, pp. 4-5.

²⁸ Xinhua, Mar. 14, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 19, 1985, pp. K/12-13.

²⁹ See Feng Zishan's article "A New Perception of Agriculture as the Foundation of the National Economy," trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 27, 1985, pp. K/15-17.

³⁰ Trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 25, 1985, pp. K/9-10.

³¹ Trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 19, 1985, pp. K/13-14.

³² See Liu Xinjiang's article, "How Are We to Carry Out Contracted Purchases of Grain?" trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, May 13, 1985, pp. K/12-13.

³³ *Guangzhou Ribao*, May 18, 1985.

³⁴ Trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 3, 1985, p. P/2, and Apr. 17, 1985, p. P/4.

³⁵ Trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 22, 1985, pp. S/1-2.

contracts by giving them "preferential treatment" in the purchase of "fine-quality chemical fertilizer and urea."³⁶

Such peasant reaction to the new contract system is apparently based on real economic considerations. According to a March 8 *Gongren Ribao* article, peasant enthusiasm for grain production is decreasing as a result of a widening of the price scissors and a reduction in the price of grain on the market.³⁷ In response, the acreage sown to grain crops has dropped. Hubei Province on March 23 reported that "some areas suited to growing grain crops are making excessive reductions in the sown areas of grain," and on March 20, Liaoning reported that "some people," thinking that grain cultivation would not bring as large of an income, had decided to plant cash crops, thereby "blindly cutting down the acreage of grain fields."³⁸

On April 26, *China Daily* confirmed these reports, stating that, nationwide, it was expected that peasants would plant 2.5 million fewer hectares of grain in 1985. According to the article, Sichuan had cut back its grain fields the most, by more than 530,000 hectares, followed by the major grain-producing provinces of Hunan, Hebei, and Shandong. The article stated that agricultural officials hoped that higher yields would offset the potential loss of 15 million tons of grain, and stated that the 1985 grain target had been set at 405 million tons, 2 million tons less than last year's harvest.

Commercializing Chinese Agriculture

The current effort to increase the role of market forces in the countryside is a continuation of efforts over recent years to reward those who are willing to invest capital and labor in the land and various rural enterprises, and thereby relieve the financially-strapped state of some of the burden of developing the countryside. Indeed a Xinhua article in November 1984 explicitly stated that "the funds for quadrupling the value of agricultural production must come mainly from the accumulations of agriculture itself."³⁹ This theme was reemphasized in a February 19, 1985, *Renmin Ribao* Commentator article, which noted that as the rural economy has developed, the peasants

have more money. "This money," the article suggested, "should first be spent on expanded reproduction."⁴⁰ One of the primary purposes of last year's decision to extend the length of land contracts from 3 years to 15 years was to give peasants a greater incentive to invest in the land and thereby prevent "exploitative" farming—the draining of nutrients from the land by not investing in fertilizer and other inputs. The principal vehicle for this primarily private accumulation and investment is the "specialized household," an institution that has emerged and burgeoned in recent years.⁴¹ The role of such households—which sell a high percentage of their produce to the state or on the market, or which have given up agriculture in favor of such services as transport or commerce—is to increase under the new policies. As Hubei party chief Guan Guangfu said, "The role of specialized households has become even more important in the new situation. . . ."⁴²

According to Chinese media, there are now 25 million households (containing 14 percent of the rural population) engaged in various forms of specialized production or services.⁴³ This figure marks a 3 percent increase over 1983, but the number of specialized households appears to be growing considerably faster in some areas.⁴⁴ The operations of some specialized households are apparently quite large, requiring sizable concentrations of land. For instance, one Jiangxi peasant last year reportedly sold 140,000 *jin* of grain to the state.⁴⁵

Chinese media in recent months have openly publicized and promoted such concentration of land holdings. On November 3, 1984, a front-page *Renmin Ribao* article reported that one-eighth of the rural population of Zhongshan City in Guangdong Province had contracted for 40 percent of the total area of farmlands and fishponds in the city. Such land concentra-

³⁶ Chengdu radio, Apr. 30, 1985, trans. in *JPRS-CAG*, No. 85-018, June 10, 1985, pp. 126-27.

³⁷ See Liu Xifeng's article, "Some Problems Must Not Be Neglected in Grain Production," trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 19, 1985, pp. K/15-16.

³⁸ Wuhan radio, Mar. 23, 1985, trans. in *JPRS-CAG*, Apr. 16, 1985, p. 70; and Shenyang radio, Mar. 20, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 22, 1985, pp. S/1-2.

³⁹ Trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 15, 1985, pp. K/17-18.

⁴⁰ Trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 27, 1985, pp. K/11-13.

⁴¹ According to *Zhongguo Nongmin Bao* (Beijing), Dec. 2, 1984, the "concerned departments" of the party Central Committee said that a household must possess four characteristics to be considered a "specialized household": (1) considering the household as a unit, its principal labor or the majority of its labor must be used in conducting specialized management activities; (2) over 60 percent of the household's income is specialized income; (3) the proportion of specialized products in its marketed goods is over 80 percent—the proportion for households specializing in grain is over 60 percent—and (4) the earnings from products sold—including income from services—outside the prefecture or county is twice the average amount of income from goods sold locally. Trans. in *JPRS-CAG*, No. 85-010, Mar. 11, 1985, p. 22.

⁴² Wuhan radio, Feb. 9, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 12, 1985, pp. P/3-5.

⁴³ Xinhua, Jan. 4, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 8, 1985, p. K/22.

⁴⁴ See, e.g., *Anhui Ribao* (Hefei), Jan. 9, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 30, 1985, pp. O/1-3; and Shijiazhuang radio, Jan. 1, 1985, trans. in *JPRS-CAG*, No. 85-007, Feb. 5, 1985, p. 68.

⁴⁵ Nanchang radio, Feb. 3, 1984, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 6, 1984, pp. O/2-3.

tion, the article declared, meant that the peasants were "willing to invest more capital and labor in the farmland." One peasant had contracted for more than 400 *mu* of farmlands and fishponds in 1982 and had contracted for an additional 300 *mu* in 1984. An accompanying Commentator article hailed land concentration as an "objective trend and a progressive step," stating that through such concentration, skilled farmers would be better able to "develop the potential of the land through inputs of science and technology."⁴⁶ *China Daily* of February 16, 1985, reported that in some brigades in Penglai County, Shandong Province, all the land had been rented out to one or two specialized households.

The emergence of households with incomes greatly exceeding those of the average peasant has clearly provoked tension and conflict at the local level. In one instance reported from Xinjiang, the head of a specialized household committed suicide after conflict erupted with his neighbors.⁴⁷ In Sichuan Province, one Liu Zuolun complained that he had been forced to pay almost 3,000 *yuan* at various checkpoints while transporting lumber, causing him a loss of some 1,800 *yuan*. The sum was eventually returned to Liu, and provincial authorities directed that the case be studied as a negative example, noting that such "cases of creating difficulties for specialized households . . . are not rare in our province."⁴⁸ There are reports from numerous other provinces about extortion of money from specialized households and jealousy toward them on the part of some party leaders.⁴⁹ In response to such problems, many provinces have taken measures to protect the "legitimate" rights and interests of specialized households.⁵⁰

The increasing reliance on specialized households who operate on a large scale raises questions about what happens if they go bankrupt. *Nongmin Ribao* on January 17, 1985, wrote about a model specialized household, that of Chen Zhixiong in Guangdong, which had run up a massive debt. The article described the expansion of Chen's activities from 1979 when he contracted for 6 *mu* of fishponds and earned 6,000 *yuan* to 1981 when he contracted for 430 *mu* of fishponds and earned over 29,000 *yuan*. In 1982, his

luck ran out, and he suffered a loss of 28,000 *yuan*, followed by a loss of more than 23,000 *yuan* in 1983. During 1984 he contracted for 2,200 *mu* of land, but lost heavily, driving his debts up to 150,000 *yuan*. According to the article, over half the debt—78,000 *yuan*—consisted of loans from the state and collective, indicating how far these institutions were willing to go in supporting specialized households. The unwillingness of the Chinese media to endorse true competition—with the attendant risk of failure—was apparent in the newspaper's conclusion that "even if a peasant suffers losses for the time being, he will not go bankrupt, as might happen in a capitalist country."⁵¹

Surplus Rural Manpower

Another, potentially more serious, problem brought about by the rapid increase in the number of specialized households and the consequent concentration of the land is the creation of a large quantity of surplus labor. Reportedly one-third of China's rural labor force has been "freed" from farming.⁵² In some areas, the move away from agriculture has been even more rapid. In many districts and townships of Zhongshan City, two-thirds of the population is said to be engaged in nonagricultural activities,⁵³ and in Zhejiang Province, half the rural labor force has abandoned agriculture.⁵⁴

The need to find an outlet for this surplus labor is apparently a factor in the recent campaign to develop the service sector of the Chinese economy. An article commenting on a summer 1984 visit of Premier Zhao to Anhui Province lashed out at "leftist" thought that "equated consumption with the capitalist lifestyle," and decried the current shortage of "catering services, hotel accommodations, communications facilities, tailors, child-care services, and bath houses." The article noted that those employed in the tertiary sector make up 70 percent of the labor force in capitalist countries but only 20 to 30 percent in China, and added that "most" of the 1 million youths employed in the province since 1979 have been given jobs in the service sector.⁵⁵

The exodus of unemployed peasants from the villages was recently endorsed by Zuo Hu of the State Council's Economic Research Center, who termed the

⁴⁶ Trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 7, 1984, pp. P/1-3.

⁴⁷ Urumqi radio, Jan. 15, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 17, 1985, pp. T/2-3.

⁴⁸ *Renmin Ribao*, Dec. 18, 1984, and Chengdu radio, Jan. 7, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 14, 1985, pp. Q/1-2; and *Sichuan Ribao* (Chengdu), Jan. 29, 1985, p.1.

⁴⁹ See, e.g., Changchun radio, Dec. 11, 1984, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 14, 1985, p. S/1; and Zhengzhou radio, Feb. 2, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 5, 1985, p. P/2.

⁵⁰ See, e.g., "Interim Provisions of Zhejiang Province for Protecting Legal Rights and Interests of Rural Specialized Households," *Zhejiang Ribao* (Hangzhou), Mar. 21, 1985, trans. in *JPRS-CAG*, No. 85-018, June 10, 1985, pp. 132-35.

⁵¹ Trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 31, 1985, pp. K/19-21.

⁵² Xinhua, Jan. 3, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 8, 1985, pp. K/20-21.

⁵³ Li Hu, "Farming Experts in Guangdong's Zhongshan City," loc. cit.

⁵⁴ Xinhua, Jan. 8, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 9, 1985, p. K/22.

⁵⁵ *Anhui Ribao*, Oct. 15, 1984.

notion that peasants should "remain in their home villages after quitting farm work" an "antiquated idea."⁵⁶ A *Renmin Ribao* Commentator article on December 6, 1984, gave authoritative approval for peasants to move not only to towns and townships but also to urban areas. Somewhat defensively, the article said that an influx of peasants into tertiary industry in the cities would not "take over others' businesses," and added that "competition is not a bad thing."⁵⁷

However, the primary destination for the new "surplus labor" from the farms is intended to be the thousands of towns dotting the Chinese countryside. Acceleration of the development of town and township enterprises was apparently endorsed by the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee's Document No. 4, promulgated in the spring of 1984 but never published in full.⁵⁸

According to media reports, both the number of towns and the importance of rural enterprises in these towns have been increasing rapidly. In Anhui Province, for instance, the number of rural enterprises increased from 45,000 in 1983 to 260,000 in 1984, and authorities there were reportedly considering plans to increase the total value of the output of such rural enterprises by 20 percent a year over the period 1987-91.⁵⁹ In Jilin Province, township enterprises now employ 11 percent of the rural work force, and the total value of output was 32 percent higher in 1984 than in 1983.⁶⁰ Similarly, in Sichuan Province, the output of rural enterprises last year increased 36 percent over 1983.⁶¹ Zhejiang Province posted an 87 percent gain in rural industrial output. In 1984, more than 30,000 new township-run factories were established in that province, bringing the total there to 110,000.⁶²

The nationwide model for developing townships and township enterprise, however, is Jiangsu Province. The province's status in this regard was highlighted recently in an article by Wang Shoudao, vice-chairman of the Central Advisory Commission. Wang called the development of township enterprises a "key link" in building socialism with Chinese characteristics, and said that Jiangsu's experience demonstrated that the only way to "thoroughly change the backward outlook" of the rural economy is to develop township

enterprises and thereby "readjust" the industrial structure. The reason that rural enterprises can play such a role, Wang noted, was their ability to attract investment funds. Citing the example of Xiashu Township in Jiangsu's Jurong County, Wang said that an "investment fever" emerged there when the township encouraged peasants to raise capital.⁶³ After a visit to Jiangsu to examine its development of township enterprises, Dai Suli, secretary and member of the Standing Committee of the Party Committee in Liaoning Province, "emphatically introduced" Jiangsu's experiences to a rural work conference in his own province. Dai called for the opening of 20,000-30,000 new village-owned enterprises and an increase in the total output value of such enterprises "by more than 50 percent" in 1985.⁶⁴

Prospects

The decision to initiate a "second major reform" of the rural economy is at once a reflection of the speed with which change and development have been occurring in the Chinese countryside and a signal that additional, possibly more far-reaching, change will be forthcoming. The very speed with which the rural economy is developing is sure to confront both economic planners and policymakers with new challenges.

In a purely economic vein, the rapid expansion of credit, including rural credit, in the last half of 1984 has provoked new restrictions this spring. According to Han Lei, president of the Agricultural Bank of China, there is an "acute shortage in the supply of funds in the rural areas," and that shortage "will be further aggravated this year."⁶⁵ Similarly, Chen Muhua, the newly appointed president of the People's Bank of China, told a rural monetary society conference that rural industry had developed too quickly and that in the future it should rely on its own accumulation of funds. Since, according to Chen, bank loans for rural industries accounted for over one-half of all rural bank loans, any tightening of rural credit is likely to slow the pace of village and town enterprise development.⁶⁶ Restrictions on official credit, however, are likely to speed the search for alternative sources of funds, such as issuance of stock and borrowing of private funds. So far, official commentary has encour-

⁵⁶ *Shijie Jingji Daobao* (Shanghai) Oct. 8, 1984, trans. in *JPRS-CAG*, No. 85-001, Jan. 3, 1985, pp. 14-15.

⁵⁷ Trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 10, 1985, pp. K/6-7.

⁵⁸ Guangzhou radio, July 12, 1984, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, July 13, 1984, p. P/1.

⁵⁹ *Shijie Jingji Daobao*, Dec. 3, 1984.

⁶⁰ Changchun radio, Jan. 1, 1985, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *China Report: Economic Affairs* (Washington, DC—hereafter *JPRS-CEA*), No. 85-009, Jan. 28, 1985, p. 120.

⁶¹ Chengdu radio, Jan. 9, 1985, trans. in *JPRS-CEA*, No. 85-012, Feb. 3, 1985, p. 48.

⁶² Xinhua, Jan. 29, 1985, trans. in *JPRS-CEA*, No. 85-017, Feb. 14, 1985, p. 56.

⁶³ *Nongmin Ribao*, Jan. 9, 1985.

⁶⁴ Shenyang radio, Jan. 28, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 31, 1985, pp. S/1-2.

⁶⁵ Xinhua, Mar. 26, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 28, 1985, pp. K/17-18.

⁶⁶ Xinhua, Apr. 21, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 22, 1985, p. K/5.

aged such privatization of credit.⁶⁷

In a more political vein, the gradual freeing of prices and the breaking-up of the state's monopoly position will to a certain extent place the state in competition with individual and collective enterprises. The instance of Sichuan peasants' trying to outsmart local grain bureaus suggests how quickly—and skillfully—peasants respond to market forces and any change in the state-society relationship. The freeing of pork prices, which has gained momentum this spring, similarly suggests that a rapid expansion of the private market will quickly challenge the predominance of state-run food stores. According to a May 13 Fuzhou radio report, the decontrol of pork prices in Fujian has undermined the position of state-run food stores, which now sell only one-third of the pork there. In the individually-run stores, the meat is fresher, the varieties of produce greater, prices more reasonable, and service more courteous. With the abolition of meat ration coupons and the granting of cash subsidies to urban residents to offset price increases, people have the freedom and the money to choose where to shop, and "naturally they shy away from stores in which they have no faith."⁶⁸

Potentially the most explosive issue, however, is the growing disparity of wealth, both inter- and intra-regional. The continuing sensitivity of this issue is apparently reflected in the change of tone of media com-

mentary in recent months. Last year, as the central authorities stressed the efficacy of their policies in leading the country to wealth, media emphasized how many "10,000-yuan households" had emerged. This year, apparently under pressure from urban interests, media have stressed how few rich peasants there in fact are. Thus, a February 22 *Renmin Ribao* Commentator article said that because of the "excessive propaganda" on wealthy peasants, urban residents had the "mistaken idea" that with the start of urban reform "it should be the turn of the urban staff and workers to become 10,000-yuan households." In fact, those peasants who had become truly wealthy were "only a few drops in the ocean."⁶⁹ At the same time, Beijing has stepped up its aid to backward areas in an attempt to alleviate the worst instances of regional poverty.

In its decision to abolish the state monopoly over the procurement and sale of agricultural produce and to institute comprehensive price reform, Beijing has signaled its confidence that it can, economically and politically, contain and control the problems that are sure to emerge. It has also, perhaps less consciously, signaled that reform has a momentum of its own—and that to stop is to go back. How the Chinese leadership manages the inevitable economic shortages and social tensions will determine not only the shape of the rural economy in the future but also the stability of rural society and the relationship of state to society.

⁶⁷ See, e.g., Commentator, "Encourage Joint-Stock Cooperation," *Renmin Ribao*, Mar. 11, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 14, 1985, pp. K/26-27; and idem, "Appropriately Expand Private Credit," *Renmin Ribao*, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 18, 1985, ppp. K/9-10.

⁶⁸ Trans. in *JPRS-CAG*, No. 85-023.

⁶⁹ Trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 25, 1985, pp. K/1-2.

Military Cuts in China

John Frankenstein

ON APRIL 19, 1985, Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang announced that the conventional forces of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) would be reduced by some 1 million men in 1985 and 1986.¹ Such a cut would constitute a 25 percent reduction in total PLA manpower—a major reduction in force by any standard. But this move may be more important for its diplomatic and political ramifications than for the actual impact it might have on Chinese military force developments.

Hu made his announcement at a press conference while on a visit to New Zealand, shrewdly tailoring his comments to fit the occasion. When asked if China would assume a military role in the South Pacific, he stated categorically that his country had no intention of expanding its military presence in the region.² Moreover, in talks with Prime Minister David Lange that same day, he expressed China's support for a nuclear-free zone in the Pacific and reiterated his country's firm commitment to an independent foreign policy based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.³ These statements meshed well with steps the Lange government had recently taken to distance New Zealand from US naval policy in the region—steps it hoped would reduce tensions in the South Pacific, even at the risk of jeopardizing the ANZUS Pact (which, ironically, had originally been formed in 1951, in part, as a reaction to growing communist Chinese power).

But Hu's trip was also part of a larger, continuing effort to present to the countries in the rapidly growing economy of the Pacific Basin an image of a nonthreatening China, that of a good neighbor now seeking economic cooperation, not revolution. Indeed, in commemorating the 30th anniversary of the Bandung Conference (in Indonesia) on April 25, 1985, Beijing Radio broadcast to Southeast Asia and the South Pacific the following message:

*China is a force for peace and stability. At the same time, China attaches extreme importance to, and supports South-South cooperation. It is striving to strengthen economic and technical cooperation with Third World countries. It is determined to contribute to the joint development and common prosperity of the Third World. Peace and development are the two most important issues at present.*⁴

The Chinese government sought to reinforce this image throughout the region by having Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian meet with Philippine and Indonesian leaders and stop off in Thailand on his way home from the commemorative Bandung meeting.⁵

The Deng Reforms

The announced force reductions should also be seen as part of Deng Xiaoping's efforts to modernize China and reform the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Reductions in personnel and steps to profes-

John Frankenstein is Associate Professor of International Studies at the Thunderbird Campus of the American Graduate School of International Management (Glendale, AZ) and in 1984 was Thunderbird Exchange Professor at the University of International Business and Economics in Beijing. He has contributed chapters on Chinese defense issues to several recent volumes.

¹ New China News Agency (hereafter Xinhua), Apr. 19, 1985, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC—hereafter FBIS-CHI), Apr. 19, 1985, p. E/3. See also *The New York Times*, Apr. 21, 1985.

² FBIS-CHI, Apr. 19, 1985, p. E/3.

³ *Ibid.*, p. E/2.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Apr. 26, 1985, p. A/3.

⁵ See, e.g., *ibid.*, Apr. 29, 1985, p. A/4. It is interesting to note that Wu was the first Chinese minister to visit Indonesia in 18 years. See *ibid.*, Apr. 25, 1985, p. A/1.

sionalize and streamline the Chinese government have been key themes in these efforts.⁶ Deng and his colleagues have pressured older officials to step down in favor of younger cadres, offering retirees numerous material and moral incentives as well as positions on newly created advisory commissions.⁷ As a result, there have been massive retirements in both the civilian bureaucracy (some 900,000 veteran cadres) and the PLA. But this is only the beginning. According to recent projections given by Hu himself, by the end of 1986, 2 million cadres—nearly 10 percent of China's 22 million cadre force—and 70,000 to 80,000 senior PLA officers will have retired.⁸

It is difficult to overemphasize the magnitude of the current personnel reshuffling and organizational streamlining now under way in the PLA. In December of 1984, Deng Xiaoping announced the "retirement" of 40 top officers in the General Staff of the rank of three-star general and above.⁹ Perhaps even more significant, it has been reported in both the Hong Kong and the American press that the number of military regions in China is to be reduced from 11 to 7 and that close to 80 percent of the leaders of these seven regions (the commanders and political commissars) will be new appointees.¹⁰ By far the most notable dismissal from high military office was that of Li Desheng, the former commander of Shenyang Military Region in northeast China. Li had been known for his resilience in office, managing to survive past purges despite having been associated with "gang of four" member Jiang Qing and the radical politics of the Cultural Revolution.¹¹

The reorganization should also be seen as part of Deng's two-pronged effort to reduce the *political* importance of the army and to increase the army's *military* effectiveness. Many, if not most, of the older officers are "old guard" revolutionaries of peasant origin who, having joined the party just before or during the civil war (1946-49), tend to be more "red" than "expert," and support Maoist military and political dogmas. Removing these older officers will allow younger, presumably more professional and better educated officers to assume command positions. One presumption is that these younger people will attend more to carrying out their professional responsibilities and less to perpetuating the revolution. Another presumption is that they will accept political guidance from the top echelons of the CCP leadership, a leadership that has, since 1979, stressed economic development, not class struggle. This, in turn, has apparently resulted in an effective freeze in the publicly announced military budget, which has run at 17 to 18 billion *yuan* ever since 1981.¹²

In sum, all of this may indicate the culmination of the long debate by the post-Mao leadership over military modernization. The issue is not military modernization itself, but rather its relationship to economic reconstruction. Essentially the question has been: should economic reconstruction take precedence over military modernization, or should military modernization occur simultaneously with economic rebuilding? The regime has been forced by persistent opposition of old-line cadres in the party and army into a "two steps forward, one step back" pattern of economic and social liberalization. Nonetheless, the projected cuts in the PLA suggest that the policy line giving priority to economic development has prevailed.¹³

⁶ See William deB. Mills, "Leadership Change in China's Provinces," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), May-June 1985, pp. 24-40.

⁷ In addition to receiving fairly lucrative retirement pay and comprehensive medical care, some retirees also were allowed continued access to official documents and permitted to attend official meetings, among other things. See *ibid.*, p. 34. The most prestigious and important advisory body was the Central Advisory Commission (CAC), for which Deng himself serves as chairman. For a description of the CAC, see William deB. Mills, "Generational Change in China," *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1983, pp. 29-31.

⁸ See *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 10, 1985, p. E13; *The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly* (Hong Kong), Apr. 15, 1985; and *The New York Times*, Apr. 21 and Mar. 6, 1985.

⁹ See John F. Burns, "40 High Officers Retire in China in Army Shake-Up," *The New York Times*, Dec. 31, 1984.

¹⁰ See "Eighty Percent of New Leadership Stratum of the Seven Military Regions Are New Appointments: Trend Is Toward Being More Sharp-Witted and Capable," *Wen Wei Po* (Hong Kong), June 14, 1985, in *FBIS-CHI*, June 14, 1985, p. W11; Daniel Southerland, "China Replaces Aging Leaders," *The Washington Post*, June 22, 1985; and John F. Burns, "China Steps Up Drive to Revive Bureaucracy," *The New York Times*, June 23, 1985.

¹¹ For a discussion of Li's ouster and how it is being viewed among some foreign observers, see Southerland, *loc. cit.* Shu-shin Wang had speculated that Deng would remove Li "when the time is ripe" because he viewed "Li's opportunism as an extremely dangerous threat to a smooth transition of power to his successors, Hu and Zhao." See his "Revamping China's Military," *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1985, p. 114, n. 19.

¹² For a handy table on Chinese military budget figures for 1977-1984, see C. M. Clarke, "Defense Modernization," *The China Business Review* (Washington, DC), July-August 1984, p. 44. Chinese Finance Minister Wang Bingqian announced in March 1985 that military spending for 1984 came to 18.073 billion *yuan* (roughly US\$8.5 billion) or 11.9 percent of total state expenditures; for 1985 the military budget allowed for 18.67 billion, again 11.9 percent of state expenditures. See "Report on the Execution of the State Budget for 1984 and on the Draft State Budget for 1985," *Beijing Review*, Apr. 29, 1985, pp. I-III. Beijing Radio noted in June 1985 that the ratio of defense spending to the state budget had been decreasing annually, dropping from 16.3 percent in 1980 to the current 11.9 percent (*FBIS-CHI*, June 21, 1985, pp. K14-15). While one can hardly take these figures at face value, given the Chinese passion for secrecy in matters of national security and the fact that it is not at all clear just what is included in the defense budget, it is the general trend that is important. CIA analysts, using the direct costing method, estimate that Chinese defense expenditures for the period under discussion run at about 40 billion *yuan*; see R.G. Mitchell, "Chinese Defense Spending in Transition," in US Congress Joint Economic Committee, *China Under the Four Modernizations*, Part I, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1982, p. 606.

¹³ For an extensive analysis of the trade-offs inherent in each of these approaches, see the essay by William T. Tow in this issue of *Problems of Communism*.

The Cuts and PLA Force Structure

But where, in fact, are the cuts taking place? Can China really enhance its security by cutting one-quarter of its military personnel? To help answer these questions, it is useful to look at what is being cut.

Most Western observers accept the official Chinese figure for total PLA personnel of 4.2 to 4.3 million for ground, air, and naval forces, although the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London gives a slightly lower figure and the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) a slightly higher one. By IISS count, the ground force, which has approximately 3.5 million soldiers, is divided into 118 main force divisions, 73 regional force divisions (also known as local defense forces), 17 field and 16 anti-aircraft artillery divisions, 13 armored divisions, plus a substantial number of chemical, communications, and logistics units.¹⁴ China's growing strategic rocket forces are included with artillery, although the exact organizational status of these forces is unclear. (*China Daily* did report in June 1984 that the rocket forces were to be broken out as an independent unit.)¹⁵

Hu did not indicate where the cuts would fall, but it seems reasonable to assume that they would come mostly in the less well-armed regional ground forces. Sizable reductions in main force army units or in the more technically oriented navy and air force—service arms that have increased responsibilities in combined-arms operations and extended coastal (and off-shore oil) defense—seem unlikely.

A more detailed look at manpower distribution within major ground force units will provide a better idea of how the cuts might be made. The unit and manpower counts from the IISS *The Military Balance, 1984-1985* and manpower figures from the US Defense Intelligence Agency's 1984 *Handbook of the Chinese People's Liberation Army*¹⁶ reveal that main force units account for approximately 60 percent of

the PLA's ground forces (see Table 1). The remaining 40 percent is made up of regional force divisions and regiments (27 percent) and of the miscellany of railway, engineering, signal, chemical, logistics, administrative, and other units (13 percent, or 400,000 troops).

While the precision of the numbers may be open to question, it is really the relative distribution and the trends that are important. Examination of Table 1, and of the figures for the miscellaneous units, shows that considerable progress toward the 1 million troop reduction could be made by cutting regional and support forces, *without* compromising the main force units. Indeed, some of the reduction may already be under way. The current figure of 73 regional divisions is 24 fewer than that given by IISS in its 1982-83 report. Also, some of the cuts could be made simply by reassigning some local force units to the People's Armed Police or to the Railway Engineer Corps, both of which are controlled by civilian ministries.¹⁷

A Modernized PLA

In other words, there appears to be some fat that can be trimmed fairly painlessly. Table 2, which compares the current status of force levels among the three services, the force distribution in 1975, and the projected force distribution if the 1 million troops were to be cut from the ground forces, gives a better picture of the modernized force China is creating. Although total PLA personnel after the cuts would be

¹⁴ The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1984-1985*, London, IISS, 1984, p. 92.

¹⁵ *China Daily* (Beijing), June 13, 1984. For a brief discussion of the establishment of this new missile wing, see p. 26 of William Tow's essay in this issue.

¹⁶ Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), *Handbook of the Chinese People's Liberation Army*, Washington, DC, US Department of Defense, November 1984.

¹⁷ The current leadership had already converted some 170,000 military engineers to civilian status. See the summary of other Deng military reforms in Wang, loc. cit., p. 116.

Table 1: Distribution of Personnel in the Chinese Army, 1984

Unit	Number	Number of troops per unit	Total manpower	Percent of ground forces
Main forces (Field Army)				
Infantry divisions	118	13,300	1,569,400	49.8
Armored divisions	13	9,900	128,700	4.1
Artillery divisions	33	5,800	191,400	6.1
Regional forces				
Divisions	73	7,500	547,500	17.4
Regiments	140	2,200	308,000	9.8

SOURCE: Defense Intelligence Agency, *Handbook of the Chinese People's Liberation Army*, Washington, DC, US Department of Defense, November 1984.

Table 2: PLA Force Structure—1975, Current, and Projected

	1975		Current		Projected	
	Manpower	% of Total	Manpower	% of total	Manpower	% of total
Ground Forces	2,800,000	86.2	3,500,000	80.5	2,500,000	74.6
Air Force	220,000	6.8	500,000	11.5	500,000	14.9
Navy	230,000	7.1	350,000	8.0	350,000	10.5
TOTAL	3,250,000		4,350,000		3,350,000	
Missiles						
(IRBM/MRBM)	80		110		?	
Missiles (ICBM)	0		6		?	

SOURCE: For past and current figures, see respective volumes of *The Military Balance*, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies.

approximately the same as in 1975, if the manpower estimates are correct, over one-fourth of China's military would be assigned to naval and air units. Conceivably, however, such units might even be expanded. And, of course, the strategic rocket forces are also apt to grow. (IISS, for 1984ff185, estimates that China has 6 ICBM's, 60 intermediate-range, and 50 medium-range ballistic missiles, plus a potential submarine-launched ballistic missile capability.)¹⁸

To be sure, manpower is only a rough guide to military capability, but it does provide a certain measure of the current leadership's priorities. The PLA today, despite its many problems, is a more competent, professional, and technically oriented force. A reduction in manpower levels of the sort suggested above can allow an increased concentration of resources, not only to enhance the capabilities of the more technical forces but also to upgrade the ground forces. As past experience demonstrates, such concentration of resources can have a significant impact on the quality of force development in China: a decade ago, a Chinese main force division (MFD) included only 32 tanks; by 1984, however, each MFD had 80.¹⁹

The Politics of PLA Reductions

The announced cuts have to be viewed in a historical context. Between 1974 and 1978, according to IISS, the PLA ballooned from a base of 3 million to over 4.2 million, with most of the growth occurring in the ground and air forces. At that time, China faced an uneasy international situation—the Soviets were building up their forces to the north of China and were establishing a presence to the south following North

Vietnam's victory. Also, American capabilities in the region had declined. And there were major domestic political questions following the deaths in 1976 of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. Since 1979, a certain stability has returned to the PRC. Thus, from one perspective, the cuts can be seen as part of a normalization process, a return to the status quo ante.

From another perspective, there is a certain sloganeering vagueness about the "one million troop reduction over 2 years" formula. Indeed, rumors of such a formula first surfaced in the aftermath of the 1980–81 political show trials of the gang of four and of the military leaders said to be associated with Lin Biao's failed attempt to seize the leadership of China.²⁰

But further Chinese statements on the currently proposed reductions place the cuts in a clearer political context.²¹ By mid-June 1985, the Beijing media had erupted with a series of stories on the planned troop reductions. The coverage had three themes—that the decision came from the top and was supported by all, that the cuts were part of the economic reform effort, and that the cuts showed the PRC's dedication to world peace.

A New China News Agency (Xinhua) story was typical. The reductions, the news agency noted, were announced by Deng Xiaoping, identified only as "Chairman of the Central Military Commission" at an "enlarged meeting." The reductions are important to the reforms, the story quotes Deng as stressing, be-

¹⁸ See Mitchell, loc. cit., p. 608, citing Kyodo news agency reports of fears of a "massive purge" in the PLA, in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 20, 1981, p. L/3.

²¹ There was some interest aroused by the fact that initially the Chinese press did not cover the troop reduction aspects of Hu's April remarks. The official party newspaper, *Renmin Ribao* (Beijing), gave the Wellington press conference little play, burying its coverage inside on page 6 (Apr. 19, 1985). Exactly what this extraordinary lack of coverage actually meant was not immediately clear. Perhaps Hu's announcement was misunderstood or, at the least, premature. Two months later, however, there was no doubt that the regime intended to put a collective seal of approval on the announcement.

¹⁸ See IISS, *The Military Balance*, 1984–1985, p. 91.

¹⁹ Cf. DIA, *Handbook on the Chinese Armed Forces*, July 1976, and *Handbook of the Chinese People's Liberation Army*, 1984. The 80 tanks per MFD, of course, are still a far cry from the 250-plus tanks in a Soviet motorized infantry division; see US Army, *Soviet Army Operations* (IAG-13-U-78), Washington, DC, 1978, pp. 2–10.

cause "the economic construction is in the overall interest of the country and everything must be subordinated to the overall situation." Such a move, he continued, "is a manifestation of the strength and confidence" of China, showing that China "is willing to safeguard and contribute to world peace with actual deeds."²² Another Xinhua report quoted other parts of Deng's speech to the meeting: "China wants to concentrate its efforts on its economic construction in order to build our country into a modern socialist power. This is the overall requirement, and everything must be subordinate to this overall requirement."²³

Similar coverage, accompanied by statements denouncing the superpowers, was carried on Beijing radio's Russian and International services. Beijing television showed film clips of China's top leaders—thereby stressing the collective nature of the decision—on the evening of June 12, 1985. And *China Daily* ran its coverage of the announcement on the front page. Additional comment, stressing variously the economic, world peace, and collective decision-making themes, also ran as follow-up items on the Xinhua wire and in *Jingji Ribao* (Economic Daily).²⁴

However, there were indications that the decision was reached not without some disagreement or, at the very least, lively discussion. A *Jiefangjun Bao* (Liberation Army Daily) editorial reprinted in *Renmin Ribao* on June 14, 1985, pointed out that the meeting at which the cuts were finalized was a "complete success"; "all the participants hold identical views and have the same ideas, that is to say, that they have achieved a genuine ideological unity on the strategic policy decisions of the CCP Central Committee and the Central Military Commission."²⁵ In other words, the unanimity so prized by Chinese political culture was reached only after what must have been considerable discussion and compromise. The meeting, the editorial pointed out, had "a very high ideological level" and was "an epoch-making and historical meeting of extremely great significance." It is difficult to imagine more direct signs that the regime is serious about the political symbolism of the reductions.

Other parts of the editorial reinforce this view. "The meeting has established a good practice in taking the situation as a whole into consideration. This is also of historic significance and is particularly gratifying." This statement seems to indicate that the reductions show the triumph of the economic perspective. But the editorial emphasizes, military modernization will continue, in the context of ongoing economic reform and personnel reductions.

*The fundamental goal of the structural reform, streamlining, and reorganization . . . is to build our Army into a crack force. . . . Without reforming the economic structure it would be impossible to liberate and develop the productive force. Without reforming the Army structure it would also be impossible to improve combat ability. Reform and streamlining are also closely linked with each other. Experiences over the years have proved that if we carry out streamlining without conducting reform at the same time, it will be impossible to keep it up even if we succeed in reducing personnel. . . . Viewed from this angle, this was a meeting of reform which took a major and historic step forward toward the goal of crack troops.*²⁶

Nevertheless, the editorial concludes, much work remains to be done in the military itself to carry out these reforms: "Now, we are again confronted with the task of making the comrades in the whole Army grasp the spirit of the meeting and unifying their thinking through the high-ranking cadres attending the meeting."

Thus, getting the PLA to follow and support the regime's overall reform program, of which the decisions of the June 1985 meeting are only a part, remains a problem. It seems clear from the editorial that not everyone agrees with Deng and his colleagues. At the same time, it is also clear that Deng's regime intends to proceed in an orderly way and that it is not about to let the PLA reductions become the focus of open struggle.

In sum, it would seem that the announcement of the reductions in force is more than just a military adjustment. It is another sign of the regime's commitment to economic reform and military modernization. It is also a salient demonstration of the regime's ability to implement its program, despite opposition. In other words, less can be more, especially in the People's Republic of China.

²² FBIS-CHI, June 10, 1985, p. K/1.

²³ See FBIS-CHI, June 12, 1985, p. K/2.

²⁴ For radio coverage, see FBIS-CHI, June 17, 1985, pp. K/9–10, June 21, 1985, pp. K/14–15; for TV and *China Daily*, see FBIS-CHI, June 14, 1985, pp. K/1–2; and for Xinhua and *Jingji Ribao* (Beijing), see FBIS-CHI, June 17, 1985, pp. K/7–8, and June 12, 1985, pp. K/1–3.

²⁵ See FBIS-CHI, June 18, 1985, p. K/15. (Emphasis added.)

²⁶ Ibid., p. K/16.

Books

The Crime of Dissent in China

Mitchell A. Silk

WANG BIXIAN et al. *Xin Xianfa Wenda* (Questions and Answers on the New Constitution). Shanxi, Shanxi Renmin Chubanshe, 1983.

FENG ERTAI et al. *Falü Wenda Siba Ti* (Four Hundred Questions and Answers on the Law). Shanghai, Xuelin Chubanshe, 1984.

LIN XILING. *Gei Deng Xiaoping de Wanyan Shu* (A Statement of Views for "Emperor" Deng Xiaoping's Perusal). Hong Kong, Guangjiao Jing Chubanshe, 1984.

JAMES D. SEYMOUR, Ed. *The Fifth Modernization: China's Human Rights Movement, 1978-1979*. Stanfordville, NY,

THE 1980's have been a time of sweeping changes in China. Economic policy changes initiated as part of the Four Modernizations have been the most dramatic, and the growth of China's economy

Mitchell A. Silk is a JD candidate and research assistant in East Asian Legal Studies at the University of Maryland School of Law (Baltimore). He works at the Baltimore law firm of Garbis, Marvel and Junghans and is Executive Editor of the Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies and the Maryland Journal of International Law and Trade.

Human Rights Publishing Group, 1980.

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL. *China: Violations of Human Rights—Prisoners of Conscience and the Death Penalty in the People's Republic of China*. London, Amnesty International Publications, 1984.

HUNGDAH CHIU and SHAO-CHUAN LENG. *Criminal Justice in Post-Mao China*. Albany, State University of New York, 1985.

RAYMOND D. GASTIL, Ed. *Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties 1983-1984*. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1984.

that has followed in their wake has captured worldwide interest. The China news story of the late 1970's—the growth of "democracy"—has been replaced by the news story of the 1980's, the growth of "capitalism."

Nevertheless, there has been some advancement in the areas of human and civil rights in China since the "Democracy Wall" movement of 1978-79. Chinese leaders have moved to end the lawlessness that prevailed during the Cultural Revolution, wreaking havoc at home while greatly dam-

aging China's reputation abroad. A new Criminal Law and Law of Criminal Procedure were put into force in 1980, and a new constitution with a total of 24 articles addressing citizens' rights and obligations was promulgated in 1982. Clearly, the Chinese leadership views the reform of China's legal system as an integral part of its modernization effort. Establishing a "rule of law" is recognized as important to China's international standing as well as to its further economic development and modernization.

The questions of how successful the Chinese have been in promoting rule by law so far and what prospects exist for further progress, particularly in the area of freedom of expression, are not easily answered. The books to be reviewed here do, however, throw some light on the topic. Two of the three Chinese-language books—*Questions and Answers on the New Constitution* by Wang Bixian and others and *Four Hundred Questions and Answers on the Law* by Feng Ertai and others—present Chinese commentators' interpretations of the scope and meaning of important new legislation and China's new constitution. The third volume in Chinese is written by Lin Xiling, a forceful student dissident of the 1950's. It offers some new insights on her arrest and impris-

onment for speaking out against the party and on her quest for exoneration. The English-language volumes focus more specifically on the problems of exercising human and political rights in China and the prospects for the reform of China's criminal justice system.

IN THE EARLY 1940's, Mao Zedong stated that "the freedoms of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of political conviction, of religious belief, and of person are the most important freedoms for the people."¹ Significantly, every constitution promulgated by the People's Republic of China (PRC) has included guarantees of some version of these rights to Chinese citizens, although the Chinese, in practice, have never been able to exercise these rights freely. This apparent puzzle—the failure to implement constitutionally guaranteed rights of expression coupled with the repeated reassertion of these rights with each new constitution—is at least partially explained by the fact that Chinese constitutions, like the constitutions of other communist countries but unlike those in the West, are not viewed as "cherished documents, quoted and referred to as the legitimator of sovereign authority, the guarantor of fundamental rights of citizens, the separator of power."² Rather, they function as both legal and propaganda documents.³ As such, they provide fundamental

law establishing norms for the state and society and make statements about the regime's current perception of past accomplishments and future goals of that state and society.⁴

This does not mean that China's constitutions have been worthless documents with no impact on the freedom of expression in China. Rather, the meaningfulness of a constitution can only be weighted through the jurisprudence that grows up around it. Thus, one must review relevant constitutional provisions and selected cases dealing with those who exercised their freedom of expression to arrive at a functional definition of freedom of expression and the constraints on it. One can glean from such cases that citizens can exercise their freedom of expression as long as it does not contravene the "Four Principles" of upholding the socialist road, the people's democratic dictatorship, the leading role of the party, and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought.

IN THE PRC, guarantees of the right of freedom of expression first appeared in the Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Congress (CPPCC), a provisional constitution adopted in September 1949. As provided in Article 5, "The people of the [PRC] shall have freedom of thought, speech, publication, assembly, association, correspondence, person, domicile, change of domicile, religious belief, and the freedom of holding processions and demonstrations."⁵ However, no case

testing citizens' rights to such freedoms was reported in the open press. Most of the crimes prosecuted in the early 1950's reflected the state's interest in the major tasks of the day—internal consolidation and reorganization. Thus, although there were mass campaigns of counterrevolutionary suppression, the most common charges were of the "historical counterrevolutionary" (*lishi fangeming*) type: opposition to land reform (mostly by landlords and rich peasants), murder or looting during the war, war crimes, affiliation with the Kuomintang (KMT), and the like.⁶

China's first formal socialist constitution was promulgated in 1954.⁷ Chapter III, "Fundamental Rights and Duties of the Citizens," enumerated guarantees of freedom of expression similar to those found in the 1949 Common Program. Article 87 provided: "Citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of association, freedom of procession, and freedom of demonstration. . . ."⁸

The first important tests of this provision took place in 1956–57.

¹ See Amnesty International, *Political Imprisonment in the People's Republic of China*, London, Amnesty International Publications, 1978, p. 14; and Jerome A. Cohen, *The Criminal Process in the People's Republic of China, 1949–1963*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1968, pp. 1–10.

² For background, see "Ten Years of the Chinese People's Constitution," *Bulletin of the International Commission of Jurists* (Geneva), September 1964, pp. 22–33; and Y. C. Chang, "A Comparative Study of the 1954 and 1975 State Constitutions of Communist China," in Lindsay, op. cit., pp. 46–62; and Jerome A. Cohen, "China's Changing Constitution," *China Quarterly* (London), December 1978, pp. 798–802.

³ For the Chinese text, see *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fagui Huibian* (Collection of Laws and Regulations of the People's Republic of China—hereafter *Fagui Huibian*), Vol. 1, Beijing, Falü Chubanshe, 1954, p. 4. The English text is in *Documents of the First National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China*, Beijing, Foreign Languages Press, 1955, pp. 131–63.

¹ Mao Zedong, "On Coalition Government," *Mao Zedong Selected Works*, Vol. IV (1941–45), New York, International Publishers, 1956, p. 287.

See William B. Simons, Ed., *The Constitutions of the Communist World*, Alphen aan den Rijn, Sijthoff & Nordhoff, 1980, p. xi.

Perhaps, then, Justice John Marshall's landmark statement in *McCulloch v. Maryland*, 17 U.S. (Wheat.) 316, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819), could be amended to describe socialist constitutional practice as: "This is [not] a constitution we are expounding."

⁴ Simons, op. cit., p. xv.

⁵ For the Chinese text, see *Zhongyang Renmin Zhengfu Faling Huibian* (Collection of Laws and Ordinances of the Central People's Government), Beijing, Falü Chubanshe, 1950, p. 17. For the English translation, see Michael Lindsay, *The New Constitution of Communist China*, Taipei, Institute of International Relations, 1976, p. 281.

Under the banner of "Let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools of thought contend" (*Bai hua qifang, bai jia zhengming*), Mao initiated a limited experiment with free speech in an attempt to incorporate intellectuals into the drive for development.⁹ Taken in by promises of political democracy and intellectual freedom, many exercised their constitutional rights by blooming and contending—only to be wrenched from society as poisonous weeds during the "anti-rightist" campaign that was launched in late 1957.¹⁰ When the party struck back at its critics it became clear that the provisions of the constitution applied only to "the people." By definition, those who chose to challenge the party were not of "the people," but were traitors, counterrevolutionaries, and rightist elements.¹¹

Lin Xiling, a young People's University law student who was a leader of dissident students during this period, is one of those who clearly was not of "the people." Her case is significant inasmuch as it marks the genesis of a working theory on the freedom of expression in the PRC.

Inspired by Mao's speeches of 1956–57, Lin began to search for ways to remedy the numerous flaws in China's legal system. She felt that the system was not complete and that democratic rights were not guaranteed. She urged the party to seek to eliminate the three evils of bureaucratism, subjectivism, and sectarianism. In

short, Lin supported Mao's campaign and began to air her views, exercising the rights enumerated in Article 87.

Lin's criticism soon began to overstep the implicit limits of complete devotion to the party's final authority. Her statements were seen as going beyond constitutional limits—that is, they transgressed the three principles on which the 1954 Constitution was based: class struggle, party rule, and democratic centralism.¹² After delivering six powerful speeches at Beijing and People's universities criticizing the shortcomings of the PRC's socialist development, Lin was labeled an "extreme rightist."¹³ Thus began her ordeal. Thereafter, the local Public Security Bureau kept a careful watch over her, and the government took away her student status, confining her at school to undergo supervised physical labor. On July 21, 1958, in the middle of the night, she was arrested and taken to the Bureau of Public Security where she was held for 15 days before being informed of her crime. Finally, pursuant to Article 10, Section 3 of the *Act of the People's Republic of China for the Punishment of Counterrevolutionaries*,¹⁴ she was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment and deprived of political rights for an additional five years.¹⁵

¹² See "Ten Years of the Chinese People's Constitution," loc. cit., p. 22.

¹³ The texts of Lin's speeches and other writings can be found in Dennis J. Doolin, *Communist China: The Politics of Student Opposition*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1964.

¹⁴ Article 10 reads as follows: "Those who, with a counterrevolutionary purpose, commit any one of the following acts of provocation or incitement shall be punished by not less than three years of imprisonment; where the circumstances of their cases are major, they shall be punished by death or life imprisonment."

Section 3 provides: "Conducting counterrevolutionary propaganda and agitation and making and spreading rumors." English translation appended in Chiu and Leng; Chinese text in *Fagui Huibian*, Vol. 1, p. 35.

¹⁵ Lin's book is actually an appeal for exoneration, that is, for gaining the status of *pingfan* ("rehabilitation").

IN LIGHT of the constitutional provisions, one would have thought that Lin and others had the freedom to speak "truth" to "power" (the party) without fear of reprisal.¹⁶ Instead, Lin was deprived of her most basic liberties—the right of livelihood, and the freedoms to speak and write.

Lin's trial record reveals that three elements led to her conviction.¹⁷ First, she defied party rule by daring to challenge the party's political authority. Even though many high officials praised her work,¹⁸ the court stated that her essays published in *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao* (China Youth News) were of a reactionary and polluting nature. Second, her public expression of shock over Nikita Khrushchev's vehement denunciation of Stalin in a "secret" speech at the 20th Soviet Party Congress (1956)¹⁹ was seen as leaking state secrets, even though by the time Lin began to air her views on the matter, accounts of the speech had already leaked out and texts of the speech had been posted in public areas.²⁰ Third and certainly

Since her release from prison in 1973, Lin has not yet had her political rights reinstated.

¹⁶ On the truth/power dichotomy, see Hans J. Morgenthau, *Truth and Power*, New York, Praeger, 1970, pp. 3–28.

¹⁷ Lin's trial record is reprinted in Mu Fu, "An Inside Look at Lin Xiling's Miscarriage of Justice," *Qishi Niandai Yuekan* (Hong Kong), September 1983, pp. 52–65.

¹⁸ Among those who praised her work were current party General Secretary Hu Yaobang, General Liu Bochong, and Wang Wen, a member of the National People's Congress Committee on the Legal System. *Ibid.*, p. 52.

¹⁹ Text of Khrushchev's speech is in Leo Guliow, Ed., *Current Soviet Policies, III: The Documentary Record of the 20th Party Congress and Its Aftermath*, New York, Praeger, 1957, p. 174.

²⁰ Zou Aiguo, "Lin Xiling Seeks Truth in Rectifying Her Label of Being a 'Rightist,'" *Renmin Ribao Neican* (Beijing—the classified internal reference version of *People's Daily*), November 1979; and Wang Wen, "[We] Should Get to the Bottom of the Miscarriage of Justice [in the case] of Lin Xiling and [Reinstate Her as] Rehabilitated," *Qingkuang Huibian* (Beijing), June 1, 1979, pp. 1–8.

* See Roderick MacFarquhar, *The Hundred Flowers Campaign and the Chinese Intellectuals*, New York, Praeger, 1960; and idem, *The Origins of the Cultural Revolution*, Vol. 1, *Contradictions among the People, 1956–1957*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1974.

⁹ For what was actually said during this "blooming and contending," see the comprehensive work by Hualing Nieh, *Literature of the Hundred Flowers*, 2 Vols., New York, Columbia University Press, 1981.

¹¹ See Cohen, "China's Changing Constitution," p. 801.

most serious, according to the record, was her speechmaking at Beijing and People's universities. Lin's highly effective speeches on the failures of socialist development in China were viewed as proof of her serious deviation from the mass line. Given their content, however, it is not surprising that her speeches angered party leaders. In them, Lin claimed that democratic rights were not guaranteed, that China was lawless and its legal system without substance, and that China and the Soviet Union were not socialist. An article in *Renmin Ribao* (June 30, 1957), the official party paper, added to the long list of criticisms of Lin, reporting that "she maligned the members of the Chinese Communist Party as mostly being 'rotten eggs' (*hun dan*), intellectually stagnant, and useless, with comparatively few true Bolsheviks among them. . . . She spread rumors that the movement against counter-revolutionaries had wronged 720,000 persons. . . . Apart from this she also publicized such fallacious theories as . . . 'China has no freedom of the press. . . .'"²¹

Clearly, as Lin's case illustrates, inescapable duties delimit the exercise of the right to freedom of expression in China.²² Statements that encroach on the state and party's interests provide *prima facie* evidence of criminality. The regime in power will define these interests, as well as the degree to which they can be contravened.²³ Lin's case demonstrates that respect for party rule, guarding of

state secrets,²⁴ and support for the main goal of democratic centralism—consensus—were three such interests in 1957.

DESPITE the transitional nature of the 1954 Constitution, the need to replace or substantially revise it was not felt until the Cultural Revolution. Indeed, the assault by Mao on party and government organizations, as well as the widespread lawlessness and arbitrary nature of administering "justice" during the movement's early stages, had totally destroyed both the spirit and letter of the document. Thus, as the Red Guards were increasingly brought under control by the People's Liberation Army (1967–69), pressure to draw up a new constitution mounted. Some hoped a new document would initiate a period of stability, return the country to civilian government, and provide greater protection for those individual rights that had been so egregiously violated during the Cultural Revolution. Others, however, hoped for the promulgation of a new document that would confirm the existing, more radical political situation.²⁵

When the Fourth National People's Congress (NPC) finally adopted the PRC's second constitution in 1975,²⁶ the new document consisted of a series of articles that were the product of reluctantly made compromises between two political factions. The 106 articles

and 15,000 words of the 1954 Constitution were replaced by 30 articles and 2,000 words, and the new constitution contained more slogans, fewer statements of goals and vaguer allocations of power among party and state institutions than did its predecessor.²⁷

Freedom of expression was guaranteed in Chapter III. Article 28 provided: "Citizens enjoy freedom of speech, correspondence, the press, assembly, association, procession, demonstration and the freedom to strike. . . ." One marked addition in the 1975 document was Article 13, the forerunner of the 1978 Constitution's highly controversial "four bigs" (*sida*) discussed below: "Speaking out freely, airing views fully, holding great debates, and writing big-character posters are new forms of carrying on socialist revolution created by the masses of the people." Although this article appeared to expand the right of expression, its real objective was to serve as a means of authorizing limited political participation as dictated and controlled by the party.²⁹ It continued: "The state shall ensure to the masses the right to use these forms to create a political situation in which there are both centralism and democracy, both discipline and freedom, both unity of will and personal ease of mind and liveliness, and so help consolidate the leadership of the

²¹ Cited in MacFarquhar, *Hundred Flowers*, p. 141.

²² See Hungdah Chiu, "Chinese Law and Justice: Trends over Three Decades," *Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies*, Baltimore, MD, University of Maryland School of Law, 1982, p. 9, citing Li Guangcan, *Woguo Gongminde Jiben Quanli He Yiwu* (The Fundamental Rights and Duties of the Citizens of Our Country), Beijing, Renmin Chubanshe, 1956, pp. 7–8.

²³ On the question of degree, see the in-depth treatment in Ellen R. Eliasoph, "Free Speech in China," *The Yale Journal of World Public Order* (New Haven, CT), Vol. 7, No. 2, 1981, pp. 287–323; June Teufel Dreyer, "The Limits of the Permissible in China," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November–December, 1980, pp. 48–65; and Merle Goldman, "Human Rights in the People's Republic of China," *Daedalus* (Cambridge, MA), Fall 1983, pp. 111–38.

²⁴ See the discussion in note 50.

²⁵ Cohen, "China's Changing Constitution," pp. 801–02.

²⁶ For the Chinese text of the 1975 Constitution, see *Zhongguo Renmin Gongheguo Disi Jie Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Diyi Huiyi Wenjian* (Documents of the First Plenary Session of the Fourth National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China), Beijing, Foreign Languages Press, 1975, p. 3; for the English translation, see *The Constitution of the People's Republic of China*, Beijing, Foreign Languages Press, 1975.

²⁷ Cohen, "China's Changing Constitution," pp. 802–03.

²⁸ See fn. 26.

²⁹ Cohen, "China's Changing Constitution," pp. 833–35.

Communist Party of China over the state and consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat."³⁰

But this document did not survive long enough to be tested. The dramatic social and political events of the years immediately following its promulgation—the deaths of Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong, the arrest and trial of the "gang of four," the second removal and subsequent reemergence of Deng Xiaoping, plus the devastating effects of major earthquakes in northern China—made the adoption of a new constitution inevitable.³¹

When promulgated in 1978, the new constitution retained, as had its predecessors, the freedoms of speech, the press, assembly, association, procession, and demonstration.³² To these were added the four freedoms that had been included in Article 13 of the 1975 Constitution. Now known officially as *sida*, or the "four bigs" (*daming, dafang, dabianlun, dazibao*), these rights were translated as the right to speak out freely, air views fully, hold great debates, and write big-character posters.³³ But these added freedoms were short-lived. Once the party charged "conspirators" with using *sida* as "an instrument for usurping Party and state leadership,"³⁴ a resolution abolishing them was quickly adopted at

the 3rd Session of the 5th National People's Congress.³⁵ James Seymour's book, *The Fifth Modernization—China's Human Rights Movement 1978–1979*, explores the reasons behind this move and suggests that the "Democracy Movement" precipitated the abolition of the "four bigs" in much the same way as the dissent of the Hundred Flowers period precipitated the antirightist movement of 1957.

The Fifth Modernization surveys the antecedents, life, and demise of China's 1978–79 "Democracy Movement" (*Minzhu Yundong*, also known as the Beijing Spring—*Beijing Zhi Chun*),³⁶ which started in November 1978 with the appearance of a few *dazibao* (big-character posters) and quickly picked up momentum. By December, in addition to the many *dazibao* that were posted on "Democracy Wall," numerous underground journals had emerged.³⁷ They called for legal guarantees, civil liberties, and a democratic system, and questioned the leadership's modernization plan.³⁸

By March 1979, the authorities moved to restrict all criticism. The party banned *dazibao*, books, and other publications opposed to the "Four Principles." And, in a manner reminiscent of the purges fol-

lowing the Hundred Flowers period, the Public Security Bureau arrested leading dissidents. After a brief period of intense counter-offensive on the part of dissidents, the Beijing Spring froze over.

The cause célèbre of the Democracy Movement was the arrest and trial of Wei Jingsheng, the editor of *Tansuo* (Exploration), one of the unofficial magazines banned in 1979. His case closely resembles that of Lin Xiling's. Wei advocated freedom, democracy, and human rights and argued that China needed to modernize politically by instituting democracy.

Wei first exercised his constitutional rights to express his views in his article "The Fifth Modernization—Democracy," which appeared on two wall posters in December 1978 (reprinted in Seymour, pp. 47–69) and subsequently was published in the first issue of *Tansuo*. He was arrested in the spring of 1979, and on October 16, 1979—more than six months later—was brought to trial (Chiu and Leng, pp. 147–48).³⁹ The Beijing Municipal Intermediate Court tried and convicted Wei on counts of leaking state secrets and carrying out counterrevolutionary agitation. He was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment, with an additional three years' deprivation of political rights.⁴⁰

In the course of Wei's trial, the court crystallized the limits on freedom of expression that it had begun to set during the trial of Lin Xiling a dozen or so years earlier:

³⁰ For detailed coverage, see Hungdah Chiu, "Structural Changes in the Organization and Operation of China's Criminal Justice System," *Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies*, Baltimore, MD, University of Maryland School of Law, 1981, pp. 10–13; see also the Amnesty International Report under review, pp. 8–10 and 24–27.

⁴⁰ The English and Chinese trial records are appended in Chiu, "Structural Changes," pp. 21–31. Wei was sentenced under the same act as Lin

³⁰ See fn. 26.

³¹ For events during this period, see Lucian Pye, *The Dynamics of Chinese Politics*, Cambridge, MA, Oelgeschlager, Gunn, and Hain, 1981, pp. 197–214, 239–67; and Michel Oksenberg and Richard Bush, "China's Political Evolution: 1972–1982," *Problems of Communism*, September–October 1982, pp. 1–19.

³² *Documents of the First Session of the Fifth National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China*, Beijing, Foreign Languages Press, 1978, pp. 125–72. See also Fang Chun-ie et al., Eds., *Laws and Regulations of the People's Republic of China*, Vol. 1, Hong Kong, Kingsway International Publications, 1982, p. 1. This is a Chinese/English edition.

³³ See Article 45 in ibid.

³⁴ See the compendium of articles, "The 'Dazibao': Its Rise and Fall," *Beijing Review*, Oct. 6, 1980, pp. 22–28.

³⁵ Eliasoph, loc. cit., pp. 287–88.

³⁶ For related commentary, see relevant sections of the Gastil book under review; Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard, "The Democracy Movement in China, 1978–79," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley, CA), July 1981, pp. 747–74; Susan L. Shirk, "Human Rights: What About China?" *Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC), Winter 1977–78, pp. 109–27; and David S. G. Goodman, *Beijing Street Voices*, London, Marion Boyars, 1981.

³⁷ A list of all the journals of this period can be found in Goodman, op. cit. See also, Yih-tang Lin, *What They Say*, Taipei, Institute of Current China Studies, 1980.

³⁸ In addition to the Goodman and Lin studies mentioned in the previous note, there are numerous reprints of the literature. See, e.g., *Issues and Studies* (Taipei) May 1979, June 1979, and June 1981; and *Chinese Law and Government* (Armonk, NY), Fall–Winter 1980–81 and Fall 1981.

"Freedom of speech of the individual citizen must be based on the four basic principles of insisting on the socialist road, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the leadership of the party, and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. *The citizen has only the freedom to support these principles and not the freedom to oppose them.*"⁴¹ The court's reasoning was clear-cut. Wei was guilty of counterrevolutionary activities, it stated, because he had written many reactionary articles that were intended to incite the "overthrow [of] the dictatorship of the proletariat and the socialist system [and to] vilify Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought." Thus, his articles "were in contradiction with the 'Four Principles.'" ⁴² Wei, in an attempt at defense, asserted his Article 45 constitutional guarantees—to no avail.

Although space limitations prohibit in-depth analysis of other, lesser known cases of human rights violations in China, the 1984 Amnesty International Report on China's prisoners of conscience provides numerous examples in which roughly the same line of reasoning as applied in the Lin and Wei cases was followed by the Chinese courts (see pp. 21–45). For example, Fu Yuehua, a 37-year-old worker, was arrested on January 18, 1979, for aiding and abetting a peasant protest. Her case was not brought to trial until August 31, 1979. The court sentenced her to two years' imprisonment. After serving her sentence, she reportedly was sent to a labor camp at Liang Xiang for "reeducation through labor." Similar arrests and trials occurred throughout China, according to the report, in-

cluding those of minorities (e.g., Tibetan Lobsang Chodag, pp. 30–31); clergy (Tibetan Monk Thubten Kelsang Thalustsogentsang, pp. 48–49, and the recently released Roman Catholic Bishop of Shanghai—Ignatius Gong Pinmei—pp. 19–21); and a Chinese computer sales engineer from Hong Kong, who was arrested for conducting counterrevolutionary activities, tried, and sentenced—all without notifying his relatives of his fate until after the proceedings (Liu Shanqing, pp. 49–50).

THE CASES cited above serve a dual purpose. On the one hand, they illustrate Chinese concepts of the criminality of freedom of expression. On the other hand, they illuminate the reasons why students of the Chinese legal system remain only "cautiously optimistic" about reform. To be sure, the Chinese criminal justice system, by transforming itself from a "revolutionary" model into a "procedural" one,⁴³ has come a long way. However, problems still remain. The "procedural" court that sentenced Wei Jingsheng to 15 years' imprisonment bears a close resemblance to the "revolutionary" court that sentenced Lin Xiling in 1957. Indeed, both courts conducted similar trials, reached similar verdicts, and handed down similar sentences.

Criminal Justice in Post-Mao China by Hungdah Chiu and Shao-chuan Leng examines some of

these problems. Chiu and Leng make the point that vagueness pervades China's penal regulations and provisions, thereby exposing defendants to jeopardy and uncertainty (p. 130).⁴⁴ The regulations dealing with "counterrevolutionary crime" and "state secrets" are good examples. Counterrevolutionary crimes are defined and enumerated in Articles 90 through 104 of the new *Criminal Code*.⁴⁵ Article 90 defines such crime as "any act endangering the People's Republic of China committed with the purpose of overthrowing the political powers of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the socialist system."⁴⁶ Chiu and Leng find actual and potential abuses of this provision, together with the fact that the yardstick for the requisite "purpose"⁴⁷ remains vague, a cause for some concern (pp. 125, 145–46). Also of concern to the authors are Article 186 of the *Criminal Code* and the *Provisional Regulations on Guarding State Secrets*, both of which deal with "state secrets."⁴⁸ In addition to the 15 categories of "state secrets" specified in the *Regulations*, two catch-all categories are included. Section 16 covers "all state affairs, which have not been made public," while section 17 adds "all

⁴⁴ The US Supreme Court, for example, has held vague criminal statutes as unconstitutional on the grounds that such statutes deny due process and fail to provide fair notice. See *United States v. Cadiff*, 344 U.S. 174 (1952). See also, A. Amsterdam, "The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court," *The University of Pennsylvania Law Review* (Philadelphia), Vol. 109, No. 1 (1960), pp. 67–116.

⁴⁵ English and Chinese texts in Jerome A. Cohen, Timothy A. Gelatt, and Florence M. Li, *The Criminal Law and the Criminal Procedure Law of China*, Beijing, Foreign Languages Press, 1984. Also appended in Chiu and Leng.

⁴⁶ Yu Man-king, *A Full Translation of the Criminal Law Codes of the People's Republic of China*, Hong Kong, Great Earth Book Co., 1980, p. 35. Emphasis added.

⁴⁷ See Eliasoph, loc. cit., pp. 304–05.

⁴⁸ See ibid. The *Regulations* are appended in Chiu and Leng.

⁴¹ Cited in ibid., p. 22. Emphasis added.

⁴² Cited in ibid., p. 21.

⁴³ The "revolutionary" (also known as societal or informal) model stresses "socially approved norms and values, implemented by political socialization and enforced by social pressures." The "procedural" (also known as jurial or formal) model "stands for formal, elaborate, and codified rules enforced by a centralized and institutionalized bureaucracy." See Shao-chuan Leng, "The Role of Law in the People's Republic of China as Reflecting Mao Tse-tung's Influence," *The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology* (Chicago), September 1977, pp. 356–57. This topic is also treated in Chiu and Leng, pp. 7–20.

other state affairs which should be kept secret."⁴⁹ Thus, almost anything not announced publicly but deemed sensitive by the authorities will amount to a state secret.⁵⁰

Moreover, unlike Western jurisprudence,⁵¹ the Chinese *Criminal Code* retains the principle of crime by analogy (Chiu and Leng, p. 129). Article 79 provides: "A crime that is not explicitly defined in the specific provisions of the Criminal Law may be determined and punished according to the most closely analogous article in the Criminal Law, but approval must be obtained from the Supreme People's Court."⁵² In essence, then, although Chinese jurists advocate restrictive application of this principle, the party is holding the Chinese people to the spirit and not the letter of the law. Thus, even if there is no codified legal prohibition against a particular action, citizens still bear criminal responsibility should such action be deemed criminal in the eyes of the party. Since citizens have no way of knowing exactly what constitutes actionable conduct or words, such legislation inhibits citizen action.

Two questions also arise with regard to the PRC's constitutional theory. First, the Lin and Wei cases support the proposition that consti-

tutional "duties" outweigh constitutional "rights." In both instances—although Lin was tried while the 1954 Constitution was in effect and Wei after the 1978 Constitution had been promulgated—the "Four Principles" . . . subsumed the constitutional guarantees of [freedom of expression] and took on the status of criminal prohibitions."⁵³ Constitutional rights were subordinated to political expediency.

Although the current Constitution (adopted by the NPC in December 1982) supposedly attaches more importance to the legal rights and duties of Chinese citizens than its predecessors did—it includes a total of 24 articles on citizens' rights and obligations and has placed the chapter embodying them directly following the first chapter on "General Principles"—the qualitative guarantee of these rights remains uncertain. Article 35 of the 1982 Constitution provides: "Citizens of the [PRC] enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of demonstration."⁵⁴ Although *Questions and Answers on the New Constitution* contends that these freedoms permit citizens to express their views on all aspects of state and social problems, state policies and law, state organs, and scientific and academic problems (Wang et al., p. 84), citizens' exercise of these freedoms is not without qualification. Indeed, the Constitution places concrete limits on citizens freedoms and rights⁵⁵ by providing

(in Article 51), "The exercise by citizens of the [PRC] of their freedoms and rights *may not infringe* upon the interests of the state, of society, and of the collective, or upon the lawful freedom and rights of other citizens."⁵⁶

Moreover, the earlier summary abrogation of some of the amendments in the 1978 Constitution, of *sida* in particular, does not say much for the protection of constitutional freedoms, especially that of individuals. Procedurally, the 5th NPC simply deleted the provision upon a party Central Committee recommendation.⁵⁷ Jurists rationalized that, among other things, since Article 45 already guaranteed freedom of expression, adding the rights to speak out freely, air views freely, hold great debates, and write big-character posters was like "adding feet to a picture of a snake—absurdly irrelevant" (Chiu and Leng, p. 147). But this reasoning assumes that freedom of speech includes the right to "speak out freely." Clearly, past practice indicates that it does not. The party tends to stress the right "to speak out freely" only before movements advocating "blooming and contending." This supports the proposition that the rights afforded by *sida* (especially "speaking out freely") are greater than those covered by the "freedom of speech" (*yanlun ziyou*).

AS THE ABOVE discussion demonstrates, freedom of expression in the PRC remains carefully circumscribed and controlled. Despite the repeated assertion of the right to a full array of freedoms, these freedoms are not a reality for the Chinese. So far, even the Dengist

⁴⁹ See in appendix in Chiu and Leng.

⁵⁰ On the lighter side of things, Chiu and Leng note that "shortly after the Regulations were reissued, a school called a political study session to go over them. The cadre in charge summarized the message by saying that people should feel free to discuss only that information which has been published in the newspapers. 'But what about my name?' a student asked flippantly. 'My name has never been in the press. Is it a state secret?' " Citing Fox Butterfield, *China: Alive in the Bitter Sea*, New York, Bantam Books, 1983, p. 158, n. 33.

⁵¹ The principle of crime by analogy is in contradiction with the Western legal principle *nulla poena sine lege* (no punishment without a pre-existing prohibitory rule). See Rollin M. Perkins and Ronald N. Boyce, *Criminal Law*, 3d ed., Mineola, NY, The Foundation Press, 1982, p. 11.

⁵² See appendix in Chiu and Leng.

⁵³ Eliasoph, loc. cit., p. 309.

⁵⁴ *The Constitution of the People's Republic of China*, Oxford, Pergamon Press, 1983, p. 32. Also see English translation in *Beijing Review*, Dec. 27, 1982, p. 16. Chinese text appeared in *Renmin Ribao* (Beijing), Dec. 5, 1982.

⁵⁵ For the relevant rights and duties, and commentary, see Feng et al., pp. 44–47, and Wang et al., pp. 77–119.

⁵⁶ *Constitution of the People's Republic of China*, p. 39. Emphasis added.

⁵⁷ See Eliasoph, loc. cit., pp. 293–98.

drive for "procedural" justice—as opposed to Mao's "revolutionary" justice—has not led to significant change.

What are the prospects for the freedom of expression in the future? Lucian Pye in his article in the Gastil volume (p. 238) cites two probable remedies to the situation: the growth of a rule of law, and the flow of international communications. Pye posits that the Chinese leadership, when exposed to and confronted with the issue of liberty in the Western sense, will be pressured into bringing "the country more into line with the progressive world" (p. 239). Recent rulings tend to support this statement, as Chinese courts have meted out lighter sentences to those defendants whose cases receive international attention.⁵⁸ The honeymoon that brought relatively mild foreign assessments of China's human rights practices will soon be over, and, as Pye points out, more critical evaluations are on their way. Thus, world public opinion is a factor not to be overlooked.

Reform of China's legal system and practices is not as clear-cut as

the situation with world public opinion. The prospects for a rule of law evolving in China are dependent on politics. Leftists will provide "revolutionary" justice; rightists will subscribe to "procedural" justice. One scholar has concluded that the criminality of dissidents' exercise of their constitutional rights will for the most part be "a function of the scope and degree of the monolithic rule demanded by the Party leaders."⁵⁹ In short, the "democratic values of the Party leaders [will] determine how far legal protection can be offered" to those who dissent.⁶⁰

Thus, prospects for the effective exercise of constitutional freedoms will depend on the future political trends in the PRC.⁶¹ China may continue down its road of pragmatism. This would reinforce the general direction of current legal reform in the PRC. If this path is chosen, one would expect the party to stress rule by law over rule

by man, thereby constructing a more equitable and predictable system of criminal justice.

It is far from certain, however, that Chinese leaders would either choose such a course or be able to control events if they did. What would happen, for example, if domestic and international developments were to foil Deng's pragmatic program? Factional power struggles, extreme ideological cynicism, or drastic American or Soviet policy shifts could mandate the adoption of a party policy of Stalinist repression and discipline and a reinstitution of a Maoist legal system. Such a system would likely resemble its predecessors, taking socially approved norms and values as the legal yardstick and employing extrajudicial apparatuses to enforce "the law."

Of course, there is a middle ground. Economic and political stability could provide Chinese leaders adequate time to evolve a communist legal system that is uniquely their own, one that blends some of the basic principles of Western law with some of the unique features of traditional Chinese culture and society. Certainly, this remains the most desirable of the three alternatives—for the regime, for the populace, and for the development of an effective right of freedom of expression in China.

⁵⁸ Carlos Wing-hung Lo, "The Legal System and Criminal Responsibility of the Intellectuals in the People's Republic of China, 1949–82," *Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies*, Baltimore, University of Maryland School of Law, forthcoming, pp. 36–37.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ This discussion draws on Thomas W. Robinson's insightful essay, "Domestic Politics of the People's Republic of China," in U. Alexis Johnson, George R. Packard, and Alfred D. Wilhelm, Jr., Eds, *China Policy for the Next Decade*, Boston, MA, Oelgeschlager, Gunn, and Hain, 1984, pp. 113–26.

⁵⁸ See comments of Ross H. Monroe in Hungdah Chiu and Karen Murphy, Eds., "The Chinese Connection and Normalization," *Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies*, Baltimore, University of Maryland School of Law, 1980, pp. 86–87; and Jerome Cohen, "Human Rights in China," *The Washington Post*, Apr. 23, 1978.

Soviet Justice

Louise I. Shelley

GER P. VAN DEN BERG. *The Soviet System of Justice: Figures and Policy*. Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1985.

DINA KAMINSKAYA. *Final Judgment: My Life as a Soviet Defense Attorney*. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1982.

MARK HOPKINS. *Russia's Underground Press: The Chronicle of Current Events*. New York, Praeger, 1983.

EDWARD TOPOL and FRIDRIKH NEZNANSKY. *Red Square*. New York, Quartet Books, 1983.

SOVIET JUSTICE has been derided by most observers of the USSR, but it should not be equated solely with the show trials of the Stalin era or the current trials of human rights activists. Although the books under review do little to dispel the bad reputation of the Soviet legal system, van den Berg and Kaminskaya suggest that this is not the total picture. Soviet justice may not be the uplifting force depicted by Soviet propagandists, but neither

is it merely a legal travesty. Despite the constraints of party pressure and the influence of pervasive corruption, a sense of justice, particularly in the area of civil law, is communicated to the ordinary citizen.

The four books, which are intended for different audiences, together provide enormous insight into the operation of Soviet law. Ger van den Berg's *The Soviet System of Justice* is a ground-breaking book, the culmination of years of painstaking analysis of numerous Soviet sources. It should be on the desk of all students of the USSR. *Final Judgment* marks its author as a virtuoso of the Soviet courtroom. Dina Kaminskaya, a former defense attorney, powerfully evokes the excitement, challenge, and moral quandaries of her high-powered legal career terminated due to her courageous defense of Soviet dissidents. While she eloquently recalls the political trials, Mark Hopkins is a most readable chronicler of KGB investigations. His *Russia's Underground Press* carefully reconstructs the KGB campaign to vanquish *The Chronicle of Current Events*, the major publication of the Soviet human rights movement. For those who want lighter reading on Soviet justice, *Red Square* fits the bill. An engrossing mystery novel by a former Moscow prosecutor, it captures the intrigue and corruption at the very top of Soviet society.

THE STUDY by van den Berg serves as a timely reminder that Soviet law is not confined to the criminal arena. Despite numerous violations of legal procedure, Soviet justice is not a fiction. A complex body of law and legal procedure and a sophisticated legal profession have developed over the past 65 years, serving both the state and much of the Soviet Union's population. While law does not have the central role in Soviet society that it has in the West, it does perform important functions.

Law is not merely a coercive force in Soviet society; it helps to govern and regulate the lives of the population. Law and the legal system serve the Soviet state by maintaining political and social order and regulating economic and labor relations. But they also serve individual citizens, who resort to the law to settle personal and family problems. The areas of law affecting most Soviet citizens—family law, civil law, housing law, and to a lesser extent, labor law—are closely observed in the Soviet courts, thus strengthening popular faith in the justice system. Moreover, Soviet legal services are readily affordable and quite accessible. Free and low cost legal assistance is available through the *advokatura* (Soviet bar), the *yuriskonsul't* (legal adviser at the workplace), trade union organizations, and local units of city government such as the *ispolkom*

Louise I. Shelley is Associate Professor in the Schools of Justice and International Service, The American University (Washington, DC). Among her numerous writings on Soviet law is the recent *Lawyers in Soviet Work Life* (1984). This essay was written while on a John Simon Guggenheim Fellowship, and preparatory research was facilitated by a summer stipend from the National Endowment for the Humanities.

(executive committee).¹

While many equate Soviet justice solely with Soviet criminal justice, van den Berg points out that approximately 80 percent of the cases that appear before Soviet courts fall into the civil category (pp. 208-9). He estimates that 3 million civil cases were heard by Soviet courts in 1980 (p. 143). Of these, approximately 60 percent concerned family matters, mostly divorce cases, followed in frequency by labor and housing cases amounting together to approximately 15 percent (p. 155). The number of cases initiated by individuals suggests that citizens do have faith in their civil law system. They use it not only to resolve family problems but also to settle housing and labor questions, matters in which they confront the authority of the state.

Van den Berg's careful analysis of Soviet statistics from a number of different sources gives rise to other interesting conclusions as well. For example, while this century has seen an increasing dependence on law and the growth of litigation in most industrialized societies, in the Soviet Union "the number of civil claims per 10,000 inhabitants has been lower during the past 15-20 years than it ever was in Soviet history, except during the hectic days of the civil war" (p. 144). While this might appear to contradict the assumption that Soviet citizens have faith in their legal system, a closer examination of legal trends reveals quite the opposite. The number of civil cases has declined in precisely those areas where they have proliferated in capitalist societies. Thus, cases involving taxes and administrative fines have declined significantly in the USSR. Whereas in Western societies civil disputes are often over economic issues, in the USSR they concern matters of individual

rights. Consequently, a proportionately larger share of all civil cases has been assumed by family, housing, and labor law, areas of direct concern to Soviet citizens.

IF SOVIET justice were judged solely on the basis of civil law, the legal system of the USSR would be exemplary. But the USSR has two parallel systems of justice—the civil and the criminal. While the civil system is fair and accessible, the criminal justice system is harsh and often arbitrary. Moreover, in criminal cases legal procedure is sometimes violated by party officials and judicial personnel. The Soviet authorities cite the need to maintain social order as an excuse for such practices. Many Soviet citizens willingly condone the harsh treatment of criminals as the price for public safety, an attitude abetted by Soviet mass media. The Soviet authorities have fostered popular support for their legal system by offering fair and affordable civil justice. But they have exploited the fears of the populace in order to maintain an intimidating and often arbitrary criminal law that fortifies public order.

Yet, the absence of a rule of law has not necessarily been detrimental to the interests of most citizens. While the existing judicial system gives the party the capability to abrogate the rights of criminal defendants, it also gives flexibility in

the administration of law. Flexibility in enforcement leads to a personalization of the law. Party officials can exploit the legal system to their personal advantage, as Topol and Neznansky write in *Red Square*. Conversely, individual lawyers, such as Kaminskaya, can humanize the law.

The party enacts, and implements, the state's legal policy, subordinating the entire legal apparatus to its will. Millions of cases pass through the Soviet courts annually but the party rarely intervenes. Instead, it maintains its control by ensuring that legal personnel comply with party dictates. Judicial personnel are controlled through CPSU administrative organs, frequent party instructional meetings, and the *nomenklatura* system. The last of these enables the party to control key positions in Soviet institutions, including the judiciary. As Michael Voslensky has shown in his recently translated book,³ the *nomenklatura* system confers power and privilege on its members, in return for absolute loyalty and compliance. With such a pervasive system in place, judicial independence becomes nominal.

Legal officials are expected to uphold "socialist order." When translated into criminal justice policy, this means that no individual who commits a crime can be permitted to escape punishment.⁴ While legal codes take note of the importance of evidentiary rules, cases are only rarely discharged or overturned because of violations of criminal procedure. Pressure is put on the legal apparatus to produce arrests and to produce convictions of apprehended offenders. Police statistics are deliberately distorted to maximize the appearance of police efficiency. As van den Berg writes, "If the chances for the detection of

¹ For a further discussion of legal services available to Soviet citizens, see Louise I. Shelley, *Lawyers in Soviet Work Life*, New Brunswick, NJ, Rutgers University Press, 1984.

² For a fuller discussion of party control over the justice system, see Robert Sharlet, "The Communist Party and the Administration of Justice in the USSR," in D. Barry, G. Ginsburgs, and Peter Maggs, Eds., *Soviet Law Under Stalin, Part 3: Soviet Institutions and the Administration of Law*, Alphen aan den Rijn, Sijthoff en Noordhoff, 1979, pp. 321-92.

³ Michael Voslensky, *Nomenklatura: The Soviet Ruling Class*, Garden City, NY, Doubleday, 1984.

⁴ Valery Chalidze, *Budushcheye Rossii* (The Future of Russia), New York, Chalidze Publications, 1983, p. 161.

criminal are low, the crime remains out of the reports. According to three-quarters of the investigation officials, the chance for a citizen to get a case of pickpocketing registered as a crime is less than 50% (p. 14). Once an offender is arrested there is little chance for his release, since the *prokuratura* and judiciary face party reprimands if they fail to uphold socialist legality.

Party pressure on judges to convict defendants usually yields the desired results. Van den Berg's statistics show that in the post-Stalin era judges have rarely acquitted offenders or turned back cases for reinvestigation (a face-saving alternative to outright acquittal). Statistics from several representative jurisdictions reveal that less than 2 percent of cases are reinvestigated; acquittals are even rarer. In the last two decades, less than 1 percent of all criminal cases heard at the lowest level, the people's court, have resulted in acquittals, a dramatic decline from the 25 percent recorded in 1923 (p. 250). Individuals fare little better at the appellate level. Few sentences are overturned even when there are proven blatant violations of criminal procedure by the lower courts.

IN A SYSTEM where a conviction is virtually foreordained, of what use is defense counsel? Dina Kaminskaya's finely written memoirs of her career as an *advokat* address this question. In *Final Judgment*, she explains that the *advokatura*, a self-governing voluntary association of defense counsels,⁵ allows its members more

autonomy than is enjoyed by other legal personnel who are paid by the state. Moreover, she notes "although an advocate's contribution is limited in scope, it is by no means useless" (p. 55).

Kaminskaya dramatically demonstrates the value of defense counsel in a fascinating criminal case that forms the highlight of her book. A year after the rape and murder of a young girl in a Moscow suburb, two young men were arrested. They confessed to the crime, but subsequently withdrew their confessions and asserted their innocence. The police had arrested them after prompting from the highest party organs. Given such pressure, the police felt obliged to find a perpetrator even if it meant fabricating a case. Kaminskaya, serving as counsel to one of the young men, was driven by her desire to see justice done. Launching her own investigation, she obtained evidence that led to the youths' exoneration. But her fight for that rare acquittal took three years and went all the way to the Supreme Court.

Years later, Kaminskaya was investigated by the Moscow *prokuratura* for undermining Soviet authority since she had told a Western journalist about this case. She defended her action by emphasizing that this "complex case was, in fact, a triumph for Soviet justice. The justice system was ultimately able . . . to forget that the case was being followed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union" (p. 157).

Defense attorneys also play a valuable role in more routine cases, particularly those involving economic crimes. By successfully challenging the investigator's evaluation of the extent of loss, an attorney can force the reclassification of charges and get a reduced sentence for the defendant.

The severity of a sentence depends not only on the quality of the defense counsel but also on both the period in Soviet history and the region in which the defendant is being tried. For example, sentencing policy was more lenient under Nikita Khrushchev than under his successors. Also, as van den Berg's data show, it is generally better not to stand trial in the republics of Moldavia, Lithuania, Turkmenia, and Kazakhstan. In contrast, defendants fare significantly better in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Belorussia (p. 95). Even with these variations, in the post-Khrushchev period, in all Soviet republics a defendant has stood a better than even chance of receiving a prison or a labor camp sentence. In 1970, according to van den Berg, "a new type of penalty [penal exile] was introduced under which the sentenced individual is obliged to perform work assigned by the penalty executing authorities" (p. 96). This measure reduced, at least temporarily, the number of individuals sentenced to institutional confinement. Nevertheless the prison and labor camp population of the Soviet Union exceeds that of Eastern Europe and all the Western industrialized countries in both absolute and per capita figures.

Van den Berg takes on the ticklish problem of estimating how many individuals are and have been incarcerated in Soviet labor camps. Challenging some widely accepted figures as based on hearsay and incomplete reports, he constructs his own table of incarceration rates by using election data, trade union figures, and other published reports. Together, these sources lead him to conclude that during the last two decades, over 1 million people, or 40 out of every 10,000 Soviet citizens, have been incarcerated in prisons and labor

⁵ See Eugene Huskey's "The Limits to Institutional Autonomy in the Soviet Union: The Case of the *advokatura*," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), Vol. 34, April 1982, p. 220, fn. 2, for a description of the legal status of voluntary organizations.

camps at any one time.⁶

These statistics suggest a harsh sentencing policy even for minor crimes. According to Kaminskaya, however, while such punishments may seem more than is "considered just or expedient, . . . [they] were always within legal limits" (p. 62). Furthermore, she contends that the justice system does work in the overwhelming majority of cases. Only in political cases are there frequent violations of legal procedure.

WRITTEN LAW does not differentiate between the treatment of ordinary and political crime. But in practice those accused of political offenses are deprived of fundamental legal rights. Soviet common criminals are usually able to meet with their lawyers in prison before trial, and the confidentiality of the lawyer-client relationship in such meetings is respected. In political cases, however, the defendant is held in a secret police cell before trial, and his conversations with his lawyer are recorded by hidden devices. Kaminskaya recalls numerous meetings with political dissidents in prison in which all communications with her clients were written, to prevent any sound from being picked up by the microphones.

Ordinary criminals have the right to a public trial and can engage a lawyer of their choice. But, Kaminskaya recalls, in almost all the major dissident trials in which she served as legal counsel, the proceedings were closed to the public. Often only members of the defendant's immediate family

were allowed to be present. The courtroom was filled with KGB and police personnel, who routinely harassed the defendant. In such circumstances, the political defendant's defense counsel may often be his only "friend" in the courtroom. But the defense attorney's role in political trials is so emasculated that often the only assistance counsel can provide is to help air the client's views in the courtroom.

Defense counsel in political cases investigated by the KGB require *dopusk*—an official party permission to handle such cases. Sometimes these KGB-approved lawyers are competent and principled, but more often they are individuals who have been expelled from the judiciary and *prokuratura* for improper conduct. Cooperation with the KGB is their only means of forestalling their own prosecution. Kaminskaya also states that an attorney in a political trial who does not condemn his client's beliefs and actions may face disbarment. For example, Kaminskaya's fellow lawyer in the Yuriy Galanskov and Aleksandr Ginzburg trial was expelled from the *advokatura* after the trial. The reason was his failure to condemn Ginzburg's efforts to compile and send abroad a collection of materials on the trial of Yuliy Daniel and Andrey Sinyavsky.

In most Soviet trials, the arguments of both the defense and the state are considered. Evidence is introduced by the prosecution and defense witnesses are called and examined—the code of criminal procedure is observed. But political trials operate differently. There is not even a pretense of a fair hearing for both sides. Defense witnesses may be excluded from the trial, vital and pertinent evidence may be declared inadmissible, and fundamental procedural rules may be violated.

SENTENCES in most Soviet trials are determined by the judge. Pressure may be brought to bear by the CPSU in individual cases, but normally the judge is considered sufficiently perspicacious to act appropriately without specific instructions. In trials for "crimes against the state" the party orchestrates the case, and the KGB executes its commands. Conviction is assured, and the sentence is predetermined. During such trials prosecutors often told Kaminskaya what the sentence would be. "Experience had taught us that 'the opinion' of a KGB investigator tended to coincide with the 'opinion' of the court," she notes ironically (p. 298).

While acquittals or reversals do occur in ordinary criminal cases they never do in political trials. Kaminskaya recalls the deliberate lies of witnesses in political trials, the falsification of testimony, and even a prosecutor who was so poorly versed in the law that he confused the articles of the criminal code under which the dissidents were charged. While such blatant breaches of criminal procedure would be grounds for dismissal in a regular criminal case, they are ignored in political trials.

THE TREATMENT accorded Soviet dissidents may be unfamiliar to some readers of Kaminskaya's book, but for those who have read *The Chronicle of Current Events*, the major *samizdat* publication of the Soviet human rights movement, *Final Judgment* offers no major revelations. Since 1968, the editors of this underground publication, discussed by Mark Hopkins in *Russia's Underground Press*, have reported on the police searches of dissidents' apartments, political trials, and conditions in labor camps. With time *The Chronicle's* news sources

⁶ This figure does not include all categories of forced labor. It is based on a mortality rate of 5 percent up until 1960, and an estimate that in recent years approximately 16 percent of offenders received sentences of up to one year, with an additional 20 percent receiving between one and three years (van den Berg, pp. 112–15).

have diversified: by the early 1970's reports were appearing on the Meskhelian movement, the trials of Crimean Tatars, and dissident activities in the Baltic republics. Nonetheless, better known developments—such as the trial of the Leningrad hijackers, the misuse of psychiatry, and the expulsion of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn—continued to dominate its pages.

The carefully compiled issues of *The Chronicle* are prepared and circulated at great risk to both editors and contributors. Hopkins, who interviewed several former contributors to *The Chronicle*, describes the efforts to maintain high standards of accuracy despite enormous obstacles. Through their conscientious work, the West as well as many Soviet citizens have been informed about the dissident movement in the Soviet Union.

In 1969, according to Hopkins's carefully constructed account, the KGB initiated "Case 24" against *The Chronicle* in order to cut off its news sources and force its editors to suspend publication. During the next three years, more than 200 people throughout the USSR were summoned for interrogation. Unlike its Stalinist predecessor the NKVD, the KGB "rarely resorted to physical punishment" (p. 52), but used psychological tactics instead. The case "symbolized a refurbished Soviet secret police whose ranks, in Moscow in any case, contained educated, intelligent, sometimes even cultured, investigators and agents" (p. 53). A number of trials followed the investigations, and *The Chronicle's* editors were temporarily cowed. But after two years, the publication of this vital organ of the Soviet human rights movement was resumed. Hopkins asserts that the dedication of its editors has assured its continued publication despite the constant

harassment of its contributors by Soviet authorities. Together, *Final Judgment* and *Russia's Underground Press* provide a clear and consistent picture of the unequal justice meted out to those who would challenge the political monopoly of the Communist Party.

A DEFENDANT'S utility to the state determines his treatment by the legal system. Dissidents' legal rights are abridged. Party members enjoy favored status. According to the authors of *Red Square*, party members' immunity from prosecution may permit highly placed officials to get away even with murder. Topol and Neznansky (the latter a former Moscow prosecutor), construct a credible scenario about the course of the investigation into KGB general Semen Tsvigun's death, revealing the crime and corruption that compromised Leonid Brezhnev's authority during his final year. The reader is drawn inside the major investigatory organs—the *prokuratura*, the MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs), and the KGB, and made to feel the opposing pulls of party influence and corruption.

Red Square suggests widespread corruption, payoffs to legal officials, and a huge underground economy sanctioned by the party elite threaten the stability of the Soviet system. While this may seem far-fetched, the subsequent cleanup campaigns of the party and the legal apparatus launched by Yuriy Andropov after Brezhnev's death lend credibility to the Topol-Neznansky tale. The popular support accorded Andropov, the "Mr. Clean" of the Soviet legal apparatus, indicates that the corruption of the party elite was widely known and deplored by the general population. Andropov's short rule, however, prevented the thorough

purge of the legal system that the pervasive corruption required.

Andropov's work may not be left unfinished. Mikhail Gorbachëv's first months as general secretary of the CPSU suggest that he will carry on the work of Andropov. Reports about the anticorruption drive continue, and 55,000 party members have been assigned to the internal affairs organs to "reinforce law and order."⁷

All this raises expectations that the selection of Gorbachëv, a Moscow State University-trained lawyer, may represent a new day for Soviet law. No lawyer in the Soviet Union has ever risen as far in the party apparatus. The legal profession has never provided the stepping-stone to a political career in the USSR that it has in the West, although in the post-Stalin era, law has become more important in regulating Soviet society.

Gorbachëv maintains close ties with the legal apparatus. His February 20, 1985, speech for the Supreme Soviet election was introduced by V. N. Kudryavtsev, director of the Institute of State and Law. It seems therefore quite possible that Gorbachëv will increasingly use law to introduce changes in the Soviet system. While the legal system may continue to be used for the repression of dissidents, its role in the regulation of labor and economic relations may well be expanded to an unprecedented degree under Gorbachëv. Law's status may also be enhanced, should Gorbachëv enlist Soviet jurists in shaping the future direction of Soviet society.

⁷ See V. Fedorchuk (minister of internal affairs), "Citizen, Society, Law: Strengthening Public Order," *Pravda* (Moscow), May 29, 1985, p. 3.

Novel Views of the Soviet Cadre

Donald F. B. Jameson

EDWARD TOPOL. *Submarine U-137*. New York, Quartet Books, 1984.

TOM CLANCY. *The Hunt for Red October*. Annapolis, MD, Naval Institute Press, 1984.

ROBERT MOSS. *Moscow Rules*. New York, Villard Books, 1985.

ALEKSANDR PROKHANOV. *Derevo v tsentre Kabula* (A Tree in the Center of Kabul). *Roman Gazeta* (Moscow), No. 15, 1982.

IN THE DYNAMICS of Soviet society, the professional cadre of the regime may be the most vital human element, perhaps exceeding in importance even the top leaders in the party *nomenklatura*. This cadre comprises the people that get things done, that synthesize reality from the dialectic of the leadership's theses and the apathetic antithesis of the general populace. Various studies, from Milovan Djilas's *The New Class* to Michael Voslensky's *Nomenklatura*,¹ have provided some information and commentary on this group. But such works have rarely brought to life this essential ver-

sion of the new Soviet man. A lively image may be at least fleetingly captured from an unlikely source—the spate of recent novels (Western and Soviet) showing the Soviet professional in action. First came the murder stories, e.g., *Gorky Park*,² and now we have adventure novels dealing with life at the critical points where East and West intersect.

The four examples of the genre under consideration here deal with three of the most active sorts of intersection—espionage, insurgency, and submarine patrols. Leaving aside their literary qualities, can they tell us something that scholarship does not about the Soviet cadre? Perhaps, if we look for the right things.

Of the four, one is by an American insurance salesman; one, by an English journalist; one, by an émigré Soviet playwright; and one (published in Russian for the indigenous readership), by a Soviet journalist who regularly covers the trouble spots of the Third World. The Soviet military and the CIA are involved in all of them. The KGB figures only in the Western three,

but state security officers of Afghanistan's KhAD play prominent roles in the Soviet work. In all the Soviet professional military officer is treated with respect as typically a competent, decent fellow. The émigré author is less generous in this regard, but even he is tolerant of the military. In only one novel does the CIA officer, as a type, fare that well. Lest the Soviet reader take too much pride in his military officers, I must caution him that the Western authors consider the Soviet military officer most likely among his peers to turn against the Soviet regime precisely because of the sterling qualities of his character.

Three of the novelists are obsessed by a need to explain their motives and personality of their heroes through long flashbacks to childhood where grandparents dominated their upbringing. The Soviet novel is the most retrospective (the hero even had a great-uncle who criticized the Revolution). The fourth novel, by the émigré writer, though neglectful of babushki, has a hero who is powerfully influenced by memories of his long-dead mother. This last writer, Edward Topol, is the best, I think, in depicting authentic Soviet characters. One can accept his people as real even if they do not flaunt their childhoods to the reader. Topol's people are also less charged with militant motives. Perhaps that is

Donald F. B. Jameson is Vice President of Research Associates International, Ltd. (Arlington, VA) and a long-time observer of Soviet internal and international politics, particularly the intelligence services.

¹ Milovan Djilas, *The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System*, New York, Harcourt-Brace Jovanovich, 1982; and Michael S. Voslensky, *Nomenklatura: The Soviet Ruling Class*, trans. Eric Mosbacher, New York, Doubleday, 1984.

² Martin C. Smith, *Gorky Park*, New York, Random House, 1981.

why he did not feel the need to dwell on the juvenile sources of character formation so much. Perhaps he is just a more skillful author—more at home in the Soviet milieu than the Westerners and free from the restraints that bind the Soviet author.

DESPITE their similarities, these books are each a unique creation, capable of inspiring enough suspension of disbelief to keep the reader involved, at times intensely. Topol's *Submarine U-137* is the least ideological and, in terms of character plausibility, the most successful. The one Soviet persona that sounded stiff and unlife-like was the head of the KGB, a General Andronov. Topol has also invented an institution that does not exist, a "little America" where Soviet agents are trained to infiltrate the United States and to act just like Americans. Training and infiltration go on, to be sure, but the agents in training are never grouped together.

Submarine U-137 is an ingeniously plotted spy story. As one follows the unfolding of the intricate plot, one can also get a good look at Soviets at work and play. Most of them are competent time-servers with little inclination to do anything beyond meeting the requirements of their jobs. The Soviet leaders have greater aspirations. They are planning the direct and nearly immediate takeover of the world, beginning with Western Europe. The villain is a thoroughly repugnant KGB officer who gets his just deserts; in fact, none of Topol's major characters survives. (Only the two books by native Westerners have happy endings.) Although Topol has the best balance of knowledge of East and West, he is explicit in citing his principal reference works, John Barron's two works on the KGB.³

TOM CLANCY's *The Hunt for Red October* is perhaps the most engrossing as an adventure novel. Moreover, for any one interested in submarine operations today, it is a unique source. As the October 1984 issue of *The Submarine Review* notes (p. 90), "By far the most impressive aspect of this book is the way a large volume of material, normally too classified to discuss, is bandied about." The novel depicts well the many significant differences between life on American and on Soviet subs, even though Clancy is, I think, in error on one major point. He claims that official fear of defection (which this book will almost certainly reinforce) explains the short span of the typical Soviet nuclear missile submarine cruise. There are other, more persuasive reasons involving strategy, tactics, maintenance, and living conditions, about which, incidentally, Clancy has enlightening things to say.

Clancy's hero is a Soviet sub skipper who defects with his ship, although the crew (but not the officers) returns to the *rodina* (motherland). The officer's father was a heavy-handed party secretary who sent thousands off to their death in the Gulag, much to the shame of the grandmother who raised both father and son. As Clancy points out, there is a genuine precedent for the basic assumption of this book, that a Soviet naval captain could defect with his ship. A Soviet destroyer tried it in the 1970's and almost got to Sweden before it was attacked by Soviet aircraft and stopped.⁴

Although Clancy's Soviet characters are a little wooden when they talk about things other than

submarines, the meticulous research that made the technical aspects of *Red October* so impressive is also evident in the depiction of Soviet personality types. The Communist rhetoric of the *zampolit* (political deputy commander), the differences between Russians and other nationalities, the attitudes of seamen toward officers and vice versa, even the ways in which senior officers in Moscow react to the news that one of their subs is running away are all carefully written on the basis of serious study. Clancy does not have Topol's confident touch in building his Soviet characters, but he has worked on it, and the product is worth reading for that reason alone.

ROBERT MOSS, coauthor of *The Spike* and *Monimbo*,⁵ two novels that deal with Soviet deception and political operations, and long an editor of the London *Economist's* Foreign Reports, has written another didactic novel on res Sovietica. The first two books were dedicated to the exposition of Soviet active measures, disinformation, the manipulation of agents of influence, and political action. They were both instructive and more accurate on Soviet clandestine operations in the West than many critics would concede. As works of literature, however, they had shortcomings. *Moscow Rules* is, I think, more of a novel, yet it reflects serious and intensive research on how the Soviet regime operates. Moss appears to have learned much from former Soviet officers, one of whom I suspect is the GRU veteran who writes under the name of Victor Suvorov and

³ KGB, New York, Bantam, 1974, and *KGB Today: The Hidden Hand*, Pleasantville, NY, Readers Digest Press, 1983.

⁴ On the incident, see Clancy's Preface.

⁵ Arnold de Borchgrave and Robert Moss, *The Spike*, New York, Avon, 1981; and Robert Moss and Arnold de Borchgrave, *Monimbo*, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1983.

another, the KGB officer who defected to the British after service in Iran. Moss even has his Russian obscenities right—a rarity among non-Russian authors—although he is somewhat repetitious in using them.

The hero of *Moscow Rules* is, like the principal Soviet character in *Submarine U-137*, the son-in-law of the chief of staff of the Soviet Armed Forces. In both cases, nepotism assists the protagonist in advancing rapidly, while his natural abilities help him gain personal authority and respect. In their attempts to weaken or destroy Soviet power, both heroes use, or intend to use, the opportunities given them by doting fathers-in-law. In Moss's book, the goal of the hero is beyond defection or even delivering a sample of his country's most valuable new weapon to the enemy; it is the overthrow of the regime. Moss seems intent on showing us that it could be done, that Soviet power could crumble in a day if only the right things worked out. The plan for staging the coup is, incidentally, entirely home-grown and home-executed—the only role for the CIA in the book being almost to wreck the operation, albeit inadvertently.

Students of Soviet politics might give some thought to Moss's thesis. His basic premise is that the extreme centralization of the system also makes it vulnerable to an attack aimed at its vital nexus at the top. Moss chooses a time when a senile general secretary, à la Leonid Brezhnev or Konstantin Chernenko, lies dying. The atmosphere is thick with plotting among party leaders, but a quick move by the Soviet Union's special forces, under the hero's direction and with the blessing of a hoodwinked father-in-law as chief of staff, decapitates the system. A new

nonparty leadership emerges and, as the novel ends, has good but not certain prospects for survival. The premises required to sustain the plot are neither as numerous nor as strained as one might think. There is some evidence that key elite units of the Soviet Army did something that caused wholesale replacements among their officers about 15 years ago.⁶ Then, too, we have Marshal Georgiy Zhukov's dismissal in 1957, Marshal Sergey Biryuzov's death in an air crash in Yugoslavia in 1964, and the recent sacking of Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov—not as evidence of plans for coups, but certainly as indications that things happen among the military we know very little about.

TAKING the three Western novels as a group, what is striking is the similarity of conclusions drawn by three authors who have carefully studied or experienced life among the professionals in the Soviet Union, three authors who approached the topic from quite different routes.

According to these fictional accounts, the career of a military officer has within it the seeds of subversion. A loyalty to country and ideals, these authors say, almost propels the able and outstanding officer into conflict with the party system. Such, incidentally, was the case of Captain Viktor Belenko, the MiG pilot, who flew his airplane to Japan in 1977. Belenko felt stifled by a system he could no longer endure.⁷

Second, the role of nepotism, the need for the connection to the top, is a major factor in each story. Third, in two of these books, the West (the United States in particu-

lar) is feckless, inept, and poorly informed about goings-on in the USSR. In marked contrast, *The Hunt for Red October* has a US/UK team "ten feet tall," as the *The Submarine Review* calls it. They do everything right, even the CIA man. The Western military are not involved in the other two books—only the intelligence, security, and diplomatic services. Whether this implies a greater regard for the military in the West as well, I leave to the reader.

THE NOVELETTE *A Tree in the Center of Kabul* is dedicated to justifying to Soviet readers the invasion of Afghanistan. Written by one of the Soviet Union's most popular international journalists, Aleksandr Prokhanov, the book has been made into a movie which received much acclaim in the USSR. I do not know whether they have tried to export it.

Prokhanov has written about Namibia, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, and other "victims of imperialist aggression," but the present opus on Afghanistan, which was approved by the Soviet censor in June 1982, is the best known of his works. It tells the story of a Soviet journalist—remarkably like the author—from the time he enters Afghanistan at the border town of Termez, through many adventures, to his rescue by Soviet armored vehicles from an encircling band of Afghan rebels. The party line is spelled out, illustrated, proclaimed, and driven home from beginning to end. But in contrast to most political pornography, this book has redeeming features. We get a good look at the Soviet professional propagandist; our hero is often revealing about himself and his craft. The other Soviets in the story also betray aspects of their true characters from time to time. Moreover, through this book one can see

⁶ Communicated by Peter Deriabin in a conversation with the author; based on obituaries of military officers published in the Soviet press.

⁷ See John Barron, *MiG Pilot: The Story of Viktor Belenko*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1980.

Afghanistan as Soviet officials viewed it four years ago.

Ivan Volkov, Prokhanov's hero, had divorced his wife some time earlier, after they had drawn apart due to his travel and a divergence of interests. She is a restorer of churches and antiquities and an ardent Russophile of the Vladimir Soloukhin variety that hankers after the past, whereas Volkov "was inclined toward the future." He would come home from his exciting trips to find his wife sitting around with her friends all saying that Mother Russia was dying. Volkov finds an adoring girlfriend in Kabul who wants to go forward into the future with him. She comes from a Moscovite family that slipped down from middle-class status when her father died. All her friends cut her off because of her reduced circumstances, and she took a job in Kabul to get away from the shame of being *déclassée*. Once in Afghanistan, however, she realized what poverty really was and learned again to count her blessings, especially in the company of Volkov.

On the professional side, Volkov receives on two occasions orders to counter specific articles in the Western press—in *Le Monde*, to be exact. That craven medium of imperialism supports a villainous correspondent named André Vignard, whose role in life is to spread misinformation about the Soviet Union. Moscow telephones to Volkov, "That Vignard . . . went to Pakistan and from there crossed the Afghan border with a terrorist group. . . . He sends out stories. Very evil, very specific. Photographs. Detachments of rebels on horseback. Executions of activists. Sabotage of the agrarian reform. They're recognized as very well written. They're beginning to be reprinted It's very important that you send us material on the

land, on the food situation, on the agrarian reform. On the activities of the Afghan soldiers giving a rebuff to the counterrevolutionaries. Where are your tractors? Did they finally arrive?" (The tractor is to the Communist propagandist what the cow is to the Hindu faithful. In this novel, Volkov tracks a rumble of tractors from Termez south to someplace near Herat. They symbolize Soviet friendship, and all good people are impressed with them. They are the same tractors that Mikhail Sholokhov and friends used 50 years ago in their collectivization novels.)

There could scarcely be a more authoritative source than Prokhanov for explaining the differences between journalistic standards West and East. The author himself may well have a guilty conscience of sorts about what he has written about Afghanistan. His flashbacks to earlier periods in his hero's life seem dedicated to explaining what a fine fellow he really is. Dedication to saving the glories of the Afghan revolution is expressed every few pages. Volkov at one point proclaims, "All the resources of the earth and nature, resources of mind and spirit, are directed toward the struggle. Not today, not in my lifetime or that of my son, but . . ." All of the Soviets in the book have to talk this way a bit, as do all of the "good" Afghans. No matter how cynical they all become, professed dedication to the ideology is necessary for survival. At times it becomes so flamboyant that it sounds like caricature; maybe it is.

According to Prokhanov, Afghanistan's liberation from the feudal yoke began with the "April Revolution" of 1978, which was then thwarted by the seizure of power by Hafizullah Amin, a "CIA agent" who overturned the revolution while keeping the communist

rhetoric. Finally, the people and the true cadre of the party rose up against Amin in 1979 and installed Babrak Kamal. Since then everything would have been all right if the imperialists, the Chinese hegemonists, and some reactionary mullahs in Pakistan had just left the poor Afghans alone. (I suspect that one of the rarest books in the Soviet Union today is Mirmukhsin's Uzbek-language novel, *Chodrali ayol* [Woman in a Veil], which praised the Amin regime as the authentic revolution. It appeared first in the Tashkent magazine *Sharq Yulduzi* in 1979 and then in book form a few weeks before the Soviets killed Amin.)^a

And yet, Prokhanov presents one captured rebel who is a university professor and states that if he were released he would fight again to drive the Marxists out of his country. Another leader of the rebels is the brother of the local state security chief. These men are clearly not hired guns. The scene where Soviet and Afghan troops convoy the sacred tractors through a hostile village with everybody just waiting for the first shot to be fired conveys a powerful sense of reality. Descriptions of parties among the members of the Soviet colony in Kabul also come through to the reader as authentic, although I suspect they drink more.

LOOKING BACK over all four books, one gets a convincing picture of the cadre, the New Class, as manifesting middle-class prejudices, strong Russian patriotic feeling among the Russians, and at least a sense of separateness among the other nationalities. The need for expansionism as a part of the ideology of the ruling class is manifest in all. That there is a rul-

^a *Zhenshchina v chadre: Afganskaya povest'* (Woman in a Veil: An Afghan Tale), in Uzbek, Tashkent, Izdatel'stvo literatury i iskusstva, 1980.

ing class of party and professional elites is assumed by all. Workers and peasants play no significant role in any of these books. The professional classes as a whole are dedicated to the regime in the absence of some other type of authority. They follow orders up to the point that the orders interfere with their personal concerns, which generally speaking are rather petty. Prokhanov might protest that his characters are all deeply motivated to bring health and enlightenment to the Afghan people, but I have come to know that author well enough to know he would not

really mean it. Even Moss stresses the apathetic, order-following nature of the bureaucracy and the people. He expects them to come alive when the yoke is lifted, as indeed many did between 1904 and 1919, but I suspect that he would agree that inertia is the greatest barrier to radical change.

Military and intelligence officers are shown as more dedicated, more active, and more able than other types of professionals and—in the case of the military—more likely to oppose the regime. Although they are necessary for a good adventure story, I question

those assumptions. KGB officers probably defect more than military officers, and the latter sort of defectors are often from the military intelligence service, the GRU. As to dedication and activity, I would judge from other sources that indifference and inertia are as prevalent among the security and military people as among the civilian counterparts.

Be that as it may, there is something to be learned from this sort of literature. Certainly, reading books like these is often more fun than taking your political science and sociology straight.

Managing the Multinational USSR

Paul A. Goble

Vospityvat' ubezhdennyykh patriotov-internatsionalistov. Po materialam Vsesoyuznoy nauchno-prakticheskoy konferentsii "Razvitiye natsional'nykh otnosheniy v usloviyakh zrelogo sotsializma. Opyt i problemy patrioteskogo i internatsional'nogo vospitaniya," Riga, 28-30 iyunya 1982 g. (Training Dedicated Patriot-Internationalists. Based on Materials from the All-Union Practical Scientific Conference "Development of Nationality Relations under Conditions of Mature Socialism. The Experience and Problems of Patriotic and Internationalist Education," Riga, June 28-30, 1982), Moscow, Politizdat, 1982.

DURING THE PAST decade, Western specialists on the Soviet Union have devoted increasing attention to demographic trends and ethnographic developments among the non-Russian nationalities and relatively less to the various Soviet institutions affecting or affected by nationality issues. This trend redresses an earlier imbalance in the

Paul A. Goble is Special Assistant for Soviet Nationality Affairs, US Department of State. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the US government.

opposite direction, but it has had two unfortunate consequences. First, it has contributed to the notion that all these social phenomena have large and immediate political consequences. Second, it has led to the idea that the Soviet state—despite its arsenal of coercive, organizational, and ideological resources—is largely incapable of dealing with these changes, of directing them to its own ends, or of mitigating their consequences for the Soviet political system. This is not to suggest that these changes have no political consequences or that Moscow will always be able to cope with them. Rather, it is to argue that the political impact of demographic and ethnographic change must be analyzed instead of assumed, and that the capacity of Soviet institutions to respond must be studied rather than ignored. A recent set of Soviet publications enables Western analysts to do just that.

In June 1982, some 250 senior Soviet party and state officials, military officers, and academic specialists met in Riga to discuss nationality relations in the USSR. They gathered neither to celebrate the "solution" of the "nationality question" in the Soviet Union nor to respond to a single, system-wide demographic or ethnographic challenge to Soviet authority. Rather, they met to discuss how developments among nationalities

were affecting Soviet institutions and how these institutions were coping with them.

In itself, a meeting of this type was not unusual. Similar gatherings have taken place since the early years of Soviet rule,¹ and they came to be a regular if inconspicuous feature of the Soviet political landscape in the 1960's and 1970's.² However, the Riga conference stands out because of the high-level attention it received, the extensive and detailed publications it produced, and, in particular, the frank discussion of prob-

¹ These meetings have received relatively little attention in the West. For a Soviet introduction to the subject, see S. I. Yelkina, "On the History of the Conferences of the CC of the Russian CP (B) with Executives from National Republics and Oblasts (1918-1923)," *Voprosy istorii KPSS* (Moscow), No. 3, 1966, pp. 54-61.

² No comprehensive list of these prior meetings is available. The best source on such conferences is the annual reports of the Institute of Ethnography, as published in *Sovetskaya etnografiya*. Monographs on the results of several important recent meetings have also appeared: *Internatsional'noye vospitaniye trudyashchikhsya* (International Education of Labor), Riga, Liesma, 1967, from a 1966 Riga conference; *Soviet medeniyeti ve emek adamy nylenevi aleml* (Soviet Culture and the Spiritual World of the Man of Labor), Baku, Azerneshr, 1982, from an April 1979 conference in Baku and Leningrad; *Internatsional'noye i natsional'noye v sotsialisticheskoy obraze zhizni sovetskogo naroda* (The International and the National in the Socialist Way of Life of the Soviet People), Frunze, Kirgizstan, 1982, from a September 1981 conference in Frunze; *Obostreniye ideologicheskoy bor'by na mirovoy arene i politicheskoye vospitaniye trudyashchikhsya* (Sharpening of Ideological Struggle in the World Arena and the Political Education of Workers), Moscow, Politizdat, 1983, from an October 1982 conference in Tallinn.

lems and policies it generated. Organized by the CPSU Central Committee, the meeting brought together senior officials from all the union and autonomous republics and from the 40 oblasts and krais of the Russian republic, as well as academic specialists from leading Soviet research institutions. General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev sent a message of greeting, and many of the ideas first expressed at the conference were subsequently reiterated by his successors, Yuriy Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko.³ Indeed, Chernenko even selected one of the conference organizers, Vadim A. Pechenev, to be his personal assistant.

The publications resulting from the Riga meeting were equally unusual. Their breadth, detail, and wide distribution represented a major departure from the way in which earlier conferences of this kind had been handled.⁴ The Riga sessions received extensive coverage in the central, regional, and specialized press, and the conference proceedings were promptly published in 12 volumes. In addition to the summary volume, *Training Dedicated Patriot-Internationalists*, under review here, a separate volume was published for each of the 11 functional sections of the conference.

³ This was reflected in the speeches and articles on the 60th anniversary of the formation of the Soviet Union in December 1982.

⁴ Earlier conferences were rarely reported in the all-Union media, and if they were, then only months after the event.

⁵ The separate titles and their publication data, including size of print run, are as follows:

On party work: *Partiynnyy komitet—organizator patrioticheskogo i international'nogo vospitaniya trudyashchikhsya* (The Party Committee—the Organizer of the Patriotic and International Education of the Working Class), Moscow, Politizdat, 1982, 221 pp., 50,000 copies.

On economic management: *Material'naya osnovna družby i bratstva* (Material Foundation of Friendship and Fraternity), Moscow, Ekonomika, 1982, 232 pp., 15,000 copies.

The summary volume contains the speeches delivered at the plenary sessions, a précis of the discussions, and a full listing of the recommendations of all sections. The other volumes provide considerably more detail on the particular topic to which a section was devoted. In order to ensure that the findings of the conference reached their intended audiences, a unique strategy for disseminating them was adopted. Although the 12 volumes have a common format, each was printed and distributed—in editions ranging from 10,000 to 50,000 copies—by publishing houses that normally publish works on the functional area covered by the particular section of the conference. Thus, the volume on Komsomol activities was issued by "Molodaya gvardiya," the one on economic management and planning by "Ekonomika," and the one on the impact of nationality developments on military matters by "Voyenizdat."⁵

BUT THE MOST impressive trait of the proceedings was the breadth and frankness of the discussions and the specificity of policy proposals. Participants discussed topics ranging from the selection of background music on Aeroflot flights in various republics and the languages used in street signs to

On social policy: *Sotsial'naya politika i natsional'nyye otnosheniya* (Social Policy and National Relations), Moscow, Mysl', 1982, 213 pp., 15,000 copies.

On government bodies: *Sotsialisticheskaya demokratiya i international'noye yedinstvo sovetskogo naroda* (Socialist Democracy and International Unity of the Soviet People), Moscow, Yuridicheskaya literatura, 1982, 232 pp., 10,000 copies.

On trade unions: *Rol' profsoyuzov v ukreplenii družby i bratstva trudyashchikhsya* (The Role of Trade Unions in Strengthening the Friendship and Fraternity of Labor), Moscow, Profizdat, 1982, 200 pp., 19,000 copies.

On Komsomol work: *Patrioticheskoye i international'noye vospitaniye molodezhi* (The Patriotic and International Education of Youth), Moscow, Molodaya gvardiya, 1983, 240 pp., 30,000 copies.

On the military: *Sovetskaya armiya—shkola družby i bratstva* (The Soviet Army—School of Friendship and

the rising percentage of non-Russians in the military's draft pool and the restructuring of economic and planning relationships between Moscow and the periphery. In some cases, the speakers claimed that all was well. More often, they acknowledged specific difficulties and proposed policy changes to overcome them. In this essay, I shall concentrate on three examples of such discussions out of the dozens that could be culled from the 2,500 pages of the published record.

1. *Non-Russians in the military.* The rising percentage of Muslims among Soviet military conscripts—now more than one in four—is perhaps the clearest example of the impact of demographic change on a Soviet institution. An entire section of the Riga conference was devoted to the efforts of the political authorities and military commanders to deal with this situation.

According to the senior military man present, Col. Gen. A. D. Lizichev, then deputy chief of the Soviet Army's Main Political Directorate, the Soviet military was currently taking three steps to accommodate to the influx of Muslim conscripts.⁶ First, because many of these men know Russian poorly—and it remains the language of

Fraternity), Moscow, Voenizdat, 1982, 160 pp., 30,000 copies.

On the media: *My družboy leninskoy sil'ny* (Our Strength is in Leninist Friendship) Moscow, Izvestiya, 1982, 160 pp., 20,000 copies.

On culture: *Kul'tura yedinogo sovetskogo naroda* (The Culture of a Single Soviet People), Moscow, Sovetskii pisatel', 1982, 208 pp., 10,000 copies.

On foreign ties: *Sotsialisticheskii internationalizm v deystviye* (Socialist Internationalism in Action), Moscow, Nauka, 1982, 145 pp., 11,000 copies.

On counterpropaganda: *Neprimirnost' k burzhaznoy ideologii, perezhitkam natsionalizma* (Incompatibility Toward Bourgeois Ideology and Vestiges of Nationalism), Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1982, 192 pp., 15,000 copies.

⁶ *Sovetskaya armiya—shkola družby i bratstva*, pp. 19–26.

command—the military has organized special language classes. But, as Lizichev noted, these “take time from military and political training.” Consequently, he urged that the regular educational system devote more time to Russian-language instruction. Second, the military is attempting to sensitize commanders to the cultural distinctiveness of their non-Slavic troops and to devise suitable indoctrination programs for both officers and men so that military service might integrate rather than polarize men of different nationality backgrounds. Third, because the officer corps is almost exclusively Slavic, Lizichev urged officials in the republics to encourage more non-Russians, especially non-Slavs, to apply to officer training institutions. These proposals were elaborated in the presentations of other section participants and figured in the conference recommendations. They have subsequently become official policy.⁷

2. *Economic development in a multinational setting.* Nationality also affects economic planning and development, but here its impact is more complex than in the case of the military. The federal structure of the state, which is based on national republics, influences the planning process and the management of the economy. Regional variations in population growth have created major labor/capital imbalances. Moreover, the national identities of individuals and groups play a role in their economic behavior, including the level of participation in the work force and the willingness to migrate to other regions. These

issues were discussed at Riga. However, in contrast to the military section, the members of the planning and development section were unable to reach consensus on what to do.⁸

Participants did point to two major problematic areas. First, any attempt to overcome nationality-related problems in the economy must contend with a variety of other policies that, while developed for other reasons, have important and often counterproductive effects on nationality relations. For example, the effort to equalize income levels among republics and between urban and rural inhabitants undercuts more specific attempts to encourage migration from labor-surplus to labor-shortage regions. Second, many nationality-related values that affect the economy do not appear to be susceptible to an economic solution, both because the system lacks sufficient economic resources to override ethnic values and because different groups respond in different and often unexpected ways to economic stimuli. Thus, more than one speaker argued for the use of noneconomic measures—social policy changes, ideological campaigns, and, implicitly at least, use of the coercive power of the state—to correct economic problems.

3. *Non-indigenous nationalities.* As a result of historical accident and the imperatives of Soviet development, one Soviet citizen out of five—some 55 million people—lives outside his or her respective nationality's home territory. In many instances, these people—a large percentage of whom are Slavs—find themselves on the cut-

ting edge of interpersonal nationality relations. More than one Riga participant noted that while such contacts may make inter-ethnic friendship possible, they can often exacerbate nationality sensitivities as well. The interesting feature of the Riga conference was the general willingness to acknowledge the dilemmas created by coping with the needs of non-indigenous settlers. For example, giving them separate cultural facilities could easily backfire, inflaming national rivalries and thus undercutting the efforts of the central authorities to consolidate their control and build bridges between various national groups. In addition, some speakers implied, such policies might adversely affect the authority of the republican governments. Consequently, the speakers argued, any measures of this nature should be accompanied by extremely careful and subtle ideological work lest they be misunderstood by the native population.⁹ Nevertheless, it was apparent that an inclination existed to move in the direction of providing special cultural privileges to non-natives. One speaker invoked Lenin in support of such action: “V. I. Lenin stressed the necessity of combining territorial and extraterritorial principles in nationality policy.”¹⁰ The founder of the Soviet state has seldom been linked to the notion of “extraterritorial” support for nationalities.

IT IS NOT SURPRISING that at a conference held under the general rubric of “Experience and Problems of Ideological Work” a num-

⁷ See William Fierman, “Soviet ‘Muslims’ and the Armed Forces,” a paper prepared at the United States Information Agency (Washington, DC), April 1985, esp. p. 15–16.

⁸ Most of the differences appear to reflect varied functional rather than territorial responsibilities.

⁹ Obviously, extending privileges not enjoyed by the indigenous nationality to non-indigenous groups—be they Russian or other—could raise questions in the minds of the local population and might aggravate ethnic tensions.

¹⁰ *Sotsial'naya politika i natsional'nyye otnosheniya*, p. 33.

ber of participants would emphasize that social and economic development alone had not solved and could not solve many nationality-related problems. In an address to the plenary session, for example, CPSU Central Committee Secretary Boris Ponomarev argued that "the disappearance of antagonistic classes and the formation of socialist social relations by themselves do not guarantee corresponding changes in the social-psychological sphere and in relations between people of various nationalities."¹¹ He specifically directed the participants' attention both to problems arising from Soviet social developments and to difficulties resulting from changes in the international atmosphere.¹²

Soviet developments, many speakers suggested, had overcome some nationality-related prejudices, but had spawned other sensitivities. Greater social mobility had led to more intergroup contacts and competition, which could turn into sources of tension. Rising levels of education had encouraged greater interest in national pasts and traditions (topics that the central authorities have always viewed as potentially dangerous). And general economic expansion has created rising expectations which, if not met, could lead some to find an outlet in ethnic preoccupations. Each of these phenomena, the speakers suggested, was different for each nationality group and had to be treated on an individual basis.

In the view of the conference participants, however, an even greater challenge was posed by the growing influence of foreign ideas among the Soviet citizenry, an influence conveyed through radio broadcasts, tourists, books, and films. The various speakers on this topic agreed with the view that the prevalence of this influence

reflected a failure of the Soviet system to meet satisfactorily the needs and interests of the population in certain areas. In the nationality area, they implied, such failures were numerous. Indeed, a Ukrainian Central Committee secretary paid to Radio Liberty and Voice of America a backhanded compliment, observing that because they kept abreast of the Ukrainian media so carefully their broadcasts to his republic were quite often addressed to precisely those issues about which the population wanted to be informed.¹³

Other speakers reported on the various means that the Soviet authorities have employed in an attempt to stop this flow—tighter border controls, more thorough censorship of foreign books and films, and other limitations on contacts with foreigners—but they agreed that such measures by themselves were insufficient. Consequently, they called for an expanded counterpropaganda campaign aimed at immunizing Soviet citizens against foreign influences. Such an undertaking, various speakers suggested, would necessarily have to include efforts to fill the gaps now exploited by the West, by providing accurate and timely information so that Soviet citizens would not turn to Western sources. However, as at least one speaker noted, such measures were not without risks: by attempting to compete with the Western media, the authorities might end up spreading the very ideas and values that they had hoped to keep out.¹⁴

¹¹ *Vospityvat' ubezhdeniynkh patriotov-internationalistov*, p. 24.

¹² *Ibid.* Such references, of course, are part of a transparent effort to shift the blame for Soviet problems, and reflect the frustrations of many Soviet officials about them.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

¹⁴ *My družboy leninskoy sl'ny*, pp. 149–56.

In view of these dilemmas and the lack of simple solutions, it is not surprising that virtually every section of the conference recommended more study of nationality issues and better utilization of academic expertise in the formulation of policy. This wish was most clearly expressed in a call for the creation of special councils—with in all republic, kray, and oblast party committees—for the study of nationality relations.¹⁵

The desire to institutionalize academic expertise in nationality policymaking suggests that the Riga speeches of nationality experts should be read with the following ideas in mind. First, though the academics could and did range more widely in their treatment of the issue than could officials with specific functional responsibilities, the most important parts of their speeches *from the point of view of those officials* were their practical proposals rather than their theoretical disquisitions. Second, the reintroduction of the term *sliyaniye* ("merger") of nationalities in that context had a somewhat different connotation than a casual reading of these proceedings might suggest. As elaborated by E. A. Bagrov and by R. D. Kosolapov, chief editor of *Kommunist*, the term was stripped explicitly of some of its more threatening aspects. As Kosolapov told the plenary session:

Of course, the Leninist idea of merger of nations does not have anything in common with its vulgar utopian usage, according to which this merger is treated as the complete destruction of national as-

¹⁵ Councils of this type have been established in various parts of the country in connection with the counterpropaganda campaign; but with rare exceptions, they do not appear to be playing the broader policy role anticipated at Riga.

pects and the rubbing out of any linguistic and ethnic distinctions. Remember Makar Nagul'nov in Sholokhov's *The Virgin Soil Upturned* when explaining the communist future, predicting that there "all the little faces will be pleasantly swarthy, and all the same." Precisely this or some other equally naive opinion has been taken at times as being Marxism, with all the consequences flowing from it.¹⁶

Consequently, even though *slivaniye* sparked some sharp debate at Riga—the above passage was not included in the reportage on Kosolapov's speech in the volume on social policy—its reintroduction actually removed a potential ideological roadblock to research, freeing scholars from the need to engage in ideological discussion on this point and allowing them to do more practical work.

THE SIGNIFICANCE of the Riga meeting for both Western and Soviet scholars lies less in the wealth of specific information it provides on Soviet policies and practices than in the perspectives it offers on how—and how well—the Soviet authorities cope with nationality problems. These perspectives can be stated as propositions

for further study. Among the most important are the following:

- All Soviet institutions exist in a multinational context, and all policies are affected by this fact. Conversely, all Soviet policies have ethnic consequences. Usually, these consequences are unimportant either because the policy or the nationality is not very important, or because concrete steps were taken to reduce the seriousness of the effects. In any case, even though the consequences are seldom decisive, if they are ignored, the policies adopted by Soviet leaders may have unintended and perhaps undesirable results. Similarly, unless Western scholars take account of nationality factors in Soviet policies, they are likely to have an incomplete understanding of the situation in the Soviet Union.

- Relatively few of the demographic or ethnographic phenomena in the USSR are of major and permanent political significance. They become important only when they lead to behavior that makes the achievement of some policy goal more difficult or costly. This is so because the Soviet authorities are primarily interested in controlling behavior affecting their goals and only secondarily interested in national phenomena that do not have such immediate repercussions.

- The Soviet authorities have at their disposal a variety of re-

sources for managing intra-national relations. Generally, they employ them to create an environment in which national identity is unlikely to be the dominant aspect of total identity or, failing that, one in which national identity is not the primary determinant of behavior. Given the disproportion between the organizational, ideological, and coercive resources of the Soviet state and those of the nationalities in the USSR, the task of managing national relations has usually not been impossible.

Forty years ago a senior party official in Moscow reputedly told a Baltic Communist that Soviet nationality policy consists of having enough boxcars ready. Even so, as Stalin reportedly learned in the case of the Ukrainians, managing nationality relations was not so simple and required a variety of other means. Now, under the impact of social change, shifts in some Soviet goals, and the concomitant decline in the direct use of coercion, this task is considerably more complex and difficult. How well the Soviet authorities will cope with it remains to be seen; but the proceedings of the Riga conference suggest that any estimate of the outcome must consider both the organizational and coercive capabilities of the Soviet state and the demographic and ethnographic trends—the boxcars as well as the birthrate.

¹⁶ *Vospityvat' ubezhdenykh patriotov. Internatsionalistov*, p. 155.

Correspondence

NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to The Editors, Problems of Communism, US Information Agency, 301 4th Street, SW, Washington, DC 20547, USA.

MOSCOW AND PHILIPPINE COMMUNISM

TO THE EDITORS: David Rosenberg, in his article "Communism in the Philippines" (*Problems of Communism*, September-October 1984), states that the "Soviet Union, so far as is known, . . . provides no support" for the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and that "there is no evidence that Moscow is currently willing to jeopardize" ties with the Philippine government "by providing significant amounts of undercover weapons or other aid to Philippine opposition groups" (p. 36). I would submit that Moscow has, in fact, been quite active since the Aquino assassination in strengthening links to the CPP and New People's Army (NPA) and that these links are not new (see my article, "Philippine Communism and the Soviet Union," *Survey* [London], No. 124, Spring 1985).

Indeed, one can trace an evolution of the CPP from a Maoist, pro-Chinese communist party to one that, while still formally independent, shows in-

creasing links to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). To be sure, both the CPSU and the CPP bend over backward to obscure their links: thus, it is almost impossible to find statements in Soviet sources about the NPA insurgency, and the CPP rarely discusses Soviet activities in the Philippines.

In the Philippines, the Kremlin faces no dilemma of choosing between pursuit of the national security interests of the Soviet Union and promotion of communist world revolution. The USSR's perceived security interests and military objectives require an end to US military superiority in the Pacific. (The placement of MiG-23 aircraft in Vietnam attests to the Soviet attempt to lessen US superiority.) The removal of the US military bases in the Philippines—particularly Clark Air Force Base and the Subic Naval Base—is thus an important strategic objective.

Since the CPP/NPA has also long sought to rid the Philippines of US military bases and "US economic imperialism," one might have expected the Soviets to have supported the insurgency of the New People's Army from the outset. However, the Soviets were presumably aware that the NPA for a long time was not the equal of the Philippine military and that "capitalist stability" remained a fact of life in the island nation—i.e., that the "objective conditions" for revolution were unfavorable.

The new group of leaders around José Sison who broke with the traditional PKP (Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas) in 1969 to form the CPP were critical of this assessment by the Soviets. The Maoist CPP in its zeal for armed struggle looked to Beijing for political inspiration and material support. During this period, Beijing was chiding the Soviets for being insufficiently militant in promoting revolution. Moscow ignored these Chinese taunts and continued to support the PKP, which dutifully followed the Soviet line that capitalism was stable in the Philippines and that armed struggle was to be avoided. The PKP concentrated instead on political struggle and organizational activities.

As it turned out, Moscow was right. In the early 1970's, revolutionary conditions were absent. The CPP had a small popular following, and the New People's Army was militarily weak vis-à-vis the Philippine Armed Forces. The government of Ferdinand Marcos was strong, and the Philippine economy was robust. Moscow continued to preach caution, patience, and political struggle. By about 1972, Sison and the CPP apparently came to the Soviet view that capitalist stability was not a short-run phenomenon in the Philippines.

It was not that the CPP somehow had suddenly "dropped" China and Maoism and had become "independent." The CPP had always been Leninist in many ways, and now became

even more Leninist in its outlook, especially regarding revolutionary tactics. From about 1975 to 1980, the CPP downplayed armed struggle and increasingly followed a Soviet line of political struggle.

During the latter half of the 1970's, it was China that appeared to "drop" the CPP. In their determination to counter the expansion of Soviet-backed Vietnam into Cambodia, the Chinese began to cultivate strong ties with the governments of Thailand and other members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (including the Philippines). China also felt it necessary to improve relations with the United States in order to counter the Soviet buildup in the Far East. To reassure ASEAN and gain its support, Beijing withdrew its support from the NPA and other "national liberation movements" in the region. It also supported the presence of US military bases in the Philippines as a counterweight to Soviet advances in Indochina—a position that infuriated the CPP. In 1976, Bernabe Buscayno (alias Commander Dante), leader of the NPA until his arrest in August of that year, indicated that the NPA was no longer Maoist.

As the 1980's approached, the CPSU and the CPP found an increasing commonality of interest in the promotion of a united front in the Philippines against the Marcos government. This was particularly evident in the labor sector, where

between 1979 and 1982 there was a new trend toward cooperation between the PKP and the CPP under the auspices of the CPSU-controlled front organization, the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). In October 1980, the PKP's WFTU affiliate, "Katipunan," joined forces with the CPP labor union Kilusang Mayo Uno (The May First Movement—KMU) and three ostensibly independent unions to create "Solidarity," a labor front organization opposed to Marcos's wage and no-strike policies. This merger marked a significant change: for the first time, the PKP now had the full backing of the CPSU in joining overtly with the anti-Marcos opposition camp. Moreover, since the "independent" trade unions were officially affiliated with the Soviet-controlled WFTU, they were exposed to influence from Moscow. The CPP's participation in "Solidarity" was evidence that the party was no longer trying to disguise its ties to Soviet-influenced organizations and to the PKP.

Further evidence of the Soviet hand in Philippine developments surfaced in July 1982, when Stanislav Levchenko, former acting chief of the active measures group of the Tokyo residency of the KGB, delivered testimony on Soviet active measures before a US Congressional committee. Levchenko said that as late as 1979 he had personally witnessed KGB officers under instructions from the CPSU's International Department "delivering money to the illegal Communist Party of the Philippines [i.e., the CPP] in bags with two bottoms. . . . [The] messenger . . . [of the] Communist Party of the Philippines . . . visited Tokyo during those years. [He] was visiting Tokyo on a more-or-less regular basis to get money from the KGB. . . . I witnessed this personally. I had to help the KGB case officer . . . to be sure that Japanese counterintelligence was not surveilling the whole operation. So I was driving the car to a

hotel, and the KGB case officer disappeared from the car with a heavy bag of money and went back without anything in his hands" (*Soviet Active Measures*, Hearing before the House Select Committee on Intelligence, 13-14 July, 1982, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1982, pp. 166-67).

The engagement of the Soviet bloc with the CPP was further revealed in 1983 when Carlos Gaspar, an East German, was discovered to be the CPP's link in a complex international funding support system (AFP, Hong Kong, Apr. 27, 1983, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Asia and Pacific*, [Washington, DC], Apr. 28, 1983, pp. P/1-4). Gaspar, 36, an anthropologist and church lay worker, was arrested in the course of a raid by a military intelligence team on a suspected "underground" house of the CPP's Mindanao regional party committee in Davao City. Confiscated documents indicated that Gaspar had traveled regularly to Europe, North Africa, the United States, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Bangladesh to contact various groups. The documents also indicated that the CPP maintained links with Soviet-sponsored solidarity groups in foreign countries through its international liaison committee (*Manila Bulletin Today*, Apr. 3, 1983).

Philippine military authorities allege that the CPP receives about 80 percent of its agitation and propaganda funds from international funding institutions. Many of these institutions are, of course, Soviet-sponsored. The *Manila Times Journal* of March 29, 1983, citing captured documents, noted that the CPP was using "humanitarian" organizations in the Netherlands and West Germany as a source of funds for the National Democratic Front in the Philippines.

Meanwhile, Moscow currently enjoys the support of the CPP in many of its foreign policy adventures. For instance, while

the Chinese blast the Nicaraguan revolution as a victory for "Soviet social-imperialism," the CPP supports the Soviet position (see *NDF-Update* [Manila], Vol. III, No. 3, March-April 1983, p. 6).

Following the August 1983 assassination of popular Philippine opposition leader Benigno Aquino, the Kremlin apparently reassessed revolutionary conditions in the Philippines. Judging from an analysis of the Soviet press since the Aquino assassination, one would say the Soviets feel that revolutionary prospects are improving. Seen through a Soviet ideological lens, the social and economic pressures for change are building; opposition to the "Marcos-US dictatorship" is increasing; and the ability of the Marcos regime to cope with the rising tide of communist insurgency and opposition sentiment among noncommunist groups is declining (see, e.g., *Izvestiya* [Moscow], May 12, 1984).

The Soviets moved quickly to exploit the anti-Marcos, anti-American sentiment that gathered momentum after the Aquino assassination. The Kremlin increased the size of the Soviet mission in Manila (from about 60 to 90) in late 1983 and early 1984. The character of the mission changed: energetic Soviet covert operatives replaced tired old diplomats. For example, the experienced KGB official Boris Smirnov—who in 1976 had successfully passed off in Tokyo what was reputed to be the "last will of Zhou Enlai"—was assigned to Manila on April 12, 1984, as first secretary of the Soviet embassy (*Business Times* [Kuala Lumpur], Dec. 5, 1984). A few weeks after his arrival in Manila, a bogus questionnaire "from the US Information Service" was distributed among leading Filipinos, seeking sensitive information on subjects such as their political leanings and military experience. This anti-American disinformation operation was reportedly successful in generating

Filipino outrage at the "imperitence" of the allegedly American questionnaire (*ibid.*).

Moscow invariably hides much of its sensitive activities with the CPP under the cover of cultural, sports, or economic exchanges and visits. According to an official of the Philippine government, there was in the last 10 months of 1984 an upsurge in the number of scientists and cultural troupes from the USSR and Eastern Europe interested in attending international conferences or performing in the Philippines. These contacts have taken place at both the official and the people-to-people levels (*ibid.*).

Soviet involvement in arms transfers to the NPA is more difficult to detect, owing to the fact that the Philippines comprises some 7,000 islands. Nevertheless, there is evidence of Soviet involvement in at least one recent shipment of arms from Eastern Europe through South Yemen to the NPA (Ross H. Munro, "Dateline Manila: A Soviet Viceroy?" *Foreign Policy* [Washington, DC], Fall 1984, p. 186).

In addition, the Soviets advance their interests through the "parliament in the streets." The PKP, almost totally controlled by the CPSU, is a partner of the CPP in many demonstrations and rallies, and members of both Philippine communist parties work together (along with other political groupings) in the National Democratic Front (*San Francisco Examiner*, Nov. 11, 1984).

From November 30 to December 4, 1984, the Soviet-controlled World Peace Council (WPC) and its Philippine affiliate, the Philippine Peace and Solidarity Council, cosponsored the first International Conference on Peace and Security in East Asia and the Pacific. The conference was held at the University of the Philippines, a central location for National Democratic Front activity. It therefore afforded the Soviets a golden opportunity to use its WPC affiliate, the Soviet Com-

mittee for the Defense of Peace, and its PKP proxy to strengthen ties with the CPP, and to fan opposition to the US bases and "American imperialism" (*Pravda* [Moscow], Dec. 4, 1984; and *Manila Bulletin Today*, Dec. 1, 1984).

This WPC-sponsored conference coincided with a wave of protests and demonstrations throughout the Philippines. *Pravda* quotes an alleged participant in one of the meetings: "There were more than 5,000 people. We gathered in front of the American base at Clark Field, the largest in this region of the world. From here the bombers flew to Vietnam. The Americans call the entrance to the base the 'Gate of Friendship,' but we call them the 'Gates of Hell,' since nuclear death lurks behind them. We demanded the removal from our land of all 23 US bases, including Clark Field and Subic Bay" (*Pravda*, Dec. 4, 1984).

LEIF ROSENBERGER
US Defense
Intelligence Agency
Arlington, VA

MR. ROSENBERG RESPONDS: Letters in the May-June and current issue of *Problems of Communism* indicate the wide range of opinion about communism in the Philippines. On the one hand, Leif Rosenberg sees a growing CPSU-CPP link. He finds that "Moscow has been quite active since the Aquino assassination in strengthening links to the CPP and New People's Army." On the other hand, Peter Bacho finds no such ties. He asserts that "there is no evidence of outside support for the revolutionary movement." Clearly, we need to review the evidence for these conflicting views.

Unfortunately, Rosenberg offers very little solid evidence to support his claims. He cautions that "it is almost impossible to find statements in Soviet sources about the NPA insurgency." Nevertheless, he goes on to assert, without any sup-

porting evidence, that "Moscow continued to preach caution, patience, and political struggle" to the CPP and the NPA; that "by about 1972, Sison and the CPP apparently came to the Soviet view that capitalist stability was not a short-run phenomenon in the Philippines"; that the PKP is "almost totally controlled by the CPSU"; and that after 1983, "energetic Soviet covert operatives replaced tired old diplomats." He also asserts that KMU is a CPP labor union, a claim which is denied by KMU leaders.

In order to demonstrate a link between the CPP and the CPSU, Rosenberg relies heavily on second-hand allegations and suspicions. For example, he alleges that Karl Gaspar, a long-time religious worker in the Philippines, was "the CPP's link in a complex international funding support system," which Rosenberg implies was connected with the Soviet bloc. According to a Foreign Broadcast Information Service translation of a Philippine government broadcast, Gaspar was arrested by a Philippine military intelligence team in "a suspected 'underground' house of the CPP in Davao City." So tenuous are Gaspar's links with the CPP that no other student of the Philippines has been able to confirm them.

Other evidence cited by Rosenberg is also not particularly persuasive. For example, in order to demonstrate KGB financial support for the CPP, he relies heavily on the testimony of a KGB defector, Stanislav Levchenko, who unfortunately does not clearly distinguish between the PKP and the CPP. Other sources indicate that the CPSU has provided regular financial subsidies and publication outlets for the thoroughly pacified PKP, not the militant CPP (see, e.g., Francisco Nemenzo, "Rectification Process in the Philippine Communist Movement," in Lim Joo-Jock, Ed., *Armed Communist Movements in Southeast Asia*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1984,

and *Marxism in the Philippines*, Manila, University of the Philippines, Third World Studies, 1984). Rosenberg also unaccountably fails to mention any of the abundant evidence—contrary to his hypothesis—that the Soviet Union has cordial relations with the Philippines. For example, Moscow and Manila were declared to be "sister cities" for the purpose of continuing cooperation in trade, technology, and cultural affairs in an October 1982 ceremony in Manila attended by President Marcos and the Soviet Ambassador. This and other examples are provided by Justus M. van der Kroef in his article on the Philippines in the Hoover Institution's 1983 *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs*. More recently, the Soviet press has described the Marcos government sympathetically as "a young liberated state" (see I. Kovalév, "Clash of Interests—The Philippines on the Eve of the Parliamentary Elections," *Izvestiya* [Moscow], May 12, 1984, trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* [Columbus, OH], June 12, 1984, p. 13).

Rosenberger's conclusions are particularly underwhelming: "Seen through a Soviet ideological lens, the social and economic pressures for change are building; opposition to the 'Marcos-US dictatorship' is increasing; and the ability of the Marcos government to cope with the rising tide of communist insurgency and opposition sentiment among noncommunist groups is declining." But one hardly needs a Soviet ideological lens to discern the growing crisis in the Philippines.

If there were any conspiratorial CPSU-CPP link, surely President Marcos would have publicized it widely to bolster sagging US support for his government. But he has not. Indeed, hardly anyone has confirmed Rosenberg's sighting of a Soviet connection to the CPP. By almost all accounts, the CPP is neither pro-Beijing nor pro-Moscow, but rather, independent and indigenous.

Peter Bacho, on the other hand, offers several useful comments on past and present revolutionary movements in the Philippines. He notes several factors—in addition to the primarily internal factors mentioned in my article—which led to the demise of the postwar Huk rebellion. In particular, he emphasizes the inability of the Huks to expand beyond Central Luzon, the effectiveness of military reforms, and the appeal of new economic development attempts.

Bacho's observations strengthen my contention that the present revolutionary movement may succeed where the earlier Huk revolution failed. First, unlike the Huks, the NPA has succeeded in expanding throughout the country. Second, military reform—widely agreed to be an essential condition for any effective counterinsurgency effort—has not happened yet, and the disappearance of key witnesses raises the possibility of a cover-up in the Aquino assassination trial, which would further tarnish the military's image and reduce its effectiveness. Third, new economic development attempts have been postponed by an International Monetary Fund stabilization program which will provide more economic austerity than economic prosperity.

Another key factor in the demise of the Huks was the vigorous new leadership of Ramon Magsaysay as Secretary of National Defense and subsequently as President. This is a big contrast with the current situation where a discredited President Marcos appears determined to hang on to the reins of power. This gives the CPP perhaps its best issue—a united militant anti-Marcos opposition.

All these factors still do not amount to a successful revolutionary struggle. Bacho cautions that widespread local protest against military abuses is several steps removed from a cohesive national revolution capable of toppling the "US-Marcos dictatorship." He sees

promising indications of a return to democracy in "the emergence of a viable 60-vote opposition minority in the Assembly" and the "signs of growing cooperation among opposition leaders."

True, the May 1984 National Assembly elections did give a new opportunity for parliamentary opposition, but very little has been accomplished by this new opposition group or by the new National Assembly, which has been ignored and overruled by President Marcos. Indeed, there are a lot of empty seats in the chamber: many elected delegates do not even show up. Filipinos who had placed great hopes in the Aquino assassination trial and the new National Assembly to restore justice and democracy to the Philippines may be greatly disappointed. Frustration of their hopes for military reform and parliamentary government is likely to lead them to more militant means of seeking redress for grievances.

What of the "signs of growing cooperation among opposition leaders" noted by Bacho? While it is true that many moderate opposition groups have agreed to select and support a single candidate in the 1987 presidential elections, this is only the first step in a long and hazardous journey. The opposition coalition must also have enough unity of purpose to get through the potentially divisive 1986 local and regional elections and to withstand the Marcos reelection machine.

This is no easy task, because moderate reform politicians run the risk of getting caught in the cross-fire between right and left. Several politicians have been mortally wounded in the process, such as Cesar Climaco, mayor of Zamboanga, and Edgar Jopson of Davao. Ninoy Aquino's political assassination was not an isolated event.

The level of violence can be expected to increase as a result of President Marcos's decision on March 22, 1985, to give governors and mayors in about

1,500 cities and towns control over 65,000 members of the Civilian Home Defense Forces and 56,000 local policemen. These forces are well-armed but very poorly trained and disciplined. Ostensibly, Marcos did this to facilitate prompt local responses to local NPA threats. But it can also be seen as an attempt to arm Marcos loyalists to win votes, through intimidation, in the upcoming local elections. This could be a fatal mistake for Marcos, leading to the bloodiest elections in Philippine history, with local vigilante groups igniting sparks of rebellion all over the country.

It is difficult to predict what might happen in such a case, but the past may not be much of a guide to the future because so many key factors have changed since the Huk rebellion. The "green revolution" has created a large and durable class of landless peasants and urban squatters. They may have lost their traditionally local and conservative orientation and become ripe for radical mobilization. The military has become highly politicized and tainted through frequent reports of abuses. The role of the Church has changed drastically from staunch supporter of the status quo to constant critic of the government. Liberation theology has even led some in the Church into the revolutionary movement. And the new revolutionary leaders are not "Marxist ideologues"; their policies have been very pragmatic, and well-tailored to meet local conditions.

If widespread violence does break out during next year's local and regional election campaign, then the situation could deteriorate rapidly. While junior officers are dispatched throughout the country to fight the growing insurgency, their commanding officers will be back in Manila, being chauffeured from ministry to courthouse, defending their stained reputations. The prospects for a coup d'état by junior officers could increase significantly.

CORRECTIONS

It has been brought to our attention that Dimče Belovski was improperly listed as the leader of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in the "Checklist of Communist Parties in 1984" published in conjunction with the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace in the March-April 1985 issue of *Problems of Communism*. The individual who should have been listed was Ali Sukrija, who as of January 1, 1985, was serving as President of the Presidency of the LCY, the official position of party leader—which has rotated among leaders from Yugoslavia's regional parties since the death of Josip Broz Tito in May 1980.

Footnote 53 of Archie Brown's article "Gorbachev: New Man in the Kremlin," published in the May-June 1985 issue of *Problems of Communism*, was omitted. The text of note 53 reads as follows:

"See *Partiy'naya zhizn'*, No. 11, June 1982, pp. 3-15."

Also, a sentence in the same article was rendered incorrectly. The first sentence of the second paragraph in column 1 on page 19 should read as follows:

"Whether Gorbachëv will follow the advice of the advocates of more far-reaching economic reform will depend not upon him alone, but upon the strength of the various interests and groups involved (above all, in the apparatus), many of whom are opposed to reform."

In a showdown, Bacho contends, the NPA would be "out-gunned" because it "is still no match for government forces." But revolutionary movements have always been outgunned. They have succeeded because they were able to organize massive popular insurgencies and to lead people to fight for nationalist, reformist objectives. Can the NPA succeed where the Huks failed? In an article prepared for the *NFL Bulletin*, a Manila labor magazine, Benedict Kerkvliet suggests that, historically, "instead of the vanguard leading the masses, the masses have dominated the vanguard." Have the new revolutionaries learned this lesson of experience? The answer is not yet clear. Only events in the Philippines over the next several years will tell.

DAVID ROSENBERG
Middlebury College
Middlebury, VT

ANGOLA AND CUBA

TO THE EDITORS: Permit me to comment on a minor point in Peter Clements's illuminating report (March-April 1985) on "Moscow and Southern Africa." On page 85, he referred to the February 16, 1984, Lusaka agreement between Angola and South Africa. As he noted, it involved, among related matters, the basis for a staged withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. Mr. Clements also observed that both the Cubans and the Soviets were probably not consulted, "which would explain the hasty invitation to [Angolan] President dos Santos to come to Havana."

This is a reasonable assumption, supported by the communiqué signed by Castro and dos Santos on March 19, 1984. This document emphatically reaffirmed a Cuban-Angolan agreement formalized two years

earlier (February 4, 1982) which took a much more rigid position concerning the withdrawal of Cuban troops.

Mr. Clements characterized the reaffirmation as "uncompromising" and "designed to protect Havana's prestige," but it was more than that. The Havana communiqué in effect pretended that the Angolan-South African agreement did not exist but at the same time was adroitly worded so as neither to invalidate nor endorse it (for an English-language text, see *Granma Weekly Review* [Havana], Mar. 25, 1984). In other words, it was window-dressing masking what in all likelihood was an acrimonious exchange of views between the two sides.

This was confirmed by the Cuban description of the "climate" in which the communiqué was produced. As stated on the front page of the *Granma Weekly Review*, Mar. 25, 1984, the "talks were held in a climate of mutual understanding and friendship. . . ." This was a distinctly cold "climate" compared with the customary effusion of solidarity, such as "identity of views" and "comradely atmosphere," to be expected at summit level meetings between Communist allies. Conspicuously absent was the term "fraternal"—a sure sign of serious dispute.

MAURICE HALPERIN
Professor Emeritus
Simon Fraser University
Burnaby, British Columbia
Canada

UPDATE ON CP CHECKLIST

TO THE EDITORS: I find the data in the "Checklist of Communist Parties in 1984," published in the March-April 1985 issue of *Problems of Communism*, to be substantially congruent with my own findings on communist party memberships around the world.

In seven cases, however, I would propose revision of the claimed membership (the source of the information is given in parentheses):

- Laos—35,000 (*Informationsbulletin* [Vienna], No. 9, 1982);
- Mongolia—80,200 (*Probleme des Friedens und des Sozialismus* No. 3, 1983);
- East Germany—2,238,283 (*Neues Deutschland* [East Berlin], May 25, 1984);
- Hungary—871,000 (MTI-Agency [Budapest], Mar. 25, 1985);
- Finland—34,200 (*Helsingin Sanomat* [Helsinki], Jan. 28, 1985);
- Italy—1,619,000 (*L'Unità* [Rome], Jan. 1, 1985); and
- Spain—80,000 (*L'Unità*, Jan. 16, 1985).

HEINZ TIMMERMANN
Bundesinstitut für
ostwissenschaftliche und
internationale Studien
Cologne

GORBACHËV: FOR THE RECORD

May I attempt to forestall criticism by timely self-criticism? On page 18 of my article "Gorbachëv: New Man in the Kremlin" in the May-June 1985 issue of *Problems of Communism*, I relied on fallible memory when I wrote of Konstantin Chernenko criticizing both the Institute of Economics of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the Central Institute of Economics and Mathematics (TsEMI) in his speech to the June 1983 plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. It was, of course, the Institute of Sociological Research that was criticized along with TsEMI on that occasion. The criticism of the Institute of Economics came substantially later—in a Central Committee resolution shortly after the death of Andropov, published in *Pravda* on February 24, 1984, p. 1. The attack is from several different angles, and some emphasis is laid on the criticism (mentioned in my article) that

the Institute had made too meager a contribution to the analysis and resolution of practical economic problems in contemporary Soviet society. That part of the resolution at least and the stipulation that the Institute should take steps to "raise the effectiveness of its international links, above all with scholars from the fraternal socialist countries" almost surely reflected the views of Gorbachëv as economic overlord within the CPSU Secretariat.

Gorbachëv's major speech on June 11, 1985, to the special Central Committee conference on scientific and technological progress provides, incidentally, further evidence that he is in earnest about economic reform. There are many passages there that I would have been very tempted to quote in my article—but for the fact that the speech was delivered two weeks after the publication of my article.

ARCHIE BROWN
St. Antony's College
Oxford

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Problems of Communism



Book Reviews

John B. Dunlop


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SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1985

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SANDINISTAS IN POWER

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Valenta

Qadhdhafi and the Kremlin

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Soviet Book Hunger

John and Carol Garrard

Problems of Communism

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Problems of Communism (ISSN 0032-941x) is a bimonthly publication providing analyses and significant information about the contemporary affairs of the Soviet Union, China, and comparable states and political movements. Views of contributors, as well as geographic boundaries and names, do not necessarily reflect the policies of the United States Government.

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An annual index for *Problems of Communism* appears in the November-December issue (No. 6) of each year except in the case of the first three volumes, which are covered in a combined index in the November-December issue (No. 6) of Vol. III. Material from the journal is also indexed in ABC POL SCI, *Bibliographie Internationale des Sciences Sociales* (all sections), *Current Contents*, *Economic Abstracts*, *Historical Abstracts*, *Index to US Government Periodicals*, *International Political Science Abstracts*, *Public Affairs Information Service*, *Social Sciences Citation Index*, *Social Sciences Index*, *Strategic Studies Reference Guide*, and *United States Political Science Documents*.

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IN THIS ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

Sandinistas in Power

Jiri and Virginia Valenta

The Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua shows strong traces of Leninism and Soviet-Cuban influence. Spawned from the pro-Moscow Nicaraguan Socialist Party in the early 1960's, the Sandinista National Liberation Front successfully maneuvered to seize leadership of the broad-based movement that overthrew Anastasio Somoza in July 1979. Since then, the FSLN has moved cautiously but steadily toward Leninist mobilization and social transformation. In the process, the leadership has relied heavily on coercive instruments and on political, military, and economic support from the USSR and its allies.

Qadhdhafi and the Kremlin

Lisa Anderson

The controversial Soviet-Libyan relationship is not as solid as sometimes portrayed. Qadhdhafi and the Soviets have generally maintained both their ideological distance and their differences over various regional issues, even as they have developed increasingly close and mutually beneficial economic and military ties over the past decade. For both sides, this marriage of convenience was entered into for want of better partners, and Moscow will probably continue its long-term search for more powerful and stable North African allies.

United Front Strategy and Soviet Foreign Policy

Herbert J. Ellison

There are some recent indications that the Gorbachëv leadership is undertaking a major effort, after tolerating a decade of "Eurocommunism," to forge a new "united front" in Europe in order to oppose US influence there. The united front strategy was originally conceived by Lenin as a means of multiplying communist influence by joining forces with socialists and social democrats against the common "capitalist-imperialist" enemy. The goal of extending communist revolution remains a part of Soviet policy, buttressing Moscow's continuing claim to lead all communist parties and indeed all "progressive" forces.


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Elite Information in China

Michael Schoenhals

China's leaders apparently rely for candid information on a controlled-circulation bulletin, *Neibu Cankao*, published twice daily and circulated to no more than a thousand or so officials. Although the bulletin is designed to report objectively on the popular mood and on the performance of local party cadres, there is some evidence that it can serve as a vehicle for political "lobbying" as well.

(Abstracts continued on reverse side)



Soviet Book Hunger

John and Carol Garrard

Soviet achievements in raising the mass educational level have had the perverse effect of generating a near-insatiable popular appetite for books, and not just the dry tracts favored by the authorities. Deprived of other outlets, Russians have long looked to literature for nonconformist or dissident ideas. Soviet publishing executives continue to parcel out the coveted works of once-suppressed early Soviet authors and foreign titles to favored elites, while trying to appease the broader public with lighter fare.

Essay-reviews

Solzhenitsyn: Unfinished Portrait

John B. Dunlop

A lengthy and stylishly written new biography of the Russian novelist Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn promised to be definitive but turned out to be one-sided, painting a surprisingly unflattering portrait of a man much admired in the West. It is a valuable source on many details of Solzhenitsyn's early life. But, precisely because this focus neglects his prodigious literary output, it fails to give a balanced picture of Solzhenitsyn the man — a complex and provocative individual but above all a gifted writer.

Demystifying Bulgaria

Alex Alexiev

Three new books by Bulgarian authors in exile, two of whom were targets of official assassination attempts, offer an eloquent rebuttal to the false image of prosperity and social peace cultivated by the Sofia regime. As these memoirs and essays demonstrate, communist Bulgaria suffers from severe political repression, economic stagnation, and imposed cultural subservience to unpopular Soviet models.

Rethinking China's History

Joshua Fogel

Both American and Japanese historiography of modern China and the development of the communist movement there have made impressive strides in recent years. In both cases, scholarly progress resulted partly from reduced preoccupation with crudely Marxist analytical categories and with the effects of imperialism on a subject society. The new picture that emerges is a complex one, in which native ideas and institutions as well as outside influences were important in shaping China's late 19th- and early 20th-century upheavals.

Cuba: Charismatic Communism

Jorge I. Domínguez

After a quarter-century in power, Castro retains his penchant for idiosyncratic shifts in Cuba's foreign and domestic policy. Under his direction, the country's economy has expanded, albeit in an uneven way and in mounting dependence on the USSR. Castro's rule remains generally popular at home, despite its repressive side. In the international arena, despite some recent setbacks, Castro has kept Cuba on an interventionist course remarkably ambitious for such a small power.

Sandinistas in Power

Jiri and Virginia Valenta

It is now six years since the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) toppled the regime of Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle. Even today, the nature of the FSLN—its road to power, its political complexion and orientation, and its objectives—remains the subject of heated debate. Some still argue that the Sandinista regime is a nationalistic, nonaligned, although radical, Third World government. Others emphasize the Marxist-Leninist overtones characterizing its seizure and consolidation of power, its foreign relations, and its efforts to introduce socialist transformation to Nicaraguan society. The topic is of more than academic interest, as the Sandinistas' increasingly repressive rule has engendered domestic opposition as well as external involvement in the affairs of Nicaragua by those who either support or oppose the regime. This raises fears that the conflict might intensify and spill over into neighboring countries.

In attempting to fathom the nature of the Sandinista regime, we shall address the following questions: (1) What factors conditioned the emergence of the FSLN insurgency? (2) How did the Front conceive of itself

and what specific road did it follow to victory? (3) To what extent has the FSLN become a Leninist-oriented party? (4) What instruments of control does the FSLN have at its disposal and how are they employed in dealing with opposition to the regime? (5) What is the nature of relations between Sandinist Nicaragua and the USSR, Cuba, and other communist states? (6) What are the major objectives of the Sandinista program and what policies have they employed in attempting to transform Nicaraguan society? In considering these questions, we have drawn from a wide range of FSLN publications and documents; materials from elsewhere in Central America, from Cuba, and from the Soviet Union; the documents seized in Grenada in the autumn of 1983; and interviews with leaders of the Nicaraguan opposition as well as with current and former FSLN members.

Revolutionary Environment

Nicaragua's geography, history, and socioeconomic conditions all have provided a rich medium for guerrilla warfare. The most significant geographic feature bearing upon Nicaragua's history is its close proximity to the United States. US policymakers traditionally have considered Nicaragua strategically important and therefore have been inclined to intervene both directly and indirectly in Nicaraguan affairs to protect perceived interests, one of which was the possibility of building a trans-isthmus canal on Nicaraguan rather than Panamanian territory. US interventionism has given rise to a certain degree of "Yankee-phobia," tempered by feelings of considerable attraction between the two peoples. Within Nicaragua, the lightly populated northeastern mountains have been the customary place of refuge for guerrilla bands, whether the nationalist forces of General Augusto Cesar Sandino in the late 1920's or the FSLN in the 1960's and 1970's. Sandino's Army for the Defense of

Jiri Valenta is Professor of Political Science and Director of Soviet, East European and Strategic Studies, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Miami (Coral Gables, FL). He is co-editor of Grenada and Soviet/Cuban Policy: Crisis and the US/OECS Intervention (1985). Virginia Valenta is a freelance writer, author of several articles and chapters on Soviet and Cuban policies in Latin America. The Valentas are co-authors of the forthcoming book The Soviet Union and Cuba in the Caribbean Basin. The authors are indebted to many Nicaraguans and Costa Ricans of diverse political persuasions for interviews, and to Paul Buchanan, Tom Cool, and Tim Dooley for comments on an earlier draft of this article.



Cuba's Fidel Castro (center), in Managua for the January 1985 inauguration of Daniel Ortega (right) as president and Sergio Ramírez (left) as vice-president of Nicaragua.

—Susan Meiselas/MAGNUM.

National Sovereignty—recruited mainly from the Nicaraguan peasantry but bolstered by a number of volunteers from elsewhere in Latin America—in the years 1927–33 conducted guerrilla operations against the presence of US Marines, who had returned to Nicaragua in 1927 following earlier interventions in the country dating back to 1909.

Despite subsequent recasting of his image by the FSLN, Sandino was not a Leninist, or a Marxist, or a socialist; nor was he a pro-Soviet “anti-imperialist.” Principally, Sandino wanted to expel the US Marines from Nicaragua; after they withdrew in 1932, he actually made peace with the Nicaraguan government. True, the Comintern attempted to exploit Sandino's struggle and bring him into the fold through his private secretary—Augustín Farabundo Martí, founder of El Salvador's communist party. However, in 1930, Sandino broke all Comintern connections and expelled Martí from his staff, a “betrayal” denounced by the Comintern.¹

Later, nevertheless, the FSLN leadership revived and refurbished the image of Sandino, who became the embodiment of their “anti-imperialist” revolution. Founding father Carlos Fonseca and other FSLN lead-

ers such as Sergio Ramírez rescued Sandino's writings from oblivion, while Ernesto Cardenal embellished the Sandino myth with the epic poem “Hora O” (Zero Hour), which recounts Sandino's death in 1934 at the hands of Anastasio (Tacho) Somoza's National Guard.²

If geography and the legend of Sandino gave form and enthusiasm to the FSLN insurgency, socio-economic underdevelopment and political repression were its major catalysts. From Spanish colonial masters the country had inherited a rigid class stratifi-

¹ Before his execution in 1932, Martí himself stated that Sandino “was unwilling to embrace the communist program that I stood for. He had raised only the flag of independence, of emancipation, while my aim was social revolt.” Quoted in Blanca Luz, *Contra la corriente* (Against the Current), Santiago, 1936, as cited in Stephen Clissold, Ed., *Soviet Relations with Latin America, 1918–1968: Documentary Survey*, London, Oxford University Press, 1970, p. 15; see also Robert J. Alexander, *Communism in Latin America*, New Brunswick, NJ, Rutgers University Press, 1957, pp. 377–78.

² See Carlos Fonseca, *Sandino-Guerrillero Proletario* (Sandino-Proletarian Guerrilla), Managua, Colección Juan de Dios Muñoz, 1980; Sergio Ramírez, Ed., *El Pensamiento Vivo de Sandino* (The Living Thought of Sandino), 6th ed., San José, Costa Rica, Editorial Universitaria Centroamericana (EDUCA), 1974, and Ernesto Cardenal, *Antología*, Managua, Nueva Nicaragua-Monimbó, 1983, pp. 57–75.

For a recent, more positive, Soviet assessment of Sandino, see *Latinskaya Amerika: entsiklopedicheskiy spravochnik* (Latin America: Encyclopedic Handbook), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo “Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya,” 1982, Part 2, p. 420.

cation. An authoritarian political culture in which democratic traditions never had an opportunity to take root was maintained first by a privileged minority consisting of export-oriented landowners and, from 1927 on, by the National Guard under the control of the Somoza family. The conservative hierarchy of the Catholic Church constituted yet another pillar of authoritarianism in the nominally democratic Nicaraguan republic.

The oppressive rule of the Somoza dynasty established conditions favorable to revolution, as did, to a lesser extent, Nicaragua's subservient client relationship with the United States. All three Somozas were adept at cultivating US support and were eager to play the role of US proxies abroad, even during the Korean and Vietnam wars, when Washington declined their offers of help. During his lifetime, the first Somoza ruled Nicaragua by use of the National Guard whose corruption he encouraged; by coopting the ruling Liberal Party, friendly businessmen, and landlords; and by skillfully manipulating domestic opposition. He was succeeded by his son Luis, who presided over a relatively peaceful Nicaragua in the 1950's and 1960's—a period during which modernization and

economic growth were the basis for an expanding middle class.


The dynasty began to disintegrate in the 1970's under Luis's brother and successor Anastasio (Tachito) Somoza, a graduate of the US Military Academy at West Point. As Régis Debray observed, "The [Sandinist] Front's best ally . . . was Somoza himself."³ Corrupt like his predecessors, Tachito lacked their adeptness in political manipulation. This was evident in his handling of the Christmas earthquake of 1972, which killed 10,000 Nicaraguans. After this disaster, relief funds were shamelessly misused, while downtown Managua lay in shambles. Somoza's continued exploitation of the Nicaraguan economy for personal benefit, his contrived reelection in 1974, and his blatant disregard for the people's basic social needs further undermined the regime's legitimacy, antagonized a majority of the population, and sowed the seeds of revolution.

³ Régis Debray, "Nicaragua: 'Radical Moderation,'" *Le Monde Diplomatique* (Paris), September 1979, pp. 6-9. For more discussion of the Somoza era, see Thomas W. Walker, *Nicaragua: The Land of Sandino*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1982.



General Augusto Sandino, center, photographed with his staff in June 1928: from left to right: Ruben Ardilla Gómez (Venezuela); Jose Paredes (Mexico), Sandino, Farabundo Marti (El Salvador), and Gregorio Gilbert (Dominican Republic).

—National Archive/MAGNUM.



Carlos Fonseca, founding father of the Sandinista National Liberation Front.

—UPI/Bettmann.

Road to Power

After the FSLN's 1979 victory, it was fashionable in the United States and Western Europe to view the revolutionaries as nationalists, or at worst, confused socialist radicals. Careful examination of the evidence suggests, however, that from its founding, the FSLN has been led by dedicated, Leninist-oriented revolutionaries with long-standing ties to the Cuban and (to a lesser degree) Soviet communist parties. Although the Front experienced various ups and downs, including near-extirmination in the early 1970's, it eventually surmounted existing factional struggles and reemerged as a Leninist-oriented "vanguard"—that is, an elitist organization under a largely unified command operating according to the vertical ruling principles of democratic centralism. Willing to form alliances with a diversity of anti-Somoza elements, the pragmatic FSLN consistently

exploited Somoza's errors and, with international support (particularly from Soviet-backed Cuba), succeeded in transforming its fledgling guerrilla struggle into a successful popular insurgency.

Somoza, too, misjudged the origins of the FSLN and its leadership. To him, it "all began" only in 1963, when the FSLN stepped up its activities in the north-eastern mountains of Nicaragua.⁴ However, the emergence of an organized Leninist party in Nicaragua actually dates back to June 1944, when the Nicaraguan Socialist Party (*Partido Socialista Nicaragüense*—PSN) was formed. In deference to Stalin's wartime united front strategy, the PSN supported the Somoza regime, partnered as it was with the United States in the anti-fascist alliance.⁵ Carlos Fonseca, a co-founder of the Sandinista Front, was at that time active in Nicaragua's Socialist Youth, the PSN's student arm. In addition, both Fonseca and his friend Tomás Borge were exposed to selected Marxist works in Guatemala during the tenure of leftist Jacobo Arbenz (1953–54) and organized a communist group among university students in the Nicaraguan city of Granada. Both men, as they later recounted, were unhappy with the weak and conservative leadership of the PSN,⁶ who still regarded Sandino as a petty bourgeois nationalist, although there is no evidence of Borge or Fonseca having openly criticized the Soviet foreign policy line that informed the PSN positions. On the contrary, Fonseca assented to the Soviet line when he attended, under the auspices of the PSN, the Sixth World Youth Festival in Moscow in 1957; he remained in the USSR for four additional months after the festival (Borge was incarcerated in Nicaragua at the time). After his Russian sojourn, Fonseca revealed his pro-Soviet views in the book *A Nicaraguan in Moscow*, in which he naively described the USSR as a state with a free press and total freedom of religion.⁷

The success of the 1959 Cuban revolution seemed to validate and strengthen the Fonseca-Borge criticism of the nonviolent strategy of the PSN. Subsequently, in June 1959, Fonseca was joined by dozens of Nicaraguans and Cubans in an effort to organize armed struggle in Nicaragua's central region, close to

⁴ As told to Jack Cox in *Nicaragua Betrayed*, Boston, Western Islands, 1980, p. 23.

⁵ On Stalin's orders, this policy was articulated in the Americas by the General Secretary of the US Communist Party, Earl Browder. See Carlos Fonseca, "Nicaragua: Zero Hour" and editorial comments on this item in *Sandinistas Speak*, New York, Pathfinder Press, 1982, p. 31. This essay originally appeared in *Tricontinental* (Havana), No. 14, 1969.

⁶ See a 1970 interview with Fonseca published in *Bohemia* (Havana), Nov. 16, 1979, pp. 50–55. See also Tomás Borge, *El Axioma de la Esperanza* (The Axiom of Hope), Bilbao, Editorial Desclee De Brouwer, 1984, p. 20–21.

⁷ *Un Nicaragüense en Moscú* (A Nicaraguan in Moscow), Managua, Publicaciones de Unidad, 1958.

Honduras. Although they failed in this effort, both Fonseca and Borge visited Cuba, where Fidel Castro and Ernesto "Che" Guevara encouraged them to return to Nicaragua in 1960 for the purpose of organizing a guerrilla struggle modeled on Fidel's 26th of July Movement. However, the PSN publicly disclosed Fonseca's would-be secret return, which led to his arrest and expulsion from the country.⁸

By now thoroughly disenchanted with the "pacifist line" of the PSN, or what they termed the "old Marxist sector,"⁹ Fonseca, Borge, and another friend and former PSN activist, Silvio Mayorga, met in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, in 1961 to create the FSLN—a guerrilla organization of the Castro/Guevara type. Originally, the organization was simply the National Liberation Front (FLN); the Sandinista label was added a year later. Not all the early FSLN members were communists, or even Marxists—for example, Colonel Santos López, a survivor of Sandino's army, was included not for his ideology but for his knowledge of guerrilla tactics. Having been reduced to a few dozen members in the struggle with the National Guard during the Rio Coco (1963) and Pancasan (1967) campaigns, the Front remained throughout the 1960's a small force without mass support. Like "Che" in his last Bolivian campaign of 1967, the FSLN discovered how difficult it is for middle-class, university-educated men to gain the support of peasants in a highly stratified social environment. In the mid-1960's, the Front attracted primarily students, including Daniel and Humberto Ortega, sons of a veteran of Sandino's army.

Faced with the meager results of their romantic revolutionary efforts, FSLN leaders began to look for a more realistic strategic line. Fonseca, in particular, called for "a clearly Marxist-Leninist ideology."¹⁰ As for tactics, by 1969, the movement had developed a new program, based on the concept of *Guerra Popular Prolongada* (GPP—Prolonged Popular War), which foresaw and supported a protracted rural insurgency similar to the long guerrilla wars preceding the victories of revolutionaries in China and Vietnam. The main strategic objectives of the FSLN were a military takeover and the establishment of "a revolutionary government based on a worker-peasant alliance." The new government would "eliminate foreign policy submission to Yankee imperialism" and "support authen-

tic unity with the fraternal peoples of Central America" by coordinating "the efforts to achieve national liberation" in the region.¹¹

To strengthen discipline, the FSLN leaders, who now clearly saw themselves as a "vanguard organization," established in 1969 a National Directorate (*Dirección Nacional*—or DN) to lead the movement. Fonseca, who had spent some time in the USSR and Cuba, became Secretary General of the DN. Other members included Borge, who had been trained to be a commander at a Cuban military school (probably between 1968 and 1970); Henry Ruíz, who studied for two years at Moscow's Patrice Lumumba University and trained in the Middle East with the Palestine Liberation Organization; and young Humberto Ortega, who had also received instruction in Cuba.¹²

Although the official Soviet line on armed struggle in Latin America did not change until 1979–80,¹³ there is at least indirect evidence that the Soviet leadership approved of Fonseca's drive to overcome the ideological vacillations of the early 1960's. In spite of Soviet-Cuban differences over tactics in the 1960's and 1970's, the KGB probably assisted in efforts to train, finance, and arm the FSLN with the help of Cuban intermediaries.¹⁴

The nearly total destruction of the FSLN at the hands of the National Guard in 1975 discredited the GPP line within the FSLN and strengthened the position of a different faction, the *Tendencia Proletaria* (TP—Proletarian Tendency). Led by Jaime Wheelock (today a member of the DN and minister of agricultural development and agrarian reform) and Luis Carrión (currently vice-minister of interior), this faction advocated a shift from the focus on Asian-style revolution in rural areas of the central region to a more orthodox focus on ideological indoctrination of the proletarian masses in the cities of the Pacific lowlands. TP leaders argued that the FSLN's struggle ought to be conditioned by objective historical forces such as the level of economic development, and that

¹¹ The FSLN program of 1969 was published in *Tricontinental*, No. 17, March-April 1970, pp. 61–68; it is reprinted in *Sandinistas Speak*, pp. 13–22.

¹² On Ruíz, see *The New York Times*, Mar. 28, 1984; on the training of Borge and Ortega, see Nolan, op. cit., pp. 139 and 148, and authors' interviews in Nicaragua.

¹³ A subsequent positive Soviet appraisal of the FSLN's 1969 program appears in *Latinskaya Amerika* . . . , Part 2, p. 420. However, content analysis of open Soviet literature on the Nicaraguan situation prior to 1979 indicates extraordinary caution, perhaps out of uncertainty over the staying power of the Sandinistas. For further discussion see Jiri Valenta, "The USSR, Cuba, and the Crisis in Central America," *Orbis* (Philadelphia), Fall 1981, pp. 715–46.


¹⁴ Edén Pastora, a former FSLN guerrilla hero, disclosed in a 1985 interview that as a Sandinista leader he had received aid from "the KGB through Fidel Castro." See *La Prensa* (Panama City), Mar. 16, 1985, p. 1.

⁸ David Nolan, *The Ideology of the Sandinistas and the Nicaraguan Revolution*, Coral Gables, FL, Institute of Interamerican Studies, University of Miami, 1984, p. 23.

Incidentally, there was never any public denunciation of Fonseca or Borge by the USSR.

⁹ See Carlos Fonseca, "Nicaragua: Zero Hour," loc. cit., pp. 31–32.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 35.



Jaime Wheelock, leader of the Proletarian Tendency within the National Directorate of the Sandinista National Liberation Front and Nicaragua's minister of agricultural development and agrarian reform.

—Alon Reininger/Contact.

the more class-conscious proletariat should be in the vanguard. Fonseca and Borge, with the latter leading the attack, condemned Wheelock and Carrión as "petit-bourgeois" and expelled them from the FSLN in October 1975 in the classic spirit of Leninist "democratic centralism."¹⁵ Despite their expulsion, the TP leaders began to build an anti-Somoza organization among the urban masses, a successful effort that helped lay the groundwork for the final FSLN offensive in the cities in 1979.

¹⁵ For Wheelock's views, see his *Raíces Indígenas de la Lucha Anticolonialista en Nicaragua* (Indigenous Roots of the Anticolonialist Struggle in Nicaragua), Mexico City, Siglo Veintiuno, 1974 (a work apparently drafted during his study in East Germany); and *Imperialismo y Dictadura: Crisis de Una Formación Social* (Imperialism and Dictatorship: Crisis of a Social Formation), Mexico City, Siglo Veintiuno, 1975. See also Jaime Wheelock and Luis Carrión, *Apuntes Sobre el Desarrollo Económico y Social de Nicaragua* (Notes on the Economic and Social Development of Nicaragua), Managua, Secretaría Nacional de Propaganda y Educación Política del FSLN, 1980. On the expulsion of the TP, see Nolan, op. cit., pp. 57–58.

A third faction, the *Tendencia Insurreccional* (Insurreccional Tendency) or *Tendencia Tercerista* (TT—Third Way Tendency), participated in the 1975 DN internal debate. Led by Humberto Ortega, a former GPP colleague of Fonseca and Borge (today a member of the DN and minister of defense), and supported by Ortega's brother Daniel and an old Mexican friend Víctor Tirado López, the TT was in some respects the most Leninist group of all. They believed that socio-economic and political conditions in Nicaragua in 1975 were ripe for a rapid, popularly-based, anti-Somoza insurgency led by an elite vanguard (the FSLN) struggling primarily, but not exclusively, in the cities. Like Lenin, they believed that a determined vanguard could ripen objective historical conditions for revolution. The position of the FSLN, and the *terceristas* in particular, had received a boost from the spectacular seizure of 30 government hostages in December 1974 in exchange for whom the Sandinistas obtained the release of FSLN prisoners (including Daniel Ortega), a US\$1 million ransom, and the opportunity to broadcast their revolutionary message via Nicaragua's public media.

The *terceristas* promoted the idea of an anti-Somoza coalition that was to include not only workers and peasants, but also elements of the middle class, particularly the intelligentsia, the students, and the petite bourgeoisie. Talk of a broad societal coalition appealed to many Nicaraguans as well as to outside observers, all of whom failed to see the tactical and transitory nature of the proposed alliance. Western observers tended to view the *terceristas* as a moderate faction inspired by social democratic and Christian democratic ideas, a view strengthened when Edén Pastora, a legendary guerrilla commander who happened to be a Christian Democrat, moved to the forefront of the Sandinista struggle, leading the seizure of the National Palace in August 1978. This interpretation prompted various groups, especially Western social democrats, to support the *terceristas* in the late 1970's and early 1980's, in the hope that the FSLN as a whole would follow a moderate, social democratic line.

For all their factional wrangling, the diverse FSLN elements between 1976 and 1979 did not stop sharing a perception of the common enemy and somehow managed to maintain a productive division of labor. Régis Debray described this synergistic relationship:

... it is in contradicting each other, and sometimes violently, that the tendencies have ended up complementing one another. The divisions of the Sandinista Front have played out as multiplication, increasing

each time its capacity for initiatives instead of diminishing it.¹⁶

Somoza's imposition of martial law in 1975-76 and the ensuing repressions (during which Fonseca was killed and Borge captured) unwittingly helped the TT faction. In May 1977, the *terceristas* took control of the "beheaded" National Directorate and adopted a new platform for the FSLN, authored mainly by Humberto Ortega. This program was even more Leninist, and less Marxist, than the initial FSLN program of 1969. In the new document, the Sandinistas' struggle was viewed as a continuation of the historical revolutionary process initiated by the "glorious October revolution" in Russia. The Leninist "vanguard" elite of the FSLN, not the Marxist proletariat, was to guide the revolutionary process. Moreover, pragmatism rather than doctrinal rigidity was to be the norm; in the words of Lenin, quoted in the FSLN platform,

*Today the misfortune lies in our routine, in our doctrinism, in intellectualism's characteristic inflexibility, in the senile fear of all initiative.*¹⁷

The platform's goal was to establish "a revolutionary, popular democratic government" (*un Gobierno Revolucionario Democrático-Popular*), evocative of the popular-democratic stage of government through which the East European communist states passed briefly in the postwar period. The Front was to enter into "tactical and temporary" alliances with the Nicaraguan masses, while preserving the "political hegemony" of the FSLN, and to "enlarge the Sandinistas' struggle without enlarging FSLN ranks." The movement was to utilize classic Leninist organizational principles: "conscious political discipline . . . the application of democratic centralism . . . the rational division of labor and collegial responsibility . . . [and] criticism and revolutionary self-criticism."¹⁸

Sandinista efforts to broaden the anti-Somoza alliance got a boost from Pastora's spectacular August 1978 attack on the National Palace, which resulted in the seizure of over 1,500 prominent hostages and their ransoming for US\$500,000, the release of FSLN prisoners (including Borge), and

another chance to air FSLN views on the public media. As the commandos and the released prisoners were driven through Managua to the airport, they were cheered by many Nicaraguans, suggesting even then that Somoza's days were numbered.

Somoza's response to the FSLN over the next two years was inconsistent and ultimately advantageous to the Sandinistas. A policy of limited democratization afforded the guerrillas and their supporters greater freedom of movement and association, while the murder of Pedro Joaquín Chamorro Cardenal, editor of the respected Nicaraguan newspaper, *La Prensa*, helped to broaden the anti-Somoza opposition, which was now joined by a number of businessmen and professionals. By 1978, when the FSLN launched broad-based offensives in several major cities, the anti-Somoza struggle had become a virtual civil war.

Several external factors also contributed to the FSLN victory. The Carter administration's reluctance to back Somoza undermined the power of his regime, which had relied heavily on Somoza's supposedly special ties with Washington. Beginning in 1978 the FSLN received war materiel from Cuba, as well as from Venezuela and Panama and private sources in the United States. Sandinista guerrillas were given sanctuary in neighboring Costa Rica and Honduras. Humberto Ortega acknowledged that the flow of arms and the FSLN's ability to organize a broadcasting system to guide the insurgents played a key role in the final campaign.¹⁹ Probably more important yet was Fidel Castro's insistence on FSLN unity as a condition for continued aid. This led to unification of the Sandinista factions under the nine-man National Directorate consisting of three representatives from each faction, and the unification of all guerrilla units under a single command. Achieved between December 1978 and March 1979,²⁰ this Cuban-sponsored unification of command and control was a decisive factor in the final victorious offensive against Somoza.

Consolidating Power

The Sandinista movement that came to power in the summer of 1979 was a more experienced and pragmatic group than the romantic July 26th Movement that took over in Cuba in 1959. And, unlike in

¹⁶ Loc. cit., pp. 6-9.

¹⁷ See *Plataforma General Político-Militar del FSLN Para el Triunfo de la Revolución Popular Sandinista* (The FSLN's General Political-Military Platform for the Triumph of the Sandinista Popular Revolution), pp. 10, 37, and 61. We are indebted to a former Sandinista official for making available a copy of the Spanish version of this document.

The Soviets now consider the publication of the platform to have been a significant act. See *Latinskaya Amerika* . . . , Part 2, p. 420.

¹⁸ *Plataforma* . . . , pp. 32-33, 45, 47, 57, and 61.

¹⁹ See interview with Ortega in *Sandinistas Speak*, p. 77.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 82-83. Ortega, however, downplayed the Cuban factor in the unification of the FSLN command. On Castro's role in this development, see Nolan, op. cit., pp. 97-98.

Cuba, decision-making has tended to be collective rather than the preserve of a charismatic leader. However, one figure who stands out above the others is Borge, the oldest, most experienced, and most individualistic leader in the DN. Some even believe that the ambitious Borge could still emerge as supreme leader.²¹ More self-effacing but equally powerful is Humberto Ortega, the FSLN's chief strategist, minister of defense and coordinator of the Defense and Security Commission.

²¹ Whenever the National Directorate attend a political function together, Borge arrives first, or if a chair is symbolically left empty to evoke the memory of Carlos Fonseca, Borge takes his place next to it. See interviews with Borge in *Caréttas* (Lima), May 22, 1983, pp. 26–32, 38, and *Excelsior* (Mexico City), June 4, 1984, pp. 1A, 20A, 21A, and 38A. Borge is quite publicity-conscious. We obtained numerous publications of his speeches in both English and Spanish in Borge's office, which was not the case with other key FSLN leaders such as Humberto Ortega. In these publications Borge continuously stresses his close relationship with founding father Fonseca. Content analysis of speeches of the Ortega brothers suggests that they rather downplay Borge's role as Fonseca's closest comrade-in-arms and as a founding father of the FSLN

The intent to transform the FSLN guerrilla organization into a Leninist revolutionary party has been clear from the outset. As Borge put it in 1980, the goal was to fashion the FSLN into "a revolutionary party organized and guided by scientific principles . . . a realistic, flexible party [inspired by] the principles of internationalism"; and elsewhere he referred to the FSLN as "the vanguard of the party, [and] without the party there is no revolution"²² More recently he candidly explained, "I believe that it would be frivolous, and even dishonest, to say that no one here talks of Marxism-Leninism. . . . I believe we are Marxists."²³

Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega tends to be more guarded in interviews with Western media, at least when speaking about his personal views. When

²² Speech by Borge, "The Time Has Come to Organize the Revolutionary Party," reported in *Barricada*, (Managua), Sept. 16, 1980, p. 2; and interview in *Juventud Rebelde* (Havana), Oct. 28, 1980, p. 3.

²³ Interview with Borge during a visit to Madrid, in *Le Monde Diplomatique* (Mexico City edition), September 1984, pp. 32–33.



Comrades-at-arms: Edén Pastora (left), the famous Sandinista Comandante Cero, pictured together with Tomás Borge (right) in 1979 in Matagalpa; the third Sandinista, with his head tilted down, is Bayardo Arce.

—Susan Meiselas/MAGNUM.

Table 1: National Directorate of the FSLN, July 1985

Comandantes, ranked according to real power	Political tendency	Bureaucratic responsibility	Leadership committee
Tomás Borge	Leader of the GPP	Minister of Interior	Member of Defense and Security Commission
Humberto Ortega	Co-leader of the TT	Minister of Defense	Coordinator of Defense and Security Commission and member of Political Commission
Daniel Ortega	Co-leader of the TT	President of Nicaragua	Member of State Commission
Jaime Wheelock	Leader of the TP	Minister of Agricultural Development and Agrarian Reform	Coordinator of State Commission and member of Political Commission
Bayardo Arce	GPP		Coordinator of Political Commission
Henry Ruíz	GPP	Minister of Foreign Cooperation	Member of State Commission
Luis Carrión	TP	Vice-Minister of Interior	Member of Defense and Security Commission
Carlos Núñez	TP	President of National Assembly	Coordinator of Mass Organizations in FSLN Secretariat
Victor Tirado	TT		Responsible for trade unions in FSLN Secretariat

SOURCES: "The Task of Mobilizing the Masses Requires a Solid and Well-Structured Vanguard!" *Barricada* (Managua), Sept. 16, 1980; N. Yu. Smirnova, "The Shaping of the Party of the Nicaraguan Revolution," *Voprosy istorii KPSS* (Moscow), May 1984, pp. 83-95; and *Grenada Documents*, Log. No. PP.

asked if he is a Marxist, he usually replies: "We are Sandinistas . . . [with] a Christian upbringing. . . [who are familiar] with both Christ and Marx."²⁴ However, in a speech to the PSN (secretly transcribed), DN member and FSLN Political Commission Coordinator Bayardo Arce confirmed the intent of the FSLN to move toward a single-party Leninist system and to maintain its "strategic ties with the USSR and the socialist community." Arce also spoke of plans to introduce a new constitution that would, in his words, allow the FSLN to mold "the juridical and political principles for the construction of socialism" in Nicaragua.²⁵

To strengthen the party, the FSLN National Directorate has carried out important organizational changes in the last six years. These include creation of a National Secretariat and three DN Commissions: Political, Defense and Security, and State. The Political Commission operates as the executive body of the DN when it is not in session and oversees the other two commissions. Below these commissions are a number of functional departments dealing with various aspects of domestic and foreign policy and

the economy.²⁶ From a recent visit to the FSLN Secretariat, the authors can confirm the establishment of a number of departments and sections comparable to Soviet, East European, and Cuban prototypes, e.g., the departments of propaganda and political education and of international relations. The Secretariat's Section for North America is quite accessible, but those dealing with security, the military, and the affairs of other communist countries are surrounded by tight security.

Factionalism has been by and large contained by continuing to include in the National Directorate representatives and leaders of all three of the major tendencies in the FSLN (see Table 1). This balance is also observed in the National Directorate's commissions. The Defense and Security Commission is coordinated by Humberto Ortega from the TT but also includes Borge from the GPP and Luis Carrión from the TP. This is the same Carrión who was once expelled from the FSLN by a committee headed by Borge; he is now deputy vice-minister of interior under his former nemesis. The Political Commission is coordinated by Arce of the GPP, while Humberto Ortega represents the TT, and Wheelock represents the TP. Coordinator of the State Commission, which is entrusted with carrying out the economic and social pro-

²⁴ Interview on Baden-Baden Südwestfunk Television Network, July 12, 1984, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Latin America* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-LAM*), July 20, 1984, pp. P13-19.

²⁵ See "Comandante Bayardo Arce Contends that Marxism-Leninism and the Single-Party System Are Going to Be Implanted," *La Vanguardia* (Barcelona), July 31, 1984, pp. 3, 8, 9. For a translation, see United States Department of State, *Comandante Bayardo Arce's Secret Speech before the Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN)*, Washington, DC, Department of State Publication 9422, Inter-American Series 118, March 1985.

²⁶ Interview with ND member Comandante Carlos Núñez, "The Watchword Is Organization, Organization, and More Organization," *Barricada*, Dec. 11, 1979, p. 4; also, "The Task of Mobilizing the Masses Requires a Solid and Well-Structured Vanguard," *ibid.*, Sept. 16, 1980.

grams of the revolution, is Jaime Wheelock of TP affiliation; other members are Henry Ruiz of the GPP and Daniel Ortega of the TT. It is noteworthy that each commission is headed by a representative of a different FSLN tendency.

These institutional arrangements have not eliminated policy disagreements. For example, with regard to the Catholic opposition, Borge and his GPP faction and supporters in the State Security department favor direct operations to discredit the Church, while the *terceristas* view such steps as unnecessary.²⁷ The FSLN leadership has also apparently been divided over how to handle Pastora's "treacherous" activities abroad, with the Ortega brothers reputedly favoring a reconciliation through Cuban mediators and Borge allegedly ordering and planning the assassination attempt on Pastora in 1984.²⁸ The *tercerista* Ramírez—a member of the Junta (prior to January 1985) but not of the DN—is considered the most moderate of the FSLN leaders. Said to abhor the use of violence in dealing with the opposition, he even hinted at one point in 1980 that the problem with the FSLN internally was that "we have all the power."²⁹

Borge seems to be closest to Moscow, having garnered a credit of US\$50 million for the purchase of Soviet machinery and equipment during his September 1981 visit to the USSR, and being cited positively in Soviet sources for advocating development of the FSLN along vanguard party lines. The Ortega brothers, particularly Humberto, are viewed as protégés of Fidel Castro, although they, too, frequently travel to Moscow, East Berlin, and Sofia.³⁰ Despite tactical differences within the DN and perhaps among their foreign sponsors, the FSLN leadership has

avoided a power struggle such as was observed in Grenada. Indeed, the intervention of forces of the US and the Organization of the East Caribbean States in that island nation in October 1983 created a siege mentality in the DN, strengthening its members' resolve to tolerate one another.

In the lower ranks, FSLN members are required "to obey unhesitatingly (*acatar sin vacilación alguna*) the directions of central and intermediate organizations . . . to respect organic [sic] discipline . . . to defend the FSLN from the attacks of its enemies . . . [and] to belong to one of the mass organizations."³¹ The new mass organizations—which include the Sandinista Workers' Central, the Rural Workers' Association, the July 19th Sandinista Youth, and the Nicaraguan Women's Association—were conceived along the model of Lenin's "transmission belts," i.e., as ancillary institutions whereby the party supplements its more direct means of controlling society. Their function is to counter the influence of opposition groups among the various sectors of society. FSLN members are also urged to take an active part in agitation and propaganda.³²

The Sandinista regime has been flexible and willing to tolerate the continued existence of various institutions of limited pluralism such as the semilegislative Council of State (since January 1985, the National Assembly) and various small opposition parties (of which more below). It does so because, in the words of Borge, the FSLN controls the instruments of "real power . . . the revolutionary organization [i.e., the party, and] the state coercive bodies—the Army, the Police, and the state security bodies." Borge boasts:

*We can do whatever we want with the power we have. We can remove the government and replace it with another if we like.*³³

Defense Minister Ortega further asserts: "The enemy . . . could never snatch power from us."³⁴

The Ministry of Defense under Humberto Ortega commands the Sandinista Popular Army (EPS) and the Sandinista Popular Militia (MPS). The active-duty armed forces number approximately 62,000.³⁵ Ac-

²⁷ From authors' interviews in Nicaragua and from the transcript of an extensive *Washington Post* interview with Miguel Bolaños Hunter, a former high-level official from the F-2 department of the General Directorate of State Security, at the Heritage Foundation (Washington, DC), June 16–17, 1983, pp. 2 and 42. The authors are indebted to Bruce Weinrod of the Heritage Foundation for providing them a copy of this transcript.

²⁸ From interviews in Nicaragua and Costa Rica in December 1984. Daniel Ortega was quoted in *El País* (Madrid) of July 15, 1982, p. 8, as saying, "Edén fought and had his own merits, this must be acknowledged." Pastora himself reported policy disagreements between the Ortega brothers and Borge. See interview in *La Prensa* (Panama City), Mar. 18, 1985, p. 1A.

²⁹ Authors' interviews in Managua; and an interview with Ramírez in *Svenska Dagbladet* (Stockholm), Mar. 14, 1980, p. 7, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Latin American Report* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-LAR*), No. 2130, JPRS 75434, Apr. 3, 1980, pp. 138–40.

³⁰ Authors' interviews in Managua. For positive Soviet appraisals of Borge's advocacy of the FSLN as a vanguard party, see I. M. Bulychev, "Successes and Problems of the Sandinist Revolution," *Latinskaya Amerika*, (Moscow), July 1981, pp. 26–41. Pastora in 1982 suggested that the GPP tendency (comprising Borge, Ruiz, and Arce) was closer to Moscow than to Havana. See interviews with *Veja* (São Paulo), Aug. 11, 1982, pp. 5, 6, and 8, and with *El País*, June 6, 1982, p. 8. According to Pastora, Castro cautioned the Sandinistas against accepting Soviet tanks. *La Prensa* (San Pedro Sula), July 15, 1982, pp. 4–5.

³¹ Interview with Comandante Núñez, loc. cit.


³² "Concerning Revolutionary Propaganda," originally published as an editorial in the FSLN weekly *Poder Sandinista* (Managua), No. 34, and reprinted in *Barricada*, July 6, 1980, p. 3.

³³ Tomás Borge, "A Dream Becomes a Reality," *Tricontinental* (Havana, in English), No. 118, 1980, pp. 18–28.

³⁴ From a speech of June 24, 1981, reported by Radio Managua, trans. in *FBIS-LAR*, No. 2339, JPRS 78513, July 15, 1981, pp. 60–62.

³⁵ *The Military Balance, 1984–85*, London, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1984, p. 123.

Figure 1: The FSLN and the Instruments of Power




according to the Patriotic Military Service Law of October 6, 1983, all Nicaraguan males between the ages of 18 and 40 are required to serve in the active or reserve military.³⁶ As in communist states, each EPS battalion has, in addition to its military commander, a

deputy for political work.³⁷

³⁶ Decree No. 1327, published in *El Nuevo Diario* (Managua), July 2, 1984, pp. 4-5.

³⁷ See a report about the activities of the counterinsurgency battalion, "Choir of Angels," *Verde Olivo* (Havana), June 9, 1983, pp. 16-17.



Young Nicaraguans are trained as members of the Sandinista Popular Militia against the background of a poster reading: "We Fight to Win! They Shall Not Pass!"

—ADN-ZB/East Berlin from Eastfoto.

The MPS traces its origins to the struggle of 1978-79, in which Nicaraguan youths fought against Somoza alongside FSLN guerrillas. After the July 1979 victory, the militia units were anxious to join regular units of the EPS. To accommodate them, and create a potential manpower reserve, the regime institutionalized the MPS in February 1980,³⁸ at a time, it should be noted, when the FSLN faced no significant internal or external threat. Today, the MPS numbers some 40,000 men.³⁹

Borge's Ministry of the Interior controls the Sandinista Police, the General Directorate of State Security (DGSE), the penal system, and special forces (the

Pablo Ubeda Brigade) engaged in fighting US-backed anti-Sandinista guerrillas known as the *contras*. The most crucial of these departments is the DGSE, headed by a Soviet-trained chief, appropriately named Lenin Cerna.⁴⁰ The real power within the security apparatus seems to be wielded by the Soviets; they reportedly concentrate on intelligence operations, while the Cubans oversee counterintelligence.⁴¹

Still another coercive instrument of the FSLN regime is the network of Sandinista Defense Committees (CDS's), modeled on Cuba's Committees for the Defense of the Revolution and commanded by Leticia Herrera, Soviet-educated, a guerrilla veteran, and formerly wife of Daniel Ortega. Originally created to

³⁸ "National Day of the Sandinista Popular Militia—Decree No. 313," *Barricada*, Feb. 24, 1980, pp. 1 and 12.

³⁹ *The Military Balance, 1984-85*, p. 124. This is believed by some US analysts we have talked to to be an underestimate.

⁴⁰ From Miguel Bolaños interview, loc. cit., p. 10.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

carry out civil defense activities (protection from air bombardment by the National Guard Air Force) during the last few years of the FSLN insurgency, they have since become a crucial social institution promoting socialist transformation at the grass-roots level. About half a million CDS members are organized in 9,000-odd units, block-by-block in the major cities. Some of these units serve as a network of intelligence, surveillance, and patrol, working closely with the Sandinista Police.⁴² Through their control of ration cards, job recommendations, and even permits for vaccinations, the CDS's are able to monitor and control the population and curtail any incipient opposition.⁴³

On a more informal basis, the State Security manipulates the so-called *turbas divinas* (divine mobs), which stage threats, demonstrations, harassments, and witch-hunts directed at opposition elements, particularly the Catholic Church.⁴⁴ Such a "turba" heckled the Pope during his 1983 visit.

These instruments of internal control and coercion have been directed in various combinations against opposition parties like the Nicaraguan Democratic Movement (MDN), the Church, the press, minority Indian groups, professional associations, private trade unions, supporters of Edén Pastora, and even radical groups such as the Trotskyite Communist Party (which has criticized the "moderation" of the FSLN).⁴⁵ Punishment has varied from job dismissal and denial of ration cards to arrest, preventive detention, imprisonment, and even occasional disappearances or violent deaths, as occurred when the President of the Superior Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP), José Salazar, was apparently murdered by Sandinista agents during his arrest for alleged anti-Sandinista activities.⁴⁶

The regime admits to holding some 5,000 persons in jail (of them, 2,000 are former National Guardsmen and another 300 have been convicted of subversive activities).⁴⁷ Since 1983, trials of dissidents have been

handled by special People's Anti-Somocista Tribunals. According to the Inter-American Permanent Commission on Human Rights, during 1983 an additional 1,400 Nicaraguans were being held in detention. During the same year, there were at least 102 instances of physical abuse and torture of political dissidents.⁴⁸ Borge, who knows the real numbers, has admitted the existence of physical abuse.⁴⁹

The Misura Indians on Nicaragua's Atlantic coast have particularly suffered at the hands of the Sandinistas. Once enjoying a fair amount of self-government and freedom to pursue their Moravian Protestant faith, these members of the Miskito, Sumo (or Sumu), and Rama tribes have resisted FSLN efforts to extend the control of the central government over their activities. As a result, they have incurred fierce repression, including seizure of church properties, denial of ration cards, impressment to work on Sandinista farms, and ultimately the mass relocation of some 10,000 Miskitos from areas on the Nicaraguan-Honduran border to areas deeper in Nicaragua. This has resulted in the flight to Honduras of some 15,000 Indians, physical attacks on Miskitos by FSLN officials, and the decision of some 5,000 Indians from various tribes to take up arms against the regime in alignment with the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN) headed by Adolfo Calero.⁵⁰ FSLN negotiations with Indian leaders to date have succeeded in fracturing the rebel leadership without addressing the serious grievances of the people.

In dealing with the Catholic Church, the Sandinistas have used a blend of coercion and of more subtle means. The FSLN has expelled foreign priests for alleged counterrevolutionary activities, assaulted Archbishop Obando y Bravo and terminated traditional radio broadcasts of his celebration of Sunday Mass, and subjected his aide Father Bismarck Carballo to a crude attempt at public defamation and humiliation.⁵¹ But the regime has also attempted to

⁴² Interview with the Chief of the Sandinista Police, Comandante Walter Ferretti, *Moncada* (Havana), April 1984, pp. 8-11.

⁴³ Interview with CDS Secretary General Herrera, *Barricada*, Feb. 17, 1984, pp. 1, 7; interview with Comandante Omar Cabezas, *La Prensa* (Managua), May 8, 1981, p. 16, and May 9, 1981, p. 8; and authors' interviews in Managua in December 1984.

⁴⁴ From Miguel Bolaños interview, loc. cit., pp. 27-28.

⁴⁵ For such criticism, the Sandinistas forced the ultra-leftist newspaper *El Pueblo* to close in January 1980. From authors' interviews in Managua in December 1984.

⁴⁶ "A Sandinist Coup," *Cambio 16* (Madrid), Dec. 1, 1980; and Shirley Christian, *Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family*, New York, Random House, 1985, pp. 181-82.

⁴⁷ *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1983*, report submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, by the Department of State, February 1984, Joint Committee Print, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, February 1984, pp. 636; and *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1984*, pp. 608-24; also Edward Cody, "Nicaraguan Special Tribunals Said to Neglect Due Process," *The Washington Post*, Aug. 3, 1985, pp. 1 and 28.

⁴⁸ *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1983*, p. 635.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ Even pro-Sandinista sources admitted a disrespectful attitude among some FSLN members toward Atlantic coast Indians. Thus, we read in *El Nuevo Diario* of June 14, 1980, p. 2, "There was a tendency not to respect the customs of the Miskitos." For an excellent discussion of the issue of the Atlantic coast Indians, see Margaret D. Wilde, "The East Coast of Nicaragua: Issues for Dialogue," an unpublished paper written for the Board of World Mission, Moravian Church in America, June 1984.

⁵¹ In August 1982 Father Carballo was asked to meet a purported woman penitent (actually a prostitute, presumably procured by the secret service), and when he did, he was hit by an agent of the DGSE's F-7 department posing as the woman's husband and then was seized and stripped by a *turba* and dragged naked down the street in front of waiting television cameras and newsmen. From Bolaños interview, loc. cit., pp. 30-31; and authors' interviews in Managua.



A priest in secular garb addresses the congregation at Santa Maria de Los Angeles Church in Managua in July 1984.

—Henry Weaver.

divide and destroy the Church by playing the rank-and-file priests and nuns against the Church hierarchy. For example, the FSLN has supported the so-called Popular Church, which follows radical liberation theology. This Church has won over some Christian segments of the population with its literacy crusade. Moreover, four "revolutionary" priests occupy high positions in the FSLN government—the former Maryknoll missionary Miguel D'Escoto Brockman is minister of foreign affairs; the former Trappist monk Ernesto Cardenal is minister of culture; his brother Fernando, a Jesuit priest, serves as minister of education; and the Franciscan Father Edgardo Parrales is Nicaragua's ambassador to the Organization of American States. The Sandinistas have also tried to use religious holidays for their purposes, e.g., turning *La Purísima*—a week-long celebration of the Immaculate Conception of Mary which foreshadows Christmas and culminates on December 8—into a party-sponsored fiesta in which even the Minister of the Interior participated.⁵²

The FSLN clearly must move slowly in attacking the Church hierarchy. A poll published in the November 10, 1981, issue of Managua's *La Prensa* indicated that 80 percent of the population considered itself Catholic and only 6.9 percent said they belonged to no

religion or were atheists. Fully 38 percent of respondents saw Archbishop (subsequently Cardinal) Miguel Obando y Bravo as the most popular Nicaraguan, followed by Daniel Ortega with only 13.5 percent. Only 8 percent favored a strictly Marxist education in the schools, while 70.9 percent favored Christian education and 17.1 percent favored a blend of Christian and Marxist education in the schools.⁵³

The FSLN has attempted to control and stifle the media through censorship and the creation of an openly "party" press to compete with the independent press. Since September 1979 all Nicaraguan journalists have been required to belong to one of two Sandinista trade unions. More important, under a state of national emergency declared on March 15, 1982, in response to attacks by anti-Sandinista guer-

⁵² Ernesto Cardenal (and perhaps some others) appears to view the revolution as "efficacious charity . . . a Christian and priestly task" and to believe that he is a "Marxist who believes in God," "follows Christ," and is a "revolutionary for his kingdom." See *El Nuevo Diario*, Feb. 22, 1983. But there is a more cynical strain in the likes of Borge, who claims he is a believer but not a Catholic and that he deeply admires Christ as a man who struggled against imperialism. See *Tiempo* (Madrid), Mar. 7–14, 1983, pp. 60–61.

⁵³ The article "A 'Directed' Survey and the Expected Response," appearing in *El Nuevo Diario* of Nov. 11, 1981, pp. 1 and 10, questioned the objectivity of the survey; *La Prensa* defended its methodology in its issue of the same day.



Managua's Archbishop (now Cardinal) Miguel de Obando y Bravo seen delivering a homily at a service in November 1984.

—Abbas/MAGNUM.

rillas, all radio and printed media were ordered to submit all materials planned for broadcast or publication for prior censorship by the Nicaraguan Communications Media Directorate, supervised by the Ministry of Interior,⁵⁴ with Borge himself engaging in the censorship. In 1980, the FSLN created two new newspapers, its own organ — *Barricada* — and the pro-FSLN daily *El Nuevo Diario*. The respected and influential *La Prensa*

has been able to maintain an opposition posture despite attempted insider takeovers by Sandinista trade unionists, intimidation of officials and distributors, restriction of foreign exchange needed to import paper, mob threats and other violence, and censorship (see Table 2).⁵⁵

Table 2: Censorship of *La Prensa*, February-November 1984

Month	Percent of content censored	Daily time needed for censorship
February	23.09	3 hrs. 02 mins.
March	19.30	3 hrs. 04 mins.
April	27.95	3 hrs. 05 mins.
May	30.57	3 hrs. 07 mins.
June	25.77	3 hrs. 24 mins.
July 1-19	45.26	3 hrs. 43 mins.
July 19-31	6.75	2 hrs. 57 mins.
August	18.80	2 hrs. 46 mins.
September	11.56	3 hrs. 05 mins.
October	15.85	2 hrs. 56 mins.
November	29.37	3 hrs. 19 mins.

SOURCE: *Brief History related to Temporary Closeouts, Censorings, Hostilities and Threats against those Working for La Prensa at Managua, Nicaragua*, published by *La Prensa* (Managua), December 1984.

Cutting Down the Opposition

Secure in the power assured by the coercive instruments at its disposal, the FSLN has resorted to traditional communist "salami tactics" to whittle away at the opposition's presence in two major institutions: the Junta of the Government of National Reconstruction (JGRN — since January 1985 the Presidency) and

⁵⁴ "Nicaraguan Government Establishes Control of Media" communiqué of the Communications Media Directorate, Mar. 15, 1982 (a copy was obtained by the authors while in Nicaragua).

⁵⁵ The famous Chamorro family is associated with all three newspapers. Pedro Joaquín Chamorro Barrios was editor-in-chief of his late father's *La Prensa* (with a circulation of 60,000 despite the FSLN policies) until he recently left for voluntary exile in Costa Rica. *Barricada* (with a circulation of 100,000) is edited by his brother Carlos, and *El Nuevo Diario* (with a circulation of 50,000) is edited by Xavier Chamorro, a brother of the late Pedro Joaquín Chamorro Cardenal. *La Prensa*, in a very objective commentary on July 4, 1980, aptly described all three newspapers as "better" than Cuba's *Granma*, which it termed "the world's most boring" newspaper.

the semilegislative Council of State/National Assembly. Although neither institution exercises real power comparable to that of the FSLN's National Directorate, the retention of some bourgeois elements in their ranks has lent some legitimacy and international respectability to the FSLN regime.

The first five-person Junta, appointed by the FSLN on June 16, 1979 (before the victorious final offensive), included the well-known Sandinistas Daniel Ortega and Moisés Hassan, but also Violeta Barrios Chamorro (widow of the former editor-in-chief of *La Prensa*), Alfonso Robelo (former chairman of COSEP and head of the MDN), and Sergio Ramírez from a FSLN-sponsored "Group of 12," charged with projecting an image of FSLN pluralism to foreign audiences. Ramírez's role in this group was pivotal. Though he was secretly a member of the FSLN at the time, Ramírez's public image as an academic of moderate persuasion helped promote the view that the Junta was a genuine coalition.⁵⁶

Under increasing pressure, Chamorro, said to be suffering from poor health, and Robelo, who opposed the FSLN takeover of the Council of State and the

reported nationalization of the country's banks,⁵⁷ both resigned from the Junta in April 1980. In an effort to maintain a pluralistic image, the FSLN appointed two replacements to the Junta: Central Bank President Arturo Cruz, who was a Social Democrat and a member of the "Group of 12," and Supreme Court Justice Rafael Cordoba Riva. However, in March 1981 the Junta was reduced to three persons—Daniel Ortega, Ramírez (who now openly voiced his FSLN affiliation), and non-FSLN member Cordoba. Cruz, disenchanted with his figurehead status, accepted appointment as ambassador to the United States, where he subsequently defected.

The FSLN's gradual rise to dominance over the Council of State followed a similar step-by-step approach. Established by an agreement reached at Pun-

⁵⁶ Ramírez's function in this transitory, tactical government reminds one of the role of Ludvík Svoboda, who in postwar Czechoslovakia joined the short-lived government of Social Democrat Zdeněk Fierlinger as a nonparty member, only to reveal subsequently that he had been acting as a secret de facto member of the Czechoslovak Communist Party all along.

⁵⁷ "I Sing, Yankee, Enemy of Mankind," an interview with Daniel Ortega in *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), Dec. 31, 1984, p. 83.



Members of the first Sandinista junta swear allegiance to the aims of the revolution after arriving in Managua on July 26, 1979: from left to right: Sergio Ramírez, Daniel Ortega, Violeta Barrios Chamorro, Alfonso Robelo, and Moisés Hassan.

—Alon Reininger/Contact.

ta Arenas, Costa Rica, in June 1979, this body was to be a pluralistic, co-legislative body charged with approving or rejecting statutory changes proposed by the Junta. The FSLN originally was to occupy only 13 of the 33 seats, but this agreement was disregarded even before the Council's first meeting by expansion of membership to 47—all 14 new seats going to FSLN members or FSLN supporters from the mass organizations.⁵⁸ As did East European communists in their postwar parliaments, so the FSLN formed a coalition in the Council of State, called the National Patriotic Front, encompassing both FSLN members and a variety of representatives and fellow-travelers from the Socialist Party of Nicaragua, the Social Christians and the Independent Liberal Party. When COSEP and MDN representatives boycotted the work of the Council, the FSLN-controlled mass media, the Sandinista Defense Committees, and other Sandinista mass organizations were mobilized to stage a national rally in support of the FSLN.⁵⁹ Sandinista coercive instruments also went into action against COSEP leaders, culminating in the murder of Salazar. After mobs attacked and wrecked the MDN's building in Managua in 1981, Robelo and other top leaders left Managua for voluntary exile. The Council of State was enlarged again in May 1981 with the addition of four new members, also FSLN supporters, bringing the membership to 51. Neither the Council of State nor its successor, the National Assembly, has been allowed to challenge the authority of the true executive body—the FSLN's National Directorate.

Turning to its own ranks, the FSLN faced the touchy problem of easing out Edén Pastora, the immensely popular "Comandante Cero," who had been head of the Southern Front during the insurrection, then vice-minister of interior, head of the Sandinista Popular Militia, and a member of the FSLN's Defense and Security Commission. Wary of his popularity and ambition and distrustful of his political orientation, the leadership never appointed him to the National Directorate per se. And after 1982, they began to accuse him of incoherence and Bonapartist ambitions. For his part, Pastora seemed disillusioned by the bureaucratization of the revolution—manifested in new uniforms, stiff manners, and stilted patterns of speech.⁶⁰ By 1981, he felt that the DN had "betrayed Sandinism . . . transforming a dictatorship of the right into one of the left," with his former comrades-in-arms (particular-



Edén Pastora, revolutionary hero and one-time official in the Sandinista regime, shown as leader of the anti-Sandinista Revolutionary Democratic Alliance.

—John Hoagland/Gamma-Liaison.

ly Borge) becoming "new Somozas."⁶¹ In July 1981, Pastora, unquestionably a complex and controversial personality, left Nicaragua. He has since become the leader of the Sandinista Revolutionary Front/Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (FRS/ARDE) guerrilla grouping operating in the vicinity of the Costa Rican-Nicaraguan border.

A further effort at political consolidation came with the 1984 presidential and legislative elections. While not entirely manipulated by the regime, the elections were not entirely free either. As a precondition for participation in the elections, opposition parties were required to declare their support for the revolution. There were partial bans on the rights of assembly and public demonstration. Media censorship and FSLN advertisements also worked to the Sandinistas' ad-

⁵⁸ James D. Rudolph, Ed., *Nicaragua: a country study*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1982, p. 163.

⁵⁹ See "Combative Nation in the Streets," *Barricada*, Nov. 13, 1980, pp. 1, 5.

⁶⁰ Interviews in *El País* and *La Prensa* (San Pedro Sula), cited in fn. 30.

⁶¹ Interviews in *Veja* and *La Prensa* (San Pedro Sula) cited in fn. 30. Pastora was particularly critical of Borge's living in the confiscated house of a former Somoza supporter which had a parking lot for 27 cars, including Jaguars and Mercedes-Benzes. Borge subsequently moved to smaller quarters.

vantage. Moreover, some voters were led to believe that if they did not vote for the FSLN they might lose their ration cards or even their jobs.⁶² Some gatherings of the opposition parties prior to the election were said to have been obstructed by various pressures and sabotaged by local FSLN authorities.⁶³

The most crucial aspect of the election was its lateness. By November 1984, no observer of the Nicaraguan scene—and least of all the Nicaraguan public—believed the Front was going to allow itself to lose. Moreover, participation in the elections only by the Front and a handful of small parties—three to the left of the Front and the rest splinters or factions of parties—offered the voter only a semblance of choice. In this context, the presidential election revealed that a significant degree of opposition to the Sandinista regime still exists in Nicaragua: the Sandinistas won 67 percent of the vote; the three ultra-left parties, 4 percent; and the three other principal opposition parties, 29 percent.⁶⁴

Socialist Transformation

The social and economic programs of the FSLN regime began cautiously. Having assumed power, the FSLN was determined to remedy socioeconomic inequities by the gradual introduction of a planned economy and redistribution of wealth to the poorer strata of society. However, having learned from the mistakes of other communist nations, they decided against a precipitous disengagement from the world capitalist system. For the immediate term they opted for a mixed economy, blending the public and private capitalist sectors. The National Directorate justified this approach by pointing out that Nicaragua had not attained the level of capitalism or developed the degree of working class consciousness that had existed in Cuba in 1959. As a Sandinista source put it, "What has taken place in Nicaragua is a Popular Revolution by workers, peasants, semi- and subproletarians, the patriotic middle class and bourgeois sectors, with a clear hegemony of the people."⁶⁵

Actually, this is not a new concept. Lenin had acknowledged that a vanguard party needed to build

coalitions with peasant and bourgeois elements during the first phase of socialist transformation, and this tactic was employed both in Russia, and after World War II in most of east-central Europe. The period of cooperation lasted even longer in China—and in East Germany, whose experience Wheelock had studied at first hand.

The Sandinistas have been relatively slow to pursue their goal of nationalization and collectivization of the economy, for fear of pushing domestic and foreign opposition too far. "There is no way," Wheelock observed, "that we can force the nationalization of tortilla production; that would be absurd . . . although we may have socialistic principles, we cannot resolve the transformation of our society by expropriating all the means of production."⁶⁶

As a result of this cautious approach, there exist in Nicaragua today three basic forms of ownership of the means of production: (1) state ownership, the so-called People's Property Area (APP); (2) cooperatives and associations such as the Sandinista Agricultural Cooperatives (CAS); and (3) private ownership. The APP was created immediately after the 1979 revolution when the holdings of Somoza, his family, and his closest supporters were seized. The FSLN claimed that 60 percent of all industrial means of production belonged to the private sector as of 1984.⁶⁷ As late as 1983, some 70 percent of the farmland remained in the hands of individual producers, even though the percentage in the hands of large *latifundistas* had declined dramatically (see Table 3). Expropriation continued at a gradual pace up to the summer of 1985, when the process appeared to be accelerated as properties belonging to oppositional figures such as Enrique Bolaños—president of COSEP—were expropriated.

The role of the central government in planning and in the allocation of national resources has also gradually increased. The principal institutions involved include the Ministry of Planning, the Labor Ministry, the Institute of Social Security, the National Planning Council, and Wheelock's Ministry of Agricultural Development and Agrarian Reform. This expansion of state intervention has been accompanied by a corresponding growth in the size of the public bureaucra-

⁶² See interview with socialist leader Adolfo Evertsz on Radio Noticias (Managua), Nov. 6, 1984, trans. in *FBIS-LAM*, Nov. 8, 1984, p. P/11.

⁶³ Interestingly, this charge came not only from the "bourgeois" parties, but also from the Trotskyite Communist Party newspaper, *Avance* (Managua), as reported by Radio Noticias on Sept. 6, 1984, trans. in *FBIS-LAM*, Sept. 7, 1984, p. P/11.

⁶⁴ The report of the Latin American Studies Association, *The Electoral Process in Nicaragua: International Influences*, Nov. 14, 1984, provides a good source on election

results. However, the report's conclusion that the elections constituted an "impressive beginning" was challenged by Nicaraguan analysts. See Jaime Chamorro, "Electoral Farce in Numbers, Statistical Data, and Percentages," an undated Spanish-language document prepared by *La Prensa* (Managua).

⁶⁵ *Pensamiento Propio* (Managua), Nos. 6–7, July–August 1983, p. 26.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁶⁷ *El Nuevo Diario*, Jan. 2, 1984, p. 2.

Table 3: Changes in Ownership of Land, 1978-83

Property sector	Percent of land owned			FSLN goal
	In 1978	In 1982 ^a	In 1983	
Private ownership				
Over 500 ^b	41.20	16.60	12	
200 to 500	13.80	12.00	10	
50 to 200	29.70	29.70	30	
10 to 50	12.90	12.90	14	
Less than 10	2.40	2.99	4	
Total private	100.00	74.19	70	25
Sandinista Agricultural Cooperatives (CAS)	0	1.87	7	50
People's Property Area (APP)	0	24.00	23	25

^a Percents in this column total more than 100, and it is not clear whether the error was in the translation, or in the original (which was not available to the authors).

^b The unit of land was not specified in the source.

SOURCE: General Directorate for Agrarian Reform, November 1983, as reported in "Socioeconomic Monday No. 32," *Barricada* (Managua), Dec. 19, 1983, p. 3, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Latin America Report* (Washington, DC), JPRS-LAM-84-016, Feb. 1, 1984, p. 92; FSLN goals from authors' interviews in Managua.

cies. These institutions have imposed a variety of regulations and controls on the private sector and exert pressure through capital investment policies, taxation, and manipulation of credit and foreign exchange. For example, in 1983, only 24 percent of capital invested in industry was allotted to the private sector.⁶⁸ What were once 17 banks have been merged into five, forming the state-operated Nicaraguan Financial Corporation. The FSLN has also established a state monopoly on foreign trade.

In the beginning, the Sandinistas' newly-created Ministry of Social Welfare sought to improve living conditions of the general populace through various public-housing and school construction projects and social welfare programs. These activities indeed helped to improve the quality of basic services, especially health care, and of housing. The FSLN also established a system of rent control, a program of urban development, and methods for controlling land and housing speculation. The first year of the revolution saw clear economic recovery and an economic growth of 18 percent.

Attempting to increase productivity, the FSLN coined slogans, which were emblazoned on huge banners and billboards, and organized popular rallies to awaken "social consciousness." In the first years, output increased in textiles, construction, and copper mining. However, six years later, these radical means of mass mobilization have become unpopular with segments of the Nicaraguan populace. Economic

mismanagement, bureaucratization, a mounting defense budget, and the state of emergency occasioned by armed opposition of the so-called *contras* have led to a serious deterioration of economic conditions and living standards. In 1983, Nicaragua's economic growth stalled, while inflation was 45 percent. Assessments of 1984 suggested an even bleaker situation, with zero or negative growth and still higher rates of inflation.⁶⁹

Arbitrary wage increases by some government institutions have contributed to inflationary pressures.⁷⁰ Gasoline and more essential items, such as water, toilet paper, and a host of basic foodstuffs, are now rationed. Nicaragua's foreign trade situation also has deteriorated. As of 1984, the country's total foreign debt was nearly US\$4 billion—only US\$1.6 billion of it inherited from the Somoza years.⁷¹

The FSLN's military buildup and apparent support for revolution in El Salvador led the United States to cancel its ongoing economic aid program to Nicaragua as of 1981. While aid has been forthcoming from other sources, particularly Mexico, Spain, and several communist states (more on this below), the latter have been unable or unwilling to provide the massive economic assistance needed to speed recovery from the damages of the insurrection. Moreover, the militarization of Nicaragua (whether to support regional revolution, as some observers contend, or to defend against *contra* opposition forces operating in border areas, as the FSLN claims—a subject of continuing debate) has swelled defense expenditures to an estimated 25 percent of the total national budget in 1984, and a much higher figure in 1985, according to Sandinista sources.⁷² This second civil war has resulted in large material losses—over US\$1 billion between March 1981 and October 1983; in the same period it reportedly resulted in the loss of several thousand lives and has also caused 100,000 people to flee from communities in the northern war zone,⁷³ not to mention the thousands of Miskito Indians forcibly relocated by the FSLN government.

⁶⁸ From a confidential document cited in *La Nación Internacional* (San Jose), Apr. 19-25, 1984, pp. 18-19.

⁶⁹ Ibid. Projections for 1984 are derived from authors' interviews in Nicaragua.

⁷⁰ The Department of Employment and Wages of the Labor Ministry in 1984 criticized inflationary salary boosts awarded by the Institute of Social Security. See *El Nuevo Diario*, Apr. 24, 1984, p. 9.

⁷¹ Document cited in *La Nación Internacional*, Apr. 19-25, p. 18.

⁷² Marcel Niedergang in *Le Monde* (Paris), May 3, 1984, pp. 1, 5; and authors' interviews in Nicaragua.

⁷³ *El Nuevo Diario*, May 22, 1984, p. 5; and document cited in *La Nación Internacional*, Apr. 19-25, 1984, pp. 18-19.



A poster of the "July 19" Sandinista Youth movement proclaims: "Advance Brigadiers. Raise Barricades of Notebooks and Blackboards. Onward to the Cultural Revolution!"

—ADN-ZB/East Berlin from Eastfoto.

The Sandinista regime has tried to counter worsening economic conditions by increasing public revenues via taxation on goods, services, sales, and imports. So far it has not been successful in reversing the deteriorating economic trends and countering popular discontent, nor has it averted the emergence of unsanctioned economic activities such as black marketeering and speculation.

While faltering on the economic front, the regime has been pushing ahead with a "progressive" educational policy—including a literacy campaign—tailored to advance socialist transformation. In workshops for middle-level teachers, the education ministry uses materials printed in Cuba and the USSR. Some of the literacy primers have been printed with the aid of Cuban experts. Even publications aimed at very young children extol not only the virtues of Sandino but also of the vanguard party, guerrilla war, the revolution, the FSLN and its founding father Fonseca, militarization, the frontier guards, the armed forces, and Yankee-phobia. For example, a mathematics pri-

mer teaches multiplication with illustrations of Soviet-made AK-47 rifles and hand grenades (see opposite page).⁷⁴ This and other primers also contain the hymn of the FSLN (composed by Tomás Borge), which children are required to memorize. One of the verses reads:

*Los hijos de Sandino
ni se venden ni se rinden
luchamos contra el Yankee
enemigo de la humanidad*

(The children of Sandino
Will not sell out, will not give up,
Let us struggle against the Yankee,
Enemy of all mankind.)⁷⁵

⁷⁴ "Multiplication with Numbers 1 to 20. Concept," in *Matemática* (Mathematics), Managua, MED (Ministerio de Educación), undated, p. 145 (copy obtained by the authors in Managua).


⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 140

Links with Communist Countries

As already suggested, the Sandinista regime has had close and growing ties with the Soviet Union and its allies, although public manifestations of the relationship have been downplayed in the aftermath of the ouster of Grenada's New Jewel Movement (NJM) in the autumn of 1983. As early as January 1980, Soviet Central Committee Secretary and Politburo Member Boris Ponomarev equated the Nicaraguan revolution with the revolutions in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Angola, and elsewhere.⁷⁶ Soviet commentary had also grouped the FSLN regime with the NJM regime under the rubric "popular-democratic,"⁷⁷ a term that was also used to describe the transitional stage of postwar regimes in Eastern Europe on their way to becoming full-fledged Leninist systems. However, it appears that since 1983, particularly after the Grenada episode, Moscow has tended to refer to Nicaragua merely as "anti-imperialist" (most likely in an attempt to lower the level of alarm in the United States), even though Nicaragua's "vanguard party" and "revolutionary liberation" struggle are still classified in the same

category as the struggles of socialist-oriented vanguards in Afghanistan, Angola, and Ethiopia. Indeed, for some Soviet analysts, the Nicaraguan revolution, like those in Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan, had already made a contribution to the expansion of the "anti-imperialist democratic camp" and to the "reduction of the geopolitical area of the capitalist system."⁷⁸ Such ideological formulations carry with them increased Soviet political and moral support for given movements. Expanded ties between the Soviet bloc and Nicaragua are evident in the realms of inter-party affairs, military assistance, and economic relations.

Party-to-party relations. In the case of the FSLN, Moscow was dealing with a relatively small yet elitist "known quantity," which had the distinction of having come to power via a popular revolution. Although the Soviets had kept a low profile vis-à-vis the FSLN insurgents, the USSR recognized the Sandinista regime on the diplomatic level precisely one day after the fall of Somoza. It may be presumed that party-to-party relations were formalized during the March 1980 visit to Moscow of an FSLN delegation led by Borge, Humberto Ortega, and Henry Ruiz. While any agreement that may have been signed then remains secret, one can speculate, based on the text of the agreement signed between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Grenada's NJM in July 1982, that the CPSU and FSLN agreed to establish a broad framework for party-to-party cooperation—including consultations on international matters, all-round development of state-to-state relations, and cooperation between mass organizations in both countries.⁷⁹ The political closeness of the two parties is suggested by the strong pro-Soviet bias in subsequent Nicaraguan foreign policy. For example, in January 1980 the FSLN regime abstained from a United Nations vote demanding the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan,



⁷⁶ "The Inevitability of the Liberation Movement," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 1, January 1980, pp. 11–27. This formula has been repeated by other Soviet writers; see, e.g., *Pravda*, June 16, 1983.

⁷⁷ See A. I. Stroganov's review of A. F. Shul'govskiy's book *Politicheskaya sistema obshchestva v Latinskoy Amerike* (The Political System of Society in Latin America) in *Latinskaya Amerika*, May 1983, p. 134.

⁷⁸ B. N. Ponomarev, "Real Socialism and the Liberated Countries," *Slovo Lektora* (Moscow), March 1984, p. 14; and Yuri Korolov, "The Experience of the Transition Period," *America Latina* (Moscow), September 1984, pp. 43–53.

⁷⁹ For the text of the CPSU-NJM agreement, see Jiri Valenta and Herbert J. Ellison, Eds., *Grenada and Soviet/Cuban Policy: Crisis and the US/OECS Intervention*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1985. The FSLN has also signed party-to-party cooperation agreements with the Bulgarian, and probably the East German and Czechoslovak, communist parties. The agreement with the Bulgarian CP was signed in November 1981. See "The FSLN and the Bulgarian CP Sign an Agreement," *Barricada*, Nov. 22, 1981, p. 12. For the comparable BCP/NJM document, see Valenta and Ellison, op. cit.



Signing of an agreement on cooperation between the USSR State Planning Committee (Gosplan) and the Planning Ministry of the Republic of Nicaragua in Moscow on March 22, 1980: at left, Nicaraguan Planning Minister Henry Ruiz, and at right, Gosplan Chairman Nikolay Baybakov. Directly behind Ruiz, is Tomás Borge, and to Borge's left are Moisés Hassan and Humberto Ortega.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

and the FSLN leadership has refused to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China.⁸⁰

There have been signs of cooperation not only between the Nicaraguan and Soviet-bloc ministries of education, but also between the FSLN Institute for the Study of Sandinism and two Soviet institutions: the Latin American Institute of Social Sciences, and the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the CPSU Central Committee.⁸¹ The Soviets have donated educational material to the Marxist-Leninist Library at the National

University at Leon, and, together with the Bulgarians, have provided donations to the FSLN newspaper *Barricada*. In the last six years, some 2,000 Nicaraguans have received scholarships to study at universities in the USSR and other communist countries. Moreover, there are active ties between the Soviet Komsomol and the 19th of July Sandinista Youth Movement and between the Nicaragua Committee for Peace and the Peace Committee of the USSR.⁸² In addition, in September 1984, a USSR-Nicaraguan Friendship Society was established.

There are several hundred Soviet civilian advisers in Nicaragua along with several dozen advisers from East European states. However, the strongest communist representation is Cuban. One suspects the existence—as in Grenada—of a party-to-party agreement between the FSLN and the Cuban Communist Party (PCC). There are also close ties between the

⁸⁰ Interestingly, the FSLN-controlled Council of State turned down a motion to recognize the PRC. See José Antonio Arguello, "A No to China Is A No to a Nonaligned Nicaragua," *La Prensa* (Managua), Aug. 20, 1980, p. 2.

⁸¹ E.g., the FSLN participated in the 14th annual conference of ministers of higher education from Warsaw Pact countries, plus Cuba and Mongolia and "socialist-oriented" Afghanistan and Angola. See Radio Havana, Sept. 11, 1984, trans. in *FBIS-LAM*, Sept. 13, 1984, p. Q/3. For a Soviet report on the Institute for the Study of Sandinism, see E. S. Dabagyan, "Visiting Among Nicaraguan Scholars," *Latinskaya Amerika*, March 1982, pp. 126–28. A Council headed by Humberto Ortega reportedly supervises ideological-methodological work at the Institute.

⁸² From authors' interviews in Nicaragua.

Union of Young Communists of Cuba and the 19th of July Sandinista Youth. Cuban advisers are attached to the most important FSLN departments and ministries, and hundreds of Nicaraguan youths are being trained in Cuban schools. Meanwhile, many Cuban teachers (at one point, 2,000) have been assigned to the Nicaraguan education sector, particularly the national literacy campaign, whose tactics of indoctrination are characteristically Leninist (many were recalled in 1985).

It is evident that the FSLN, like the NJM in Grenada, conceives of itself as a revolutionary bridge between the CPSU and PCC on the one hand and leftist forces in the Caribbean Basin (particularly Central America) on the other. The FSLN coordinates regional support for revolutionary movements in El Salvador (the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front—FMLN) and Guatemala (the Guerrilla Army of the Poor—EGP), and for the Costa Rican revolutionary underground. Members of other Latin American revolutionary movements, e.g., the M-19 guerrillas of Colombia and the Montoneros of Argentina, are also present in Nicaragua, and even the Palestine Liberation Organization and Libya have headquarters in Managua.⁸³ As the captured Grenada Documents illustrate, the FSLN and NJM both participated in the work of a secret regional caucus of the leftist parties in January 1983. Nicaragua supplied some 2,000 uniforms to the Grenadian Armed Forces prior to 1983 and had agreed to train a number of Grenadian teachers.⁸⁴

Fraternal military assistance. The Soviet Union and other communist states have discreetly but steadily increased their military and intelligence support for the Sandinistas. To be sure, during the insurrection, it was Cuba that supplied weapons to the FSLN and helped it obtain weapons on international markets. Also, some 50 Cuban security advisers were among the Sandinista forces that captured Managua in July 1979. But subsequently, the FSLN has received much more substantial military aid. It is reasonable to assume that the first agreement for substantial arms transfers from the Soviet Union was signed during the visit of FSLN officials to Moscow, East Berlin, and Prague in March 1980. The initiation of arms transfers was only publicly confirmed at the July 1980 celebration of the revolution's anniversary in Managua, where the EPS displayed 18 ZPU light antiaircraft guns, 6 SA-7 surface-to-air missile launchers, and 100

RPG-7 anti-tank weapons of Soviet make, plus 96 W-50 trucks from East Germany.⁸⁵

As in the case of Grenada, these first Soviet-bloc arms transfers arrived well before the 1980 election of Ronald Reagan as president of the United States. Subsequently, as US-Nicaraguan relations deteriorated over the issue of FSLN aid to the guerrillas in El Salvador, the communist states' shipments of military supplies to Managua increased. By the summer of 1981, the first T-54 and T-55 tanks arrived, on Algerian ships. On a second visit to Moscow, in November 1981, Humberto Ortega met with Soviet Defense Minister Dimitriy Ustinov and Chief of the General Staff Nikolay Ogarkov, and presumably signed a new arms transfer agreement. In 1983, as the anti-FSLN insurgency intensified, communist arms transfers (now on Soviet-bloc ships) increased, totaling some 20,000 tons of materiel (double the amounts for 1981 and 1982). In addition to dozens of tanks, there were other weapons specifically suited to counterinsurgency operations: 25 to 30 armored personnel carriers, several MI-8 helicopters.⁸⁶

Moscow soon added An-26 transport planes, jeeps, field ambulances, and thousands more AK-47 rifles to the Nicaraguan arsenal. There were also reports of some 80 MiG fighters being held in Cuba for future delivery—and reports that dozens of Nicaraguan pilots were completing training in Bulgaria, that others were going to Cuba for further study, and that the FSLN was acquiring several L-39 military trainers from Czechoslovakia to train Nicaraguan fighter pilots.⁸⁷ By late 1984, Nicaragua had more than 100 Soviet T-54 and T-55 medium tanks, over 20 light amphibious PT-76 tanks, 120 armored vehicles, more than 1,000 military trucks, 120 antiaircraft missiles, 120 antiaircraft guns, and 700 shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles.⁸⁸ (Despite the preponderance of Soviet-bloc nations among those providing military assistance, Nicaragua prior to 1983 also received some aid from Algeria and France.)

As in Grenada, the Soviets and Cubans are assisting in construction projects with immediate or potential military and intelligence application. Cubans, using Soviet equipment, are helping to build a military airport in Punta Huete and upgrade facilities at Puerto Cabezas, Esteli, La Rosita, and Bluefields. Meanwhile, Soviets and Nicaraguans are conducting joint ocean-

⁸³ Rudolph, op. cit., p. 213.

⁸⁴ From interview with Miguel Bolaños, loc. cit., p. 86; also Peter Clement, "Moscow and Nicaragua: Cultivating a New Client?" *Comparative Strategy* (New York), No. 1, 1985.

⁸⁵ From authors' interviews in Nicaragua.

⁸⁶ Ibid., and *The New York Times*, Nov. 7, 1984.

⁸³ Interview with Miguel Bolaños, loc. cit., p. 36.

⁸⁴ Valenta and Ellison, op. cit., and *Grenada Documents*, Log No. X.

ographic research in the Atlantic and Pacific. Moscow was going to donate dry-dock and fishing boat repair facilities at the Pacific port of San Juan del Sur, although the project is currently on hold. Cuban construction workers are building a new US\$80 million deep-water port at El Bluff on the Caribbean coast, financed largely by the Soviet-dominated Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA). Borge described the new port as "undoubtedly a strategically important project" that would provide Nicaragua with access to European markets without having to use the Panama Canal.⁸⁹ Again as in Grenada, the Soviets are helping to build a satellite communications earth station. (Perhaps not coincidentally, the president of the Soviet-Nicaraguan Friendship Society, Vasiliy Shamshin, is also the Soviet communications minister.)

United States and Caribbean sources estimate that there are 3,000 Cuban military and security advisers in Nicaragua today, although Daniel Ortega admits to

only 800.⁹⁰ The Cuban military advisers wear uniforms indistinguishable from those of the Nicaraguans. Cuban security advisers occupy important positions in the Nicaraguan secret police. In addition, there are some 100 Soviet military-security advisers, 25 Bulgarians, 40–50 East Germans, and some 25 PLO specialists. There are also Libyan personnel and members of the Spanish Basque separatist organization ETA.⁹¹

It should be remembered that prior to 1979, many of the FSLN guerrillas—including Borge and Humberto Ortega—were trained in Cuban guerrilla schools and camps, and that Ruiz, secret police chief Cerna, and CDS chief Herrera studied in the USSR. This pattern continues: as of 1985, there are dozens of Nica-

⁸⁹ Ortega is cited by *EFE* (Madrid), Mar. 12, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-LAM*, Mar. 13, 1985, p. P/2. The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cuba, Jorge Bolaños, has claimed that there were only 200 Cuban military advisers in Nicaragua. See *Barbados Advocate* (Bridgetown), Nov. 9, 1984, p. 4.

⁹¹ Interview with Miguel Bolaños, loc. cit., pp. 16 and 33; also *Cambio 16*, Oct. 3, 1983, p. 29, and Tegucigalpa Cadena Audio Video, Sept. 4, 1984, trans. in *FBIS-LAM*, Sept. 5, 1984, p. P/18.

⁹⁰ Radio Sandino (Managua), July 4, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-LAM*, July 10, 1985, p. P/10.



A Soviet PT-76 light tank is used to transport troops and supplies during operations of the Sandinista Popular Army against contra forces in the area of San Juan del Rio Coco in 1985.

—Susan Meiselas/MAGNUM.

raguan security personnel being trained in two-year and shorter courses in Cuba and in three-year security courses in the USSR.⁹²

There appears to be a rough division of labor among the communist states that give security assistance to Nicaragua—a pattern also observed in Soviet-bloc dealings with such “socialist-oriented” countries as Angola, Ethiopia, and (formerly) Grenada. The Soviets appear to be responsible for overall command and control; the Cubans provide manpower and serve as military and counterintelligence advisers; the East Germans provide trucks, police specialists, and highly qualified communications technicians; the Bulgarians aid the processing of information in security matters; and Bulgaria and (to a lesser degree) Czechoslovakia provide weapons, explosives, and ammunition.

Communist economic relations. Paralleling the gradual approach toward restructuring the mode of production, the FSLN government has been measured in its expansion of economic cooperation with communist states, although not necessarily completely of its own volition. So far, the primary objective of Soviet-bloc assistance seems to be to reinforce the FSLN in political, ideological, and security aspects. However, exploration of Soviet-Nicaraguan economic cooperation began in January 1980 with the visit of a high-level Soviet technical mission to Managua. Over the next two-and-a-half years a variety of trade, technical, and economic agreements were signed, and various trade and economic assistance commissions were established. Between July 1979 and February 1982, for example, Soviet aid amounted to only US\$7.9 million, compared to Cuban aid of US\$42.5 million (aid from the United States for 1979–81 totaled US\$118 million).⁹³ However, Soviet aid was highly publicized, as in the shipment of 20,000 tons of grain in 1981.

In late 1982, the Soviet Union stepped up its economic assistance to the Sandinistas. Some US\$100 million worth of tractors and earth-moving equipment was donated, and in 1983, Soviet-bloc economic aid amounted to \$240 million (including \$100 million from the USSR).⁹⁴ Initially, the United States was again much more forthcoming with credits than were the communist states, extending some

\$72.6 million in 1979–80. In this period the Soviet Union made no credits available; Cuba offered a symbolic \$1 million, and East Germany, \$82 million. In 1981, the USSR offered some \$73.2 million, and in 1982 another \$150 million. Cuba provided \$3.5 million in 1981 and \$50 million in 1982 (which very likely included supplies for Cuban personnel in Nicaragua). In 1982, there was an additional \$26 million from East Germany, indeterminate amounts from Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, and \$100 million from Libya.⁹⁵ By June 1985, the total economic aid of communist nations to Nicaragua (annuities [sic], credits, and machinery, excluding goods for development projects) had reached \$600 million.⁹⁶

Soviet-Nicaraguan trade has grown significantly, with Soviet exports to Nicaragua in 1983 valued at some 42.4 million rubles against 0.1 million rubles in 1980. Nicaraguan exports to the USSR grew much more slowly over that period, from 5.5 to 9.5 million rubles.⁹⁷ While not dramatic, Soviet-Nicaraguan trade now exceeds in volume the trade of the USSR with Mexico or Peru. A regular maritime link was established between Leningrad and the Nicaraguan port of Corinto in early 1985.

Still, Moscow is hesitant to take on another Cuba. In April 1983, Viktor Volskiy, director of Moscow's Latin American Institute, noted that “it has cost us a lot to send oil to Cuba—two tankers a day for 20 years. We would not like to have to repeat that on a larger scale.”⁹⁸ Nicaragua is, of course, a less populous country than Cuba, and therefore expansion of Soviet and CEMA aid to Managua cannot be excluded. Indeed, in 1985, Moscow became Nicaragua's major oil supplier.⁹⁹ Other signs of increased Soviet aid may be the establishment of a new Commission on Cooperation in Economics, Trade, Science, and Technology, announced during Daniel Ortega's April 1985 visit to Moscow, and Nicaraguan participation as an observer at the meetings of the CEMA. At a CEMA meeting in

⁹² Clement, loc. cit.

⁹³ Domingues, loc. cit., Table II.

⁹⁴ Interview with Minister of Foreign Cooperation, Comandante Henry Ruiz, conducted by Madrid's EFE in Warsaw on June 27, 1985, at the conclusion of a CEMA session at which Ruiz represented Nicaragua, trans. in *FBIS-LAM*, July 1, 1985, pp. P/21–22.

⁹⁵ “Soviet Foreign Trade (January–December 1983),” in *Foreign Trade* (Moscow), March 1984, and statistics compiled by Nikki Miller and Laurance Whitehead in their unpublished paper, “The Soviet Interest in Latin America: An Economic Perspective.”

⁹⁶ *The Guardian* (London), Apr. 28, 1983, p. 15.

⁹⁷ Soviet tankers with oil for Managua were said to be sailing twice a week from Leningrad to Corinto; Radio Havana, Mar. 5, 1985, in *FBIS-LAM*, Mar. 7, 1985, p. Q/5. Delayed arrival of a Soviet tanker in the early fall of 1984 forced the FSLN to reduce fuel rations. See *The Wall Street Journal*, Oct. 2, 1984, p. 38.

⁹² Interview with Miguel Bolaños, loc. cit., p. 33.

⁹³ On Soviet aid, see Edme Domingues, unpublished paper, “Soviet Policy toward Central America, the Caribbean, and the Members of the Contadora Group”; for US aid, see *Review of Nicaragua's Commitments to the OAS*, Washington, DC, US Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, July 18, 1984.



The freighter "Nikolay Krylenko" registered at Leningrad unloads its cargo at Nicaragua's Corinto port in April 1984.

—Susan Meiselas/MAGNUM.

June 1985, Nicaragua was able to secure expanded CEMA economic cooperation with the Nicaraguan agricultural, livestock, and textile industries, plus 10,000 scholarships. Minister of Foreign Cooperation Ruíz did not exclude Nicaragua's joining CEMA in 1989 or 1990.¹⁰⁰

Conclusions

Nicaragua has not yet become a full-fledged Leninist state like the countries of Eastern Europe, Cuba, or Vietnam. Yet the regime appears headed toward becoming a dictatorship of a Leninist-oriented party. The FSLN has been engaged in a gradual, skillful process of socialist transformation at home, benefiting from earlier Soviet, East European, and Cuban experiences and the awareness that too rapid a Leninization of the country would overly alarm the dominant power in the region—the United States. The FSLN government is

prepared to make tactical concessions as long as it controls the real power base—the party, the state security, and the army. On these matters the FSLN closely follows the Soviet and Cuban models and is unlikely to make meaningful concessions.

In terms of regional politics, the National Directorate appears prepared to follow the Bolshevik example—i.e., forgo full-scale internationalism until circumstances permit a resumption of large-scale aid to revolutionaries in the region; meanwhile, the flow of small arms to the Salvadoran guerrillas evidently continues.¹⁰¹ In the long run, as a former Sandinista told us in Managua, the FSLN revolution will need to spread throughout the region or perish. This assessment conforms with an emerging consensus in Central America that the FSLN is unwilling to give up its original (1969) commitment to region-wide revolution. As the Salvadoran newspaper *El Diario de Hoy* wrote on January 24, 1985: "The consensus in the Central American region is that so long as the Sandinista

¹⁰⁰ Ruíz interview cited in fn. 96.

¹⁰¹ *The New York Times*, Apr. 11, 1984.

Communists remain in Nicaragua, the region will remain a permanent focus of subversion and political unrest that will threaten neighboring countries." The same view is heard from various policymakers in Honduras, Panama, and democratic Costa Rica. Nicaragua's military buildup has already made the EPS a dominant factor in the immediate Central American regional military balance. Costa Rica is particularly vulnerable, having only a para-military police force but no army.

As in Cuba earlier, Moscow (this time with Havana's help) has made guarded political, security, and economic commitments to the FSLN. Yet, as the Grenada case demonstrated, and various Soviet signals suggest, the FSLN can count on nothing more than "political" support from the USSR in the case of a direct conflict with the United States.¹⁰² The Cubans could only provide insufficient support in such an event, lacking—as they admit—the air- and sea-lift capabilities to bring in adequate reinforcements.¹⁰³

The FSLN contends that the opposition insurgency owes its existence to the United States. But the issue of US support for the *contras* begs the more important issue—that the anti-Sandinista insurgencies

are symptomatic of conditions created by most Leninist-oriented regimes in the Third World. In every socialist-oriented country with an elitist vanguard party (Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, and Mozambique) there exists a significant resistance movement, with strong popular support, which has multiplied in response to forced socialist transformation of the society by the ruling party. In the Nicaraguan opposition forces, estimated at 19,000 men, there are at most 3,000 former Somoza National Guardsmen—i.e., the vast majority are Nicaraguans disenchanted with the Sandinista revolution, and many of them are former Sandinistas (including former Sandinista officials Pastora, Cruz, and Robelo). In the largest organization, the Democratic National Front, reportedly only 1 to 3 percent of the insurgents are former National Guard members, 19 percent are former Sandinistas, and the remainder are peasants from the northern part of Nicaragua. Ex-Sandinistas

¹⁰² See Jiri Valenta's testimony before the Kissinger Commission, "Soviet Policy in Central America," *Survey* (London), Autumn-Winter 1983, pp. 287-303.

¹⁰³ Interview with Cuban First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, José Viera, *Kyodo* (Tokyo), Nov. 8, 1984, trans. in *FBIS-LAM*, Nov. 8, 1984, p. Q/2.



Leading figures in the Nicaraguan Democratic Front (FDN) shown in Washington in April 1985, from left to right: Adolfo Calero, FDN head; and former members of the Junta of the Government of National Reconstruction under the Sandinistas, Arturo Cruz and Alfonso Robelo.

—Willard Volz/*The Washington Times*.

and disenchanted civilians also provide some of the top military leadership of the guerrillas.¹⁰⁴

Outside players cannot "buy" into such a large insurgency. It rather draws major impetus from the FSLN military buildup, from enforced recruitment, from ideological mobilization by the elite vanguard party—with its arbitrary Leninist rules of the political game—from the economic ineptitude of the government and growing national penury, from the vigilant and often coercive control of the population, and from the blatantly pro-Soviet stances of the government (witness three days of official national mourning following the death of Soviet leader Konstantin Chernenko and the government's refusal to establish diplomatic relations with China.)

To some former Sandinistas, this approach is Leninist only, not Marxist. In the words of Pastora:

*I am not afraid of Marxism . . . a philosophy that teaches you to do justice, but in accordance with the social and political conditions of each country. The "screw-up" comes when you apply this philosophy in the Soviet style, and in accordance with the social, political, and economic laws of the Soviet Union.*¹⁰⁵

For Pastora, at least, the goal is to return to true Sandinism, "Nicaraguan Sandinism, not Soviet Sandinism. . . ."

There have been numerous attempts in the past in

Eastern Europe to make communism more pluralistic, more humane, all of which might have flourished but for the threat or reality of Soviet military invasion. In the case of Nicaragua, such an evolution seems precluded by the rule of an FSLN regime that has internalized Soviet and Cuban models of repression and is intent on consolidating its own real power through coercive mechanisms.

* * *

Authors' Note: After completing this article, we learned of a recent reorganization within the National Directorate of the FSLN. In early August, the Political Commission was replaced by an Executive Commission with Daniel Ortega as Coordinator and Bayardo Arce as Deputy Coordinator, and with other members Tomás Borge, Humberto Ortega, and Jaime Wheelock. While the new line-up ostensibly promotes Daniel Ortega, it also brought Tomás Borge into the FSLN's top coordinating commission for the first time. In a communiqué broadcast over Managua Radio Sandino on August 4, Arce stated: "The National Directorate hereby creates an Executive Commission entrusted with organizing the execution and control of the decisions in all instances of revolutionary power. . . . This Executive Commission will be an implementation organ of the National Directorate, but it will not assume any of its authority." On the same day, the FSLN announced establishment of seven auxiliary departments to deal with general affairs, organization, agitation and propaganda, political education, international organization, finances, and studies of Sandinism. On these developments, see *FBIS-LAM*, Aug. 6, 1985, pp. P/5-6.

¹⁰⁴ Interview with Arturo Cruz, Guatemala Radio, Mar. 18, 1985, in *FBIS-LAM*, Mar. 21, 1985, p. P/13; also authors' interviews in Nicaragua and Costa Rica in December 1984.

¹⁰⁵ Interview with *La Prensa* (San Pedro Sula), July 15, 1982, p. 5.

Qadhdhafi and the Kremlin

Lisa Anderson

Soviet-Libyan relations have been a subject of controversy in the West almost from the start of Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi's rule in Libya in September 1969. Qadhdhafi's initial posture of nonalignment constituted a marked shift away from the pro-Western position of the monarchy he had overthrown. In the United States, despite efforts to retain constructive relations with the new regime, concern was voiced early on that Qadhdhafi's nonalignment was hardly different from that of Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir in Egypt, who was, of course, by then heavily dependent on Soviet advisers and military equipment. Subsequent Libyan arms purchases from the Soviet Union, estimated by US government analysts in 1983 at over US\$20 billion, raised fears that Libya was little more than a conveniently located strategic stockpile for the Soviets, since the Libyan armed forces themselves were clearly incapable of absorbing the large quantities of materiel being supplied.

In fact, however, as the Soviets themselves have undoubtedly gathered, Qadhdhafi's growing reliance on Eastern-bloc arms supplies and trade relations throughout the 1970's would make him no more amenable to their direction than his continuing dependence upon American and European oil companies and markets made him willing to accommodate Western political interests. His control of the vast financial resources produced by his country's oil wealth made him somewhat unusual among radical Third World leaders: simultaneously an attractive consumer for

Soviet goods, including military equipment, and a dangerously self-sufficient friend. Throughout Qadhdhafi's tenure in Libya, Soviet-Libyan cooperation has reflected the convergence of otherwise independent interests and policies, and each government has repeatedly displayed a willingness to hold the other at arm's length when such a posture better served its purposes. This has thus been less an alliance of the like-minded than a marriage of convenience based on expediency and opportunism. As such, it provided yet another illustration of the common dilemmas of the superpowers in dealing with Third World sympathizers.

In part because Soviet-Libyan ties reflected the largely independent preoccupations of each participant, their relations evolved through several distinct stages. From the Soviets' perspective, beyond a long-term strategic interest in the Mediterranean, the principal variable in their relationship with Libya was their rivalry with the United States in the Middle East. Their interest in Qadhdhafi's Libya was heightened by their loss of Egypt to the Western camp after Sadat consolidated his hold on power, and subsequently by the economic utility of good commercial relations with a "petrodollar" producer. By the 1980's, Libya's relatively straitened circumstances, far from being entirely negative in Soviet eyes, may have created an opportunity for the more serious economic penetration that might enhance Moscow's influence in the future. From the Libyan point of view, relations with the Soviets were determined in the first place by Libya's relationship with Egypt, and secondarily by the Qadhdhafi regime's mounting confrontation with the United States. Over the course of his 15 years in power, moreover, Qadhdhafi's ideological ambitions have evolved as well, and although at no point did he embrace communism, his growing radicalism also contributed to his changing views of the Soviets. The intersection of these diverse interests created the contours of Soviet-Libyan relations.

Lisa Anderson is Assistant Professor of Government at Harvard University and Director of the Moroccan Studies Program at its Center for Middle Eastern Studies. She is a specialist on comparative politics and social change, with a concentration on North Africa, and is author of two forthcoming works, The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1830-1980 and A History of Modern Libya.



Soviet party leader Leonid Brezhnev welcomes Libya's Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi to Moscow on April 27, 1981.

—UPI/Bettmann.

Soviet-Libyan Relations Before Qadhdhafi

The first recorded expression of Soviet interest in Libya came in the immediate aftermath of World War II. Libya, which had been an Italian colony, was captured by the Allied forces during the North African campaigns, and found itself at the end of the war governed by British and French military administrations

as occupied enemy territory. It was at the time a very poor and sparsely populated land; the population of about one million people disposed of a per capita income estimated at US\$25 per year, and there were fewer than 14 college graduates. The general consensus in international circles was that the country was too poor to be accorded independence. There was, however, little agreement over the suitable disposition of the territory.¹

At the Potsdam Conference of July 1945, the Soviets suggested, obviously without success, that they be offered a trusteeship over the territory. They subsequently, and briefly, supported an American plan for a United Nations trusteeship, and later proposed a ten-year Soviet trusteeship for Tripolitania, the western and most populous of the country's three provinces. The British wartime promise that the eastern

¹ On the early Soviet interest in Libya and the debates surrounding disposition of the Italian territories, see Benjamin Rivlin, "Unity and Nationalism in Libya," *The Middle East Journal* (Washington, DC), Winter 1949, pp. 31-44; John Wright, *Libya*, New York, Praeger, 1970, pp. 200-201; and John K. Cooley, *Libyan Sandstorm: The Complete Account of Qadhdhafi's Revolution*, New York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1982, p. 37. On the economy at independence, see International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *The Economic Development of Libya*, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1960.

province, Cyrenaica, would not be returned to Italian rule gave the British paramount influence in that region and apparently precluded Soviet interests there; while French suggestions of "border rectifications" that would have joined the Fazzan and southern Cyrenaica to their Saharan possessions in Chad left little room for Soviet claims in the south. Despite a Soviet promise that the Soviet system would not be introduced in Tripolitania, the Western allies were not enthusiastic about Moscow's designs on the region, and they did not respond favorably either to the Soviets' initial proposals or to their subsequent suggestion that Tripolitania become a joint Soviet-Italian trusteeship. By 1948 the Soviets had therefore told Italy that they favored Italian, rather than British or French, trusteeship over Rome's former African colonies.

The inability of the Great Powers to agree upon a solution—the United States had also offered to administer the territory—led the British and French eventually to turn the problem over to the United Nations. In April 1949 the head of the Soviet delegation to the United Nations, Andrey Gromyko, attacked the British and French administrations and called for establishment of a ten-year UN trusteeship as a prelude to Libyan independence. By September, the Soviets were advocating immediate independence; within two months, a very close vote in the General Assembly produced the decision to grant the territory independence by the beginning of 1952. The next several years were devoted to organizing a domestic administration; the Cyrenaican leader and ally of the British, Idris, was made king of a new, federal United Kingdom of Libya.

Libya's poverty made foreign subventions of its operating budget essential, and an arrangement was soon worked out whereby the British and the United States would provide the necessary grants and pay rent for military bases on Libyan territory. Wheelus Air Force Base, outside Tripoli, was the second largest such American installation after Clark Base in the Philippines. That the Soviet interest in Libya had been in part strategic—Libya is, of course, possessed of a long Mediterranean coastline—was suggested in 1950, when Moscow unsuccessfully demanded that the United Nations request evacuation of the British and American military bases.

After Libya became independent, its admission to the United Nations was blocked by the Soviet Union in the wrangling over admission of the Soviet socialist republics. It was not until 1955 that diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Libya were established—at Libyan initiative, in an effort to persuade the Soviets to end their blockage of the country's

admission to the UN. This diplomatic maneuver was, at the time, unsuccessful, although the underlying dispute was resolved by the end of the year and Libya was admitted along with 15 other countries in December.²

Diplomatic relations remained cool throughout the 1950's. The Soviets opened an embassy in Tripoli and offered economic aid, but the Libyans chose to accept a larger American counteroffer and did not open an embassy in Moscow. The Soviets apparently viewed Libyan policy as somewhat at odds with itself, but Libya was a fairly small concern in any event. Oil was not discovered until 1959, and oil exports did not start until several years later. In March 1961 a Soviet deputy foreign minister visited Tripoli and announced the conclusion of trade agreements, but it was not until two years later that any trade was actually recorded. By 1962, Libya had finally appointed an ambassador to Moscow, and the following year Libya received shipments of machinery in exchange for exports to the USSR of wool, hides, and tobacco.

Throughout the period of the monarchy, both the Soviet Union and Libya had other, more important foreign policy priorities. For the Soviets, the prospect of growing influence in Egypt (after the 1952 revolution), in Syria (where a relatively strong communist party challenged both the republican and Ba'thist rulers), and in Iraq (where the overthrow of the monarchy in 1958 seemed to herald the coming to power of one of the most powerful communist parties in the Middle East), far outweighed the small benefits to be gained in courting a monarchy that appeared likely to meet the same fate as its Egyptian and Iraqi counterparts. For the Libyan monarchy, its origins in the Cyrenaican religious brotherhood headed by Idris, the role of British patronage in securing his accession to power at independence, and the king's staunch anti-communism—indeed, his opposition to party politics of any kind—all discouraged close ties with the Soviets. For the Soviets, Libya's long shoreline on the Mediterranean paled by comparison to Egypt's comparable Mediterranean position and control of the Suez Canal. Although by the end of the 1960's Libya's annual per capita income had risen to US\$1,500, representing considerable, dollar-denominated buying power, Egypt was still the greater prize. All this was to change, in a gradual and complex but ultimately dra-

² On the foreign policy of the monarchy, see John Wright, *Libya*; and idem, *Libya: A Modern History*, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982, esp. pp. 85, 116; Henry Serrano Villard, *Libya: The New Arab Kingdom of North Africa*, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1956; Ruth First, *Libya: The Elusive Revolution*, Baltimore, MD, Penguin Books, 1974.

matic process of realignment, following the rise to power of Qadhdhafi in Libya and of Sadat in Egypt at the close of the decade.

Nonalignment in Action

Soon after the military coup that brought Colonel (then Captain) Qadhdhafi and his fellow Free Officers to power, a member of the quickly constituted Revolutionary Command Council was quoted on the new regime's foreign policy:

With regard to foreign policy we will follow a policy of absolute neutrality without partiality towards East or West. . . . We are on the side of neither the Americans nor the Russians. Both are strangers to us and threaten the independence of the states situated on the shores of the Mediterranean. He who supports the Palestine cause is a friend to the Arabs and he who supports Israel is an enemy to them. . . . The Arabs who are sincere in working for the Palestine cause must build their relations with other states on the basis of their position on this very cause.³

Certainly, at the outset of the new regime, this represented an accurate portrayal of the government's policy. The emphasis on neutrality, and on the Palestinian issue as a litmus test of foreign policy, characterized the stance of the new Libyan government. Qadhdhafi was, particularly at this stage, a faithful follower of Nasir; indeed, he was probably more faithful to the ideals of Nasirist Arab nationalism than was Nasir himself by then. In fact, Egypt's ties with the Soviets were among the few things Qadhdhafi objected to in Nasir's policies, for they threatened to undermine the nonaligned and independent stance of the Arab world. Qadhdhafi's principal preoccupation throughout the early years was the resurrection, as he saw it, of the single Arab nation that had been carved up into numerous states during the imperial era, and the liquidation of the last vestige of imperial occupation, Israel. Although these were not positions designed to win favor with either of the superpowers, within a week of the change in regime, both the United States and the Soviet Union had recognized the new government.

In the early years of the new regime, Libyan-Soviet relations, while marked by some tensions, became considerably more cordial than they had ever been during the monarchy. During 1970 the Libyan minister of petroleum visited Moscow and a Soviet delegation returned the visit, and the first Soviet arms shipments,



Mu'ammār al-Qadhafī (foreground) and Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir (in the sport shirt) watch Egyptian military maneuvers in June 1970.

—UPI/Bettman.

in the form of tanks, arrived in Libya. In February 1972, 'Abd al-Salam Jallud, Qadhdhafi's perennial second-in-command, made the first visit by any Libyan leader to Moscow. On that occasion, in a portent of things to come, the Soviets agreed to buy the oil from British Petroleum's nationalized Sarir field, oil which was then under boycott in the West in protest against the nationalization.⁴

In addition, the Soviets could take satisfaction from the hard-line anti-imperialist stance of the new government. The American and British bases were evacuated in 1970 and replaced with Libyan national installations. The Western oil companies that provided the government's revenues were put on the defensive by the regime's willingness to confront them with positions once considered too rash, and higher oil prices were successfully negotiated in these first years of what came to be known as the First of September

³ "The Libyan Revolution in the World of Its Leaders" *The Middle East Journal*, Spring 1970, p. 212.

⁴ John Wright, *Libya: A Modern History*, pp. 147, 244.

Revolution. Finally, Western influence was lessened in a variety of more symbolic moves, including the decree that all government business be conducted in Arabic rather than in English.

Nevertheless, Qadhdhafi was insistent on putting what he viewed as Arab interests, including his own abhorrence of communism, above good relations with the Soviet Union. Thus, his anti-imperialism, however useful it might have been to the Soviets, did not put him in the Soviet camp, and he early demonstrated his willingness to be an embarrassment to all. At the outset Egypt's Arab Socialist Union was adopted as the single party for domestic Libyan political organization, and in 1971 Qadhdhafi criticized the Soviets for their support of local communist parties in the Arab world, saying that while Arab governments should attempt to collaborate with the Soviets in international affairs, they also had to root out communist activity in their own countries.⁵ Worse yet, from the Soviet standpoint, was a series of Libyan moves in 1971: Qadhdhafi denounced Soviet "imperialism" in the India-Pakistan war; strongly supported the downfall of the pro-Soviet wing of the Egyptian government under the new president, Anwar al-Sadat; and played an active role in stemming the growth of communist influence in the Sudan. Libya denounced the Soviet-Iraqi friendship treaty of 1972 and welcomed Sadat's expulsion that same year of Egypt's Soviet advisors, saying that a major barrier to Egyptian-Libyan union had been removed. By 1973, the Soviets felt compelled to denounce what they called Libya's "adventurism and extremism."⁶

Qadhdhafi's Growing Radicalism

The Arab-Israeli war of 1973 proved to be a critical turning point for the Qadhdhafi regime. During the spring before the war, Qadhdhafi had announced the launching of a "popular revolution" in Libya that would eventually lead to the imposition of the dictates of his *Green Book*, three volumes of which were published in the late 1970's. This philosophy of revolution, called the Third International Theory by its author to distinguish it from both capitalism and communism, was very simple, and in implementation, very radical. Although it borrowed from a variety of socialist and anarchist traditions, no explicitly Marxist-Leninist influence was established, and Qadhdhafi himself

claimed it as his own individual revelation. Certainly it had more in common with the "primitive communism" of Libyan tribal society than with the "advanced socialism" of Marxist-Leninist thought.⁷

Although the start of the popular revolution was timed more by domestic than by foreign policy imperatives, Qadhdhafi's disenchantment with the Arab Socialist Union was exacerbated by his growing disenchantment with all things Egyptian, particularly Sadat. The Egyptian leader's failure to consult him on plans for the October War was a profound disappointment. It seemed to confirm the weakness of Sadat's attachment to the cause of Arab unity, earlier suggested by his less than enthusiastic response to Qadhdhafi's overtures for a Libyan-Egyptian union. Sadat's subsequent willingness to participate in the negotiations mediated by US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger that led to the disengagement agreements with Israel further eroded Qadhdhafi's confidence that Sadat could be relied upon as a steadfast opponent of "American-Zionist imperialism" in the Arab world.

Qadhdhafi's unhappiness with the postwar turn of events was paralleled by Soviet dismay with growing American influence in Arab and Israeli affairs. The Soviets, already licking the wounds inflicted by Sadat's expulsion of their advisers before the war, began to see Libya as a possible strategic replacement for Egypt. Eastern-bloc countries were encouraged to buy Libyan oil at auction in January 1974, as Jallud began a swing through bloc capitals on his way to Moscow in May. That month Qadhdhafi explained the emerging Soviet-Libyan ties as based on a common interest in preventing the spread of American influence in the Middle East.⁸ During the year, the two countries signed several major technical, economic, and military trade agreements. The Soviets now replaced Egyptian military advisers in Libya; provided aid for the creation of a petroleum institute; and agreed to cooperate in the construction of a railway line, seawater desalinization plants, and other projects in energy extraction, construction, agriculture,

⁷ The philosophical affinities of the *Green Book* were regularly debated in conferences sponsored by the Qadhdhafi government, sometimes jointly with academic institutions of various sorts; see the report on one such recent meeting on "Marxisme et Livre Vert" at the Université de Paris in April 1984 in *Recherches internationales* (Paris), April-May-June 1984. In a June 1978 interview, according to one report, Qadhdhafi himself referred to Marxism as "closer to Muslims than Christianity and Judaism." "It is the Christians and Jews," he continued, "who commit genocide, and it's... the atheists who call for peace and are for the cause of liberty"; cited in Harold D. Nelson, Ed., *Libya: A Country Study*, Foreign Area Studies Series, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1979, p. 215. On Qadhdhafi's philosophical inclinations see also Marius K. Deeb and Mary Jane Deeb, *Libya Since the Revolution: Aspects of Social and Political Development*, New York, Praeger, 1982.

⁸ John K. Cooley, "The Libyan Menace," *Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC), Spring 1981, p. 86.

⁵ Interview with Qadhdhafi, August 27, 1971, cited in *The Middle East Journal*, Fall 1971, Chronology.

⁶ John K. Cooley, op. cit., pp. 83, 246.



Libyan Premier 'Abd al-Salam Jallud, left, shakes hands with his Soviet counterpart Aleksey Kosygin at the start of negotiations in the Kremlin on May 15, 1974.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

education, and oil refining. Although these projects were matched by a flurry of comparable contracts with West European countries, usually in return for long-term oil-supply contracts, the growing rapprochement with the Soviets was unmistakable.

Perhaps the most spectacular outcome of the new warmth in relations was the signing of the first major Soviet-Libyan arms agreement in 1974. During the first years of the regime, Qadhdhafi had attempted to maintain a diverse stable of arms suppliers, and France was among his principal sources. He insisted that arms transfers were little different from any other commercial transactions, and that he hoped to maintain "normal economic relations" with both superpowers; an early Soviet request for the use of the evacuated American and British bases in Libya had been denied. The value of the 1974 contract, US\$2.3 billion, was said to be almost a billion dollars higher than the total of all military purchases by the regime until that time. With this transaction the Soviet Union replaced France as Libya's principal arms supplier.⁹

The following year Soviet Premier Aleksey Kosygin visited Libya at the head of a large delegation. Reports at the time suggested that this visit included an effort—eventually unsuccessful—to patch up Libya's growing differences with Egypt and to gather support for the Soviet-backed proposal for a Geneva Peace Conference on the Arab-Israeli conflict.¹⁰ Despite these diplomatic differences, the Libyans soon after-

ward announced Soviet agreement to sell them a nuclear power plant, the first Soviet aid in the nuclear field outside the socialist bloc and Finland. Although this plant was said to be designed for peaceful power generation—and it appears that the Soviets did not in fact deliver any nuclear energy aid until 1978—concern was voiced in the West because of Qadhdhafi's simultaneous financing of Pakistani nuclear energy projects, which was thought to reflect his desire to obtain nuclear weapons. Soviet sensitivity in this area seemed indicated by the fact that only a nuclear research reactor but no power stations had gone on line by the end of 1984, and this only after Libya had ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The growing relationship with the Soviet Union combined with high spending on foreign and military affairs during a slight (and temporary) dip in oil revenues helped to produce a split in the Libyan regime in 1975. The ministers of foreign affairs and of planning were apparently foiled in attempting a palace coup against Qadhdhafi; they fled into exile to join what would soon be an important brain drain from Libya. The ministers reportedly felt that Libya's oil revenues were better spent on domestic development projects than on high-profile foreign and military activities. With their departure and the subsequent dismissal of their allies in the government, the regime lost much of what technocratic and pragmatic character it had earlier exhibited. Qadhdhafi's radical political inclinations, in both foreign and domestic policy, would henceforth be virtually unrestrained.¹¹

⁹ The Soviet request for a Libyan base is reported in John Wright, *Libya: A Modern History*, at p. 170. On Libyan arms purchases, and the quite disparate—though always large—estimates of their cost and composition, see *ibid.*; and I. William Zartman, "Arms Imports—The Libyan Experience," in US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1971–1980*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, pp. 15–20; US Department of State, Special Report No. 111, "The Libyan Problem," October 1983; and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), *World Armaments and Disarmament Yearbook*, various years. The 1984 SIPRI Yearbook, at p. 180, puts Libya just behind Syria as the second of the "twenty largest Third World major-weapon importing countries," with 9.2 percent of the total value of imports over the period 1979–83. Since Libya bankrolled much of Syria's Soviet weaponry, some of Syria's 11.8 percent should probably also be credited to Libya's account.

¹⁰ The Economist Intelligence Unit, *Quarterly Economic Review, Libya, Tunisia, Malta*, (London—hereafter *QER*), No. 2, 1975. On the development of nuclear power see *Newsweek* (New York), July 20, 1981; *Nucleonics Week* (New York), Sept. 27, 1984; and the JANA (Jamahiriyah Arab News Agency) report on plans for power stations, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Middle East and Africa* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-MEA*), Oct. 22, 1984, p. Q/2. For background on Soviet-Libyan diplomatic differences during this period, within the context of increasingly close economic and military relations, see Robert O. Freedman, *Soviet Policy in the Middle East Since 1970*, 3rd ed., New York, Praeger, 1982, pp. 162–66, 204–05, 279–80.

¹¹ On this split in the regime, see Raymond A. Hinnebusch, "Libya: Personalistic Leadership of a Populist Revolution," in I. William Zartman, Ed., *Political Elites in Arab North Africa*, New York, Longman, 1982.

During 1976, Libyan relations with the Soviets remained good on the level of technical cooperation, and Qadhafi visited Moscow in December. (Significantly, his first visit as head of state outside the Arab world had been to France, in 1974.) Nonetheless, Soviet support for the Geneva conference—which Qadhafi still opposed as likely to produce a sell-out of Palestinian interests—and encouragement of Egyptian interest in such a meeting continued to create tensions. Qadhafi was by this time completely disenchanted with Sadat, whom he viewed as a traitor to the causes of Palestine and the Arab nation.

In July 1977 the Qadhafi-Sadat war of words escalated into a border war between Egypt and Libya. The Egyptians attacked Libyan military installations in an apparent effort to discourage Libyan interference in Egyptian affairs and perhaps to spark a general uprising against the Qadhafi regime. In the event, however, Libyan patriotism evidently overrode scattered domestic unhappiness with the regime. The government had been reorganized earlier in the spring, and the country officially transformed into what Qadhafi would call the first *jamahiriyah*, or “state of the masses.” While this was not particularly popular at

home, neither did it precipitate widespread disaffection; after all, Libyan per capita income was approaching US\$8,000 per year, and most Libyans had benefited from the regime’s egalitarian distributive policies. The Libyan defense against Egypt was adequate though not impressive, despite ample warning—from the Soviets as well as from the Egyptians themselves—of Egyptian intentions. Algerian mediation of the conflict led to a cease-fire after four days during which the Egyptian air force destroyed armor, aircraft and Russian-manned radar stations in northeastern Cyrenaica. The latter, according to Sadat, had been capable of surveillance not only of Egyptian activity but also of the US Sixth Fleet and NATO installations in the Mediterranean.¹²

The battle with Egypt provided the Libyans with a rationale for further military buildup, and a new military agreement with the Soviets brought the delivery of MiG-25’s to Libya the following year. Libya was the first country to import these advanced supersonic

¹² John Wright, *Libya: A Modern History*, p. 205; Cooley, op. cit., p. 122. On the domestic uses of the oil revenues, see J. A. Allan, *Libya: The Experience of Oil*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1981.



Soviet ZSU-23-4 self-propelled anti-aircraft guns of the Libyan armed forces on display at a September 1, 1981, Revolution Day celebration in Tripoli.

fighters.¹³ Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November 1977, provoked in part by Egyptian fears that Soviet participation in a Geneva Peace Conference would ensure its failure, provided the Soviets with a rationale for supporting the rejectionist Steadfastness Front of Algeria, Iraq, South Yemen, the PLO, and Libya that was established that December in Tripoli.

Libyan-Soviet cooperation continued throughout 1978, as the second summit of the Steadfastness Front, held in Algiers in February, called for closer ties between the USSR and the Arab states. By that time Libya represented a fairly substantial military power in the Mediterranean, at least in terms of equipment. The Libyans were said to have spent US\$6 billion in oil deliveries and cash—for which they had acquired Soviet-bloc weapons including 2,000 T-54, T-55, and T-62 tanks, 1,000 armored personnel carriers, a dozen T-22 bombers, two squadrons of MiG-23 and a number of MiG-25 aircraft, as well as an impressive array of missiles and other equipment, including a fast-improving naval capability. Qadhdhafi, in an effort to lure Sadat away from the Arab-Israeli peace process, reportedly offered to put this military power at the disposal of Egypt in the event of a decisive battle with Israel. While this offer was certain to be refused, it suggested that the Soviets had not placed on the equipment delivered to Libya the sort of restrictions on transfers to third parties that are standard in Western arms transactions. Indeed, Qadhdhafi was said to have bankrolled Soviet arms deliveries to Ethiopia and Syria and to have provided much of the equipment of the Polisario guerrilla opposition to Moroccan claims in the Western Sahara.¹⁴

The military buildup in Libya during this period was matched by a marked strengthening of the domestic intelligence and security services and a stepping up of nonconventional military activity, about which somewhat less is known. The deaths of several visiting East German dignitaries in a helicopter crash in Libya in March 1978, in what appeared to be an assassination attempt against Qadhdhafi, confirmed widely held suspicions that East Germans were involved in Libya's domestic intelligence field.¹⁵ Similarly, Cuban President Fidel Castro's visit to Libya in the spring of 1977 was linked to the existence of training camps in Libya, staffed by Cubans as well as Palestinians and others, that provided instruction in guerrilla and terrorist tactics to a wide variety of revolution-



Leaders from a number of Arab states assembled in Tripoli in December 1977 to voice their opposition to Egyptian-Israeli accommodation, from left to right: Algerian President Houari Boumedienne, Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yasir Arafat, Iraqi delegation leader Taha Yasin; and Libya's Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi.

—UPI/Bettmann.

ary or ostensibly revolutionary groups throughout the world. American press reports in 1979 suggested that Soviet military advisers in Libya numbered at least 2,000, and that Czech tank crews and North Korean pilots also operated alongside Libyan military personnel. Since it was said that Libya had only 150 competent Libyan pilots for its 160 operational aircraft, and a full third of Libyan troop strength would have been required just to man the army's tanks, such foreign military personnel appeared to be a necessary adjunct to the equipment.¹⁶

During this period, and particularly after the signing of the September 1978 Camp David accords between Egypt and Israel, Qadhdhafi began to move away publicly from his earlier strict adherence to nonalignment. In part this reflected the growing ambitions of his rev-

¹³ *The Wall Street Journal*, Aug. 24, 1977; *QER*, Nos. 1 and 3, 1977.

¹⁴ *QER*, No. 2, 1978; *Jeune Afrique* (Paris), Apr. 26, 1978; Zartman, "Arms Imports...," p. 20.

¹⁵ *The New York Times*, Mar. 29, 1978.

¹⁶ *Newsweek*, July 9, 1979.

olution. Once a fairly conventional Arab nationalist, Qadhdhafi developed into an almost indiscriminate opponent of the status quo. His domestic revolution was proceeding apace with the creation of popular committees, the seizure of workplaces by workers' committees, the nationalization of all retail trade, and government control over bank accounts. The rationale for the revolution was, as he put it, "based on an international ideology, not a national movement."¹⁷ While this ideology was the Third International Theory, not communism, its author came to share with the other exponents of such revolutionary ideologies a profoundly negative assessment of the world as it is, and a willingness to use unconventional tactics to effect the changes he viewed as desirable.

Thus, while Qadhdhafi remained unenamored of the Soviet system, he found the interests of his revolution and of the Soviets converging, if only for tactical reasons. As he put it in a press interview:

My experience with the Soviet Union has not been negative. . . . The Soviet Union is a friend of ours. . . . Plus the fact that the Soviet Union is on the side of the Arabs against Israel. This we consider an anti-imperialist position . . . [Camp David would bring] increasing enmity toward the U.S. and bring the Arabs closer to the Soviet Union. But for ourselves, for us Arabs, that is a positive result. Why should we be closer to the Soviets? Because the Americans have challenged us. America is involved in a conspiracy [against the Arab world], primarily because of its policy toward Israel. In our view, anyone who stands against the Americans stands with us.

Moreover, Qadhdhafi viewed the increased American arms transfers to Egypt after its peace treaty with Israel as more likely to be used against Libya than against anyone else, and he warned that

if the Americans seek to change the balance [of power in the region] in a way that is threatening to Libya, we will be forced to seek Soviet assistance.¹⁸

¹⁷ Interview, *Time* (New York), April 9, 1979. In what may have been a move to avoid exclusive alignment with the Soviet Union during this period, Libya established diplomatic relations with China in August 1978; see Nelson, op. cit., pp. 232-33. On domestic developments in the *jamahiriyyah*, see Omar I. El-Fathaly and Monte Palmer, *Political Development and Social Change in Libya*, Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, 1980; Nathan Alexander, "Libya: The Continuous Revolution," *Middle Eastern Studies* (London), April 1981, pp. 210-27.

¹⁸ Interview with Oriana Fallaci, "The Iranians are Our Brothers," *The New York Times Magazine*, Dec. 19, 1979; *Time*, Apr. 9, 1979.

In 1980, suiting deeds to words, Libya concluded another major arms agreement with Moscow, and by then it was estimated that a full 10 percent of Soviet hard-currency earnings came from Libya.¹⁹

By that time, too, Qadhdhafi's failure to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the sacking of the US embassy in Tripoli soon after the American hostages were taken in Iran had added fuel to Washington's contention that Libya under Qadhdhafi was a dangerous force in world politics. And yet, for all of Qadhdhafi's concern about American pressure in the aftermath of the Camp David accords, he was to find that the Carter Administration was considerably more conciliatory toward Libya than its successor would prove to be.

Qadhdhafi's Increasing Isolation

By the early 1980's, the Soviet-Libyan relationship was the object of increasing concern in the United States. The likelihood that the Soviets would have access to Libyan bases and airfields in the event of a crisis in the Mediterranean was said to be worrying NATO planners. The signing in August 1981 of a defense pact joining Libya, Syria, and South Yemen, evidently designed to threaten Egypt and the Sudan, seemed to smack of Soviet influence. Certainly Moscow welcomed this treaty, publicly describing it as a step forward in relations among the signatories. The mounting evidence about Soviet and Eastern-bloc military advisers in Libya, now thought to total around 3,500, also raised the specter of a Soviet-engineered palace coup, although the Soviets reportedly warned Qadhdhafi of several coup attempts in the late 1970's and early 1980's in time for him to escape without injury. Neither the Soviets nor the Libyans did much in public to discourage speculation that theirs was a close and amicable relationship.²⁰

¹⁹ John Wright, *Libya: A Modern History*, p. 216.

²⁰ For differing assessments of the significance of Soviet-Libyan relations at the turn of the decade, see, e.g., Drew Middleton, in *The New York Times*, Mar. 1, 1981; Yossel Bodansky, "Soviet Military Presence in Libya," *Armed Forces Journal International* (Washington, DC), November 1980; Claudia Wright, "Libya and the West: Headlong into Confrontation?," *International Affairs* (London), Winter 1981-82; Ellen Laipson, "Libya and the Soviet Union: Alliance at Arm's Length," in Walter Laqueur, Ed., *The Pattern of Soviet Conduct in the Third World*, New York, Praeger, 1983; Karen Dawisha, "The Correlation of Forces and Soviet Policy in the Middle East," in Adeed Dawisha and Karen Dawisha, Eds., *The Soviet Union in the Middle East*, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1982; Nathan Alexander, "The Foreign Policy of Libya: Inflexibility and Change," *Orbis* (Philadelphia, PA), Winter 1981. On the Soviet warnings of coup attempts, see *The New York Times*, July 20, 1981.

In March 1981, Qadhdhafi visited Moscow for the second time, where he was accorded full honors and met at the airport by President Leonid Brezhnev. This visit was followed in June by that of a Libyan military delegation headed by Jallud, and in July by a port call to Tripoli of a Soviet naval task force, the first such event since Qadhdhafi came to power. In August, the United States made clear the depth of its dismay with Libyan policy when American aircraft downed two Libyan jets over the Gulf of Sirte, in waters over which Libya's claim of sovereignty was disputed.

Nevertheless, despite official American concern, some observers felt that there was less to Libya's Soviet connection than met the eye. During his visit to Moscow, Qadhdhafi insisted on praying at the closed Grand Mosque, and a senior Soviet official was reported to have remarked after his departure that "one should not forget that Colonel Qadhdhafi is a Muslim fanatic, with all that implies."²¹ The Soviets' unwillingness to embrace the Libyan leader's causes wholeheartedly was reflected in their restraint after the American downing of the Libyan aircraft, when they reported both the American and the Libyan versions of events and contented themselves with calling for Third World countries to respond to American provocations. Qadhdhafi's no less provocative request to open Libyan consulates in the Soviet Central Asian republics was denied, and it must be assumed that his advice that the Soviets withdraw from Afghanistan and let Poland "go free" met a cool reception. Jallud was no more popular in Moscow, where he was reportedly considered "a nonentity, an actor, a man who believes in nothing."²²

Soviet skepticism about Qadhdhafi was expressed not only in private estimates of his character and associates but also in Moscow's pointedly faint praise of his ideological positions. From the Soviet as well as the Libyan point of view, the convergent interests of the two countries derived from a coincidence of foreign policy postures, not from any common philosophy. Qadhdhafi had not permitted any communist party activity in Libya since the early days of his regime, and his domestic revolution was as idiosyncratic by Soviet as by Western standards. Far from constituting a "socialist-oriented" or even "progressive" regime, Qadhdhafi's Libya qualified as little more than "anti-imperialist" in the Soviet lexicon. As Brezhnev put it in his dinner speech during the Libyan

leader's 1981 visit:

*Our states differ from each other in many ways. There are also certain differences of an ideological order between us. But this does not prevent us from being good comrades and brothers in arms in the struggle for the rights and freedom of peoples, against imperialist oppression and aggression and for lasting and just peace and social progress.*²³

The superficially impressive Libyan military establishment was probably not what it seemed on paper either.²⁴ The by then 65,000 troops were poorly trained; the officers politically loyal but militarily ineffective. Only between 450 and 900 of the 2,400 tanks were thought to be operational, because of maintenance problems; and the great majority of the 450 aircraft were in mothballs, presumably awaiting either the appearance of trained Libyan pilots or a crisis that would merit their transfer elsewhere in the region. Despite Soviet training of Libyan submarine crews, Qadhdhafi had not permitted the Soviet navy to use Libyan ports regularly—even though an offshore anchorage at Salum, on the Egyptian border, was a main center of operations for the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean.

Finally, suspicions that the Soviets were coordinating Libyan terrorism remained unsubstantiated as well. The Libyan regime contributed generously to causes as disparate as the Irish Republican Army, the Italian Red Brigades, and the Lebanese Murabitun, to say nothing of various factions among the Palestinians. To be sure, the Soviets were clearly happy to reap what advantages of Libyan terrorism and support for "national liberation struggles" might accrue to them; and Cubans had joined Syrians and Palestinians in training revolutionary groups on Libyan soil. But there is no hard evidence that Tripoli and Moscow were consciously acting in concert in these endeavors, much less that Qadhdhafi was doing the Soviets' bidding. The Soviet press, to take one suggestive indicator, reported both the British and the Libyan versions of the April 1984 killing of a British policewoman and wounding of several other people during an anti-Qadhdhafi demonstration in front of the Libyan People's Bureau in London (although the Moscow media did declare that American outcries over this incident were but "preparations for another American provoca-

²¹ *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), Oct. 16, 1981.

²² Qadhdhafi is quoted in *The New York Times*, Aug. 23, 1981; the Soviet official, in Claudia Wright, loc. cit., p. 39. For Soviet reaction to the Gulf of Sirte incident, see Freedman, op. cit., pp. 411-13.

²³ Text of Brezhnev speech as reported in *Pravda* (Moscow), trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, OH—hereafter CDSP), May 27, 1981, p. 10.

²⁴ See the report by Drew Middleton in *The New York Times*, Oct. 23, 1981; also see US State Department, "The Libyan Problem," loc. cit.



The April 27, 1984, funeral of British policewoman Yvonne Fletcher, killed several days earlier when officials of Libya's People's Bureau in London opened fire on anti-Qadhdhafi demonstrators outside.

—SYGMA.

tion against the Libyan Jamahiriyyah").²⁵ For his part, Qadhdhafi's interest in combatting what he saw as the twin evils of Western imperialism and Zionism needed no encouragement from the Soviet Union. Indeed, on the latter issue, the Soviets and the Libyans evidently agreed to disagree; while both condemned the Camp David accords and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, continued Soviet support for UN Resolution 242 was never acceptable to Qadhdhafi, who insisted on nothing less than the complete dismantling of Israel.

In the meantime, several countries in Europe and North Africa expressed concern that the American confrontation with Qadhdhafi would drive him more closely into the arms of the Soviets. Qadhdhafi himself echoed this view, expressing the opinion to an American newsmagazine that "if we are involved in a

war the Soviet Union will fight on our side."²⁶ In fact, a contingent of Soviet advisers accompanied 4,000 Libyan troops into Chad in 1980. Even so, the Soviets were cautious in their reaction to Libya's involvement there, welcoming the opportunity to "restore peace to Chad," yet signaling by their failure to include it among the world's liberation struggles their lack of enthusiasm for the operation.²⁷ The confrontation with Washington, and the failure of Western Europe to follow suit in breaking off diplomatic relations with Tripoli or embargoing imports of Libyan oil, did serve Soviet purposes in dividing the Western allies. But this was

²⁵ *Newsweek*, July 20, 1981.

²⁷ *The Washington Post*, Aug. 22, 1981. For another view of Soviet policy toward Libya's role in Chad, see Robert O. Freedman, "The Soviet Reaction to the Reagan Middle East Policy: From the Inauguration to the Arab Summit at Fez," in Mark V. Kauppi and R. Craig Nation, Eds., *The Soviet Union and the Middle East in the 1980s: Opportunities, Constraints, and Dilemmas*, Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, 1983, pp. 79–80. Two years later, Soviet press commentary condemned French but not Libyan intervention in that African country; see the *Pravda* articles from mid-1983 trans. in *CDSP*, Aug. 31, 1983, p. 8, and *ibid.*, Sept. 7, 1983, p. 15.

²⁶ See the story in *Izvestiya* (Moscow), trans. in *CDSP*, May 16, 1984, p. 22. For one of the most influential works advocating the contrary view, that the Soviets are coordinating or manipulating Libyan terrorist activity, see Claire Sterling, *The Terror Network*, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981.

less a reflection of Soviet confidence in Qadhdhafi than a happy (for the Soviets) side effect of American policies—and they took full advantage of it. As the Soviet leadership told Jallud during his 1982 visit,

*We see the unity of our two countries' goals in the anti-imperialist struggle and in the noble cause of defending the freedom and independence of people as the firm basis of our relations. . . . We salute the Libyan people's courageous struggle against American imperialism. . . .*²⁸

During the early 1980's, American pressure on Qadhdhafi continued, as he was identified as one of the world's principal exponents of terrorism. Accord-

²⁸ See the story in *Pravda*, trans. in *CDSP*, June 23, 1982, p. 18. On the complaints of US allies, see *The New York Times*, Nov. 28, 1981. Similarly, *The Economist* (London) quoted the Italian defense minister on August 29, 1981, as accusing Reagan of "lighting a cigarette near a stick of dynamite." By 1983, two years after the United States embargoed oil imports from Libya, that country had become the European Community's second largest oil supplier after Saudi Arabia, replacing the United Kingdom; see *QER*, No. 4, 1983. On the tensions between US and European views of and relations with Qadhdhafi, see also *The New York Times*, Apr. 10 and Nov. 21, 1984.

ing to the Libyan foreign minister, by 1984 Libya had become

*the basic target of a prolonged campaign of military provocations and aggressions, secret operations and economic plots, and pressures by America. These are represented by the provocations carried out by the Sixth Fleet close to Libyan shores and the dirty acts of the Central Intelligence Agency, including an attempted assassination against the Leader of the Revolution [Qadhdhafi's official title] and the training of saboteurs and sending them to the country to strike at important targets and shake stability. America has through every means worked to wreck the Libyan economy by imposing a comprehensive boycott on the Jamahiriyah. . . .*²⁹

Somewhat independently of this situation, Qadhdhafi grew increasingly isolated in the Arab world and Africa as well during the 1980's. Among the Arab

²⁹ Speech by the Secretary of the People's Committee of the People's Bureau for Foreign Liaison, Ali 'Abd al-Salam al-Turayki, at the United Nations General Assembly, in *FBIS-MEA*, Oct. 3, 1984.



Libyan soldiers captured inside Chad in 1979.

countries, his support of Iran in its war with Iraq was welcomed only by Syria, and his suggestion that the Palestinians commit suicide rather than surrender to Israeli invasion forces in Lebanon during the summer of 1982 was universally considered unhelpful. Elsewhere, in much of Africa, his meddling in domestic politics—including his support for the failing regime of Idi Amin in Uganda in 1979—had infuriated many of his erstwhile friends. They made their unhappiness known when they failed to seat Qadhdhafi as chairman of the Organization for African Unity after his refusal to recognize the official government of Chad.³⁰ Soviet responses to such instances of Libyan alienation of other regional powers seem to have been quite muted, although the evidence available for making this judgment is unavoidably circumstantial or indirect. In all the various quarrels between Qadhdhafi and PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat over the past decade, for example, there is no record that Moscow did more than counsel solidarity and attempt to maintain its own neutrality. One might infer that the Soviets have less confidence in their ability to predict the interests and actions of Qadhdhafi than, say, of President Hafez al-Asad of Syria (or, *a fortiori*, President Ali Nasir Muhammad of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen). The latter are less impulsive leaders on whom Moscow might try, and even there not always successfully, to exert more pressure. In the Libyan case, there may well be little the Soviets can do to encourage solidarity and discourage bickering with their other regional clients; instead, Moscow may simply be forced to sit uneasily on the sidelines and hope not to get dragged any further into the fray. In this connection, one of the few positive recent developments, from the Libyan point of view, was the Moroccan-initiated Moroccan-Libyan unity agreement of late summer 1984. Soviet reaction to this, too, was muted. This may have reflected not only Soviet relief that Qadhdhafi's isolation was not complete, but also Moscow's own extensive and enduring commercial ties with Morocco, which have long dampened its criticism of the kingdom.

Growing isolation elsewhere contributed to Libya's increasing ties with the Eastern bloc during the early 1980's. Qadhdhafi had relatively few options; from the Soviets' point of view, closer ties between their allies

and Libya served to maintain the economic and military benefits of the relationship without committing the Soviet Union itself to too close an identification with a leader they evidently did not trust. By the 1980's Libyan oil had begun to look increasingly attractive to the East Europeans, who were having trouble obtaining adequate supplies from the Soviet Union itself; and the East-bloc markets were equally welcome to Libya at a time when a glut on the world oil market was cutting annual Libyan revenues to half their 1970's level.

Thus Libya signed treaties of friendship with North Korea and Czechoslovakia in 1982 and with Bulgaria and Romania in 1983. The terms of the treaties were not made public, although in at least one case, that of Romania, the deal was thought to include improved terms for imports of Libyan crude oil, which ran at an annual rate of three million tons. For Bulgaria, Libya provided employment for at least 9,000 of its citizens. Poland's contribution to the Libyan labor force was estimated at 14,000, said to represent a sizable gain in hard currency for Poland. Yugoslavia signed a new economic protocol with Libya in 1983, reflecting the importance of the US\$2.2 billion in Yugoslav contracts in that country.³¹ While these agreements with Eastern-bloc countries were matched by new commercial ventures with France, Italy, and other West European countries, and by Libyan efforts to develop ties with other Third World countries such as Turkey, they nonetheless provided support for the Reagan Administration's contention that Libya had slipped into the Soviet orbit.

The extent to which Soviet-Libyan relations had by now come to represent a reaction to American activity in the Middle East and Mediterranean, however, was suggested by the timing of the first joint Libyan-Soviet naval exercises in the fall of 1982, shortly after the United States had contributed its Marines and naval forces to peacekeeping in Lebanon. In mid-February 1983, reports that Libyan troops were massing near the Sudanese border brought American AWACS aircraft to Egypt and units of the Sixth Fleet to the Gulf of Sirte. The Egyptians subsequently denied that the Libyan troop movements had been unusual, and the American equipment was withdrawn by March. Still, observers in Europe speculated that it was "in response to US accusations" that Jallud visited Moscow in early March and came away with a joint declaration in principle that Libya and the USSR

³⁰ On Qadhdhafi's troubles in Africa, see *The New York Times*, June 9, 1983.

Qadhdhafi's own views of Libya's role in Africa and of the OAU debacle are expressed in an interview in *Africa Now* (London), February 1983. On Soviet-Moroccan ties, see the statement in *Pravda*, trans. in *CDSF*, Feb. 27, 1983, p. 23; and Richard B. Parker, *North Africa: Regional Tensions and Strategic Concerns*, New York, Praeger, 1984, p. 153.

³¹ *The New York Times*, Jan. 31, 1982; *Middle East Economic Digest* (London), Nov. 5, 1982; *QER*, Nos. 2 and 3, 1983.



Libyan crewmen check their Soviet-made Il-76 prior to taking off from Manaus, Brazil, on April 24, 1983, after Brazilian authorities had confiscated arms and ammunition aboard bound for Nicaragua.

—UPI/Bettmann.

would sign a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.³² In March 1984, TASS reported that Libya had become the USSR's main trading partner in the Arab world, as the value of trade had risen 160 percent from 1981 levels to US\$1.7 billion a year.³³

Costs and Benefits of Soviet-Libyan Ties

The agreement to sign a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation remained a dead letter through 1984, and may well have represented the high point of formal political Libyan-Soviet relations under Qadhdhafi. The Soviets remained understandably skeptical about

Qadhdhafi's reliability. The fact that he faced growing opposition both at home and abroad in the mid-1980's could not have eased their fears that too close an identification might jeopardize their larger purposes. Qadhdhafi's was an idiosyncratic revolution, and, unlike Nasir's earlier nationalist revolution, it was unconstrained by pragmatic considerations of national interest, particularly after the 1975 split in the regime. The Soviet interests in Libya, by contrast, were above all pragmatic: their strategic concern with the Mediterranean, their political rivalry with the United States, and their commercial interest in hard-currency earnings all contributed to the development of relations with a leader for whose ideological inclinations Moscow had nothing but contempt. From the Soviet point of view, as from that of most other governments, Qadhdhafi was something of a wild horse, and those who attempted to ride his revolution had to be very careful.

What made the relationship particularly difficult for the Soviets was that this role as the world's maverick

³² QER, No. 3, 1983.

³³ Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter FBIS-SOV), Mar. 23, 1984, pp. H/8-9. For examples of Soviet involvement in the Libyan economy during this period, see Colin Legum, Ed., *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents 1982-1983*, New York, Holmes & Meier, 1984, p. A/162.

was one Qadhdhafi clearly enjoyed. His ability to manipulate and to embarrass the superpowers seemed to demonstrate, at least in the short run (which was the run about which Qadhdhafi cared most), the power of his country and his revolution. His use of his country's only resources—its geostrategic position and its oil wealth—to attract suitors from around the world was shrewd, though its effectiveness led him (and many other observers) to an exaggerated view of the country's importance. And yet, far from providing a stable staging point for Soviet penetration of sub-Saharan Africa or for Soviet influence in the western Maghrib, Qadhdhafi's penchant for alienating friends and neighbors alike made him a slim reed indeed on which to rely for access to other countries. By the 1980's, all of Libya's neighbors and a good many countries further afield were on the alert for Libyan mischief—something with which the Soviets neither wanted nor needed to be associated.

Over the longer term, the Soviets are likely to have gotten the better of their relationship with Libya, although even this will not necessarily constitute a substantial gain. Eastern-bloc aid, particularly in the sphere of domestic security, has probably afforded Qadhdhafi a few more years in power than he would otherwise have enjoyed—but continued Western commercial traffic, in providing the financial wherewithal for the revolution, must be counted as at least as important in this outcome. The military equipment Qadhdhafi has bought from the Soviets was unlikely to benefit Libya or Libya's causes in any tangible way, certainly not in any way proportional to its cost. Indeed, since Libyan oil is not inexhaustible—and some estimates put the end of Libyan exports as early as the turn of the century—the opportunity cost of the arms purchases, like that of the “export of the revolution” generally, is likely to prove extremely high. This was, in fact, among the principal complaints of the technocrats who make up the core of the exiled opposition to Qadhdhafi in the mid-1980's.³⁴

The Soviets, on the other hand, have profited handsomely from their military sales (although it is worth keeping in mind that the Soviet-Libyan arms trade was estimated to amount to only one-quarter the value of American arms sales to Saudi Arabia since 1975).³⁵

The weapons themselves were unlikely to serve as some sort of Soviet “strategic stockpile,” since most of them went out of service soon after arrival in Libya for want of proper maintenance or qualified operators. Libya was also a buyer and supplier of small arms and other equipment of Soviet manufacture to various radical groups, and a financier of some of the military acquisitions of Third World Soviet allies, but most of Libya's money was spent on equipment that stayed on Libyan soil, enhancing little more than Qadhdhafi's self-image. The Soviets have, in addition, profited at second hand from Qadhdhafi's support of radical groups throughout the world, both because instability and opposition to the status quo in the Third World generally worked to their benefit, and because such operations diverted the attention and resources of the West from direct Soviet activity. The Soviets have also, of course, had the pleasure of seeing the NATO allies bickering over whether Qadhdhafi represented a genuine danger in the world. Finally, Qadhdhafi's declining reputation in radical circles in the 1980's may have provided opportunities for other more reliable backers, including the Soviets and their allies, to step in after the work of mobilizing a constituency had been done.

Since the Soviets have carefully avoided investing much political or economic capital in Libya through the 1970's (in contrast, for example, to South Yemen or even to Nasir's Egypt), choosing instead to go along for the ride while Qadhdhafi was going their way, it is not clear how seriously they take Libya's geostrategic position. It is evident that they have long harbored a desire for secure access to Mediterranean ports. Their early interest in Libya, however, may have reflected merely the political inaccessibility of the more attractive French North Africa and British-influenced Egypt in the immediate postwar period. Certainly the Soviets' pursuit of relations with Libya under the monarchy was less than ardent, and their eyes seem always to have been focused on greater prizes in Egypt or in the western Maghrib. More recently, Moscow has conceivably viewed Libya's declining oil revenues in the 1980's as an opportunity to establish what one TASS economic analyst termed “a stable structure of economic links”³⁶ from which Libya would eventually be hard put to escape. The increased non-military commercial links between Libya and the Eastern bloc during the second decade of Qadhdhafi's regime suggested that the Soviets were not unhappy with the prospect of Libya's growing dependence on

³⁴ On recent opposition to Qadhdhafi, see the *Newsletter of the National Front for the Salvation of Libya* and that organization's magazine, *al-Inqadh*. Also see Eric Rouleau's reports in *Le Monde* (Paris), May 10 and 11, 1984. For projections of future Libyan oil production, see Paul Barker and Keith McLachlan, “Development of the Libyan Oil Industry,” in J. A. Allan, Ed., *Libya Since Independence*, New York, St. Martin's, 1982.

³⁵ Laipson, loc. cit., p. 143.

³⁶ TASS, in *FBIS-SOV*, Mar. 23, 1984, pp. H/8-9.

Eastern markets caused by the international oil glut and, at the margin, by the American embargo on Libyan imports. After all, Qadhdhafi's successor may be more inclined to trim his political sails to reflect the country's economic and military dependence. Still, ever since World War II, Libya appears to have represented for the Soviets little more than a pale substitute for its larger and more attractive neighbors. Barring the prospect of renewed influence in Egypt or increased ties with the western Maghrib, friendly Soviet relations with Libya are preferable to no political presence on the southern shores of the Mediterranean at all. And given the upheavals likely in North Africa in the next several decades, with the eventual passing of Bourguiba in Tunisia and the possibility of increasing instability in Morocco, there was little point, from the Soviet perspective, in becoming too heavily committed to Libya—where the domestic economy was in shambles, the population a mere three million, and most of the country desert—when much more attractive targets were likely to present themselves.

Libya thus exemplifies the case of a small, not particularly important Third World country becoming associated with a superpower less as a result of ideological affinity than of the interaction of regional power shifts and global superpower rivalries. The decline of nonaligned nationalism in the Arab world after Nasir's death in 1970 left Qadhdhafi adrift, without a solid network of regional allies and increasingly disenchanted with the leader of the one country—Sadat

of Egypt—to which he had always expected Libya to look. This was a disenchantment Qadhdhafi shared, for very different reasons, with the Soviets, who likewise found themselves forced to seek other outposts in the Arab world. Libya's wealth and geostrategic position are not inconsiderable, but neither are they so valuable as to outweigh the attractions of other regional powers, notably Egypt itself. The US and the USSR would therefore probably agree that it was the former who came out ahead in the "trade" of local allies in Libya and Egypt that took place between 1969 and 1975.

This was so not just because of Egypt's greater size—with a population 15 times that of Libya—and weight in the Arab world, but also because Qadhdhafi proved so independent of Soviet direction as to be unreliable and even embarrassing. Indeed, as with their repeated if apparently half-hearted condemnations of the French role in Chad, the Soviets sometimes found themselves compelled to rationalize Qadhdhafi's behavior as "anti-imperialist" long after it had become something of a nuisance. The Reagan Administration's confrontation with Qadhdhafi proved to be as much a curse as a blessing for the Soviets, for it contributed to cementing a relationship in which they were reluctant partners. Naturally, Moscow tried to make the best of an awkward situation; but it does seem that the Soviet Union is no more adept at avoiding encumbering ties with philosophically incompatible Third World regimes than are any other powers.

United Front Strategy and Soviet Foreign Policy

Herbert J. Ellison

Historically, the united front strategy has played a central role in Soviet efforts to extend communist revolution. Lenin first built a broad alliance at home to oppose Russia's autocracy before the 1905 Revolution, used it again in 1917, then revived it in 1921 when the revolutionary ferment born of the war had subsided. He encouraged socialists abroad to plan and execute revolution based on the Soviet model, but he understood the limits of revolutionary action. His famous article "Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder" was directed precisely against those communists who wished to continue revolutionary action when revolutionary opportunities had waned. The task of the moment was to broaden the base of communist support and influence, which could only be done in alliances with the leaderships of noncommunist workers' parties, trade unions, and so forth (united front from above) and by efforts to win the acceptance or even the adherence of these organizations' followers (united front from below). Where possible—that is, where legal—the communists were also to form political parties and seek representation in legislatures and other political bodies.

Some six decades have passed since Lenin's death. Yet, his united front strategy remains an integral part

of the Soviet Union's efforts to extend communism. Perhaps the clearest recent indication of a continuing Soviet commitment to such a strategy is the steady stream of books and brochures on world revolution published under the auspices of the International Department (ID) of the CPSU Central Committee and related organizations. Most notable among these works is the *World Communist Movement* by ID deputy chief Vadim Zagladin, an excellent compendium of Soviet analysis and positions on major issues in contemporary international affairs. The book begins with "the world revolutionary process," describes the international communist movement and the "countries of real socialism," outlines the "peace movement," and then concentrates on social classes and categories of countries (developed capitalist countries, countries with a middle level of capitalist development, and emergent Asian and African countries). The concluding chapters deal with questions of party organization and problems of the unity of the communist movement.¹ The most telling prescription of

Herbert J. Ellison is Secretary of the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies (Washington, DC) and a Professor of Russian History at the University of Washington (Seattle). He is author of a number of works and editor of The Sino-Soviet Conflict: A Global Perspective (1981) and Soviet Policy Toward Western Europe: Implications for the Atlantic Alliance (1983). The author would like to acknowledge the important contribution of Robert H. Getz, a former Kennan Institute intern, to the research for this article.

¹ See V. V. Zagladin, *Mirovoye kommunisticheskoye dvizheniye* (World Communist Movement), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literatury, 1982. Reference throughout this article is to the English translation published by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (Washington, DC), JPRS No. UPS-84-034-L, Aug. 29, 1984. It is both interesting and useful to follow the more concrete application of policy recommendations on specific questions in the other publications of the International Department and related organizations. Among the most important are *Problems of Peace and Socialism* (monthly) and *Information Bulletin* (twice monthly), both published in numerous languages and headquartered in Prague. Among the many books and brochures dealing with international affairs and presenting the viewpoint endorsed by the Soviets, much in the fashion of the publications of the old Communist International or Communist Information Bureau, are several works by Zagladin, including *The Soviet Peace Philosophy*, Moscow, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1981; *Marksizm-Leninizm. Yedinoye internatsional'noye ucheniye kommunistov vseh stran* (Marxism-Leninism. The Sole International Theory of Communists of All Countries), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo "Znaniye," 1980; and *Europe and the Communists*, Moscow, (continued on p. 46)



Willy Brandt, center, chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Germany and of the Socialist International, during a May 1985 visit to Moscow; to his left is Boris Ponomarev, Candidate Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), and to his right Vadim Zagladin, member of the Central Committee and First Deputy Director of its International Department.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

Zagladin's authoritative work is his stress on the need for communists in developed capitalist societies to enlist social democrats in the "struggle" for the adoption of a series of institutional changes that would ultimately weaken the "bourgeois" state's capacity to resist socialist revolution.²

It is striking, given such open evidence, that Western specialists on Soviet foreign policy and the world communist movement have paid little attention

to the ID and its subsidiary organizations.³ Though much attention has been given in recent years to Eurocommunism, and to communist revolution in the Third World, much less has been devoted to the specific examination of Soviet policy toward both or to the

Progress Publishers, 1977, a book in his specialty which he edited. The ID also works closely with the Institute of the International Workers' Movement, which has put its imprimatur on a variety of books on workers' issues, including one coauthored by Zagladin—V. V. Zagladin, A. A. Galkin, and T. T. Timofeyev, *Rabochiy klass—vedushchaya sila mirovogo revolyutsionnogo protsesssa* (The Working Class—the Leading Force of the World Revolutionary Process), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literatury, 1973.

² Zagladin, *World Communist Movement*, p. 282.

³ One recent notable exception is Robert W. Kitrinos, "International Department of the CPSU," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September-October 1984, pp. 47-67. Also Radio Liberty Research Department has produced some very important materials on the ID in its *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin* (Munich). See, e.g., Elizabeth Teague, "The Foreign Departments of the Central Committee of the CPSU," Oct. 27, 1980, Supplement; and Alexander Rahr, "The Central Committee Secretariat," RL 439-84, Nov. 16, 1984, and "The Apparatus of the Central Committee of the CPSU," RL 21-85, Jan. 22, 1985. Leonard Schapiro was the first to draw attention to the ID in his "The International Department of the CPSU: Key to Soviet Policy," *International Journal* (Toronto), Winter 1976-77, pp. 41-55. Other studies include Jerry F. Hough, "Soviet Policymaking Toward Foreign Communists," *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Los Angeles), Autumn 1982, pp. 167-83; and Wallace H. Spaulding, "The Communist Movement and Its Allies," in Ralph Goldman, Ed., *Transnational Parties*, New York, University Press of America, 1983, pp. 25-60.

way in which the administration and content of policy toward world communism relate to the overall structure of Soviet foreign policy. This may be due in part to a pervasive feeling among Western analysts that nongoverning foreign communist parties are merely instruments of Soviet state interests. It may also reflect a suspicion among many analysts that a world communist movement no longer exists. Both interpretations, however, ignore the central tenet of CPSU foreign policy, namely that the policy of the Soviet state, as defined by the party, is the extension of communist revolution, and that the foreign communist parties are partners—often awkward and recalcitrant partners—in that process.⁴ What has changed, and particularly rapidly in the past two decades, is the nature of the partnership.

Clearly there is no longer a “single” world communist movement. There is, to be sure, “a common residue of ideology [that] makes it possible to attempt a meaningful discussion of the activities of ‘communists’ in world politics.”⁵ But the movement as a whole is not united; neither are its parts. Indeed, there is now strong emphasis on the autonomy of individual parties, even among parties firmly associated with the Soviet Union. Yet, such autonomy is not incompatible with a considerable degree of unity of the movement. This essay examines the CPSU’s efforts to continue its general leadership of the communist movement, and as part of those efforts, to integrate the communist parties of the advanced industrial world into the Soviets’ plans for world revolution. The general themes remain: the continued buildup of Soviet military power and the constant emphasis on changing the “correlation of forces”; the peace campaign with the portrayal of the United States (“imperialism”) as the chief threat to peace; the effort to separate the United States from the industrial states in Europe and Japan; and the effort, as well as the coordinating purpose of the whole enterprise, to find the mix of general foreign policy and revolutionary strategy that can achieve communist revolution, either by the ballot box or by violent means, depending on local circumstances.

The complex task of providing coordinated policies that would unite a like-minded but not monolithic communist movement behind this mission falls to the International Department. This essay traces the evolution of the CPSU’s united front strategy in deal-

ing with nongoverning communist parties, especially the major parties in the industrialized countries of Western Europe and Japan. Its purpose is twofold: to follow the development of Soviet direction of political strategy and tactics through official analysis and policy, mainly since the early 1970’s; and to explore the nature and use of the instruments of coordination designed to maintain unity under Soviet leadership within the movement. CPSU involvement with the Eurocommunist parties is a particular focus because those parties have often severely tested the unity of the Soviet-led party group. Before one can understand current Soviet policy, however, it is useful to look briefly at the evolution of inter-party relations between the Soviet Union and its communist allies.

Lessons of Soviet History

One of the works of the early Soviet artist, Vladimir Tatlin, was a model of a skyscraper construction to honor the Third (communist) International (Comintern). The extraordinary innovative modernism of the design could be taken as a metaphor for the vitality of the early revolutionary enthusiasm. The theme—the Third International—symbolized the universalist aspirations of the Bolshevik Revolution. Just as 15th-century ecclesiastics had proclaimed Muscovy’s succession to heretical Rome and Byzantium as the “Third Rome”—the lone preserver and advocate of the true Orthodox Christian faith—so the new Soviet Russia had rescued the socialist faith from the revisionist Second International and reaffirmed a true socialist/communist orthodoxy as the ideology of a world revolutionary movement to which the resources of the new Soviet state would be dedicated.

There was no question of Lenin’s commitment to the spread of communist revolution. Even during the early months of Bolshevik rule, before Bolshevik power had been secured in Russia proper, he worked to extend the revolution abroad, believing that successful revolution in Europe, especially in Germany, was essential to the survival of his own minority regime. The new Red Army was used not only to fight the Whites, but also to overturn, or attempt to overturn, autonomous national regimes that had cropped up in the borderlands of the former empire following the collapse of the autocracy.⁶ The limits to the west-

⁴ I refer here, of course, to the parties that recognize the Soviet leadership of the movement.

⁵ Hugh Seton-Watson, *The Imperialist Revolutionaries: Trends in World Communism in the 1960s and 1970s*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1978, p. 6.

⁶ The military conquest and “Bolshevization” of the non-Russian borderlands by the Red Army was in many ways the prototype of the conquest and Sovietization of Eastern Europe during and after World War II.

ward expansion of revolution were set by nationalist military resistance with varying degrees of foreign support (German and French) in Finland, the Baltic States, and Poland, or by failure or overturn of revolution beyond the reach of the Red Army as in Hungary and Germany.

Two central events of the early years of Soviet power are particularly revealing about the attitude of the Soviet leadership toward the spread of communist revolution. The first is the debate in early 1918 over the Brest-Litovsk treaty with Germany in which an influential segment of the Bolshevik leadership argued for all-out revolutionary war against the Central Powers, combined with an appeal to the internal revolutionary forces in their societies. Ever the realist, Lenin recognized that even humiliating and painful territorial concessions to Germany were preferable to a futile and romantic revolutionary gesture that could lead to the overturn of his still-frail regime. The event reveals both the powerful universalist revolutionary utopianism that still inspired Bolshevism and the disciplined calculation that was the essence of Leninist strategy.

The second event is the debate over the political structure of the new state that led to the formation of the Soviet Union. For many leaders, such as Trotsky, it was unnecessary even to identify national units within the new internationalist workers' state, while for others, in particular Lenin and Stalin, a concession to national feelings and identity provided practical advantages so long as a unitary political structure and doctrine undergirded it. Stalin termed this formula "national in form, socialist in content." Thus, when non-Russian leaders in the borderlands challenged the universality of the Soviet model, advocating the acceptance of national varieties of communism, they were firmly crushed.

It is worth remembering that the early Russian communist leaders saw the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as an indefinitely expandable union of communist states, and that Stalin had dictated, following unpleasant experiences with Ukrainian and other national communisms in the 1920's, a rigorous subordination of republican party leaderships to Russian power and to the Russian communist model. It is hardly surprising, then, that he took the same attitudes with him when he began to restructure the postwar order in Eastern Europe, or that he treated communist parties abroad, before and after the abolition of the Comintern in 1943, as subordinates and dependents.

In the years between the two world wars Lenin, and then Stalin, used the Comintern and its Executive

Committee as the organizational instrument of Soviet power over world communism. The Soviets controlled the deciding vote at regular Comintern congresses, and between congresses had firm control of the Executive Committee headquartered in Moscow, periodically purging party leaderships abroad to assure obedience.⁷ Lenin required organizational and ideological conformity to the Russian model, both for non-Russian communists inside the Soviet Union and for foreign communist parties. Stalin used brutal power to compel those parties to accept the strategies of Moscow, even when such strategies were plainly suicidal.

There is an impressive continuity of Leninist ideology in the Soviet approach to party organization and revolution. The essence of Lenin's position was to affirm the primacy of revolutionary power. A true Bolshevik (later communist) party, he stressed, must repudiate without qualification the program and organization of the mass socialist parties, which sought the parliamentary road to power and worked within democratic mass party and labor organizations to that end. For Lenin, such "revisionism" betrayed the revolutionary mission of the party. Parliamentarism and piecemeal reform, he felt, would dissolve revolutionary fervor. Hence, he insisted upon a small, centralized, and authoritarian (later called "democratic centralist") party organization and a firm ideological commitment to revolutionary socialism, which to him meant the pursuit of monopoly political power.

Such were the views that not only split Russian social democracy into its Menshevik and Bolshevik wings, and subsequently justified the Bolshevik seizure and monopoly of power in October 1917, but also split the European socialist movements in 1920–21. Indeed, when forming the Communist International only those parties that recognized the Bolshevik organizational and ideological model were accepted as members.⁸ This forced foreign communist parties, like their Bolshevik model, to sever all ties with a "revisionist" socialism that advocated reform

⁷ The American communist leader Jay Lovestone had an experience like that of many others: resistance to Kremlin policy dictates from a presumed position of strength in his party followed by the appearance of a Comintern representative who used his power to reduce Lovestone's majority following to a tiny fraction. See Bertram D. Wolfe, "Comintern—The Early Years: The Sixth Congress and the American CP," *Survey* (London), Winter 1979, pp. 157–73. And in the case of the Polish party in the 1930's, its refugee leadership in Russia was either killed or imprisoned by Stalin and its organization summarily disbanded. See M. K. Dziewanowski, *The Communist Party of Poland: An Outline of History*, 2nd ed., Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1976, pp. 146–54.

⁸ Hugh Seton-Watson, *From Lenin to Khrushchev: The History of World Communism*, 2nd ed., New York, Praeger, 1960, pp. 73–77. See also Franz Borkenau, *World Communism: A History of the Communist International*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1st pbk. ed., 1962, pp. 182–207.

in place of revolution, democratic party organization, and parliamentary power-sharing.

The splitting of the socialist parties of Europe and North America by insisting on the Twenty-One Conditions of Membership in the Comintern formalized the developing break between communism and democratic socialism, which has been a central feature of world politics since that time. The split was accomplished with much difficulty, and was bitterly resisted even by many left socialists who admired the Bolshevik Revolution and devoutly wished to work within the Comintern. But for Lenin it served an indispensable purpose. It created the centralized, authoritarian party structure that could resist ideological revision and remain firmly committed to his brand of revolutionism.

Once the split was accomplished Lenin and his Russian/Soviet successors could operate as opportunistically as they wished in dealing with foreign socialist parties. Communists abroad could be told, by turns, either to form alliances *with* socialists or to form alliances *against* them. This established the doctrine that socialists were "bourgeois reformists" and, at the extreme (to borrow Stalin's formula), proto-fascists. In those countries where communists came to power, such a view could easily justify the forcible destruction of socialist parties and their leaderships, as was the case in Eastern Europe after World War II.⁹

The Recent Context

World War II provided an opportunity for a vast extension of the area of communist power and the number of communist states. Politically, the Soviet Union made considerable gains, impressively orchestrating the strategy and tactics of the communists in wartime resistance movements in Axis-occupied areas of Europe and Asia, albeit without a formal Comintern apparatus.¹⁰ Militarily, the Soviet Union

rose from a position of weakness and vulnerability vis-à-vis its powerful neighbors, east and west, to a position of enormous power in Eurasia. The bright picture was marred only by the challenge of a great and increasingly hostile American power, and a growing network of American regional alliances whose purpose was to contain the outward thrust of Soviet power and of communism. By the early 1950's, the communist drive had been more or less contained, and following confirmation of Stalin's successors a major shift of foreign policy, for both the CPSU and the communist parties abroad, was in the making.¹¹

But now the revolutionary task could not be undertaken, so far as the foreign parties were concerned, with the same unity and discipline that had marked the Comintern era. The experience with Yugoslavia had revealed the difficulty of controlling a strong-willed and independent governing party leadership, and as the results of the era of Stalinist policies in Eastern Europe emerged, it was also clear that rumblings of popular revolt against the new communist power gave even formerly docile East European communist leaderships, not to mention Western party leaders, new courage to challenge Soviet policy. The Chinese party had just won its revolutionary victory, but by 1956, as Khrushchev unveiled his anti-Stalin policies, and in the later 1950's as he expanded the application of the policy of peaceful coexistence in relations with the United States, Soviet-Chinese policy conflicts revealed the great differences in world communism resulting from the advent of a new communist major power.

Soviet leaders did not adjust easily to these changes. The habit of commanding the movement was firmly entrenched. As they saw it, in the effort to expand communist revolution, it was still the Soviet Union's responsibility to serve as coordinator and senior commander. Moreover, no other communist state or power (though Mao Zedong was developing such ambitions) could influence world events on behalf of the movement as a whole, or had the tradition and experience of guiding the collective revolutionary enterprise. Thus, in the eyes of the leaders in the Kremlin, the Soviet Union, through its theoretical and policy pronouncements, would continue to present the authoritative global political analysis and formulate the appropriate strategy and tactics for the current period. As in the past, the larger interest might require a foreign party, ruling or nonruling, to post-

⁹ It is interesting to note that the only explicit reconsideration of the attitude toward socialist parties by ruling communist parties has come in communist countries in the midst of destabilizing reform or revolution: Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. In fact, Imre Nagy had actually restored the Hungarian Socialist party before Soviet military intervention. In the Czech case, the party leadership, under Soviet pressure, specifically promised shortly before the invasion not to permit restoration of the Social Democratic Party. See Jiri Valenta, *Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia: Anatomy of a Decision*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979, p. 82.

¹⁰ The Comintern, or Third (Communist) International, was founded in Moscow in March 1919 and disbanded in May 1943. After the war, following the deterioration of relations with the Western powers and the beginning of the Sovietization of Eastern Europe, a founding conference of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) was held secretly in Poland in September 1947. It included the seven ruling communist parties, as well as the French and Italian parties. The Cominform was disbanded in April 1956.

¹¹ Alvin Z. Rubenstein, *Soviet Foreign Policy since World War II: Imperial and Global*, Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1981, pp. 72-73, 95-96, and 145-65.

pone or sacrifice immediate advantage—even revolutionary opportunity—for the larger objective.

Viewed broadly, the more than three decades since the death of Stalin reveal a continuity of themes in Soviet policy. The central focus and preoccupation has been to expand Soviet economic and military power vis-à-vis the United States and its allies. This has resulted in a sustained emphasis upon military power and a constant effort to dismantle or weaken American alliances in Europe and Asia. By the mid-1970's, the Soviets had attained military superiority in Europe and Asia, and the logistical capacity (air and seapower) to extend that power far beyond Eurasia in support of revolutionary interests. The problem was to avoid alarming the opposition as that process progressed, and the themes of united front and peaceful coexistence provided the chief policy line for that purpose.

The main problem within the movement was how to maintain foreign communists' commitment to the Soviet vision and policy, and that proved immensely difficult. Both Chinese and West European party leaders, in quite different ways, challenged Soviet policy leadership. Particularly troubling was the emerging popularity in the 1950's and 1960's of a Maoist brand of left communism—an eagerness to confront the US "paper tiger" and to support revolution abroad by all means, a mood shared by the new communist leadership in Cuba.¹² And as the Sino-Soviet conflict sharpened, threatening actual military confrontation, the Chinese became increasingly aware of the menace to themselves of the massively expanding Soviet military power that could be used for something other than the sword of the collective revolutionary enterprise.¹³

The position of West European communist parties was rather different. The continuing revolutions against Soviet-style communism—especially in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Afghanistan—raised doubts for many about the validity of the Soviet model, and also demonstrated Soviet power and will to enforce that model.¹⁴ For some communist leaders, that power posed a potential long-term danger to themselves, not to mention a formidable obstacle to internal, independent communist reform



Participants at an anti-NATO demonstration in Bonn in June 1982 bear signs reading: "Budget for Social, Not Arms Expenditures" and "Our No to the Bomb Is a Yes for Democracy."

—Poly-Press from Katherine Young.

in Eastern Europe. And the whole ugly process of Soviet invasions bringing "fraternal aid" had enormously negative political consequences for West European communists internally as they sought to validate their credentials as reliable national political parties with an independent, progressive role.

Yet, there is another side of Soviet policy, emerging first as peaceful coexistence and then as détente, that has helped to soften the general image of the Soviet Union in the eyes of the West European public. The Soviets' coordinating slogan is peace, democracy, and socialism. But like so much of the vocab-

¹² For a discussion of the Chinese policy, see Richard Wich, *Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics: A Study of Political Change and Communication*, Cambridge, Harvard University Council on East Asian Studies, 1980. For a perspective on Cuban policy, see Martin Weinstein, *Revolutionary Cuba in the World Arena*, Philadelphia, Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1979, pp. 3-4.

¹³ Jonathan D. Pollack, "China's Agonizing Reappraisal," in Herbert J. Ellison, Ed., *The Sino-Soviet Conflict: A Global Perspective*, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1982, p. 70.

¹⁴ The invasion of Czechoslovakia had a great impact on the Italian and Spanish parties, with the Italian party making its first public criticism of Soviet foreign policy at the time. See Anna Maria Gentili and Angelo Pianbianco, "The PCI and International Relations, 1945-1975: The Politics of Accommodation," in Simon Serfaty and Lawrence Gray, Eds., *The Italian Communist Party Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow*, Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1980, p. 113. Like Italian party leaders, the Spanish leadership was unrestrained in its praise for Czech reforms and bitter in its denunciation of the Soviet invasion. The Spanish and Italian parties both also denounced martial law in Poland in December 1981. See Eusebio Mujal-Leon, *Communism and Political Change in Spain*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1983, pp. 107-09 and 217. For other analyses of the relationship between events in Eastern Europe and Soviet-West European party-to-party relations, see Jiri Valenta, "Eurocommunism and Czechoslovakia," and Paul R. Milch, "Eurocommunism and Hungary," both in Vernon V. Aspaturian et al., Eds., *Eurocommunism between East and West*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1980.

ulary of communist propaganda, these words have different, more complex meanings for Soviet users than for Western auditors. For the Soviets, peace means avoidance of general war, utilization of wars of national liberation, and constant pursuit of superior military power not so that war can be undertaken but so that such superiority can be translated into bloodless victories. It also means trying to block Western responses to major increments in Soviet power (as in the confrontation over Euromissiles), and a continuing effort to detach the United States from defensive alliances with Western Europe and Japan. Democracy means maintaining constant pressure to implement policies aimed at dismantling the structures within bourgeois states that enable them to defend themselves; and socialism means the socialist revolution. To the International Department falls the formidable task of winning acceptance for these ideas, which it must attain by providing ideological and policy leadership for nongoverning parties, maintaining inter-party unity, and integrating these activities into the broader structure of Soviet foreign policy.

Soviet Policy for the 1980's

The conventional wisdom in much of Western commentary is that the Soviets have finally abandoned hope of revolution in advanced industrial countries and that the parties there are seen chiefly as instruments of Soviet foreign policy. A closer look at Soviet policy recommendations to the Western parties, in particular concerning the role of political alliances with parties on the left, suggests quite a different conclusion about Soviet assessments of revolutionary prospects and revolutionary strategy.

Present Soviet policy seems overwhelmingly dominated by the theme of "peace." But along with that policy, for which every effort is made to mobilize the support of the foreign communist parties, there is much attention to evaluation of the recent political experience of the European parties and ways of improving their political prospects. Critical to this evaluation is the Soviets' current analysis of conditions in the developed capitalist countries, which stresses the importance of revolutionary opportunities in "a most important sector of the world front of the class struggle."¹⁵ Though the analysis emphasizes a "crisis of monopoly capitalism" that neither managerial improvements nor new technology can overcome, it takes sober note of the fact that "all the necessary objective prerequisites of socialist revolutions have not yet taken shape."¹⁶ Strong leadership by a bour-

geoisie given to violent and oppressive methods, the continued "treachery" of reformist socialists, and the persistence of "strong bourgeois-democratic and parliamentary prejudices" mean that revolution will be deferred for some time.

Much attention focuses on the question of finding a communist "way out (of the crisis) which would open the way to the socialist transformation of society."¹⁷ Emphasis is on the latter phrase, and communists are warned not "to manage the capitalists' crisis," that is, not to support remedies or reforms that have the potential to turn crisis into a new stability. Hence, one should identify the key problems that the crisis poses for the worker—unemployment and inflation—and propose only those remedies that serve the goal of "socialist transformation": the fight for a guaranteed right to work, the "defense of existing jobs and the creation of new jobs," the opposition to plant closures or mass dismissals (including the holding of "mass protests"), and the reduction of the work week with retention of full earnings.¹⁸ Such measures put the whole burden on the employer and greatly increase the role and responsibility of the state, thus simultaneously nudging the society toward "socialist transformation" and deepening the economic crisis.¹⁹

Another particularly vulnerable area earmarked for attack is ecology. The opening phraseology on environmental questions—"the problem of the mutual relationship of man and the environment"—is familiar in East and West. It is acknowledged that these problems "trouble peoples of all countries, irrespective of their social system." But in capitalist countries, "owing to the predatory sway of the monopolies, this problem has become acutely social and has assumed the nature of a genuine crisis." And indeed the capitalist countries ravage not only their own environ-

¹⁵ Zagladin, *World Communist Movement*, p. 255. There is a very informative analysis of the background to the change in the Soviet view on the prospects for revolution in the industrial countries, especially from mid-1974, in the article by Joan Urban, "Contemporary Soviet Perspectives on Revolution in the West," *Orbis* (Philadelphia), Winter 1976, pp. 1359-1402, esp. pp. 1400-02.

¹⁶ Zagladin, *World Communist Movement*, p. 259.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 277.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Zagladin identifies other areas of interest as well. For example, the "struggle for the implementation of anti-inflationary measures" consists of indexed wages and "strict public control" of prices, neither of them historically effective in controlling inflation, but both offered as evidence that communists "are not forgetting about the future" or about finding "a way out of the crisis which would make it possible to move toward the ultimate goal" (*ibid.*, p. 278). The familiar bugbear—the multinational corporation—receives harsh but brief attention; they aim to "increase the exploitation of the working class . . . and are increasing unemployment and inflation." As they also support "right wing and avowedly neofascist forces" and spur the arms race, one must organize a common program of the workers against "these giant octopuses" (*ibid.*, p. 279).



The Communist-dominated General Labor Confederation (CGT) and the local unit of the French Communist Party protest the closing of the Unimetal steelworks at Trith St. Leger in August 1985.

—Abbas/MAGNUM.

ment, but the global environment as well, "drawing from world natural resources and polluting the environment (per capita) ten times more than all other countries."²⁰

How communists should relate to the ecology movements in the advanced capitalist countries is an important issue. Although Soviet leaders acknowledge that mass ecology movements "could be an important positive factor in the class struggle and a significant antimonopoly force," they are quick to point out that such movements are composed of representatives not from the working class, but from the "middle urban strata, the intelligentsia, and the youth." Ecologists thus are an uncertain ally whose "concepts combine both progressive and reactionary positions and elements of antimonopoly protest with apolitical and even anticommunist aims."²¹ A critical flaw in the ecologists' analysis, in the Soviet view, is that it wrongly attributes "ecological evil" to industrial civilization in general rather than to capitalism in particular.

If the ecology movement is to be mobilized for communist purposes, so too is the energy "crisis." While it is acknowledged that energy problems "objectively exist" independently of social system, only "under the impact of the socioeconomic and political factors inherent in state-monopoly capitalism" have such problems become a "real crisis."²² But communists are ready with a solution, the first and key item in which is "nationalization of the energy complex with the establishment of democratic control over the nationalized enterprises and oil prices."²³

Probably the most important part of the communist program goes under the rather innocent label of "democratic transformations." On close inspection, it is clear that what is meant is the gradual transformation of the power structure in the contemporary democratic capitalist state. The attendant slogans are "democratization of the legal system and the judicial

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 280–81.

²¹ Ibid., p. 281. It is perhaps not surprising that no mention is made of the rapid rise in efficiency of oil usage in capitalist countries following the oil price rises of the 1970's in contrast to the failure of the countries of "real socialism" to improve such efficiency.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 279.

²¹ Ibid.

machinery" and "democratization of the army [and] the police." The intention, no doubt, is to open up the judiciary, the army, and the police to political pressure and penetration, and to undermine the conventional authority structures within the army and the police as well as their organizational subordination to the traditional executive authority. This is to be achieved by introducing "internal democracy" in the army, trade unions in the police forces, and "demilitarization" of the police.²⁴ Collectively, such measures would make the state structure a less serious obstacle to communist revolution. Thus the "struggle for democratic demands" is one in which "it is necessary to know how to combine the struggle for democracy and the struggle for socialist revolution, subordinating the first to the second."²⁵ Good Leninism dictates that the program of democratization should be not a "reformist" program but a series of institutional changes aiming to facilitate revolution by weakening the capacity of the "bourgeois" state to resist it.

Communist Political Allies

Traditionally, the question of political allies has been central to the thinking of communists, and the most important alliance stratagem inherited from Lenin is that of the united front. Contemporary Soviet commentary describes the united front in Europe in two forms: the united front of the working class, and the united front of all "antimonopoly forces." The united front of the working class, primarily applied to industrial countries, usually means an alliance with other parties of the left—mainly socialist, though sometimes agrarian as well. The aim is to coopt either the leadership or its following, or both, for an alliance in which the communists ultimately gain control. The united front of "antimonopoly forces" refers to a broad front of individuals and organizations of varied class, religious, political, and other backgrounds and commitments. The term encompasses almost any individual or group opposed in some way to the prevailing political leadership and its policies.

The recent treatment in Soviet literature of the subject of the united front of the working class is full of interesting and important historical references. As noted at the outset of this essay, Lenin first used the united front stratagem at home to oppose the autocracy before the 1905 revolution. During the 1920's, the Soviets attempted to form united fronts abroad.

The alliances were routinely described as "temporary" and "conditional," and party members were regularly cautioned to guard their ideological virtue while consorting in alliances of convenience with a variety of suspect "reformist" socialists, "petty-bourgeois" agrarians, and "bourgeois" nationalists. For many communists outside the Soviet Union (and for some inside, such as Trotsky), the united front was a betrayal of principle. For Lenin and his successors it was a necessary stratagem.

By the end of the decade, however, the stratagem had accumulated an impressive list of short-term failures (the General Strike in Britain in 1926, the support of the Pilsudski coup in Poland in the same year, and the Kuomintang's brutal break with the communists in China in 1927), though the longer-term balance sheet reads quite differently. But it was the advent of a new "crisis of capitalism" in Western societies, and the perceived need to struggle against, not with, erstwhile socialist allies, that induced the Soviets to abandon the united front in Europe in 1927.

The united front stratagem had two major applications in the following three decades. The first was in the Popular Front of the 1930's, when it was used mainly to form a broad coalition of political parties or groups opposed to the foreign policies of the European fascist states and Japan. The second major application came in June 1941, following the German attack on the Soviet Union, which of course terminated the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939. Communist parties abroad were instructed to form broad united fronts to support the war effort in countries allied with the Soviet Union and to lead resistance forces in occupied countries. The wartime use of united fronts produced some impressive successes: full control or a powerful position in the resistance movements in much of occupied Europe (France, Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece, and post-Mussolini northern Italy); and a powerful or dominant position in the postwar governing coalitions of all of the Soviet-occupied countries of central and eastern Europe, where some variant (real or bogus) of the united front was applied.

In areas not dominated by Soviet military power, however, the communist united front efforts were less successful. Although the postwar popular front strategy did permit communist entry into government in France and Italy, and a huge expansion of electoral support in both countries, the breakdown of the wartime alliance and onset of the cold war brought with it their removal from both governments and their repudiation of cooperation with other parties of the left. As a result, communists became completely isolated from, and hostile to, the other parties of the left.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 282.

²⁵ *Ibid.*



Leaders of the French Communist Party (PCF) and of the Socialist French Section of the Workers' International (SFIO) lead a massive demonstration of solidarity in Paris on October 22, 1936, in connection with the suicide of their Popular Front government's Minister of the Interior, Roger Salengro.

—FPG.

Stalin's death in 1953 opened up a new era in the history not only of Soviet communism, but of Soviet relations with nongoverning communist parties. It was clearly the intention of Soviet spokesmen at the 20th Congress of the CPSU in February 1956 to return European communists to the strategy of united front. Anastas Mikoyan spoke approvingly of the communist takeover in Czechoslovakia in 1948: "The communists came to power after concluding an alliance not only with the working people's parties that were close to them but also with the bourgeois parties that supported the common national front."²⁶ His purpose was to affirm the possibility of a peaceful acquisition of power by communists. But his comment also indicated the possibility of broad alliances pursuing and attaining power. Specific indication that a united front with the socialists was now in order was provided in the statement announcing the dissolution of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform), which

referred to "the particularly urgent tasks today of overcoming the division within the working class movement and strengthening the unity of the working class in the interests of a successful struggle for peace and socialism."²⁷

During most of the decade following the 20th Party Congress, the appeal for a united front with the European socialists had little effect: the memories of past bad relations with communist parties were still vivid,

²⁶ Leo Grulow, Ed., *Current Soviet Policies—II: The Documentary Record of the 20th Communist Party Congress and Its Aftermath*, Praeger, New York, 1957, p. 85.

Mikoyan's speech at the 20th Party Congress was clearly intended to encourage Stalinist party leaderships to think more flexibly, in the united front mode, about future possibilities for broadening collaboration with noncommunist parties. The actual historical experience of Czechoslovakia with a four-party "National Front" government in the early postwar years, and its relationship to later discussions among Eurocommunist parties, is discussed very interestingly in Valenta, "Eurocommunism and Czechoslovakia," pp. 164–77.

²⁷ Robert H. McNeal, Ed., *International Relations Among Communists*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall, 1967, p. 84.

and the Soviet invasion of Hungary discouraged any thoughts that communism had changed after Stalin. Yet the united front did eventually find application in four separate and distinct cases: in Chile, Portugal, Italy, and France. An examination of these cases provides the context for discussion of the current Soviet view of the appropriate form and purposes of the united front.

Chile and Portugal

The election of the Socialist Salvador Allende in Chile was the climax of the effort to form a united front of communists and socialists in Chile. That front was formed as Popular Unity (UP) in 1969 and included four small political groups in addition to the communists and socialists. As UP's candidate for the presidency in September 1970, Allende secured a 36-percent plurality, and needed support of the Christian Democrats (DC) to assume the presidency. The availability of such support was evidence of how successful the communists had been in changing their image and of Allende's ability to convince DC leaders of his commitment to civil liberties. The three years of the Allende government were turbulent and complex, but it was the loss of DC support in 1972, the deterioration of the economy, and Allende's failure to control the revolutionary activism of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR)—and not the clandestine activities of the US Central Intelligence Agency, as some observers allege—that eventually cost him his power and prepared the way for a military coup.²⁸ From the communist perspective, a united front enterprise that had begun with great promise, securing not only close cooperation with the socialists but the endorsement of the Christian Democrats, had ended in disaster.

For the specialists of the International Department, and for many communist leaders abroad, the fall of

the Allende government was occasion not only for denunciation of the United States, but also for close analysis of the events of the Chilean revolution.²⁹ This analysis, which is closely related to the views of European communist leaders of the 1970's and the refinement of the Soviet theory and practice of the united front stratagem in the 1980's, emphasized the loss of support of the middle class, blaming much of this on violence by the ultra-left, the MIR. It also emphasized the Allende government's lack of control of key organs of power—congress, the courts, the bureaucracy, and the army. According to this critique, Allende's revolutionary actions exceeded his capacity for administrative control and for repression of opposition.

The Portuguese Communist Party, under Alvaro Cunhal, pursued an entirely different policy from that of the communists in Chile.³⁰ Cunhal, a Stalinist hard-liner who had spent many years in exile, was a wholly different personality from either the top leaders of the Chilean communists or Allende himself. He stressed the need for communists to be serious revolutionaries and acquire control of the instruments of power. Thus, following the seizure of power by leaders of the Armed Forces' Movement (MFA) in April 1974, he sought immediately to establish cooperative contacts with the army leaders and to penetrate the officer corps.³¹ A specific target was the Fifth Division of the army, which as the organ responsible for education in the military could provide a channel for communist ideological influence. The communists moved swiftly and effectively, drawing on a corps of dedicated, well-trained cadres that they had developed during their many years of illegal operation. Their goal was not revolution by parliamentary means, as had been the hope of the communists in Chile, but seizure of the instruments of power within a revolutionary situation. And though they sought broad support, the communists were not notably effective in building a united front of the Left. Indeed, their Portuguese Democratic Movement (MPD) won little support outside the party,

²⁸ See Paul Sigmund, *The Overthrow of Allende and the Politics of Chile, 1964-76*, Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977, esp. pp. 275ff. See also Stefan de Vylder, *Allende's Chile: The Political Economy of the Rise and Fall of the Unidad Popular*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1976, pp. 214-15. Professor Sigmund recently summarized his views in the following manner: "The escalation of violence on the part of left and right during the last year of the Allende presidency, combined with the virtual collapse of the Chilean economy, was the major reason for the overthrow of Allende by the Chilean armed forces on 11 September 1973." See his "Chile," in Richard F. Staar, Ed., *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1982* (hereafter cited as *YICA* with relevant year), Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1982, p. 77.

For a rather different viewpoint—one that stresses the role of US policy in Allende's political failure—see the essays in Paul M. Sweezy and Harry Magdoff, Eds., *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Chile*, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1974, esp. Andrew Zimbalist and Barbara Stallings, "Showdown in Chile," p. 123.

²⁹ There is a very useful summary and analysis of the Soviet reaction to the events in Chile in Joan Urban, "Socialist Pluralism in Soviet and Italian Communist Perspective: The Chilean Catalyst," *Orbis*, Summer 1974, pp. 495-502. Urban also reviews the reaction of the PCI (pp. 502-05).

³⁰ Seton-Watson, *The Imperialist Revolutionaries*, pp. 22ff. See also Kenneth Maxwell, "Portuguese Communism," in George Schwab, Ed., *Eurocommunism: The Ideological and Political-Theoretical Foundations*, Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1981, pp. 269-99.

³¹ The Portuguese Communist Party and the Socialist Party reached an agreement on cooperation against the government in September 1973, but after the successful overturn of the government, the agreement collapsed (August 1974) as the communists pursued an independent course. See H. Leslie Robinson, "Portugal," in *YICA* 1974, p. 205, and in *YICA* 1975, pp. 229-34.

and the socialists under Mario Soares, though willing to cooperate, would not accept communist leadership.

Communist influence peaked under the premiership of Colonel Vasco Gonçalves, who took office in July 1974. The communists controlled the new national trade union organization and dominated the press.³² Except on the issue of decolonization—in Guinea, Mozambique, and Angola—the communists espoused a moderate program and retained fairly broad sympathy in the MFA, although that sympathy diminished somewhat when the communists only reluctantly supported stern measures against the extreme left.

The communist leadership resisted unsuccessfully the MFA leadership's decision to hold parliamentary elections on April 25, 1975. The socialists (38 percent) and moderate Popular Democrats (PPD—26 percent) far outstripped the communists and their front organization, the MPD (16 percent).³³ Cunhal's response recalled Lenin's repudiation of the 1919 Constituent Assembly elections: the electorate, he claimed, had simply not had time to absorb and understand the significance of the revolutionary process. He continued to count on his close ties with the MFA and on the possibility of further communist penetration of the military. Meanwhile, his policies brought open conflict with the socialists, whose journal *República* was taken over by communist workers. The peak of communist power, and of internal conflict, came in the summer of 1975. When Gonçalves was removed as premier at the end of August, and a new, moderate government was created, the tide had turned. A November attempt at insurrection by leftist paratroopers was crushed, and Cunhal abandoned his own plans for insurrection. Elections in April 1976 ratified a new constitution and created a socialist government under Soares.

The outcome of the revolution was thus a socialist-led parliamentary democracy rather than the communist dictatorship sought by Cunhal. His gamble on the MFA and on his ability to gain control in the army had failed. In Chile, the communists had lost in alliance with the socialists; in Portugal, they lost *against* them. Chile went from democracy to military dictatorship; Portugal from military dictatorship to democracy.

Both illustrated the difficulty of using the strategy of united front, as well as the flexibility with which communist leaders could apply it.

Italy and France

Italy provides another important example of the 1970's of the flexible use of united front. Interestingly, the main object of the united front exercise there was neither a socialist party nor a victorious revolutionary organization but the Italian Christian Democrats.³⁴ The background to this effort began in the late 1950's, when party leader Palmiro Togliatti called for a general reevaluation of the policies of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and stressed the need to seek greater diversity among the various national communist parties. Following years of sectarian isolation, the PCI developed a new political image over the course of the 1960's and 1970's, broadening its electoral base and shedding much of its negative reputation as a Soviet puppet and an enemy of the Church.

With the appointment of Enrico Berlinguer as secretary general in 1972, the PCI undertook a comprehensive review of its electoral potential, given the changing make-up of the Italian electorate. The social structure of contemporary Italy, the party noted, precluded the attainment of a PCI parliamentary majority with the support of the working class alone; new support had to come from various segments of the growing middle class, now as numerous as the workers and the mainstay of electoral support for the Christian Democrats. The goal, therefore, was to convince this group, as well as other potential supporters, that the communists offered an acceptable alternative. Thus, communist spokesmen now claimed to offer a "democratic alternative" rather than a "left alternative," stressing their willingness to respect democratic parliamentary tradition and the alternation of governing parties at the command of the electorate.

Berlinguer's concept of the "historic compromise" was really a proposed understanding between communists and Christian Democrats, an understanding that would link "the forces that assemble and that represent the great majority of the Italian people."³⁵ CD acceptance of this proposal could bring the PCI two kinds of benefits: formal acceptance in a govern-

³² Robinson, "Portugal," in *YICA* 1976, p. 207; Jean Seaton and Ben Pimlott, "The Portuguese Media in Transition," in Kenneth Maxwell, Ed., *The Press and the Rebirth of Iberian Democracy*, Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1983, pp. 101-02. The authors note that from March to November 1975, the decisive phase of the Portuguese revolution, "six of the state-owned daily papers were broadly sympathetic to communist positions, only one . . . was consistently opposed to them."

³³ Robinson, "Portugal," in *YICA* 1976, pp. 201, 203.

³⁴ It was in 1973, following the overthrow of Allende in Chile, that Berlinguer formulated his strategy for the PCI in a series of articles entitled "Reflections after Events in Chile," *Rinascita* (Rome), Nos. 38, 39, 40, September-October 1973. See also the comment on this strategy in Franco Ferrarotti, "Eurocommunism: Italian Version," in Schwab, op. cit., pp. 157-86.

³⁵ Zagladin, *World Communist Movement*, p. 179.

ing coalition, with communist ministers; and/or a movement of the left-wing Christian Democratic supporters to the communist side. In other words, the "historic compromise" was a classic united front stratagem: a proposal for limited collaboration with an ideological opponent in order to influence the opponent's following and policies.³⁶ In operation, the compromise ultimately proved unsatisfactory for the communists. They incurred responsibility for policies they did not control, they alienated the party's left wing, and they lost electoral support.

An analysis and line similar to that of Berlinguer was advocated in France in the early 1970's by a leading party theorist, Roger Garaudy.³⁷ Like Berlinguer, he felt that social change necessitated broadening the base of party membership to include "new social layers" that were not traditional working class. His ideas were rejected by Georges Marchais, who became secretary general in 1972.

Marchais chose instead a "Joint Program" agreement with the socialists. The communists had been committed for some years to a united front of the left, and the time was now favorable. The socialists had just achieved a broad reunification of disparate groups (1971), and saw cooperation with the communists, in the developing atmosphere of East-West détente, as a suitable policy. The Joint Program of 1972 was an effort to establish a broad basis of agreement between the two parties for future parliamentary elections. The development of East-West détente and the increasing electoral strength of the Left seemed to bode well for the success of cooperation. But the new united front ("Union of the Left") created major problems for the communist leadership. Communist electoral strength declined steadily over the course of the 1970's, while that of the socialists rose. Pressure mounted within the party, especially among its young intellectuals, to follow a line similar to that of the Italian and Spanish communists and dissociate the French Communist Party (PCF) from much of the legacy of the CPSU, with some calling even for democ-



French Communist Party leader Georges Marchais (left) with French Socialist Party Leader François Mitterrand at a December 1972 rally celebrating the Union of the Left and its Joint Program.

—Alain Dejean/SYGMA.

ratization of party governance. Marchais never went as far as Berlinguer toward Eurocommunism, but the November 1975 Common Declaration he signed with Berlinguer affirmed PCF support of the traditions of parliamentary democracy. Still, his criticism of the USSR was both milder and briefer than that of his Italian and Spanish colleagues, and during the following two years he supervised a considerable purge of party reformists who insisted that there could be no authentic "Eurocommunism" without democratization of the party.

Communist-socialist collaboration was thus a troubled affair, with Marchais worrying about the internal pressures for reform it had unleashed and the simultaneous and continuing decline of communist electoral strength. His temporary withdrawal from the union may have cost the Left the election in 1977, and the joint victory in the election of June 1981 was marked by a large increase in the socialist vote and a decline in the communist electoral strength from over 20 percent to about 16 percent. The communists continued to do poorly at the polls, receiving only 11.2 percent of the French vote in the European parliamentary election of June 1984. Communist withdrawal from the Union of the Left in July 1984 followed three years of almost continuous communist-socialist bickering. Although the communists had received several ministerial portfolios during this time, the socialists were firmly in control of the government.

When both parties lost heavily in the European parliamentary elections in June, their diametrically opposed responses deepened their differences. Socialist President François Mitterrand retreated from his educational bill, which had challenged the

³⁶ The historical parallels for the "historic compromise" have been given too little attention. Clearly, no previous or contemporary situation can be precisely compared to the Italian one, but the basic motive for the action—to broaden the support for communist political programs and to influence the policies and following of political rivals—is generally the same as in other efforts by the Italian and other parties. The alliance was seen not as a permanent solution, but as a stratagem that could be changed when circumstances dictated. The fundamental objective was to build a stronger base of support for the PCI, and as such it was a variant of united front, a well-tested tactic.

³⁷ Seton-Watson, *The Imperialist Revolutionaries*, p. 35. The preparation for an agreement with the socialists had been several years in the making. PCF spokesman Waldeck Rochet had argued the possibility of a "peaceful transition to socialism within a plurality of parties" in 1967. See "The 18th Congress of the French Communist Party," *Cahiers du Communisme* (Paris), February-March 1967, pp. 64–66.

continued existence of private schools and provoked massive popular demonstrations. And in July he appointed a new prime minister, Laurent Fabius, widely recognized as a pragmatic centrist. These measures marked a new stage of a socialist retreat from the ideologically socialist program of 1981–82, which had itself signaled socialist abandonment of the Joint Program. Marchais, for his part, continued to reject strong pressures (including those from the communist government ministers) to seek renewed electoral strength through internal party reform and a distancing of the party from the Soviet Union—a tie that became a growing liability in the wake of the powerful reaction of French intellectuals to Solzhenitsyn's *Gulag Archipelago* and the evidence of Soviet intransigence in the Euromissile controversy. He moved instead to prepare for a struggle against the government, exploiting popular dissatisfaction with the government's program of economic austerity, using the party's strength in the huge CGT labor federation, and reaffirming the traditional organizational and ideological positions of the party. Announcing that he was abandoning a policy of 25 years' duration, he made it clear that the policy of united front would be replaced by an effort to build broad mass support against the Mitterrand government.

Refining United Front Strategy

How have these twists and failures of the united front stratagem affected Soviet attitudes toward its use by communist movements in advanced industrial societies? Are Soviet leaders likely to abandon such tactics in favor of more strident revolutionary action? Or are they still committed to the effort to implement an effective united front with socialist and social democratic parties? Answers to these questions, as well as recent refinements in united front tactics, can be found in contemporary Soviet writings on the subject.

The contemporary analysis of the united front and its possibilities by International Department Deputy Chief Zagladin reveals both continuity and innovation. Zagladin is somewhat defensive in his appraisal of past behavior by communists in united front arrangements. He rejects the contention of socialists and others that such collaboration might be subject to abrupt termination, as happened in the past, by asserting that the new united front is "not a temporary, passing, situational phenomenon."³⁸ And he

reminds those social democrats who stress the painful experiences of the 1920's that "the erroneous evaluations of social democracy as social fascism were emphatically condemned by the Seventh Comintern Congress in 1935."³⁹ The important point, he notes, is to achieve a "unity of action of . . . independent political parties" on the assumption that all workers, whether socialists, Christian Democrats, or communists are "class brothers." Thus, one should remember not the errors and conflicts of the past but the good periods, when "cooperation of different currents of the workers' movement was particularly broad."⁴⁰

Elements of continuity can be found in Zagladin's dual emphasis on united front from below ("it is . . . precisely in the masses that it is easier to surmount the obstacles that prevent the joint struggle") and from above ("by agreements between . . . the leading figures").⁴¹ Familiar too is his emphasis on rigorous adherence to the basic tenets of communist ideology, ensuring that it is not tainted by the beliefs of other members of the united front: cooperation "does not mean . . . that the communist parties are abandoning [either] the ideological struggle against 'right' and 'left' opportunist concepts [or] criticism of the ideology and policy of class collaboration."⁴²

At the same time, the united front of the 1980's responds to new conditions and new opportunities. Soviet writings describe the usual impediments to the political unity of the working class: the great variety of workers; the new categories of jobs created by rapid changes in technology and the growing service sector of the economy; a labor leadership composed of many leaders with reformist rather than revolutionary political commitments; and the divisiveness of nation, race, and religion. Moreover, the impact of these negative factors is described as intensified by the skillful opposition of the bourgeoisie on the one hand and the political folly of misguided Marxists—those on the right who have inherited the "reformist" tradition of Eduard Bernstein and those on the left ("Trotskyites and others") who "create serious obstacles in the way of the unity of action and cooperation of revolutionaries with social democrats [by insisting] that the sole correct policy in respect of the social democratic parties and their members is constant, uncompromising, resolute struggle."⁴³

³⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 179.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid., p. 181.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 175.

³⁹ Zagladin, *World Communist Movement*, p. 177.

But there are many favorable factors. There are ever-worsening contradictions in the contemporary capitalist economy, creating growing unemployment and uncontrollable inflation. There is a powerful fear of war and "a growing sense that imperialism is the main threat to peace." There is resistance to the "incursions of imperialism" in the form of transnational companies and military bases. And there is the still-vital legacy of détente which has reduced anticommunism and "anti-Sovietism" and radically altered the attitudes of socialist parties—leaders and memberships—toward cooperation with communists.

This changing attitude among socialists is perhaps the most encouraging sign from the Soviet viewpoint. The 60-odd socialist and social democratic parties in the world, many of which had worked with the communists before, total some 15 million members and account for 80 or so million votes.⁴⁴ The communists' potential to draw on this enormous electoral clout was enhanced considerably in 1972 when the Socialist International dropped its prohibition against the establishment of independent alliances between member parties and communist parties within their own countries.⁴⁵ And while the social democrats may be fettered by the ideology of social reformism and anti-communism, they do, no matter how "timidly, inconsistently, and pretentiously, . . . proclaim as their goal the replacement of capitalism by socialism."⁴⁶ One should therefore "not struggle against the social democrats and their organizations but struggle for the social democrats and their enlistment in assertive action in defense of peace, democracy and social progress."⁴⁷

Soviet analysis delineates three distinct levels of possible joint programs that can be undertaken by social democrats and communists: (1) specific issues related to the work force, such as wages, working hours, working conditions, and housing; (2) larger issues of "democratic transformation and reform" of society as a whole; nationalization of certain sectors of the economy; imposition of "democratic controls"

over security; and rigorous adherence to a "peaceful foreign policy"; and (3) the ultimate issue involving the joint struggle "against the entire capitalist system and for socialism."⁴⁸

It is clear that the second category is being given much greater emphasis in current Soviet thinking than in the past, especially since such measures are seen as "capable of bringing [bourgeois] society closer to socialist transformation." The notion of joint struggle "against the entire capitalist system," on the other hand, seems an unlikely mission for social democratic parties, as it does for many socialist parties. Yet, Zagladin writes that communists "are ready to cooperate with the social democrats in the achievement of the goals of socialist revolution." His apparent optimism on this score seems to be based on two factors: the "appreciable shifts to the left in the positions of social democracy"; and international political conditions that appear to favor peaceful development of socialist revolution. Such developments, according to Zagladin, improve the possibility of cooperation with socialists "who, as is known, regardless of conditions, recognize only peaceful forms of mass struggle."⁴⁹

Gorbachëv's United Front

Developments of recent months indicate that the Gorbachëv leadership is undertaking a major application of the united front in Soviet European policy, linked in familiar fashion to the external policies of the European communist parties. The Soviet ideological and foreign policy administrative apparatus and its leadership are under review, and the substance and rationale of a new policy is emerging.

The appointment of Yegor Ligachëv to the powerful position of "second secretary" of the CPSU gives him the primary control and coordinating role for ideology and foreign policy.⁵⁰ Boris Stukalin has been replaced as head of the party propaganda department by Aleksandr Yakovlev, former ambassador to Canada and since 1983 head of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations (IMEMO). Yakovlev is per-

⁴⁴ The figures are taken from *ibid.*, p. 183. Accompanying the figures is the comment that "the overwhelming majority of parties adhering to the social-reformist positions are incorporated in the Socialist International, and the figures are for those parties."

As no source is given, it is not possible to know what year is meant or precisely what parties are included. There are figures for the European parties that indicate that these parties alone had a membership of about 11.5 million in the late 1970's. See Anton Pelinka, *Social Democratic Parties in Europe*, New York, Praeger, 1983, p. 41.

⁴⁵ For a discussion of the mixed balance sheet of successes and failures of Soviet policy toward the noncommunist Left in Western Europe, see Trond Gilberg, "The Soviets and the Noncommunist Left," in Herbert J. Ellison, Ed., *Soviet Policy toward Western Europe: Implications for the Atlantic Alliance*, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1983, pp. 130-58.

⁴⁶ Zagladin, *World Communist Movement*, p. 183.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 185.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 187.


⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 189-90.

⁵⁰ There is, of course, no formally designated position of "second secretary" in the CPSU. In informal usage, however, this term has been generally reserved for that person who serves as the general secretary's deputy. Under Brezhnev, it was Mikhail Suslov; under Chernenko, it was Gorbachëv. According to Alexander Rahr, Ligachëv has more or less taken over the Suslov portfolio, which includes supervision of the work of the Secretariat of the Central Committee and oversight of ideology. See Alexander Rahr, "A New Chief Ideologist in the Kremlin," *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, RL 183-85, June 5, 1985, pp. 1-9.

haps best remembered in the West for his hard-line anti-American statements while ambassador. Meanwhile, rumor has it that Leonid Zamyatin's influence has waned and that his International Information Department may be absorbed into the International Department.⁵¹ While such changes are unlikely to alter the fundamentals of CPSU foreign policy, they do emphasize the importance of the mission of this crucial part of the party apparatus headed by Ligachëv.

Other developments indicate a major new policy thrust for which Ligachëv will have substantial responsibility. For example, once again the united front is to be the centerpiece and major emphasis of Soviet policy in Europe. Its symbol and model, according to a *Pravda* article of July 25, 1985, is the 7th Comintern Congress of 1935.⁵² The article, commemorating the congress's 50th anniversary, claims to find close parallels between the circumstances of the mid-1930's and those of the mid-1980's, and suggests that the task of half a century ago—"rallying all revolutionary and democratic forces against fascism and war"—is today's task as well. Once again an appeal is made to the socialists and other "progressive" forces for a united front, and the United States is cast in the role of Nazi Germany as the chief threat to peace and progress. The article demonstrates that 50 years have taught Soviet ideologists nothing new about fascism—it is still the creation of "the most reactionary circles of finance capitalism"—but without such economic determinism there would be no justification for tarring the United States with the fascist brush. In the Soviet view, the United States is the main opponent in today's struggle against capitalism, to be fought as a struggle for peace in which "a major role in the defense of peace belongs to the joint actions of communists and social democrats." Hence the appeal to the socialists for a "united front for peace," and the endorsement of "CPSU Central Committee contacts with the Socialist International Consultative Committee on disarmament."

Such is the policy background to recent approaches by Soviet leaders to prominent West European socialist parties and leaders, both in and out of government. The policy was evident in May in the warm reception given to Italy's Socialist Prime Minister Bettino Craxi and to the chairman of Germany's Social Democratic Party (SPD), Willi Brandt. Following the visits, *Pravda* wrote that "the consolidation of all forces sincerely interested in preserving and consoli-



Aleksandr Yakovlev, the new chief of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

—Camera Press.

dating peace is essential" and stressed the importance of "continued development of contacts between the CPSU and the Socialist International and Social Democratic and Socialist parties, in particular the SPD."⁵³ In the Soviet effort to divide the states of Western Europe from the United States, the social democratic parties are assigned a prominent role. As with the popular front of the 1930's, the aim is "a coalition between the USSR and a number of bourgeois states."

The new foreign policy task is linked to the revolutionary mission, and European communist leaders are told that the new popular front promises them not just victories in the "struggle for peace," important though those are, but improved prospects for political power. Here too the July 25 article is instructive:

The policy of popular front, enriched by the people's democratic revolutions, became the prototype for the present-day broad platforms of struggle for progressive, antimonopoly democracy, through which . . . it is possible to approach socialist transformations.

The lesson is clear: just as the war and early postwar united front coalitions in Eastern Europe were used to

⁵¹ *The Economist* (London), Aug. 19, 1985, p. 32.

⁵² K. Shirinya, "Against Fascism and War: On The 50th Anniversary of the 7th Congress of the Communist International," *Pravda* (Moscow), July 25, 1985, p. 4.

⁵³ *Pravda*, May 31, 1985, quoted in Elizabeth Teague, "Soviet Peace Offensive Targets West Europe's Social Democrats," *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, RL 248-85, July 30, 1985, p. 1.

advance the cause of socialist revolution, so too would the "struggle for progressive, antimonopoly democracy" united front be used in Western Europe today. But there is also a lesson in the review of the 7th Comintern Congress for contemporary Eurocommunist leaders who would limit the means of acquiring power. The Comintern had endorsed the broad coalition of parties formed by the communists against Franco in Spain, but it had not dismissed "the possibility, in certain conditions, of a directly socialist path of revolution." And with that lesson comes a reminder that the 7th Congress "bequeathed to present-day communists another important precept: display constant concern for the unity and cohesion of the international communist movement on the principled basis of Marxism-Leninism."

Responding to Eurocommunists

Before discussing recent Soviet responses to the Eurocommunist challenge, it is useful to summarize the central assumptions underlying the Soviet view of the world communist movement. In the first instance, the Soviets see themselves as the natural leaders of the movement. They are the inheritors of the ideological and institutional legacy of the October Revolution, and are the leaders of the senior and by far the most powerful communist state. They are masters of the literature (historical and theoretical) of the world communist movement, having written (and creatively edited) much of it, and are profoundly aware of its central dogmas as well as of past departures from those dogmas. And they are quick to sense deviation from ways and forms of communist organization and action that have been firmly settled by a long historical experience.

It is from this perspective that the Soviet leadership has faced, in the post-Stalin era, and particularly in the 1970's and 1980's, a challenge from European communist parties that has touched on some of the most basic doctrines of Soviet and world communism.⁵⁴ One of the most important areas in

which the Soviets have been challenged is that of inter-party relations. The Soviet claim to primary authority in ideological questions was part of the Comintern tradition, a tradition challenged for the first time by the Yugoslavs in 1948, by the Chinese in the early 1960's, and more broadly by West European communist leaders in the 1960's and after. Lacking (or being unwilling any longer to use) decisive instruments of coercion in their relations with nongoverning European parties, the Soviets were obliged to hear those parties' criticism or rejection of the ideological rationale (necessary fraternal aid against counterrevolution) for their policies toward Czechoslovakia (1968), Afghanistan (1979), and Poland (1980-81). For some West European communist leaders, Soviet interventionist claims posed a serious threat to their party's independence and to the general communist image among their electorates. The Soviet version of "proletarian internationalism" challenged not only their concept of needed reforms in Eastern Europe, but their own autonomy and hence their capacity to build a socialist system different from that of the countries of "real socialism." The most explicit statement of this view was offered by the Italian party leadership in a resolution adopted in December 1981:

*The PCI intends to maintain normal relations with all communist parties as with any other socialist, revolutionary and progressive forces, with no particular or privileged bond with any, on the basis of absolute independence of thought and of political action, with no ideological, political, or organizational restraints.*⁵⁵

This "new internationalism" expressed autonomist claims that had developed for some years, and that resulted in the systematic weakening of the role and authority of international communist party conferences in the 1960's and 1970's. The first postwar world conference was held in Moscow only in 1969; the last European party conference in East Berlin in June 1976. Efforts by the Soviets and their allies to impose a general line at the Berlin conference were frustrated by the adoption of a new principle of agreement by consensus, which affirmed "the principles of equality and sovereign independence for each party, non-interference in internal affairs, and respect for their free choice of different roads in the struggle for social change of a progressive nature and for socialism."⁵⁶

The declaration of martial law in Poland in December 1981 was attacked by the parties of Italy, Spain,

⁵⁴ There is now a fairly extensive literature on Eurocommunism (see the review article by Michael Sodaro, "Whatever Happened to Eurocommunism?" *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1984, pp. 59-65, for a recent sample). However, there is still a need for analysis of key aspects of the subject: the major differences among the European parties; the continuity and discontinuity, consistency and inconsistency of Eurocommunist positions with earlier communist theory and practice; and most neglected, the ideological and practical problems of relations with the Soviets. The last topic was very interestingly treated in a special issue of *Studies in Comparative Communism*, Autumn 1982. See especially the articles by Joan Barth Urban (on the PCI), Eusebio Mujal-Léon (on Spain), Peter Berton (on Japan), and Heinz Timmermann (on Soviet treatment of Western Communists).

⁵⁵ *L'Unità* (Rome), Dec. 8, 1981.

⁵⁶ Seton-Watson, *The Imperialist Revolutionaries*, p. 4.


Japan, Sweden, Australia, and Mexico, which held the Soviets responsible and contended that it would discredit all communist parties and frustrate their political efforts. They further charged that the frustration of Polish reform in this fashion demonstrated the impoverishment of the Soviet/East European model of socialism.⁵⁷

Although the Soviets have repeatedly expressed disagreement with the positions taken by Eurocommunist leaders, they are obviously prepared to accept a good deal of variety in the politics of nonruling parties, recognizing that they must deal with quite varied political and social conditions and that communist doctrine must, therefore, be creatively applied. It ought not to be surprising, though, that they reject criticism of their policies in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Afghanistan. In the former two cases the traditional structure of communist power (communist party monopoly of power and democratic centralism in the party) was in process of dismantlement, with potentially very dangerous consequences for other East European communist leaderships and for the Soviet system itself. In Afghanistan—a state regarded by the Soviets as socialist since communists had come to power in 1978—the established power was threatened, by Soviet lights, both by unreliable party leadership and by internal rebellion.

Soviet disagreement with the Eurocommunists on the achievement of socialist revolution began with the proposition of the Italian and Spanish party leaders that such revolution must be accomplished by peaceful, parliamentary means. In his speech at the 26th CPSU Congress in 1981, for example, Leonid Brezhnev rejected the notion that there should be only one "form of transition to the new social system." He asserted that in a variety of socialist revolutions

there were armed struggles, and there were peaceful forms of transition to the new social system; there were cases in which the working classes came to power quickly and there were processes that dragged

⁵⁷ The tendency of the Eurocommunist party leaderships (particularly the Italian and Spanish) to go beyond criticism of specific actions of Soviet foreign policy—such as the invasion of Afghanistan or Soviet behavior during the Polish crisis of 1980–81—and undertake to trace such actions to flaws in the fundamental Soviet political and social structure is described and documented in an article by Heinz Timmermann, "The CPSU and the Western Communist Parties," *International Journal*, Spring 1982, pp. 241–62. The PCI "Charter of Peace and Development," published in *L'Unità*, Nov. 8, 1981, accused the Soviet Union of developing a traditional imperialist style of foreign policy. Similar charges were addressed to the CPSU by the Central Committee of the Japan Communist Party in an open letter published in *Akahata* (Tokyo), No. 5, September 1981. The Italian analysis suggested the development of something like a Soviet military-industrial complex that was more influential in policymaking than the party itself.



The late leader of the Italian Communist Party, Enrico Berlinguer, shown participating in the June 1983 elections for Italy's Chamber of Deputies.

—Edoardo Fornaci/GAMMA-LIAISON.

*out for long periods of time. In some countries the revolution had to defend itself against foreign intervention, while in others there was no incursion from outside.*⁵⁸

The Italians were taken to task by Zagladin for suggesting that "all fundamental questions of development are tackled . . . with the help of the ballot box." And he asked rhetorically: "Will not punctilious observance of the rules of the game and the standards of bourgeois democracy at the decisive moment for the revolution represent ingratiation with the class enemy?"⁵⁹ Other Soviet commentary makes it clear that observance of "the standards of bourgeois democracy" was part of the undoing of the revolution in Chile. The real evidence that one has found the correct means of achieving the revolution is "a qualitative leap forward in the development of the revolutionary process" whose result is "the establishment of the power of the working class, led by the communist party."⁶⁰ Clearly, coming to power by the ballot box is acceptable if it brings communist power, but that power is not to be relinquished peacefully thereafter.

The Soviets rejected equally firmly the charges of the Italian and Spanish parties that the Soviet revolu-

⁵⁸ *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, OH), Mar. 25, 1981.

⁵⁹ Zagladin, *World Communist Movement*, p. 271.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 272.

tion, and those modeled on it in Eastern Europe, were not democratic. What is a democratic path to socialism? "Any path in the course of which an exploiting minority is removed from power and the accession to the power of . . . the working people is secured."⁶¹ The Italian effort to find a "Third Way" to socialism—separated alike from capitalism and from the Soviet/East European model—is a sham. What it does, says Zagladin, is simply counterpose to its own theoretical vision the reality of the Soviet/East European model, and with negative intent not unlike the "direct attacks on important aspects of the socialist countries' domestic and foreign policy."⁶²

Some Conclusions

It is clear that there are severe constraints on the Soviet capacity to secure a common policy with the nonruling communist parties of the West. Yet, the CPSU continues to exercise considerable leverage over the policies of these parties. The small parties can be relatively easily disciplined. Specialists of responsible CPSU organs, such as the ID, can direct pro-Soviet sympathizers to form small splinter factions and then support their secession and the formation of separate parties. This occurred in Australia in 1971, in Sweden in 1977, and in Spain in 1984.⁶³ From the Soviet viewpoint, what matters, as one scholar put it, is to have "a reliable mouthpiece."⁶⁴ But that view is perhaps too simplistic. Close examination of individual cases—especially the Spanish case⁶⁵—suggests that CPSU specialists may at times pursue rather cautious policies and that their approach can be quite subtle and flexible.

Party-splitting is clearly the action of last resort, and not a tactic that can be used in dealing with the large parties, such as the French or the Italian. Rather, the CPSU can apply pressures through inter-party consultation (often using East European rather than Soviet party leaders), through bilateral and multi-lateral leadership conferences, and through the use of Soviet embassy representatives. One should not forget either the power of Soviet ideological leadership

provided by the key journals (*Problems of Peace and Socialism* and *New Times*), and by a flood of other publications of the International Department and related agencies, that seek to form and direct opinion on key questions and achieve uniformity of views.

Soviet leadership is strengthened in a variety of ways. Certainly the training of party cadres, especially for new parties, is an important instrument.⁶⁶ Dissident parties find themselves under pressure from a growing number of parties, especially in international meetings, that have been carefully trained by Soviet specialists. Moreover, there is the undeniable prestige and power of the Soviet Union, the symbol of communist tradition and a global power that is enormously important to the strength of nonruling parties, even to critics of Soviet policy. Finally, the Soviet Union is, for almost all parties, an important source of financial support, often provided indirectly through such means as subscriptions to publications and revenue from trading companies, among others.⁶⁷

In the last analysis, one is struck by the large body of ideological agreement and of continuing organizational unity. Members of Eurocommunist parties may privately belittle the intelligence or culture of senior figures in the International Department, yet the clarity, continuity, and vigor of Soviet tutelage and nurture of the collective movement are beyond doubt, and the very structure of administrative organization for this purpose attests to the centrality and high priority of the function. If Eurocommunism is on the wane, and it appears to be, it is probably precisely because it was not able to formulate a politically successful alternative to the Soviet model of communist party and ideology.⁶⁸ Even pursuit of political power by the ballot using the united front strategy is fully consistent with the Soviet tradition. It is significant that in the end it is the Eurocommunist efforts to affirm that strategy as the sole option, along with endorsement of constitutional democratic government and the criticism of Soviet foreign policy and the Soviet model of society, that have caused the major friction. But none of these

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 271.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ See Heinz Timmermann, "Soviet Treatment of Western Communists: A Comparative Analysis," *Studies in Comparative Communism*, August 1982, pp. 288–307; and Kevin Devlin, "Spanish Rivals: A Tale of Two Parties," *Radio Free Europe Research* (Munich), June 1, 1984.

⁶⁴ Timmermann, "The CPSU and Western Communist Parties," p. 247.

⁶⁵ See, e.g., Eusebio Mujal-León, "The Soviet and Spanish Communist Parties: Policies, Tactics, Negotiating Behavior," *Studies in Comparative Communism*, Autumn 1982, pp. 236–65.

⁶⁶ On CPSU training of local cadres, see sources cited in Kitrinos, loc. cit., fns. 41 and 42.

⁶⁷ On CPSU financial support for local parties, see, e.g., Jean Montaldo, *Les Finances de P.C.F.* (The Finances of the PCF), Paris, Albin Michel, 1977; idem, *Les secrets de la banque soviétique en France* (The Secrets of the Soviet Bank in France), Paris, Albin Michel, 1979; Heinz Timmermann, "Problems of Party Financing of the Italian and French Communists," *Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien* (Cologne), No. 15 1971; and Michael Ledeen and Claire Sterling, "Italy's Russian Sugar Daddy," *The New Republic* (Washington, DC), Apr. 3, 1976.

⁶⁸ See Kevin Devlin, "The Decline of Eurocommunism: Downhill from the Summit," *Radio Free Europe Research*, Apr. 20, 1984.

challenges has resulted in an open break with the Soviets. And the professed commitment to such a strategy has failed to bring even the Italian party the credibility that it needed for its political purposes.

And so even in the new context of inter-party relations the Soviet policy continues to dominate, at least within the framework of the international movement. What is impressive about that policy is its comprehensiveness and its continuity. The peace campaign goes forward, chipping away at the structure of alliances linking Western Europe and Japan to the United States, seeking to build a broad body of public opinion (a united front of "anti-monopoly forces") opposed to the American alliance and its defense structures, and obscuring the reality of growing Soviet military might. The composite of mobilizing issues, from environment to unemployment, is used to win favor for the communist cause and to provide a cooperating link between communists and other parties of the left as well as broader political and social groupings. Meanwhile the battle fought and refought since 1903 continues—the battle to retain a party of revolution commanded by an

authoritarian leadership structure and a consciously exclusive force within the political left claiming the unique right to lead the proletariat.

History has yet to provide a communist strategy that won a parliamentary majority in a democratic system; hence the Soviets' persistent emphasis on keeping all options open—including revolutionary violence. That theme rings loud and clear. Equally clear is the care and persistence of the analysis of the strategy and tactics of acquisition of power, the main emphasis and the main interest of recent Soviet commentary. In that commentary perhaps the most important issue is that of the so-called democratic measures, which if implemented successfully would serve as a long-term strategy for enfeebling the democratic state. If a major democratic industrial state should become the scene of an internal power seizure, the Soviets expect that the changed "correlation of forces" would combine with the weakening of defensive alliances to assure that no amount of opposing "fraternal aid" could reverse this power seizure.

Notes

Elite Information in China

Michael Schoenhals

VIRTUALLY ALL scholarly studies of the Chinese political elite have been hampered by the almost complete lack of information about how its members regularly secure data necessary for rational policy and decision-making. Outside of China, and indeed even outside of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), little is known about this important subject. Through what means do the members of the CCP central leadership and the State Council keep themselves up to date on what is happening within China and beyond its borders? How do they get prompt reports on important political events, natural disasters, or societal developments? How do they stay briefed on the political climate prevailing among the Chinese population, what "the masses" think of the CCP, and how the lower level echelon of the party views those at the top? What are the channels through which they receive their daily news, and how do these channels fit into China's political system?

This article tries to provide some answers, albeit tentative and speculative ones, to these questions by describing and analyzing *Neibu Cankao* (Internal Reference), the most important controlled-circulation information bulletin in the People's Republic of China (PRC). Published twice daily by the New China News Agency (Xinhua), *Neibu Cankao* contains domestic news reports intended exclusively for China's political

elite. The following pages will briefly present its history, its editorial policy, and its contents. Also included is a short section on the role restricted news bulletins play in the Chinese political system and a brief overview of other PRC "internal" publications similar to, but more widely distributed than, *Neibu Cankao*.

Reliable information on *Neibu Cankao* is difficult to obtain. Although foreigners working in China in recent years have found it increasingly easy to gain access to other supposedly classified publications, such as Xinhua's *Cankao Xiaoxi* (Reference News) and *Cankao Ziliao* (Reference Materials),¹ *Neibu Cankao* has remained more or less inaccessible. Indeed, references to it can be found only in official publications governing journalistic work in China and in some pronouncements of high-ranking Chinese officials. For this reason, information on *Neibu Cankao* is somewhat sketchy and almost completely derivative; to my knowledge, few, if any, foreigners have ever seen it, and if they have there has been scant mention of it. Nonetheless, careful examination of official Chinese documents on *neibu duwu* (internal reading material) does yield considerable insight into an area one Western authority on China's political elite says we "know almost nothing about."²

Xinhua's News for Elites

Xinhua was founded by the Chinese Communist Party in 1937. During China's War of Resistance

Michael Schoenhals is a Ph.D. Candidate at the University of Stockholm, writing a thesis about the politics of China's Great Leap Forward. He has published a number of pamphlets and articles on Chinese politics and economics, mostly in Sweden, and has read papers on Chinese political discourse at the School of Oriental and African Studies (London) and the University of Copenhagen. Mr. Schoenhals currently lives in London.

¹ See, e.g., Jörg-Meinhard Rudolph, "China's Media: Fitting News to Print," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July-August 1984, pp. 58-67; and idem, "Cankao Xiaoxi: Foreign News in the Propaganda System of the People's Republic of China," *Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies*, Baltimore, MD, University of Maryland Law School, 1984.

² Kenneth Lieberthal, quoted in Godwin C. Chu and Francis L.K. Hsu, Eds., *China's New Social Fabric*, London, Kegan Paul International, 1983, p. 112.

against Japan (1937–1945) and prior to the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, it was the party's official news agency. In 1950, by decision of the new People's Government, it also became the official news agency of the state.³ Today, it is a central government organ (subordinate to the State Council), but is closely tied to the party Central Committee Propaganda Department and is an integral part of China's political system.⁴ Its current director, Mu Qing, is a member of the Central Committee⁵ and holds a formal position equivalent to that of a State Council minister.⁶

Xinhua's primary task has remained more or less the same since 1950, despite the numerous political campaigns and upheavals that have shaken China during the last 35 years. In one document, this task is defined as the collection and dissemination of information about "new things, new conditions, new people, and new experiences." Such information is to "serve a didactic purpose and be of use to the masses as guidance or reference for them in their work." Finally, Xinhua news dispatches are to be "comprehensive, timely, and accurate."⁷

But Xinhua does not serve only "the masses." A lesser known, but equally important, task of Xinhua is serving the special information needs of China's political elite. Through such publications as *Neibu Cankao*, China's news agency supplies the central party, government, and military leadership with regular reports about such things as the "views and moods prevailing among the masses" and "problems and defects in the work" of the party.⁸ In short, it satisfies fundamentally different needs for the PRC's leaders than for the rest of the Chinese population.

Since Xinhua began publishing *Neibu Cankao* in 1951,⁹ it has remained the most exclusive publication of its kind in China. Although its exact circulation is not known, circumstantial evidence and statements

from Chinese informants¹⁰ (the reliability of which cannot be verified) suggest a readership of some 1,000 to 2,000. One CCP document describes the readership of *Neibu Cankao* as all "responsible comrades within the central leadership." Just how many people this might actually refer to is difficult to determine, but CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang has put a similarly designated category of people at between one hundred and a few thousand.¹¹ About all one can say with certainty is that the circulation of *Neibu Cankao* is extremely restricted. In the 1950's, it was published somewhat irregularly, though on average it appeared once a day; today it appears twice daily, once in the morning and once in the afternoon.¹²

Initially, *Neibu Cankao* was edited in a somewhat improvised fashion, without precise and established guidelines as to its content and editorial policy. In July 1953, however, the CCP Central Committee presented Xinhua with a set of regulations detailing what it wanted the bulletin to contain. These "Regulations Governing the Writing of Internal Reference Materials by Xinhua Journalists" still constitute the basic charter of *Neibu Cankao*. According to the "Regulations," *Neibu Cankao* is to contain information on the following six topics:

(1) *How the party's short- and long-term policies are carried out in various localities and problems that arise in this process, especially the kinds of difficulties, erroneous tendencies, errors, and shortcomings encountered, knowledge of which might be of reference value for the work of leading organs.*

(2) *The current political and ideological climate among the different social strata of the people. Their views on important domestic and international politi-*

³ *Zhongguo Gongchandang Xinwen Gongzuo Wenjian Huibian* (Collected Documents on Journalistic Work of the Chinese Communist Party—hereafter *Wenjian Huibian*), Beijing, Xinhua Chubanshe 1980, Vol. 2, p. 66. This *neibu* compilation in three volumes contains 359 documents on CCP press and propaganda work written between 1921 and 1956, almost none of which was previously known or available outside China.

⁴ For details on the relationship between Xinhua and the CCP Propaganda Department, see *Wenjian Huibian*, Vol. 2, pp. 191–92.

⁵ See US Central Intelligence Agency, *Directory of Chinese Officials: National Level Organizations*, CR 85–12068, Washington, DC, June 1985, p. 122.

⁶ *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Quanguo Renda, Zhongyang he Difang Zhengfu, Quanguo Zhengxie Lijie Fuzeren Renming Lu* (List of the Names of Responsible Persons of Past National People's Congresses, Central and Local Governments, and National Political Consultative Conferences of the People's Republic of China), Beijing, Renmin Chubanshe, 1984, includes the head of Xinhua among persons of ministerial rank.

⁷ *Wenjian Huibian*, Vol. 2, p. 250.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ The earliest reference to *Neibu Cankao* I have come across is Jan. 30, 1953 (*ibid.*, p. 248). However, counting backward from two 1959 issues, the exact publication dates and serial numbers of which are known, and assuming that *Neibu Cankao* appeared more or less once a day in the 1950's, I arrive at 1951 as the most likely year in which it commenced publication. Judging from information provided in *Wenjian Huibian*, it seems highly unlikely that *Neibu Cankao* existed prior to the First National Xinhua Work Conference that convened in December 1950.

¹⁰ My main informant is a journalist, who, in 1982–1983, worked for a newspaper in Beijing, which is where I spoke with him. Other informants were friends of the offspring of persons having access to the *Neibu Cankao*.

¹¹ *Wenjian Huibian*, Vol. 2, p. 248; and *Xuanchuan Dongtai Xuanbian* 1979 (Selections from Propaganda Trends 1979—hereafter *Xuanbian* 1979), Beijing, Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 1981, p. 204. *Xuanchuan Dongtai* (Propaganda Trends) is the *neibu* weekly bulletin of the CCP Propaganda Department. Before the Cultural Revolution, it was called *Xuanjiao Dongtai* (Trends in Propaganda and Education), but after having been discontinued in 1966, it resumed publication under its current title in 1979. It is, according to its preface, a publication intended to "guide the work" of its readers, defined by the editors as CCP cadres "on or above the county level" who are engaged in propaganda work.

¹² From the same journalist cited in fn. 10.

cal events. The difficulties they encounter in their life and work and their opinion of leading organs.

(3) Problems in united front work.

(4) [Party] work experiences whose unripe or experimental nature makes them unsuitable for open reporting.

(5) Details about natural disasters in various parts of the country and the activities of counterrevolutionary elements.

(6) Other important conditions about which open reporting would be inappropriate.¹³

Although these topics have remained the same for over three decades, the way in which they have been interpreted by Xinhua editors and journalists has not. "Important conditions about which open reporting would be unsuitable" have in part depended on historical and political circumstances. Presumably, they encompassed a much broader range of facts in the days of the Korean war than they do today. Some indication of what is generally considered "inappropriate" for "open reporting" by the current Chinese leadership is given in a summary of discussions on economic policy published in 1979 in the weekly bulletin of the CCP Propaganda Department. The summary addresses what kind of facts should be reported openly and what kind of reports should be published only in so called internal publications:

However, . . . whatever forms part of the downward adjustments should not be mentioned in the open propaganda. Internal publications [neibu kanwu] should systematically reflect the situation and problems occurring on the economic front in the course of increasing production and practicing economy and carrying out the policy of readjustment, so that central, provincial, and municipal party committees may be guided by them in good time.¹⁴

As for the style and language to be used by Xinhua journalists when writing "internal" reference materi-

als, the CCP has emphasized that they should not be propagandistic, but aim only, or as far as possible, at presenting "pure facts." The 1953 "Regulations" explicitly state that "when writing reference materials, journalists are only responsible for the objective reporting of facts. They should neither express views about the things they describe nor put forth demands for action on the part of the authorities concerned."¹⁵

An Excerpt from *Neibu Cankao*

Xinhua reports carried in *Neibu Cankao* are rarely reproduced elsewhere, but sometimes it does happen that other "internal" publications quote or reprint them. The following is an excerpt from a restricted Xinhua news dispatch, as reprinted in the *neibu* bulletin of the CCP Propaganda Department, *Xuanchuan Dongtai* (Propaganda Trends), on December 3, 1979:

During the latter part of October, feudal superstitious activities of mass character, revolving mainly around asking the Gods for medicine, have spread rapidly from the Yinnan region to the old city, new city, and suburbs of Yinchuan [capital of the Muslim Autonomous Region of Ningxia] and the counties of Yongning and Helan, subordinate to Yinchuan municipality, where they are increasing in magnitude. In a very short time there have appeared 29 places of activity in Yongning county, spread over all the eight communes in the county. The number participating each time in the superstitious activities ranges from a minimum of ten people to a maximum of a thousand. Furthermore, at approximately 10 o'clock in the evening, on October the 17th, 28 trucks from Yinchuan and Helan transported staff, workers, and local residents to Yongning to burn incense and ask for medicine. During the last couple of days, these activities seem to have become the main topic of conversation in the alleys and courtyards here. . . .¹⁶

This short excerpt is an example of the kind of factual report that attempts to provide members of China's political elite with an idea of the mood prevailing among a part of China's population. In a later section of the same report, the editors discussed the inhabitants' difficulties generally and attributed the resurgence of "feudal activities" in the area to a lack of proper medical facilities and doctors. Similar Xinhua reports, originally circulated only among those in the central leadership, and later reproduced in

¹³ Wenjian Huibian, Vol. 2, pp. 250-51.

¹⁴ Xuanbian 1979, p. 113. A monthly title and author index to a large number of *neibu* PRC periodicals in the fields of philosophy, politics, law, economics, literature, religion, sociology, history (including CCP history), and education is currently edited and published by the library of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences under the title *Neibu Ziliao Suoyin* (Index to Internal Materials). Unfortunately, the index is neither for sale in bookshops nor available for subscription through the regular distribution system of China's postal service, but can only be subscribed to directly from the publishers by PRC units, schools, and organizations above the county and regiment levels. Subscriptions from individuals are currently not accepted. It should be pointed out here that the index does not list articles appearing in *Neibu Cankao*, but only more widely distributed *neibu* publications such as those put out by CCP party schools, professional organizations, and academic institutions.

¹⁵ Wenjian Huibian, Vol. 2, p. 251.

¹⁶ Xuanbian 1979, p. 267.

other restricted but more widely distributed publications, have included a description of the poor morale prevailing among People's Liberation Army soldiers in Fujian; a very detailed account of a series of bestial mass murders in Guizhou; a piece about an African student who handed in obscene photographs of himself and two naked Chinese women to a photo shop in Shanghai to be developed and printed; and a description of how the 61 CCP members among the Chinese personnel employed at Beijing's joint-venture Jianguo Hotel grapple with the delicate problems posed to them by their "capitalist" working environment.¹⁷

Other Neibu

What are some of the other *neibu* news bulletins of lesser standing and wider circulation than *Neibu Cankao*? Among these, Xinhua's bulletin containing translations of international news from foreign sources, *Cankao Ziliao*, is perhaps best known outside the PRC. A fairly well known bulletin containing domestic news intended primarily for a local (as opposed to national/central) privileged party and government audience is *Baokan Wenzhai* (Newspaper Excerpts), put out by the publishers of the Shanghai *Jiefang Ribao* (Liberation Daily).¹⁸

In the early 1950's, the official party paper, *Renmin Ribao* (People's Daily), published a reference bulletin similar to *Neibu Cankao*, but it was discontinued after a few years since it was considered to be little more than a duplication of the latter.¹⁹ At present, *Renmin Ribao* edits a *neibu* bulletin entitled *Qingkuang Huibian* (Situation Summary).²⁰ Before the Cultural Revolution, this publication was called *Meiri Qingkuang Jianbao* (Brief Daily Situation Reports).²¹ *Qingkuang Huibian* is different from *Neibu Cankao* in that it contains not only "pure facts" and news dispatches written by *Renmin Ribao* journalists, but also a considerable proportion of opinions, appraisals, and comments by these same journalists. One Zhang Shihong, for instance, made the following very pertinent comment on the overall information policy of the CCP in issue No. 1178 of *Qingkuang Huibian* in 1979:

*There are those who claim that to let the masses know more about what goes on among the leaders of the party would lead to ideological confusion. In reality, this is not at all so. It has always been insufficient knowledge of things that has created ideological confusion. . . .*²²

Intra-Elite Communications

If Zhang's statement could be taken at face value, there would seem to be little need for *neibu*. But PRC history suggests otherwise. Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and other high-ranking CCP leaders have on many occasions commented favorably upon restricted Xinhua news bulletins. For example, in a letter to Xinhua on February 2, 1953, Mao praised the agency for its coverage in *Neibu Cankao* on "bureaucratic habits, abuses of power, and illegal acts" among CCP cadres in the Chinese countryside and stated that the Central Committee got a good idea of how its instructions were being implemented by reading the internal reference bulletin. (Later in 1953, Mao's letter was circulated within Xinhua together with a comment that Mao had instructed the agency and its local bureaus to "cover and expose bureaucratism, commandism, and offenses against law and discipline and to print this kind of news in *Neibu Cankao*.")²³ After the upheavals in Tibet in 1959, Mao wrote another letter to Xinhua suggesting that the agency keep the Beijing leadership informed about the situation among the Tibetans by way of *Neibu Cankao*.²⁴

In 1956, Liu Shaoqi met and talked to the Xinhua leadership on at least two occasions. He stressed that it was imperative for political and tactical reasons to make a clear distinction between those events that could be openly reported and those about which reports should be confined to *neibu* news bulletins. In May 1956 he said:

Something that has happened may be true, but if open reporting about it serves the enemy and not our own cause, then we cannot allow it to be openly reported, but should rather write about it internally. Journalists

¹⁷ *Xuanchuan Dongtai Xuanbian 1980* (Selections from Propaganda Trends 1980), Beijing, Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 1981, pp. 173-78, 273, 277; and *Xuanchuan Ziliao* (Propaganda Materials), No. 13, Chengdu, Zhonggong Sichuan Shengwei Xuanchuanbu, 1984, pp. 6-15.

¹⁸ Information on the contents and circulation of *Baokan Wenzhai* was given to me by foreign students studying in Shanghai. Additional information on *neibu* news bulletins published in Shanghai is provided in *Ziliao Gongzuo Tongxun* (Newsletter on Documentation), Beijing, People's University, No. 3, 1981, pp. 45-47.

¹⁹ *Wenjian Huibian*, Vol. 2, p. 252.

²⁰ *Xuanbian 1979*, p. 65. The English journalist Philip Short refers to *Qingkuang Huibian* in his book *The Dragon and the Bear*, but his comment that it is comparable

to, but on a higher level of secrecy than, *Neibu Cankao* is, in my opinion, wrong. It is an entirely different type of publication and is by no means, as he claims, a "secret bulletin of domestic political intelligence." See Philip Short, *The Dragon and the Bear—Inside Russia and China Today*, London, Abacus, 1982, p. 139.

²¹ Information on the different *neibu* publications put out by the publishers of *Renmin Ribao* is provided in *Tantan Baozhi Gongzuo* (On Newspaper Work), Beijing, Xinwen Yanjiusuo, 1978, pp. 119-20.

²² *Xuanbian 1979*, p. 69.

²³ *Wenjian Huibian*, Vol. 2, p. 248, contains both Mao's letter and Xinhua's comment.

²⁴ *Mao Zedong Shuxin Xuanji* (Selected Letters of Mao Zedong), Beijing, Renmin Chubanshe, 1983, pp. 555-56.

in China and journalists stationed abroad both must produce internal reference materials. *Neibu Cankao* should be made into an authoritative publication.²⁵

One month later, in June 1956, Liu told the leadership of Xinhua that they "must run *Neibu Cankao* and *Cankao Xiaoxi* seriously. You must take your work seriously. . . . You must call a special conference, and discuss how to run *Neibu Cankao*."²⁶ In November 1956, presumably in direct response to this call for an elevation in the status of *Neibu Cankao*, Xinhua submitted a report to the CCP Central Committee stating that the agency had two primary tasks of equal importance: to provide to central party leaders reference materials and photographs not suitable for distribution among the general Chinese public, and to gather and release, inside China and abroad, important and interesting news about Chinese and foreign politics, economics, culture, etc. (including both text and photographs).²⁷

While *Neibu Cankao* is primarily a medium for the transmission of news and information from a nationwide network of journalists to a small elite readership, it at times also functions as a vehicle for high-level intrabureaucratic communication. China's leaders themselves occasionally publish comments and letters in *Neibu Cankao*. In this way, they are able to communicate their views on particular issues to the rest of the party, government, and military leadership without using more formal channels, such as circulars or directives from the various executive bodies and departments of the Central Committee.²⁸

²⁵ *Wenjian Huibian*, Vol. 3, p. 363.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 381. It has been assumed by some Western scholars that *Cankao Xiaoxi* commenced publication in 1956 (see, e.g., Helmut Opletal, *Die Informationspolitik der Volksrepublik China* [Information Policy of the People's Republic of China], Bochum, Studienverlag Brockmeyer, 1981, p. 98 *passim*). As a matter of fact, this is wrong. *Cankao Xiaoxi* had already existed for some time when it was mentioned by name in the July 1953 CCP CC regulations referred to above. My guess is that *Neibu Cankao* and the original *Cankao Xiaoxi* both saw the light of day at about the same time, i.e., in 1951. The reason why Liu Shaoqi did not, as might have been expected in this context, refer to *Cankao Ziliao* (a detailed description of which can be found in Rudolph, "China's Media," pp. 58–67) is that most likely it did not exist in 1956. Possibly *Cankao Ziliao* was created to succeed the original *Cankao Xiaoxi* in 1957 when the circulation of the latter was increased from 2,000 to 400,000. The earliest issue of *Cankao Ziliao* I have come across is one dated Nov. 8, 1957.

²⁷ See the 28-page Red Guard pamphlet *Zhanduan Liu Shaoqi Shenxiang Xinhua She de Heishou* (Chop off Liu Shaoqi's black hand, reaching out for Xinhua), n.p., n.d., p. 13.

²⁸ See Kenneth Lieberthal, with the assistance of James Tong and Sai-cheung Yeung, *Central Documents and Politburo Politics in China*, Ann Arbor, Michigan Papers in Chinese Studies No. 33, 1978, pp. 6–21, for a discussion of the significance of Central Committee circulars as a vehicle for intrabureaucratic communication within the Chinese political system. An index to the circulars has been compiled by the Domestic Documentation Section of *Renmin Ribao* (Beijing) and published by the publishers of *Renmin Ribao* under the title *Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenjian Suoyin* (Index to Circulars of the CCP Central Committee). See also *Ziliao Gongzuo Tongxun*, No. 1, 1982, p. 21.

In issue No. 2929 of *Neibu Cankao*, published on December 8, 1959, a letter from Mao Zedong accompanied a Xinhua report on pig breeding in a People's Commune in Hebei Province. Mao's letter apparently was originally directed to the head of Xinhua, Wu Lengxi; it began with the words, "This document is very good, please reproduce it in Xinhua's *Neibu Cankao*," and went on to point out that the CCP leadership at every level ought to consider the possibilities of expanding pig breeding on a grand scale.²⁹

Useful Tool or Unreliable Crutch?

Given the importance of *Neibu Cankao* as a medium through which the Chinese political elite gets most, if not all, of its daily information on what is happening in China, it is hardly surprising that at times it has been used covertly by some members of that elite to try to lobby for their own stand in important policy matters. Assuming for instance that members of the CCP Politburo read *Neibu Cankao* every day—and Mao Zedong for one said that it and Xinhua's other news bulletin, *Cankao Ziliao*, were the two daily sources of information that he always read, no matter how busy he was³⁰—whoever controls the contents of *Neibu Cankao* wields a considerable amount of political power and influence in China.

In 1962, Mao Zedong castigated Xinhua because it had recently published too many positive reports in *Neibu Cankao* on successful experiments in the PRC countryside with so-called responsibility systems.³¹ Judging from admittedly scant evidence, it seems that Mao was afraid that too many of these positive reports might eventually make a majority of the CCP leadership come out in support of such experimental systems. Knowing the degree to which his colleagues were dependent on *Neibu Cankao* for their knowledge of what went on in the countryside, Mao used his own political power and authority simply to forbid the further publication of reports on the responsibility system. In this way, he successfully obstructed further

²⁹ For Mao's letter and the editor's reference to *Neibu Cankao*, see Mao Zhuxi Guanyu Fazhan Yangzhuyue de Zhishi (Instructions from Chairman Mao on the Development of Pig Breeding), n.p., n.d., 1975, pp. 1–2. For an English-language translation, based on a garbled Red Guard version of the text, see Joint Publications Research Service, *Miscellany of Mao Tse-tung Thought (1949–1968)*, JPRS Nos. 61269-1 and 61269-2, Washington, DC, 1974, pp. 173–77.

³⁰ *Mao Zedong Xinwen Gongzuo Wenxuan* (Selected Texts on Journalism by Mao Zedong), Beijing, Xinhua Chubanshe 1983, p. 215.

³¹ Helmut Martin, *Mao Zedong Texte* (Mao Zedong Texts), Munich, Hanser Verlag, 1982, Vol. 5, p. 653; Martin's source was a Red Guard publication entitled *Xinwen Zhanxian Liangtiao Luxian Douzheng Dashi Ji* 1948–1966 (An Account of Important Events in the Struggle Between Two Lines on the Journalistic Front, 1948–1966), n.p., n.d.

lobbying in Xinhua in support of a policy he himself opposed.

Despite a general tendency among many Chinese to view any *neibu* information as reliable and "truthful,"³² China's leaders seem to be aware that uncritical overreliance on Xinhua reports can be highly dangerous and have politically disastrous consequences under certain circumstances. Examples of members of China's political elite's making "erroneous" decisions based on misleading information from Xinhua in *Neibu Cankao* abound in the history of the PRC.

For instance, in February 1959, while talking to provincial and municipal party secretaries, Mao Zedong indicated that his information in May and June of 1957 concerning the amount and scope of unrest at Beijing University had been skewed. Xinhua's reports in *Neibu Cankao*, he said, had been exaggerated and had unduly frightened him and presumably other CCP leaders. He suggested that the decision to launch the Anti-Rightist Campaign had been based partly on an incorrect assessment of the political situation. Thus, Mao warned his audience that it should not just read, trust, and rely on *Neibu Cankao*.³³

Criticism has also come from those outside of official political circles. During the 1979 "Democracy Movement," for example, opinions echoing those of Mao some 20 years earlier were voiced by dissidents. One member of the editorial board of *Beijing Zhi Chun* (Beijing Spring), a leading journal of the movement, said in a report to the Qinghua University CCP Committee in May 1979 that one of the reasons why "magazines run by the people"—that is, non-CCP-controlled publications—were useful was because they gave the "party center" an opportunity to hear "the voice of the grass roots and the masses." The "democratic journals," he said, are "much more immediate and vivid" than Xinhua's *Neibu Cankao*.³⁴

Neibu Cankao's checkered history may or may not have something to do with the recent emergence of yet another highly restricted *neibu* periodical. Writing about "errors" and "shortcomings" within the CCP on higher levels than that covered by Xinhua reporters and *Neibu Cankao* seems to be the task of a group of writers/journalists newly affiliated with the CCP Discipline Inspection Commission, the party's watchdog organization charged with combating corruption and political misbehavior.³⁵ These writers/journalists live and work under somewhat special conditions due to the sensitive nature of their work. In most cases the Discipline Inspection Commission supplies them with the "raw facts" on which they are to base their stories, which are then printed in the Commission's bulletin.

Unfortunately, the name, frequency, and circulation of this bulletin are still unknown outside China.³⁶

Curbing Jurisdictional Conflicts

Xinhua journalists, irrespective of where they work, are directly subordinate to the central authorities in the head office in Beijing. One of the journalists' most important tasks is to be the eyes and ears of the CCP center. In this respect they are different from other Chinese journalists who work for local or provincial newspapers. The 1953 CCP regulations governing internal Xinhua news bulletins clearly anticipated the possibility of conflicts arising between leaders of local party committees and conscientious Xinhua reporters covering, for example, those committees' implementation of central directives. Section III of the regulations, entitled "On Relations with Party Committees," addresses the relationship between Xinhua journalists and CCP party committees:

Xinhua journalists working in various localities must carry out their work under the leadership of the Xinhua Head Office as well as under the simultaneous supervision of the party committees on the various levels. Attention must be paid to the prevention of anything suggesting disrespect of the views of the party committees. Of course, respecting the views of the party committees does not mean that journalists are not allowed to disagree and hold a different opinion on certain matters. Neither does it mean that they should not report to the center on shortcomings in the work that they witness. In order to facilitate their work, it is hereby stipulated that: Materials concerning matters pertaining to the work of party committees under the prefectural level written by journalists of Xinhua may be sent directly to the Xinhua Head Office; materials containing reports on problems in the work of party committees on the provincial and municipal levels should first be passed on to the responsible person within the provincial or municipal party committee to look at before they are sent to the Xinhua Head Office. If a journalist is of the opinion that something

³² Rudolph, among others, notes that the *neibu* classification enhances the credibility of periodicals in the eyes of the Chinese public. See "China's Media," p. 66.

³³ *Miscellany of Mao Tse-tung Thought (1949–1968)*, p. 152.

³⁴ *Qingnian Yanjiu* (Youth Research), No. 2, Beijing, Gongqingtuan Zhongyang Yanjiushi, 1979, p. 19.

³⁵ For a brief discussion of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission, see William deB. Mills, "Generational Change in China," *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1983, pp. 31–32.

³⁶ Information on this bulletin was given to me by a PRC journalist who had turned down an offer to work for the Discipline Inspection Commission.

ought to be reported to the party center, even though the provincial or municipal party committee disagrees with the materials, the latter should be accompanied by the view of the party committee. . . .³⁷

Inasmuch as there appears to be no source other than *Neibu Cankao* through which party and govern-

ment organs at lower levels can receive regular, straightforward information on the "shortcomings" and "erroneous tendencies" at higher levels, *Neibu Cankao* has become an integral part of that set of checks and balances by which the CCP center skillfully retains a high degree of control over the rest of the party. In some ways, this aspect of *Neibu Cankao* almost surpasses in importance its uses as a channel of information.

³⁷ Wenjian Huibian, Vol. 2, p. 251.

Soviet Book Hunger

John and Carol Garrard

THE SOVIET UNION publishes more books each year than any other country in the world. Soviet statistics show that in 1982 the USSR published 713 books for every 100 of its citizens.¹ More than enough, one would think, to satisfy the Russians' demand for reading material, even allowing for the fact that the statistics count brochures as books so as to make the figures look more impressive. The Soviet Union also publishes large numbers of monthly journals and magazines with equally impressive subscription lists.² Furthermore, the print runs of most Soviet books are enormous, far beyond those of anything but the biggest sellers in American publishing. Soviet officials cite such figures with pride whenever they are given an opportunity to do so.

Soviet statistics, however, only state how many books are published, not how many are sold. Many a

book with an enormous print run—as high as two million—may gather dust in bookstores or be remaindered and pulped. In contrast, books with a small print run may enjoy immense popularity and become yet another *defitsitnyy* item in great demand, like quality food or clothing. The absence of decision-making based on principles of supply and demand has had the same negative impact on the Soviet publishing industry as it has elsewhere in the Soviet economy. The result has been a “book hunger” that is now so widespread that even the Soviet press is obliged to take it seriously.

The phrase “book hunger” (*knizhnyy golod*) or sometimes, more euphemistically, “book boom” (*knizhnyy boom*) began appearing in the Soviet press a dozen years ago. Articles on the topic have been published with increasing frequency ever since, attempting to define the problem, explain its causes, and offer solutions. Much of what we in the West know about book hunger derives directly from the Soviet media, which on occasion can be remarkably outspoken. Realizing that they have to compete with foreign radio broadcasts in Russian and cater to an increasingly sophisticated audience, officials of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) have given the press more freedom to criticize “negative phenomena” in Soviet society. However, the matter

John Garrard is Head of the Department of Russian and Slavic Languages and Director of the Institute for the Study of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe at the University of Arizona (Tucson), and is a member of the Research Team of the Soviet Interview Project currently undertaking a specialized project conducting intensive interviews with Soviet writers and editors now living in the United States. Carol Garrard is an independent communications consultant in Tucson. Interviews in Europe and the USSR were made possible by grants from the Earhart Foundation and IREX, and the Garrards were guests of the Gorky Institute for World Literature of the USSR Academy of Sciences during their stay in Moscow in December 1983. Radio Liberty facilitated interviews in Munich and Paris. Work was begun on this paper while at the Hoover Institution (Stanford, CA) and was completed at the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies (Washington, DC). The material will be included in a forthcoming book by the Garrards on the Soviet Writers' Union.

¹ *Pechat' SSSR v 1982 godu* (Soviet Publications in 1982), Moscow, Statistika, 1983.

In addition to the overall statistics provided in this volume, one can find the print run of any Soviet book at the back, together with the coded number of the censor who signed off on it for publication.

² It is only fair to point out that much new fiction first appears in the traditional “thick journals” (*tolstyye zhurnaly*), so that print runs of books do not represent the total available copies of fictional works. The chief periodical for fiction on a massive scale is *Roman-gazeta* (literally, “Novel-newspaper”), which appears every two weeks and had a subscription list in 1983 of 2 million, with a further half a million copies circulated for public sale. Each issue contains a complete novel or long fictional work (some works take two or even three issues) that has first been published elsewhere within the previous two or three years. The idea is to republish works that have demonstrated great popularity with the reading public. Such literary journals as *Novyy mir* (New World) also have large circulations.

of "book hunger" is many-layered, touching upon sensitive economic and political issues. The press is not permitted to address all of its levels, or to reveal all the types of books that are in demand. It also cannot come to grips with the real reasons for the persistence of "book hunger" after more than a decade of government efforts to solve the problem, nor can it tackle the problem's future implications.

Therefore, in attempting to shed some light on these questions, we have relied not solely on published Soviet materials, or even on the personal interviews that we conducted with Soviet editors and publishing executives in Moscow in December 1983. Since no Soviet publishing official is likely to criticize his employer, we also interviewed recent Soviet émigré writers and journalists who now live in Europe and the United States, as well as defectors with professional experience in Soviet publishing. Finally, we have also used data generated by the Soviet Interview Project, a survey of recent Soviet emigrants now living in the United States; the project is directed by James R. Millar of the University of Illinois and is funded by the National Council for Soviet and East European Research. Naturally, the analysis and interpretations drawn here from the project data are our own and not necessarily those of the sponsors.

The Reading Public

To some extent, a hunger for books has existed throughout modern Russian history as a direct result of government censorship. Traditionally, because Russia has lacked the institutions for unrestricted public discussion of social, political, and sometimes even ethical issues, books have provided a substitute forum. This is why novelists and poets can become heroic figures and why Russian governments regard them as dangerous rivals.³ Think, for instance, of the excitement aroused by the award of the Nobel Prize for Literature to Boris Pasternak in 1958 or to Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in 1970. To find a parallel in the West, one must turn to the award of the Nobel Prize for Peace to the likes of Martin Luther King or, more recently, Bishop Desmond Tutu.

One tends to think of censorship in terms of its effect on writers and on the creative process. But it also affects readers. Even before the Bolshevik coup of 1917, tsarist censorship restricted public access to

books, and Soviet control of information has been much more severe. Russians have never enjoyed the luxury that citizens of the United States and other Western (and many non-Western) nations take for granted: the freedom to buy in a bookstore or to borrow from a public library the particular book they wish to read.

However, two important characteristics distinguish the current book hunger from anything in the past. First, it is a mass phenomenon, no longer limited to the intelligentsia. Second, the general public's demand is not for books that would normally be considered subversive, even by the Soviet government's definition of the term.

Andrey Nikolayevich Sakharov, chairman of the literature section of the State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing, and the Book Trade (Goskomizdat),⁴ suggested in a December 1983 interview that improvements in the standard of living and in the cultural and educational level of the Soviet population have contributed to the increased demand for works of fiction. This is the fourth generation of Soviet citizens to have had access to higher education in large numbers. Nearly universal literacy is one of the regime's undoubted achievements. In fact, education is the only category among those used to quantify "quality of life" in which the Soviet Union comes close in percentage of GNP expenditure to that of other industrialized countries. In all other categories the Soviet Union lags sadly behind, since it focuses relatively little attention on consumer goods, preferring instead to devote capital to heavy industry and military production. The result is a highly educated population with a low standard of living and few sources of quality entertainment and leisure activity.

Book hunger, and official acknowledgment of its existence, both constitute signs of important changes that have been taking place in Soviet society over the past generation. Obviously, one needs some discretionary income in order to buy books. Hunger for books is a lot healthier than hunger for food; the terrible famines of the past are no more than painful memories. Russians are not starving—as one glance at the national waistline will attest. They can get enough to

³ For a more detailed discussion of the unique role played by literature in Russian history, see the Introduction in John Garrard, Ed., *The Russian Novel from Pushkin to Pasternak*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1983.

⁴ The full title of Goskomizdat is *Gosudarstvennyy komitet SSSR po delam izdatel'stv, poligrafii i knizhnoy torgovli*. It reports to the USSR Council of Ministers, and is currently headed by Boris Pastukhov. We are grateful to Andrey Sakharov and his colleagues for granting us interviews and for their attempts to answer our questions fully and factually. During our visit to Moscow we were treated with unfailing courtesy at all times. The interviews were conducted in Russian; all translations are ours.

For a good outline of Goskomizdat's functions see Gregory Walker, *Soviet Book Publishing Policy*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1978, pp. 29–36. Walker provides a table of organization on p. 34.

eat, though the choice may be limited and the queues long. After Russians have bought food, they still have rubles left to spend on books and other luxuries.

Émigrés in Europe and the United States concur in attributing Soviet book hunger to a sharp rise in the educational and cultural level of the Soviet population. Sergey Yur'enen, a young émigré writer and critic now living in Munich, even suggested that what had been taking place was an "intellectualization" (*intellektualizatsiya*) of Soviet society. Both the émigrés and Soviet officials thus agree that "book hunger" as a mass phenomenon is essentially a creation of the Soviet regime itself. As we shall see, the Soviet authorities have not only laid the groundwork for the problem, thus becoming victims of their own success, but have actually exacerbated the problem by their failure to face up to the political and economic issues involved.

Hunger for What?

What people in the Soviet Union want to read seems innocent to Western eyes: all types of domestic and foreign fiction; works on history, philosophy, and art; and books about the West, particularly about the United States. But fiction clearly tops the list of books in demand, and it has been the focus of the growing Soviet press coverage of the book hunger phenomenon.⁵ Data from the Soviet Interview Project confirm the special place of fiction. A very high proportion of respondents (86.1 percent) said they had read fiction for pleasure while living in the Soviet Union.

The Soviet press is in general agreement with the émigrés and with our own personal observations. What the average Russian wants are the Russian classics (e.g., Pushkin and Tolstoy), the latest "hot" item in Soviet fiction (e.g., works by Valentin Rasputin or the late Yuriy Trifonov). In addition, there is an enormous and clearly unsatisfied demand for classic and contemporary foreign fiction—ranging from James Fenimore Cooper, Alexandre Dumas, and Mark Twain to Arthur Hailey, Kurt Vonnegut, and Louis L'Amour.

Surprisingly, it turns out that none of these types of

fiction is easy to obtain. During the interview in Munich, Yur'enen arranged (in descending order of availability) the following categories of fiction: (1) humdrum contemporary Soviet fiction; (2) Russian classics; (3) good Soviet fiction; (4) translations of Western literature; (5) Russian fiction published abroad (*tamizdat*); (6) Russian fiction (and poetry) of the 1920's and early 1930's by authors who emigrated, became "unpersons," or were imprisoned and sometimes murdered. Yur'enen's ranking was confirmed by most other émigrés to whom we spoke. They also agreed with him that the literature hardest to obtain in the USSR is anything religious, particularly the Bible.

Yur'enen's list does not include any reference to *samizdat* or "self-publishing"—the circulation in manuscript form of written material never submitted and unlikely to have been approved for official publication. Of course, the émigrés we spoke to were thinking primarily of published books. However, the relatively narrow audience for *samizdat* is corroborated by data generated by the Soviet Interview Project. Given the nature of the sample population—émigrés, chiefly from large cities and towns in the European part of the Russian Republic, with a much higher average educational level than that of the Soviet population as a whole—it was surprising to find that so few respondents had actually read *samizdat* or *tamizdat* materials. More than two thirds (69.6 percent) said they had not done so.

Not all strata of society are interested in all the categories of books on Yur'enen's list. The great mass of the Soviet population is interested only in the first four types of fiction listed above, and the Soviet press restricts itself to these four categories when discussing *knizhnyy golod*. The remaining two items, Russian fiction published abroad and the poetry and fiction of suppressed Russian authors of the 1920's and 1930's, lie more within the range of concern of the intelligentsia. They are not acknowledged as acceptable reading matter by the Soviet authorities.

Data generated by the Soviet Interview Project once again appear to confirm other estimates of the types of reading material that are in greatest demand. When asked about the categories of fiction they used to like to read most, the émigré respondents gave the replies indicated in Table 1. As can be seen from the table, the classics—foreign and domestic—top the list of reader preferences, with contemporary fiction published in the Soviet Union falling significantly further behind.

This list is interesting when compared with what the respondents said they wanted to read more of, but

⁵This figure and other data cited from the Soviet Interview Project (SIP) were provided by the SIP Data Management Center, and are preliminary and subject to revision.

As has been noted, there is also a hunger for nonfiction works. For example, the mass-audience weekly picture magazine *Ogonëk* (Moscow) published in January 1983 an interview in which the deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of History remarked that the enormous increase in the reading public's interest in history had obliged historians to devote more attention to "psychological motivation" and to write in a more lively style. He also noted that popular history books are published in hundreds of thousands of copies and yet still sell out very fast.

Table 1: A Sampling of Soviet Reader Preferences for Fiction

Type of fiction	Percent who read it ^a
Classic foreign fiction	53.8
Classic Russian fiction	48.2
Detective/mysteries	42.8
Modern foreign fiction	41.8
Soviet fiction	32.1
World War II fiction	28.4
Science fiction	28.0

^a During last year of normal life in the USSR.

SOURCE: Soviet Interview Project's Data Management Center. The data are preliminary and subject to revision.

could not for various reasons: the largest percentage (31.1 percent) said they wanted to read more modern foreign fiction, and the next largest group (22.2 percent) said they wanted to read more classic foreign fiction. As noted, Yur'enen ranked translations of foreign fiction as the most difficult to obtain. In other words, the Soviet Interview Project data and the consensus of émigré writers and critics suggest that foreign works rank at the top of the types of fiction that Soviet readers most want to read and yet find hardest to acquire. This fascination with foreign, i.e., Western, fiction—indeed with everything Western—is an aspect of book hunger that has caused the Soviet authorities special problems.

A Soviet literary critic recently (May 1985) provided confirmation of this pattern on a visit to the United States. Knowing of our interest in Soviet "best-sellers," he had asked for the hottest selling items these days at the Writers' Union bookstore in Moscow and brought three top qualifiers as gifts. The three books were: Aleksandr Chakovskiy, *Neokonchennyy portret* (Unfinished Portrait); Viktor Chernyak, *Chas probil* (The Time Has Come); and Valeriy Gusev, *Shpagu knyazyu Obolenskomu!* (A Sword for Prince Obolensky!). The first two novels deal with American characters and are set partly in the West. Chakovskiy's portrait is of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, now officially viewed as a great statesman whose "constructive" attitude toward the USSR has been betrayed by succeeding presidents. The third book is a collection of mystery stories. All three books are poorly written and contain standard Soviet propaganda statements, but such fiction about the West evidently must substitute for Western fiction by Western writers, which is in such short supply.

Goskomizdat's Sakharov alluded to other factors contributing to the mass demand for books: "People want everything. They like to decorate their homes

with collections of the classics. Everyone wants to have books to read now, and also to leave as a bequest to their children." And several émigrés spoke about the "gentleman's collection" (*dzhental'menskiy nabor*), i.e., the books that an elegant man-about-town should have on his shelves. The émigré poet Joseph Brodsky remarked in his fascinating autobiographical essay "Less Than One" that "it was—and still is—a mark of chic for the Soviet middle class to subscribe to new editions of encyclopedias, classics, and so on."⁶ Reading books, or at least possessing them, is felt to be a mark of culture, and to call a Russian "uncultured" (*nekul'turnyy*) is tantamount to questioning the circumstances of his birth.

Book hunger is also a matter of rubles and kopeks. Books have become a valuable commodity and a prized possession. They take up little space, are portable, are in short supply, and do not spoil; moreover, "one size fits all." What has occurred in Soviet society, at least on the part of the reading public, is a democratization of culture in which Socialist Realism seems to have played only a minor role. Apartments bulge with books, crowded on floor-to-ceiling bookshelves that line small rooms, stacked on the floor, on the refrigerator, on and under the couch that serves as a bed, and on chairs. Regardless of the obstacles, Soviet citizens manage to obtain lots and lots of books.

Making Do In A "Defitsitnyy" World

Russians have reacted to the shortage of books in much the same way as they do to other shortages, by relying on contacts or the black market. Our own experiences bear this out. One of our Soviet friends is a cultivated woman who is very interested in art and poetry. When we asked her what book she would like as a gift, she responded that she had heard there was a new edition of Anna Akhmatova's poetry out—could we get it? We could, but only at the Writers' Union bookstore. There we asked another Soviet friend, a member of the Union, to go up to the upper level (where foreigners are not allowed) to find it. Thus, as visitors in the Soviet Union, we had to resort to the same sorts of stratagems that the Soviets themselves rely on in order to get a book in demand. The typical scene in Soviet new and used bookstores is one of crowds of people milling around searching in vain for something interesting to buy. You have as good a

⁶ *The New York Review of Books*, Sept. 27, 1979.

chance of buying a book you want from another person in the bookstore as from the bookstore itself. (During a recent visit to a Mocow bookstore, a woman offered us a dog-eared translation of Heinrich Heine's poetry.)

Just as the discriminating Soviet shopper goes to the legal "farmers' markets" to find fresh fruits and vegetables, so too the discriminating reader is willing to turn to private enterprise to obtain books. Unfortunately for the Soviet reader, while the farmers' markets have been tolerated by the regime, private initiative in book buying and selling is called "speculation" and is a punishable offense. The official Soviet view is that selling any item above the government's assigned price is speculation. And sentences are regularly meted out to "criminals" engaged in this vice.⁷ Soviet friends tell us that it is not unusual for members of the intelligentsia to spend 50 to 100 rubles on a desired volume whose listed price might be only four or five rubles. (The Soviet average monthly income, according to most Western experts, now stands at around 200 rubles.)

In his informative 1981 essay on "Books in the Soviet Second Economy," Keith Bush notes still other ways in which Russians have bypassed the official distribution and pricing system in order to obtain the books they or their fellow citizens want to read.⁸ These include stealing books from libraries, forging the coupons that one obtains by taking books and scrap paper in to pulping centers, and selling books and magazines confiscated from foreigners by customs officers.

Bush drew his examples chiefly from articles and letters to the editor published in the Soviet media. A review of the Soviet press since 1981 and of comments by recent émigrés confirms that these activities continue. Indeed, Russians appear to be displaying even more ingenuity and to be "speculating" on a broader scale. One new scam involves the sale of "reconstituted books," i.e., complete copies patched together from several defective copies taken from publishing houses. A recent review of this activity notes that it is taking place on a massive scale. The biggest market in such books seems to be for Soviet *detektivy* ("who-done-its") as well as foreign adventure novels by such perennial favorites as Jules

Verne, James Fenimore Cooper, and Mayne Reid, a 19th-century British author of Westerns who is completely unknown outside Russia. People are willing to pay 15 to 20 times the list price for such books. For example, a novel by Arthur Hailey priced at 9.50 rubles (presumably a secondhand copy), once "reconstituted," sells for 75 rubles.⁹

Émigrés describe still another instance of private initiative used to obtain copies of rare books. Translations of foreign novels, which are in great demand in urban areas, are distributed in larger quantities to the provinces, where the demand is slight. In order to counter this faulty distribution system, a group of friends will designate one of their number by turns to scour the countryside. Six copies of John Updike's *Centaur* were located in this way about 100 kilometers from Moscow, and three copies of the works of Hermann Hesse were found in Kalinin, about 150 kilometers away.

One particularly widespread example of free enterprise is the pirating and translation of contemporary foreign novels, particularly American fiction. Somehow a copy is obtained, either from a visitor or a Soviet citizen returning from abroad. Then students in language institutes work long hours translating it; copies are made and sold at considerable profit. Such activities are totally illegal according to Soviet law. They are also quite dangerous, if only because the use of copy machines is restricted; unauthorized use can bring a prison sentence of two or three years, if not longer.¹⁰

Foreign visitors can also be a good source for rare Soviet editions, since they have access to Beryozka stores. These stores—a Soviet invention that has since spread to other communist states—are sometimes called "dollar stores," because only Western hard currencies are accepted in them. Leonid Vladimirov, a former Soviet journalist now living in England, pointed out to us that Beryozka stores had their antecedents in the Torgsin stores of the late 1920's: "The difference is that Torgsins would accept any gold or silver in exchange for vouchers for good food and other luxuries. Thus many Soviet citizens used to shop there—alongside foreigners." Now only special sections of Beryozkas are open to Soviet citizens—those members of the elite and/or nomenklatura who are

⁷ For example, *Izvestiya* (Moscow) reported on Jan. 27, 1983, that a typical "speculator" who worked as a vendor of lottery tickets had been sentenced to four years in prison for selling popular fictional works from his apartment. In one deal he received 85 rubles for a secondhand book that the state had priced at 18. See *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, OH—hereafter *CDSP*), July 13, 1983.

⁸ *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin* (Munich), RL 468/81, Nov. 23, 1981.

⁹ Allan Kroncher, "A New Wrinkle in the Unofficial Book Trade," *ibid.*, RL 116/82, Mar. 10, 1982.

¹⁰ For a fascinating account of the ways in which famous and not-so-famous foreign authors have been translated into Russian, see Maurice Friedberg, *A Decade of Euphoria: Western Literature in Post-Stalin Russia 1954-64*, Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1977.

paid in "certificates" (worth many times their face value in rubles).

The Soviet authorities use the Beryozka stores to obtain valuable foreign currency from tourists. The stores have proven so useful that they have been expanded to sell all sorts of merchandise, even books. During the winter of 1983-84, the main Beryozka bookstore in Moscow was greatly enlarged. The authorities now stock the store with Soviet publications that are unobtainable in regular bookstores, knowing that foreigners will pay hard currency to buy those publications for themselves and for their Russian friends. Russians with access to foreign currency supposedly can buy books there as well. The works sold for hard currency tend to belong to the categories of fiction that are relatively difficult to obtain: good contemporary fiction or works by "rehabilitated" authors.

Meeting the Demand

Soviet publishing executives and CPSU officials insist that satisfying popular demand is precisely what they are trying to do. For example, on a visit to West Germany in 1977, Irakliy Chkhikvishvili, then vice-chairman of Goskomizdat, said in an interview with *Der Spiegel* that "editorial councils" in publishing houses decide what books to publish. These councils in turn determine the number of copies to be printed on the basis of "orders received from readers" and of the "material means" at their disposal. Oleg Bezrodnyy, deputy chief of Goskomizdat's International Relations Department, echoed this statement during an interview with us in Moscow in December 1983:

We depend upon social opinion. In each publishing house there are councils of authors, writers, and critics. Each publishing house presents its plan to the council, and that council discusses each plan within each department of publication. It is either accepted, or we make some corrections. We listen to the opinions of critics, authors, and readers.

During our discussions, there was much talk about meeting demand, or at least trying to meet it, in terms of both content and size. Further investigation revealed that the process is a little more complicated than these statements might suggest. As far as we were able to discover, the sequences of events is the following. Each publishing house does indeed have an advisory council, which makes recommendations. However, it is Goskomizdat that decides to accept or modify these initial proposals. They are then returned to the publishing houses, each of which prepares its

own publication "thematic plan" or *templan* for the coming year. Copies of each *templan* are made available free of charge to libraries and bookstores (in the latter case through SoyuzKniga—literally, Union-Book), which are invited to request titles in whatever volume they feel they need in order to meet public demand.

We were given a copy of one *templan* by Aleksandr Puzikov, chief editor for "Khudozhestvennaya Literatura" publishing house. Published in Russian in an edition of 71,000 copies, this *templan* (for the year 1983) contained 217 items, chiefly of original Russian works but with several works of foreign literature in Russian translation and a sprinkling of books published in the various non-Russian languages of the USSR.

Among the American authors, the editions proposed by "Khudozhestvennaya Literatura" for 1983 (all but one of them in print runs of 50,000 copies) were as follows: Henry James, tales and stories; Washington Irving, novellas; James Fenimore Cooper, *The Last of the Mohicans*; Mark Twain, *The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn*; J. D. Salinger, *The Catcher in the Rye* and selected tales; Ernest Hemingway, *For Whom the Bell Tolls*; Sherwood Anderson, *Winesburg, Ohio* and other tales; Robert Penn Warren, *All the King's Men* and *Meet Me in the Green Glen*; and Joyce Carol Oates, *Do With Me What You Will*. The list leans toward older works, because this publishing house is chiefly responsible for classics (*aproprirovannyye veshchi*). "Raduga," formerly known as "Progress," publishes postwar fiction.

If Soviet publishing executives understand the nature of the demand, why do they not respond to it better? Soviet publishing executives argue that the sheer size of the demand precludes satisfying it. During our Moscow interview, Sakharov insisted: "You would need the printing presses of the entire world to meet the demand. One or two million copies is nothing." When pressed to give estimates in hard figures, he responded that an edition of 30 million copies of Tolstoy might come close to the demand, or that 10 million copies of Pushkin might be sufficient. Sakharov admitted: "We know the demand, but we cannot meet it." Oleg Bezrodnyy repeated much the same thing to us: "You could cut down all the woods of Siberia—it would still not meet the demand." Sakharov estimated that only about one-third of the public's demand for fiction was being met. But even this seems overly generous; an article in *Literaturnaya gazeta* of August 22, 1979, stated that only 10 percent of the demand was being met by bookstores, and there is no evidence that the situation has improved

since that time. Émigrés tend to think that even less of the demand is met.

Going back to Sakharov's own example, we would note the oversubscription of a recently completed edition of Tolstoy's works in 20 volumes with a print run of 1 million. Shortly before we met with Sakharov and other Soviet publishing officials, Goskomizdat and the USSR State Supply Committee announced a special five-year plan (for 1985–1990) in which very large editions of up to 30 million copies of books in great demand are scheduled for publication.¹¹

Soviet officials and the Soviet media are unanimous in pointing to another important economic cause of book hunger: the shortage of paper. Hence one shortage is blamed on another, a not uncommon situation in the Soviet economy, resulting from centralized planning. That such a shortage actually exists in the USSR is astonishing for the country possesses, according to one recent study, "about one-third of all standing, and over one-half of all the world's valuable coniferous, forests."¹² Leonid Vladimirov told us that the paper shortage is certainly real:

In 1958 I wrote a long article on this for the late Literatura i zhizn' newspaper (afterwards called Literaturnaya Rossiya). The censor did not allow me to quote the following figures on the annual production of newsprint per head of population obtained from the Agitprop Paper Section (Sektor bumagi Agitpropa) of the CPSU Central Committee:

USSR—less than 2 kilograms
Finland—12 kilograms
France—15 kilograms
United Kingdom—22 kilograms
USA—48 kilograms.

The gap may be narrower today, but not much narrower.

A recent article sheds some light on the causes of the paper shortage.¹³ Losses and waste in the timber industry continue to be very large, "in excess of one-third of all cut trees." The author of this article, Boris Mironov, also makes short work of the so-called pulping stations that were first set up in 10 cities on an experimental basis in 1974 and were extended to 40 more locations in 1983. The purpose of these centers

was to receive waste paper or unwanted books for recycling, as part of a campaign to make books more available to the reading public. According to Mironov, the pulping centers were a failure: 80 percent of the scrap paper had to be burned since it was not distributed to paper mills, and in any case there were no incentives (*nikakikh stimulov*) for the mills to use the scrap paper even if they did receive it. The Soviet press has also noted over the years that many of the books brought by citizens to the pulping centers were actually stolen from libraries and bookstores.

Poor distribution also plagues the book trade. According to one account about the book trade in Kazakhstan, readers are not informed about new publications, books are not delivered where they have been requested, and shipments of books are "picked over" before they arrive. An open letter to the press in 1981 from five distinguished Kazakh writers complained that "in some instances large shipments of books have not been opened for years and have consequently deteriorated to the point where they are no longer usable."¹⁴ Librarians and readers constantly complain that their requests for books are ignored. One librarian in charge of 1,250 libraries in Vologda province reported that she had ordered 6,000 copies of Dostoevsky's novel *The Humiliated and the Injured*, but received only 384. She was able to obtain only 96 of 1,000 requested copies of a novel by the officially approved writer Aleksandr Chakovskiy. As often as not, requests are simply ignored, or copies of totally unrelated books are dumped on libraries so that the distributors can fulfill their quotas.¹⁵

While it is true that the demand for books is enormous and that both the paper and publishing industries are notoriously inefficient, it is difficult to accept these factors alone as an explanation for continuing book hunger. For one thing, Soviet bookstores are packed with unsold books, published in enormous print runs. Then, too, the Soviet Union remains a major book exporter. A recent research report produced by the US Information Agency indicates that in 1982 the Soviet Union "exported more than 70 million books—more than 37 million in Russian or another language of the USSR, and 33 million in a foreign language."¹⁶ If paper is in such short supply, why so many exports?

¹⁴ Cited in Charles Carlson, "Mismanagement of Book Trade in Kazakhstan," *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, RL 48–84, Jan. 31, 1984.

¹⁵ Yu. A. Andreyev, "In Vologda Country," in V. Ya. Kantorovich and Yu. B. Kuzmenko, Eds., *Literatura i sotsiologiya (Literature and Sociology)*, Moscow, Khudozhestvennaya Literatura, 1977, pp. 397–98.

¹⁶ William E. Freeman with Scott Righetti, *Soviet Book Exports, 1973–82*, Washington, DC, US Information Agency, Office of Research, March 1984.

¹¹ *Sovetskaya kul'tura* (Moscow), Sept. 3, 1983, trans. in *CDSP*, Oct. 5, 1983, pp. 27–28.

¹² Peter Blandon, *Soviet Forest Industries*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1983, p. 9.

¹³ *Nash sovremennik* (Moscow), June 1984.

The Ideological Factor

As the preceding paragraph suggests, the Soviet book shortage is really a matter of politics—i.e., questions of power and ideology are more important than economics in determining what books are published, in what quantities, and for what markets. There are plenty of books in the USSR, but not the books people want to read. The CPSU has decided that the “classics of Marxism-Leninism” and other sociopolitical works must be published at the expense of the classics of Russian literature and certainly of foreign fiction, let alone popular novels. Sakharov made it quite clear that publishing decisions would always favor not only textbooks and reference books but also “sociopolitical works.”

Oleg Bitov, a defector who had been editor of the foreign literature department of *Literaturnaya gazeta*, told us during an interview in London in June 1984 that the regime is perfectly aware that the populace does not want to read the ideological tomes that continue to be published in such enormous quantities. They are printed because the ideology says they *must* be printed.¹⁷ Bitov pointed, as an example, to a book by Konstantin Chernenko on the USSR’s “leading role” in fostering human rights. It had an enormous print run, but soon disappeared from the shelves. Bitov claimed that it had not sold out, but had simply been pulped, without even waiting for citizens to take it to the official pulping centers. The exercise served to reflect Chernenko’s new prestige and, incidentally, represented an enormous “achievement” for the publisher’s own *templan*.

This illuminating vignette is not an isolated incident. As far back as 1974, one A. Rubinov argued in *Literaturnaya gazeta* that publishers print books just to destroy them.¹⁸ Leonid Brezhnev must have broken all print records, at least since Stalin, with the enormous editions of his (ghost-written) memoirs. We must assume that they too were mostly pulped. An exception was Brezhnev’s *Leninskoy kursom* (On Lenin’s Course), which was a big seller only because the Soviets packaged it in a valuable leather binding worth 2.50 rubles, whereas the book sold for only 60 kopeks.

Russians simply bought the book and threw out the text.¹⁹ (It is not unusual for officially sponsored books to be printed on uncommonly high-quality paper with excellent bindings.)

It is only after these types of books have been printed that the scramble begins for the rest of the paper. And what is fiction’s share of the total output of printed pages? One émigré told of attending a “closed” meeting in the USSR at which a Central Committee lecturer admitted that only 7 percent of the available paper is allotted to fiction.

Even in the case of fiction, the political priorities of the party override the preferences of the reading public. Recent articles on book hunger criticize a growing “consumer mentality” among readers. Official pronouncements deplore the public’s desire for “adventure and light-reading titles that are of no great educational value,”²⁰ and a reporter for *Izvestiya* complains about the “brisk market that exists for light adventure reading.”²¹ The authorities continue to issue decrees such as that printed in *Pravda* of July 30, 1982, which ordered editors of literary magazines to publish more works with “socially significant themes” to counter such “apolitical positions and a consumer mentality.” Valeriy Golovskoy, an émigré journalist and critic now living in New York, told us that works by, or ghost-written for, party leaders do in fact sell vast quantities simply because all libraries *must* buy them. Furthermore, millions of people in a giant network of military and civilian political education groups, or *kruzhki politicheskogo prosveshcheniya*, are required to read and study these works. (In the case of Brezhnev’s memoirs Golovskoy did say that the writing was so creditable that the work enjoyed a measure of genuine popularity among many readers.)

Having created the demand for books, Soviet officials now find that they cannot control it. The democratization of culture in Russia means that the mass reading public wants to read popular novels as well as Tolstoy and Pushkin. Even though the tastes of the population do not seem to run to anything that could be called anti-Soviet, the taste for popular fiction, especially foreign fiction, is suspect in the eyes of Soviet officials.

¹⁷ We interviewed Bitov in London in June 1984, just six weeks before he disappeared—only to resurface in Moscow on September 19, claiming not to have defected but to have been kidnaped by British intelligence. I discuss the Bitov affair in detail in *Intelligence Report of the American Bar Association Standing Committee on Law and National Security* (Washington, DC), Vol. 6, No. 11, 1984, pp. 3-5. My conclusion is that Bitov did defect voluntarily to the British in Italy, and was then kidnaped or forced to return to Moscow in August 1984.

¹⁸ *Literaturnaya gazeta* (Moscow), Aug. 2, 1974.

¹⁹ *Posev* (Munich), No. 4, 1980, p. 12, quoted in Bush, loc. cit., p. 3.

²⁰ *Sovetskaya kul'tura*, loc. cit., p. 27.

²¹ See L. Ivchenko, “I Have a Book to Trade,” *Izvestiya*, Mar. 9, 1984, trans. in *CDSR*, Apr. 4, 1984, p. 32. Ivchenko recounts entering one of the 86 of 209 bookstores in Moscow authorized to buy and sell used volumes and offering a novel by a “well-known Soviet author” for “designated exchange” or “free barter.” The sales clerk barely glanced at the volume and refused to take it, evidently knowing there would be no demand for this “correct” work.

Purity vs. Profit

Considerations of ideology clearly cloud not just the selection of titles and size of print runs but also, as a result, the economics of Soviet publishing. Since the 1970's, the Soviets have been conducting a lively discussion in the press about the nature and place of the book as a "product." Some writers have argued that books are a commodity like any other, one whose value should be sought not in ideological terms but in economic ones, with the cost of production balanced against the selling price.²² However, the authorities have rejected this view. Although the State Planning Committee (Gosplan) still regards *printing* as a full-fledged industry, *publishing*—everything involved in the preparation, distribution, and sale of a text—is listed with clubs and libraries as part of culture and education. Consequently, a Soviet publishing executive has two plans to fulfill: the familiar economic plan and the ideological *templan*.

Nevertheless, Soviet publishers we interviewed continually stressed the profit motive. Viktor M. Menshikov, deputy editor-in-chief of the "Khudozhestvennaya literatura" publishing house, told us that his enterprise makes a profit of 150 million rubles in an average year. Andrey Sakharov, too, stressed profits, although he noted that his organization could have made even more by publishing *The Godfather* or a James Bond novel. These he passed up because they "are not serious works." Yet, he firmly denied any contradiction between the need for political orthodoxy and the desire for economic profit.

In seeking to make a profit, editors attempt to meet part way the demand for popular fiction, even as they strive to maintain a "serious" profile. This was illustrated by an anecdote recounted by Dmitriy Urnov, a well-known Moscow literary critic, during an April 1985 lecture at the Kennan Institute in Washington. The journal *Inostrannaya literatura* (Foreign Literature) printed a translation of Arthur Hailey's *Hotel* in its "subscription month" issue (when a reader must sign up for the annual subscription). Circulation immediately increased. Then the journal followed in succeeding months with a translation of William Faulkner's *Light in August*. The opening chapter, with its description of a golf game seen through the eyes of the retarded Benji, did not go over well with the Soviet "middle-brow" public. Circulation plummeted the following year. Letters to the editor pleaded for a return to fiction "in the Hailey style." As Oleg Bezrodnny put

it, "the more love stories it publishes, the more demand there is for a given periodical."

Given the intense public hunger for works of fiction, it is not hard for publishers to make a profit with almost any work. Furthermore, publishing houses pay rates that are very modest by American standards, although not unreasonable judging by the Soviet standard of living. Valeriy Golovskoy pointed out that successful authors can make ruble fortunes and that there are quite a few "millionaire writers" in Moscow. Any author whose collected works are published in three of four volumes can be counted a millionaire at once.

Golovskoy updated some of the information on author's fees given in Gregory Walker's 1978 book. An author receives 250–600 rubles for each *pechatnyy list*, i.e., a printed sheet or "signature," as it is known in Western publishing. A signature consists of 16 pages, or 40,000 printed characters (about 6,000 words). One advantage of receiving state prizes, for example the Lenin Prize, is that an author can command top money for his works. In addition, a print run of 100,000 (not unusual) would count as a double mass circulation (*tirazh*), with the author receiving double the rate per signature. The general pattern is for an author to receive an advance of close to 40 percent based on the number of signatures, then 60 percent on submission of the manuscript, followed by print run payments (*potirazhnyye*) on publication. It is easy to see how these figures can add up to a comfortable income for a Soviet citizen, while not really cutting into the profits of the publisher. One author and publishing official, Tankred Golenpolskiy, told us in Moscow that he had received an advance of 3,000 rubles for a collection of American folk songs he had translated and edited.

In an interview in Munich, Anatoliy Limberger, an émigré who worked at *Komsomol'skaya pravda* for nearly 20 years, said that what the regime wants in the publishing industry are people who know how to play the ideological game, but are at the same time professionally competent and able to make a profit. This dual responsibility requires not only talent but also a measure of cynicism.

According to Bitov, a Soviet publishing executive does not regard profit as his most important goal. Rather, he is more preoccupied with two other objectives. The first is to protect his own fiefdom. Consequently, the executive constantly asks himself, "What does my own immediate superior want?" His second objective is to be "safe" from an ideological point of view. Only after assuring himself on these two counts does he let the profit factor come into play. Thus, ideo-

²² Walker, op. cit.

logical constraints leave consumer demand unsatisfied while cutting into the profits of the Soviet Union's own publishing empire.

Ulterior Motives?

And yet, some émigrés argue that, far from being troubled by book hunger, Soviet authorities have in effect deliberately created it and are using it to good advantage. Viktor Enyutin suggested in an interview that access to translations of foreign literature are a special "carrot" that the regime allows to a privileged few whose services are in demand:

They translated Proust, they translated Joyce—very sophisticated—they translated Garcia Lorca. You can read Garcia Lorca, and you can work eight hours per day for the Soviet government, and have your salary, and be quiet. And it is easier for you to be quiet if you have the chance to read Garcia Lorca than if you don't have the chance to read him. . . . And you can feel that you are among the chosen few.

The émigré writer Vladimir Voinovich made a similar point in a piece entitled "Shut Up, and Eat!" He says that the regime provides writers with the special privileges associated with membership in the Writers' Union, and then expects writers to be grateful and perform as required on demand.²³ Members of the Writers' Union and other privileged groups are often allowed to jump the queue on the restricted subscription rolls of popular magazines and journals. In addition, the Writers' Union has its own bookstore.

Still, it may be imputing too much Machiavellian sophistication to the Soviet regime to claim that book hunger was deliberately created. As we have tried to show, ideological blindness and the basic inflexibility of the system probably have as much to do with the persistence of book hunger as does any conscious decision by anyone. However, it is certainly true that the authorities have shown considerable flexibility in turning it to their own advantage. They understand that they can guarantee the silence, if not the loyalty, of bureaucrats and professional elites by doling out privileges in a systematic fashion. If the regime published the books that everyone wants, then how could it use related privileges and special access to reward the faithful?

Indeed, such privileges are one of the main props of

the regime. Access to limited goods and services is the Soviet meaning of privilege, and is more important to a Soviet citizen than money, although we have already seen that authors, like other professionals, are paid handsomely according to an elaborate system. Privilege is also carefully graded. Once a citizen enters the *nomenklatura*, he becomes entitled to a certain type of coupon, which can be used in a certain type of grocery store, and so on.²⁴ Gradations of privilege affect literature as well. For example, there is the Literary Fund (*Litfund*), which was set up to help the 9,000 members of the USSR Writers' Union. Membership in itself is a much-sought-after privilege (Sakharov and other top editors mention it on their business cards). But the membership is divided into three carefully separated levels of privilege. The first level is available only to 50 or 60 at the top, the second to some 300 senior people, and the third to the rest of the members.²⁵ Privileges include access to vacation villas, books, consumer goods, transportation, trips abroad, lawyers, theater tickets, and everything else that is *defitsitnyy*. The books in Beryozkas are another example of this system of privilege, one by which the Soviet government achieves several ends at once. The shops keep certain books out of the hands of the public at large, and also serve to earn much-needed foreign currency. In addition, foreigners who go into Beryozka stores and see copies of Bulgakov or Akhmatova get the false impression that such works are readily available.

Another example of privileged access to books, albeit on a somewhat lower and broader basis, are the special libraries maintained at many places of work, such as government ministries and factories. It is almost impossible to find anything worth reading at public libraries, but your work or association library will offer a much better selection. Even publishing houses have their own libraries, as do the "creative unions" (organizations of writers, journalists, film makers, and so on). Incidentally, these unions also give showings of the latest Western films, which are impossible to see elsewhere in the Soviet Union.

If the party has a problem, it is how to adjust to the rising expectations of Soviet citizens at all levels. The party *apparatchiks* need to move privileges along a sliding scale in order to help keep everyone else quiet while maintaining their own positions. To this end, they will address the public demand for books by doling out to the intelligentsia their ration of Garcia Lorca, and to citizens in provincial towns an occasional Agatha Christie. But such bones will not really assuage the fundamental public hunger for books.

²³ *The New Republic* (Washington, DC), Aug. 9, 1982, pp. 27–29.

²⁴ See Michael Voslensky, *Nomenklatura: The Soviet Ruling Class*, trans. by Eric Mosbacher, Garden City, NY, Doubleday, 1984.

²⁵ *The New York Times*, May 15, 1983.

Books

Solzhenitsyn: Unfinished Portrait

John B. Dunlop

MICHAEL SCAMMELL. *Solzhenitsyn: A Biography*. New York, Norton, 1984.

THIS NEW, 1,051-page biography of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn has earned considerable acclaim in the Anglo-American press. The comments of Norman Podhoretz in the February 1985 issue of *Commentary* are not untypical. Terming the biography "a wonderful book," Podhoretz accords Scammell high marks in virtually every category: "His prose is lucid and elegant; his scholarship is scrupulous, well-digested and lightly carried; and his narrative pace is steady and sure."¹ One can safely assume that reactions such as these have contributed to an impression—certainly among non-specialists—that Scammell's book will serve as the definitive biography of Solzhenitsyn for years to come.

John B. Dunlop is Associate Director and Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University (Stanford, CA). He is co-editor of *Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn: Critical Essays and Documentary Materials (1973 and 1975) and of Solzhenitsyn in Exile (forthcoming)*, and author of several works on the Soviet Union, including *The Faces of Contemporary Russian Nationalism (1983)*.

But the praise has by no means been unanimous, and a number of serious questions have been raised about the biography. Thus the distinguished Slavist Ronald Hingley of Oxford University weighed in with a scathing review of the book in *The Spectator*.² Veronica Stein, a cousin of Solzhenitsyn's first wife and a recent émigré, as well as an acknowledged "rich source of information" (p. 21) for Scammell's book, offered some searching criticism of the biography in a published letter to *Commentary* and in a privately circulated manuscript entitled "Notes Concerning Michael Scammell's Book *Solzhenitsyn*."³ And Professor Edward Ericson, author of a monograph on Solzhenitsyn, published a tightly-reasoned essay containing charges that cast doubt on Scammell's reliability as a biographer.⁴

What follows is an attempt at a balanced assessment of Scammell's volume, one that takes into account the considered judgments of earlier commentators. I begin with the book's unquestionable strong points.

Scammell terms his study a "biographical chronicle," and, as a chronicle, the book's virtues are considerable. To trace Solzheni-

tsyn's activities from the time of his birth in 1918 to the Harvard commencement address in 1978, placing them against the background of the Bolshevik Revolution and its aftermath, is a worthwhile and complex endeavor. Scammell has assiduously sought to determine where Solzhenitsyn was when, what he said where, etc. To this end, he has had to sift through a great deal of incomplete or contradictory evidence, including Solzhenitsyn's own writings (especially his literary memoir, *The Oak and the Calf*); the reminiscences of his friends and former colleagues; and the disinformation produced or sponsored by the Soviet authorities. With a few glaring lapses (of which more below), he has been successful in pursuing this goal, especially as it pertains to the period before 1956. The "biographical chronicle" aspect of Scam-

¹ Norman Podhoretz, "The Terrible Question of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn," *Commentary* (New York), February 1985, p. 19.

² Ronald Hingley, "Too Prickly to Be True," *The Spectator* (London), Mar. 9, 1985, pp. 27-28.

³ Stein's letter appeared in *Commentary*, June 1985, pp. 6-7. The Russian title of her privately circulated manuscript is "Iz zapisok o knige Maikla Skemmella 'Solzhenitsyn.'"

⁴ Edward E. Ericson, Jr., "In Search of the Real Solzhenitsyn," *Catholicism in Crisis* (Notre Dame, IN), February 1985, pp. 51-57.

mell's book is undoubtedly its strongest point.

Another obvious virtue of the book is its lucid style, which Podhoretz has correctly termed "elegant." Finally, whenever Scammell sets himself the goal of correcting misconceptions about Solzhenitsyn, he can be very illuminating. His level-headed and persuasive disposal of charges that Solzhenitsyn is an anti-Semite is a case in point, as is his discussion of the lawsuit that Olga Carlisle launched against the author and subsequently lost.

Unfortunately, the book's defects more often than not outweigh its virtues. The most obvious fault is Scammell's inability to condense his material, which results, as Ronald Hingley has pointed out, in "too much elementary background for the specialist and too much recondite material for the general reader. . . . Swamped in a plethora of detail, the essential tensions of such a life as Solzhenitsyn's easily lose their springiness."⁵ Hingley has put his finger on a salient flaw of the book; there was no inherent need for this biography to run to over a thousand pages.

A more complex problem concerns Scammell's attitude toward the object of his scrutiny. Whether or not Scammell's relationship to Solzhenitsyn constitutes the book's "hidden agenda," as Ericson has claimed, it is clear that this was a biography that involved various understandings (and misunderstandings) with its subject.

According to Scammell's preface, he first met Solzhenitsyn in the autumn of 1974, the year of Solzhenitsyn's expulsion from the Soviet Union. Scammell's name was known to Solzhenitsyn, as he had been engaged to revise and

polish the American translation of the first volume of *The Gulag Archipelago*. At their meeting, Scammell mentioned the idea of a biography to Solzhenitsyn and requested his cooperation. A correspondence then ensued over the book and its contents. According to Scammell, they eventually arrived at a "compromise" in which Scammell was free to ask any questions he desired, and Solzhenitsyn could respond in any way, and at any length, he saw fit.

A critical issue here was the type of biography under consideration. The Solzhenitsyns are emphatic that a "life and works" (with the stress on the latter) was always discussed, never an intimate biography.⁶ This point is also stressed by Veronica Stein, one of the persons extensively interviewed by Scammell, in her "Notes Concerning Michael Scammell's Book *Solzhenitsyn*." And indeed, in his letter to Solzhenitsyn of December 28, 1974, Scammell underlined his principal interest in the writer's literary persona rather than in his person. He also indicated that he did not plan to write a biography containing reflections on Solzhenitsyn's personal motives or family life, and specifically said that he intended to treat the author's relations with his first wife, Natalya Reshetovskaya, briefly and with detachment.

Whatever his original intentions, though, it is clear that Scammell's final product is far removed from such a description. Solzhenitsyn's person, rather than his persona, is the object of Scammell's attention; the book is replete with reflections on Solzhenitsyn's motives and family situations, and the biographer has been anything but brief or de-

tached in describing Solzhenitsyn's relations with Reshetovskaya. Indeed Scammell has admitted this shift in a recent letter to *Commentary*:

To tell the truth, I had originally intended to devote more of my book to the literary aspect of Solzhenitsyn's works, but that was before I realized how much I had to say on other matters, and saw what a monster I had spawned.⁷

The problem with this is that Solzhenitsyn, along with several other interviewees, had agreed to cooperate with Scammell on the explicit understanding that he was engaged in a literary biography. They are adamant that they would not have lent their names to anything else. It seems that Scammell's shifting emphasis was never made clear to the subjects of his interviews.

Another point of contention involves the week-long visit that the author made to Solzhenitsyn's home in Vermont in the summer of 1977. According to Scammell's preface, during this period he interviewed Solzhenitsyn for one to three hours a day. Solzhenitsyn, he reports, also permitted him to interview his second wife, Natalya Svetlova, and authorized him to interview one or two close friends, including Veronica Stein.

As the correspondence between the two men shows, this week-long meeting was the sole interview that Scammell was promised by the subject of his biography. Basing himself on the recollections of Solzhenitsyn's former secretary and close advisor, Irina Alberti, now editor of the prestigious émigré weekly *Russkaya Mysl'*, Ericson writes:

⁶ At my request, the Solzhenitsyns have generously supplied me with copies of the relevant letters from this correspondence.

⁷ Scammell's letter appeared in *Commentary*, June 1985, p. 4.

⁵ Hingley, loc. cit., p. 27.

... Solzhenitsyn gave Scammell a week at Cavendish [Vermont] to ask the questions which he had. Scammell was to have done his homework, so that there would not be an extensive ongoing correspondence which would deflect Solzhenitsyn from his own work. It was Scammell, not the Solzhenitsyns, who broke the agreement; he sent long lists of questions afterwards. . . . And what was the Solzhenitsyns' reaction: They kept sending him answers. For a couple of years.⁸

Ericson's conclusion: "It is apparent that Scammell was the recipient of Solzhenitsyn's generosity. Yet Scammell's preface makes Solzhenitsyn look not generous but niggardly."⁹

Indeed, Scammell does make Solzhenitsyn look niggardly. While he admits that, after his 1977 visit, Solzhenitsyn continued to answer his queries for two years, he obviously believes it was unfair of Solzhenitsyn to break off contact with him in 1979. He laments his "one and only visit to Vermont" (p. 975). One could argue, however, that Scammell's expectations were unrealistic. It appears that Scammell made poor use of his time in Cavendish, allowing himself to get bogged down in the minutiae of the writer's early years, and therefore managing to interview Solzhenitsyn only about events up to the 37th year of his life (i.e., up to 1955). One suspects that Scammell's excessive focus on detail would have tried the patience of a man far less concerned with time than Solzhenitsyn.

It is also worth noting that at about the same time that Solzhenitsyn began to withdraw his coop-

eration from Scammell's project, Scammell ceased being the writer's official translator. Scammell had earlier participated in the English translation of volumes 1 and 2 of *The Gulag Archipelago*, had translated the *Letter to the Soviet Leaders*, and had supervised the translation of *From Under the Rubble*. As he relates the story, an unfortunate misunderstanding caused his work on *The Oak and the Calf* to be condemned as "unfit for publication" (p. 889 fn). While Scammell expresses deserved admiration for the translator who took his place, Harry Willetts, he would be less than human if he did not resent this episode deeply, a feeling that could not fail to color his perception of Solzhenitsyn.

ONCE SCAMMELL ceased receiving answers to his queries from Solzhenitsyn, he found himself in a bind, although, as I have suggested, it appears to have been one largely of his own making. How was he to collect sufficient information on the post-1955 Solzhenitsyn? Here fate intervened. In 1982, Scammell reports (p. 18), Natalya Reshetovskaya sent him a message from the USSR that she was anxious to provide him with "her side of the story of her relations with Solzhenitsyn." Reshetovskaya had already given her side of the story eight years earlier in her book, *Sanya*, "coauthored" with the Novosti Press Agency,¹⁰ but Scammell leapt at the chance to get more information from her. He entered into correspondence with Reshetovskaya, and between March 1982 and May 1983 re-

ceived from her "a series of letters touching upon her relationship with her former husband, together with some excerpts from her unwritten memoirs" (p. 18).

Cut off from Solzhenitsyn, Scammell appears to have fallen under Reshetovskaya's sway. Ericson has documented Scammell's use of this source. By his count there are 211 footnote references to Reshetovskaya.

*Fifty-four of these are to seven letters which she sent to Scammell when she knew that he was writing this biography. The remaining 157 footnotes refer to her book Sanya, a frequently scurrilous treatment of her ex-husband. By contrast, only 134 footnotes are drawn from Scammell's extensive interviews with Solzhenitsyn himself. And a mere eight notes come from Solzhenitsyn's second wife, Natalia Svetlova.*¹¹

As Stein has noted, "Scammell is well aware that Reshetovskaya had earlier collaborated with Soviet authorities in their campaign to discredit Solzhenitsyn, yet he persists in accepting her version of events in a manner that can at best be called recklessly uncritical."¹² As an example, Stein cites events connected with the divorce proceedings in 1972: ". . . incredibly, he [Scammell] has chosen to skip over the stormy events of 1972: two court hearings in Ryazan (in June and July); the appearance of a manipulated lawyer, Alexeyeva; the false testimony of Alexeyeva and Reshetovskaya in court; and finally the direct intervention of the KGB and the resultant scandalous publicity in August."¹³ The memoirs of opera singer Galina

¹⁰ Natalya Reshetovskaya, *Sanya: My Life with Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn*, Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1975. The Russian version of this book, entitled *V spore so vremenem* (At Odds with the Age), was published in Moscow by Novosti Press Agency in 1975.

¹¹ Ericson, loc. cit., p. 53.

¹² See Stein's letter to *Commentary*, p. 7.

¹³ Ibid.

⁸ Ericson, loc. cit., p. 52.

⁹ Ibid.

Vishnevskaya, wife of cellist Mstislav Rostropovich, contain a detailed discussion of these events.¹⁴ Since Solzhenitsyn lived for a considerable period of time with the Rostropoviches, and since they have been in the West for some years, it would seem to have been incumbent upon Scammell to obtain their recollections. Yet it appears that he did not interview them; their names are strangely absent from the list of persons he spoke with.

Surely Scammell's great confidence in the testimony of an estranged wife who had vowed revenge against her former husband is to be questioned. Hingley sums up the case succinctly: "Excessive reliance is here placed on the testimony, highly suspect and discreditable to Solzhenitsyn, contained in communications volunteered from inside the USSR by his ex-wife. . . ."¹⁵

IN A CERTAIN sense, then, Scammell's biography may be considered two books: one treating Solzhenitsyn's life up to age 37 and largely relying on the writer's own testimony; and a second, tracing Solzhenitsyn's life after 1955 and relying heavily on Reshetovskaya's testimony. In this latter "book," Solzhenitsyn is seen through the prism of his first wife's unremitting hostility, magnified by Scammell's own growing dislike for the subject of his book. It is not surprising that the concluding half of the biography evidences a dislike of Solzhenitsyn bordering on detestation.

Norman Podhoretz has written that this biography "is a book written out of the deepest respect for its subject. . . ."¹⁶ It is not anything

of the kind, particularly in its latter sections. Scammell's outwardly objective tone tends to reassure the reader, but *Solzhenitsyn* is often a highly partisan and unfair book. It is unlikely that Scammell consciously decided to do a "hatchet job" on Solzhenitsyn; more likely, by the time he got to the last 600 pages or so, the "sage of Vermont" (as Scammell ironically calls him) had become an object of loathing to him. In a few spots this attitude breaks out into the open. Thus, while indicting Solzhenitsyn for his rhetoric at an AFL-CIO banquet in his honor, Scammell indulges in some rhetoric of his own: "shallow ingratiation," "gross flattery," "cheap gibes," "tendentious half-truth," "brazen demagoguery" (pp. 912-13). Similarly, he seems incapable of a calm discussion of Solzhenitsyn's literary memoir *The Oak and the Calf*: "didactic," "contradictory and boastful," "outsize egotism of the narrative" (pp. 538, 612, 924). Such outbursts, however, are comparatively rare; usually Scammell's bias is more subtle.

In his preface, Scammell writes (p. 19) that his aim has been "not to act as advocate or judge, but to illuminate. . . ." But it is precisely as an imperious judge that he frequently comes across. Often Scammell evidences no sympathy toward Solzhenitsyn where sympathy would appear to be due. Thus he denigrates (pp. 528-29) Solzhenitsyn's agonized reaction and thoughts of suicide at the time the KGB seized his archive in 1965. He belittles Solzhenitsyn's "love of mysticism and conspiracy," observing: "His past experiences at the hands of the security service had been no joke, but one cannot escape feeling that

Solzhenitsyn took a certain boyish delight in playing at disappearing and reappearing . . ." (pp. 547-48). Even Solzhenitsyn's concern that *The Gulag Archipelago*—perhaps the most anti-Soviet book ever written—would be discovered is made light of. Yet Scammell is aware that when the KGB did get its hands on a copy of the manuscript, they tortured the poor woman, Voronyanskaya, who had been concealing it, after which she was either murdered or committed suicide. As for Solzhenitsyn, he was charged with high treason, for which he could have been shot. At times Scammell's lack of empathy is astounding.

In general, Scammell does not give us much of a sense of Solzhenitsyn's lethal and cunning adversaries—Brezhnev, Andropov, and the Soviet regime. As one British reviewer put it: ". . . the full drama of Solzhenitsyn's achievement could be appreciated only in the light of some real understanding of the strength and awesome scale of the dark power he is up against. . . ."¹⁷ The problem is surely not lack of knowledge about the Soviet Union—Scammell has it in abundance—but a loss of perspective caused by an undue emphasis on Solzhenitsyn's alleged hubris. The fact remains that Solzhenitsyn did not exaggerate the dangers connected with his various projects, especially *The Gulag Archipelago*.

Scammell writes in his preface: "It would be idle to deny that he [Solzhenitsyn] is a man with substantial faults, as well as with some towering virtues" (p. 18). I submit that not a single virtue is discernible in the Solzhenitsyn depicted in

¹⁴ See Galina Vishnevskaya, *Galina*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1984, pp. 414-421.

¹⁵ Hingley, loc. cit., p. 27.

¹⁶ Podhoretz, loc. cit., p. 19.

¹⁷ Christopher Booker, "Years in the Life of Solzhenitsyn," *The Sunday Telegraph* (London), Feb. 24, 1985.

this biography. A man of towering talents, to be sure, but no virtues. A consistent denigration, usually subtle, of Solzhenitsyn is sensed throughout the book. Particularly in the second half, we are shown a steely-willed, workaholic megalomaniac, callously indifferent to the fates of his fellow men. Of course, this is explained by environmental factors: Solzhenitsyn never knew his father, was spoiled by his dotting mother, had a deprived childhood, went through the brutalization of the labor camps. But the end product is a most unattractive individual. Ronald Hingley has aptly commented that the real Solzhenitsyn is "a far more noble, admirable and likeable person than the figure who emerges here."¹⁸

To be sure, Scammell is not entirely consistent in his hostility toward Solzhenitsyn. Just as he speculates at times (pp. 394, 525, 558–59, 982) about the existence of two Solzhenitsyns—a vengeful "Old Testamental" Solzhenitsyn and one with flashes of insight into himself and others—so one might speculate about there being two Scammells: one who loathes the subject of his biography and one who struggles to be balanced in his assessment. But most of the time, it is the first Scammell who wins the struggle.

In addition to showing Solzhenitsyn as a flinty and overbearing egotist, Scammell at times shifts gears and depicts him as an eccentric or a coward. Solzhenitsyn's eccentricity is frequently emphasized in the book. I will limit myself to one instance. In discussing how Solzhenitsyn wrote *The Gulag Archipelago*, Scammell notes that the writer "had read somewhere the theories of the German doctor Beckmann that sleep was more re-

freshing—and that you needed less of it—if you went to bed at sundown and rose with the sun the next morning. Going the theory one better, he established a routine whereby he went to bed at eight o'clock each evening and rose at two . . ." (p. 575). My point is not that Solzhenitsyn lacks eccentric traits; like the rest of us, he has them. What seems odd is the insistent focus on this aspect and the concurrent lack of emphasis on the dedication and courage that were surely the driving forces behind Solzhenitsyn's writing. Scammell cannot see the forest for the trees.

Solzhenitsyn's extraordinary courage in the period prior to his deportation mesmerized the West. But Scammell will have none of this. Concerning Solzhenitsyn's decision to postpone publication of *The Gulag*, he writes (p. 813) that Solzhenitsyn "would rationalize the postponement by envisaging the reprisals for which he [above all, he] and others of his two hundred witnesses would be subjected once the book appeared." The transparent insinuation here (and elsewhere in the book) is that Solzhenitsyn is a coward.

Scammell is also astonishingly uncritical of negative assessments of the writer made by various acquaintances. Thus he accepts at face value the harsh judgments of Vladimir Lakshin, Ilya Zilberberg and others. He even cites approvingly (p. 645) the gibes made by the notorious KGB courier, Victor Louis, about Solzhenitsyn's beard.

On the other hand, those who express admiration for Solzhenitsyn and his work are invariably undercut by Scammell. Mary McCarthy's generally positive review of *August 1914* is described as "determinedly sympathetic" (p. 792). The account by London *Times* columnist Bernard Levin of

a meeting with Solzhenitsyn is termed "breathless" (p. 936). Lydia Chukovskaya's reminiscences of Solzhenitsyn are sarcastically presented as "marvellously sympathetic" (p. 821). These are not isolated examples; the pattern is consistent through the text.

Scammell's bias is particularly evident in his discussion of Solzhenitsyn's political and religious views. Podhoretz terms Scammell's politics "unobtrusively social-democratic."¹⁹ For a person with such political convictions to be able to grasp Solzhenitsyn's religiously based conservatism, a leap of empathy and understanding is obviously necessary. But Scammell is either unwilling or unable to make such a leap. Certainly his agreement with Aleksandr Tvardovskiy's categorization of Solzhenitsyn as an "extreme nationalist" (p. 925) is unacceptable to anyone who has studied the spectrum of contemporary Russian nationalism in the USSR.²⁰

Scammell's treatment of Solzhenitsyn's religion is one of the most obvious weaknesses of the book. Stein has rightly noted "an utter lack of sympathy for the writer's religious convictions" in the biography.²¹ In fact, Scammell's discussion of Solzhenitsyn's religious views is unremittingly snide. Solzhenitsyn's well-known "Prayer," for example, is dismissed thus: "There was nothing mystical or intimate about this prayer" (p. 641). Definitions of mysticism can differ, but about the intimacy of Solzhenitsyn's prayer there can be no

¹⁸ Hingley, loc. cit., p. 27.

¹⁹ Podhoretz, loc. cit., p. 19.

²⁰ For a discussion of this spectrum, see my *The Face of Contemporary Russian Nationalism*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1983; and my forthcoming collection of essays, *The New Russian Nationalism*, The Washington Papers Series, Washington, DC, Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1985.

²¹ See Stein's letter to *Commentary*, loc. cit., p. 7.

doubt. The prayer, Scammell continues, showed Solzhenitsyn's "eminently practical attitude to religion—God was there to help him accomplish things." But this is a distortion of what Solzhenitsyn, and millions of Christian believers, conceive of as man's relationship to the Divinity. If God wills it, man can accomplish anything; without that will, he can accomplish nothing. Basing himself rather slavishly on the testimony of an unnamed priest "who knew Solzhenitsyn well" (p. 992), Scammell even defines Solzhenitsyn as a deist rather than a theist. In fact, the evidence is overwhelming that Solzhenitsyn is a convinced theist and that his Orthodox Christianity is sincerely held. To be sure, Solzhenitsyn is no theologian à la Dostoevsky, but he neither pretends nor intends to be anything of the sort.

In his treatment of Solzhenitsyn's politics and religion, as in his understanding of Solzhenitsyn's personality, Scammell contrasts most unfavorably with the author of the best general study of Solzhenitsyn and his writings, Georges Nivat of the University of Geneva. Those seeking a balanced and objective introduction to Solzhenitsyn should read Nivat's stimulating *Solzhenitsyne*.²² Though less than one-fifth the size of Scammell's study, Nivat's book offers a superior and far more nuanced sense of Solzhenitsyn the man and the writer. Like Scammell, Nivat appears to share neither Solzhenitsyn's political and religious views nor his (restrained) Russian nationalism. But he does understand them, and he is able to balance empathy and detachment in a manner that seems beyond Scammell.

THE MAJOR DIFFERENCE between the two biographers, however, is that Nivat chose to focus on a "life and works" rather than on

a biography alone. To have attempted an assessment of Solzhenitsyn without examining his books in any depth is an unredeemable fault of Scammell's study. Since Solzhenitsyn lives for his art, his art must be the most central part of his biography. "I am good only in my art," Aleksandr Pushkin once said about himself. One can hardly imagine a biography of Pushkin that omits serious discussion of his poetry. Similarly, it is in his literary works that Solzhenitsyn reveals the brilliance and complexity of his intellect and spirit.

It may well be that Scammell does not even consider Solzhenitsyn to be an especially gifted writer. The rationale for the book seems to be different: since the world has made a fuss over this man, and millions of copies of his books have been sold, a biography is justified. Scammell shows no awareness of the fact that some of the most outstanding literary critics of the day have compared Solzhenitsyn to such inimitable stylists as Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, Gogol, and Herzen.²³

For example, Scammell does not conceal his low opinion of the "Red Wheel" historical cycle that begins with *August 1914* and on which Solzhenitsyn continues to work. The biographer wonders about "the appropriateness of the whole enterprise" and speculates: "It is possible that Solzhenitsyn had got more mixed up in politics since his expulsion not only out of a sense of compulsion but also as a subconscious escape [from the 'Red Wheel' project]" (p. 982). It should be noted that Anglo-American readers did not get an accurate sense of the first volume of

August 1914, due to the inadequacy of a hasty translation.²⁴ But even with that deficiency, some critics managed to sense something of the scope and subtlety of the work.²⁵ The second part of *August 1914* has appeared in Russian and in French translation and has been applauded by émigré and French critics.²⁶ None of them, to my knowledge, has called into question the "appropriateness of the whole enterprise." Two volumes of *October 1916* have also recently appeared in Russian, and I, for one, have read them with great interest and absorption.²⁷

The issue of the quality of English translations of Solzhenitsyn's writings deserves one last comment. One reason why Norman Podhoretz admires *The Oak and the Calf* but dislikes *The First Circle* and *Cancer Ward* may be the respective merits of their translations. But unlike Podhoretz, Scammell of course reads Russian and thus has less excuse for his literary assessments of Solzhenitsyn's writings. Hingley has rightly criticized Scammell for his slovenly treatment of this important issue:

Objections must be made. . . to the slapdash treatment of Solzhenitsyn's translations. . . [He] should either analyse these renderings systematically (and he does not even refer to Alexis Klimoff's creditable attempt to do just that, "Solzhenitsyn in English") or he

²⁴ *August 1914*, New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1972, translated by Michael Glenny.

²⁵ See the ten essays on *August 1914* in John B. Dunlop, Richard Haugh, and Alexis Klimoff, Eds., *Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn: Critical Essays and Documentary Materials*, 2nd ed., New York, Collier Books, 1975, pp. 328–446.

²⁶ For an important review by a new émigré, see Lev Losev, "The Splendid Russian Future," *Kontinent* (Munich), No. 42, 1984, pp. 289–320. For a sampling of French reactions, see *Vestnik R.Kh.D.* (Paris), No. 142, 1984, pp. 173–86.

²⁷ Published as volumes 13 and 14 of the author's *Collected Works*, Vermont/Paris, YMCA Press, 1984.

²² Paris, Éditions Écrivains de toujours/Seuil, 1980.

²³ See, for example, John B. Dunlop, Richard Haugh, and Michael Nicholson, Eds., *Solzhenitsyn in Exile*, Stanford, CA, The Hoover Institution Press, 1985.

*should leave them alone. As it is, high and low marks are scattered about as if Scammell enjoyed the unquestionable status of supreme arbiter in the field of translation from Russian.*²⁸

TO SUMMARIZE: Scammell has performed a service for future historians, biographers, and literary critics by establishing many of the facts of Solzhenitsyn's life (especially his early life) and integrating those facts into the world of Soviet political history and literary politics. It is precisely as a factual

chronicle that Scammell's book is valuable, although the reliability of his data declines sharply in the discussion of Solzhenitsyn's relations with Reshetovskaya.

Scammell has been immeasurably less successful in conveying a balanced sense of Solzhenitsyn the man. He relentlessly points to every act of deviousness, real or perceived, to every failing on Solzhenitsyn's part. But the countervailing, attractive side of the man is almost never shown. Scammell's failure to engage in any serious examination of Solzhenitsyn's writings is a major factor here. His portrait of Solzhenitsyn is one-sided, indeed lopsided, and at times a grotesque caricature. For a bal-

anced introduction to Solzhenitsyn, one should read Nivat.

In attempting a biography of Solzhenitsyn, Scammell undertook an immensely difficult task. I imagine that he started out with good will and respect for the object of his study. Eventually, however, he became sidetracked, even ensnared in a former wife's (and the Soviet regime's) vendetta. At times, Scammell struggles manfully against a growing distaste for Solzhenitsyn, but more often he gives way to snide sniping, especially in the second half of the book. One can sympathize with Scammell's ordeal in writing this huge biography, but he ought to have done better.

²⁸ Hingley, loc. cit., pp. 27-28. On this subject, see also the letter by Alexis Klimoff in *Commentary*, July 1985, p. 17.

Demystifying Bulgaria

Alex Alexiev

GEORGI MARKOV. *The Truth That Killed*. London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983.

NATALYA and VLADIMIR KOSTOV. *Sotsializmat V Bulgariya* (Socialism in Bulgaria). Paris, Peev and Popov, 1983.

ATANAS SLAVOV. *S Treva Obrasli* (Overgrown with Grass). Paris, Peev and Popov, 1983.

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC of Bulgaria will celebrate in early September 1985 the 41st anniversary of the establishment, under Soviet auspices, of its communist regime. Throughout most of this period, Bulgaria could boast of another, equally dubious distinction: it has managed to remain among the most obscure of European communist countries. It has attracted very little Western scholarly interest, as attested by the fact that the last book-length study of modern Bulgarian politics was published almost 20 years ago; and virtually no attention was paid to its international role until the allegations of Bulgarian involvement in the assassination plot against Pope John Paul II were recently revealed.

Alex Alexiev is a Senior Analyst of Soviet Affairs, the Rand Corporation (Santa Monica, CA). The views expressed in this article are the author's own and are not necessarily shared by Rand or its research sponsors.

The Western public's perceptions of life in this little Balkan country—to the extent that they exist at all—have been formed largely by an occasional journalistic piece filed by an itinerant correspondent on a typical two-day junket closely supervised by the Bulgarian regime. The picture that emerges from such dispatches is generally one of a peaceful and prosperous country where the Communist Party enjoys the support of the people, and both party and people are united in undying devotion and love toward the Soviet “older brother.” Recent articles on Bulgaria in the American press, with such titles as “To Russians, Bulgaria is an Island of Gratitude,” “Russia and Bulgaria: Two Peoples, One Organism,” and “Bulgaria Saluting Soviets,” assert authoritatively that most Bulgarians genuinely like the Soviets, accept communist rule, seem satisfied, and enjoy a high standard of living. “It is not Soviet communism that oppresses Bulgaria so much as history itself,” opines a recent *Wall Street Journal* article; while an earlier piece in *The New York Times* rather uncritically reports regime claims that there have not been any political prisoners in the country for 25 years.¹

To such shallow clichés, which not only paint a grotesque caricature of Bulgarian reality but also in a very real sense represent an in-

sult to the Bulgarian people who suffer under one of the more brutal communist regimes, the books reviewed here offer an eloquent rebuttal—and one that is all the more deserving of attention, since two of the authors were targets of assassination attempts by the Bulgarian authorities their writings had offended. The books by Georgi Markov and by Atanas Slavov are essentially collections of sketches on life in Bulgaria based on the authors' personal experiences and observations; the volume coauthored by Natalya and Vladimir Kostov comprises a more analytical series of essays. All three books deal to some extent with the most deeply ingrained of the prevailing stereotypes about the authors' native country—the myth of an almost congenital love and gratitude felt by all Bulgarians toward Russia and the Soviet Union. In Markov's words, “this litany about the Bulgarians' eternal love for the USSR . . . has become one of the most mendacious, misleading clichés”; he finds it “impossible to forgive the shortsightedness, ignorance and irresponsible generalizations of Western correspondents” who have cultivated this picture (p. 162). Un-

¹ *The New York Times*, June 25 and 28, 1984; *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), May 17, 1984; *The Washington Post*, Sept. 9, 1984; *The Wall Street Journal*, Jan. 9, 1985.

fortunately, the myth has been repeated even by some Western scholars who should know better.²

The reasons usually adduced for this "eternal love," of which Markov (and most Bulgarians) "would not have known were it not for newspaper reports," consist of the liberation of Bulgaria from the Turks in the Russo-Turkish war of 1878, the common Slavic and Orthodox heritage of the two nations, and an alleged Bulgarian cultural indebtedness to the Russians. Yet even a superficial acquaintance with Bulgarian history would indicate that there is little reason for the Bulgarians to feel either inferior or particularly grateful to the Russians. Bulgaria, whose statehood dates back to 681 A.D. (some seven centuries before that of Muscovy), had by the 9th century established a powerful empire with flourishing literature and arts that, according to the historian Edward Gibbon, "assumed a rank among the civilized powers of the earth." At that time the Kievan Prince Svyatoslav was still little more than a pagan chieftain. Indeed, by later providing newly Christianized Rus' with missionaries and with a literature in Church-Slavonic, written in the Cyrillic alphabet that originated in Bulgaria, the Bulgarians contributed in no small measure to the development of Russian culture.

In the 19th century, as the Bulgarians and the other Balkan peoples strove to emancipate themselves from Ottoman domination, Russia's interest in them was motivated more by the imperialist aims of replacing the Ottoman empire in the Balkans and controlling the Turkish straits than by compassion for the Bulgarians and other fellow-

Slavs and Orthodox believers. The most prominent leaders of the 19th-century Bulgarian liberation movement, such as Georgi Rakovski and Lyuben Karavelov, clearly saw Russian imperialism as a major threat to their nation's future. Twenty years before the liberation from the Ottomans in 1878, Rakovski had become so suspicious of the Russians' political intentions that he considered them a threat to the very existence of the Bulgarian nation: "Russia has always wanted to be the mistress of this old possession of ours or at least to have it under her unlimited influence," he warned his compatriots.³ Such suspicions proved justified after the Bulgarian liberation in the Russo-Turkish war, which, according to Markov, "was not the result of a Russian outburst of humanity, compassion and love for the unhappy Bulgarians, but the fruit of a rational imperialist policy" (p. 163). In short order, the Russian generals who in effect ruled the country began to pursue policies in blatant disregard of Bulgarian national interests. They alienated most of the population so thoroughly that only a few years after the liberation the Russians were kicked out, lock, stock, and barrel. From that time on, notwithstanding the efforts of a segment of the native elite that remained stubbornly pro-Russian, relations with Russia were never very good, and Bulgaria fought against Russia on the side of the Central Powers in World War I.⁴

³ Asen G. Kimov, "G. S. Rakovski in the Struggle for the Establishment of the Bulgarian Church," *East European Quarterly* (Boulder, CO), June 1974, p. 193.

⁴ On Bulgarian history, see, e.g., Barbara Jelavich, *A History of the Balkans*, 2 vols., London, Cambridge University Press, 1983; Dimitrije Djordjevic and Stephen Fischer-Galati, *The Balkan Revolutionary Tradition*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1981; and Edgar Hösch, *The Balkans: A Short History from Greek Times to the Present Day*, tr. by Alexander Tanio, New York, Crane-Russak, 1972.

Nor has Russian influence on the Bulgarian intelligentsia and Bulgarian culture been very strong. While educated Bulgarians learned to appreciate and value the Russian creative genius in literature, music, and the arts in the late 19th century, most Bulgarians nevertheless turned to the West for cultural and technical inspiration. Even faraway America probably made a more substantial contribution to the young Bulgarian state by training a large number of future Bulgarian leaders, including two prime ministers, at the American-sponsored Robert College in Istanbul.

All of this, of course, has been obliterated from official historiography by the present regime, which has sought to project the ideological imperatives of the present onto the past through a thorough, if crude, rewriting of Bulgarian history. This attempt is ably documented in one of the Kostovs' best essays, "An Encounter with a 'History of Bulgaria'" (pp. 31-44). Yet, few Bulgarians have been fooled. In the 1970's, a reprint of a 60-year-old Bulgarian history, which presents the historical truth and is therefore essentially anti-Russian, somehow slipped by the censor.⁵ Overnight, it became a bestseller and is now a standard reference book in many Bulgarian homes.

The Sovietization of the country after 1944 and the incessant pro-Soviet propaganda to which the Bulgarians have been subjected for 40 years have failed to have the desired effect. Soviet goods are the butt of countless jokes, Soviet movies play to empty houses while even third-rate Western films attract huge crowds, and at international sports events the sym-

² See, e.g., Robert F. Byrnes, Ed., *After Brezhnev*, Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, pp. 310, 317; and Aurel Braun, *Small State Security in the Balkans*, New York, Barnes and Noble, 1983, pp. 192, 213.

⁵ Simeon Radev, *Stroyteli Na Sovremena Bulgariya* (The Builders of Contemporary Bulgaria), reprint of 1911 ed., Sofia, Bulgariya Pisatel, 1973.

pathy of the Bulgarian public is invariably on the side of whoever plays against the Soviet team.

Indeed, many Bulgarians are increasingly disturbed by the regime's efforts at Russification. Since the early 1950's, the Kostovs reveal, the circulation of Soviet media, often distributed through mandatory subscription, has increased 32 times to some 130 million copies per year, while the volume of Bulgarian publications has increased barely threefold. On the average, one Soviet Russian-language book a day is published in 10,000 copies and sold at prices much cheaper than those of Bulgarian books. Sofia television broadcasts Soviet programs in the Russian language regularly (including day-long programming every Friday), and Russian is a mandatory subject at all levels of the educational system above elementary school.

These policies have produced an understandable backlash. For instance, students desiring to major in a Western language at Sofia State University must have straight "A's," pass an extremely tough exam, and usually compete with a dozen candidates for every available place; to be accepted in the Russian department, by contrast, a "C" average is sufficient. In spite of this, there are never enough candidates for that department. Interest in the language and in the Russian classics has waned dramatically. Regrettably, of late, even ordinary Russians visiting Bulgaria are increasingly treated with contempt and animosity. This backlash has also contributed to an intense fetishism for all things Western, particularly American, from jeans to jazz. As one of Markov's acquaintances quipped, he would even listen to the Soviet national anthem if it were sung in English.

NEXT TO THE BULGARIANS' alleged infatuation with the Russian "older brother," the most common journalistic myth is of Bulgaria as an island of economic prosperity and well-being amidst the East European economic morass. Evidence cited for this includes a smaller Bulgarian indebtedness to the West, relatively high growth rates, availability of food in the stores, and a recently attempted economic reform known as the "New Economic Mechanism." While all of these things are true, Bulgaria is a long way from being a communist economic miracle, and its people are hardly awash in well-being.

The highly touted "New Economic Mechanism" introduced in 1982, while a positive step, is at best a partial reform and does not come close to Hungarian efforts to modify certain aspects of central planning. There is no reason to believe that the Bulgarian party will relinquish its control over the economy, and this makes the prospects for meaningful reform uncertain to say the least.⁶

Bulgarian economic performance, while generally better than that of the bloc as a whole, is hardly breathtaking. GNP growth has slowed considerably since the mid-1970's to about 3 percent in 1984, while agricultural production, which between 1970 and 1981 had gone up by only 19 percent—the worst performance in the Soviet bloc next to the Soviet Union itself—actually went down by 7 percent in 1983.⁷

⁶ For the ambiguous results of the reform so far, see Ilse Grosser, *Bulgarien: Zwischenbilanz des Neuen Wirtschaftsmechanismus* (Bulgaria: Interim Assessment of the New Economic Mechanism), Cologne, Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, 1984.

⁷ Ibid., p. 27; US Central Intelligence Agency, *Handbook of Economic Statistics*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, September 1982, p. 27.

A major structural weakness of the Bulgarian economy, deriving to a considerable extent from its pervasive dependence on Soviet trade (currently almost 60 percent of total foreign trade), is its inability to produce goods competitive on Western markets. As a result, Bulgarian exports to the West have declined steadily since 1980. In March 1984, party boss Todor Zhivkov revealed that losses due to claims by foreign customers were 68 percent higher than in the previous year, and that some US\$66 million worth of goods had to be withdrawn from the market because of poor quality. (There is one area of Bulgarian exports, however, that is evidently doing extremely well. According to a study by Wharton Econometric Forecasting, in 1982, exports of arms represented the leading source of export earnings for Bulgaria, accounting for 9.1 percent of the total—some 990 million *leva*, or approximately US\$1 billion at the official rate of exchange.⁸)

Overall, as Vladimir Kostov shows in one of his essays, after 40 years of "uninterrupted socialist progress" Bulgaria has slipped from 21st place before World War II to 23rd place today in the GNP-per-capita ranking among European states (p. 60). As just one indication of the kind of basic problems the Bulgarian economy has still not been able to solve, in the winter of 1984–85 the country experienced its most severe energy crisis to date, one that resulted in regular blackouts of 12 hours per day, a ban on electrical heating in all factories and public buildings, and a curtailment of railroad traffic.⁹

⁸ *The Washington Post*, Aug. 10, 1984.

⁹ See Radio Free Europe Research (hereafter RFE), *Situation Report* (Munich), No. 14 (Bulgaria), Apr. 5, 1985.

If Bulgarian aggregate economic performance has been less than spectacular, what about the living standards of the people? Here again the Kostovs' book provides some persuasive answers (pp. 89–103). The authors' methodology is simple but effective. They take officially published data and compare them with data published in the *Statisticheski Godishnik* (Statistical Yearbook), a government publication printed in only 2,500 copies intended for economists and planners and not generally available to the public. They then trace the pattern of consumption, income, and prices to arrive at their conclusions.

The first thing that strikes the reader is the shocking discrepancy not only between planned targets and actual achievements, but also between the results announced publicly by the party and those listed in the yearbook. For instance, the 7th Five-Year Plan, beginning in 1975, envisaged growth in services to the population of between 450 and 500 percent. The 12th party congress, held in 1980, reported that the growth achieved had been only 50 percent, while the yearbook indicated a mere 9.45 percent. Other interesting data are provided on food consumption and nutrition. In 1980, the average citizen consumed somewhat more bread and sugar but considerably less meat, fish, vegetables, and fruit in comparison to the preceding year. Vegetable consumption actually fell below the 1975 level.

A likely explanation for this retrogression is the fact that, in a country where inflation cannot officially exist, it is in fact rampant. Thus, food prices for 1980 are reported to have gone up 24.7 percent over the preceding year, while the food expenses of an average household increased 32.1 percent.

At the same time, housing expenses went up 21.2 percent. Overall, the average Bulgarian household's expenses went up 21.2 percent, while its income, including loans and withdrawals from savings, rose by only 15.2 percent. It is not difficult to figure out which way this household is heading.

Although the Kostovs' figures are taken from the 1981 yearbook, it is not likely that things have gotten much better in the meantime. Wage increases since then are officially estimated to have averaged 2.5 to 3 percent per year, while prices have gone up by at least 5 percent annually.¹⁰ Even the minimal wage increases claimed by the regime are somewhat suspect. For instance, the *Statistical Yearbook* for 1982, the last one available to this reviewer, indicates (at p. 90) that 1981 per capita wages actually declined by more than 2 percent in comparison with the preceding year. Given these statistics, it is a mystery how and where Western reporters (and some unwary scholars) have discovered the high Bulgarian living standards they write about. Indeed, a detailed analysis prepared by a group of dissident economists and published in *samizdat* concludes that the standard of living improved only slowly and only until 1975, when it started deteriorating. Even in the communist regime's best year, according to this scholarly treatise, Bulgarian living standards failed to reach the level of the best prewar year, 1939. Forty years later, the authors claim, the average living standard, particularly with respect to food consumption, had actually fallen by almost 25 percent.¹¹

What is more, the communist regime can hardly be given credit for the fact that Bulgarian food markets may be better supplied

than those of other socialist countries. Bulgarian weekend farmers cultivating private plots amounting to less than 5 percent of the arable land produce 50 percent of the eggs, 40 percent of the meat, and 27 percent of the vegetables consumed in the country.¹² Altogether, there is considerable evidence in the regime's own statistics that the standard of living of the average Bulgarian is maintained only on the basis of increases in private-plot earnings and of growing involvement in the underground economy. One indication of the mass character of the latter is provided in the 1981 *Statistical Yearbook* (cited in the Kostovs' volume, p. 93). According to government figures, the average Bulgarian household in 1980 actually spent more than it officially earned by nearly the equivalent of an average monthly salary. This reconfirms the popular adage that the only thing that really succeeds in socialism is private enterprise.

THERE IS ALSO much fascinating information, in all three of the books under review, about the pernicious and stifling influence of the party on Bulgarian cultural life. The authors were prominent writers and journalists, and thus knew that milieu intimately. They describe how the regime showers privileges on talented and potentially nonconformist writers so that they will not write. They tell of the life of privilege of the party elite, complete with sex orgies and weekend shopping trips to Paris (which Sofia's wits labeled the "concentration camp for former party mistresses"), and of the pervasive atmo-

¹⁰ "Slowdown in the Bulgarian Economy," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Nov. 9, 1983.

¹¹ See "The Poverty of Socialism in Bulgaria," *Badashte* (Paris), June 1983, p. 281.

¹² "Slowdown in the Bulgarian Economy," loc. cit.

sphere of corruption and dishonesty permeating Bulgarian socialist society. In this connection, there is some evidence that as far as alcoholism is concerned, Bulgaria has followed firmly in the footsteps of its Soviet "older brother." According to an article by a Bulgarian professor, the number of registered alcoholics increased six times for men and 13 times for women over the decade 1962-72.¹³

Much is also revealed in these books about an even darker side of the regime's record: the brutal and uncompromising suppression of all opponents, real or imagined; the virtual liquidation of the Bulgarian intelligentsia that claimed tens of thousands of lives after the communist takeover; the successive bloody purges, first of the political opposition and then of the party itself, during the Sovietization stage. The terror and human drama of these events is rendered particularly well in Slavov's book. As late as the 1960's, the death camps in Lovech and Belene swallowed thousands, often for transgressions no greater than telling a political joke. Since then the methods have changed somewhat, with the regime learning from the "older brother" to use psychiatric hospitals to deal with dissidents (who, according to Western news reports, do not exist).

Yet, the previous methods have not been entirely forgotten. Beginning in late 1984, the regime has conducted a massive and, for post-war Europe, uniquely brutal campaign of forced assimilation of the country's sizable Turkish minority. Bulgarian Muslims have been forced to adopt Slavic names; all vestiges of Turkish cultural life have been extirpated; and the

more than one-million-strong Muslim minority declared nonexistent. As a result of this campaign, which has been resisted in many places, several hundred people have been killed, thousands arrested and sent to labor camps, and many more deported from their native regions. A remarkably frank admission of the regime's determination to use such odious Stalinist practices is provided in a recent speech by the president of the national assembly, Politburo member Stanko Todorov. According to him,

*All those who dance to the propaganda music from Ankara and its nationalist agents in Bulgaria, and all those who do not want to live in their villages and towns, could be resettled. For such cases the responsible Bulgarian organs have already received their instructions to make a quick resettlement—even within a few hours—possible. The resettlement, however, will not be in Turkey, but in other regions in Bulgaria where these people can live quietly and happily.*¹⁴

OTHER DEVELOPMENTS in Bulgaria over the past year have likewise given the lie to another myth carefully cultivated by the party and all too uncritically swallowed by Western journalists—the myth of a complacent, satisfied population and of the absence of any dissent from regime policies. Beginning in August 1984, a series of bombing, sabotage, and arson incidents has shaken the country and caused serious concern among

the authorities.¹⁵ Though initially dismissed as the criminal deeds of antisocial elements, the evidence suggests that these violent activities are politically motivated and well organized; this was openly admitted by the authorities last May.¹⁶ The regime has responded by beefing up internal security, particularly for party installations and officials (who appear to have been the targets in at least some cases), and by further restricting the already limited travel opportunities that Bulgarians possess. It is remarkable that more than a year after the beginning of this form of violent protest, the all-powerful State Security Service has yet to arrest and bring to trial any of the perpetrators.

The books reviewed here, of course, were written before this series of events took place; they also predate the recent revelations of massive Bulgarian involvement in the conspiracy to assassinate the pope and in the international drug and arms traffic.¹⁷ Today, according to US officials, a significant fraction of the heroin consumed in the United States passes through Bulgaria. (If the regime were to take even a minor cut from the profits of this kind of drug volume, that would explain its greater ability, compared with other Soviet-bloc nations, to pay its Western debts.) But even before all this came to light, the information in these books leaves little doubt about the Bulgarian regime's ca-

¹⁵ RFE, *Situation Report*, No. 14 (Bulgaria), "Bombing Incidents Reported," Oct. 23, 1984.

¹⁶ *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, May 17, 1985; *Die Welt*, May 17, 1985.

¹⁷ The best and most detailed account of Bulgarian involvement in the attempt to kill John Paul II is in Paul Henze, *The Plot to Kill the Pope*, rev. pb. ed., New York, Scribner's, 1985. For Bulgarian involvement in the drug and arms smuggling scene, see, e.g., Nathan Adams, "Drugs and Guns," *The Reader's Digest* (Pleasantville, NY), January 1984; and Massimo Conti, "State Drug Pushers," *Panorama* (Rome), Aug. 13, 1984.

¹³ See Todor Stankushev, "Alcohol and Women," *Zhenata dnes* (Sofia), No. 4, 1980, p. 26.

¹⁴ Cited in *Politika* (Belgrade), Mar. 29, 1985. For details on the campaign, see RFE, *Situation Report*, No. 5 (Bulgaria), "Officials Say There Are No Turks in Bulgaria," Mar. 28, 1985; Jens Reuter, "The Denationalization of Turks in Bulgaria," *Sudosteuropa* (Munich), Nos. 3-4, 1985; "Resistance to Bulgarianization," *Die Welt* (Bonn), Jan. 26, 1985; "Aides in Ankara Say Bulgaria Has Slain 1,000 Ethnic Turks," *The New York Times*, Aug. 7, 1985.

capacity for unsavory behavior.

In a memorable passage in *The Truth That Killed*, Markov recalls a dinner with Zhivkov at which some party hack severely criticized a nonconformist poet. Zhivkov remarked that the party had made a

mistake about him, and coldly added: "He should have been shot a long time ago" (p. 253). The regime evidently does not make a habit of such mistakes. Shortly after Vladimir Kostov, now a prominent defector and regime critic,

miraculously survived an assassination attempt with a poison-tipped umbrella, Markov, whose programs on the BBC and Radio Free Europe had infuriated the Bulgarian regime, was murdered by the same method.

Rethinking China's History

Joshua Fogel

NOZAWA YUTAKA and TANAKA MASATOSHI, General Editors. *Kōza: Chūgoku kin-gendai shi* (Symposium on the Modern and Contemporary History of China), 7 Vols. Tokyo, Tokyo University Press, 1979.

PAUL A. COHEN. *Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1984.

JOHN K. FAIRBANK, Ed. *The Cambridge History of China, Volume 12: Republican China 1912–1949, Part 1*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983.

NEARLY EVERY YEAR for at least the last five, a Japanese scholar has announced that Japanese research on modern Chinese history "has reached a threshold" or "is standing at a crossroads." Western sinology, much younger to be sure, has also come to a turning point during the past several years. In both cases, developments in contemporary China have played a critical role. From the ludicrous Lin

Biao affair (and the official explanation of it) through the "revelations" about the horrors of the Cultural Revolution and the efforts at de-Maoization of the past few years, the picture of contemporary China has been radically reshaped. Increased travel to and field research within China have also played an important role, revealing quite a different China than had been portrayed abroad.

Although Japanese and Western sinologists are now, for the first time, becoming interested in similar avenues of research, their respective crossroads are very different. Several years ago, Tokyo University Press published a seven-volume history of China from the Opium War (1839–42) through the communist victory in 1949. In the past, even the way one designated the temporal contours of a study constituted a statement in Japan. By calling a collection "modern and contemporary" and dating it from the Opium War, the editors would have been declaring their support for the popular Marxist periodization scheme for Chinese history—particularly in a collection published by Tokyo University, the bastion of academic Marxism in Japan since World War II. But that has all become a much more murky issue of late. Although Marxist scholarship in Japan has produced some of the most crea-

tive and innovative research on modern Chinese history in the world, most Japanese intellectuals no longer seem content to focus their analyses through a single lens.

THE SEVEN-VOLUME set under review constitutes neither a textbook on modern China nor a summary of past research. Each volume focuses on an important theme in modern Chinese history and brings together essays by leading historians and political scientists in the area covered. After an introductory essay by a prominent scholar, there are eight or nine topical essays within the time frame covered by that particular volume. For example, Volume 3, on "The 1911 Revolution," is introduced by Professor Kubota Bunji. This is followed by Kojima Yoshio's well-documented essay entitled "The Landlord System and the Dissolution of the Peasantry: A Look at Kiangnan in the Period of the 1911 Revolution." Kurahashi Masanao follows with a piece on industrial development in the late Qing Dynasty (1644–1911), providing readers with a wealth of materials. Nozawa Yutaka's essay, "The 1911 Revolution and the Development of Capitalism," has some interesting things to say about the Chinese constitutionalists, in particular the industrialist and social reformer

Joshua Fogel is Assistant Professor of History, specializing in modern Chinese history and Sino-Japanese relations, at Harvard University. He is author of *Politics and Sinology: The Case of Naitō Konan, 1866–1934* (1984).

Zhang Jian, and about Japanese involvement in Chinese markets (especially in North China). Nakamura Tetsuo then looks at the imperial examination system in its last days, at what its end in 1905 meant to local society, and at the overall relationship between that society and the educational process.

Needless to say, space limitations prohibit a full description of the rich contents of these seven volumes, but a look through the various "Tables of Contents" is sure to turn up at least one essay of interest to every scholar of "modern" China. Of particular concern to scholars interested in the evolution of Marxism in China and the development and victory of the Chinese communist movement are the following five articles: Saitō Michihiko, "Ideological Trends of the May Fourth Period: Li Dazhao's Notion of 'Young China'" (Vol. 4); Matsumoto Sachiko, "The Comintern and the Chinese Communist Revolution" (Vol. 5); Endō Setsuaki and Himeta Mitsuyoshi, "The Chinese Soviet Movement" (Vol. 5); Baba Takeshi, "The Formation of Anti-Japanese Base Areas and the Peasantry" (Vol. 6); and Itō Keiichi, "Intellectual and Cultural Issues in the Anti-Japanese Period" (Vol. 6). In addition, all the essays in Volume 7 deal with the establishment of the People's Republic of China and the problems it faced early on.

PAUL COHEN'S recent volume, *Discovering History in China*, takes a highly critical look at postwar American writings on China. He focuses on what one might call the "Fairbank school," the "Levenson school," and the "Imperialism school." In what amounts to an extended review-essay of the past 30 years of research, Cohen pleads for greater complexity and less reliance on monocausal explana-

tory schemes in historical work on China.

Cohen would have us believe that the school of thought that emerged from the teachings of John King Fairbank, which long stressed the theme of "China's response to the West" as the correct way to understand historical developments in 19th-century China, had a surpassing influence in American academic circles. Certainly this theme was taught even to the many of us who were not trained by Fairbank at Harvard University, and it did tend to dominate the field; but it was never regarded as gospel. One senses, in Cohen's attack on the perspective of his teacher, the veracity of the aphorism that lapsed Catholics make the best atheists.

One of the reasons why the "Fairbank school" of sinology gained such prominence in the West surely owes something to the curious (although clearly explicable) confluence that school enjoys with the Marxist explanation for the development of modern Chinese history. In both perspectives, the West plays an inordinately important role in the emergence of a modern China. The Marxist view, of course, sees the Opium War as the beginning of the destruction of China's pre-capitalist economy. General sympathy for the Chinese Marxists' view of their own history made a rebuttal of the essence of the "Fairbank school" rather difficult, until recently. Now, however, scholars can agree with Cohen that clearly both schools are strikingly Eurocentric, a conclusion that leads Cohen to make a most ardent (and oft-repeated) plea for a China-centered history.

Cohen's critique of the late Joseph Levenson's near-great trilogy, *Confucian China and Its Modern Fate*,¹ hits the nail squarely on the head. Sad as it is that Leven-

son is no longer with us to develop his ideas and indeed to defend himself, we have tended to follow many of his assumptions about Chinese history of the past two centuries—assumptions that were argued more persuasively than they were ever proven. His eloquent style and ability to make all the apparent pieces of the puzzle fit together perfectly led many scholars to conclude that he had told the entire story. Cohen demonstrates that in fact many absent pieces were simply not apparent, but nonetheless integral to any understanding of the development of the history of modern China. For example, he points out that contrary to Levenson's analysis, there is no reason to believe that Confucian thought had exhausted all its own alternatives in resolving China's problems, or that Chinese intellectuals began to find modern solutions to age-old issues only as a result of the Western impact on their country.

The final book to which Cohen devotes concerted attention and invective is a comparative study of the development of China and of Japan in the 19th century by Frances Moulder.² Moulder is left smoldering after the attack, and little can be said to bolster her (to me) pitiful argument about the importance of Western imperialism to modern China. One wonders, though, if Cohen's efforts might not have been better spent looking elsewhere, for by affording this kind of book such attention he only tends to make it seem more important than it actually is.

¹ Joseph R. Levenson, *Confucian China and Its Modern Fate: A Trilogy*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1968 (reprint of volumes originally published in 1958, 1964, and 1965).

² F. V. Moulder, *Japan, China, and the Modern World Economy*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1977.

Cohen is aware that the China-centered history he seeks may in fact lead scholars to an opposite form of parochialism: a new kind of Sinocentrism completely oblivious to the outside world. This is precisely what he explicitly hopes will *not* occur in future research. Rather, Cohen calls for a more highly textured, complex, multi-dimensional, and methodologically sound approach to the rich materials for Chinese historical research. How could anyone object?

THE COMMENCEMENT in 1978 of the publication of the multivolume *Cambridge History of China* is another indication of Western sinology's having reached a major turning point. Such collections, by virtue of the immense organizational, financial, and geographical problems involved in their collection and editing, almost immediately stand as the final word on the previous generation of research in the field. In fact, many of the essays in the three volumes on the "modern" period that have appeared thus far do just that: they summarize where the field now stands. Some of the other essays, though, are much more ambitious in their efforts to chart prospective courses for future research; and still others stand as seminal essays on the specific topics covered. One systemic problem the editors have tried (with partial success) to avoid is the "major events" approach that regards the modern history of China as a succession of great historical happenings: Opium War, Taiping Rebellion, Tongzhi (T'ung-chih) Restoration, and so on. By contrast, the new, China-centered history that Cohen prescribed would stress local history, history away from the treaty ports—in general, the daily life of the Chinese people only secondarily as it was affected by those

"great events."

Volume 12 of the *Cambridge History* is the first of two that will treat the Republican period, 1912–49. In it we find the three kinds of essays characteristic of earlier volumes: reviews of the literature; broad descriptive overviews based on extensive research in primary sources; and in-depth treatments of narrower topics. The best essays of the literature-review style are those by Andrew Nathan on constitutionalism and the Beijing government during the decade 1919–28, and by Ernest Young on the brief reign of Yuan Shikai (1912–16), first as provisional president then as president of the Chinese Republic. The reason these essays are as good as they are, despite the review-essay format, is surely that their respective authors penned the finest book in each field.³ I would not go so far as to suggest that one read these essays in place of these authors' more comprehensive works, but it would not be a bad place to begin.

Nathan develops, at much less length than in his longer study, the factionalism model he used to explain why cliques in Beijing acted the way they did. According to Nathan, one can understand the complex machinations of central politics in China during this period only by examining the competition among cliques for control of the Beijing government. He also addresses the broad appeal of constitutionalism, regarded by virtually all of the players at the time as a political panacea of sorts. Constitutionalism was seen as the quintessential element in "moderniza-

tion"; once one had a constitution, surely a modern state structure and economy could not be too far away. Perhaps most rewarding, though, is that after reading Nathan's short essay one gets a grasp of this immensely complicated decade.

Similarly, Young's chapter attempts to make sense of a slice of history most scholars assumed they understood (albeit, in reality, in the simplest and crassest of ways). Rather than merely presenting Yuan as a reactionary tyrant without an iota of concern for anyone or anything but himself, as some scholars have done, Young views the Republic's president and would-be emperor within the historical context in which he lived. He sees Yuan's presidency as the continuation of troubled trends from the previous decade and as an accurate representation of the "ambiguous legacy" of the 1911 Revolution. As with Nathan's excellent essay, we get another finely textured and seasoned analysis of events. Absent is the artificial teleology that depicted Yuan's every act as yet another step in his lifelong effort to centralize power and make himself Emperor of China. In a mere 45 pages Young presents the reader with a genuine *tour de force*.

Other essays of this sort include James Sheridan's on warlordism (an excellent synopsis of his book on this period); Benjamin Schwartz's on intellectual trends from the May Fourth Movement (1919) through the final ascendancy of Marxism; Jerome Chen's 20-page piece on the early Chinese Communist movement (which barely summarizes his own excellent earlier work on this topic); and Leo Lee's masterly summary of literary trends from 1895 to 1927.

In the second category of contributions, that of broad overviews

³ Andrew J. Nathan, *Peking Politics, 1918–1923: Factionalism and the Future of Constitutionalism*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1976; Ernest P. Young, *The Presidency of Yuan Shih-Kai: Liberalism and Dictatorship in Early Republican China*, Ann Arbor, MI, University of Michigan Press, 1977.

based on primary sources, this volume offers two essays: Albert Feuerwerker's piece on economic trends in the Republican era; and C. Martin Wilbur's study of the Nationalist revolution. Feuerwerker not only provides a wealth of detail for all the major sectors of the Chinese economy during that time, but also offers some interesting conclusions based on his own and others' latest research. These concern the relationship between China's politics and its developing economy in the 1920's and 1930's; the impact of the military on the economy; economic development generally, and particularly the development of Chinese agriculture in those decades; and a host of other issues at the forefront of debate in this area. One of Feuerwerker's major contributions here is his ability to address the relationship between China's politics and economics without seeing either sphere as dictated by developments in the other.

Wilbur's contribution runs to nearly 200 pages, and is by far the most detailed chapter of any yet published in the *Cambridge History*; so much so, in fact, that the publisher has issued it in a separate paperback edition. Based on a wealth of primary materials, some published and some in the Kuomintang (KMT) archives in Taiwan, it will long stand as *the* statement on the Nationalists' rise to preeminence, Chiang Kai-shek's ascension, the first United Front, the Shanghai massacre, the Canton Commune, the Northern Expedition, and a plethora of other topics from the period 1923–28. Students and teachers will long resort to Wilbur's chapter to resolve points of debate when discussing the 1920's.

TWO ESSAYS in this volume of the *Cambridge History* clearly aimed

at more ambitious goals. Unlike the other contributions, which effectively tell us how far the field has come or bring the field up to the leading experts' level of research, the articles by Charlotte Furth and by Marie-Claire Bergère offer readers insights into where China scholarship will go in the years to come.

Western-language studies on the intellectual history of the late Qing period have thus far tended to focus on a single issue or a single thinker. This was to be expected, given the many hindrances to penetrating this complex period of change and innovation—when Western schools of thought from Deweyism to Marxism and beyond swept across the Chinese intellectual landscape. Rather than patterning her study of the intellectual history of China from 1895 to 1920 on “major events” in the political and diplomatic history of this period, Furth attempts to place in broad cosmological perspective the intellectual changes that influenced leading Chinese thinkers. She is critical of the “China's response to the West” approach, which served for so long, as suggested earlier, as the dominant paradigm for intellectual histories written in the West. Instead, in Furth's words,

A more fruitful approach may be to recognize that the leading thinkers of the reform generation were trying to understand how both continuities and discontinuities fit into significantly altered structures of meaning. The socio-political struggle for reform was not articulated in isolation, but within the framework of a new evolutionary cosmology. (p. 325).

Furth examines the assumptions underlying the intellectual worldview of thinkers across a wide

spectrum, from the reformist official Xue Fucheng (1838–94), to the great translator Yan Fu (1853–1921), to the reform-minded journalist Wang Tao (1828–97), to the radical reformer and iconoclast Kang Youwei (1858–1927) and his followers at the end of the century, who defied Confucius by turning his teachings into a progressive prescription for change.

To do justice to the appeal of evolutionary theory to Chinese intellectuals at the turn of the century, one needs to examine the points where Confucian and other indigenous Chinese schools of thought met Darwinian notions of change and flux. This is precisely the tack taken by Furth, and it enriches her study immensely. Her point of departure, in other words, is a seminal question: inasmuch as the idea of “change” was not simply imported into China from the West, how did native conceptions of change in the late 19th century interact, in the minds of Chinese reformers, with the Darwinian ideas to which they were later exposed? Another line Furth pursues is a discussion of what she calls “neo-traditional alternatives” to China's predicament, from the very end of the Qing dynasty through the immediate aftermath of the 1911 Revolution. Most interesting here is her examination of the National Essence Movement of Zhang Binglin and Liu Shiwei. Zhang and Liu, both virulent anti-Manchus, regarded Kang Youwei's reformist notions as counterrevolutionary. Unlike Kang and his followers, who idiosyncratically interpreted certain Confucian texts to build their case for reform through the ruling Manchu house, and who also incorporated certain Western ideas into their system, the adherents of the National Essence Movement saw the Manchu regime as the destroyer of Chinese

culture. Their response was to call for a revolution in the name of traditional Confucianism, the "essence" of that culture, in order to reaffirm the greatness of China's past before it was too late.

One hopes that Furth's analysis will open up discussion on these complex and all too little understood men. The general appeal of a kind of anarchism to many Chinese intellectuals at this time has been pointed to by other scholars. Furth's real contribution here is to examine this appeal along a continuum, from genuine opponents of any form of institutional restriction to more moderate iconoclasts merely seeking a way for China to escape what seemed to them an endless struggle against the ubiquitous heavy hand of the state. This vaguely anarchist trend may help scholars to understand the wide appeal of the women's liberation movement and its radical message at that time; it also forms an interesting commentary on how much less renovative communist practice has been when compared to earlier anarchist theory.

Even as late as the second decade of this century, when the educator Cai Yuanpei was bringing together a wide variety of men and women at Beijing University, the anarchist-inspired program of free thought and discussion implicitly united Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao, Zhang Binglin, and many others. And when Li and Chen later moved to Marxism (they jointly founded the Chinese Communist Party in 1921), their understanding of it was much influenced by the anarchism of the previous generation. Furth's summary paragraph is worth quoting at length:

Throughout the reform generation, those who took their intellectual orientation from evolutionary cosmology, whether in its more sacred

or more secularized forms, had depended upon a few essential ideals. They had assumed that traditional Confucian-Taoist cosmological categories complemented rather than contradicted Western models of the natural universe They projected a utopian portrait of world-wide progress, leading, with whatever twists and turns, to the ideal world of ta-t'ung [Great Harmony]. . . . they looked within humanity, first for the moral energy conceptualized as a subjective spiritual force, then as an organic collective spirit of a whole people, and finally objectified in mass political movements. When Chinese Marxists no longer relied upon any Confucian-Taoist symbols to describe the universe at large, when they no longer linked the energies of the revolutionary working classes to a spirit of universal humanistic enlightenment developing within the people, and when they portrayed themselves as strict, secular scientific materialists, they had stepped outside the boundaries of evolutionary cosmology as a belief system. To the extent that the Marxist focus on mass political movements as agents of change demanded attention to social action, the intellectual energies of Chinese Marxists no longer went to evolutionary myth-making. Yet as the case of Li Ta-chao [Li Dazhao] illustrates, this break was by no means always immediate or sharp, and evolutionary cosmology has left its imprint upon the structure of Chinese Marxist dialectics. (pp. 404-05)

BERGÈRE'S essay is concerned with the Chinese bourgeoisie from 1911 through the end of the Nanjing decade (the period of KMT dominance) in 1937. It is a stunning attempt to align intellectual developments with political-economic ones. Although clearly

inspired by Marxist modes of thought, Bergère's line of attack is not crassly Marxist. She begins with an investigation of the domestic and foreign influences (and hindrances) to the emergence of a Chinese bourgeoisie in the late Qing period, and she discusses Yuan Shikai's equivocating policies vis-à-vis the merchants.

Bergère describes the period 1917-23 as the golden age of Chinese capitalism. Her analysis focuses on the institutions of commerce ("The rise of the modern Chinese banks," she notes at p. 749, "dated from the First World War"), the rise of new organizational forms as well as the persistence of old ones, and the emergence of a distinct bourgeois thinking, protective of its own interests but still highly reluctant to enter into the political sphere. Such thinking produced an awkward dilemma: how could the bourgeoisie stay out of the political realm and at the same time compel foreign powers to respect their national independence, especially when these same entrepreneurs had to rely on foreign economic assistance?

Bergère supports her analysis with a wealth of detail from the lives and experiences of individual Chinese merchants at the time. When merchants, as a class, finally did enter the political process by associating with one or another political clique, they were inevitably outsmarted. But the merchants failed politically not so much for their beliefs as for their approach. Indeed, as Bergère so subtly notes, merchants in China adopted a liberal, "nonaligned" approach in their political methods, which found little fertile ground in the rough and tumble of warlord-torn China during the Republican period.

As circumstances became more stable in the early 1920's, the

bourgeoisie increasingly looked toward the restoration of a more traditional form of social control—bureaucratic and military—to insure stability and national independence. Although deeply nationalist in sentiment (and this meant anti-imperialist in the Chinese context), the bourgeoisie gradually found itself less and less interested in identifying with the activists in the May Thirtieth Movement (1925–26), who orchestrated a series of nationwide strikes, protests, and boycotts against foreigners and their businesses; and the bourgeoisie eventually abandoned this connection. They next placed their money on the rising star of Chiang Kai-shek.

While the Kuomintang actively sought their support and, even more, their capital, merchants soon (by the early 1930's) found themselves completely subordinate to the KMT party and government. Participation in government led not to a significant say in governmental matters, as the merchants had hoped, but rather to subservience to the centralizing policies of the KMT and Chiang Kai-shek. In short, whereas the merchants were interested in economic modernization, the KMT was concerned primarily with re-centralization, that is, the reunification of China under Chiang's banner. As a result, "all the reforms sought by the bourgeoisie appeared to rebound on them" (p. 821). They seemed to have bet, again, on the wrong horse. In pondering whether the experience of the Chinese bourgeoisie was "merely a sneeze in history—an episode without posterity," Bergère concludes as follows:

In later stages of the revolution the bourgeoisie was to be eliminated as a class. Yet a heritage survived:

urban, modernist, democratic and cosmopolitan. This tradition—of a national development opening onto the rest of the world—inspired the modernizing bureaucracy of later times. The Chinese bourgeoisie was the first—as a class—to take on the challenge of modernization; that is why the tradition which it founded continued to inspire those who dreamt of succeeding where it had failed. (p. 825)

ON THE WHOLE, however, the *Cambridge History* project, while extremely commendable, seems almost damned by its very nature. Even as volume after volume provides definitive essays on traditional topics, new research on hitherto unexplored areas is continually emerging. Particularly worthy of note at this juncture in sinological research is that both Japanese and Western scholars are becoming ever more interested in local and religious history, albeit for different reasons. In the Japanese case, the recent revival of interest in local history derives from a general intellectual exhaustion or exasperation with the Marxist scheme for plotting Chinese history along universally accepted guidelines. Many Japanese scholars are no longer looking, with myopic lenses, for the roots of class conflict anywhere and everywhere in Chinese society, but are instead examining the nature of the cross-class bonds that held local society together for such a long time. This has led to many new studies of previously unexamined local institutions, procedures involved in land transactions, local welfare institutions, gentry-commoner ties, and numerous other tracks for research. Japanese scholars' heightened interest in religious history derives, I believe, from a long-time concern for the history of Chinese rebellions. But

as traditional Marxist class analysis increasingly proved unable to explain the causes of these religious uprisings, the search for more meaningful sources of conflict has led to deeper research into the religious life of the Chinese.

Why have local and religious histories also become so popular among China scholars in the West? Part of the reason naturally has to do with a genuine desire to understand the daily life of the average Chinese, elite or commoner. But a large part of the impetus lies in increased access to source materials, both primary sources in China and secondary sources in Japan. The younger generation of scholars of modern Chinese history (this has been less of a problem for scholars of the pre-modern period) are now getting better training in the Chinese language, in its many and sundry forms. They are also now able to travel somewhat more freely to China to examine documentary sources not previously available. Also, and perhaps even more important, the younger generation of historians has been forced as part of their graduate training to learn Japanese in order to research secondary materials on China's modern history in that language. This trend may prove even more valuable when the next generation of books on China comes off the presses at the close of this century.

WHAT ROLE, finally, have developments in contemporary China played in all this? In both Western and Japanese scholars' past efforts to be as sympathetic as possible to the struggles of the regime in China, they seem also to have been all too willing to accept the inordinately shallow vision of history that this regime espoused. In the Japanese case, one found a number of overtly Maoist scholars who

followed the latest line emanating from the Great Helmsman and applied it to their research on China. But among the great majority of Japanese researchers the deep commitment to view contemporary China sympathetically was probably the product not of ideological predisposition but of a profound sense of guilt over their nation's military actions in China in the 1930's and 1940's and the presumed collaboration of the academy in those activities.

Now that China has itself provided numerous examples of just how prone it too is to aberrational

behavior—especially in its efforts to undo much that was previously conceived of as quintessentially Chinese (Maoist, in actuality)—the contemporary picture that emerges, and by extension, our perceptions and understanding of China's history, have all been altered. In the Japanese case, much of this may be laid at the door of frustration with Marxism as a "panacea" for historical explanation. In the West, this is less the case, for a general malaise about China and its ability to reform at all has spread a pall over the entire field. Where several years ago

China, in the minds of foreign scholars, was capable of virtually changing human nature, it is now seen as incapable of carrying out the most common reforms of a "modernizing" nation. (China was not after all, it seemed, a country without any flies—*hae no nai kuni*, as the Japanese used to say.) Both perceptions, however, are too extreme, inspired in the former case by excessive enthusiasm for the Chinese experiment, and in the latter by excessive disappointment that the experiment had apparently failed. In neither case have scholarly attitudes prevailed.

Cuba: Charismatic Communism

Jorge I. Domínguez

CLAES BRUNDENIUS. *Revolutionary Cuba: The Challenge of Economic Growth with Equity*. Boulder, CO, Westview, 1984.

CARLOS ALBERTO MONTANER. *Fidel Castro y la revolución cubana*. Barcelona, Plaza & Janes, 1983.

PAMELA FALK. *Cuban Foreign Policy: Caribbean Tempest*. Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, 1985.

H. MICHAEL ERISMAN. *Cuba's International Relations: The Anatomy of a Nationalistic Foreign Policy*. Boulder, CO, Westview, 1985.

BOTH THE CUBAN revolution and writings about it have reached a turning point in the mid-1980's. From the perspective of a quarter-century since Fidel Castro took power, it is apparent that Cuba continues to face three related concerns: (1) how can a small, still economically underdeveloped

country conduct the foreign policy of a major power? (2) how feasible is a combination of economic growth and egalitarianism under a Marxist-Leninist regime? and (3) how can Cuba be governed without depending solely on the extraordinary talents of a single person? Outside observers might add a fourth, more theoretical concern: how Cuba's revolutionary history relates to larger ideological currents that inform the intellectual life of Latin America and of those who believe in Marxism's enduring intellectual significance. Fortunately, a new wave of scholarly writing has begun to address these central issues.

In January 1986, Cuba will mark the 27th anniversary of Fulgencio Batista's overthrow and the beginning of revolutionary rule. President Castro's government is no longer novel, much less youthful. Its record of accomplishments and of setbacks, at home and abroad, is the subject of the four books under review. These are very different works in content, style, and intellectual orientation but, together, they shed much light on the remarkable history and impact of one of the century's foremost revolutions—and the only one in the Americas consolidated in power against the wishes of the US government.

Claes Brundenius, an author in broad sympathy with the Cuban

government's goals and many of its policies, has written an able, technical, quantitatively informed work on Cuba's economy under revolutionary rule. Brundenius's work, along with that of Carmelo Mesa-Lago,¹ whose excellent work on the Cuban economy is complemented and also criticized by Brundenius, serve jointly to yield some judgments about the long-term record of Cuban economic performance. Given the contentious nature of the subject, it is worth sketching an emerging consensus.

The Cuban economy recovered quickly from the civil war that overthrew Batista. However, it collapsed in the 1960's for a variety of reasons, ranging from the imposition of US economic sanctions to the incompetence of the Cuban government's (and Castro's personal) management. Ordinary Cubans suffered. Brundenius devised a composite index to measure performance in meeting the basic needs of the population. He found that "basic needs performance . . . rapidly improved during the first two or three years after the revolution. After 1962, however, there was a period of relative stagnation and even decline until

Jorge I. Domínguez is a Professor of Government at Harvard University, and a past president of the Latin American Studies Association. Author of *Cuba: Order and Revolution* (1978) and co-author (with Marc Lindenberg) of *Central America: Current Crisis and Future Prospects* (1984), he was also Series Editor for the Public Broadcasting System's series on Central America and Cuba aired in April 1985.

¹ See especially Carmelo Mesa-Lago, *The Economy of Socialist Cuba*, Albuquerque, NM, University of New Mexico Press, 1981.

1970" (p. 91). To put it bluntly, Cuba lost a decade of economic growth during which its ability to meet the basic needs of the population—the revolution's very justification—declined.

During the first half of the 1970's, the Cuban economy recovered impressively. This, too, happened for a variety of reasons, including the spectacular increase in the world price of sugar as well as the introduction of organizational reforms. During the second half of the 1970's, the economic growth rate slowed down markedly but remained positive. Among the negative factors were the decline of the world price of sugar and the deployment of tens of thousands of Cuban troops to fight overseas. Among the positive factors were a marked increase in Soviet subsidization of the Cuban economy (especially after 1976) and Cuba's own improved economic management and administration.

Contrary to common discourse, therefore, the Cuban economy stopped being a "basket case" long ago. Since the early 1970's, it has met the basic needs of the population, albeit modestly. The government engineered a major redistribution of income in the early 1960's, and managed to prevent the widening of inequalities in the 1970's. Cuba's economy remains troubled because efficiency levels are still quite low. Managerial skills, too, are still in short supply. Economic growth, to be sure, occurs to a large degree thanks to Soviet aid, to a lesser degree, East European support. But the economy does grow and has been growing modestly for some years.

A SCHOLARLY CONSENSUS has yet to develop concerning performance in the 1980's; indeed, there are few publications on the period. Unfortunately, Cuban economic

statistics for the first half of the 1980's have been distorted by a major "price reform" (i.e., price increases) at the beginning of this decade. Cuba's statistical system has yet to generate credible data about the obviously economically troubled 1980–82 period, for which official figures unconvincingly suggest an economic boom. Nevertheless, subsequent (and more credible) official statistics as well as other, independent observations suggest that the Cuban economy began to grow again in the second half of 1983, and continued to grow in 1984 at a rate equal to the highest in Latin America. That was an unprecedented development in the economic history of the Cuban revolution.

Cuba's growth in 1984 suggested a major milestone: although the world price of sugar fell substantially, the Cuban economy grew. This happened in part because Cuba's extraordinarily close integration with the Soviet and East European economies sheltered it from the downswing of the world market and in part—as Brundenius argues accurately, though with exaggeration—because an import substitution strategy has broadened Cuba's economic base beyond sugar.

Even in the mid-1980's, however, Cuba's economic problems remain quite serious. The Cuban and Soviet economies have become so tightly linked that their growth rates now tend to fluctuate in tandem; in this sense, Cuba has indeed become very "dependent" on the USSR. Moreover, beginning in 1981, the Soviet Union cut back its grant-like economic subsidies (based on artificially high sugar prices) to Havana, forcing the Cuban government to rely more on favorable but still interest-bearing, repayable Soviet loans. Efficiency levels have hardly improved.

Cuba's bad economic performance is especially evident in the external sector. It has been unable to diversify much out of sugar exports. According to Castro, Cuba did not even deliver as much sugar, nickel, and citrus fruits (its main exports) in 1984 as it had agreed to under contract with the Soviet Union and East European countries. Therefore, in December 1984, Castro ordered a major redraft of the central plan for 1985, imposing austerity on domestic consumption and gearing the economy to promote exports.²

Central planning, in Castro's judgment, had not produced an acceptable blueprint for the near future. He suspended on his own authority the institutionalized mechanisms that had taken so long to fashion. Instead, on an ad hoc basis, relying on long-standing comrades from his early years in power, Castro brought out a new, quickly improvised plan for 1985, calling on the people, yet again, to sacrifice the present for the ever receding future when such austerity would not be so common. This economic policy reorientation, though painful and executed in an intrusive and ultimately damaging manner, was basically on target. The Cuban economy required a dampening of domestic demand after 18 months of expansion, along with much greater attention to exports and to the fulfillment of international economic commitments.

THE EVENTS of December 1984 highlight Castro's still overwhelming personal role—the subject of Carlos Alberto Montaner's book. Montaner's prologue makes clear that his is not an academic book.

² *Granma* (Havana), Jan. 4, 1985, Special Supplement, p. 4.

His intention is to criticize the Cuban revolution sharply, especially regarding Castro's own leadership. Montaner's style is that of an essayist, and he writes with wit and literary skill. But Montaner's work does not help us understand why the revolutionary government has genuine support. Cuba has had an authentic revolution; Castro does command substantial popular backing. Nor does it help us understand how the regime has become somewhat more institutionalized and, through these new capabilities, more able to project its power overseas. What Montaner does very well is to expose the regime's repressive nature.

The Cuban revolution has never been "liberal" in any sense of that word, but it is at times especially harsh and intolerant. Montaner explores this painful though important subject in detail with regard to intellectual life, religion, sexuality, race, political imprisonment, and freedom of political expression, association, and opposition. He reminds us that Castro's role in the revolution cannot be ignored, and that organizational changes should not be allowed to obscure either his persistent importance or the costs that his control has imposed on Cubans.

The political record of the last several years (generally beyond Montaner's coverage) underlines this point once more. During this period, part of Cuba's national crisis was Castro's personal crisis. In late 1979, Castro began dismissing dozens of the highest government officials, beginning with many in the Council of Ministers, in response to a faltering economy, mounting indiscipline, and rising discontent. Soon afterward he was shaken by the death of Celia Sanchez, his personal secretary and confidante since the civil war of the 1950's; later in the year he was

affected by the suicide of another long-time comrade, Haydee Santamaria. In between, thousands of Cubans crowded onto the grounds of the Peruvian embassy in Havana after Castro had made the miscalculation of removing the embassy's Cuban guards and letting it be known that entry would not be barred. That began the chain of events that would lead to the dramatic emigration of over 125,000 people to the United States through the port of Mariel. Finally, in yet another mysterious lapse of political judgment or control, the Cuban Air Force attacked a Bahamian Coast Guard boat without provocation in May 1980, sinking it and killing four of its crew—for which Cuba, under pressure from other Caribbean countries, eventually apologized and paid compensation.

Castro's personal role was again evident in October 1983, when the United States and several English-speaking Caribbean countries intervened in Grenada. Castro took personal charge of directing the Cuban response. He ordered all Cuban personnel, when attacked, to fight to the death rather than surrender. Many Cuban reservists who were issued weapons fought bravely against impossible odds. But Castro was hurt, and felt humiliated, when most Cubans on Grenada, including the top officers, surrendered thereafter. His expectation that Cubans would imolate themselves for a Grenadian revolution whose most recent act—the killing of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop—Castro himself had just denounced is but another example of the extreme and unreasonable demands he has often placed on the Cuban people.

A year later, having cut the economic planning apparatus down to size, Castro took on the Communist Party's ideological appa-

ratus—unilaterally riding roughshod over another institution that had taken a long time to build. He dismissed, with the Central Committee's support obtained at an emergency meeting, the party secretary for ideology, beginning a chain reaction that has led to the replacement of many key officials in charge of the mass media, propaganda, and religious and ideological affairs.³ More changes are likely, culminating in the Central Committee's renewal at the 3rd party congress in February 1986.

Altogether, then, Castro's intensely personal rule remains a serious constraint on institutionalized and stable conduct of the Cuban government and party, on the making of a revolution that is genuinely socialist and not just the "heroic expression" of one man's personality—a revolution heir to Marx and Lenin, not to a mixture of Blanqui and Bonaparte.

And yet, many of these same events illustrate Castro's enormous success. Despite personal grief and undoubted mistakes, he saved the revolution in 1980. He even turned the Mariel exodus into an embarrassment for a president of the United States who first welcomed, and then wanted to stop, this unexpected migration. He embarrassed his enemies in the Cuban-American community in the United States by, in effect, deporting a fair number of Cuban criminals. (The Cuban government insists that all who left prison for the United States did so voluntarily, but this was obviously an offer that few were likely to refuse.) At the time of the Grenada invasion, he rallied Cubans to their government with pride in those who fought. He found justification for many of his defense and inter-

³ Ibid., Feb. 1, 1985.

nal security policies in the US actions in Grenada; and he elicited the increased support, from his own people and from the Soviet Union, needed to improve economic performance in 1983-84. Thus, the record of the past five years can in some sense be viewed as a microcosm of the vicissitudes of Cuba under Castro. He has managed to govern the island for over a quarter-century because he, alone among the revolutionary leadership, has had the mixture of vision, ruthlessness, and practicality to recover from past mistakes and carry out the measures needed to remain in power.

THE SAME COMBINATION of vision and ruthlessness evident in Castro's management of domestic economic and political issues is also reflected in Cuban foreign affairs. Cuba's revolution has always been too big, in its leader's eyes, for such a small island. Beginning in 1959, the new Cuban government began to project itself abroad, first in small steps supporting revolutionary movements in neighboring countries and eventually on a worldwide scale. Tens of thousands of Cubans, by official count, now serve in dozens of countries throughout the Third World. Of greatest concern to the United States and its allies is the permanent deployment of well over 20,000 Cuban troops (at times as many as 36,000) in Angola, of a smaller though still substantial number in Ethiopia, and of a few thousand military advisers in several other countries. Tens of thousands of people from dozens of countries have also studied in Cuba, with over 20,000 doing so on scholarship each year in the mid-1980's.

Pamela Falk and H. Michael Erisman have published, nearly simultaneously, good general

books on the evolution of Cuban foreign policy, joining another good book on the same subject, by Carla Robbins, published a couple of years ago.⁴ Surprisingly, this important subject had earlier been treated primarily in articles or incorporated as a part of larger works on Cuban affairs. This new boom in books about Cuban foreign policy is a somewhat belated recognition that the island counts in the world's affairs today.⁵

The Falk and Erisman books share several similarities. Both are aimed at a general audience, and both are fairly short. Both make extensive (and at times somewhat uncritical) use of non-Cuban at the expense of Cuban sources. In compensation, both devote substantial space to the re-publication of speeches and other documents pertaining to Cuban international relations; Falk's book devotes about one-quarter of its length to such materials. This feature would enable a college teacher to ask students to work on their own with primary materials—a laudable and, until now, difficult endeavor in teaching about Cuban foreign policy. Both books emphasize Cuban relations with Third World countries and with the United States at the expense of Cuban relations with Eastern and Western Europe and, somewhat surprisingly, with the Soviet Union as well. Both authors also emphasize political at the expense of military and economic issues.

Each author, however, takes a different approach to the substance of Cuba's external affairs. Falk seeks to cover a great deal, devoting brief sections to Cuba's

foreign policy before the revolution, to Cuban external activities in the immediate aftermath of revolutionary victory, and to more recent events. She has something to say on virtually every topic of Cuban foreign policy. Erisman, instead, has focused much more on Cuban foreign policy since the early 1970's, after a brief background discussion. Falk stresses the various geographic settings of Cuban international activities, with chapters on different episodes and aspects of Cuban policies toward Latin America and Africa. Erisman, by contrast, has picked one grand theme—Cuban globalism—and explored it through its impact on and implications for the Non-aligned Movement, the United States, and the Soviet Union.

Perhaps the most important conclusion of both volumes is that the subject of Cuban foreign policy exists; it is not just an appendix of Soviet policy. It is not only not enough, but it is foolish, to seek to understand Cuban activities worldwide by looking for causation only, or even mainly, in Moscow rather than in Havana. A second important conclusion is the wide scope of Cuban foreign policy. Indeed, one difficulty in writing a book about the subject is that there is so much that could be covered. There are Cubans riding camels in the desert and slashing their paths through tropical forests. There are Cubans riding tanks in war and riding jeeps to heal sick children in remote places. There are Cubans seeking to overthrow some established governments and seeking to prop up others. Cuba behaves abroad as a big power trapped within the resources and constraints of a little one.

For the United States and its allies, however, the concerns posed by the overseas spread of the Cuban revolution can be iden-

⁴ Carla Ann Robbins, *The Cuban Threat*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1983.

⁵ I am also at work on a book about Cuban international affairs that is the source for some of the statements made here.

tified with some precision. The United States has long been legitimately concerned about the military aspects of Soviet-Cuban relations. This includes not just the persistent US commitment to prevent the emplacement of strategic weapons in Cuba but also a growing concern about the Soviet-supplied increase in Cuban conventional military capabilities. The latter have been deployed in wars in Angola and in the Horn of Africa; the Cuban armed forces have acquired the potential capacity to threaten some US allies or even the United States itself in the specific scenario of the latter's preoccupation with a full-fledged conventional war in Europe.

The United States and its allies also have legitimate concerns about Cuban support for the overthrow of many established governments. In the 1960's, Cuba was at times almost indiscriminate in its revolutionary efforts, aiming them at democratic as well as at authoritarian regimes whose only common denominator was their alignment with the United States. Cuban support for revolutionary movements has grown much more discriminating, but it is still a destabilizing force in particular settings, especially in northern Central America and in southwest and northwest Africa.

More complex has been the concern about Cuban support for established revolutionary states throughout the Third World. For example, neither the United States nor Cuba (nor, for that matter, the Soviet Union) supported Somalia's efforts in 1977-78 to wrest the Ogaden from Ethiopia by force. Rather, the US concern was focused on the secondary consequences of Cuban and Soviet troop deployments helping Ethiopia beat back the Somali invasion. Similarly, most outside parties support the

independence of Namibia from South Africa, but Washington also wants Cuban troops to withdraw from Angola in connection with the process of emancipating Namibia. Even more complex is US concern over more subtle elements of Cuban influence overseas, be it through the deployment of technical advisers and school teachers or through the odd case of Cuban leadership in the Nonaligned Movement—odd because it is difficult to find any country more aligned with the Soviet Union than is Cuba.

Widespread as Cuban overseas engagement has been, it has been less effective since late 1979 as a result both of Cuba's own mistakes and of the policies of others, including the US government. As compared to the mid-1970's, Cuba is much more isolated in the English-speaking Caribbean and in Latin America; in relative terms, it trades much less with West European countries, Canada, and Japan. It is less influential in the Nonaligned Movement. Its personnel have been expelled from Grenada, Jamaica, and Suriname. It has withdrawn most of its troops from Ethiopia, where their mission was largely accomplished. Its wide-ranging government-to-government relations mean that there is less room to support the overthrow of established governments, so that this has been a less pervasive feature of Cuban policy. In December 1984, after long discussions, the Cuban Communist Party's Central Committee agreed to tell Cubans that they had to be prepared to fight on their own in a war in the Caribbean—in other words, not to expect that the Soviets would declare war on the United States just for the sake of rescuing the Cuban revolution.⁶

⁶ *Granma*, Feb. 4, 1985

Revolutionary Cubans still stand tall in defense of their policies—but they no longer seem ten feet tall.

To try to recover from some of these setbacks, Castro in the mid-1980's took up the matter of the huge debt Latin American countries owed to international banks and lending institutions and to foreign governments. He argued that much of this debt was illegitimate, that it was payable at usurious interest rates, and that it should therefore be repudiated. Castro distinguished, however, between "good" and "bad" debts; the former, he said, should still be honored.⁷ Cuba's own debts, incurred not only with other communist countries but also with international banks, were "good" ones; Havana has rescheduled its debt and has been repaying it faithfully so far. The Cuban leader's argument about Latin America's "bad" debts, therefore, has a primarily political goal: to ingratiate himself with the new democratic governments that have come to power in much of South America in recent years, and thereby to extend Cuba's influence abroad. Regardless of how effective this tactic turns out to be, other Latin American countries may benefit from Cuba's radical posture because it makes them appear more moderate, and may make it easier for them to obtain better terms from their creditors.

Altogether, Cuba's international relations, despite their troubles, remain impressive in their range and impact. Cuba is still a source of influence for its allies and of worry

⁷ For the text of Castro's speech to the recent "Continental Dialogue on the Foreign Debt" convened in Havana and attended by government and business participants from various Latin American countries, see Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Latin America* (Washington, DC), Aug. 6, 1985, pp. Q/1-26.

for its adversaries. It is likely to have its own foreign policy, conducted "not with a whimper but with a bang," for a long time.

GIVEN THE ENDURANCE of the Cuban revolution at home and its ability to project its influence abroad, it is perhaps surprising that the Cuban contribution to Marxist intellectual discourse, even within Latin America, has been so negligible. In a book published last year, Sheldon Liss, a noted diplomatic historian, turned his attention to an examination of Marxist thought in Latin America.⁸ His book is organized by country chapters, with the unanticipated but appropriate consequence of devoting only a bit more than 10 percent of the text to Cuba. Indeed, Cuba has not added much to the evolution of Marxist thinking in Latin America throughout the 20th century. Its own revolution owed more to the audacity of a few individuals than to the leadership of

the Communist Party or the consciousness and militancy of the proletariat.

Even after revolutionary victory, Cuba was more of a problem than a solution in the development of Latin America's Marxist thought. As Liss notes accurately: "Revolutionary Left critics have accused the Cubans of turning from theory as a guide to action, to action as a means of building theory, and have noted that living intellectuals did not play a major role in the early stages of the revolution."⁹ Liss states, less convincingly, that, as time has passed, Castro has become more persuaded about the utility of theory and that, consequently, intellectuals have become a more important part of the revolutionary process. But Liss's own book includes no such intellectual. His case studies of Cuban "thinkers" still alive include only men of action—members of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Cuba. These are very talented and intellectually thoughtful men (Castro, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, and

Blas Roca), but hardly proof of the importance or the vibrancy of the life of the mind in contemporary Cuba.

As Montaner reminds us, intellectual life in Cuba is, to say the least, problematic. Liss's own able analysis sheds much light on why this is so from a perspective much more sympathetic to its subject than is Montaner's. Liss argues that, from a theoretical perspective, the success of the Cuban revolution meant that "Castro and his comrades proved Marx, Engels, and Lenin wrong."¹⁰ In fact, the Cuban revolution is still difficult to explain from a Marxist-Leninist perspective; there is no such serious analysis available. And it remains a challenge to the Marxist intellectual tradition to provide a convincing theoretical explanation that links Castro to those he proved wrong. What the books reviewed here can provide, though, is useful analysis of the practical methods if not the theoretical justifications of Cuba's unique revolutionary tradition.

⁸ Sheldon B. Liss, *Marxist Thought in Latin America*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1984.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 270.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 239.

Correspondence

NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to The Editors, Problems of Communism, US Information Agency, 301 4th Street, SW, Washington, DC 20547, USA.

DEMOCRACY AND CHINA

TO THE EDITORS: I am troubled by Jill A. Friedman's review of *The Limits of Reform* (edited by Ronald Morse) in the January-February 1985 issue of *Problems of Communism*. In discussing some of our essays, she seems to be arguing that democracy is a totally alien idea for Chinese, one that outsiders like us seek to impose on them.

For example, in her one sentence dealing with my contribu-

tion to that edited volume, she states: "In similar vein, Seymour decries China's politics for being 'illiberal, undemocratic and . . . feudal' (p. 86, ellipsis Friedman's). That passage seems to support her contention. However, if I am quoted in context, it becomes apparent that she has things reversed. The quote, taken from the beginning of my conclusion (p. 153), follows detailed documentation of the point being made (I wonder if she read it). I actually wrote: "In short, there is wide recognition in China that the country's politics is illiberal, undemocratic and (to use the officially accepted term) 'feudal.' To a greater or lesser degree (probably depending upon how well the system has favored the particular individual, this is seen as a problem."

My contribution was an academic piece. I was not "decrying" anything, but was simply

reporting Chinese attitudes and perceptions. I make it clear that these attitudes are not simple or uniform. She ascribes solely to me views that are not even necessarily mine. By deleting the words "to use the officially accepted term" and the quotation marks around "feudal," she attributes to me a word that is explicitly not part of my parlance. Ms. Friedman finds democracy "abstract," as opposed to some "specific" social-

ist and Chinese models. One suspects that by "abstract" she means "unattractive," or at least "irrelevant." She is entitled to such views, and many people in China would agree with her. But many would not!

JAMES SEYMOUR
Associate Research
Scholar
Columbia University
New York

CORRECTIONS

The captions of two photos printed the March-April 1985 issue of *Problems of Communism* contained incorrect information. On page 67, the individual to the left of Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko was not Soviet arms negotiator Viktor Karpov but an unidentified Swiss official. On page 70, the individual shown with Nikolay Tikhonov is not Dwayne Andreas, but an unidentified aide.

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Problems of Communism



Book Reviews

Susan Williams O'Sullivan

Darko Bekić

Frank L. Wilson

SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER 1985

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SOVIET AGITPROP

Stephen White

Discipline and Growth in the USSR

Vladimir Kontorovich

Albania After Hoxha

Elez Biberaj

Note

Soviet Shabashniki

Patrick Murphy



Problems of Communism

NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1985 VOL XXXIV

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An annual index for *Problems of Communism* appears in the November-December issue (No. 6) of each year except in the case of the first three volumes, which are covered in a combined index in the November-December issue (No. 6) of Vol. III. Material from the journal is also indexed in *ABC POL SCI*, *Bibliographie Internationale des Sciences Sociales* (all sections), *Current Contents*, *Economic Abstracts*, *Historical Abstracts*, *Index to US Government Periodicals*, *International Political Science Abstracts*, *Public Affairs Information Service*, *Social Sciences Citation Index*, *Social Sciences Index*, *Strategic Studies Reference Guide*, and *United States Political Science Documents*.

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Cover: A poster in the Soviet Union displays the slogan: "We Will Always Be True to Lenin's Cause."
Photo by R. Rowan/FPG.

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IN THIS ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

Propagating Communist Values in the USSR

Stephen White

The Soviet Union has one of the world's most comprehensive systems of ideological indoctrination. Yet, the top party leadership remains seriously concerned about the effectiveness of this political socialization system and is trying to improve it, so far with very limited success. As long as manifest discrepancies exist between the claims of official ideologists and the realities of daily life, a successful indoctrination of the Soviet population is likely to remain elusive.

Discipline and Growth in the Soviet Economy

Vladimir Kontorovich

Current economic growth rates in the Soviet Union have declined to a level that is unacceptable to the political leadership. Mikhail Gorbachëv's prescription for reversing this slowdown is to tighten discipline and accelerate technological progress. Initial experiments in tightening managerial discipline, notably in the railroad-transport sector, have met with some success. Imposition of sanctions on managers rather than on workers carries less political risk and heightens the potential for long-term gain.

Albania after Hoxha: Dilemmas of Change

Elez Biberaj

Owing to the cumulative social and economic ills that are part of Enver Hoxha's legacy, his successor, Ramiz Alia, will need to introduce some substantive changes in Albania. He has already pledged to remedy the economy by opening it to greater interaction with West European economies and acquiring advanced technology from abroad. Yet he faces the major dilemma of how to implement economic reform without permitting a broader liberalization that could undermine his authority and alienate party hard-liners.


Note

Soviet *Shabashniki*: Material Incentives at Work

Patrick Murphy

The experience of the Soviet *shabashniki* demonstrates both the dramatic potential for increasing productivity inherent in allowing a free play of material incentives and individual initiative and the entrenched opposition to such innovations. These enterprising migrant workers perform critical rural construction jobs not undertaken by state or cooperative construction organizations, and they receive enormous remuneration for their efforts.

(Abstracts continued on reverse side)



Essay-reviews

Traditionalizing China's Modern Women

Susan Williams O'Sullivan

Few would deny that the position of women has improved in China since 1949. Yet, women have not attained full equality with men. While the majority of them are out of the home and employed, almost none has escaped the double burden of working and keeping house. Although Chinese authorities have tried to improve the position of women, China's current modernization drive—particularly after the introduction of the household responsibility system—seems to be reinforcing the traditional role of women by restoring the family as the basic economic unit in the countryside.

Yugoslav System in Crisis: Internal Views

Darko Bekić

The notion that Yugoslavia is living through a "crisis" was officially introduced into the political vocabulary of the country in September 1982. The search for the basic source of this crisis has led Yugoslav analysts to examine and discuss the flaws of their country's constitutional and economic systems. This discussion has produced two streams of thought, one seeking to preserve the concept of a federated Yugoslavia based on economic and political decentralization, the other promoting the concept of a Third Yugoslavia with a centralized state and party and greater government control over the economy.

French Communism on the Defensive

Frank L. Wilson

Over the last eight years, the French Communist Party has suffered a precipitous decline in public approbation and serious losses in membership, despite the fact that the Communists participated in the government of François Mitterrand from 1981 to 1984. These setbacks essentially stem from the party leadership's decision to retreat from wholehearted support of the Union of the Left (dominated by the Socialist Party) and from Eurocommunist tendencies in general. As a result, the French party is becoming an apparatus party that preaches revolutionary transformation for France and complete fidelity to Moscow.

Propagating Communist Values in the USSR

Stephen White

The Soviet system has always been distinctive in the attention it has devoted to the ideological upbringing of its citizens. The first postrevolutionary party program, adopted in 1919, made it clear that in this as well as in other respects the new Bolshevik regime would mark a sharp departure from the practices of its predecessors. Within the Red Army, for instance, education was to be conducted on the basis of "class solidarity" and was to serve as a means for establishing "class conscious discipline and an intellectual link with the party." In general education, the schools were to be transformed into an "instrument for the communist regeneration of society," and state resources were to be used for the "development of communist ideas on a wide scale."¹ For party members, a formal system of political education had operated even before the revolution—since the establishment of a party school on Capri in 1911. After the revolution, a more comprehensive

system began to develop, guided by the decision of the 8th party conference in 1919 that all members should attend classes on "what communism is," on "the road to communism," on "our party," and on other subjects. Party members were in turn required to engage in agitational work among the population at large.² Since 1919, mass agitation and propaganda, education of party members, and other aspects of party "ideological work" have remained among the regime's highest priorities. Moreover, despite a series of reforms in the late 1930's and the 1960's, these and other forms of regime-sponsored political socialization have retained roughly the same structure.³

As presently constituted, the party's ideological work embraces a variety of forms of activity that together are intended to inculcate in all members of society from childhood to late adult years the bases of a "communist world outlook." Perhaps the most important such activity is mass agitation and propaganda work, which consists of lectures on current topics normally delivered weekly by party agitators, political instructors, and lecturers in workplaces and residential districts throughout the USSR. Their work is augmented by the 3.1 million members of the "Znaniye" (Knowledge) Society, who delivered 25.1 million lectures on party, political and other themes in 1983 to a total audience in excess of 1.1 billion.⁴ Second, there is an elaborate system of political and economic study, intended particularly for party members, in which over 60 million adults were enrolled in

¹ KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s'yezdov, konferentsiy i plenumov TsK (The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences, and Central Committee Plenums), 9th Ed., Vol. 2, Moscow, Izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literatury, 1983, pp. 80–83.

Stephen White is Reader in Politics and a member of the Institute of Soviet and East European Studies at the University of Glasgow, UK. His most recent book is *The Origins of Detente* (1985). This article is adapted from a paper presented to the III World Congress for Soviet and East European Studies, Washington, DC, Oct. 30–Nov. 4, 1985. A different version is to be published by Cambridge University Press in Peter Potichnyj, Ed., *People of Power: Ruling Stratum in the USSR*, one of the volumes of III World Congress papers.

² *Ibid.*, p. 210.

³ On these developments, see Frederick C. Barghoorn, *Politics in the USSR*, 2nd ed., Boston, Little, Brown, 1972, chs. 4–6; Ellen P. Mickiewicz, *Soviet Political Schools*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1967; and, on the first decade, Peter Kenez, *The Propaganda State*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985.

⁴ *Yezhegodnik Bol'shoy Sovetskoy Entsiklopedii 1984* (1984 Yearbook of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia), Moscow, Sovetskaya entsiklopediya, 1984, p. 21.



A young Soviet Pioneer ties the youth group's traditional red banner around the neck of party General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachëv during his August 16, 1985, visit to the Artek summer camp.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

1984–85.⁵ Third, both the school curriculum and the youth organizations based around the school are intended to play a role in developing a communist consciousness, with the Komsomol (Communist Youth League) in particular sponsoring a system of formal political instruction for its 42 million members. At the apex of this system is the Higher Komsomol School in Moscow.⁶ Fourth, the mass media have a part to play in extending the party's interpretation of current domestic and international developments to Soviet citizens. Fifth, "visual propaganda," such as posters, slogans, and public monuments, forms a further part of the system together with the creative arts, such as film, literature, and painting, which are expected to dwell in an accessible and constructive manner upon the achievements and current tasks of socialist construction. Taken as a whole, this appears to be the

most comprehensive system of political socialization in the world.

The present organization and recent development of these forms of party ideological work are reasonably easy to establish. Much more complicated is the question of the degree of success that they have enjoyed. Some Western scholars have argued that "Soviet citizenship training has succeeded and the main tenets of the ideology have been internalized," or that the Soviet Union is probably the most "dramatically successful case of planned political cultural change" that has yet occurred.⁷ Other scholars have been much more skeptical about Soviet successes in this area. Certainly, the Soviet authorities themselves seem to have been seriously concerned in recent

⁵ *Partiynaya zhizn'* (Moscow), No. 15, 1985, p. 27.

⁶ *Yezhegodnik* . . . , p. 18.

⁷ Alfred Meyer, "The USSR Incorporated," in Donald W. Treadgold, Ed., *The Development of the USSR*, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1964, p. 24; Samuel Huntington and Jorge I. Domínguez, "Political Development," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, Eds., *Handbook of Political Science*, Vol. 3, Reading, PA, Addison-Wesley, 1975, p. 31.

years about both the performance and the rationale of the elaborate system of socialization that they have established. A series of resolutions on ideological work adopted in the late 1970's identified a variety of shortcomings in the party's ideological work and put forward, particularly in a resolution of April 1979 on the "further improvement of ideological-political upbringing work," a series of measures designed to bring about a radical improvement.

This article will examine some of the shortcomings in ideological work that Soviet scholars have themselves identified, especially with regard to mass agitation and political education; it will also consider the attempts that have been made to respond to these shortcomings as reflected in recent resolutions, up to and including the measures adopted by the Gorbachëv leadership since March 1985, and the limited degree of success that such measures appear to have had. The persistence of such shortcomings, despite an energetic attempt to eliminate them, in turn suggests some conclusions about the "limits to reform" that appear to attend the party's work in ideology as much as, if not more than, in other spheres of its activity.

Gauging Ideological Work

Serious examination of the effectiveness of Soviet ideological work began in the mid-1960's at about the same time that sociology was establishing itself in the USSR as a legitimate academic discipline. Since that time, fairly active sociological groups and commissions, normally on an unpaid basis, have come into existence under the auspices of the Moscow, Lenin-grad, Chelyabinsk, Tomsk, Sverdlovsk, Estonian, Latvian and other party organizations. The party organization of the Georgian republic is probably most notable for the range and variety of sociological research it has commissioned.⁸ Sociological research into various aspects of party work has also been conducted at a number of other institutions, among them the Academy of Social Sciences attached to the Central Committee of the CPSU whose Ideological Work Department has been sponsoring investigations into the systems of political and economic education and into mass agitational work since about the mid-1970's. Important work has also been carried out by the section for sociological work of the Institute of Sociologi-

cal Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and by other bodies.⁹ Taken separately, much of this work may be open to grave and obvious objections. The samples may be unduly small, the formulation of the questions may leave a lot to be desired, the representative nature of the locality chosen for research may be unclear, and even elementary arithmetical errors and inconsistencies are not unknown. Yet, when different investigations point to more or less the same conclusion, it seems not unreasonable to grant such findings at least a certain measure of validity.

Studies of this kind, for the most part, tell a sobering tale. First of all, there is less than universal interest in attending mass agitational lectures or political education classes. For instance, one investigation was conducted among a group of 1,700 who attended Znaniye Society lectures in Tbilisi. Some six percent of them attended "on the orders of the administration," and a further 14 percent attended for other reasons. In some workplaces the proportion of those who stated a wish to attend such lectures was no more than 40 percent, as compared with 47 percent who did not wish to do so.¹⁰ Another study found that while 86.2 percent of those polled expressed interest in political information sessions, only 61.8 percent were interested in lectures and the remaining 38.2 percent showed little or no interest at all in attending agitational talks.¹¹

Political education classes appear to be somewhat more popular, in part because they are directed toward a smaller and largely self-selected group of activists. An investigation in the Gorkiy region in 1975, for instance, found that 25.2 percent of those who attended such classes found them interesting, and 26.8 percent found them useful. Some 34 percent, however, reported that they attended because they were compelled to do so, and 13.8 percent declined to comment.¹² An earlier study had found that as many as 50.8 percent of those who attended political education classes in Moscow, Chita, and Polotsk reported that they did so "reluctantly" (*bez zhelaniya*); in perhaps the most remarkable finding of all, some 75

⁸ G. T. Zhuravlev, Ed., *Ideologicheskaya rabota i formirovaniye obshchestvennogo mneniya v trudovom kollektive* (Ideological Work and the Formation of Public Opinion in the Labor Collective), Moscow, Academy of Sciences, 1977, p. 93.

¹⁰ N. N. Bokarev, *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya effektivnosti lektsionnoy propagandy* (Sociological Research on the Effectiveness of Lecture Propaganda), Moscow, Znaniye, 1980, p. 100.

¹¹ G. T. Zhuravlev, *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya effektivnosti ideologicheskoy raboty* (Sociological Research on the Effectiveness of Ideological Work), Moscow, Mysl', 1980, p. 157.

¹² M. F. Nenashev, *Ideyno-vospitatel'naya rabota KPSS* (Ideological Upbringing Work of the CPSU), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literatury, 1980, p. 78.

⁹ See especially Darrell Slider, "Party-sponsored Public Opinion Research in the Soviet Union," *Journal of Politics* (Gainesville, FL), February 1985, pp. 209-27.

percent of those polled at a Leningrad factory reported that they attended their political education classes because of party or administrative pressure (a further five percent attended because they simply "did not wish to offend the lecturer").¹³

A related series of investigations has focused on the relative popularity of lecture topics. Among the most consistent findings are that contemporary topics are more popular than theoretical ones, that foreign topics are more popular than domestic ones, and that socio-cultural topics are more popular than philosophical or economic ones. A study carried out in Taganrog, for instance, found that 61 percent of those polled were most interested in current affairs, and that 36 percent were attracted equally by current affairs and theory. Only 1 percent of those polled preferred more lectures of a purely theoretical character. The respondents' preferred topics were international, current national, and local affairs (96, 95, and 94 percent, respectively); far less popular were the history of the CPSU (50 percent) and Marxist-Leninist philosophy, political economy, and scientific communism, which attracted no more than 37 to 40 percent of all respondents (or just 17 to 22 percent of those who did not normally attend such lectures).¹⁴ A similar survey in Chelyabinsk found that approximately 42 percent of those polled expressed a preference for more lectures on international affairs, as compared with only 1.3 percent who wanted more lectures on Marxist-Leninist philosophy and 1.8 percent who wanted more lectures on scientific communism.¹⁵ Many other surveys have reported similar findings, and there appears to be little variation by education, occupation, sex, nationality, or age group.

Perhaps not surprisingly, the content of political lectures and education classes has also been cause for some concern. Investigations at a number of industrial enterprises in Moscow, for instance, found that many respondents identified a "whole series of shortcomings" in the political information sessions

they attended. About 20 percent of those polled complained about the lack of attention that was given to the affairs of their local enterprise and area, about 17 percent criticized the superficial level of discussion, 14 percent found such sessions boring, and almost 10 percent complained that they were not given convincing answers to the questions they raised.¹⁶ A poll in the Chelyabinsk region found that only 31.3 percent of the 2,000 asked were prepared to describe the political information sessions they attended as "good."¹⁷ An investigation into Znaniye Society lectures in Lithuania found that as many as 80 percent of those polled complained of "insufficiently convincing argumentation" in the lectures they attended, and more than 13 percent complained of the lecturer's boring or monotonous delivery.¹⁸ There were repeated complaints of "academicism" and of a "divorce from life, from current questions," and of propagandists who "for hours repeat propositions that are already well known, not connecting them with the particular interests and preoccupations of their audience."¹⁹ It also appears that classes are frequently cancelled or badly attended, and that many propagandists give lectures that are simply a "dry recapitulation of various chapters of the textbook."²⁰ For their part, only a fraction of students (36.6 percent in one investigation) appear to prepare regularly for the classes they do attend.²¹

The data from the questionnaires suggest that those who do attend political lectures and education classes are better informed than those who do not. It is by no means clear, however, that political lectures and education classes are in themselves an important source of information on the matters with which they deal. Rather, it appears that those who attend lectures or classes are more likely to be well informed in the first place, and that they do not find that their knowledge has been significantly advanced by their participation in such exercises. A study in Taganrog, for instance, found that 80.3 percent of those polled obtained their information on current events from newspapers, radio, and television; 19.9 percent also

¹³ A. G. Yefimov and P. V. Pozdnyakov, *Nauchnyye osnovy partiynoy propagandy* (The Scientific Bases of Party Propaganda), Moscow, Mysl', 1966, p. 101; N. S. Afonin, *Sotsial'no-politicheskiye aspekty povysheniya effektivnosti partiynoy propagandy* (Social and Political Aspects of Heightening the Effectiveness of Party Propaganda), avtoreferat kand. dissertatsii, Moscow, 1973, p. 20. Some of the findings that follow were first presented in Stephen White, *Political Culture and Soviet Politics*, London, Macmillan, 1979, ch. 6, and "The Effectiveness of Political Propaganda in the USSR," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), July 1980, pp. 323-48.

¹⁴ V. S. Korbeynikov, Ed., *Sotsiologicheskiye problemy obshchestvennogo mneniya i sredstv massovoy informatsii* (Sociological Problems of Public Opinion and the Means of Mass Information), Moscow, Institute of Sociological Research, USSR Academy of Sciences, 1975, p. 103.

¹⁵ N. I. Mekhontsev et al., *Lektor i slushatel'* (The Lecturer and His Auditor), Moscow, Znaniye, 1975, p. 65.

¹⁶ P. V. Pozdnyakov, Ed., *Politicheskaya informatsiya: Nekotoryye voprosy teorii i praktiki* (Political Information: Some Problems of Theory and Practice), Moscow, Mysl', 1974, p. 87.

¹⁷ Nenashev, op. cit., p. 136.

¹⁸ *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya* (Moscow), No. 4, 1975, p. 115.

¹⁹ Nenashev, op. cit., p. 85.

²⁰ L. Ya. Zile, Ed., *Formy i metody ideologicheskoy raboty partii* (Forms and Methods of the Party's Ideological Work), Riga, Liesma, 1974, p. 169; *Partiynaya zhizn'*, No. 20, 1975, p. 42; V. G. Baykova et al., *Politicheskoye obrazovaniye: sistema, metodika, metodologiya* (Political Education: System, Method, Methodology), Moscow, Mysl', 1976, p. 82.

²¹ Nenashev, op. cit., p. 83.

relied on relatives and neighbors; 18.5 percent talked with colleagues at their place of work; and only 3.9 percent of the respondents identified these lectures as their source of information on "current events."²² A study at an industrial enterprise in the Moscow region found that television (81.7 percent) was the most important source of information available to the work force; then came newspapers (78.9 percent), radio (49 percent), political information sessions (a long way behind at 24 percent), propagandists and lecturers (21.5 percent), and least important, agitators (just 3.6 percent of those polled).²³ Fewer than a quarter of those polled in another survey could remember the subject of the last political information

session they had attended and the name of the lecturer, and more than a third were unable to name the agitator attached to their local work group, with whom they were supposedly in constant touch.²⁴

Still more important for the party authorities is the link between political lectures and education classes

²² Zhuravlev, *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya*. . . , p. 154.

²³ Nenashev, op. cit., p. 83.

²⁴ N. S. Afonin, Comp., *Politicheskaya agitatsiya v trudovom kolektive* (Political Agitation in a Labor Collective), Saransk, Mordovskoye Knizhnoye izdatel'stvo, p. 28; idem, *Lektor i auditoriya* (The Lecturer and the Audience), Saransk, Mordovskoye Knizhnoye izdatel'stvo, 1973, pp. 73, 91; and V. G. Baykova, *Ideologicheskaya rabota KPSS v usloviyakh razvitiya sotsializma* (The Ideological Work of the CPSU in Conditions of Developed Socialism), Moscow, Mysl', 1977, p. 138.



The Lenin Palace of Culture in Voroshilovgrad serves as an "agitation point" for the March 1984 elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet; it also is the site for regular agitation and propaganda lectures.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

and the subsequent behavior of those who attend them. An investigation in the Moscow region found that 80.3 percent of the Znaniye Society lecturers who were polled believed that they had indeed connected their last lecture with everyday life and the concerns of the local work group and district. Yet only 58.6 percent of those who attended their lectures took the same view,²⁵ and still less impressive results have been reported elsewhere. A poll in Saransk, for instance, found that no more than 23 percent of those who attended political lectures thought they would be able to make use of the information they had received;²⁶ a similar poll at an aluminum factory in the Irkutsk region revealed that no more than 8.6 percent of respondents reported that they took a more active part in socio-political life as a result of their involvement in mass-political work (16.6 percent reported that their involvement in such work had had no influence at all upon their subsequent behavior, and 30 percent declined to answer the question).²⁷

Investigations of the extent to which the knowledge obtained at political education classes can be put to practical use uncovered similar findings. "There is nothing I can apply it to," a student of Marxist theory in Kazakhstan is reported to have said. "Philosophy is up in the clouds, but we have to apply it on earth," remarked another.²⁸ Even when substantial proportions of students are prepared to report that their Marxist studies have had a significant impact on their interest in political questions, much smaller proportions appear actually to have taken a more active part in political or propaganda work or to have read more political literature as a result.²⁹

But, these are the results achieved with those who do in fact attend political lectures and education classes. Despite every effort, there is at present a real concern that substantial numbers of the population have not been reached. Investigations in Vitebsk and Taganrog, for instance, found that 22 and 35 percent respectively of those who were polled did not in practice attend lectures.³⁰ A study in Stavropol' Krai found that as many as 44 percent of those polled "very rarely" attended political information sessions.³¹ A poll conducted in Chelyabinsk region showed that only



Election agitators prepare to exhort the population of the Latvian town Imanta to participate in elections to the local soviet of workers' deputies in June 1977; at left and right are Komsomol members Ghita Libaus and Janis Perkons, in the center, candidate member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Ludmila Vedmetetskaya.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

25.4 percent of those polled attended six or more political lectures every year; 24 percent attended only one or two; and 20.5 percent attended none at all.³² In a survey in Tomsk, 40 percent of those polled had attended no political information sessions, and 65 percent had attended no agitational talks over the previous three months.³³

Particular problems have been encountered in reaching young workers living in dormitories, rural residents, night-shift workers, workers in enterprises with a low level of party membership, and older children and pensioners. Residents in urban centers, it appears, hear more than twice as many political lectures as do their counterparts in the countryside, and industrial workers are four or five times more likely to

²⁵ Bokarev, op. cit., p. 51.

²⁶ Afonin, *Lektor i auditoriya*, p. 73.

²⁷ G. I. Mel'nikov, Ed., *Kollektiv i Lichnost'* (The Collective and the Individual), Irkutsk, Izdatel'stvo Irkutskogo universiteta, 1973, pp. 133-34.

²⁸ A. I. Khukova, "Effectiveness of Ideological-Upbringing Education," *Izvestiya Akademii Nauk Kazakhskoy SSR* (Alma-Ata), No. 2, 1977, p. 63.

²⁹ See White, "Effectiveness of Political Propaganda. . .," p. 337.

³⁰ Nenashv, op. cit. p. 112.

³¹ *Pravda* (Moscow) Sept. 6, 1978, p. 2.

³² Nenashv, op. cit., p. 111.

³³ *Problemy povysheniya effektivnosti kommunisticheskoy propagandy* (Tomsk), No. 3, 1975, p. 75.

be reached than collective or state farm workers.³⁴ The problem of differential saturation has received a good deal of attention in the party press, and as the (former) deputy head of the Propaganda Department of the CPSU Central Committee has warned, there is a danger that the party may simply be "informing the informed and agitating the agitated."³⁵

Resolving on Improvements

Presumably it was at least partly in response to such studies that the Brezhnev leadership, in the late 1970's, adopted a series of resolutions designed to identify the major faults in the system of ideological work and to bring about their speedy elimination.³⁶ One of the earliest such resolutions, on "Raising the Role of Oral Political Agitation in Carrying Out the Decisions of the 25th Congress of the CPSU," appeared in February 1977. It began by noting that party committees, relying on the traditions of oral agitation already developed, had found new and more effective forms and methods for such work. Measures such as question-and-answer evenings, monthly appearances by leading officials before the population, and visits of agitational brigades to outlying localities had been more widely practiced, and political informers were working successfully on a group basis. At the same time, these new opportunities were not everywhere being exploited to the full. People's levels of education, culture, and information were not sufficiently being taken into account, and political talks and lectures were still in many cases confined to the "repetition of well-known truths" with no attempt to deal with the questions of greatest importance and interest to the audience that was being addressed.

The resolution pointed out that this work was often given to people who were ill equipped to carry it out successfully, and who were often left without sufficient guidance and assistance by the party committees to which they were responsible. Specialists and officials were allowed to evade lecturing responsibilities, and work in residential districts was neglected except during election campaigns. This appeared to reflect the mistaken view of some party committees that, given the universal accessibility to the means of

mass communication, the need for agitational work had lessened. The resolution stressed that it was essential to raise the significance and effectiveness of such work, and party committees at all levels were instructed to adopt whatever measures were necessary toward this end.³⁷

Another resolution, on "The State of and Measures for Improving Lecture Propaganda," appeared in February 1978. Notwithstanding recent successes, the resolution declared, there was a need to raise still further the level of face-to-face propaganda and its role in the building of communism. Many party committees apparently were not sufficiently concerned to ensure that the expanding quantity of lecture propaganda reflected improved ideological content. The higher levels of education, culture, and information of Soviet citizens were not always taken into account, nor was their need to have prompt and thoughtful responses to current national and international developments. There were also serious faults in the preparation and guidance of lecturers and in the technical assistance that was made available to them. The resolution urged party committees to improve all aspects of lecture propaganda, particularly that aimed at youth, and to strengthen their guidance of the Znaniye Society, which was itself directed to raise the quality of its lecturing work and to institute a review of its membership. The trade unions, Kom-somol, the armed forces, the Academy of Sciences, and other bodies were urged to take corresponding measures to improve the organization and content of lecture propaganda and to increase its effectiveness, involving younger lecturers in such work and supplying them with better technical and printed aids.³⁸

The most elaborate resolution of all, "On the Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Upbringing Work," was adopted in April 1979. It followed the establishment of a special Politburo commission in November 1978 to consider the party's work in this area.³⁹ The resolution began by noting that the successes of the USSR both domestically and internationally had created the broadest opportunities for the formation of a communist consciousness among the population at large. A large and well-qualified corps of ideological workers had been trained, and considerable experience in propagandist and agitational work had been accumulated. Mass communications media were also well developed. The 25th party congress in 1976 had indicated the means by which the ideologi-

³⁴ Nenashev, op. cit., p. 98.

³⁵ M. F. Nenashev in *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 4, 1977, p. 33.

³⁶ These resolutions are conveniently collected in *Ob ideologicheskoy rabote KPSS: Sbornik dokumentov* (On the Ideological Work of the CPSU: a Collection of Documents), 2nd ed., Moscow, Izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literatury, 1983, which also contains a number of earlier resolutions on the same subject.

³⁷ *KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh*. . . , 8th ed., Vol. 12, 1978, pp. 447-53.

³⁸ *Ob ideologicheskoy rabote*. . . , pp. 305-08.

³⁹ *Pravda*, Nov. 28, 1978, p. 2.

cal level and effectiveness of this work was to be developed, particularly through the adoption of a "complex approach" that brought political, labor, and moral upbringing more closely into association with one another in the light of the particular needs of different groups of citizens. A series of resolutions since the 25th congress was intended to carry these objectives forward. Much had already been done to improve the content and effectiveness of education and informational work. The party, Komsomol, and economic education systems had been stimulated and brought more closely into touch with problems of everyday life. Publications in the press, and radio and television broadcasts were more satisfactory in their content and were more accessible to the population.

At the same time, the resolution noted, there were still quite a few weaknesses and shortcomings in the party's informational and upbringing work, "some of them extremely significant." The main one was that the quality of such work frequently failed to reflect the high cultural levels and requirements of contemporary Soviet citizens and did not take sufficient account of the dynamic character of socioeconomic and spiritual changes that were taking place in Soviet society, as well as of the sharply deteriorating atmosphere in the international arena. In these circumstances, the Soviet mass media and agitation and propaganda systems must be prepared to make a still greater contribution in helping Soviet citizens to orient themselves correctly in relation to domestic and international developments. The acceleration of scientific-technical progress, the raising of labor productivity, and the strictest economy in the use of raw materials, energy, and financial resources were given insufficient attention in the press and in mass agitational work, according to the resolution. The experience of leading production workers and labor collectives was also neglected. At the same time controversial and unresolved questions were often avoided, and shortcomings and difficulties ignored. Such an approach—a "tendency toward window-dressing"—only made more difficult the solution of such problems. There must be a more determined attempt to eliminate money-grubbing, corruption, disorder and waste, drunkenness and hooliganism, bureaucratism and an uncaring attitude toward people, the resolution went on. The performance of leading personnel should more often be rated by the level of discipline and the "moral-political climate" in their enterprises; and ideological work in residential areas, dormitories, smaller enterprises, remote areas, and among young people must be stepped up and made more lively and convincing.

The 1979 resolution drew particular attention to the efforts being made by imperialist circles, assisted by "Peking chauvinists," to conduct a "ferocious offensive on the minds of Soviet people," to slander Soviet reality so as to denigrate socialism and disguise the antihuman nature of their own activities. One of the most important tasks of Soviet ideological and informational work must be to help Soviet people appreciate the falseness of this slanderous propaganda. It was essential to give prompt and considered attention to current problems and to leave no question unanswered, lest advantage be taken of this by the class enemy. There must be an end to the "formalism . . . blathering . . . propagandist clichés . . . mechanical repetition of general truths . . . and pompous language," all of which were unfortunately still quite prevalent in informational and propaganda work. The emphasis must rather be upon "serious, thoughtful analysis," convincing argumentation, and a lively and accessible style. The economic, political, and cultural progress of the country, and the full realization of the potential of developed socialism, would in turn depend to a significant degree upon the success that was achieved in effecting such a transformation. Toward this end, the resolution said, agitation and propaganda must be raised to a higher scientific level, linked more closely with current tasks, and made more militant in character. The political education system must ensure "profound study" of Marxist theory and party documents, and propagandists must be more carefully selected and guided in their work. Mass political work in residential areas and workplaces must be developed further, with improvements in the composition of the personnel involved in such work and in the technical resources available to them. The "ideological content and effectiveness" of the mass media were to be raised in a corresponding manner. Party committees were instructed to prepare both long-term and annual plans on these matters, and to report back in December 1979 and December 1980 on their fulfillment of the resolution.⁴⁰

The points of the April 1979 resolution were elaborated on fully in an all-Union conference of ideological workers that was held in Moscow in October of the same year. The meeting was opened by Mikhail Suslov, then the party secretary responsible for ideology. Suslov hailed the April resolution as a "major event in the ideological-political life of the party, of the whole people." He noted that the resolution, which was of a "long-term character," contained a "comprehensive

⁴⁰ *Ob ideologicheskoy rabote*. . . , p. 316-27.

program of action in the field of ideological-educational work." Once again Suslov stressed the need for political education and lectures to be linked with real-life tasks and for the press, radio, and television to respond promptly, substantively, and in a principled manner to domestic and international developments. Literature and the creative arts also had a part to play, by dealing with the building of communism and with current problems rather than (as some had done) with petty themes, naturalistic studies of daily life, or, still worse, with distorted treatments of the past. Summing up, Suslov noted that the April 1979 resolution had been thoroughly discussed by the party and by the population at large. It would become a real force, however, only when it was put into effect in organizations and work places throughout the USSR, and not allowed to become just the "latest campaign." In some public organizations, such as the State Committee for Construction Affairs, discussion of the resolution had regrettably taken a purely abstract form and had not been accompanied by practical measures to deal with the problems it had identified. Such a formal, "ticking-off" response must at all costs be avoided. Suslov's address was followed by less comprehensive speeches by CC Secretary Boris Ponomarev, Minister of Culture Petr Demichev, and other party and state officials with particular responsibility for this area of work.⁴¹

Further attention to the party's work in the ideological sphere came in the aftermath of the 26th party congress in 1981. A further all-Union conference of ideological workers was convened in Moscow shortly after the congress, from April 20th to 25th; it was again addressed by Suslov, and at greater length by CC Secretary Mikhail Zimyanin. Zimyanin dwelt particularly upon the need to publicize the decisions of the congress and more generally to secure an all-around improvement in the party's ideological work. Definite improvements had taken place in ideological work since the April 1979 resolution, Zimyanin noted, but so far only the "first steps" had been taken. There was still evidence of a divorce from real-life problems, of delayed responses to developments, of formalism, superficiality, window-dressing, and propagandist clichés. The elimination of such faults, as Suslov had earlier observed, was proceeding much too slowly.⁴² Zimyanin was followed by Vladimir Dolgikh, Mikhail

Gorbachëv, and other CC secretaries, and by a wide variety of party, state, journalistic, academic, and other speakers.⁴³ A Central Committee resolution on "The Further Perfection of Party Study" appeared in May 1981.⁴⁴ Still another resolution on improving ideological-educational and organizational work was published the following October. While life had shown the timeliness of the April 1979 resolution, it noted, there were still "significant weaknesses" in the party's ideological work, such as a lack of association with real-life tasks, formalism, and verbosity. A series of "supplementary measures" were announced to deal with these weaknesses and, more particularly, with the need for more effective counterpropaganda against the "ideological diversions of imperialism."⁴⁵ A resolution of June 1982 sought to bring about a corresponding series of improvements in the system of economic education.⁴⁶

A year later, in June 1983, a whole Central Committee plenum was devoted to the party's ideological work, the first such session in 20 years. The opening address, on "Current Problems of Ideological, Mass Political Work," was delivered by Konstantin Chernenko. The April 1979 and subsequent resolutions, Chernenko explained, had set out the "main directions" for improving the party's work in these areas. The main need was now to ally this work with the party's "strategic task"—the perfection of developed socialism—and, in this connection, to associate ideological work more closely with the struggle to carry out the main economic and sociopolitical tasks that arise at this stage of development. There had been some progress, noted Chernenko, since the April 1979 resolution: party committees had begun to devote more attention to the content and effectiveness of ideological work. But such changes had not occurred everywhere. In Irkutsk, Tula, and elsewhere, party committees had underestimated the importance of ideological work, and in some other cases, the number of resolutions on the subject had increased, but the real state of affairs had remained unchanged. The Leninabad regional party committee, for example, had discussed the question of legal propaganda 40 times over the previous three years, but the number of violations of the law in their area had in

⁴¹ E. M. Tyazhel'nikov, Ed., *Za vysokoye kachestvo i deystvennost' ideologicheskoy raboty. Materialy Vsesoyuznogo seminarasoveshchaniya ideologicheskikh rabotnikov. Moskva, 20–25 aprelya 1981 g.* (Toward High Quality and Relevance of Ideological Work. Materials of an All-Union Seminar-Meeting of Ideological Workers. Moscow, Apr. 20–25, 1981), Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, pp. 33–83ff.

⁴² *Ob ideologicheskoy rabote*. . . , pp. 346–51.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 352–56.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 375–79.

⁴¹ E. M. Tyazhel'nikov, Ed., *Delo vsey partii. Materialy Vsesoyuznogo soveshchaniya ideologicheskikh rabotnikov. Moskva, 16–17 oktyabrya 1979 g.* (A Matter for the Whole Party: Materials of the All-Union Meeting of Ideological Workers. Moscow, Oct. 16–17, 1979), Moscow, Politizdat, 1980, pp. 20–51ff.

⁴² Suslov in *Partiynaya zhizn'*, No. 8, 1981, p. 23.



Konstantin Chernenko, who delivered the major address at the June 1983 Central Committee Plenum on ideology, was an advocate among Soviet party leaders of the use of opinion surveys to gauge the views of the Soviet populace.

—Camera Press.

fact increased over the same period. Thus, the level of ideological work within the party itself needed to be raised, particularly with new members, and more attention had to be given to the upbringing of young people, a certain proportion of whom were politically naive and inclined toward parasitism and consumerism. There must also be more consideration given to relations between nationalities, and to the proportion of Soviet people, "not all that small," who were still religious believers, according to Chernenko.

The plenum duly adopted a resolution on current tasks in the sphere of ideological work broadly approving the work of party committees in carrying out the resolution of April 1979 and those of the 26th congress, but warning that "serious shortcomings" had "not been completely eliminated" and that not all party committees were devoting sufficient attention to such matters.⁴⁷

A further conference on ideological work took place in Moscow in December 1984. Its proceedings were signed for publication two months later. Gorbachëv, at this time still a Central Committee secretary, opened the gathering with a speech reviewing devel-

opments since the June 1983 plenum (he made no reference at all to the April 1979 resolution). The plenum, Gorbachëv began, had "opened a new page in the ideological life of the party." The party's ideological work had become more substantive and more closely linked with the carrying out of social and economic tasks. There had been changes for the better in the training of ideological workers, and in the forms and methods of their work. But there was "still a lot to be done" to raise the theoretical level of such work and to make it more comprehensible and effective. With regard to the central question of the economy, for instance, much more had to be expected from academic social scientists, from production propaganda, and from socialist emulation. The 1983 law on labor collectives, which extended significant rights of self-management to the work force, should also be implemented more widely, Gorbachëv asserted. A more contemporary style of party leadership was required in ideological matters, with greater emphasis upon real results and a more attentive attitude to popular needs instead of the vanity, nepotism, and bureaucratism that were sometimes encountered in leading party circles (for instance in the Kalinin region). The mass media should also make a greater contribution to the acceleration of socioeconomic progress and to the inculcation of a communist outlook. Zimyanin, who followed Gorbachëv, devoted particular attention to improvements in party education, oral propaganda, and the work of the mass media that were needed in this connection. No less than 90 party and state officials, journalists, academics, Komsomol, and trade union officials also addressed the conference.⁴⁸

"Limits to Reform" in Ideological Work

Students of other aspects of the Soviet system have noted its propensity to launch energetic programs of reform that in the end do not remedy the situation they were supposed to transform.⁴⁹ It would be difficult to argue that the resolutions of the late 1970's and early 1980's on the party's ideological work did more than this; indeed, the extent to which

⁴⁷ B. I. Stukalin et al., Eds., *Sovershenstvovaniye razvitoogo sotsializma i ideologicheskaya rabota partii v svetle resheniy iyun'skogo (1983 g.) Plenuma TsK KPSS. Materialy Vsesoyuznoy nauchno-prakticheskoy konferentsii. Moskva, 10–11 dekabrya 1984 g.* (Perfecting Developed Socialism and the Ideological Work of the Party in Light of the Decisions of the June (1983) Plenum of the CPSU CC. Materials of an All-Union Scientific-Practical Conference. Moscow, Dec. 10–11, 1984), Moscow, Politizdat, 1985, pp. 7, 11, 13, 25–26, 29–30, 41–43, 50–59ff.

⁴⁸ See, e.g., Gertrude E. Schroeder, "The Soviet Economy on a Treadmill of 'Reforms,'" in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economy in a Time of Change*, Vol. 1, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1979, pp. 312–40.

⁴⁹ *Plenum Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS 14–15 iyunya 1983 goda. Stenograficheskiy otchët* (The June 14–15, 1983, Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. Stenographic Report), Moscow, Politizdat, 1983, pp. 6–43, 188–200.

each successive resolution has had to recapitulate the failings listed in its predecessor proves this point. The first stage in propaganda reform efforts is for a set of "serious shortcomings" to be identified, preferably with the support of a series of apparently independent research findings. The second stage is for a resolution on the matter to be adopted which promises to eliminate the shortcomings in question; it will often be accompanied by articles in the press and speeches at scientific conferences that will describe it as "deep" and "scientific," and as containing a series of "precise, well worked-out directives" that party committees must now implement. The third stage, perhaps six months or a year later, begins with a critical speech by a member of the leadership in which it is pointed out that the resolution is unfortunately "not everywhere" being implemented, at least "in deeds" rather than "in words." Such "formalism" must immediately be ended; several party committees whose leading members have failed to appreciate this may even be named. Thereafter the resolution gradually disappears from view (it may be referred to, if at all, as "of a long-term character"), and the cycle is finally completed when a new resolution is adopted, listing almost exactly the same faults as its predecessor and promising, once again, to ensure their speedy elimination. Party officials who have repeatedly experienced this ritual soon learn to regard each

successive campaign with scarcely concealed indifference.



This is not to suggest that the recent ideological resolutions have been entirely without effect. Several practical proposals have in fact been made, and there have been changes of various kinds, particularly under Yuriy Andropov. For instance, there have been important changes in personnel, with the replacement of the heads of the CPSU Propaganda and of the Science and Educational Institutions departments, the rector of the Academy of Social Sciences at the CPSU Central Committee, the first secretary of the Komsomol, and the head of the State Publishing Committee.⁵⁰ An All-Union House of Political Enlightenment was established in 1983 under Central Committee auspices to take overall charge of propagandist services.⁵¹ The Academy of Social Sciences attached to the CPSU Central Committee was reorganized in 1978 and now incorporates the Higher Party School and the External Party Higher Schools.⁵² The composition of the Znaniye Society has been reviewed, with 200,000 members losing their membership in the process.⁵³

⁵⁰ The present incumbents are respectively A. N. Yakovlev (since July 1985), V. A. Medvedev (since 1983), and R. G. Yanovsky, V. N. Mishin, and B. N. Pastukhov (all since 1982).

⁵¹ *Plenum* . . . , p. 192.

⁵² *Partynaya zhizn'*, No. 7, 1978, p. 3.

⁵³ *Za vysokoye kachestvo* . . . , p. 77.



Some of the Andropov-appointed leadership team in propaganda and indoctrination work: at left, Viktor Mishin, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League; center, Boris Pastukhov, Mishin's predecessor and then Chairman of the USSR State Publishing Committee; and right, Boris Stukalin, Mishin's predecessor as head of the State Publishing Committee and now chief of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

Rather greater use has been made of devices such as the "unitary political day" (*edinyi politden*), in which a number of lectures and other measures are combined together, and of other more active forms of study and mass-political work.⁵⁴ Party resolutions have themselves suggested a number of other measures, such as competitions for the best political textbooks,⁵⁵ awards of the title of "honored cultural worker of the republic" to the best and most experienced political lecturers,⁵⁶ and of Lenin diplomas and medals to the best propaganda workers. (In addition, a "Propagandist's Day" is to be designated just before the start of each study year.)⁵⁷ Party officials have suggested a number of further changes, such as ending the primary level of study (where at present almost all the party members are pensioners) and reducing the number of over 130 courses now available at all levels of study.⁵⁸ Other suggestions have included the establishment of specialist higher educational institutions to train students for all aspects of journalistic work,⁵⁹ as well as more standardized and meaningful success indicators (for instance, "propagandists per 1000 auditors" rather than the total number of either).⁶⁰

Despite all the measures that have been adopted, it has proved remarkably difficult for Soviet ideological work to eliminate the faults that have so often been identified (many of them, indeed, since the very establishment of the regime). At least six main factors seem to be of particular importance in this connection. The first is the bureaucratic tendency to pass responsibility for improvement from one institution or level of the system to another (a phenomenon that is not unknown elsewhere). The party, for instance, has repeatedly called upon academics to produce a more adequate theory of political socialization to underpin the party's work in this area and to give "precise, well grounded recommendations" to ideology officials rather than indulging in "scholasticism." The Academy of Sciences, the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, and the Academy of Social Sciences have been asked to devote particular attention to such matters.⁶¹ In some cases, it has been charged, the research that is carried out may deal with the problems of the past rather than the

present, and the conclusions may be brought to the attention of party committees too late to be of any practical value (the research may even be abandoned before it has reached this stage).⁶² Responding to these criticisms at the June 1983 plenum, P. N. Fedoseyev, a vice-president of the Academy of Sciences, promised whatever assistance was necessary in order to train specialist sociologists to undertake timely research. In turn, however, he pointed out that sociological research and the study of public opinion were preeminently political matters that could not be resolved without the guidance of party committees which were themselves able to rely upon the hundreds of thousands of primary party organizations at the local level that were in the closest possible touch with public sentiment. He himself suggested that a new "critical-bibliographical journal" be established to provide a topical and serious analysis of recent literature and to publicize scientific findings more widely.⁶³

Local party organizations have similarly been criticized in party resolutions for their failure to respond promptly and effectively to the most recent directives on the manner in which ideological work is to be conducted. The party has also asked for more satisfactory work from propagandists, from the Znaniye Society, from trade unions, from the mass media, and from other quarters.⁶⁴ Local party organizations, however, have themselves requested better information from the central apparatus, such as through the provision of a new bulletin directed particularly to ideological workers, and have been told that they may quite reasonably seek more active assistance from the CC Propaganda Department than they have been able to secure in the past.⁶⁵ Officials responsible for the mass media have similarly pointed out that, much as they would like to help, their ability to do so is limited by a lack of mobile television studios, gaps in the transmission area, the poor quality of the radios and television sets that are produced, and so forth.⁶⁶ Cinema officials have pointed out that their ability to make the significant contribution to ideological work that they wished to make was limited by the failure in recent years to construct enough film theaters.⁶⁷ The trade unions in turn have pointed out that fewer clubs and houses of culture have been built in recent years in which their ideological work might be conducted.⁶⁸

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 569; but see *Plenum* . . . , p. 41, for a more pessimistic view.

⁵⁵ *Ob ideologicheskoy rabote* . . . , p. 553.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 308; *Za vysokoye kachestvo* . . . , p. 553.

⁵⁷ *Ob ideologicheskoy rabote* . . . , p. 349.

⁵⁸ *Za vysokoye kachestvo* . . . , p. 451; *Sovershenstvovaniye* . . . , p. 53.

⁵⁹ *Plenum* . . . , p. 60 (proposed by Eduard Shevardnadze).

⁶⁰ *Sovershenstvovaniye* . . . , pp. 193-94.

⁶¹ See, e.g. *Za vysokoye kachestvo* . . . , pp. 9, 82, 570; *Plenum* . . . , pp. 11-13, 40, 107.

⁶² *Za vysokoye kachestvo* . . . , pp. 569, 521, 542.

⁶³ *Plenum* . . . , pp. 150, 147.

⁶⁴ *Ob ideologicheskoy rabote* . . . , p. 553; *Plenum* . . . , p. 40.

⁶⁵ *Za vysokoye kachestvo* . . . , p. 553; *Plenum* . . . , p. 40.

⁶⁶ *Plenum* . . . , pp. 159, 161, 162.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 174.

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 177.

Officials from the State Publishing Committee, while conceding that more and better quality books must be produced, have added that their attempt to do so is frustrated by the lack of paper and of modern printing machinery.⁶⁹ And some local party officials have simply asked for more money to reward lecturers and supply them with needed technical aids.⁷⁰ In every case a satisfactory resolution of the matter seems to depend upon someone else.

A second, equally serious problem is the chronically low priority that party committees appear to attach to ideological work as compared with other spheres of activity. In Georgia, Moldavia, and Tomsk, as Zimyanin told the December 1984 conference, the party organizations regularly analyzed the work of the republican and local press. In the Novosibirsk region, however, the editor of a local paper had not been invited to attend party committee meetings for at least five years, and his staff had frequently been diverted to other tasks.⁷¹ Officials responsible for ideology normally, the second secretary in each local party organization is charged with ideology and is ultimately under the scrutiny of the Central Committee's Propaganda Department) appear to suffer from a particularly high rate of turnover as compared with officials responsible for other areas.⁷² In general, many party committees, Chernenko complained to the June 1983 plenum, had taken far too simple a view of the Central Committee's directives on such matters. Ideological work had too often been left to the officials and lecturers concerned, and the decisions that were taken were not followed up adequately with practical activity. The situation could not be changed by directives alone, Chernenko reminded the gathering: it was essential for party committees as a whole, their departments, and "of course" their first secretaries to engage themselves continuously in matters of this kind.⁷³

Difficulties of this nature are more likely to arise because of a third factor: the tendency, particularly in recent years, to conceive of ideological work in very broad terms, which makes it all but impossible to isolate the particular contribution of political lectures, education classes, or even the mass media. The closer association between specifically political and other elements of ideological work was mapped out at

the 25th party congress of 1976, particularly in its decision to adopt a "complex approach" to such activity. A "complex approach," as Brezhnev explained it, involved the "closest possible unity of ideological political labor and moral upbringing taking into account the particularities of different groups of toilers." This in turn involved improving the performance of the political education system and of oral propaganda; it also involved the commemoration of anniversaries, military-patriotic upbringing, socialist emulation, educational reform, moral education, the work of the mass media, and of literature and art.⁷⁴

Zimyanin told the April 1981 conference that the party attached particular importance to mass-political work that was related to the economy and that encouraged people to work better, to strengthen labor discipline, and to take better care of scarce resources in their work places. Indeed, very little was excluded; atheistic propaganda formed part of the party's ideological work, as did the activities of cultural organizations, sports clubs, and libraries.⁷⁵ Gorbachëv's address to the December 1984 ideology conference in fact had little to say about the specific work of party propagandists, lecturers, or other ideological officials; far more attention was devoted to social and economic questions such as socialist self-management, science and production, the educational system, socialist emulation, and the social sciences. "The economy and ideology are indivisible," claimed Gorbachëv; "the closer their interconnection, the better the results both from the perspective of economic management and upbringing."⁷⁶ Some scholars have interpreted ideological work so sweepingly as to include, apparently, interpersonal relations, the work of the Red Cross, and the scientific and technical inventions of young people.⁷⁷ Clearly, the more broadly ideological work is defined, the more difficult it becomes to identify the specific contribution that party lecturers and propagandists may be expected to make to it.

Political education classes and lectures suffer from the further related problem that it is sometimes difficult to point to their particular contribution to the party's ideological work as compared with that of the mass media. Suslov, addressing the ideology conference in October 1979, insisted that "not even the most developed technological means" could replace the

⁶⁹ *Materialy XXV s'yezda KPSS* (Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress), Moscow, Politizdat, 1976, pp. 74-80.

⁷⁰ *Za vysokoye kachestvo* . . . , pp. 78-79.

⁷¹ *Sovershenstvovaniye* . . . , pp. 7-45; the quotation is on p. 27.

⁷² A.I. Yakovlev, *Effektivnost' ideologicheskoy raboty* (The Effectiveness of Ideological Work), Moscow, Politizdat, 1984, p. 10.


⁶⁸ *Delo vsey partii* . . . , pp. 223-4; *Plenum* . . . , pp. 217-18.

⁷⁰ See, e.g., *Delo vsey partii* . . . , pp. 257-58; *Sovershenstvovaniye* . . . , p. 232.

⁷¹ *Sovershenstvovaniye* . . . , p. 58.

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 210.

⁷³ *Plenum* . . . , p. 31.



A Soviet poster in 1981 declares: "Everything that the Party Has Mapped Out, We Will Fulfill."

—Barry Rosenthal/FPG

"direct, live communication between the agitator, speaker, or lecturer with the masses." On the contrary, propagandists, agitators, and lecturers, who knew the situation in their own locality, made a "great contribution to the concretization of general political-propagandist tasks as these applied to the conditions of their own collective."⁷⁶ The trouble with Suslov's exhortations is that many party committees appear to take the view that the development of the press, radio, and television lessens the need to devote attention to other forms of propaganda work.⁷⁹ Also, the evidence that is available on sources of political information suggests that Soviet citizens turn overwhelmingly to the mass media rather than to political classes and lectures for their information on current national and international developments. For example, the main evening television news, "Vremya," is watched by an estimated 80 to 90 percent of all families with television sets (who represent about 86 percent of the total

population), and the central radio and television service receives 2.5 to 3 million letters every year. By contrast, no more than 500,000 or so letters reach *Pravda* annually.⁸⁰ It would be difficult to conceive of the mass media entirely displacing the system of political education; but the mass media have already raised very serious questions about a system of oral propaganda that developed in very different circumstances, and about the contemporary role and functions of the agitator (of whom there are presently up to 4.8 million—all working on a spare-time basis).⁸¹

This in turn raises a fourth problem: the extent to which it is possible to determine the "success" or otherwise of the party's ideological work, given the close association it is supposed to have with so many other aspects of the party's leading role. Some of the difficulties that arise in this connection were identified

⁷⁶ *Delo vsey partii*. . . , p. 34.

⁷⁹ *Za vysokoye kachestvo*. . . , p. 504.

⁸⁰ *Plenurn*. . . , p. 1589; *Za vysokoye kachestvo*. . . , p. 384; *Sovershenstvovaniye*. . . , p. 75.

⁸¹ Nenashev, op. cit., p. 135; Zh. T. Toshchenko, Ed., *Teoriya i praktika ideologicheskoy raboty. Kurs lektsii* (The Theory and Practice of Ideological Work. A Lecture Course), Moscow, Mysl', 1984, p. 306.

with rare frankness in a recent book by Nikolay N. Bokarev, head of the sector on the functioning of social organizations in the Institute of Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Bokarev directly acknowledged that the question of the criteria and indicators of effectiveness of (in this case) oral propaganda was "one of the most complicated in the study of the state of ideological work." How, for instance, could the impact of political lectures, or of independent political study, be distinguished from that of the party education system, or of newspapers, radio, and television? How could an increase in levels of political knowledge be related directly to political lectures or education classes when there were so many other sources for such knowledge? How could levels of "ideological commitment" and "consciousness" be defined and measured in empirical terms? How could a connection between political values and political behavior satisfactorily be demonstrated? The results of ideological work, he pointed out, were long-term in their effect and depended upon a great many factors—for instance, the education and age of those concerned, their prior political beliefs, and their "real life" experiences in the work place and outside of it. Bokarev conceded that it was in fact impossible in present circumstances to measure the direct influence on people's consciousness and behavior of any particular form of ideological work, that is, to measure its effectiveness.⁸²

Not all officials are so pessimistic. A Dnipropetrovsk ideology secretary, for instance, reported recently to *Pravda* that his party committee had, in fact, devised such a measure: it took the form of a single figure that incorporated separate measures of changes in levels of productivity, participation in socialist emulation and in socio-political life, sports, violations of labor discipline, and so forth. It has however been pointed out that exercises of this kind are meaningless unless some measure of equivalence can be established between each of these separate activities.⁸³ Others have more frankly acknowledged that no satisfactory success indicators have as yet been devised while pointing out that existing purely quantitative measures are of little value.⁸⁴

At least two further problems may be identified, each of which has a serious effect upon the party's ideological work. The first is the "gap between words and deeds," or, in other words, the example set by leading party members on the kinds of matters with which the resolutions on ideology have typically been concerned. This problem was perhaps at its most acute in the later Brezhnev era. The October 1979 conference on ideology, for instance, was addressed

by Nikolay Shchëlokov, at that time minister of internal affairs. His speech dwelt at length upon the importance of a "conscientious attitude to social duty" and upon the "strengthening of the moral health" of the society. The ministry's staff members, he promised, by their "own honest labor" would ensure the implementation of these and other ideological tasks that had been set forth by the party.⁸⁵ In December 1982, however, Shchëlokov was dismissed from his position; as head of law enforcement he had enjoyed considerable opportunities for personal enrichment, of which his son and wife had also taken advantage. In June 1983 he was dismissed from the Central Committee for "mistakes in his work"; in November 1984 he lost his military rank of general for "abuse of position for personal gain"; and in early 1985 he is reported to have committed suicide.⁸⁶ Less spectacular examples of the gap between words and deeds occur when propagandists, lecturers, or political informers accept or are themselves responsible for inefficiency and waste, or when communists in leading posts "confuse their own pocket with the state's" and abuse the authority with which they have been entrusted.⁸⁷ It is their own integrity, as *Kommunist* has recently pointed out, that gives party members the right to direct others and to criticize wrong-doing. For party members in executive positions the requirements are still more stringent. Regrettably, the journal went on, some party members, including some in leading posts, had been guilty of theft, bribe-taking, money-grubbing, and nepotism. However insignificant the number of those involved, every violation of party norms of this kind inflicted "serious moral-political damage" upon the party. The communist, as Gorbachëv has put it, "is judged by his actions and deeds."⁸⁸ In ideological work particularly, the moral authority of those who conduct it cannot fail to be undermined when their personal behavior is at odds with the standards that they seek to impose upon others.

A final problem is the extent to which control over the agencies of political socialization has nowadays escaped from the party's hands. This applies particularly to the flow of information across Soviet borders from the east and south as well as

⁸² Bokarev, op. cit., pp. 13, 14, 18, 19, 39, 43, 82.

⁸³ *Pravda*, Mar. 25, 1983, p. 2; Yakovlev, op. cit., p. 107.

⁸⁴ Nenashev, op. cit., p. 58; Toshchenko, op. cit., p. 417.

⁸⁵ *Delo vsey partii* . . . , pp. 190, 197; *Sovershenstvovaniye* . . . , p. 466.

⁸⁶ See Stephen White, "Soviet Politics Since Brezhnev," *Journal of Communist Studies* (London), June 1985, pp. 115–31, at pp. 121–22.

⁸⁷ *Za vysokoye kachestvo* . . . , p. 459; *Delo vsey partii* . . . , p. 219.

⁸⁸ *Kommunist*, No. 13, 1985, pp. 5, 6, 7.



Banners mounted on GUM department store for the November 1985 Revolution Day celebrations carry the texts, from left to right: "We Will Fulfill the 1985 Plan and Successfully Complete the 11th Five-Year Plan"; "A Worthy Greeting to the 27th CPSU Congress"; and "Under the Banner of Lenin, Under the Leadership of the Communist Party—Onward to New Victories in the Creation of Communism."

—Wide World.

from the west. Party leaders in the Baltic republics have particular reason to be concerned by such developments. Officials in Lithuania, for instance, have pointed to the "heightened activity" in this connection of the "Vatican and reactionary clerical centers of the Lithuanian emigration" and to their efforts to encourage "antisocial actions" and "religious extremism" in the republic. Party officials in Latvia have encountered similar problems in resisting "bourgeois-émigré fabrications about the establishment and development of Soviet Latvia," not to mention "pornographic videofilms" and other products of Western mass culture. According to the party's (then) first secretary, A. E. Voss, subversive activities directed against Latvia and the other Baltic republics had significantly increased under the Reagan administration; hostile radio broadcasts had been stepped up, and every use had been made of trade, scientific, cultural, and family connections as well as the international telephone and postal systems.⁸⁹ The first sec-

retary of the Estonian party organization drew the attention of the June 1983 party plenum to the increase in hostile propaganda that was emanating from the CIA, émigrés, and clerics, and which was seeking to misrepresent the party's nationality policy.⁹⁰ A party secretary from Ukraine complained to the December 1984 conference about the development of "clerical nationalism" among that republic's "reactionary émigré community."⁹¹ A relatively novel source of dissatisfaction is the "Islamic factor," which is employed particularly in the Soviet Muslim republics.⁹² Even along the Pacific coast, as the first secretary of the Maritime territorial party committee told the December 1984 conference, the movement of large numbers of ships and their personnel into and out of Soviet ter-

⁸⁹ *Delo vsey partii*. . . , pp. 223; *Plenum*. . . , pp. 106–07.

⁹⁰ *Plenum*. . . , pp. 140–41.

⁹¹ *Sovershenstvovaniye*. . . , p. 105.

⁹² *Plenum*. . . , p. 205.

ritory allowed a "multifaceted" bourgeois ideological complex to come into play, including research institutes, missionary and religious clubs, radio stations, and so forth.⁹³ Greater interaction between the USSR and the outside world is certainly among the factors that have most seriously complicated the work of ideological officials at all levels.

Party ideological work, accordingly, is faced with perhaps more serious problems in the 1980's than at any previous time in Soviet history. A whole range of faults and shortcomings in present arrangements has been identified and documented in the academic literature. At the same time, a series of resolutions has sought to analyze the reasons for these shortcomings and to devise appropriate measures to bring about their speedy elimination. As we have seen, these measures appear to have had a very limited effect. Indeed, given the obstacles that attend the party's work in the ideological sphere, it is difficult to conceive of any measure that might bring about what the authorities would regard as a significant improvement.

It is still too early to judge the intentions of the Gorbachëv leadership in the ideological field. Nevertheless, given the General Secretary's close involvement in such matters in the past, it would be surprising if measures were not undertaken to revive the party's ideological work and indeed to improve the moral-political climate of Soviet life more generally. One early indication of the importance that Gorbachëv attaches to such matters was the appointment of a new head of the Propaganda Department, Aleksandr N. Yakovlev, in July 1985. Yakovlev, formerly director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences and before that USSR Ambassador to Canada, is known as a critic of Russian nationalist tendencies in Soviet life.⁹⁴ Significant changes have been made in

the party statutes, published in draft form at the beginning of November 1985, including new references to "broad publicity" (*glasnost*) in party affairs and new requirements that party members "strictly observe the communist morality" and display "truthfulness and honesty" in their dealings with the party and the Soviet people.⁹⁵ Soviet dealings in international affairs have also become more skillful as shown by the decision, particularly evident at the Geneva summit, to engage in "counter-counter propaganda" and to attack the West directly for its social ills and even for its manifestations of anti-Semitism.⁹⁶

Most important for the effectiveness of ideological work, however, is likely to be the commitment of the new leadership, both in the new version of the Party Program and more specifically in the 12th Five Year Plan published in draft form in late 1985, to raise living standards substantially and to double national income by the year 2000. Particular importance is attached to these tasks in terms of both domestic support for the regime and the international prestige of the Soviet system.⁹⁷ Party leaders, including Gorbachëv, have been fond of repeating Marx's well-known dictum that it is not men's consciousness that determines their being, but rather their social being that determines their consciousness. As things now stand, the greatest problem in the party's ideological work is probably the manifest discrepancy between the overblown claims of official ideologists and the unprepossessing realities of Soviet daily life. Only when there have been significant changes for the better in Soviet daily life will it be realistic to expect significant changes in the patterns of political belief and behavior that party ideologists have been trying for so long and with so little success to alter.

⁹³ *Pravda*, Nov. 2, 1985, p. 1.

⁹⁴ See for instance *The Guardian* (London), Nov. 19, 1985, p. 8.

⁹⁵ *Izvestiya*, Oct. 26, 1985, pp. 2-3; *Pravda*, Nov. 9, 1985, p. 1.

⁹³ *Sovershenstvovaniye*. . . , p. 213; also *Pravda*, Sept. 4, 1983, p. 2.

⁹⁴ See *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin* (Munich), RL357/85, Oct. 31, 1985.

Discipline and Growth in the Soviet Economy

Vladimir Kontorovich

Although Soviet economic growth has been slowing for the last 30 years, current growth rates have declined to a level that is clearly unacceptable to the political leadership.¹ The new Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachëv, openly accepts responsibility for rectifying the situation. His prescription for reversing the slowdown is two-pronged: tighten discipline,² and accelerate technological progress. Accelerating technological progress is not actually a policy tool; it is rather a desideratum, a goal to be achieved by some unspecified means. Tightening dis-

cipline, on the other hand, is a policy tool over which the Soviet leader has significant control, and one he has already started to wield.³

How will Gorbachëv's discipline-tightening campaign affect Soviet economic growth? Can a new leadership team bring about a change in the "work styles [of] everyone everywhere in the Soviet Union, . . . demanding more from everyone, from worker to minister, [and] instilling labor ethics"?⁴ And can "greater discipline and order" help to develop more efficient management which in turn would "dramatically accelerate the rate of scientific and technological progress and make better use of all resources"?⁵

To gain some insight into such issues, it is first necessary to show how discipline is linked to conventional economic variables that determine the rate of economic growth, such as labor, capital, and technological progress. It is also useful to place in perspective the role that discipline, or the lack thereof, has played in the Soviet postwar growth slowdown. Finally, in order to get some sense of what future discipline campaigns might look like, it is instructive to examine the experience of one sector of the economy (railroad transport) where a large-scale drive to tighten discipline was recently launched. While in many respects the railroad-transport service is unique—it has a long tradition of strict discipline dating back to the early days of Soviet rule—it is nevertheless an aging sector of heavy industry where discipline has deteriorated noticeably in recent years. Also, the sector provided Soviet leaders with a relatively manageable environment in which to conduct a discipline campaign.

¹ Gorbachëv stated at the April 1985 plenum of the CPSU Central Committee that the "historic fate of the country and the position of socialism in the modern world" depend on accelerating economic growth. See *Pravda* (Moscow), Apr. 24, 1985, p. 1. Average annual rate of growth of national income produced in 1981–83 was 3.8 percent, compared to 11.4 percent in 1951–55, 6.5 percent in 1961–65, and 5.7 percent in 1971–75. See *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1978 godu* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1978), Moscow, Statistika, 1979, p. 38; and *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1983 godu* Moscow, Finansy i statistika, 1984, p. 43.

² One should note the political overtones of discipline campaigns. Speaking about lax discipline is in effect shifting the blame for poor performance from the economic system to individuals. Reformers generally do not raise the issue of discipline; the proponents of the status quo do.

Vladimir Kontorovich heads Command Economies Research, Princeton Junction, NJ. He holds a University Diploma in Economics from Novosibirsk University and a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia) and has written on the Soviet economy in Russian and English. The author wishes to thank Philip Hanson, Holland Hunter, Herbert Levine, Wolfram Schrettl, and Vladimir Shlapentokh, as well as participants in the Comparative Economic Systems workshop of Columbia University and the Soviet Economy Seminar at the University of Pennsylvania, for their comments.

³ As firing of government and party officials attests. Indeed, out of 50 economic ministers, 10 have been replaced so far. See *The New York Times*, Nov. 23, 1985.

⁴ See the interview with Gorbachëv in *Time* (New York), Sept. 9, 1985, pp. 21 and 14.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 14.



Soviet Communist Party General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachyov (second from right) and Ukrainian party chief Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi (to Gorbachyov's right) pay a June 1985 visit to a steel mill in Dnipropetrovsk.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

The Economic Meaning of Discipline

Labor input into production is usually measured in terms of the number of man-hours worked. Yet, along with this extensive measure, labor input also has an intensive component. An hour worked will yield different outputs, depending on how hard the worker expends his energy. This intensive component of labor input is termed "effort." Effort is an extremely important component of labor input and can substitute for other inputs (for example, hours of work, or capital). As with any input, however, the return from increasing effort, while keeping other inputs constant, will gradually decline.

Most people, most of the time, do not like to expend more than a minimum amount of effort. They do so only if given something in return. Effort exerted by a worker beyond the minimum level depends on the sanctions he anticipates, that is, rewards and punishments.⁶ This assumption about human motives is conventional in economics. It excludes such potentially

important determinants of effort as human aspirations, customs, and values, which are better analyzed by other social sciences.⁷

The term "discipline" means adherence to commands, instructions, and rules. It is a method for eliciting effort in hierarchical organizations, in which workers' level of performance is prescribed by their superiors' commands. These commands serve both to coordinate the performance of individual agents⁸ and to induce them to work harder. Individual actions are coordinated by prescribing different levels of per-

⁶ Of course, what is induced by sanctions is both hours of work and effort per hour. The reason I treat effort as a separate component of labor input is that, being unmeasurable, it is not accounted for in the studies of economic growth, while changes in hours worked are. Differences in observability also make effort per hour harder to enforce than hours of work. Therefore, the two components of labor input may change differently in response to a change in sanctions.

⁷ On the role of aspirations, see V. Shlapentokh, "Human Aspiration as a Cause of the Failure of Soviet Agriculture: Data from Soviet Rural Sociology," *The Rural Sociologist* (Bozeman, MT), May 1982.

⁸ I assume here that whoever gives the commands has solved the problems of coordination of agents' actions, and has arrived at commands that are compatible with each other. This, of course, is not always the case in many hierarchical organizations.

formance for different agents; the general level of commands or targets establishes the level of aggregate performance and effort. If an agent performs below his targeted level, he lowers the aggregate performance of an organization in two ways: directly, by producing less than expected, and indirectly, by curtailing the performance of other agents, whose actions are dependent upon his. Therefore, the higher the degree of adherence to commands, the higher the overall level of performance in the organization.⁹

In the Soviet parlance, the term discipline is often qualified by such adjectives as labor, plan, and technological. Labor discipline denotes adherence of workers to the orders of their supervisors, to work rules, and to schedules. Plan discipline denotes managers' adherence to plan targets. Technological discipline means compliance with repair schedules, rules of operation of equipment, and other technological norms.

Adherence to commands, rules, instructions, plan targets, and technological norms requires workers to exert effort, which is extracted by the use of sanctions. Strengthening discipline thus means improving the degree of adherence to targets, commands, and norms by increasing the magnitude of sanctions or frequency of their application. The result of tightening discipline must be the input of more effort, producing both better coordination and a higher overall level of

performance: more output, in short. Weakening discipline means the opposite. It should be noted that decline in effort input resulting from the decline in magnitude and frequency of sanctions is not necessarily expressed in increased disobedience of commands. Commands themselves may be scaled down to prevent disobedience and thus preserve their coordinating role. When the magnitude and frequency of sanctions increase, commands may become correspondingly harder to execute.

Discipline and effort are harder to observe and measure than the amount of time worked. Measuring them is made even more difficult when one attempts to analyze discipline and effort on the level of the entire economy or in one of its primary sectors. This is perhaps why it is relatively easy to make unsupported claims about effort and discipline. Leonid Brezhnev, for example, repeatedly called for strengthening discipline,¹⁰ but everything we know about his tenure suggests that discipline actually deteriorated greatly dur-

⁹ This description applies to any organization with an internal division of labor; a centrally planned economy, a railroad network, or a machine-building plant may be the examples. Performance then would stand for output.

¹⁰ See, e.g., L. I. Brezhnev, *Otchétnyy doklad Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS XXVI s'yezdu Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza i ocherednyye zadachi partii v oblasti vnutrenney i vneshney politiki* (Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Current Tasks of the Party in the Area of Domestic and Foreign Policy), Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, p. 67.



Soviet railworkers tend to a freight car.

ing his time in office. His public stance of promoting discipline was intended to show concern with the state of the economy, but the absence of sanctions (in particular the extremely small turnover of managers) betrayed the lack of substance in such calls. In this essay, I shall deduce changes in the level of discipline over time from changes in sanctions, since these are more readily observable than their results.

Discipline and Growth Slowdown

Most studies of the Soviet growth slowdown are conducted within the framework of production-function or growth-account analysis and are concerned with immediate determinants of economic growth that are quantifiable, or that at least have quantifiable proxies.¹¹ Such determinants comprise changes in quantities of capital and labor, as well as in their quality and utilization; structural shifts in resource allocation; and the scope and pace of technological progress. These methods establish the contribution of each determinant to the growth rate of output. Obviously, the unmeasurable effects of changing discipline cannot be treated within such a framework.

There is also another approach: examining the ultimate causes of growth—broad social, political, and cultural processes that induce changes in the immediate growth determinants.¹² It is in this context that discipline can be brought to bear in explaining Soviet growth.

In the early 1950's, Barrington Moore, Jr., theorized that the dynamism of the Soviet economy stems from pressure from the top of the political system. By pressure, Moore meant the variety of sanctions used to elicit effort. Should such pressure ever cease, he predicted, the economy would sink into stagnation.¹³

Moore proved to be a brilliant prognosticator. As Soviet authorities began to relax the pressure on economic agents in the 1950's, growth rates started to decline. It is, of course, impossible to demonstrate a direct correlation between the economic slowdown and the decline in effort input. But it can be shown

that in the last 30 years, there has been a clear erosion of punishments and rewards in the Soviet system, an erosion that was bound to result in declining effort.

The erosion of punishments took place in two major stages: Khrushchev's de-Stalinization in the 1950's, and Brezhnev's policy of "careful treatment of cadres" from 1965 until his death in 1982. In the first stage, party leaders suspended the severest punishments by eliminating the use of terror and repealing Draconian labor laws. In the second stage, authorities diminished the risk of being fired for poor performance, thereby allowing officials and managers to attain a high degree of security. The more relaxed atmosphere at the top no doubt affected lower echelons as well. It is reasonable to assume that managers, feeling less pressure from above, similarly relaxed pressure on their subordinates. This coincided with the emergence in the 1960's of an excess in the number of workplaces over the number of workers,¹⁴ making it increasingly difficult to punish workers for poor performance.

Rewards were also eroded in this period as the decrease in the incidence of piece work,¹⁵ the leveling off of income differentials,¹⁶ and accumulation in the hands of the population of cash that could not be turned into desirable consumer goods and services¹⁷ all must have lowered the incentive effect of workers' wages.

It is not unreasonable to deduce from these developments that effort has also declined during the past three decades.¹⁸ This decline in effort has taken different forms: less intensive work by blue-collar workers and less attention to decisions on resource allocation and technologies by managers. Declines in intensity of work, deterioration of resource allocation, and slowdown of technological progress were the chan-

¹⁴ See the evidence collected in V. Kontorovich, "Capital-Labor Substitution," in Kontorovich, *Productivity in the Soviet Economy*, Report to the Director of Net Assessment, Department of Defense, Washington, DC, Foundation for Soviet Studies, 1985.

¹⁵ Abram Bergson, "Income Inequality Under Soviet Socialism," *Journal of Economic Literature* (Nashville, TN), September 1984, p. 1082.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 1076-77.

¹⁷ The emergence of an imbalance between incomes and volume of consumer goods and services in the 1960's is analyzed in V. D. Belkin and V. V. Ivanter, *Planovaya sbalansirovannost': ustanovleniye, podderzhanie, effektivnost'* (Plan Balance: Establishment, Maintenance, Effectiveness), Moscow, Ekonomika, 1983; and in B. I. Khanin's review of Ivanter's book "Ways of Assuring Commodity-Monetary Balance," *Ekonomicheskiye nauki* (Moscow), No. 12, 1984.

¹⁸ Popular impression strongly supports the hypothesis of declining effort in the post-Stalin period, especially in the late years of Brezhnev's rule. Unfortunately, popular impressions cannot be trusted in this matter, as Frederic L. Pryor has demonstrated. See his article "Some Economics of Sloth," *The Social Science Review* (Colombo, Sri Lanka), Fall 1983, pp. 94-95.

¹¹ See, e.g., Abram Bergson, "Technological Progress," in Abram Bergson and Herbert S. Levine, Eds., *Soviet Economy toward the Year 2000*, London, Allen & Unwin, 1983; and Padma Desai, "Total Factor Productivity in Postwar Soviet Industry and Its Branches," *Journal of Comparative Economics* (New York), March 1985.

¹² One example of this approach would be Mancur Olson's explanation of differential growth across democratic countries by the degree of institutionalization of interest groups. See "Stagflation and the Political Economy of the Decline in Productivity," *American Economic Review* (Menasha, WI), May 1982.

¹³ Barrington Moore, Jr., *Terror and Progress USSR*, New York, Harper and Row, 1966 (originally published in 1954), p. 71.

Table 1: Comparative growth of railroad fixed capital, employment, and freight traffic growth rates, 1961-83

	(in percent)				
	1961-65	1966-70	1971-75	1976-80	1981-83
Freight traffic	29.6	31.4	29.1	6.4	4.7
Fixed capital	23.2	18.8	22.2	21.0	—
Employment	- 1.5	0.5	5.5	6.4	2.6

SOURCES: Capital is from V. Kontorovich, *The Role of Fixed Capital in the T&C Sector*, Soviet Transportation Project, Working Paper No. 1, Washington, DC, Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, September 1984, p. 9; the rest calculated from *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR* (The National Economy of the USSR), Moscow, Statistika, for various years.

nels through which the relaxation of discipline influenced economic growth.¹⁹

While economic processes play a major role in the relaxation of pressure on workers, it is generally decisions of the political leadership that result in relaxation of pressure on managers. Thus, theoretically, this cause of the growth slowdown can be reversed by policy. Such a reversal was attempted by Yuriy Andropov in the spring of 1983 during the very brief period when he firmly held power. Now the attempt is being repeated by Gorbachëv. Again, one must look to the increased incidence of firings of high officials as indicators, not just the declarations of the leaders.

If the above reasoning is correct, and relaxation of discipline was indeed one of the causes of the growth slowdown of the last 30 years, then tightening discipline should have a positive effect on growth. What will the magnitude of this effect be? Will it be a one-shot boost to growth rates, or will it provide an enduring source of growth? The only way to approach these questions is to mount a large-scale experiment in discipline tightening in the contemporary Soviet economy. An equivalent of such an experiment has been under way in the Soviet railroad ministry since late 1982. In the next section, I shall discuss the background against which the results of the campaign to tighten railroad discipline can be interpreted.²⁰

Railroad Prosperity, 1961-75

Railroads have been an extremely important sector of the Soviet economy, handling more than half of the common-carrier shipments.²¹ Between 1961 and

1975, freight traffic grew rapidly, increasing more than twofold (see Table 1). Perhaps even more significant, railroad operations were quite cost efficient, both in terms of capital investment and in terms of utilization of personnel. Indeed, while the capital-to-output ratio in the economy as a whole increased during this decade and a half, it fell in the railroad freight-transport sector. Moreover, during the 1960's at least, employment in the railroads actually declined by about 1 percent.

This remarkable performance was the result of a radical change in technology: the switch from steam to electric and diesel-electric traction, especially in the early 1960's.²² At that time, traffic was growing because of train productivity gains, that is, operating heavier trains at higher speeds (see Tables 2 and 3).²³ Around 1966, however, the growth of train speed leveled off, and the growth of train weight slowed down.²⁴ Yet, traffic continued to grow, as more trains were crammed into the existing network. The degree of utilization of the network capacity, as measured by train density, started to increase rapidly (see Table 2).²⁵ This practice continued for some 10 years, until

²² See Holland Hunter, *Soviet Transport Experience: Its Lessons for Other Countries*, Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1968.

²³ Freight-traffic volume can be represented as a product of the length of road operated, train productivity, and train density. See William B. Boncher, *Case Study of Soviet Rail Transport Output and the Productivity of Rail Transport Inputs*, Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates Monograph, Washington, DC, December 1982, p. 6.

Train productivity equals the product of average net train weight and average train speed. This expression can be easily transformed into one that represents the rate of growth of train productivity as a sum of the rates of growth of train weight and train speed. The shares of each of the sources of traffic growth in the total can be obtained by dividing the rates of growth of the variables by the rate of growth of traffic. I use gross train weight instead of net, because no continuous time-series is available for the latter. The available data on net train weight show that the ratio of net to gross remained nearly constant in the past; hence, growth rates of gross train weight must be close to the growth rates of net weight.

²⁴ The reasons for that are not altogether clear; exhaustion of the gains from switching away from steam traction may be one.

²⁵ That is, just at the time that transition of the economy from extensive to intensive sources of growth became the official slogan, railroads moved in the opposite direction. Train density, it should be noted, reflects the time during which a kilometer of track is occupied by trains throughout the year. It can serve as a measure of congestion on the line.

¹⁹ I found a slowdown in the pace of technological progress in the 1970's and early 1980's. See my "Technological Progress," in Kontorovich, *Productivity in the Soviet Economy*.

²⁰ The sections of this essay on the Soviet railroads are based on V. Kontorovich, "Causes of Railroad Crisis, 1976-1982, and Recovery, 1983-85," Research Report, PlanEcon, Inc., Washington, DC, 1985.

²¹ It should be pointed out, however, that the railroad's share has been declining over time, dipping below the 50 percent mark for the first time in 1984 to 49 percent. See *Pravda*, Jan. 26, 1985, p. 2.

1975, by which time capacity reserves were exhausted on large parts of the network.

No data on the capacity utilization rate (ratio of actual volume of traffic to capacity, or the maximum volume of traffic technically possible on given facilities) are available for the Soviet railroads. But there are data on incremental capacity utilization rates (ratio of increment of traffic to the increment of capacity) from 1960 to 1982. If the incremental capacity utilization rate is higher than the average capacity utilization rate, the latter increases. Thus, when the combined passenger and freight traffic increased by more than

capacity between 1961 and 1975 (with the incremental capacity utilization rate reaching 108.7 percent),²⁶

²⁶ Data on capacity increments are based on engineering capacity calculations for particular lines. See V. V. Povorozhenko and V. M. Akulinichev, *Ekspluatatsiya zheleznikh dorog* (Running the Railroads), Moscow, Transport, 1982, Ch. 37.

I have combined freight and passenger traffic by simply adding together passenger-kilometers and ton-kilometers, as it is usually done in the Soviet literature. Data on capacity increments are from B. Kozin and A. Mitaishvili, "Improving the Planning of Transport Development," *Planovoye khozyaystvo* (Moscow), No. 5, 1979, p. 63; and A. Mitaishvili, "Planning of the Transport Complex," *Voprosy ekonomiki* (Moscow), No. 6, 1983, p. 88.

Table 2: Change in Freight Traffic and Its Determinants, 1951-84

Growth rates, in percent

Year	Operating freight traffic	Components of freight traffic				
		Length of road operated	Train density	Train productivity	Train speed	Train weight
1951	12.35	0.68	-1.35	13.13	9.45	3.36
1952	9.34	0.72	4.07	4.31	1.36	2.91
1953	7.55	0.92	-2.59	9.40	5.38	3.81
1954	7.04	0.73	3.73	2.45	-2.55	5.13
1955	12.92	0.30	-1.45	14.23	7.86	5.90
1956	11.61	0.17	6.55	4.57	0.40	4.15
1957	12.46	0.22	5.48	6.38	3.23	3.06
1958	7.26	0.87	-2.08	8.59	3.91	4.50
1959	10.08	1.32	2.86	5.63	2.26	3.30
1960	3.57	1.27	-4.60	7.21	4.04	3.04
1961	4.14	0.80	-3.49	7.05	4.95	2.00
1962	5.09	0.75	-1.75	6.17	3.37	2.71
1963	6.26	0.79	-1.27	6.79	3.58	3.09
1964	5.98	0.60	-0.29	5.65	3.46	2.12
1965	5.18	1.09	-0.40	4.47	2.13	2.29
1966	3.37	1.25	0.18	1.91	0.30	1.60
1967	7.17	0.72	3.45	2.85	0.59	2.24
1968	5.29	0.39	3.63	1.20	-0.29	1.50
1969	4.06	0.48	2.84	0.70	-0.89	1.60
1970	5.39	0.61	3.25	1.46	0.00	1.46
1971	5.72	0.32	3.52	1.80	0.90	0.89
1972	4.68	0.41	3.22	1.01	-0.30	1.31
1973	7.14	0.49	4.55	1.97	0.30	1.67
1974	4.72	0.43	4.12	0.15	-0.89	1.05
1975	4.48	1.27	2.38	0.77	-0.30	1.07
1976	1.82	-0.33	3.37	-1.17	-1.50	0.33
1977	1.08	0.54	1.77	-1.21	-1.82	0.62
1978	2.96	0.68	2.19	0.17	-0.62	0.69
1979	-2.34	0.49	-0.29	-2.52	-3.43	0.94
1980	2.71	0.50	2.95	-0.73	-1.29	0.57
1981	1.84	0.59	-0.45	1.70	0.98	0.71
1982	-1.10	0.50	-0.64	-0.97	-0.97	0.00
1983	3.91	0.29	1.21	2.38	1.31	1.06
1984	1.14	0.28	-3.94	4.99	1.94	3.00

SOURCES and METHODOLOGY: Various issues of *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR*. The train productivity is calculated as a product of train weight and train speed. Train density is calculated by dividing freight traffic by the length of road operated, and then by train productivity. Rates of growth are then calculated for each series.

the average capacity utilization rate for freight traffic alone increased by a factor of 2.8.²⁷

With the incremental capacity utilization ratio so high for so long, the average capacity utilization ratio exceeded feasible limits on many lines. Thus, by the end of the 1970's, "on almost one third of the lines of the railway system (handling the major part of the freight volume), the capacity utilization rate reached 80-90%."²⁸ On long stretches of double-tracked line carrying a significant share of total traffic, the average interval between trains headed in the same direction was approximately 10 minutes.²⁹ The capacity of stations and classification yards was similarly strained.³⁰ While a railroad capacity utilization rate higher than 75 percent is physically possible, and can be attained for short periods of time, it is not sustainable.³¹ A system simply will not have enough capacity in reserve to compensate for unforeseen stresses, such as might be brought on by poor weather conditions and breakdown of equipment.³² The strain on capacity set the stage for the railroad crisis of 1976-82.

The Railroad Crisis, 1976-82

With capacity utilization reaching the limit, traffic growth slowed down in 1976-78 (to less than 2 percent) and diminished even further in 1979-82 (see Table 2). Between 1976 and 1982, capacity increments exceeded traffic increments, which means that average capacity utilization must have declined. Nonetheless, the incremental rate of capacity utilization for 1961-82 remained unsustainably high (90 percent). While traffic is a measure of work done by the railroads, it is not a measure of their net contribution

²⁷ Between 1951 and 1978, railroad capacity increased by less than a factor of 2.

See N. Fufriansky, "Some Directions in Improving the Work of the Railroads,"

Planovoye khozyaystvo, No. 1, 1981, p. 107.

²⁸ Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 22.

²⁹ G. I. Chernomordik and L. E. Tuvysheva speak about 130-150 or more pairs of trains a day. See "Raising the Operational-Economic Efficiency of Loaded Double-Track Lines," *Zheleznodorozhnyy transport* (Moscow), No. 12, 1981, p. 47.

³⁰ On full-capacity utilization of the stations in and around Omsk, see P. F. Mysik and I. T. Kolkov, "Complex Development of a Junction," *Zheleznodorozhnyy transport*, No. 3, 1981, p. 24. Full-capacity utilization of the stations along the Siberia-Urals-Center axis was documented in V. Kontorovich, *Case Study of Transport in the Urals-West Siberia-North Kazakhstan Region*, Soviet Transportation Project, Wharton Econometric Forecast Associates Monograph, Washington, DC, December 1982, pp. 73-74. See also V. Selyunin, "The Nerve of the Economy," *Druzhba narodov* (Moscow), No. 11, 1981, pp. 190-92.

³¹ E.g., Yu. L. Vysotskiy gives the threshold as 75 to 78 percent. See his "Optimizing Train Operations in the Administrations," *Zheleznodorozhnyy transport*, No. 11, 1981, p. 48. Fufriansky gives a higher value: 75 to 85 percent (*loc. cit.*, pp. 109-10).

³² See Boncher's description of "cascading failure" resulting from unsustainably high capacity utilization rates (*Case Study*, . . . , pp. 23-26).

Table 3: Contribution of Factors to Freight Traffic Growth, 1951-84

Year	In percent			
	Length of road operated	Train density	Gross train weight	Train speed
1951	5.47	- 10.95	27.18	76.53
1952	7.70	43.59	31.15	14.60
1953	12.23	- 34.35	50.52	71.30
1954	10.37	52.96	72.84	- 36.25
1955	2.35	- 11.20	45.71	60.86
1956	1.49	56.37	35.76	3.49
1957	1.76	44.00	24.54	25.89
1958	12.01	- 28.60	62.05	53.81
1959	13.09	28.37	32.70	22.38
1960	35.45	- 128.77	85.18	113.17
1961	19.29	- 84.15	48.32	119.45
1962	14.70	- 34.44	53.25	66.18
1963	12.62	- 20.29	49.38	57.21
1964	10.11	- 4.78	35.38	57.80
1965	21.09	- 7.75	44.17	41.05
1966	37.14	5.46	47.56	8.82
1967	10.02	48.18	31.31	8.28
1968	7.37	68.68	28.43	- 5.58
1969	11.95	69.88	39.48	- 21.87
1970	11.26	60.27	27.05	0.00
1971	5.53	61.63	15.63	15.67
1972	8.71	68.67	27.96	- 6.32
1973	6.89	63.75	23.41	4.15
1974	9.04	87.27	22.16	- 18.79
1975	28.42	53.06	23.94	- 6.66
1976	- 18.08	185.07	18.10	- 82.26
1977	50.37	164.12	57.57	- 169.29
1978	23.01	74.20	22.30	- 20.94
1979	22.09	- 13.31	42.56	- 155.76
1980	18.36	108.90	21.10	- 47.70
1981	32.30	- 24.50	38.55	53.28
1982	50.38	- 63.57	0.00	- 97.09
1983	7.34	30.91	27.00	33.40
1984	24.54	- 346.77	263.85	170.37

SOURCE and METHODOLOGY: Calculated from Table 2 above. Contribution factors derived by dividing the rates of growth of each variable in a given year by the rate of growth of freight traffic in that year, and multiplying by 100.

to the rest of the economy. This is better measured by the volume of shipments (tons originated). And the volume of shipments did not increase between 1978 to 1982,³³ making the railroads one of the worst bottlenecks in the economy.

The high rate of capacity utilization made the railroads' performance unstable and more vulnerable to outside influences. Harsh weather conditions in the

³³ See *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1983 godu*, p. 317; and *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1980 godu*, p. 296.

winters of 1979 and 1982, for example, shocked the system, interrupting service and causing absolute declines in annual traffic and shipments.

The extremely slow growth of traffic was caused, first, by the exhaustion of the source of its past growth, namely, capacity reserves. Second, congestion in the network depressed train speed, further diminishing traffic growth. Finally, the increase in train weight during the crisis slowed down significantly. Thus, the modest traffic growth that did take place during the crisis was due not to intensive factors such as increased train speed or train weight, but primarily to increased train density, which only made congestion worse. In one year, 1977, increased density actually produced net traffic losses, as average train speed declined because of increased congestion.

Also at this time, according to Soviet experts, discipline among rail transport workers deteriorated, and this further contributed to the crisis. Less attention was given to execution of plans and schedules and to organization of operations; quality of repair and maintenance declined; and adjustments in the plan from above became more frequent. In addition, absenteeism increased (at least in 1982).³⁴

While such claims must be viewed with some caution,³⁵ the experts are probably right. Discipline on the railroads most likely did decline, for much the same reasons it did in the other sectors of the economy (as discussed above). There are two additional reasons that are specific to the railroads. First, the worldwide decline in the prestige attached to railroad employment contributed to the demoralization of railroad personnel.³⁶ Once one of the largest and most glamorous employers of the industrialization era, the railroad industry had become simply one of many Soviet industries in the modern urban economy. Furthermore, in



Two Soviet freight trains pass in Siberia.

—Camera Press.

the Soviet Union of the 1970's, the quality of work and the quality of life became more important factors in worker motivation than did wages.³⁷ With this change, such highly paid and formerly highly prestigious jobs as locomotive engineer could no longer compensate for the disadvantages associated with railroading—around-the-clock work, long stays away from home, and frequent disruption of family life.³⁸ Once prestige waned, an important reward was lost, and discipline no doubt became harder to enforce. Thus, it is likely that the relaxation of discipline contributed to the railroad crisis of 1976–82.

³⁴ See, e.g., A. Mitaishvili, "Transport Losses of the National Economy," *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 3, 1982, p. 50; Fufriansky, loc. cit., p. 107; Kozin and Mitaishvili, loc. cit., p. 61; "Boldly and Daringly Manage Scientific and Technological Progress," *Zheleznodorozhnyy transport*, No. 11, 1983, pp. 6–7; "Strengthen the Role of Stations in Improving Transport Work," *Zheleznodorozhnyy transport*, No. 6, 1983, p. 34; V. V. Pavlov, "Strengthen Discipline," *Zheleznodorozhnyy transport*, No. 3, 1983, p. 4; and "Work Efficiently, Productively," *Gudok* (Moscow), Sept. 1, 1983.

Surprisingly, for a sector that elsewhere in the world is characterized by shrinking employment, railroad employment in 1976–80 grew at the same rate as traffic (6.4 percent—see Table 1). It is likely that this was an instance of forced substitution of labor for capital that the railroads could not obtain.

³⁵ It should be noted that lack of capacity reserves would have made it harder to adhere to plans and schedules, carry out timely repair and maintenance, and accommodate unforeseeable contingencies. It may be the case that discipline did not relax, but just did not tighten up enough to compensate for worsening conditions of work caused by the congestion.

³⁶ Such demoralization was felt among railroad workers worldwide. Note, e.g., drug and drinking problems of the US railroadmen. See Nicholas Faith, "Return Train," *The Economist* (London), Aug. 24, 1985, p. 60.

³⁷ On quality of work and occupational conditions, see V. Yadov, "Work Attitude: A Conceptual Model and New Tendencies," *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya* (Moscow), No. 3, 1983, p. 55; A. Kissel', "The Value-Normative Aspect of Work Attitudes," *ibid.*, No. 1, 1984, p. 53; and M. Loyberg, *Stabilizatsiya proizvodstvennykh kollektivov v lesnoy i derevoobrabatывayushchey promyshlennosti* (Stabilization of Production Collectives in the Forestry and Wood-Processing Industry), Moscow, *Lesnaya promyshlennost'*, 1982, pp. 32–33.

On quality of life, see B. Kononyuk, *Sotsial'nyye problemy sokrashcheniya tekuchesti kadrov i formirovaniye stabil'nykh proizvodstvennykh kollektivov* (Social Problems of Reducing Personnel Turnover and Formation of Stable Production Collectives), Moscow, Institut Sotsiologicheskikh Issledovaniy, 1977, p. 38.

³⁸ M. Antonov, *Nravstvennost' ekonomiki* (Morality of the Economy), Moscow, Molodaya gvardiya, 1984, p. 123.

Railroad Recovery, 1983-85

The rates of traffic growth in 1983-84 were only marginally higher than those of the crisis period (see Table 2).³⁹ There has been no return to the pre-crisis growth rates. What makes what happened in recent years a recovery is the change in the sources of growth from extensive to intensive and the increased stability of performance. Average train weight, which did not increase at all in 1982, began to grow at rates unseen since the early 1970's (see Tables 2 and 3). More traffic was handled with fewer trains, reducing congestion of the rail network. With lower congestion, train speed increased, which further contributed to traffic growth.


The resiliency of the train industry during this past year attests to the potentially positive impact such a change in the source of traffic growth can have on the system. Like the winters of 1979 and 1982, severe weather conditions in the winter of 1984-1985 caused

a substantial decline in first-quarter traffic.⁴⁰ However, unlike in 1979 and 1982, when the train industry never really recovered from the first-quarter losses and experienced declines in annual traffic, figures for the second quarter of 1985 already show a high rate of growth (see Table 4).

How was this feat achieved? On a practical level, accelerated growth of train weight is the key to under-

³⁹ The average annual growth rate of freight traffic in 1976-82 was 1 percent, and in 1983-84, 2.5 percent. However, this comparison is misleading, because the crisis period includes two years when severe winters caused absolute declines in traffic; one of these years is the terminal year of the period. Such "bad" years are followed by faster growth next year, as normal results are compared to the depressed base year. But this "artificially" higher growth rate following the 1982 decline is included in another period, that of recovery. The recovery period of 1983-84 also does not include any "bad" years (1985 was a "bad" year, but the annual results are not in yet). This uneven distribution of the years with predictably low and predictably high growth rates distorts the comparison between the crisis and recovery periods. If one were to eliminate 1982 and 1983, it would reverse the comparison: the freight traffic growth rate in 1984 is even lower than that in 1976-81 (1.14 percent and 1.3 percent respectively).

⁴⁰ The decline for the first quarter was 8 percent. It should be noted that the growth in a quarter is relative to the same quarter of the previous year.



Passenger and freight trains crowd the station at Tynda, the "capital" of the Baikal-Amur Mainline.

Table 4: Quarterly Trends in Freight Traffic, 1979-85

Growth relative to same quarter in
in previous year, in percent

Year	Quarter			
	First	Second	Third	Fourth
1979	-6.22	-1.81	-1.18	-0.23
1980	7.53	1.96	0.48	1.27
1981	3.91	1.47	2.02	0.00
1982	-4.00	-0.33	0.12	-0.11
1983	5.35	2.24	2.91	5.15
1984	1.35	2.50	2.27	-1.50
1985	-7.40	3.00	n.a.	n.a.

SOURCES: Holland Hunter and Peggy Dunn, *The Soviet Transport Situation*, Soviet Transportation Research Project, Executive Summary, Washington, DC, Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, October 1984; and *Gudok* (Moscow), Jan. 29, Apr. 23, and July 25, 1985.

standing the recovery. It is a result of two influences: wider application of well-known techniques using available equipment; and improvements in equipment and structures. I shall argue below that wider application of techniques for increasing the weight of trains was forced upon managers through a tightening of managerial discipline.

On the surface, the solution was rather simple. Trains that were shorter and lighter than the norm were run less frequently.⁴¹ Techniques that were known but rarely used, such as double and triple engines, pushing as well as pulling, and electronic synchronization of operation of several locomotives, gained wider acceptance.⁴² In the past, however, such techniques had been underutilized because operating heavy trains creates problems for managers, both in terms of scheduling and directing such trains along the line and in terms of assembling and breaking them up. Thus, managers had to be "persuaded" to take on these added problems. The push they got came in the form of a discipline campaign that was initiated in the sector in late 1982, when Andropov came to power.

Andropov contributed to the railroad recovery in three ways. In the very first days of his rule, he fired the old minister and installed a new one. He then initiated a discipline-tightening campaign in the economy, which was zealously followed by the new minister of railroads. Andropov also disregarded the advice of ex-



Change at the top in the USSR Ministry of Railways: Nikolay Konarev (right) replaced Ivan Pavlovskiy (left) as railway minister on November 29, 1982.

—Camera Press; TASS from Sovfoto.

perts, who claimed that railroads lacked capacity for adequate operation, and declared that the only thing lacking was discipline.⁴³

The new minister fired at least four chiefs of railroad administrations, out of the total of 32, as well as a number of deputy chiefs and heads of railroad divisions, citing poor performance as the reason.⁴⁴ Lest anyone miss the point, these firings were announced in *Gudok*, the newspaper read regularly by every switchman.⁴⁵ Several other steps were also taken. A number of high-level managers were publicly warned to improve their division's performance or face dismissal;⁴⁶ the number of plan corrections were reduced;⁴⁷ and supervisors were ordered to wear uniforms at work and ensure that their subordinates did the same.⁴⁸

⁴¹ "Speech of the General Secretary of the CC of the CPSU Yu. V. Andropov at the CPSU CC Plenum on November 22, 1982," *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta* (Moscow), No. 48, November 1982. The experts who had previously been writing about strains on railroad capacity swiftly changed their tune after the different official line was announced (e.g., compare the 1982 Mitashvili article, "Planning the Transport Complex," loc. cit., with his 1983 "Transport Losses of the National Economy," loc. cit.). This presents an interesting case for political scientists studying the role of experts in Soviet decision-making.

⁴² The Soviet railroad network is divided into 32 regional railroad administrations (*upravleniya*); each of these, in turn, includes a number of divisions (*otdeleniya*).

⁴³ For announcements of dismissals, see N. S. Konarev, "Strengthen Discipline, Improve the Style and Methods of Work," *Gudok*, Dec. 16, 1982; Pavlov, "Strengthen Discipline," loc. cit., p. 5; *Gudok*, July 22, 1983, and Feb. 2, Mar. 21, May 25, June 21, July 7, and Nov. 27, 1984.

⁴⁴ Such threats were announced, e.g., in *Gudok*, May 12, 1983, and Nov. 4 and 17, 1984.

⁴⁵ "Responsible Tasks, High Frontiers," *ibid.*, Jan. 20, 1984.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, July 22, 1983.

⁴¹ "Work of the Railroads in 1984," *Zheleznodorozhnyy transport*, No. 3, 1985, p. 10.

⁴² See, e.g., "Boldly and Daringly Manage . . .," loc. cit., p. 8; "Strategic Tasks in the Second Half of the Five-Year Period," *Gudok*, July 23, 1983, p. 2; "Running in Tandem with the Five-Year Plan," *Gudok*, July 14, 1984; N. P. Ovsianik and V. P. Tereshchenko, "Organizing the Movement of Super-Heavy Trains," *Zheleznodorozhnyy transport*, No. 10, 1984; and Kh. Kh. Khalykov, "Utilizing the Reserves for Raising Train Weights," *Zheleznodorozhnyy transport*, No. 10, 1984.

The purpose of these sanctions, of course, was to pressure managers to exert more effort, and the results were in all likelihood positive: newly appointed managers no doubt attempted to prove themselves; and old managers probably worked extra hard so as to avert dismissal. Moreover, the overall level of competence of managers must have improved.⁴⁹

The latest official accounts about the achievements of 1983–84 are given in terms that relate to the discipline of managers only.⁵⁰ There is no claim that discipline of workers improved. Indeed, there is some evidence that it did not improve.⁵¹ No action taken by the minister was aimed at improving workers' discipline. This is probably due to the fact that there was an abundance of vacancies in other sectors in which discipline was not being tightened. Any attempt to tighten discipline of workers might have triggered a substantial number of departures from jobs in the railroad sector.

Attempting to improve the discipline of the managers was the only strategy available, but it was a good one. Because the whole career of a manager is tied to a given ministry, he is more susceptible to pressure. Moreover, in hierarchical organizations, the higher the position, the more impact the performance of its occupant has on the overall performance of the organization. Therefore, tightening discipline at the highest levels holds the greatest potential for gain.

Another cause of increased train weight was improvement in structures and equipment. Many lines were given more powerful locomotives, and station tracks were lengthened, allowing longer (hence, heavier) trains to be operated. Such improvements were slow and gradual, and certainly were under way before the period of recovery. Unfortunately, there is not enough detailed information publicly available to determine the scope of this type of improvement in equipment and structures. It may simply be the case that by 1983 the cumulative impact of these improvements reached a critical point that allowed heavier trains to be operated along entire routes. On the strength of the data available, it appears that the main source of the accelerated growth in train weight was the wider diffusion of familiar procedures⁵² utilizing

old structures and equipment.⁵³ The discipline drive thus accelerated technological progress on the railroads. Though no high-tech revolution occurred, diffusion of already-existing technologies gained considerable momentum.

Possibilities for improvements of this kind are far from being exhausted in this sector, if one is to believe the Minister's pronouncements. If discipline is maintained at the current level, improvement in train productivity may continue at rates similar to those of 1983–84 for some period of time.

It should be noted that managerial discipline still has room for improvement.⁵⁴ Further tightening of discipline should produce additional acceleration of traffic and train productivity growth.

Prospects for Tighter Worker Discipline

The railroad experience involves only managerial discipline. But the new Soviet leader apparently has a loftier ambition: to improve discipline on all tiers of the economic hierarchy. The current anti-alcoholism campaign, while addressed to all social and occupational groups, clearly is aimed at tightening worker discipline. Will not the new national discipline campaign have a larger impact on economic growth than it did in the case of the railroads?

Tightening discipline of workers should make them work more intensively. While the workers are striving to attain the new, higher levels of effort, economic growth rates will rise. But once the new level of effort is reached, the rates of growth will return to their previous levels. It is reasonable to assume that the workers will adapt quite fast to tighter discipline; consequently, the period of fast growth will be quite short (one to two years). To increase growth rates permanently, one would have to be permanently tightening discipline—but, of course, there is a limit after which this will become counterproductive (as well as politically infeasible).

By contrast, tightening discipline of managers is likely to prop up growth rates for a longer period of time. As the railroad case demonstrates, more disciplined management can accelerate the adoption of better technologies and improve the allocation of resources. The store of technologies readily available

⁴⁹ People who revealed their low ability were replaced by people who had yet to prove their ability. This should have improved average ability even if selection were random; and the new minister probably felt under more pressure than his predecessor to give weight to ability in his appointments.

⁵⁰ The changes are characterized as "measures for improving the style and methods of work, increasing the responsibility of the cadres, and raising the level of economic activity." See "Sobriety Is Our Law," *Gudok*, June 4, 1985.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*; and "When at Work, Work," *ibid.*, June 5, 1985.

⁵² That is, these procedures do not represent any new inventions; some of the methods for driving heavy trains have been known for decades.

⁵³ This conclusion is shared by William Boncher. See his "The Current Soviet Campaign to Increase Train Weight," Working Paper, Department of Economics, Seton Hall University, South Orange, NJ, May 1985, pp. 27, 36.

⁵⁴ See Yu. Makhrin and G. Yastrebtsov, "Letters from the Ministry," *Pravda*, Aug. 29 and 30, 1985.



Members of the Moscow press in January 1984 interview the conductors of the first train to complete the run from Tynda to Moscow on the Baikal-Amur Mainline.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

to the managers can be exploited over time, as can the possibilities for improved resource allocation. This is bound to produce higher growth rates over a longer period of time than in the case of tightening discipline of workers.⁵⁵

Effecting even this short-lived increase of growth rates will not be easy. Many of the processes that caused the deterioration of worker discipline are not easily reversed. For example, eliminating cash reserves accumulated by workers would require a currency reform with the effective confiscation of part of their savings. This step, which has been advocated by some observers in the West for years,⁵⁶ would in-

crease the incentive effect of wages, but it also would entail large political risks.

The excess demand for labor also presents a problem that cannot be solved by disciplinary measures. Current policies aimed at rectifying this issue (for example, certification of workplaces, redirecting of investment to reconstruction) will not succeed in eliminating the fairly large gap between the number of workers and the number of workplaces.⁵⁷

Two solutions are currently being discussed. One is to introduce a greater differentiation of rewards to reflect differential performance (under the slogan of "social justice"). This would strengthen the role of rewards, without additional commitment of resources to consumption (to the degree that the rewards are effective at all). The other is to increase the effec-

⁵⁵ Tightening of discipline of managers can influence output in two ways. First, managers can, in their turn, put more pressure on workers, making them work harder. Second, the managers can put more effort into the purely managerial tasks, such as scheduling, planning, and introduction of new technologies. Such effort raises output directly, without requiring workers to work harder. In fact, better scheduling and use of new technologies may make the workers' tasks easier to perform. Here when I speak of the effects of tightening of discipline of managers, I have in mind only the direct effects of managerial activity proper.

⁵⁶ See, e.g., Igor Birman, *Ekonomika nedostach* (An Economy of Shortage), New York, Chalidze Publications, 1983 (originally published in 1979), pp. 70–93.

⁵⁷ Vacant workplaces (machines that lack operators, or are operated only in one shift) create the physical basis for the excess demand for labor. I analyze certification of workplaces, aimed at reducing the number of superfluous or obsolete ones, in my *Productivity in the Soviet Economy*, sect. 10. Redirecting of investment to construction, aimed at upgrading existing workplaces rather than creating new ones, is analyzed by Boris Rumer, *Investment and Reindustrialization in the Soviet Economy*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1984, Ch. 2.

tiveness of punishing workers by making the labor market less free. Small steps in this direction were initiated late in Brezhnev's tenure and continue to this day. Indeed, systems for "accounting, control, and management of mobility of individual workers," with shades of blacklisting, are being introduced in various localities.⁵⁸ Keeping track of all working-age residents is the main purpose of the system. There is a formidable machinery set up for this task in the USSR, but its effectiveness is uncertain.

Punishing a small group of the privileged (managers) is politically safer than punishing a large portion of the population, especially since the latter would require a major change in the social climate. Of course, punishments directed against only the most egregious violators of labor discipline are politically easy to carry out, but their effect cannot be significant, since they are aimed at a very narrow group of workers.

Improvement in worker discipline requires significant social and political change. The pay-off to any timid steps must be negligible, and even a full-scale crackdown will bring only short-lived gains in economic growth.

Conclusion

How applicable is the railroad experience to the economy as a whole? Railroads are a highly centralized sector. Installing a small number of high-level managers who are competent and hard-working matters more in this sector than in many others. Technology on the railroads is more uniform than in many other sectors; thus, it can be more successfully prescribed from the center. On the other hand, capacity constraints appear to be more binding in this sector than elsewhere.⁵⁹ This means that the other sectors will have more reserves to be exploited by the discipline drive.

The industrial output growth rate reached 5 percent in the third quarter of 1985.⁶⁰ This is most likely the



The data processing center of the Novolipetsk cold rolling shop, where a major modernization program is under way.

—Camera Press.

first result of the Gorbachëv discipline campaign. It is my forecast that industrial output will grow in 1986 by about 5 percent, that is, at a rate higher by one percentage point than that for 1983–84. Industrial growth rates may stay above 4 percent for several years, as a result of maintaining new, tighter levels of discipline.

Tightening discipline of managers raises the pace of technological progress by speeding up the diffusion of existing technologies. This is bound to provide a longer lasting impact on economic growth. However, this impact will diminish with time. What increased discipline accomplishes in this case is not an advance in the best technologies but a speeding up of the movement toward the production possibilities frontier (that is, the rise of average technological level). Thus, if the rate of improvement in the best technology and in the average technology were the same before the discipline drive, then a discipline drive would cause average technology to approach the best technology, and the gain from this movement would progressively diminish. The stock of known and readily usable technologies would become depleted over time.

For a discipline drive to provide a sustained source of growth, it would have to accelerate the expansion of the technological frontier. Shifting out of the technological frontier is accomplished by research and development, that is, by subtle and unstructured

⁵⁸ The most sinister account of this system was given by the chairman of the Belorussian State Committee for Labor, A Fomin. See his article, "They All Went to Work," *Pravda*, Mar. 10, 1985. Similar systems are being developed, and can be put to policing uses, in other localities. See, e.g., an article by Fomin's Latvian colleague, V. Chevanin, "The Most Valuable Capital," *ibid.*, Aug. 12, 1985.

⁵⁹ Capacity utilization rates for industry and railroads are not directly comparable. This judgment is based on the fact that the railroads appear to be one of the worst bottlenecks in the economy. The intensity of use of capital in this sector far exceeds world levels (this is true for freight traffic per kilometer of line, as well as for freight-locomotive and freight-car productivity). On this, see the beginning of the first installment of Makhnin and Yastrebtsov, *loc. cit.*

⁶⁰ *Pravda*, Oct. 20, 1985.

creative processes with a large degree of uncertainty. Can creativity be stimulated by discipline? This is not the place to analyze the problem, but I believe that a tightly run centralized system can improve on the current Soviet performance in this area, too.

Of course, all the gains discussed here are conditional on the maintenance of the corresponding level of discipline. How long will Gorbachëv's discipline drive last, and how far will it go? If the national discipline campaign reaches a scale commensurate with that of the railroads and succeeds in raising industrial growth rate by one percentage point, as I project it will, will this be enough to satisfy the expectations aroused by the ascent of the new leader?

But these are political not economic questions. If a discipline drive does indeed succeed in accelerating economic growth, Lenin's dictum on the primacy of politics over economics under socialism will receive ringing confirmation. If Gorbachëv succeeds, this will be an instance of a reinvigorated political system coming to the rescue of a sick economy. It will also demonstrate why the Soviet economy cannot collapse under the weight of its own problems. As long as the political system works, it simply will not allow the economy to collapse but will help it back to its feet in its idiosyncratic, yet workable, ways.

Albania after Hoxha: Dilemmas of Change

Elez Biberaj

Enver Hoxha, First Secretary of the Albanian Party of Labor (APL) and the founder of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania (PSRA), died on April 11, 1985, after 40 years of virtually undisputed rule over his country. He was succeeded two days later by his protégé, Ramiz Alia, whose smooth and rapid succession prompted many Western observers to assume that Alia would continue Hoxha's policies of isolation and repression. After all, Alia had been groomed by Hoxha to succeed him and was very much a product of Hoxha's repressive totalitarian system. Thus, it seemed unlikely that he would initiate policies of economic and political liberalization, since these might undermine the very institutional structures that had made Alia's rise to power possible.

Nonetheless, owing to the cumulative social and economic ills that proliferated during Hoxha's rule, Alia might find it advisable to introduce some much-needed substantive changes in the longer run. Indeed, he has already shown some inclination to do so. He has pledged publicly that remedying the state of Albania's economy is his first priority. To understand the nature of the challenge facing the new Albanian leader it is necessary to review the major aspects of the Hoxha legacy, as well as the circumstances attending Alia's rise to power.

Hoxha's Legacy

For four decades, Enver Hoxha dominated Albania's domestic and foreign policy. Following a strictly Stalinist course in domestic politics and a basically isolationist policy in international affairs, he succeeded in eliminating all internal opposition and foreign contacts that could have threatened his totalitarian regime. Although Albania did move forward in the economic and educational spheres under Hoxha's rule, these gains were overshadowed by the first secretary's legacy of repression, party factionalism, and multiple economic, social, and political problems.

More specifically, Hoxha created a highly centralized polity in which almost all aspects of life were controlled by the ruling APL and little room was left for social and individual initiative. Crafty and ruthless, Hoxha employed terror and coercion to impose a totalitarian system that denied his people the most basic of rights. His propaganda fostered a siege mentality, by claiming that Albania—the only “true” socialist state in the world—faced serious threats to its very existence from external and internal enemies. Any political opposition could thereby be equated with treason, and the *Sigurimi* (secret police) moved quickly and efficiently to eliminate any potential opposition movement and groups pressing for a relaxation in Albania's rigid social and political system.

Initially, Hoxha relied on alliances with communist states that supported Albania and provided foreign aid for its economic development. Over a period of 33 years, Tiranë passed through a series of alliances with Belgrade (1945–48), Moscow (1948–61), and Beijing (1961–78). After the break in ideological and economic ties with China, Albania's stance on foreign relations was characterized by an unrelenting opposi-

Elez Biberaj is Senior Writer/Editor specializing in Soviet and East European Affairs at the United States Information Agency. He holds a Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University and has contributed articles to Survey, Conflict Studies, and East European Quarterly. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the US Government.

tion to the two superpowers and a rejection of all political and military alliances with foreign countries. In keeping with this position, during the last years of his rule, Hoxha rejected both Washington's and Moscow's overtures for a normalization of relations and continued to maintain that "socialist" Albania was menaced by an "imperialist-revisionist blockade."

In contrast to most communist leaders, Hoxha continued to hold Stalin in high esteem. Under Hoxha's guidance, the APL came to oppose what it termed as "revisionist" changes in the Soviet bloc following Stalin's death, claiming that the Soviet and East European ruling elites were in effect opening their doors to a restoration of capitalism. After the break with Beijing, Hoxha declared that even Mao Zedong, once his political idol, was not a true Marxist-Leninist, and that China was not a socialist state.¹ At that point all contacts with the international communist movement were severed, with the exception of some insignificant Marxist-Leninist splinter parties, notably in Western Europe and Latin America.

Hoxha's regime did achieve some positive gains in the sphere of economics. By the early 1980's, the PSRA became self-sufficient in the production of cereal grains, electric energy, oil, and other chemicals, and had even become an energy-exporting country. (For average annual growth rates of industrial output from 1960 to 1980, see Table 1.) The Albanian economy provided its consumers with 85 percent of their consumer-good needs, and its industrial sector with about 95 percent of required spare parts.² The principle of self-reliance became the key element in the PSRA's economic development program.³ Crash industrialization had resulted in the creation of a relatively strong industrial base, and the APL's economic program envisaged eventual processing of all the country's natural resources by local industry.

¹ Enver Hoxha, *Raport në Kongresin VIII të PPSH* (Report to the 8th APL Congress), Tiranë, "8 Nëntori," 1981, p. 24; and *Zëri i Popullit* (Tiranë), May 11, 1985.

² Albania's 1976 Constitution prohibits the government from seeking foreign aid and credits, from granting concessions to other countries, and from forming joint-venture companies with foreigners. See article 28 of *Kushtetuta e Republikës Popullore Socialiste të Shqipërisë* (The Constitution of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania), Tiranë, 1976.

¹ Enver Hoxha, *Reflections on China*, 2 Vols., Tiranë, "8 Nëntori," 1979



SOCIALIZMI
MUND TE NDERTOHEJ VETEM
MBI BAZEN E TEORISE
MARKSISTE-LENINISTE

A sign in Tiranë states: "Socialism Can Only Be Built on the Basis of Marxist-Leninist Theory."

—Malcolm J. Gilson/Alpha.

Table 1: Growth of Albanian Industrial Output, 1966-80

Average annual growth, in percent

Branch of industry	1966-70	1971-75	1976-80
Building materials	21.1	13.3	7.7
Chemicals	47.6	8.0	15.9
Chromium	9.4	13.2	9.7
Coal	11.9	5.0	7.3
Copper	25.1	6.0	11.1
Electric power	21.3	10.0	18.3
Engineering	25.7	16.7	8.5
Glass and ceramics	16.6	16.1	6.2
Iron-nickel	22.7	0.6	25.9
Light and Food	5.8	8.6	2.7
Timber and paper	10.1	4.6	4.0
ALL BRANCHES	12.9	8.7	6.2

SOURCE: Directory of Statistics, State Planning Commission, 40 Vjet Shqipëri Socialiste: të dhëna statistikore për zhvillimin e ekonomisë dhe të kulturës (40 Years of Socialist Albania: Statistical Data on the Development of the Economy and Culture), Tiranë, 1984, p. 59.

Substantial progress was also achieved in the fields of education and health. Illiteracy, a dominant feature of pre-World War II Albania, was virtually eliminated, and there was a considerable reduction in the incidence of most infectious diseases.

Although these changes were significant, they compared poorly with the progress made by Albania's immediate neighbors. In fact, the economic gap between Albania and other European nations has now widened. Hoxha's isolationism and the highly centralized management system he instituted have retarded the country's technological development and have relegated Albania to a position inferior to that of its neighbors, both east and west.

The Succession

Aware of the major shifts in direction that followed successions in other communist countries, particularly in the Soviet Union after Stalin and China after Mao, Hoxha strove to ensure an orderly transfer of power to Alia.⁴ The process of preparation involved a dramatic reshuffling of top party and government officials, resulting in the downfall of many prominent members of the Old Guard.

Although Hoxha's regime enjoyed a high degree of stability after Tiranë's break with Moscow, the situation deteriorated in the early 1970's prior to the break

with China. Some members of the party leadership were demanding that Hoxha change his foreign policy by broadening contacts with the outside world, reform the rigidly centralized economy, and relax control over society. His response was to launch a series of purges that resulted in the dismissal of such prominent officials as Central Committee members Fadi Paçrami and Todi Lubonja (the chief advocates of liberalization); the top military leadership, including Defense Minister Beqir Balluku, Chief of Staff Petrit Dume, and the head of the military's Political Directorate Hito Çako; the Chairman of the State Planning Commission Abdyl Kellezi; Minister of Industry Koço Theodhosi and Minister of Trade Kiço Ngjela.⁵

⁵ Nicholas C. Pano, "Albania in the 1970's," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November-December 1977, pp. 36-40.



A sign outside the Haxhi Ethem Bey Mosque in Tiranë—in which services are no longer held—reads: "We Will Fulfill the 7th Five-Year Plan With Our Own Forces, Without Any Help or Credits from the Outside."

—Alexander Kulpok.

⁴ Paul Milliez, Hoxha's French consulting physician, said the late Albanian leader told him that "his succession was ready and that he could die peacefully for his country." Quoted in *The Los Angeles Times*, Apr. 12, 1985.



Albanian leaders at the military academy in Tiranë in 1978: at center, party leader Enver Hoxha; to his right, Premier Mehmet Shehu; and to his left, Deputy Premier Adil Çarçani.

—Camera Press.

Extensive changes in the party and government leadership continued throughout the late 1970's and early 1980's. Relatively young people—mostly in their late forties and early fifties—who had distinguished themselves as local and district administrators moved into top positions.

Hoxha wanted a successor who could be trusted to maintain the primacy of the APL in all aspects of public life and to tackle the country's growing socioeconomic difficulties. It had been widely assumed that Mehmet Shehu (1913–1981), reputedly the second ranking member of the Albanian leadership, was that man. A distinguished military commander in World War II, Shehu assumed the post of prime minister in 1954, and, after Balluku's downfall, became minister of defense as well. Although Hoxha and Shehu were said to have disagreed during the war over party and military policy, they apparently remained on good terms and worked successfully together for three decades. Shehu never challenged Hoxha's role as first secretary of the party and supported him in many confrontations with internal and external adversaries. He also loyally implemented

Hoxha's often unpopular and repressive measures. As a consequence, Shehu and his kinsman, Kadri Hazbiu, the minister of the interior and head of the *Sigurimi*, became identified with the regime's repressive policies and were highly unpopular, particularly among the young and the intelligentsia.

Shehu fared relatively well during the reshuffling of government officials in April 1980. Although he was relieved of his duties as minister of defense, on the grounds of his "heavy responsibilities as Chairman of the Council of Ministers," he was able to ensure Hazbiu's appointment as defense minister, while another relative, Feçor Shehu, became minister of the interior.⁶ With much of his power intact, Shehu still appeared to have a good chance of succeeding Hoxha.

It is difficult to pinpoint exactly when Hoxha decided to rule out Shehu as his successor and give his support to the much younger Alia. This turn probably took place during the preparation of the Seventh Five-

⁶ See *Bashkimi* (Tiranë), Apr. 27, 1980.

Year Plan (1981–1985) when, according to Hoxha, he and Shehu clashed over domestic economic development priorities and economic relations with the West. In contrast to Hoxha, Shehu reportedly had advocated a reallocation of resources away from heavy industry so as to boost the consumer-goods sector, effect an improvement in the system of prices, and stimulate economic interaction with the West. Hoxha also asserted that he had been dissatisfied with Prime Minister Shehu because he had been neglecting his government responsibilities and delaying the preparation of his report to the 7th APL Congress due to his preoccupation with writing a book on the world economic crisis.⁷

At first Hoxha attempted to rid himself of Shehu by luring him into a "graceful" retirement. On the one hand, the First Secretary honored him by allowing him to publish the first volume of his collected works (a privilege enjoyed by no other living member of the Albanian leadership except Hoxha);⁸ on the other, Hoxha gave increasing responsibility for the day-to-day running of the government to Adil Çarçani, Shehu's deputy. When these subtle efforts failed, Hoxha stepped up the campaign to dislodge Shehu. This culminated on December 17, 1981, when the Politburo joined the First Secretary in rebuking Shehu for what it identified as politically undesirable behavior.⁹ The following day there was an official announcement that Shehu had committed suicide.¹⁰

Hoxha now moved swiftly to undercut any potential opposition from within the military and security forces that had traditionally supported Shehu. Hazbiu, Feçor Shehu, and an undetermined number of senior army and security officers were arrested, as were the Foreign Minister Nesti Nase, the Minister of Health Llambi Ziqishti, and Shehu's wife, Fiqret, director of the party school in Tiranë. In addition, the titular head of state, eleven cabinet members, and the chairman of the State Planning Commission were summarily dismissed in November 1982. Eventually, Hazbiu, Feçor



Enver Hoxha with Ramiz Alia.

—Me Popullin, Mes Shokëve (With the People, Among Comrades), Tiranë, Shtëpia Botuese "8 Nëntori," 1983.

Shehu, and Ziqishti were put to death, while Fiqret Shehu and Nesti Nase were each sentenced to 25 years in prison.¹¹

Alia's Accession

Shehu's demise and the subsequent purges of senior officials paved the way for Alia's accession. Born in 1925 in the northern town of Shkodër, Alia had joined the communist-led national liberation movement as a teenager, becoming a party member in 1943. He rose rapidly under Hoxha's patronage, and was elected a member of the Central Committee in 1948 and a candidate member of the Politburo in 1956. At the 4th party congress in 1961, he was made a full member of the Politburo and a member of the party Secretariat. As a long-time member of Hoxha's inner circle, he acquired extensive experience in party matters, as well as in the cultural and ideological sectors.

There can be little doubt that Alia played a part in Hoxha's settling of accounts with the Shehu faction. In any case, he emerged as the chief beneficiary of those extensive leadership changes. In 1982, in addition to retaining his party posts, Alia was appointed

⁷ Enver Hoxha, *Rapporte e Fjalime 1982–1983* (Reports and Speeches 1982–1983), Tiranë, "8 Nëntori," 1985, pp. 53, 176, 210–11, and 375 passim.

⁸ Mehmet Shehu, *Vepra të zgjedhura* (Selected Works), Vol. 1, Tiranë, "8 Nëntori," 1981. In the prefaces, Shehu is described as a "loyal" party leader and Hoxha is quoted as referring to him as "a talented and legendary general" (pp. v–viii).

⁹ In November 1982, Hoxha denounced Shehu publicly as a spy working simultaneously for American, British, Soviet, and Yugoslav agencies. These charges were preposterous and cannot be taken seriously. For Hoxha's account of the Shehu affair, see Enver Hoxha, *The Titoites: Historical Notes*, Tiranë, "8 Nëntori," 1982, pp. 567–633; and *Rapporte e Fjalime 1982–1983*, pp. 184–217. See also Arshi Pipa, "Party Ideology and Purges in Albania," *Telos* (London), Spring 1984, pp. 69–100.

¹⁰ Hoxha, *The Titoites*, p. 627. Albanian authorities attributed Shehu's suicide to "nervous stress," but some foreign commentators believe that Shehu may have been executed. See, e.g., *Keessing's Contemporary Archives* (Bath, England), Vol. XXXI, April 1985, p. 33559.

¹¹ *Corriere della Sera* (Milan), Nov. 4, 1983.

president of the Presidium of the People's Assembly (titular head of state). As Hoxha increasingly limited his political activity, going into semi-retirement in early 1983, Alia assumed a greater role. He traveled extensively, took Hoxha's place on major occasions, and delivered authoritative statements on Albania's domestic and foreign policy.

With impeccable party credentials and Hoxha's blessings, Alia became more than "the first among equals" in the Politburo. Only Rita Marko¹² and Manush Myftiu¹³ had served longer than Alia on the Politburo, but neither was considered a serious contender for the post of party first secretary. The only other member of the Old Guard, Prime Minister Çarçani,¹⁴ had little experience in party matters. Of the current 15 full and candidate Politburo members, seven were elevated to that body in 1981 and have yet to prove themselves. Moreover, Alia played a preeminent role in the governing of the country during the last two years of Hoxha's rule, which enabled him to influence the appointment and advancement of many cadres to the middle and top ranks of the party and state apparatus, including to the Politburo and Secretariat.

Alia has enjoyed the support of Hoxha's widow, Nexhmije, a Central Committee member and director of the Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies; indeed she may have contributed to his rise to power. In a message of thanks for condolences on her husband's death, Nexhmije Hoxha said: "Comrade Enver had much faith in and deeply appreciated his close collaborator, Comrade Ramiz Alia, in whom he saw a revolutionary embodying the ability, courage, wisdom, and determination needed to carry forward the complete construction of socialism at the head of the Central Committee of the APL."¹⁵ She has also given him enthusiastic support in her many public appearances, which receive prominent media coverage.¹⁶

Despite this support, Alia is likely to face some challenges to his position and will have to strike shrewd political bargains to achieve a consensus on major issues. His chances of consolidating power will depend to a great extent on his ability to shape a broad coalition committed to his policies. During his first six months in office, he has shown caution in initiating changes in the top leadership. The three vacancies in the Politburo left open after the demise of Shehu, Hazbiu, and Hoxha, have yet to be filled. In July, Foto Çami, candidate member of the Politburo and Alia's long-time associate, was appointed to the Secretariat,¹⁷ while Harilla Papajorgji, chairman of the State Planning Commission, was replaced by newcomer Niko Gjyzari, the former minister of finance.¹⁸ Papajorgji's replacement, which was not made public, may be connected with leadership disagreements over priorities for the next five-year plan, now in the process of being drafted.

Alia's public statements have conveyed a sense of continuity and stability. At the same time, he has called for greater vigilance and a continuation of the "class struggle." Significantly, he chose the occasion

¹⁷ Ibid., Jul. 10, 1985. Çami is a relative newcomer to the Albanian leadership. He became a Central Committee member in 1971 and was promoted to a candidate member of the Politburo at the 8th party congress in 1981. From November 1982 until his appointment to the Secretariat, he served as first party secretary for the Tiranë district.

¹⁸ Ibid., Jul. 18, 1985.



Enver Hoxha and his wife, Nexhmije, voting in Tiranë on April 24, 1983.

—Me Popullin, Mes Shokeve (With the People, Among Comrades), Tiranë, Shtëpia Botuese "8 Nëntori," 1983.

¹² Born in 1920 in Korçë, Marko joined the party in 1942. He was elected a member of the Central Committee at the first party congress held in 1948 and six years later became full member of the Politburo. From 1966 to 1976, he served as deputy president of the Presidium of the People's Assembly, a post to which he was again appointed in November 1982 when Alia became head of state.

¹³ At age 66, Myftiu is the oldest member of the Albanian leadership, having attained full membership in the Politburo in 1956. During 1970–82, he served as chairman of the Central Council of Trade Unions, and since 1976 as deputy prime minister.

¹⁴ Çarçani was born in 1922 in Gjirokastër. He was elected full member of the Politburo in 1961. A shrewd administrator, he served as Shehu's deputy from 1965 until Shehu's demise. In January 1982, Çarçani replaced Shehu as Prime Minister.

¹⁵ ATA News Bulletin (Tiranë), Apr. 28–30, 1985, p. 8.

¹⁶ Zëri i Popullit, Sept. 12, 15, and 17, 1985, and Oct. 2, 12, and 13, 1985. While in the past Mrs. Hoxha displayed no political ambitions, she may now be interested in a higher position—perhaps membership on the Politburo—to ensure the continuation of her husband's policies. Whether she will use her influence to promote her own political objectives remains to be seen.

of a visit in June 1985 to Mallakastër, a traditional Shehu stronghold, to remind his audience of the danger presented by internal and external enemies.¹⁹

Potential Pitfalls

Alia is confronted with an array of problems. Potential and actual pressures for change within the party, which in the past had been kept under control by Hoxha's threat or use of coercion, have been building up for a long time. Rising leaders in the cultural, economic, and military sectors, like their predecessors in the early 1970's, are most likely to exert pressure on the top leadership for greater autonomy in their respective domains. Their loyalty to Alia will undoubtedly be contingent on his willingness to accommodate their demands.

There is also considerable public discontent over the regime's appalling human rights record. The state's formal abolition of institutionalized religion in 1967 is also apparently widely resented, although there are no visible signs of organized opposition. In recent years, Albanian official sources have acknowledged a revival of "religious remnants and backward customs."²⁰ Religious sentiments "to a greater or lesser extent exist in all districts, particularly in villages and remote mountainous areas."²¹

The intelligentsia resents rigid party controls and yearns for greater creative freedom. Young people appear to be alienated and disillusioned with the system and its ideology, and, to the consternation of party ideologues, highly susceptible to Western life styles, art, literature, music, and fashion. The official media devotes considerable attention to the "subversive" impact of "alien phenomena," spread by the growing access to foreign radio and television and increasing contact with foreign tourists. Many youths, it is claimed, lack communist convictions and socialist norms of conduct.²² Clearly, the APL has not succeeded fully in its efforts to instill the population with "appropriate" Marxist-Leninist attitudes.

¹⁹ Ibid., June 12, 1985. In a sharply worded article on Hoxha's role in the development of the "class struggle," Raqi Madhi, deputy director of the Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies, said the "class struggle" was essential in order to ensure the party's leading role and protect Albania's socialist gains. He stressed Hoxha's "iron hand" approach against the manifestation of nonsocialist tendencies. See his "Comrade Enver Hoxha's Theoretical Marxist-Leninist Thought on the Class Struggle in Socialism," *Zëri i Popullit*, June 14, 1985.

²⁰ *Zëri i Popullit*, Dec. 14, 1983, and Sept. 9, 1984.

²¹ Muharrem Xhafa, "On the Further Deepening of the Ideological Struggle Against Alien Manifestations and Influence," *Rruga e Partisë* (Tiranë), No. 4, April 1984, p. 32.

²² Ibid., p. 27; and *Zëri i Popullit*, June 14, 1984.



Two young Albanians stroll past a bust of Joseph Stalin in the central square of Fier.

—Wide World.

In an uncharacteristic admission, the party theoretical organ, *Rruga e Partisë* conceded in March 1984 that there had been an erosion of discipline among the young and an increase in such pathological social phenomena as parasitism, social anomie and low productivity, unwillingness to accept assignments in the countryside and remote areas, manifestations of religious belief, hooliganism, theft, and crime.²³ An Albanian official told a visiting Western journalist in June 1985 that Tiranë does not promote tourism—a potential source of badly needed hard currency earnings—because of its fear "that our youth could be negatively influenced by foreign customs."²⁴ Yet, an article in the May 1985 issue of *Rruga e Partisë* urged that more understanding be shown to young people's needs and demands. The author called for a more subtle approach in work with young people, insisting that the "old" methods could be counterproductive under current circumstances.²⁵

²³ See the editorial in *Rruga e Partisë*, Mar. 1984, pp. 10–11.

²⁴ *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (Zurich), June 26, 1985.

²⁵ Pirro Lako, "For More Effective Party Work with the Youth," *Rruga e Partisë*, May 1985, pp. 72–75.

However, Mehmet Elezi, first secretary of the Albanian Union of Working Youth, writing in the July 1985 issue of the same journal, advocated a strict approach in dealing with young people influenced by foreign "ideological diversion." A weakening of vigilance against foreign influences, Elezi said, would only result in their further spread and perpetuation.²⁶

Alia will have to devote greater attention to the problems of youth, a task that will require great imagination and foresight, as Albania has one of the youngest and fastest growing populations in Europe. The population has been increasing at an annual rate of 2.2 percent, approximately four times higher than the average annual rate in other European countries, and it is estimated that Albania's population will reach 4 million by the year 2000. The average age of the population is 25.7 years, and 37 percent of the total are under 15 years of age. As the country moves toward greater automation and away from a labor-intensive economy, the authorities will find it increasingly difficult to secure full employment for its able-bodied workers.²⁷

In all likelihood, Alia's major challenges will thus lie in the economic sphere. The roots of Albania's economic difficulties can be found in rigid centralization, low labor productivity, poor discipline, and a shortage of skilled workers and managers. The APL's tight control of the economic decision-making process has led to widespread inefficiency. Untimely investments, construction of grandiose projects in the nonproductive sphere, extravagant use of personnel, and excessive expenditures are said to be quite common. Machinery and equipment are not properly utilized, particularly in the petroleum industry.²⁸ Labor productivity is low, especially in the industrial sector, and worker absenteeism, indifference, and other "alien manifestations" are reported to be on the rise.²⁹ A lack of material incentives appears to be the main cause of the low morale of the work force.

Shortfalls have been reported in the leading sectors of the economy. There has been a failure to achieve

satisfactory growth in the agricultural sector. Industrial output in the first four years of the Seventh Five-Year Plan was also off target, falling to a record low of 3 percent in 1983. During 1984, industrial output rose by 3.3 percent, although the plan had projected an increase of 8.5 percent. Performance results for other sectors in 1984 were not made public, suggesting that they too fell well below official expectations.

Targets for 1985 have been scaled down,³⁰ and it now appears highly unlikely that the overall targets of the five-year plan will be met. Considerable problems have been reported in the oil, gas, mining, and machine industries, leading to a shortage of goods for export.³¹ The exploitation of natural resources has been hampered by obsolete machinery and equipment, a lack of technical expertise, poor organization, and an inability to fully assimilate imported technology.

Given its emphasis on the development of heavy industry, the regime has hitherto paid little attention to meeting the demand for more and better-quality consumer goods. Some Albanian analysts suggest that grave consequences could result from a continuing failure to satisfy these needs.³² In a report to the People's Assembly on June 26, 1985, the Council of Ministers indicated that the supply of consumer goods has worsened, particularly in the countryside.³³ Vito Kapo, minister of light industry and food industry, was reported to have stated that "to be well fed one needs more than just bread."³⁴

The PSRA could undoubtedly muddle through for years by accepting lower growth rates. However, Hoxha's death has raised expectations of change for the better. The new political climate was underscored in an article in the party daily that implied that the new leadership could not rely solely on Hoxha's "thought" as a guide in tackling the country's economic problems. Reviewing Hoxha's economic writings, Hekuran Mara, a prominent economist and a vice-president of the Albanian Academy of Sciences, noted:

It is, of course, impossible to find the solution to every problem arising in the course of the country's economic development in Comrade Enver's economic

²⁶ Mehmet Elezi, "Let Us Utilize the Loyalty and Determination of Youth to Progress Always," *ibid.*, No. 7, July 1985, pp. 69-80, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Eastern Europe* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-EEU*), Aug. 14, 1985, pp. B/1-3.

²⁷ Koço Skenderi and Ylli Vejisiu, "The Development of Demographic Processes Is Indivisible from the Country's Socioeconomic Development," *Rruga e Partisë*, August 1983, pp. 45-48; and Leontjev Cuci, "The Employment of All Able-Bodied Forces—The Object of Study and Constant Activity," *ibid.*, No. 2, February 1985, pp. 25-34, excerpts trans. in *FBIS-EEU*, Mar. 21, 1985, pp. B/1-2.

²⁸ *Zëri i Popullit*, Dec. 22, 1984.

²⁹ Vangjel Çërava, "The Overall Fulfillment of Planned Tasks Leads to Increased Economic Effectiveness," *Rruga e Partisë*, March 1983, p. 15; and *Zëri i Popullit*, July 23, and Aug. 21, 1985.

³⁰ Report by Harilla Papajorgji, chairman of the State Planning Commission, in *Zëri i Popullit*, Dec. 25, 1984.

³¹ *Zëri i Popullit*, June 23 and Sept. 13, 1984.

³² Vjollca Kallajxhi, "For Development of Trade in Harmony with the Ever-Increasing Demands of the Population," *Rruga e Partisë*, February 1983, pp. 22-29; and Osman Murati, "Supplying the People in a Continually Improved Manner with Consumer Goods Requires the Strengthening of Organizational Work in Trade Organs," *ibid.*, July 1984, pp. 28-37.

³³ *Zëri i Popullit*, June 27, 1985.

³⁴ Tiranë Domestic Service, June 27, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-EEU*, July 1, 1985, p. B/1

*thinking. This would be unreasonable and impossible. Comrade Enver's economic thinking generalizes the economic imperative and the objective direction of its development, but the concrete methods, the organizational, technical, administrative and other measures, are the results of subjective activity, constituting what is known as the "corridor for free action" of our people, who are guided by the party's ideology and policy, under conditions of a specific reality, to resolve a specific problem.*³⁵

Alia has indicated that one of his top priorities will be tackling economic inefficiency. He has criticized the underutilization of resources, and the inefficiency of workers, and has called for increases in labor productivity. Although his statements clearly call for changes, he has not committed himself to an overall decentralization of the economy or to reforms that would give managers more authority in decision-making and in providing incentives to workers so as to increase productivity.


However, Alia appears intent on introducing modern technology in all fields. Backward technology has hampered the development of the industrial sector, and Tiranë is particularly in need of updating equip-

ment in the mining and oil industries in order to exploit fully its reserves of chrome, nickel, copper, natural gas, iron, coal, lignite, and oil. Alia has called for a "general reassessment" of current work methods and has urged workers to master up-to-date technology and show greater initiative. In a speech at a conference on technological innovation in Shkodër on September 9, 1985, Alia asserted that "we are still far away from what we intend to achieve," and called for structural improvements in production by saying that it was an "absolute necessity" to boldly introduce advanced methods and advanced technology in design and production.³⁶

But economic performance is not likely to improve significantly in the absence of important changes that would delegate some of the initiative to individual enterprises, institute a more realistic system of prices, and provide greater incentives for managers and workers. The current investment strategy, which allocates the greatest share of resources to heavy in-

³⁵ Hekuran Mara, "Comrade Enver's Economic Thought—A Great Treasure for Present and Future Generations," *Zëri i Popullit*, Sept. 12, 1985.

³⁶ *Zëri i Popullit*, Sept. 10, 1985.



A 1984 scene inside an Albanian factory.

dustry at the expense of other sectors, will also require revision. (For a breakdown by sector allocation of Albanian investments see Table 2.) This means that Albanian policymakers will be facing increasingly difficult decisions in choosing between competing claims on resources by the various branches of industry, other sectors of the economy, consumers, and the military. Moreover, it is questionable whether Albania will be able to achieve the technological modernization for which Alia is calling without greater economic interaction with the Western world. The draft of the 1986-90 five-year plan is to be ready by mid-1986. So far, Albanian sources are indicating that it will follow Hoxha's autarkic inclinations, since Albania is to rely entirely on domestic resources for the plan's fulfillment. Nevertheless, it is possible that Alia will accelerate the departure from Albania's international isolation for the sake of achieving technological gains for the economy.

Foreign Policy

Although a dramatic change in Albania's foreign policy orientation is unlikely, recent public statements from Tiranë suggest a somewhat different approach to international relations. According to Deputy Foreign Minister Muhamet Kapllani, Albania favors "an active as opposed to passive policy," and henceforth will be a direct participant in rather than a mere observer of international developments.³⁷ Realizing the unviability of Hoxha's policy of going it alone, Alia has taken steps to end Albania's self-imposed isolation. This is reflected in Tiranë's increase of diplomatic activity, the signing of numerous agreements on economic and cultural cooperation, the exchange of high-level delegations, and the heightening of participation in international trade fairs. At the 40th session of the UN General Assembly in 1985, Albanian Foreign Minister Reiz Malile met with his counterparts from 16 countries, including Italy, Greece, Turkey, and Austria.³⁸

Moreover, since Alia's accession, Tiranë has played host to high-level Italian and French diplomatic delegations, held talks with London on normalizing relations, concluded an agreement with Athens on border demarcation, held talks with Japanese and West German trade delegations, and increased contacts with many Western and Third World countries.

In July 1985, Tiranë published a posthumous work by Hoxha, the main thesis of which supports Albania's current efforts to emerge from isolation. That book contains passages in which Hoxha asserts that when-

Table 2: Allocation of Albanian Investments by Sector, 1971-83

Sector	In million leks at 1981 prices					
	1971-75	Percent of total	1976-80	Percent of total	1981-83	Percent of total
Industry	8,065	52.1	8,570	47.0	5,971	48.8
Agriculture	2,560	16.5	3,054	16.8	2,507	20.4
Transport and communications	1,250	8.1	1,427	7.8	1,022	8.3
Education, culture and health service	593	3.8	488	2.7	433	3.5
Housing	862	5.6	790	4.3	750	6.1
Others	2,145	13.9	3,891	21.4	1,581	12.9
TOTAL	15,474 ^a	100.0	18,220	100.0	12,264	100.0

^a Total is 1 less, due to rounding.

SOURCE: Directory of Statistics, State Planning Commission, *40 Vjet Shqipëri Socialiste: të dhëna statistikore për zhvillimin e ekonomisë dhe të kulturës* (40 Years of Socialist Albania: Statistical Data on the Development of Economy and Culture), Tiranë, 1984, p. 106.

ever it had been in Albania's national interest to "open up" to the outside world, it had done so, and that it would do the same in the future. The work sought to rationalize Tiranë's diplomatic shift since 1981 away from Yugoslavia and toward Greece and Italy, and the expansion of bilateral economic relations with other West European states, while maintaining Albania's hostility toward the Soviet bloc as such.³⁹ Thus it appears from the recent record that Alia's foreign policy objectives are: to contain the conflict with Yugoslavia over Kosovo; to expand economic, cultural, and political relations with other neighboring countries and Western Europe; to maintain the country's distance from the two superpowers; and to limit contacts with the Soviets' allies in Eastern Europe by and large to the commercial sphere.⁴⁰

Yugoslavia. Relations with Yugoslavia represent a major problem area for Alia. Tiranë and Belgrade have traditionally had an uneasy relationship complicated by the presence of approximately 2 million ethnic Albanians in Yugoslavia, most of whom live in the Autonomous Province of Kosovo, which is contiguous to Albania.⁴¹

³⁷ Muhamet Kapllani, "Inspirer, Architect, and Implementer of the Strategy and Tactics of Our Foreign Policy of Proletarian Principles," *Aruga e Partisë*, June 1985, p. 18.

³⁸ *Zëri i Popullit*, Sept. 29, and Oct. 4, 1985.

³⁹ Enver Hoxha, *Dy popuj miq* (Two Friendly People), Tiranë, "8 Nëntori," 1985, pp. 413-25.

⁴⁰ *Zëri i Popullit*, Aug. 27, 1985.

⁴¹ For a multifaceted treatment of the Kosovo issue, see Arshi Pipa and Sami Repishti, Eds., *Studies on Kosova*, Boulder, CO, East European Monographs, 1984.

Under Hoxha's rule, the PSRA subordinated its ethnic ties with the Albanians in Kosovo to its overall political, security, and economic interests. During the 1970's, Albania and Yugoslavia developed correct relations, and Yugoslavia became Albania's major trading partner. Albania even declared publicly that it would come to Yugoslavia's assistance in the event of a Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia.⁴²

Albanian-Yugoslav relations deteriorated significantly in the aftermath of demonstrations by ethnic Albanians in Kosovo during March and April of 1981. Mutual recriminations followed these events, with Albania supporting the demonstrators' demand that Kosovo province be given republic status, and Yugoslavia accusing Albania of intervening in its internal affairs. As a result, contacts between the two countries were substantially curtailed.

Tensions with Yugoslavia underscored the risks of Hoxha's isolationist policy. The perception of an increased threat from Yugoslavia caused Tiranë to move on two fronts: on the one hand, it sought to contain the conflict with Yugoslavia while, on the other, it attempted to strengthen its ties with Western Europe.⁴³ Despite Albania's escalating denunciations of Belgrade, it appeared eager to maintain business-like relations with Yugoslavia. To the chagrin of many ethnic Albanians in Yugoslavia, the PSRA did not raise the issue of Kosovo at the United Nations or in other international forums. Tiranë realized, after all, that ultimately Yugoslavia would be likely to provide an important protective buffer for Albania against any direct attack from the Warsaw Pact.

The Albanian regime, however, is concerned about the fate of Albanians in Kosovo, and has not remained indifferent to events there. Alia, whose parents stem from Kosovo, has repeatedly stated that while Albania harbors no territorial claims against Yugoslavia, it wants to be assured that the ethnic Albanians there will enjoy the same rights as other ethnic groups.⁴⁴ Even as he denounced what he termed "savage national oppression" of ethnic Albanians, Alia stated in a major foreign policy speech on August 26, 1985, that Albania was in favor of normalizing relations with Belgrade if the latter would change its "hostile" attitude toward Tiranë and the Kosovars. He added: "We have neither interfered nor do we interfere in the internal af-

fairs of Yugoslavia. It is up to it to solve its political, economic, national, and other problems. . . ."⁴⁵ The Yugoslav government, however, has rejected this contention charging that Tiranë attempted to intervene directly in Yugoslavia's internal affairs.

The Albanian government, for its part, is troubled by what it perceives to be punitive measures initiated by Yugoslavia that have resulted in a decline in trade and economic cooperation. For example, the Albanians claim that the Yugoslavs have purposely delayed the construction of their portion of the Shkodër-Titograd railroad, Albania's first rail link to Europe. Albania completed its segment in January 1985, and while Yugoslavia has attributed its delay to cost overruns, the Albanians believe that political reasons may also have been a factor.⁴⁶

Thus the Albanian leadership has sought to lessen Albania's dependence on economic cooperation with Yugoslavia. Tiranë has reportedly considered rerouting its entire trade with Western Europe through Italy.⁴⁷ Albanian-Yugoslav trade has declined significantly,⁴⁸ and Italy may soon replace Yugoslavia as Albania's leading commercial partner.

Soviet Union. With Hoxha's death, some observers speculated that Albania might now align with the USSR. Such a development would have grave implications for the West. It would give the Soviet military access to the Adriatic, increase Soviet pressure on Yugoslavia and Greece, and heighten the threat to NATO's southern flank. Moscow and its allies have in fact made persistent efforts to improve relations with Tiranë. Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachëv renewed Moscow's offer to normalize relations with Tiranë in a speech in Sofia in September 1984.⁴⁹ Since Hoxha's death, Soviet media coverage of Albania has increased significantly.⁵⁰ The Soviet media continues to emphasize that Albania has "friends" in the Soviet bloc, that CEMA countries represent a stable market for the sale of Albania's traditional export goods, and

⁴² *Zëri i Popullit*, Aug. 27, 1985.

⁴³ In June 1985, Albania and Yugoslavia signed an agreement on rail freight traffic, and reportedly the Yugoslav segment of the railway will be completed by the end of 1985. See *Rilindja* (Pristina), June 1, 1985.

⁴⁴ *Business Eastern Europe* (Geneva), Sept. 7, 1984, p. 282, and Oct. 19, 1984, p. 331.

⁴⁵ Albanian-Yugoslav trade dropped from US\$115 million in 1980 to \$88.3 million in 1984. See e.g., *Rilindja*, Feb. 22, 1981; *Business Eastern Europe*, Mar. 2, 1984; and *Borba* (Belgrade), Mar. 12, 1985.

⁴⁶ *Pravda* (Moscow), Sept. 10, 1984, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-SOV*), Sept. 10, 1984, p. F10.

⁴⁷ See, e.g., *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 6, 1985, p. F/4, Aug. 9, 1985, p. F/1, Sept. 17, 1985, p. F/3, Sept. 24, 1985, p. F/4, Oct. 17, 1985, p. F/7, Oct. 23, 1985, pp. F/1-2, Nov. 1, 1985, pp. F/3-4, Nov. 12, 1985, pp. F/1-2, and Nov. 13, 1985, p. F/3.

⁴² The offer most recently was reiterated in January 1982 by the newly appointed Prime Minister Çarçani. Tiranë Domestic Service, Jan. 15, 1982, trans. in *FBIS-EEU*, Jan. 18, 1982, pp. B/1-8.

⁴³ Hoxha, *Dy popuj miq*, pp. 418-22.

⁴⁴ Ramiz Alia, *Politikë në shërbim të socializmit, lirisë dhe pavarësisë së atdheut* (A Policy in the Service of Socialism, Freedom, and Independence of the Motherland), Tiranë, "8 Nëntori," 1983, p. 21; and *Zëri i Popullit*, Nov. 28, 1984.



Albania's port city of Durrës.

—Malcolm J. Gilson/Camera Press.

that it is in the interest of Tiranë to normalize its political relations with the Soviet bloc.⁵¹

The Albanian leadership, however, has thus far rebuffed Soviet and East European offers, leaving little doubt that it still considers the USSR to be its main adversary. The Albanians rejected the official condolences offered by the CPSU Central Committee on Hoxha's death;⁵² they also strongly denounced the renewal of the Warsaw Pact.⁵³ An article in *Zëri i Popullit* on November 16, 1985, asserted that Albania "will never reconcile" with the Soviet Union. And while some West European countries have ambassadors in Tiranë, maverick Romania is the only Warsaw Pact country to be represented at the ambassadorial level.

Although an improvement in relations between Tiranë and Moscow cannot be ruled out entirely, a full normalization of relations is not likely soon. Alia certainly played an important role in the break with the Soviet Union, and there are no indications that he will be any more accommodating to the Soviets than Ho-

xa was. This does not mean that a betterment in relations with the Soviet Union's East European allies is unlikely. In fact, Albania's trade with CEMA countries has been increasing steadily (see Table 3). However, the low priority that Alia evidently assigns to political relations with Eastern Europe is suggested by the fact that he did not even raise the subject in his first major foreign policy address after assuming power.⁵⁴

The West. Hoxha's innate distrust of the West, and his concern that increased contacts with Western countries could adversely affect the political stability of his regime, kept Albania effectively isolated from the West for most of the period he was in power. Although certain Western countries, notably Italy and France, attempted, with some degree of success, to cultivate better relations with Albania, the West in general remained relatively uninterested.

Alia, however, apparently believes that Albania's greatest possibilities lie in economic and political cooperation with the West European countries. In a major policy address delivered in November 1984, he declared that the PSRA "has been and is for good rela-

⁵¹ See G. Nikolayev, "The Birth of People's Albania," *Izvestiya* (Moscow), May 25, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, May 30, 1985, pp. F/1-2; and Radio Moscow (in Albanian), May 13, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, May 17, 1985, pp. F/13-14.

⁵² *The New York Times*, Apr. 13, 1985.

⁵³ ATA, in English, Apr. 28, 1985, in *FBIS-EEU*, Apr. 29, 1985, pp. B/1-2.

⁵⁴ *Zëri i Popullit*, Aug. 27, 1985.

Table 3: Albanian Trade with Eastern Europe, 1979-83

Total trade, US\$1 million					
	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
Bulgaria	18.7	24.5	22.6	40.4	32.0
Czechoslovakia	62.7	64.3	70.6	69.4	78.0
GDR ^a	35.0	34.8	36.6	41.0	48.4
Hungary	13.1	15.6	18.3	23.1	18.7
Poland	39.8	49.7	41.9	32.5	32.5
Romania	50.1	71.8	45.9	48.4	65.4
TOTAL	219.4	260.7	235.6	254.8	275.0

^a Estimate.

SOURCES: Derived from data in Center for Social Analysis of the State University of New York at Binghamton, *Economic Handbook of the World*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1982; and US Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook 1985*, Washington, DC, 1985.

tions" with Western Europe, adding that "Albania is a European country and as such it is vitally interested in what is occurring on that continent."⁵⁵ In an allusion to the possible establishment of diplomatic ties with West Germany and Great Britain, he noted that "through joint efforts the difficulties can be overcome."⁵⁶ Significantly, Alia mentioned no preconditions for improving relations.

Albania still claims war reparations from West Germany, and has continued to demand that Great Britain return Albania's prewar gold reserves, which were frozen by the allies after the war and are now held in London. In recent negotiations with Bonn, however, the Albanian government has reportedly indicated that it might drop its demand for reparations in exchange for West German aid in several heavy industry projects.⁵⁷ Georg von Waldenfels, state secretary of the Bavarian Economics Ministry, visited Tiranë in late September 1985 and reported that the establishment of Tiranë-Bonn relations was imminent.⁵⁸

Tiranë has also resumed official discussions with Great Britain about a settlement of the gold issue; meetings were held in Paris in March and June of 1985.⁵⁹ In an August 26 speech, Alia stated that the return of the gold would open the way for a normalization of relations between the two countries. He again denied Albania's responsibility for the 1946 mining of

two British warships off the Albanian coast⁶⁰ that has been the main source of friction in their relations. Britain has demanded compensation for the loss of 44 sailors in that incident.⁶¹

Thus far, of the Western countries Italy has developed the closest relations with Albania. In December 1983, the two countries established a maritime line linking the ports of Durrës and Trieste; they also signed a long-term trade agreement by which Italy is to provide Albania with substantial industrial technology in return for raw materials. During a visit to Rome in December 1984, Albanian First Deputy Foreign Minister Sokrat Plaka reportedly declared that Albania "is seeking partners in the West, and is looking to Italy in particular in view of the social and cultural ties between the two countries."⁶²

The importance that Albania attaches to the further strengthening of its relations with Italy became particularly evident following Hoxha's death. In the beginning of May 1985, Çarçani sent a message to the Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi, expressing a desire "for better cooperation between the two countries."⁶³ Italy's Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Bruno Corti was the first senior Western official to visit Tiranë after Hoxha's death.⁶⁴ Before his departure for Albania, the Italian Foreign Ministry issued a statement stressing the importance of his discussions with Albania, adding that "this dialogue is of great interest to all the Western nations who can 'communicate' with Albania through Italy."⁶⁵

French Deputy Foreign Minister Jean-Michel Baylet's visit to Tiranë on September 10-12, 1985, and Albanian negotiations with the British and the West Germans on the establishment of relations, are but the latest indications of Alia's desire to overcome the adverse consequences of Albania's international isolation. Baylet, the highest ranking French official to visit Tiranë since World War II, was accompanied by a large group of Western businessmen interested in trade ties to Albania. He held talks with a number of senior officials and was received by Prime Minister Çarçani. The Albanians reportedly expressed a keen interest in expanding relations with France and a

⁵⁵ Ibid., Nov. 28, 1984.⁵⁶ Ibid.⁵⁷ Charles Meynell, "Albania's Tortuous Opening-up," *The World Today* (London), November 1984, p. 449.⁵⁸ *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich), Sept. 19, 1985, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Western Europe* (Washington, DC—hereafter FBIS-WEU), Sept. 25, 1985, p. J14; and *Rilindja*, Sept. 21, 1985.⁵⁹ *The Guardian* (Manchester), June 11, 1985.⁶⁰ *Zëri i Popullit*, Aug. 27, 1985. By all accounts, Albania did not have mine-laying equipment at its disposal at the time. In fact, an "anti-Tito Yugoslav" navy officer whodefected claims to have seen two Yugoslav minesweepers loaded with mines leave their base for Albanian waters just before the incident. Just after the explosions, he said, they returned empty. See John Cooley, "Albania Expected to Resume Secret Talks with Britain," *The Christian Science Monitor* (Cambridge, MA), Aug. 26, 1985.⁶¹ Cooley, loc. cit.; and Harry Hodgkinson, "Albania under Hoxha—and After," *The Political Quarterly* (London), July-September 1985, p. 290.⁶² ANSA (Rome), in English, Dec. 21, 1984, in FBIS-WEU, Dec. 26, 1984, pp. L/3-4.⁶³ Belgrade Domestic Service, May 8, 1985, trans. in FBIS-EEU, May 9, 1985, p. B/2.⁶⁴ *Zëri i Popullit*, May 16-19, 1985.⁶⁵ ANSA, in English, May 15, 1985, in FBIS-WEU, May 16, 1985, p. L/1.



Albania's First Deputy Foreign Minister Sokrat Plaka, right, welcomed to Rome by Italian Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Bruno Corti in December 1984.

—ANSA.

special joint commission was established to study ways of expanding trade.⁶⁶

Albania's relations with Greece have improved noticeably and the prospects seem good for further improvement. The two countries have signed a long-term economic agreement, as well as agreements on road transportation, cultural exchanges, scientific and technological cooperation, telecommunications, and postal services. In December 1984, Greek Alternate Minister of Foreign Affairs Karolos Papoulias visited Tiranë, and in January 1985 the Kakavija border road in the Gjirokastrë district was reopened. Cultural exchanges between the two countries have grown steadily. Bilateral trade has also increased, reaching a record US\$80 million in 1984, double the amount for 1982. An agreement has reportedly been concluded as well on the construction of a US\$7

million chrome-processing plant in Albania by a Greek ferroalloy company.⁶⁷

In strengthening its ties with the West, Albania has thus been motivated by both political and economic considerations. The Albanians are also turning to the West as the best source for technology imports to help revitalize their economy. In the wake of Alia's calls for modernization, a growing number of students, technicians, and engineers are being sent for advanced training in West European countries. Western experts and technicians have been brought in to help supervise and operate technical equipment imported from the West.⁶⁸ Negotiations are reportedly under way with some Austrian corporations for the purchase of several modern industrial plants, and with West German steel, machinery, and chemical companies about the possibility of advanced technology

⁶⁶ AFP (Paris), in English, Sept. 12, 1985, in *FBIS-EEU*, Sept. 12, 1985, p. B/2; AFP in English, Sept. 13, 1985, in *FBIS-EEU*, Sept. 16, 1985, p. B/1.

⁶⁷ Athens Domestic Service, Jan. 25, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-WEU*, Jan. 28, 1985, p. S/2

⁶⁸ *Die Presse* (Vienna), Aug. 1, 1984

Table 4: Albania's Trade with the West, 1977-84

	Total trade, in US\$1 million							
	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
Austria	9	10	9	14	12	17	11	13
Belgium	2	2	1	2	6	5	7	—
France	8	6	14	14	28	35	23	40
West Germany	21	21	39	29	42	53	39	29
Greece	14	14	22	39	17	25	28	—
Italy	33	27	52	65	69	74	55	49
Japan	5	2	6	2	9	14	11	7
Netherlands	11	14	12	9	17	12	10	11
Norway	—	6	1	—	3	2	1	1
Spain	—	—	4	3	3	12	11	10
Sweden	5	3	21	9	18	9	12	14
Switzerland	3	4	4	5	5	7	9	6
Turkey	3	3	4	14	11	3	3	—
United Kingdom	—	—	2	3	6	8	5	8
United States	9	9	21	19	11	20	8	12
TOTAL	123	121	212	227	257	296	233	200 ^a

^a Since the source cited provided no data for 1984 trade with Greece, Belgium, or Turkey, this total is probably understated.

SOURCE: International Monetary Fund, *Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1985*, Washington, DC, 1985.

imports.⁶⁹ Albania has also sought technical assistance in locating and exploiting oil deposits on its Adriatic coast; and talks on the same subject were held with Mexico and the Italian firm AGIP.⁷⁰ However, no agreements have as yet been announced.

While Tiranë's contacts with the West have increased significantly in recent years, the level of trade continues to fluctuate (see Table 4). The country's foreign trade is constrained by Tiranë's insistence on barter trade, by its low foreign reserves, by the limited number of export commodities that can effectively compete in Western markets, and by constitutional provisions that prohibit the government from seeking foreign aid, accepting loans, or allowing foreign investments. However, several industrialized Western nations reportedly are ready to offer economic assistance if Albania requests it.

Conclusion

Lacking as yet his predecessor's authority and prestige, Alia faces a major dilemma: how to move away from the rigid policies of his predecessor with-

out alienating party hard-liners. While the introduction of systemic reforms is unlikely, Alia may well try to relax somewhat the party's tight grip on society and eliminate some of the regime's traditional repressive controls.

There are indications that Alia is inclined to pursue at home a more flexible political, social, and cultural policy than Hoxha. For example, his appointment as titular head of state in 1982 coincided with an amnesty for political detainees and an easing of the regime's atheist policy.⁷¹ The government even conceded that some "errors" had been committed in the waging of the class struggle.⁷² The pursuit of somewhat softer policies might also be facilitated by the curtailment of the powers of the omnipresent *Sigurimi*. Mehmet Shehu, Kadri Hazbiu, and Feçor Shehu—and by implication the entire security apparatus—were accused of placing the secret police above the law and the party, artificially aggravating the class struggle, and carrying out indiscriminate arrests. As a result, the Office of Investigation was reorganized, separated from the Ministry of the Interior, and placed under the control of the People's Assembly.⁷³ A Western journalist visiting Albania in November of 1985 was informed by a "reliable" source that "not a single new political prisoner has been jailed since Hoxha died," and that Alia has reportedly ordered the gradual release of long-term prisoners. Furthermore, travel restrictions on Albanians have been eased.⁷⁴

Even if Alia favors extensive economic reforms, and there is no firm evidence to indicate that he does, he is not likely to carry out a general decentralization of the planning and administrative structure in the near future. Indeed, the entrenched bureaucracy is not likely to support drastic changes for fear that such changes could seriously undermine its authority. The introduction of more advanced technology would alleviate but probably not resolve the PSRA's economic difficulties. Thus far, technology imports have done little to revive the country's growth, and given

⁷¹ Amnesty International, *Albania: Political Imprisonment and the Law*, London, Amnesty International Publications, 1984, p. 30; *Die Presse*, Aug. 1, 1984; and *Handelsblatt* (Düsseldorf), Apr. 25, 1985.

⁷² Sami Gega, "Party Leadership and Control—an Indispensable Objective and the Basis of Every Success," *Pruga e Partisë*, December 1983, pp. 24–26; and Enver Hoxha, *Vepra* (Works), Vol. 45, Tiranë, "8 Nëntori," 1985, p. 248.

⁷³ Simon Stefani, "The Assurance of the Leadership Role of the Party and the Correct Understanding of the Party Directives and of Comrade Enver Hoxha's Implementation of the Tasks by the Organs of Investigation," *Drejtësia Popullore* (Tiranë), October–December 1983, pp. 3–10, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *East Europe Report: Political, Sociological, and Military Affairs* (Washington, DC), No. 84–056, Apr. 30, 1984, pp. 1–18.

⁷⁴ *The Observer* (London), Nov. 10, 1985.

⁶⁹ *Business Eastern Europe*, Oct. 28, 1983, p. 342, Nov. 11, 1983, p. 358; Vienna Television Service, Sept. 2, 1984, trans. in *FBIIS-EEU*, Sept. 5, 1984, p. B/3; and *Wiener Zeitung* (Vienna), Oct. 26, 1983.

⁷⁰ *Business Eastern Europe*, Mar. 11, 1983, p. 80, Dec. 16, 1983, p. 400, and Feb. 3, 1984, p. 34.



Ramiz Alia, First Secretary of the Albanian Party of Labor, seen during his August 26, 1985, speech in Korçë.

—Ramiz Alia, *L'Albanie ira toujours de l'avant dan la voie du socialisme* (Albania Will Always Advance Along the Path to Socialism), Tiranë, Editions "8 Nëntori," 1985.

the shortage of qualified experts,⁷⁵ Albania will have difficulty absorbing and fully utilizing new technology. Moreover, limited foreign reserves and constitutional restrictions on foreign loans and credits may serve to limit Tiranë's technology imports.

Although polemical exchanges between Tiranë and Belgrade have subsided somewhat since Hoxha's death, the prospects for a reduction of tensions be-

tween the two countries appear dim, given the continuing unrest in Kosovo and Serbian fears of Albanian irredentism. Nonetheless, both countries recognize that the Kosovo troubles provide the Soviet Union with opportunities for gaining greater influence in the area. For that reason, a political resolution of the Kosovo problem would be in their mutual interest.

The PSRA has asserted its independence from the Soviet bloc and is not likely again to play a subordinate role to the USSR, or any other country for that matter. The Albanian media continues to accord the same hostile treatment to the United States and NATO as to the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Yet, despite its rhetoric, Albania does not perceive the West as a serious threat to its independence. Albanians recognize that US and NATO support for Yugoslavia's independence has enhanced Albania's security as well. In a statement made in August 1969, but published only after Tiranë's rupture with Beijing in 1978, Hoxha had argued that, in view of Albania's strategic importance, NATO would not stand by idly if the PSRA were to be invaded by the Soviet Union.⁷⁶ He suggested that NATO would go to war with the Warsaw Pact if the latter were to attack Albania.

Thus, it is likely that Albania's foreign policy in the post-Hoxha era will be directed toward establishing closer ties with Western Europe, particularly with Italy. While it is unlikely that these ties will become as extensive as Yugoslavia's ties with the West, a steady improvement of Tiranë's cultural, economic, and political relations with the West cannot help but contribute to stability in the Balkans.

⁷⁵ According to official statistics, in 1983 there were 10,755 engineers and 7,500 economists with higher education. Among those with a vocational secondary-school education were 19,367 economists, 7,552 builders and hydro-technicians, and 1,045 mining and oil geologists. Although these figures are significantly higher than the figures for 1970, they still are quite low. See Directory of Statistics, State Planning Commission, *40 Vjet Shqipëri socialiste: të dhëna statistikore për zhvillimin e ekonomisë dhe të kulturës* (40 Years of Socialist Albania: Statistical Data on the Development of the Economy and Culture), Tiranë, 1984, p. 47.

⁷⁶ Enver Hoxha, *Kundër Revizionizmit Modern 1968-1970* (Against Modern Revisionism 1968-1970), Tiranë, "8 Nëntori," 1979, p. 487.

Notes

Soviet Shabashniki: Material Incentives at Work

Patrick Murphy

SOVIET LEADERS look to increased labor productivity as a principal engine for accelerating economic growth in the USSR.¹ This development could be fostered by such means as increasing capital investment, strengthening labor discipline, or expanding the use of incentives. With regard to incentives, there has of late been considerable interest expressed in the brigade form of organization of labor and, particularly, in increased pay differentiation.² It is thus of more than incidental interest that one detects recently in the Soviet press heightened attention to one of the highest-paid groups of workers in the USSR—the so-called *shabashniki*. The discussion highlights both the productive potential of material incentives and the ambivalence of Soviet officialdom regarding the social consequences of giving a freer rein to individual initiative and enterprise.

Who are the *shabashniki*? Typically, they are men in the 25–40 age range,³ who hire themselves out as brigades of laborers—carpenters, bricklayers, plasterers, and sometimes agricultural workers—to build

barns, garages, housing, roads, etc., on collective or state farms. These are often urgently needed projects that state or cooperative construction organizations prove unwilling or unable to undertake. By contrast, the *shabashniki* are both willing and able to complete the jobs quickly. In return, they receive wages three to four times as great as the average industrial wage of some 190 rubles a month—and sometimes as much as 2,000 rubles or more a month. Others receive payment in kind—i.e., a portion of the harvest from crops they raise or help gather, also quite lucrative.

The term “*shabashnik*” comes from the colloquial expression “*shabashnit*,” which means “to finish work” or “to take a break from work for rest,” and the related noun “*shabashka*,” meaning either “time free

¹ See, e.g., the following passage (printed in bold face) from the draft five-year plan for 1986–90, “The Basic Directions of the Economic and Social Development of the USSR in 1986–90 and for the Period to 2000,” *Pravda* (Moscow), Nov. 9, 1985, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: The Soviet Union* (Washington, DC), Nov. 12, 1985, Supplement, p. 2: “Production is to be transferred onto a mainly intensive path of development, a fundamental enhancement of social labor productivity is to be sought, and, on this basis, the pace of economic growth is to be accelerated.”

² On the brigade, see, e.g., “Collective Forms of the Organization of Labor,” *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta* (Moscow), No. 37, September 1983, pp. 11–14; (Moscow), Dec. 4, 1983, p. 1.

Wage leveling (*uravnilovka*) has been termed a “destructive process” that “threatens the essential reasons for participation of workers in the development of the economy.” See “Social Justice and Distribution According to Labor,” *Obshchestvennyye nauki* (Moscow), No. 1, 1985, pp. 27–41. Economist Tatyana Zaslavskaya, who is openly identified with Soviet reformers, has argued that increased pay differentiation is “a direct and natural result of the rising labor productivity of active people.” See interview with Zaslavskaya printed in *Izvestiya* (Moscow), June 1, 1985, trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, OH—hereafter, *CDSP*), June 26, 1985.

³ My estimate, based on interviews with *shabashniki* in Moscow. *Komsomol'skaya pravda* (Moscow), Apr. 14, 1981, estimates their ages at 20–35 (see *CDSP*, May 27, 1981, p. 7).

Patrick Murphy is an attorney currently working for the Federal Judicial Center in Washington, DC. He spent the 1983–84 academic year researching issues in Soviet labor law at Moscow State University and paid a return visit to the USSR in the summer of 1985 to update his findings. He is grateful to the International Research and Exchanges Board and the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies for funding the research and writing of this paper and to Ms. Emily Silliman of the University of Illinois College of Law for research assistance.

from work, a break in work for rest," or "work on the side, usually in free, out-of-school time, connected with sidelines, crooked wages, or hack work."⁴ Their activity is referred to as *shabashnichestvo*, and their working groups are variously termed "hired brigades" (*nayëmnyye brigady*), "brigades on the left" (*levyye brigady*), "wild brigades" (*dikiye brigady*), "free builders" (*svobodnyye stroiteli*), or "otkhodniki" (from *otkhozhyy promysel*, or seasonal work away from the village). Detractors also pin them with such epithets as "parasite," "grabber," or "sponger," (*parazit, rvach, or tunevadets*).

Many of the "professional" *shabashniki* come from western Ukraine, Belorussia, or the hilly part of Moldavia. Others come from regions where families are traditionally larger, such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, or the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic and other parts of the northern Caucasus. Sometimes they bring their wives or families with them. Such "professional" *shabashniki* often work for six to eight months at a time before returning home, and some never return home.⁵

A second group of *shabashniki* consists of student-age youth who work only for short periods, such as during summer vacation from the university. After receiving their diplomas, some cross over into the ranks of the "professional" *shabashniki* or work sporadically as *shabashniki* during the summer while holding low-paying, undemanding jobs at other times of the year. This latter pattern, rather typical of young male intellectuals—in Moscow, at least—is reflective of a broader tendency of persons with higher education or specialized training to work outside their specialties at higher-paying jobs.⁶

The areas where the *shabashniki* are in greatest demand include the Central Non-Black-Earth Zone, the Urals, and Siberia. However, on a smaller scale, they may find work almost anywhere building someone's private country home, or doing any kind of construction job where someone with money wants something done faster than the normal government construction organizations would do it.

Most *shabashniki* work as teams of three to nine people, although the brigades occasionally number as many as 20 or 25. Sometimes a group of students will join forces with two, three, or four experienced con-

struction specialists to form a team. Occasionally, the migrant workers team up with local workers, but in actual practice the pace of the work as performed by *shabashniki*, who are anxious to move on to new contracts, seems to deter most local workers from joining *shabashnik* brigades.⁷

The status of the brigades in the Soviet system is cloudy at best. The Soviet press sometimes refers to such a brigade as an "artel." This usage has overtones not normally found in the official Soviet terminology of labor organization. The third edition of the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* defines "artel" as

various forms of voluntary consolidation of people for the purpose of carrying out a common economic task, for example . . . the short-term or seasonal pooling of carpenters, woodcutters, and others Artel's arise with the development of capitalism, and in bourgeois countries exist as a consolidation of small producers of goods with the goal of adapting their economic production to the conditions of a capitalist economy.⁸

The term "*shabashnik*" is not the favored term in official Soviet legal and economic sources. Work not performed by official contractors is described in legal and economic literature as being performed on a "do-it-yourself basis" (*khozyaystvennyy sposob*, often abbreviated as *khozsposob* in newspaper accounts).⁹ "*Khozyaystvennyy sposob*" is legally approved as a method for carrying out agricultural construction.¹⁰ Articles in the press make it clear that the work done under the rubric of "*khozsposob*" is in fact work done by "hired brigades"—that is, *shabashniki*.¹¹

Other groups that might perform the tasks completed by *shabashniki* include government contract construction-installation organizations, interkolkhoz construction organizations (which pay construction workers wages somewhat higher than those paid to local machine operators but only a fraction of what *shabashniki* receive),¹² and inter-kolkhoz mobile

⁷ For reference to outsiders and locals working together, see *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (Moscow), Aug. 29, 1982; for the unwillingness of locals to keep up with the pace set by the migrants, see *Komsomol'skaya pravda*, Apr. 17, 1981, p. 2, trans. in *CDSP*, May 27, 1981, p. 7.

⁸ *Bol'shaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya*, 3d Ed., Moscow, Sovetskaya entsiklopediya, 1970, p. 259.

⁹ This is how *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* renders the Soviet expression.

¹⁰ See, e.g., Article 372 of the Civil Code of the RSFSR, "Rules of Contract Agreements for Capital Construction," and the Commentary thereto, par. 2, in which construction on kolkhozes is divided into government contracting and *khozyaystvennyy sposob*. *Komentarii k grazhdanskomu kodeksu RSFSR* (Commentary to the Civil Code of the RSFSR), Moscow, Yuridicheskaya literatura, 1982, p. 442.

¹¹ See, e.g., *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, Aug. 29, 1982, p. 3.

¹² *Komsomol'skaya pravda*, Apr. 15, 1982, p. 2.

⁴ *Slovar' sovremennogo russkogo literaturnogo yazyka* (Dictionary of Contemporary Russian Literary Language), Moscow, Nauka, 1965, Vol. 17, p. 1226.

⁵ *Komsomol'skaya pravda*, Nov. 3, 1982, p. 2.

⁶ See, e.g., the Soviet sources cited in *Posev* (Munich), No. 5, 1982, pp. 46-47; and "Engineers Get Jobs in Service Sector to Earn 'Easy Money,'" *Pravda*, July 23, 1984, p. 3, trans. in *CDSP*, Aug. 29, 1984, pp. 14-15.

mechanized columns (which are criticized for taking months to do paperwork before starting to build).¹³ There are also councils of interkolkhoz organizations, which confirm lists of construction jobs of significance to production (so-called *titul'nyye spiski*).¹⁴ All of these state or cooperative construction organizations are top-heavy with economists, bookkeepers, supervisors, and foremen. By contrast, a *shabashnik* brigade consists only of workers, all with a material incentive to finish the job as quickly as possible. In addition, as we shall see below, a kolkhoz boss who is not satisfied with the pace or quality of work being performed can send the *shabashniki* packing, whereas he cannot get rid of a government contractor.

Shabashniki are not the only sort of migrant, seasonal, or temporary labor in the Soviet countryside, and some of the public complaints about them can apply to other groups as well. Although the terms are sometimes used interchangeably, one can distinguish *shabashniki* from the so-called *sezonniki* (seasonal workers), who often quit regular factory jobs to participate in lucrative employment such as planting, tending, or harvesting melons or other fruit, only to return to their factory jobs in the fall. Administrative regulations purport to govern the activities of both temporary workers (*vremennyye rabotniki*) and workers engaged in seasonal work (*sezonnaya rabota*),¹⁵ and procedures exist for concluding a normal labor contract (*trudovoy dogovor*) between them and the temporary employer. In practice, the *sezonniki* often leave their regular jobs without their permanent employer's consent and do not take their labor booklet to the summer job as required by law. Given the severe Soviet labor shortage, they have been able to count on getting their factory job back in the autumn.¹⁶

Then there are workers sent to perform seasonal, usually agricultural tasks, by order of the local government executive committee (*ispolkom*), acting at party behest—an assignment to “go dig potatoes” (*na kartoshku*) in popular parlance. Yet another category are the so-called *bichi* (“bums”—literally, “whip” or “scourge,” but by some accounts perhaps denoting “formerly intelligent person” or *byvshiy intelligentnyy chelovek*). It is rumored and believed by some that these persons, largely found in the Soviet Far East,

are people whose lives were ruined by sentences to labor camps under Stalin and who have become helpless alcoholics with no personal documentation or fixed place of residence. As such, they are exploited by being forced to work for a mere pittance under threat of being exposed to the authorities if they refuse.¹⁷ Still other groups include official student contingents sent to perform summer tasks under the auspices of the Communist Youth League,¹⁸ and so-called construction battalions (*stroybaty*), consisting of military conscripts.

Contracts and Pay

Contracts between employers and *shabashniki* may be written out or concluded orally (sometimes over a bottle of vodka, although some *shabashniki* are so intent on boosting their productivity and earnings that they take collective vows of strict sobriety for the duration of their work together). Some contracts fix the amount of compensation to be paid for completion of a given project, such as construction of a barn, and others pay by the unit measure of work, for example, 10 rubles per cubic meter of bricklaying completed (the latter method is known as *akkordnaya rabota*).¹⁹ In written contracts, the mutual obligations of the organization and the brigade of *shabashniki* are spelled out; such contracts deal with the project to be completed and are not to be confused with a labor contract. Although practices vary, typically a contract is confirmed, on the employer's side, by the boss (*nachal'nik*) of the hiring organization, its main bookkeeper (*glavnyy bukhalter*), and its work superintendent (*prorab*), and on the brigade side, by the leader

¹⁷ Comments on the *bichi*, and both on and by the *shabashniki*, were noted during conversations the author had during an academic year of study in the Soviet Union in 1983–84 and a return trip in 1985.

Vagabondage (*brodyazhnichestvo*) is punishable under Article 209 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR by deprivation of freedom for up to three years, corrective labor for one to two years, or time at a “curative labor facility” (the last not formally considered a “criminal punishment”). See *Yuridicheskii entsiklopedicheskii slovar'*, pp. 290 and 159.

The Soviet press occasionally discusses the plight of the *bichi*. See, e.g., *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, Sept. 25, 1983, p. 3, trans. in *CDSP*, Nov. 9, 1983, pp. 2–4; and *Izvestiya*, Feb. 4, 1985, p. 3, trans. in *CDSP*, Feb. 27, 1985, p. 9.

¹⁸ On this, see *Yuridicheskii entsiklopedicheskii slovar'*, p. 358. Conversations I had in Moscow in 1985 indicated that some of the more entrepreneurial Komsomol-sponsored student contingents also function in *shabashnik* style, arranging to work on projects for high wages.

¹⁹ One reference to *akkordnaya rabota* notes that payment by this formula “is applied with the aim of strengthening the material incentive of workers to raise labor productivity and to shorten the term for fulfilling the work entrusted to them. The 25th Congress of the Communist Party [in 1976] recognized the necessity of the wider application of *akkordnaya* payment of work, especially in construction and agriculture.” See S. A. Ivanov, Ed., *Trudovoye pravo. Entsiklopedicheskii slovar*, (Labor Law: An Encyclopedic Dictionary), Moscow, Sovetskaya entsiklopediya, 1979, pp. 14–15.

¹³ *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, Aug. 29, 1982, p. 3.

¹⁴ Article 372 of the Civil Code, Commentary, par. 3. *Kommentariy k grazhdanskomu kodeksu RSFSR*, p. 443.

¹⁵ See *Yuridicheskii entsiklopedicheskii slovar'* (Encyclopedic Dictionary of Juridical Matters), Moscow, Sovetskaya entsiklopediya, 1984, p. 51 (for temporary workers) and p. 327 (for seasonal workers).

¹⁶ See, e.g., “He Quit to Go Pick Cherries,” *Sotsialisticheskaya industriya* (Moscow), Sept. 6, 1983, p. 2, trans. in *CDSP*, Nov. 9, 1983, p. 4.

and three other members chosen by the brigade. The bureaucratic instance above the "employing" organization also normally gives its approval.

The payment for a given construction job is usually calculated as a percentage of the estimated cost of the completed project—often 22 percent, but ranging from 20 percent to 35 percent in some cases.²⁰ The estimated cost (*smetnaya stoimost'*) is fixed in the project lists (*titul'nyye spiski*), on the basis of which contractual agreements for capital construction are concluded, resources are allocated, and bank credit is furnished. The value in rubles and the nature of the project determine which bureaucratic level must give its approval before payment can be made for a given project.²¹

At the completion of the job, the brigade leader normally collects personally the agreed-upon payment and divides it among the brigade members according to a mutually acceptable formula, usually based on the share of the work performed. As we shall see below, the brigade leader is often caught in the middle because payment—either in full, or even in part—is not always forthcoming. Moreover, as one Soviet legal scholar has pointed out, this middleman function of a brigade leader is illegal.²²

This arrangement of payment for work done and distribution of pay according to each worker's contribution is strikingly similar to the brigade system of labor currently being promoted for Soviet industry.²³ Indeed, one *shabashnik* stated in an interview: "Everybody talks about the brigade contract, but we're the only group that really has one."²⁴

When work is paid on a per-unit basis, *shabashniki* receive far more than going government rates. Where plastering was officially paid at a rate of 84 kopecks per meter, *shabashniki* received two rubles per meter. Brickwork compensated officially at three rubles 8 kopecks per meter, earned 10 to 25 rubles per meter

when performed by *shabashniki* (some especially fancy brickwork on a private home netted 100 rubles per meter).²⁵ Examples of compensation for work performed on a project basis are as follows:

- 30,000 rubles for construction of a barn in 1976;
- 15,000 rubles for construction of a garage in 1976;
- 37,547 rubles for building a calf shed and two buildings in 1982;
- 5,000 rubles for conversion of a tumble-down stable into an eight-space garage on a sovkhos in the southern Urals (a job performed by six persons, four of them students and two of them construction specialists);
- 16,000 rubles for construction of a 16-unit apartment building in Krasnodarsk Kray (work done by 16 persons, 12 of them students and four of them construction specialists);
- 72,000 rubles for a factory built of brick in Vologda Oblast (work done by 11 persons—eight youths or students, three specialist builders);
- 52,000 rubles for construction of an animal-husbandry complex (work done by 12 persons, all youths/students);
- 72,000 rubles for construction of 12 two-apartment wooden buildings on a kolkhoz in Ryazan' Oblast (work done by 18 persons);
- 110,000 rubles for work on the Urengoy pipeline between compressor stations 15 and 16 (the chief engineer and boss of PMK-Z invited a brigade of 25 people for more than one month and 40 people for up to one month).²⁶

How big is this phenomenon? In 1984, Soviet Minister of Internal Affairs Vitaly Fedorchuk stated in a newspaper interview that *shabashniki* account for half of all construction work in some rural areas. He men-

²⁰ See, e.g., P. Tsapenko, "Free Builders in the USSR," in *V zashchitu ekonomicheskikh svobod* (In Defense of Economic Freedoms), a 1981 samizdat document; also *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, Aug. 29, 1982; and *Komsomol'skaya pravda*, Aug. 28, 1981, and Nov. 3, 1982. The *Sovetskaya Rossiya* item contended that 22 percent of the estimated cost was a fair price and could not be considered too high when all factors were taken into consideration; it also referred to a possible 40 percent premium on top of the 22 percent figure if the work was performed on time, considering the 14–16-hour workdays put in by the *shabashniki*. In one case prosecution of *shabashniki* was initiated because wages amounted to 50 percent of the estimated cost. See "The Road," *Izvestiya*, Apr. 18, 1985, p. 3, trans. in *CDSP*, May 15, 1985, pp. 19–20.

Various combinations of land-use, cash, and payments in kind as remuneration for *shabashnik* labor are discussed in "A Police Officer and a *Shabashnik* Speak Frankly," *ibid.*, June 16, 1985, p. 2, trans. in *CDSP*, July 10, 1985, pp. 1–3.

²¹ See *Yuridicheskii entsiklopedicheskii slovar'*, pp. 332, 369–70. As one *shabashnik* told me, "We would build the barn, and someone from Gosbank would come out and look it over before releasing the money to the kolkhoz."

²² See "Legal Interpretation of Agreements with 'Shabashnik' Brigades," in *Sotsialisticheskaya zakonnost'* (Moscow), No. 3, 1978, pp. 54–55.

²³ See, e.g., the decrees of the Central Committee and of the Council of Ministers and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, respectively, in *Trud*, Dec. 4, 1983, p. 1; and *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, Jan. 1984, p. 19.

²⁴ *Komsomol'skaya pravda*, Apr. 14, 1981, trans. in *CDSP*, May 27, 1981, p. 6.

Officially, the brigade system has been encouraged in construction for a number of years. See, for example, "In Favor of the Mass Introduction of the Brigade Contract," *Ekonomika stroitel'stva* (Moscow), No. 8, 1979, pp. 9–12.

There is reason to believe that official claims overstate the extent to which the brigade contract system is actually in use. Indeed, Soviet sources occasionally acknowledge that many contract brigades exist only on paper. See, e.g., Economist A. Aganbegyan, *Trud*, Aug. 28, 1984, p. 2, trans. in *CDSP*, Oct. 3, 1984, p. 1; and "What Is Holding Up Economic Accountability?" *Izvestiya*, Apr. 28, 1985, p. 3.

²⁵ *Pravda*, May 15 and Sept. 8, 1976; and Tsapenko, loc. cit.

²⁶ The first example is from *Pravda*, Sept. 8, 1976; the second, from *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, Aug. 29, 1982, p. 3; the rest, from Tsapenko, loc. cit.

tioned instances where the volume of work performed by *shabashniki* was misstated by 1 or 2 million rubles, and he spoke of a bribe of 30,000 rubles paid by one brigade of *shabashniki*.²⁷ In 1976, *Pravda* reported that in the previous two years in Kherson Oblast, more than 1.5 million rubles had been paid to "hired brigades."²⁸ In 1981, *Komsomol'skaya pravda* wrote that more than 70 million rubles worth of work a year was being performed "by the do-it-yourself method" (*khozspособom*) in Kurgan Oblast, and that "more than half of all construction money is used by the do-it-yourselfers."²⁹ A 1982 article mentioned that in Kustanay Oblast there were about 200 farms, each employing one or two brigades of *shabashniki*.³⁰ Other articles spoke of brigade leaders who receive advances of 20,000 or 37,000 rubles.³¹ Clearly large sums of money are changing hands.

Shabashniki and the Law

When workers and farm bosses cut a deal to get badly needed work done at high wage rates, the last thing most of them think about is what the fine print of the law has to say about their conduct.³² Nevertheless, there are a variety of laws having some bearing on *shabashnichestvo*. The activity does not fall squarely under Soviet labor legislation; rather its legal status derives *mainly* from a number of Soviet criminal and civil laws that can be read as applying to migrant labor in general, depending on the circumstances. For example, Article 153 of the RSFSR Criminal Code forbids "private entrepreneurial activity by utilization of state, cooperative, or social forms" and stipulates up to five years' deprivation of freedom or exile, and confiscation of property.³³ The key concepts are not clearly defined, although the USSR Supreme Court attempted to clarify the statute in 1976.³⁴ The Court read the statute as applying to the

production of goods, to construction, or to the provision of services, undertaken for the purpose of deriving unearned income utilizing "socialist forms" to enjoy privileges that are the exclusive province of socialist organizations—such as the hiring of labor—and done systematically or on a significant scale. The Supreme Court explained to the lower courts that

... the fulfillment by separate persons (brigades) of contract work and labor agreements, concluded with government, cooperative, and other social organizations can be considered to be private entrepreneurship only in cases when persons, covering themselves in the form of socialist organizations, illegally acquire construction and other equipment, funded materials, and so on, and in connection with this, derive incomes, clearly not corresponding to the labor spent.

The Court further alluded to the second paragraph of Article 153 of the Criminal Code, establishing the crime of and penalties for private persons engaging in the activities of a "commercial middleman," such as seeking a buyer for a seller or a seller for a buyer, but reminded the lower courts that this activity was criminally punishable only if the conditions set in the statutes were met, i.e., when the activity was engaged in on a "large scale" or with "goals of enrichment."

The Commentary to the part of Article 153 that established criminal penalties for "commercial middleman" activity cites a 1966 Supreme Court decree interpreting this statute to include acquisition of construction materials.³⁵ The *shabashnik* brigade leader who goes onto the "market" for materials for his men to work with has traditionally had almost no way to obtain them without running afoul of this law. Rank-and-file brigade members, by contrast, are not criminally liable, according to the Supreme Court, if they participate in illicit operations as mere laborers paid just for the work performed.

Shabashniki are also vulnerable under Article 174 of the Criminal Code, which fixes penalties of 3–8 years in jail (7–15 years for repeat offenders) with possible post-sentence exile of 2–5 years for conviction on bribery charges. Often, cash payments are essential if the brigade is to obtain necessary construction materials from outside sources or even from the very *kolkhoz* bosses who had originally promised to provide such materials.³⁶

²⁷ *Literaturnaya gazeta* (Moscow), Aug. 29, 1984, p. 10, trans in *CDSP*, Sept. 19, 1984, p. 5.

²⁸ Aug. 15, 1976, p. 3, trans. in *CDSP*, Sept. 15, 1976, pp. 21–22.

²⁹ Apr. 15, 1981, p. 2, trans. in *CDSP*, May 27, 1981, p. 7.

³⁰ *Komsomol'skaya pravda*, Nov. 2, 1982, p. 2, trans. in *CDSP*, Oct. 15, 1982, p. 10.

³¹ *Pravda*, Oct. 5, 1984, p. 6, trans. in *CDSP*, Oct. 31, 1984, pp. 20–21; and *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, Aug. 29, 1982, p. 3.

³² Indeed, several *shabashniki* (with higher education) who read a draft of my article during my July 1985 visit to Moscow criticized it for paying too much attention to matters of Soviet legislation. They suggested this emphasis might convey the misimpression that *shabashniki* stop to ponder the legal issues before taking a job, whereas in fact they normally just plunge in and get the job done.

³³ *Kommentarii k ugodovnomu kodeksu RSFSR* (Commentaries to the Criminal Code of the RSFSR), Moscow, Yuridicheskaya literatura, 1984, p. 304.

³⁴ "Practice in Application by the Courts of Legislation About Responsibility for Private-Entrepreneurial Commercial Middleman Responsibility Activity, [Decree] No. 7 of June 25, 1976," reprinted in *Sotsialisticheskaya zakonnost'*, No. 9, 1976, pp. 81–83.

³⁵ *Komentarii k ugodovnomu kodeksu RSFSR*, p. 307, par. 3.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 368.

A 1978 decree of the USSR Council of Minister's State Committee on Labor and Social Questions and the Secretariat of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, seemingly directed at the *shabashniki*, confirms a model contract for work as a hired construction laborer.³⁷ The very first point of the decree obligates government organizations, enterprises, and farms to apply the model contract agreement for the fulfillment of *rural* construction work. The model contract requires each worker to have a labor booklet or other document, confirming that the worker is free at this time to work away from his regular job. The brigade leader, according to the model contract, is not freely chosen by the brigade, but is picked by order of the enterprise. Under the model contract, each member of the brigade must be familiarized with the regime of the enterprise and the collective agreement between the administration and the trade union. One professional *shabashnik* with many years' experience as an ordinary member and then as leader of a brigade saw this decree and its provisions as

*an effort to replace freely-agreed-to relations and construct a series of new social obligations, falling under the control of the punitive organs [karatel'nyye organy] The punitive organs, controlling these new relations, are forcing free construction to move from the sphere of government [jobs] to the private sector. The fundamental distinction between free construction and governmental is that the former doesn't fall under the regime of the enterprise and isn't subordinated to it; the enterprise pays only for the work.*³⁸

This same experienced *shabashnik* worked on the Urengoy pipeline the year after the 1978 decree was adopted, and reported that under its terms he was fired after one month of work. More than 20 other people kept working without having complied with all of the decree's requirements and ultimately did not receive their wages because they could not provide certificates (*spravki*) that they were on vacation from other work and thus legally able to work on the pipeline job. The requirement to produce such documentation is aimed at eliminating payment for fictitious laborers—a device that this *shabashnik* admitted to having used often in order to receive the amounts promised for the work performed. When large sums of money are dispensed to only a small number of per-

sons, this tends to arouse the suspicion of higher authorities, resulting in visits by "inspection commissions," which check the work and often determine that the contract price was "too high."

Although *shabashniki* sometimes still succeed in getting partial payments, they are also sometimes threatened with criminal prosecution unless they leave immediately, without being paid any money. *Shabashniki* have told me that some local government officials are under orders to limit the amount of money paid to *shabashniki*, whatever the work performed. In theory, written contracts are enforceable in the courts, but *shabashniki* tend to believe it is better to move on than to fight matters out with the authorities in court. One Soviet labor law specialist I talked with in Moscow said that courts would not uphold *shabashniki* seeking to receive 5,000 rubles promised on top of 5,000 already received, and he went on to criticize such individuals for receiving unearned income at state expense—perhaps indicative of jealousy over *shabashnik* earnings. According to conversations I had in Moscow in 1985, difficulties in collecting payment for construction work have recently prompted many *shabashniki* to seek harvesting work instead, inasmuch as immediate possession of a share of a highly saleable crop is preferable to prospective and highly uncertain cash payments.

There are, to be sure, some legal bases for reducing agreed-upon payments to *shabashniki*. Article 370 of the Civil Code of the RSFSR—one of the statutes regulating contractual relations—provides that failure to complete work or misuse of materials on the part of the contractor must be compensated by the contractor at his own expense.³⁹

Legal aspects of relations between *shabashniki* and their employers must be analyzed by reference to the Civil Code rather than the Labor Code.⁴⁰ Article 434 of the Soviet Civil Code authorizes agreements to perform joint activity for the attainment of a common economic goal—for example, construction—although such agreements are allowed only for the satisfaction of everyday needs and cannot be entered into between citizens and socialist organizations. This provision seems to be widely violated.⁴¹

Article 350 of the Civil Code states that "by contract agreement, the contractor is obligated to complete at his own risk the particular work . . ." The Commentary to the article stresses the importance of distin-

³⁷ "Confirming of a Model Contract for Fulfillment by Kolkhozniks and Other Citizens of Work on Construction of Objects in Rural Places, May 24, 1978, No. 168/16-23,"

Bulleten' Goskomtruda (Moscow), No. 8, 1978, pp. 20-27.

³⁸ Quoted in Tsapenko, loc. cit.

³⁹ *Kommentariy k grazhdanskomu kodeksu RSFSR*, pp. 439-40; also "Legal Interpretation . . .," loc. cit., p. 54.

⁴⁰ See, e.g., *Komsomol'skaya pravda*, Apr. 17, 1981, p. 2, trans. in CDSP, May 27, 1981, pp. 7-8; and "Legal Interpretation . . .," loc. cit., p. 54.

⁴¹ *Kommentariy k grazhdanskomu kodeksu RSFSR*, p. 508.

guishing such a contractual agreement from a labor agreement. Under a contract, the contractor can be an organization: "Citizens usually fulfill the functions of customers and only from time to time (*during episodic acceptance of separate orders in time free from work in socialist organizations*) those of contractors."⁴²

Article 351 of the Civil Code, "The Fulfillment of Contract Work by a Citizen," specifies that "a citizen can undertake the fulfillment of work by contract *only under conditions of fulfillment of this work by his own labor*." This rule is explained in the Commentary to the Article as existing to prevent the contract agreement from being used to exploit another person's labor. The Commentary cites as an example of the prevention of the exploitation of another person's labor:

*If the citizen who has contracted several elements of a total volume of work cannot fulfill them (for example, not being a specialist, he cannot install plumbing in a house being erected by him under contract), for their fulfillment an independent contract agreement must be concluded, not by the contractor, but by the customer.*⁴³

Thus, although a citizen can contract to build a dacha, he cannot hire subcontractors; if he does, he may be found guilty of acting as a "commercial middleman."

Since the *shabashniki* fall under laws on contracts but not those on labor relations, they are deprived of various benefits and protections afforded by labor legislation. They get no pay for holidays and no vacations at trade union facilities; more important, they have no guarantees of job safety or compensation for injuries incurred in the course of their work.⁴⁴

The Matter of Materials

A major factor subjecting many *shabashniki* to the risk of criminal prosecution, or, at best, leaving them uncertain of their ultimate fate at the hands of the authorities, is the fact that there have been virtually no legal sources for the construction materials needed to perform the agreed-upon work. Contract or no, most *shabashniki* end up providing most of their own

materials and supplies, acquiring them by whatever means possible—begging, borrowing, stealing, or buying or bribing them away from government organizations. Indeed, one of the main attractions of the *shabashniki* to a farm chairman or director is this very "supply function."⁴⁵

One *shabashnik* told me of having to spend 400 rubles of the group's own money for welding equipment and supplies, although a kolkhoz administration had promised to supply all necessary materials and equipment for a job. Another brigade of young Muscovite *shabashniki* were told by their employer, a kolkhoz boss, to steal any pipe they might need for a job. They approached the driver of a truck loaded with pipe and asked him, "Do you want to help Soviet agriculture?" "Why?" he answered, as if he could not imagine wanting to do such a thing. For a liter of vodka, they got all the pipe they needed.

An item in the press speaks of *shabashniki* in Siberia who swap beef, potatoes, and honey for building materials—trading a side of beef for a carload of cement or a load of slate or gravel.⁴⁶ A *shabashnik* brigade leader whose group needs a bulldozer, truck, or crane for a day simply hires one away from a government construction organization for 10, 20, or 30 rubles.⁴⁷ Some *shabashniki* are even said to have their own tractors, although this is illegal. They supposedly strike deals to purchase machinery that has been written off as unusable by a kolkhoz.⁴⁸

This process of barter, buying, bribery, and theft can assume a quite large scale. A 1976 *Pravda* article described how one *shabashnik* leader held himself out as an "expert" in questions of material-technical supply. At his direction, the bosses of kolkhozes in Kherson Oblast wrote letters to various enterprises requesting them simply to allocate funded materials (*fondirovannyye materialy*) to the kolkhozes without receiving the appropriate authorizations (*fondy*) from supply and planning organizations. Armed with such letters, the supply "expert" flew halfway across the country and visited the sales department of an oil refinery, where he requested the release without payment of several hundred tons of tightly controlled bitumen (asphalt). He further requested and received rail transportation of the material by means of a special type of railroad car that was in short supply even for planned uses. The article suggested that, in return, the enterprises providing materials received

⁴² Ibid., pp. 418–19. Emphasis added. According to the Commentary, Article 350 is not really intended to cover "capital construction." A separate chapter of the code, beginning with Article 368 deals with this subject.

⁴³ Ibid., pp. 419–20. Emphasis added.

⁴⁴ *Komsomol'skaya pravda*, Nov. 2, 1982, p. 2, trans. in *CDSP*, Dec. 15, 1982, p. 9, tells of a *shabashnik* crane operator electrocuted because power had not been properly shut off at the site. The attitude of the employer was: "If he couldn't handle the job, he shouldn't have been working as a crane operator." See also *Izvestiya*, Dec. 15, 1983, p. 2.

⁴⁵ *Pravda*, Oct. 5, 1984, p. 6, trans. in *CDSP*, Oct. 31, 1984, pp. 19–20.

⁴⁶ *Komsomol'skaya pravda*, Apr. 17, 1981, p. 2, trans. in *CDSP*, May 27, 1981, p. 8.

⁴⁷ *Komsomol'skaya pravda*, Nov. 3, 1982, p. 2, trans. in *CDSP*, Dec. 15, 1982, p. 10.

⁴⁸ Interview with a Moscow *shabashnik*.

rail shipments of meat and fruit, as well as passes to the farms' holiday resort on the shore of the Azov Sea. Apparently, the supply "expert" had never been called to account.⁴⁹

The authorities apparently have mixed feelings in approaching this serious problem. One *shabashnik* leader was sentenced to 15 years' deprivation of freedom in connection with the theft of some pipes in collusion with the head of a warehouse.⁵⁰ A front-page editorial assailed the "unearned income" of *shabashniki* and their dishonest deals with district officials and farm managers; it reported that Armenia's minister of the building materials industry and two of his deputies had been fired and others had been expelled from the party or otherwise disciplined for such activities.⁵¹ Yet someone in official circles is apparently interested in tapping the energies and abilities of the *shabashniki* by facilitating their work: witness the decree of the USSR Council of Ministers "To Broaden the Sale to the Population of Construction Materials," announced in *Izvestiya* of July 19, 1985. That decree provides that ministries responsible for producing construction materials must significantly increase the output of such materials for sale to the population, and requires the local government executive committees to work with distributors to establish means for transporting construction materials from warehouses and factories directly to consumers.

Ambivalent Image

From private conversations in the Soviet Union and a reading of a great many articles in the Soviet press as well as selected items from *samizdat* and other Soviet literature, I have discovered a wide range of attitudes about the *shabashniki* among party officials, farm bosses, construction organizations, the police, local residents, and the *shabashniki* themselves.

One view sees the *shabashniki* as greedy parasites who ignore the needs of their native community and families, abandon their homes and go elsewhere to wheel and deal, bribe, stage drunken debauches, perform shoddy work, receive outrageously inflated wages, and then vanish, leaving behind unfinished or substandard building projects, widespread resentment, a trail of corrupted local officials, and a bad ex-

ample for youth. Another view depicts the phenomenon as an admirable response of work-seeking youth to mismanaged local economies and local unemployment, and treats the *shabashniki* themselves as hard-working, highly-skilled, and often well-educated workers who introduce the work ethic by traveling long distances to work long hours. The fact that they are forced to supply their own materials, go unprotected by legislation, and—although they perform superior work—are often cheated of their fair wages or even hauled into court on serious criminal charges through connivance by local farm leaders and government and security officials also wins them additional sympathy.

The *shabashniki* have been the subject of articles in the Soviet press since the early 1970's. Initially, these articles generally condemned the phenomenon, but in a new spate of articles appearing in 1985 one finds some that defend these workers, present their version of events, and condemn the reflex hostility of many authorities to the *shabashniki*'s high earnings.⁵² In general, the closer to the phenomenon the party functionary or journalist writing about it, the more likely he is to view it as a "many-sided problem" arising out of "real conditions" of the further development of the Soviet economy.

Typically, the representatives of the *kolkhozes* and *sovkhozes* who hire the *shabashniki* either praise their ability to get the job done, or at least justify hiring them by criticizing the performance of the regular construction contracting organizations. One article notes that of 32 million rubles' worth of construction performed in one year by one government construction trust, only 17 million rubles' worth was in the countryside proper. The construction organization seeks to perform work in towns where there is a supply base, and does not go out of its way to build small barns, sheepfolds, calf sheds, etc. The three-article series from which this statement comes alleges that the "official" contractors do almost nothing with the materials allocated to them. One of the articles implicitly approves a farm's decision to hire *shabashniki*

⁵² For a traditional critique, see "Who Will Stop the Private Construction Worker," *Zarya vostoka* (Tbilisi), Jan. 22, 1978, trans. in *CDSP*, Mar. 1, 1978, p. 15. For recent, more balanced commentary, see "They Went to Work," *Pravda*, Mar. 10, 1985, p. 2, trans. in *CDSP*, Apr. 3, 1985, pp. 19–20; "A Sponger in Profile and Face-to-Face," *Izvestiya*, Apr. 5, 1985, p. 3; "The Road," loc. cit.; "Two Sides to 'Easy Money,'" *Pravda*, June 13, 1985, p. 3, trans. in *CDSP*, July 10, 1985, pp. 4–5; "The Thorns and Roses . . . of Earnings," a letter to the editor published in *Komsomol'skaya pravda*, July 6, 1985, p. 2; "Unearned Income," *Izvestiya*, July 7, 1985, p. 3, trans. in *CDSP*, July 31, 1985, pp. 7–8, 12; "A Police Officer and a *Shabashnik* Speak Frankly," loc. cit.; "Time and Money," *Izvestiya*, July 30, 1985, p. 3; and "Is It Shameful to Earn a Lot?" *Literaturnaya gazeta*, No. 34, Aug. 21, 1985, p. 12.

⁴⁹ *Pravda*, Aug. 15, 1976, p. 3, trans. in *CDSP*, Sept. 15, 1976, p. 21.

⁵⁰ *Pravda*, Oct. 5, 1984, p. 6, trans. in *CDSP*, Oct. 31, 1984, p. 20.

⁵¹ *Pravda*, Jan. 12, 1983, p. 1, trans. in *CDSP*, Feb. 9, 1983, p. 3. As one *shabashnik* writes, "[E]ven today no one can be certain that charges won't be brought against him by the police or prosecutor's office" (*Izvestiya*, June 16, 1985, trans. in *CDSP*, July 10, 1985, pp. 1–3).

because an official contractor failed to meet its deadline in building winter shelter for farm animals.⁵³

Representatives of the public construction organizations defend themselves by pointing out that their ability to fulfill assignments is crippled by the very fact that many of their most qualified workers have left to work as *shabashniki*.⁵⁴ For example, in 1982 at one construction firm, the number of hiring actions required to keep up to complement was almost double the total number of positions at the firm.⁵⁵ In the Chechen-Ingush Republic Construction Administration almost one-fifth of the 9,000 workers left their jobs in the spring and returned in the autumn; in all, an estimated 10,000–15,000 seasonal workers left the republic according to the State Committee on Labor.⁵⁶ The phenomenon has an impact not only on the urban economy; in western Ukraine, one estimate was that every seventh member of the Komsomol leaves the village at the worst possible time—planting and harvesting seasons.⁵⁷

While officials of areas from which the *shabashniki* come generally criticize them for their “greed,” some do acknowledge that the *shabashniki* seek employment elsewhere because there is not enough productive work to go around in the local economy. The chairman of the presidium of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic’s Supreme Soviet spoke of an employment rate of only 80 percent for able-bodied local men. He noted efforts to send surplus labor to the Far East, where manpower was short, and he criticized the USSR State Committee on Labor and Social Questions for poor organization of these matters.⁵⁸

Local workers are resentful of migrant workers, who work harder, earn three or more times as much money, may go on drinking sprees, and sometimes even leave with projects uncompleted. The locals find it particularly galling to be called on to mop up the resulting mess.⁵⁹ Sometimes the resentment takes a more sinister tone as when a *shabashnik* crew was hired to work on part of the Urengoy pipeline. The locals covered the valves of the pipelines on especially cold nights so that the pipes burst, cut down an electric pole causing loss of energy to the work site,

stole construction materials brought in by the *shabashniki*, and refused in the store to sell groceries to the outsiders. The account added, “We solved these difficulties in a natural way—that is, with natural force.”⁶⁰

Officials of the Ministry of Internal Affairs are particularly sensitive to the problems introduced by the *shabashniki*, who often arrive without labor booklets or other identification, use the passports of friends and relatives to pad the list of brigade “members,” are “overpaid,” and engage in bribery and stealing.⁶¹ Yet there are also accounts of work by *shabashniki* being duly entered in labor books as required, and of due registration of *shabashnik* brigades with local police authorities.⁶²

Ramifications for Soviet Society

As suggested at the outset, the debate regarding the *shabashniki* highlights many of the issues that dominate discussions concerning reform of the Soviet economy at large. One of the longest of the recent articles about the *shabashniki*—and one of the most sympathetic to them—describes a legal proceeding that resulted in long prison sentences for several Armenian *shabashniki*, and a prison sentence for the collective farm chairman who had contracted with them to build a road (The chairman was granted an amnesty, the article notes). The author of the article points out that the road built by the *shabashniki* would more than repay the government’s investment in it, because the collective farm’s beet crop could not otherwise be transported efficiently to the refinery during the rainy season. The *shabashniki* were charged with engaging in private enterprise under cover of collective-farm types of activity. This was because they were paid by the collective farm for building a *state* rather than a *farm* road. Describing the authorities’ response to the road-building case, the author of the article asked:

I know . . . initiative has to be within the framework of the law. . . . But isn't it time to think about why, in practice, the framework has to be so tight that initiative

⁵³ *Komsomol'skaya pravda*, Apr. 14, 15, and 17, 1981, trans. in *CDSP*, May 27, 1981, pp. 6–8. See also, *Pravda*, Aug. 15, 1976, p. 3, trans. *CDSP*, Sept. 15, 1976, p. 21.

⁵⁴ *Pravda*, May 15, 1976; see also *Komsomol'skaya pravda*, Nov. 2, 1982, p. 2, trans. in *CDSP*, Dec. 15, 1982, p. 9, which tells of local construction projects being at a standstill in an area from which 600 people had left to work as *shabashniki*.

⁵⁵ See *Sotsialisticheskaya zakonnost'*, Sept. 6, 1983, p. 4.

⁵⁶ *Izvestiya*, Dec. 15, 1983, p. 2.

⁵⁷ *Komsomol'skaya pravda*, Nov. 2, 1982.

⁵⁸ *Izvestiya*, Dec. 15, 1983, p. 2.

⁵⁹ See *Literaturnaya gazeta*, Aug. 29, 1984, p. 10, trans. in *CDSP*, Sept. 19, 1984, p. 5; and *Komsomol'skaya pravda*, Nov. 3, 1982, p. 2.

⁶⁰ Tsapenko, loc. cit.

⁶¹ See, e.g., *Komsomol'skaya pravda*, Nov. 3, 1982, p. 2, trans. in *CDSP*, Dec. 15, 1982, p. 10; *Komsomol'skaya pravda*, Apr. 14, 1981, p. 2; and *Pravda*, Oct. 5, 1984, p. 6, trans. in *CDSP*, Oct. 31, 1984, pp. 19–20. See also “Legal Interpretation . . .,” loc. cit., p. 54, which gives the legal rationale for obliging contractors to repay sums exceeding the measures of payment at the official rates (*po normam i rastsenkam*).

⁶² *Izvestiya*, Dec. 15, 1983, p. 2; and *Komsomol'skaya pravda*, Nov. 3, 1982, p. 2, trans. in *CDSP*, Dec. 15, 1982, p. 10.

and violation are one and the same? . . . We're speaking a lot now about the economic independence of the enterprise—but has this independence been prepared for legally? We keep speaking more loudly of the role of economic initiative—but where are the criteria by which to judge whether initiative is good or bad? The end result? But that, as the criminal investigators . . . explained, isn't a "legal argument."⁶³

The authorities are more comfortable with such "legalism." In December 1983, *Izvestiya* called for gaining control over "ungoverned migration."⁶⁴ Articles in *Komsomol'skaya pravda* in 1981 and 1982 called for strengthening of rural contracting organizations, allocation of more resources to rural construction, clarification of the legal status of seasonal workers and their coverage under the Labor Code, and creation of economically self-sufficient organizations to serve as temporary job placement bureaus to act as intermediaries between rural clients and hired brigades. The more recent of these two articles concluded:

*Migrant labor is detrimental if it is uncontrolled, but it can bring certain benefits if it is regulated and aimed at the fulfillment of specific tasks of the national economy.*⁶⁵

Such an approach misses the point. It is the very lack of "control" that gives the *shabashnik* system its

advantages over government construction contracting organizations. Unlike the latter, the *shabashniki* operate according to economic incentives—the faster they build, the more money they will receive. Instead of looking to bring the *shabashniki* under control, a Soviet leadership truly interested in raising productivity should be looking for ways to increase the role of economic incentives.

In the view of one *shabashnik* I talked with, these workers embody a type of psychology traditionally alien to the Soviet worker:

The shabashnik is a new kind of worker in the Soviet Union. He is a worker who is willing to work hard. Our workers don't want to work hard. Their attitude toward work is more like that in some Third World countries than in the advanced capitalist ones. The shabashnik already has a consumer mentality—he wants to buy a car, or have a good personal library. The only way he can earn enough money to buy a car or such books as are available on the black market is to work as a shabashnik.

In a system where "initiative is punishable" (*initsiativa nakazuyema*),⁶⁶ the *shabashniki* act on the contrary assumption—that enterprise is rewarded. They exist in a kind of legal twilight zone, their activities subject to the vicissitudes of material supply problems, the good faith of those who hire them, and the attitudes of local authorities. The situation of these enterprising workers is indicative of the serious ideological, psychological, and institutional obstacles to economic reform that permeate the Soviet system.

⁶³ "The Road," loc. cit. The prohibition on use of kolkhoz funds for constructing non-kolkhoz structures is discussed in "Decree No. 21 of the Plenum of the USSR Supreme Court of November 15, 1984," *Byulleten' verkhovnogo suda SSSR* (Moscow), No. 1, 1985, p. 10, item 16.

⁶⁴ *Izvestiya*, Dec. 15, 1983, trans. in *CDSP*, Jan. 11, 1984, p. 8.

⁶⁵ *Komsomol'skaya pravda*, Apr. 17, 1981, p. 2, trans. in *CDSP*, May 27, 1981, pp. 6–8; and *Komsomol'skaya pravda*, Nov. 3, 1982, p. 2, trans. in *CDSP*, Dec. 15, 1982, p. 12.

⁶⁶ The concept that "initiative is punishable" even found its way into a journalistic novel about the introduction of the brigade contract system at the Kaluga Turbine Plant and elsewhere, written for a mass readership. See A. I. Levikov, *Kaluzhskiy variant* (The Kaluga Variant), Moscow, Politizdat, 1980, p. 385.

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MARGERIE WOLF. *Revolution Postponed: Women in Contemporary China*. Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1985.

ELISABETH CROLL. *Chinese Women Since Mao*. Armonk, NY, and London, England, M. E. Sharpe, Inc., and Zed Books, Ltd., 1983.

as calls for expanded opportunities for women, frequently appeared in the leading journals of the period, including the most prominent, *Xin Qingnian* (New Youth).² Journals written for and about women also proliferated at this time, helping to inspire men and women to embrace radical feminism.³ Indeed, as Judith Stacey points out, "family issues radicalized many of the future Chinese Communist leaders before their conversion to Marxism-Leninism."⁴

By the early 1920's, feminists' hopes and expectations for the speedy emancipation of women were high. The women's liberation movement appeared to be well

SEVENTY YEARS AGO, China's May Fourth radicals singled out China's Confucian-based family/social system as the main cause of the country's weakness and the greatest obstacle to its modernization.¹ Although the emancipation of women was not initially an articulated aim of the cultural revolution that these radicals launched in

1915, the position of women in Chinese society quickly emerged as a central issue. Interest in the inferior position of women as a dramatic illustration of the harmful effects of Confucianism and of the urgent need for basic change soon gave way to interest in the role of women in Chinese society as a problem in its own right.

The "woman problem" (*funü wenti*) became one of the most emotional issues of the day. Passionate debates over the system of arranged marriage, the cult of female chastity, and the double standard of sexual morality, as well

Susan Williams O'Sullivan has worked for The Asia Society as Associate Editor of its magazine, Asia, and as a program associate with its China Council. She is currently a freelance writer and editor.

¹ Although the term "May Fourth Movement" was originally applied in a narrow sense to describe the May 4, 1919, massive student demonstration against the Chinese government's policy toward Japan, in this essay I use the term in a broader sense to encompass the intellectual revolution and social transformation that began some four years earlier. For a discussion of the "Definition of the Movement," see the introduction in Chow Tse-tsung's *The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1967, pp. 1-15.

² See Susan Williams O'Sullivan, "The Debates Over the Woman Problem During the May Fourth Period of Modern China," New York, East Asian Institute Certificate Essay, Columbia University, 1975; and Roxanne Heater Witke, "Transformation of Attitudes Toward Women During the May Fourth Era of Modern China," Ph.D. diss., Berkeley, University of California, 1970, for a fuller discussion of the "woman problem" during the May Fourth period.

³ Stacey, *Patriarchy and Socialist Revolution in China*, p. 75.

⁴ Ibid.

under way; China's emerging leadership seemed committed to equality for women; and women themselves were becoming increasingly active in politics and in the campaign for their own liberation.

Today, while few would deny that the position of women has improved in China, it has become clear to most scholars and observers that women as a group have fallen far short of the May Fourth goal of full equality. Women may no longer be "frogs at the bottom of the well," but neither do they "hold up half the sky." The majority of them are out of the home and employed, but almost none has escaped the "double burden" of working and running a household.⁵ Greater numbers are getting an education, but they still constitute only 39.2 percent of the high-school population⁶ and make up 70 percent of China's illiterates.⁷ More are participating in politics, but few reach high positions of power.⁸ Some are enjoying increased status in their families and communities and greater respect from their in-laws and husbands, but wife abuse and wife beating continue and in some areas even appear to be on the rise.⁹ A few are marrying with a minimum of outside influ-

ence, and some are getting divorces, but the "free-choice" marriage that the May Fourth radicals envisaged and, indeed, considered essential to women's liberation is still not a reality for the majority of women in China.¹⁰

Clearly, the theory of Friedrich Engels that women's liberation evolves as a "natural consequence" of socialist revolution—embraced by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) since the early 1940's—has not been borne out by the Chinese experience. It is obvious that women's participation in economic production outside the home has not led to their full emancipation. Deep-rooted obstacles to women's further progress remain despite constitutional guarantees of full equality, the existence of legislation designed to protect women's rights and opportunities, and official pronouncements heralding women's new role in China's economy. The books under review here contribute to our understanding of these obstacles and the relationship between feminism and socialism in China.

Most of the authors, by their own admission, were initially drawn to the topic of women in contemporary China in part because of an interest in the Western feminist movement of the 1960's and 1970's, as well as an interest in socialist China's apparent successes in redefining women's position in society. Despite such ideological predispositions, however, they have avoided many of the pitfalls feminist writers fell into when writing about China in the early 1970's.¹¹ Aided by greater access to China, the authors have subjected the Chinese experience to

scholarly scrutiny, reassessed earlier and grossly exaggerated reports of the progress of Chinese women, and offered some valuable insights into the reasons why Chinese women continue to be second-class citizens subject to educational, economic, political, and cultural discrimination. The work of these writers is especially important and timely, both as an aid in assessing the likely long-term impact of the "Four Modernizations" policies on women and as a key to understanding why Chinese peasants, when confronted with the imperatives of the one-child birth policy and recent rural reforms, have resumed the practice of female infanticide, which in the past they resorted to only during times of extreme economic hardship.

ELISABETH CROLL'S *Feminism and Socialism in China* is perhaps the most ambitious of the seven. Croll, an area specialist, uses Marxist theory as a framework for her analysis of the relationship between the wider revolutionary movement in China and the separately organized women's movement, of the integration of feminism and socialism in CCP policy, and of the tensions between feminist and class interests. By her own admission, she began the study committed to the view that "only the broader economic, social and political transformations that have occurred in China have made the unquestionable changes in the lives of women possible" (p. 4).

Croll's heavy reliance on orthodox Marxist theory has limited her ability to contribute to the theoretical understanding of the relationship between socialism and feminism. Nonetheless, in the process of preparing the framework for her arguments, she has written a comprehensive and much-needed his-

⁵ The "double burden" refers to women's child care and household responsibilities coupled with their remunerative employment. Croll reports that rural women spend over three-and-one-half hours a day on provision of food alone. See Croll, *Chinese Women Since Mao*, p. 61. See also Martin King Whyte and William L. Parish, *Urban Life in Contemporary China*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984, pp. 216–21.

⁶ Beverley Hooper, "China's Modernization: Are Young Women Going to Lose Out?" *Modern China* (Beverly Hills), July 1984, p. 321. For more information on women and education, see Croll, *Chinese Women Since Mao*, p. 37, and Wolf, *Revolution Postponed*, pp. 124–25.

⁷ *Beijing Review*, Sept. 19, 1983, p. 6.

⁸ For statistics, see Whyte and Parish, op. cit., p. 210.

⁹ Michael Weisskopf, "China's Birth Control Policy Drives Some to Kill Baby Girls," *The Washington Post*, Jan. 8, 1985; Jeffrey Wasserstrom, "Resistance to the One-Child Family," *Modern China*, July 1984, p. 357; and Mosher, *Broken Earth*, pp. 221–23.

¹⁰ Wolf, op. cit., pp. 171–72.

¹¹ See Stacey, op. cit., p. 2, n. 3, for a listing of early, overly optimistic feminist interpretations of women's liberation in the PRC.

tory of women in China from the late Qing Dynasty (1644–1911) to the 1970's. Her coverage of the period from the fall of the Qing to the Communists' victory in 1949 is particularly good. Although Croll uses little in the way of new primary-source materials, she is able to bring to life the early feminists' efforts to liberate women. Working primarily from the accounts of Western observers, articles and studies on women in China, and several long-available translations, Croll has pieced together a lively account of the first few decades of the 20th century.

The most interesting chapters are those that deal with the period from the May Fourth Movement of 1919 to the split in the first united front in 1927, which divided China into two areas—one governed by Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang (KMT), the other by the CCP. Interweaving descriptions of incidents and historical events with excerpts from contemporary autobiographies and essays written by women, Croll drives home the drama of the May Fourth feminists' attempts to translate their radical ideology into a mass-based activism within the organizational framework provided by the alliance of the KMT and CCP in the early 1920's. We hear from young women activists caught between their new ideals and family demands, discouraged by their failure to awaken women in rural areas, overwhelmed by responsibilities to their nation, exhilarated by their newfound freedoms, and, finally, crushed by the dismantling of the women's associations and unions that took place as feminism was subordinated to what both the KMT and CCP came to consider as more basic and immediate concerns.

Croll's coverage of the women's movement after 1949 is less useful. This is due, in large part, to her

extensive and surprisingly uncritical use of Chinese government documents and newspaper articles to describe events and women's reactions to them. Her trip to China in 1973 during the Anti-Lin Biao/Anti-Confucius campaign, when achievements of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution were still being highly touted, also colored her view of the condition of women during these periods. In describing the services provided by neighborhood service centers during the Great Leap, Croll states that "women returned home from work to find hot meals locally available and their homes neatly cleaned. There were nurseries where mothers might leave their babies for a few hours to go shopping, see a film or go to spare-time school" (p. 273). One wonders where she left her skepticism.

It would be misleading, however, to suggest that Croll paints an entirely rosy picture of women in China. She does describe in detail the full range of existing inequities—unequal pay, limited access to higher education, the double burden of production labor and housework, and so forth. What she fails to do is to provide a convincing analysis of why gender equality has not yet been achieved under socialism. Like the Chinese press, she blames obstacles to women's progress on the persistence of a feudal ideology that has affected how men view women and how women view themselves. She sees the conflicting demands of gender and class as a major problem facing feminists today and calls upon women to resolve the problem. In her conclusion, she quotes Zui Yulan, who in summing up a lifetime of experience in the women's movement stated: "actual life and struggle have taught us that real equality between men and women

doesn't come of itself, and it can't be given by anybody." Equality is obtainable, Zui stressed, only "if the women themselves fight for it with a constantly heightened consciousness" (pp. 332–33).

Croll's book is in some ways disappointing. Although she refers repeatedly to the uneasy alliance between socialism and feminism in China, she fails to account convincingly for the basis of this uneasiness. By emphasizing only the economic and ideological underpinnings of the oppression of women in China and by mentioning but not fully exploring the role that the patriarchal family structure plays in this oppression, she also fails to present a satisfying analysis of the interaction between socialism and feminism or even suggest an answer to the question of why Chinese women have neither been particularly inclined nor able to fight for their equality. One senses that Croll has not really come to terms with what her research revealed as opposed to what she hoped to discover about the progress of women in China.

PHYLLIS ANDORS begins her inquiry into the last 30 years of the history of both urban and rural women in China against a backdrop of Western modernization, development theory and traditional Marxist theory. Although she acknowledges that the Chinese case reinforces to a certain extent the rather optimistic and mechanistic view typical of both theories, namely, that women's position in society will inevitably change as a result of industrialization and technological development, she ultimately finds both theories inadequate for understanding the woman question. In her view, neither theory can explain female inequality and oppression, because each places "the woman question

in a clearly dependent and subordinate position in relationship to economic change and development" (p. 170). She maintains that the Chinese experience "clearly shows [that] a commitment to female equality *cannot be simply the outcome of economic development but that it can and must shape the patterns and process of development itself*" (p. 171). Indeed, according to Andors, "the role of women in society generally is a function not of female sexuality but rather of the mode of production or, in cases where modes of production are conscious choices, of 'development strategy'" (p. 171).

This emphasis on the interaction between women's issues and important shifts in development policy is thought-provoking. Nevertheless, Andors's analysis falls short of being totally convincing, in my opinion, because it relies too heavily on *urban* women's experiences.¹² Women's progress may indeed, as Andors asserts, be slowed by policies such as those implemented during the First Five-Year Plan (for 1953–57), which emphasized heavy industry, development of urban-based welfare facilities, a formal education system, and centralization; and it may, in a qualified way, be given a boost by decentralized, mass mobilization of all labor, development of all forms of production, and political emphasis on the elimination of all kinds of inequality such as characterized the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, and the post-Cultural Revolution period. Andors is on thin ice, however, when she asserts that "the more radical mobilization-

oriented policies aimed specifically at developing mass participation and mobilization in all aspects of social life created an atmosphere and generated forces in which all kinds of inequality—including that of women—could be immediately and effectively challenged" (p. 99). This analysis ignores recent research that suggests that these policies also disrupted women's lives and added to their burdens. Furthermore, it fails to take into account the role of women within the family, particularly in rural areas, as a critical factor in sexual inequality.

Andors seems to appreciate fully the constraints that the Chinese patriarchal family system places on the progress of women, and she discusses the conflict between eliminating female oppression and inequality and promoting economic and political policies with higher priority. But she does not develop either of these issues. Indeed, although she acknowledges that an ambiguous, officially articulated family policy that implicitly accepted traditional female roles acted as a constraint on women's progress, she argues that "specific employment and participatory opportunities made available by the overall development strategy, including educational policy, was in the longer run a potentially greater significance in creating social and material equality" (p. 89). In her view, "economic development strategy remains the context for the dialectical struggle between revolutionary roles for women that demand a high degree of participation in public life and a traditional culture that emphasizes passivity, subordination, and domestic confinement" (p. 173). Thus, she believes that economic development will continue to determine the scope, pace, and direction of the transformation of

female roles in China (p. 174).

Unfinished Liberation is largely an unrevised version of Andors's dissertation. It is unfortunate that she did not take advantage of several new studies of rural China that were available when her book went to press in 1983 and refine some of her conclusions. Andors does ask some important and interesting questions, but her book is marred by some questionable assertions. Her extravagant claims with regard to the role that young urban women sent to work in rural areas during the *xiafang* movement played in promoting female liberation in the countryside have proved to be particularly unwarranted.¹³

KAY ANN JOHNSON, in *The Family and Peasant Revolution in China*, examines the relationship between socialism and the liberation of women in 20th-century China through a prism of feminist theory. She openly challenges the Marxist-Engelsian theory that women's participation in productive labor will with time automatically liberate them, a theory that Croll embraces and Andors stops short of unequivocally denouncing. Johnson also eschews conventional modernization/development explanations, arguing instead that even if major economic changes were to make males and females equal in their income-earning activities, the subordination of women would only be marginally affected. In her view, female subordination rests on fundamental principles of kinship organization and family formation that have made men the "rooted basis of community networks" and "each new generation of women 'outsiders' to social orga-

¹² See Whyte and Parish, *op. cit.*, p. 226, for a discussion of the relative importance of shifts in government policy on basic structural changes. See also Judith Stacey, "Feminist Reflections on the Socialist Question," *Harvard Education Review* (Cambridge), February 1980, p. 84, n. 10.

¹³ For the most comprehensive discussion of the *xiafang* movement, see Thomas P. Bernstein, *Up to the Mountains and Down to the Villages*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1977.

nization" (p. 25). Johnson argues persuasively that patrilocal exogamous marriage customs have played a particularly strong role in curtailing women's opportunities and in stimulating discrimination against them. The fact that natal families "lost" their women economically as well as psychologically upon marriage, notes Johnson, provided a rational basis for a wide range of discrimination and denial of opportunity. It gave "structural substance and support to continuing bride price practices which expropriate rights from women, to male supremacist attitudes which favor sons over daughters, to community power structures which perpetuate evaluations of economic worth that discriminate against women and exclude women from public authority, and to family practices which continue to assign subordinate traditional roles and obligations to women" (p. 216).

The persistence of patrilocal marriage customs, according to Johnson, also helps explain why Chinese women have often failed to support reforms designed to liberate them and have exhibited little enthusiasm for leading the struggle for their own liberation. As strangers in their husbands' families, women were forced to rely on patriarchal norms and customs to develop strategies of influence and survival. They supported filial piety, blind marriages, and the suppression of love because they needed to bind their children, and, most importantly, their sons, to themselves (pp. 18-19). A woman's children were her buffer from the male authority structure and one of the few effective ways she had of influencing that authority.¹⁴

Johnson is not optimistic about the abilities of Chinese reformers to eradicate the root causes of female oppression in China. Her

excellent review of China's political, social, and economic policies in revolutionary and postrevolutionary times reveals a pattern of missed opportunities and of deliberate caution and delay on issues of women's liberation. She also makes the point that, although the Chinese leadership adopted the egalitarian visions of the May Fourth Movement as official goals, it has never pursued them with the vigor accorded other, higher priority goals.¹⁵ Under the cover of Engelsian theory, the CCP instead followed a conservative, politically inactive policy with regard to women's issues in order to win over the poor male peasant base. The result, in Johnson's view, is that the state began to develop a real, though barely acknowledged, stake in maintaining the traditional patrilineal bonds that strengthened the stability of the rural family and community upon which the regime so heavily rested (p. 151).

THIS ARGUMENT is picked up and developed by Judith Stacey in *Patriarchy and Socialist Revolution in China*. Stacey, who is a historical sociologist and feminist, not an area specialist, has rather dauntingly described her work as "a feminist, historical-materialist analysis of why socialism has not liberated women in China" (p. 10). In her introduction, she also calls it "secondary" and "synthetic" (p. 14). However, it is neither a derivative work nor a radical feminist tract. Although Stacey has relied heavily on secondary sources and has drawn extensively from feminist theory and literature, hers is a

well-researched and incisively thought-out book.

It is Stacey's thesis that the radical feminism that occupied center stage in Chinese politics during the May Fourth Movement was quickly shunted to the wings by the pressing and immediate demands of the political revolution in the mid-1920's and completely subordinated to other priorities by Communist Party leaders after 1927 (p. 76). She argues that once the party was forced to flee on its Long March in 1934 from its principal bases in Jiangxi to China's hinterlands in the northwest, survival dictated that it forge an alliance with its only possible base of support—the poor rural patriarchs, who were experiencing a family "realization" crisis—"an alarming decline in their capacity to realize proper Confucian life, or any family life at all" (p. 68). She maintains, contrary to the prevalent view, that the Chinese Communists never attempted to abolish the family, but rather deliberately "rescued peasant family life from the precipice of destruction" (p. 108) in order to win crucial support from the rural patriarchs. Stacey suggests that the CCP went beyond accommodating the family restorationist motives of its peasant collaborators, exploiting them for its own ends (p. 117). The result, according to Stacey, was the creation of a new, stable family system. She terms this new family system "the new democratic patriarchy"¹⁶ and describes it as a system in which gender and generational relationships were reformed substantially while patriarchal authority was made more democratically available to peasant men. In short, notes Stacey, "its revolutionary essence" was "a

¹⁴ Margery Wolf has also explored this topic of the uterine family in *Women and the Family in Rural Taiwan*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1972.

¹⁵ Johnson points out that "when top leadership priorities have been at stake, the government has often moved to alter rather than accommodate traditional orientations" (p. 219).

¹⁶ Stacey is fully aware of the irony of juxtaposing these two terms but does so precisely to take full advantage of this irony (p. 116).

radical redistribution of patriarchy" (p. 116). Stacey points out that although abuses associated with an elite class of patriarchs—concubinage, bound feet, and the cult of chastity—were the object of successful reform efforts, the CCP never confronted the structural supports of small-scale patriarchal authority and consistently compromised on reforms unacceptable to poor male peasants.

Land reform, in her view, did not improve women's lot so much as it brought independent family farming within the realm of the possible for nearly every peasant family, thus equalizing access to the means of patriarchal authority. The organization of mutual aid teams and various cooperatives provided support to the traditionalist implications of land reform by supporting family households as the basic units of production, which in turn reinforced the major features of the traditional division of labor. Stacey also persuasively argues that the Communists' military power complemented the economic reforms that rescued and reformed the traditional peasant family system by creating a new political culture based on extra-kin male solidarity.

In the postrevolutionary period, Stacey argues, the Communist regime built a patriarchal socialist rural order based on its new democratic patriarchal alliance with the peasantry, using the links of male kinship to ensure the success of its program of agrarian reform. Consequently, agricultural producer cooperatives were formed around existing neighborhoods and villages, strengthening the networks of male kin and increasing their political leadership roles. Furthermore, according to Stacey, patriarchal marriage and an entrenched sexual division of labor—the two main structural supports of patriar-

chal authority—were never challenged by the CCP. The party either tacitly supported the patriarchal structure or quietly accommodated development policies to it. Thus, in Stacey's view, agricultural collectivization did not "betray the fundamental terms of the new democratic patriarchal revolution but, instead, extended its basic principles and policies"; it did not destroy peasant patriarchy but further democratized and secured it (p. 204).

Stacey maintains that the success of this newest collaboration between the Chinese communists and the peasants, and the stability it created, seriously constrained the regime's ability to proceed along the socialist continuum. By way of example she discusses the Great Leap Forward, arguing that its disastrous outcome was, in large part, due to the fact that the CCP violated its pact with the peasant patriarchs by pushing two anti-patriarchal policies—family production and socialization of domestic work (pp. 212–13).

Patriarchy and Socialist Revolution in China presents the most cogently argued and persuasive explanation to date of why socialism has failed to realize the avowed feminist goals of the CCP. Chinese women have made significant gains, but as Stacey concludes, they have done so as "subordinate daughters," not as "equal sisters of fraternal Communist men" (p. 256). Stacey's sociological perspective, theoretical insight, and analytical skills have served her well and have allowed her to overcome the methodological obstacles that she refers to in her introduction.¹⁷ Her book is an excellent example of the important contribution that a non-area specialist can make to the China field as a synthesizer, critic, and theorist.

AUTHORS Steven Mosher and Margery Wolf were participants in a cultural exchange program that was set up after US diplomatic relations were established with the PRC in January 1979, and their respective books, *Broken Earth* and *Revolution Postponed*, are based on field research undertaken in China. Both provide firsthand glimpses of women's lives in the PRC and are of interest to specialist as well as general audiences. Like the more scholarly works of Croll, Andors, Johnson, and Stacey, each stresses that although urban women have made significant progress during the last 35 years, the lot of rural women has, for the most part, remained unchanged.

Mosher, who was the first American to do field research in China, studied an agricultural brigade in Guangdong Province from September 1979 to June 1980. The relatively relaxed political atmosphere that prevailed at the time and his ability to speak fluent Cantonese as well as Mandarin enabled him to pursue his research remarkably free of day-to-day interference. *Broken Earth* is a popularized account of his findings that falls into the "China Stinks" genre of books written by the first wave of scholars and journalists who had extended experiences living and working in China.¹⁸ While Mosher's biases are obvious and allowances must be made for them by the reader, in

¹⁷ As a non-area specialist unfamiliar with the Chinese language, Stacey had to obtain almost all of her empirical evidence second or third hand. For a discussion of the problems this posed, see Stacey, *op. cit.*, pp. 13–14.

¹⁸ Mosher has been charged with behaving illegally and unprofessionally in China and has been expelled from the Ph.D. program at Stanford University. For further information and analysis of the controversy surrounding his research work, see Peter Van Ness, "The Mosher Affair," *Wilson Quarterly* (Washington, DC), New Year's 1984, pp. 160–72.

general, his account rings true. Indeed, the material in Mosher's explosive chapter on China's population policy has been confirmed by recent reports. The Chinese themselves have acknowledged the resurgence of female infanticide and the abuse of women who bear female children, and the Western press has confirmed his early reports of forced, third trimester abortions.¹⁹

Mosher's most important contribution to the study of women in China lies in his vivid account of what life is like for rural women. His extraordinary access to Chinese society coupled with his descriptive powers have made for a powerful book. The picture he draws of women, who had been pressured to have third trimester abortions, awaiting the removal by caesarian section of fetuses killed by injection is haunting testimony to the price Chinese women are paying as China moves to enforce the one-child policy. On a less emotional level, his detailed account of his neighbor's grueling daily schedule (and those of her fellow village women) is a powerful antidote to the descriptions of model women, who deftly handle myriad domestic and public responsibilities with good cheer and enthusiasm, that have abounded in the Chinese press in recent years.

Mosher's book is, however, disappointing in the sense that he does not probe beneath the surface of what he sees. Given his unusual access, one cannot help but wish that he had not ignored the interplay between feminism

and socialism in China. Mosher argues simplistically that much of the progress that women have made is a natural continuation of trends begun in the Qing and Republican (1912-49) periods and that the limitations to further progress are due to deep-seated prejudices widely held by men and accepted by women.

Margery Wolf's book is based on nearly a year of research and over 300 interviews conducted in six sites, two urban and four rural, in the years 1980 and 1981. Unlike Mosher's experience, Wolf's research was heavily circumscribed. Her initial request to do a neighborhood study in Beijing was turned down, as was her request to interview women in their own homes. She was forced to make do with formal interviews in offices where official observers and her "handlers" could be present.

Despite these rather daunting restrictions and the need to work at times through an interpreter, Wolf's powers of observation and her skill and experience as an interviewer of Chinese women have enabled her to amass a wealth of material that, in the main, confirms the findings of the books reviewed here, particularly the Stacey and Johnson volumes. Through her we get a firsthand look into women's lives and the enormous differences not only between rural and urban areas but between one rural area and another.

In her rather discouraging report on conditions in rural China, Wolf attributes women's lack of progress to the persistence of the party's narrow self-interest. She argues that social planners have consistently ignored the ideological base of male supremacy upon which power has rested because, although it profoundly affects women's lives, it has not been viewed as a threat to the state (p.

189). Wolf, in fact, is very much in accord with Stacey's thesis. What they disagree on is intent. Wolf is convinced (by exactly what she does not say) that Chinese leaders have not consciously tried to keep women subordinate, but merely have failed to be aware of their own sexist assumptions. In her opinion, their blinders have resulted in the inclination to abandon the principle of equality at "each economic downturn or show of rural resistance," to the constant and perhaps permanent detriment of women (pp. 25-26).

THERE IS considerable consensus among the authors reviewed here that the Four Modernizations policies, so much touted in the Western press, threaten the modest gains women have made in China. Even Elisabeth Croll, who had viewed socialism's ability to liberate women most optimistically, has taken a look at recent developments and revised her thinking. In her new book, *Chinese Women Since Mao*, Croll abandons the strict adherence to Marxist theory that limited her analysis in *Socialism and Feminism in China* and accepts the idea that the subordination of women in rural areas continues to be reproduced by the structure and function of household and kin groups that are maintained, if not elaborated upon, by demographic and economic policies (p. 15). In doing so, she moves her analysis of what is happening to women closer to that of both Johnson and Stacey.

Underlying Croll's, Stacey's, Johnson's, Andors, and Wolf's uneasiness about the Four Modernizations is the recognition that many of the new economic policies restore the role of the family as an economic unit and thus reinforce the traditional roles of women.

¹⁹ Discussions of the problem of female infanticide in the Chinese press are numerous. For examples see Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-CHI*), Jan. 10, 1983, p. K/16; Feb. 18, 1983, p. K/11; Apr. 7, 1983, pp. K/5-6; Apr. 8, 1983, pp. K/2-3; and Apr. 18, 1983, pp. K/8-9. See also Weisskopf, loc. cit.

The institution of the household responsibility system and the expansion of domestic sideline occupations, which have been widely praised in the Chinese and Western press as bringing prosperity to the Chinese countryside, are cases in point. Although women have to some degree benefited from the increased income the household responsibility system has brought to their families, the innovative incentive system has also made them increasingly vulnerable by returning them "to their pre-liberation position in relation to the means of production."²⁰ Instead of being independent producers and wage earners with certain guaranteed benefits from the production team, women now find themselves back at home and under the control and supervision of the male head of household.²¹ They are no longer protected by rules that provided them with such things as maternity leave, time off to nurse babies, and opportunities to do household chores during daylight hours. Laboring in family fields also results in less social contact and greater parental involvement in marriages. Furthermore, it extends the period of loneliness and powerlessness that follows after a young woman marries and leaves her natal village.²² As Stacey points out in *Patriarchy and Socialist Revolution in China*, a major effect of the efforts to increase agricultural productivity has been to strengthen the supports of rural patriarchy and cause a partial retreat from what she calls "patriarchal-socialism" back to "new democratic patriarchy" (p. 274).

In addition to placing many women directly under the control of rural patriarchs, the household responsibility system threatens the long-range prospects of women in three other significant ways. First, as the responsibility system establishes the positive relationship of the number of laborers to household prosperity, more and more families have been taking their sons and daughters, but especially their daughters, out of school to work on the family plot, help with housework, and play a role in sideline production.²³ At a time when the essential ingredient for getting ahead is no longer one's "redness" but one's level of expertise, this trend is potentially disastrous for women. This is especially true since they are already held back by gender-typing and official and semi-official discrimination in education and employment opportunities.²⁴

Ironically, by increasing women's earning potential and ability to make major contributions to their families, the household responsibility system has also actually played a role in curtailing women's economic independence and personal freedom. Bride prices have risen dramatically along with women's earning power, reinforcing the traditional view that women are an investment to be carefully managed and exploited.²⁵ Marriages have thus once again become a matter of paramount economic importance to a family, and divorce a financial disaster.

Finally, the household responsibility system threatens gains

women have made in the past as the beneficiaries of collective welfare programs and services. Funds for these programs almost certainly will be less available now that households retain certain rights over the products of their labor. In the 1970's, the production team made an allocation to collective welfare before distributing income (70 percent of which was in the form of commodities) to member households. Today, household contributions to collective welfare funds have become a part of a negotiated contract between the production team and the individual household.²⁶ As Croll points out in *Chinese Women Since Mao*, this development may lead to collectives being unable to maintain sufficient control to prevent individual households, particularly extended family households who are in a better position to provide for their own welfare, from contracting out of collective arrangements (p. 63).

POLICIES associated with the Four Modernizations drive in the cities also have had a mixed impact on women. Designed to expand and provide new employment opportunities, these policies have focused, in large part, on increasing the number of production cooperatives and promoting the reappearance of individually owned enterprises.

Current efforts to expand and upgrade production cooperatives hold the most promise for women.²⁷ Initially established by house-

²⁰ See Frederick W. Crook, "The Baogan Daohu Incentive System: Translation and Analysis of a Model Contract," *The China Quarterly* (London), June 1985, pp. 291-303.

²⁷ Production cooperatives in urban areas typically consist of small street or neighborhood factories. They are collectively owned by the workers and generally require little capital investment. They are invariably labor-intensive. Among their various products are handicrafts, simple parts or chemicals for nearby industries, and goods made out of recycled materials. For a discussion of the cooperatives, see *ibid.*, p. 47.

²⁰ Wolf, *Revolution Postponed*, p. 268.

²¹ *Ibid.* For an argument that women were most successful at pressing their demands at the commune and brigade level, see Andors, *The Unfinished Liberation*, p. 60.

²² Wolf, *Revolution Postponed*, p. 269.

²³ See Hooper, *loc. cit.*, p. 323.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 323-26; and *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 8, 1982, p. K/15. For a discussion of the drop in female college enrollment, see Whyte and Parish, *op. cit.*, p. 199.

²⁵ For a discussion, see Croll, *Chinese Women since Mao*, pp. 79-81.

wives responding to government demands to increase production during the Great Leap Forward, this sector has been dominated by women. They constitute 90 percent of this poorly-paid, unskilled work force, which is ineligible for any of the benefits extended to state workers. The current policy to invest in new plants and equipment and to tie new cooperatives with state enterprises and improve their image should benefit women, but the danger exists that the pressure of high male unemployment will lead to the displacement of women as this sector is upgraded. Of more immediate importance to women is the widespread introduction of the "putting out" system, where work from new cooperative enterprises is contracted out to women in their homes. Like rural women, urban women are increasingly working at home, isolated from the wider community and more subject to family authority.²⁸

The development of individually owned enterprises has also resulted in more women working under familial controls. For every successful businesswoman who is profiled in glowing terms in the Chinese or Western press, there are many more women employed in individual enterprises that are family-based and male-controlled. As Croll points out in *Chinese Women Since Mao*, this situation could lead to the structure of family authority, with all its attendant disadvantages, being reproduced in the productive sphere (p. 54). With no benefits, individual paychecks, or pensions, an entire new generation of women, like their mothers before them, could become "dependent on the goodwill of their children when they are too old to work."²⁹

New policies designed to make state-run enterprises more profitable and efficient also hold perils for women. Indeed, there is considerable evidence suggesting that the push to make these enterprises more profitable has already worked against women. As early as 1981, Wolf found that officials in charge of job assignments were more reluctant than ever to accept women workers: they required paid maternity leave, took time off for family emergencies, worked less overtime because of home responsibilities, and put pressures on management for child care.³⁰

Some of the new incentive programs currently being implemented³¹ also are biased in favor of men, according to a recent study.³² This study makes the point that floating wages and piecework bonuses—two of the new incentive programs—are tied to the original wage scale for women (which was below that of men), instead of being calculated on an equal basis for all employees.

Operating on the Marxist assumption that what is good for China's development and modernization is also good for China's women, China's decision-makers have paid little attention to the repercussions of these new economic policies for women. No substantive analysis of the household

and the distribution of labor and compensation within it has accompanied current policies that return production to the household;³³ no major anti-patriarchal campaigns have been launched; and the new marriage law enacted in 1981 has not been effectively enforced. Indeed, in contrast to the propaganda of the early 1970's when women were told that they "could do anything men could do," the party is promoting a policy vis-à-vis women that is reminiscent of the 1960's. When the 4th National Women's Federation Congress was held in 1978, women's movement leader Kang Keqing urged women to pay attention to their households and children and to assume a supportive rearguard role in the Four Modernizations drive.³⁴ A 1981 directive of the Secretariat of the CCP Central Committee confirmed this direction in women's policy and called upon the Women's Federation to take "bringing up, cultivating, and educating China's 300 million children and young people" as the focus of its work.³⁵ Deng Yingchao, one of the most respected and influential women in China, hailed this assignment as increasing women's responsibility, stating in *Renmin Ribao* (People's Daily) that "It is raising the work formerly considered as minor household chores to the plane of cultivating a backup force for the cause of socialist construction."³⁶

By the time of the convening of the Fifth All-China Women's Federation (ACWF) Congress in September 1983, some officials had begun to advocate that women should "return home and perform their

²⁸ Ibid., pp. 264–65.

²⁹ In October 1984, the PRC announced even more sweeping economic reforms in its "Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Reform of the Economic Structure." See *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 22, 1984, pp. K/1–17; and *The New York Times*, Oct. 21, 1984.

³⁰ Wolf, *Revolution Postponed*, p. 266, citing Marilyn Dalsimer and Laurie Nisonoff, "Implications of the New Economic Readjustment Policies for Chinese Urban Working Women," *Review of Radical Political Economics* (New York), Spring 1984. For an overall evaluation of the impact of Four Modernizations policies on women, see Stacey, op. cit., pp. 268–80; and Phyllis Andors, "The Four Modernizations and Chinese Policy on Women," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* (Berkeley), April-June 1981, p. 45.

³¹ Croll, *Chinese Women Since Mao*, p. 128.

³² Andors, *Unfinished Liberation*, p. 152, citing New China News Agency (Xinhua), Sept. 18, 1978.

³³ *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 4, 1981, pp. L/1–2.

³⁴ *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 11, 1981, p. L/5.

²⁸ Ibid., pp. 47–52.

²⁹ Wolf, *Revolution Postponed*, p. 264.

household duties."³⁷ Although Kang Keqing publicly attacked this proposal as wrongheaded at the Congress, the tone of her report had not changed appreciably from 1978. While she called on women to "foster lofty revolutionary ideals, work and study hard," she continued to stress the need for women to focus on their families and work to ensure the healthy growth of the young.³⁸ Her recitation of the achievements of women over the previous five years is of interest primarily because of the extreme modesty of its claims: the percentage of women worker and staff members in state and collectively owned enterprises rose from 32.9 percent in 1978 to 36.2 percent in 1982; the number of senior women professionals in the natural sciences went up from 1,412 in 1978 to 6,588 in 1982; and 54 women won world sports championships between 1981 and mid-1983.³⁹ Such lackluster statistics indicate the price women are paying as a result of the CCP decision to pursue these new economic policies.

WOMEN ARE ALSO not faring well as the second prong of the current modernization drive—the birth limitation policy—is being carried out. Historically speaking, family planning has usually benefited women. Nevertheless, as the Chinese leadership attempts to extend the one-child rule to the Chinese countryside and coercively enforce it, there are indications that, in some instances, women and their female offspring are its victims and not its

beneficiaries. Thirty-five years of subordinating women's issues to more pressing political or economic considerations coupled with the implementation of the new economic policies has not created a social and economic context supportive of a one-child (and for approximately half of the population, a one-daughter) policy in rural China. Chinese birth control policy has collided head-on with China's patriarchs.

The government, however, shows no signs of retreating. Family planning has been accorded top priority; and the limitation of births is considered essential to China's recovery and advancement. The new constitution (adopted in December 1982) makes it clear that family planning is a civic responsibility, and Chapter 1 of the 1981 Marriage Law unequivocally states "family planning is practiced."⁴⁰ Outside the cities, resistance to the one-child rule has reached a high level and is growing. It has taken several forms, ranging from simple refusal to stop at one child to the illicit removal of intrauterine devices, the sabotage of family planning work, and the dramatic resurgence of female infanticide and wife beating.⁴¹ At the heart of such resistance is the preference for sons over daughters. Although this preference has been significantly weakened in the cities, where men and women are relatively more equal, according to several recent studies,⁴² it remains

strong in rural areas. A 1982 survey of peasant households reported a scant 2.2 percent wanted a daughter as an only child.⁴³ The Chinese press has worked to promote the idea "that times have changed and now men and women are the same,"⁴⁴ but the Chinese, especially the rural Chinese, clearly know better. It continues to make good economic, political, and social sense to prefer sons in the countryside. The new policies have done little to counter this preference among either men or women.

Indeed, they have had the opposite effect. As collectivization decreases under the Four Modernizations, sons grow in importance. They are regaining their sacred and symbolic role in society as the family reassumes many of its pre-liberation functions, and the phenomena of ancestor worship, lineage-based activities, and clan wars reemerge.⁴⁵ The economic role of sons within the family is also recapturing its previous importance as the trend toward family-based agriculture and social welfare arrangements gains momentum. Unlike their sisters, sons remain with the natal families after marriage and continue to contribute their labor power to it. In addition, they add to its labor power by bringing in a wife and children.⁴⁶ Their renewed economic importance to rural farming families is graphically illustrated by the apparent correlation between the lev-

³⁷ For a translation of the Marriage Law, see *ibid.*, Mar. 16, 1981, pp. 24–27. According to Article 49 of the Constitution, "both husband and wife have the duty to practice family planning." See *ibid.*, Dec. 27, 1982, p. 18 (emphasis added).

⁴¹ Wasserstrom, *loc. cit.*, pp. 355–57. See also *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 7, 1983, pp. K/5–6, for a discussion of an Anhui Women's Federation survey that revealed a female-to-male baby ratio of 1:5 in some rural areas due to the "malpractice of drowning and abandoning baby girls."

⁴² See Whyte and Parish, *op. cit.*, pp. 221–23; Wolf, *Revolution Postponed*, p. 210; and Deborah Davis-Friedman, *Long Lives, Chinese Elderly and the Communist Revolution*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1983, pp. 45–47 and 56–57.

⁴³ Croll, *Chinese Women Since Mao*, p. 98.

⁴⁴ *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 21, 1982, p. K/33.

⁴⁵ Wasserstrom, *loc. cit.*, p. 369. Also Wolf's interviewees confirmed the reappearance of ancestor worship, see *Revolution Postponed*, p. 46.

⁴⁶ Wasserstrom, p. 369.

³⁷ *Beijing Review*, Sept. 19, 1983, p. 6. Also see Wolf, *Revolution Postponed*, pp. 266–67, for results of a 1980–1981 study by two Chinese social scientists who advocated that women be given part-time work so that they can attend to household responsibilities; and Cooper, *loc. cit.*, pp. 326–28.

³⁸ *Beijing Review*, Sept. 19, 1983, p. 6.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

el of implementation of the household responsibility system and the ratios of surviving male to female infants.⁴⁷

Sons also continue to be viewed as essential to one's survival in old age. This has always been true, but the undermining of the few old-age programs that did exist in the countryside seems to have intensified this conviction. A 1982 survey of people expressing the desire to have more than one child revealed that the principal motivating factor was the desire to have sons to take care of them when they were old.⁴⁸ Despite the progress women have made, daughters are considered pretty poor insurance policies.⁴⁹ And for good reason. In the 1980's, they still earn less, are less educated, and are less apt to hold positions of power; in addition, they are heavily burdened by commitments to their own uterine families. They also continue to "marry out" of their families, and having a married daughter take care of you is considered equivalent to "eating other people's food."⁵⁰

The Chinese leadership is clearly aware that the preference for boys over girls lies at the heart of the resistance to the birth limitation.⁵¹ The Chinese press is full of calls for doing away with what one article called the "hackneyed" idea

that men are superior to women⁵² and of urgent pleas that the rights of women and children be protected.⁵³ The fact that an official connection has been made between women's secondary position in Chinese society and the difficulty in implementing what is widely viewed by China's top leadership as an essential policy raises the question of whether the leadership will seek to improve the status of women to achieve its goals. Unfortunately, a review of the Chinese press does not indicate that the Chinese are prepared, at this stage, to embark on a program designed to achieve full gender equality. One finds halfhearted arguments in favor of matrilocal marriage,⁵⁴ references to the terms of the new marriage law that lay out the bilateral rights and responsibilities for both sexes,⁵⁵ and promises that the pension system will be instituted more broadly,⁵⁶ but no convincing evidence that China's leaders are launching an all-out effort to remove the structural and attitudinal obstacles to women assuming an equal place in society. As Kay Johnson points out, the Chinese instead seem intent on overriding the existing resistance rather than instituting reforms that would fundamentally alter the patterns of Chinese society and make the rural populace more receptive to the one-child

rule (p. 229). A system of direct economic incentives and punishments, including the institution of some areas of a multiple responsibility system,⁵⁷ is being carried out in hopes of promoting compliance with the one-child rule.⁵⁸ This system of incentives and punishment is buttressed by extensive education and propaganda work that extolls the advantages of small families and emphasizes the incorrectness of preferring boys over girls. When these techniques fail, women are often rounded up and "persuaded" to have an abortion.⁵⁹

The official Chinese position remains that the structural changes necessary for a socialist society have already been implemented and the continuing encroachment on the legitimate rights of women and children (including female infanticide and wife beating), while deplorable, are attributable to the "pernicious influence of the feudal legacy and the corrosive influence of bourgeois ideas" and the disruption of the "standard of social conduct by the 10 years" of the Cultural Revolution.⁶⁰ For the present, the patriarchal-based causes of resistance to the one-child policy and the resulting incidence of female infanticide and wife beating have not been subject to vigorous direct attack.

WHAT COURSE Chinese policy will take in the future is difficult to foresee. Much depends on how determined the Chinese are to en-

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 371. Wasserstrom makes the point that Anhui, the province with the highest disproportion of surviving male to female infants (111 to 100), also is one of the most advanced areas in the implementation of the household responsibility system. See also note 41 above.

⁴⁸ Croll, *Chinese Women Since Mao*, pp. 97-98.

⁴⁹ Davis-Friedman, op. cit., pp. 45-56, reports that, in contrast to rural parents, urban parents without a son happily turn to daughters for support and "appear to suffer no financial or social disadvantages in comparison to those living with sons." She maintains that the relative equality between men and women in China's cities has led to a weakening in urban areas of a preference for sons.

⁵⁰ Wolf, *Revolution Postponed*, p. 190.

⁵¹ Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *China Report: Political, Sociological, and Military* (Washington, DC—hereafter *JPRS* and number), Apr. 22, 1983, p. 40; *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 27, 1982, p. K/8.

⁵² *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 18, 1983, pp. K/11-13.

⁵³ A propaganda drive aimed at educating the public about protecting the legitimate rights of women and children under the law was launched in the spring of 1984. For a description of major points emphasized during the campaign see *JPRS*, No. 84-031 Apr. 27, 1984, pp. 24-26.

⁵⁴ For an example, see *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 21, 1982, p. K/11. Also Johnson, op. cit., p. 229, discusses the beginning efforts on the part of the Chinese to discuss matrilocality and promote abandonment of village exogamy for women.

⁵⁵ For an example, see *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 3, 1983, p. K/11. For a discussion of the law, see Stacey, op. cit., p. 275.

⁵⁶ For an example, see *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 7, 1982, pp. K/55-57.

⁵⁷ The multiple responsibility system is an attempt to link reproduction responsibility and production responsibility. Under this system, peasants sign contracts for both family planning and agricultural production. For a fuller discussion, see Wasserstrom, loc. cit., p. 363.

⁵⁸ Ibid.; Wolf, *Revolution Postponed*, p. 249; and *Beijing Review*, Feb. 14, 1983, pp. 24-26.

⁵⁹ For a description of this process, see Mosher, op. cit., pp. 225-30; and Michael Weisskopf, "Abortion Policy Tears at Fabric of China's Society," *The Washington Post*, Jan. 7, 1985.

⁶⁰ *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 7, 1983, p. K/15.

force the one-child rule in the countryside.⁶¹ If they are willing to allow a two-child norm unofficially while officially advocating a one-child policy, no major overhaul of family structure or gender relationships is likely, as Stacey points out (p. 280). If, however, the Chinese leadership is determined to enforce rigidly the one-child rule in the countryside (and it seems to be moving in this direction), it is going

to be forced to use more and more draconian and socially disruptive measures to achieve its aims or at long last be compelled to deal with the unfinished state of women's liberation in China. The leadership may gradually be forced for demographic reasons to institute the reforms of the May Fourth era.⁶² The logic is compelling.

In the meantime, however, the position of women in China—at least in rural China—is precarious. In addition to “carrying the hoe outdoors, handling the pot indoors,

and taking a back seat in a meeting or in study,”⁶³ women are bearing the brunt of a birth policy that is at odds with the imperatives of a patriarchal system that their government does not, as yet, appear inclined to dismantle.

⁶¹ The Chinese are clearly worried about the social effects of an unbalanced male-female ratio. See *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 19, 1983, p. K/22; and *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 8, 1983, pp. K/2-3. See Stacey, p. 275, for a discussion of demographic motivation behind the 1981 revision of the Marriage Law.

⁶² Croll, *Feminism and Socialism*, p. 310, quoting a women's group in Guangxi Province.

⁶¹ See *Beijing Review*, Jul. 23, 1984, p. 4, for guidelines allowing for exceptions to the one-child policy.

Yugoslav System in Crisis: Internal Views

Darko Bekić

JOSIP ŽUPANOV. *Marginalije o društvenoj krizi* (Marginalia on the Social Crisis). Zagreb, Globus, 1983.

JOVAN DORDEVIĆ. *Socializam — Kriza — Odgovornost* (Socialism — Crisis — Responsibility). Belgrade, Radnička Štampa, 1984.

JOVAN MIRIĆ. *Sistem i kriza* (System and Crisis). Zagreb, CEKADE, 1984.

LONG BEFORE Tito's death in 1980, Western political analysts and the Western media were predicting a political and economic crisis in "post-Tito" Yugoslavia.¹ Helmut Sonnenfeldt was speaking for many of them when he noted:

¹ See, for example, A. Ross Johnson, "Yugoslavia: In the Twilight of Tito," *The Washington Papers*, No. 16, Washington, DC, Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1974; Philip A. Peterson, Ed., "Soviet Policy in the Post-Tito Balkans," *Studies in Communist Affairs*, Vol. 4, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, n.d. This series is published under the auspices of the US Air Force.

Darko Bekić, formerly Senior Researcher at the University of Zagreb, is currently a Research Fellow at the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, The Wilson Center, Washington, DC. He specializes in international relations and Balkan studies.

"we are concerned about what will happen when Tito disappears, and it is worrying us a great deal."² Such misgivings were not aired in the country itself, and, in fact, not until 1982 did Yugoslavs begin to use the term "crisis" in public references to the problems of their country. This was due not so much to any officially imposed taboo as to the ingrained modes of expression of Yugoslav social science or, more precisely, the sociology of Marxism. A readiness to recognize a real crisis was also discouraged by the experience of Yugoslavia's rapid postwar socioeconomic development. Many of the country's Marxist social scientists had maintained that socialist Yugoslavia was a "non-conflict" society,³ reserving the concept of "crisis" for theoretical discussions of social phenomena and political conflicts in other East European states, such as Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. In analyzing the situation in their own country, the majority of Yugoslav social scientists looked upon current social phenomena from a perspec-

tive of optimistic determinism.⁴ Any problem, inconsistency, or apparent contradiction between reality and the ideal of a "non-conflict" society was seen as a "developmental problem" or "transitory difficulty," a natural accompaniment to the next "great leap forward."

In some respects, their assessment was understandable. After all, during the 35 years of Tito's rule, Yugoslavia had evolved from a backward agrarian society into a newly industrialized one, from a provincial state into a prominent actor in international affairs. This transition had naturally entailed certain growing pains; it also left little time or energy to devote to the seemingly abstract notion of an impending crisis. Moreover, it took more than a year after Tito's death for Yugoslavia to experience its first serious problem, a year longer than most foreign analysts had predicted.

Tito had taken great pains to prepare the country for his pass-

⁴ Josip Županov describes this state of mind as a form of "historical optimism," according to which "contemporary capitalism which is doomed to collapse is in a state of crisis; contemporary étatism (the classical case is Poland) is also in a state of crisis and will evolve sooner or later toward socialist self-management (that is, the Yugoslav model), but the socialism of self-management cannot be in crisis. If it is, what is then left us?" See Županov, *Marginalije o društvenoj krizi*, p. 6.

² See *The New York Times*, Apr. 6, 1976.

³ There were of course some exceptions. For example, the group of Yugoslav philosophers and social scientists gathered around the Zagreb magazine *Praxis* contributed to a creative Marxist analysis of current social and political controversies.

ing. Several years before his death, he began introducing a series of thoroughgoing institutional, political, and ideological changes to ensure the preservation of a stable Yugoslavia, even without his leadership.

At the institutional level, Tito introduced the principle of "collective state leadership" and set a one-year term for all executive positions, from the leaders of local communities and cells of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) to members of the State and LCY Central Committee presidia. At the same time, many crucial legal, political, and economic functions were transferred from the central government to the federal republics and provinces.

On the political level, the aim of these innovations and the overall decentralization was to accommodate the divergent interests of the traditionally feuding Yugoslav nations, to ensure equality among them, and thus to avoid internecine conflict. Furthermore, Tito introduced the principle of "consensus," which meant, in effect, that the country could not make any crucial decision without the consent of all of the republics and provinces. With this decentralized and—as was widely believed—more democratic system in place, Tito then concentrated on party affairs and foreign policy, leaving internal policy and economic management to the federal units. To counterbalance what might be excessive decentralization, he worked at reestablishing a strong and centralized party that could ensure the country's political and ideological unity.

Finally, Tito initiated an ideological campaign aimed at strengthening Yugoslav patriotism and belief in Yugoslavia's own brand of socialism, with its notions of "socialist self-management," brotherhood

and unity among the units of the federation, comprehensive people's defense against total war, nonalignment, and cooperation with the Third World.

For about a year after Tito's death on May 5, 1980, the transition process proved to be exceptionally smooth. Even the optimists, both at home and abroad, were pleasantly surprised at how well the system actually worked without Tito. The situation, however, deteriorated dramatically in 1981 with the outburst of ethnic unrest in the Serbia Republic's autonomous province of Kosovo, which borders Albania and has a large Albanian population.⁵ In April and May, thousands of young Albanians in Kosovo marched in demonstrations, chanting anti-Yugoslav slogans and demanding economic equality for Yugoslav Albanians and political emancipation from the Republic of Serbia. These violent demonstrations paved the way for the country's first post-Tito political crisis.

Although the Kosovo riots were primarily political and nationalist in character, they undoubtedly were precipitated by the rapid deterioration of the country's economy. In 1981, the Yugoslav foreign debt reached US\$20.5 billion, inflation was rising at an embarrassing rate of 40 percent and more, and unemployment was 12 percent.⁶ These problems were the consequences of long-hidden economic mismanagement, an excessive foreign borrowing, arbitrary decision-making, and an autarkic economic policy in general.⁷

⁵ See Mark Baskin, "Crisis in Kosovo," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March-April 1983, pp. 61-74.

⁶ See O. Kovac, Lj. Madjar, Z. Popov, and D. Stanisić, *Stabilization and Development: Yugoslavia until 1985*, Belgrade, Jugoslavenski Pregled, 1982, p. 142.

⁷ Baskin, loc.cit., p. 65.

Western states and banks that had extended credits to Yugoslavia between 1975 and 1980 were quick to find a link between the Kosovo riots and the country's growing economic troubles. Worried about Yugoslavia's ability to service its foreign debt, they sought to exert pressure through the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In theory, the IMF's austerity program aimed at curbing Yugoslavia's inflation by restricting domestic consumption and introducing a tight monetary policy, while encouraging exports. In practice, however, the IMF's "shock therapy" demoralized the work force even more by sharpening the decline in the average standard of living. It also led to an "export at all costs" mentality and a further fragmentation of the economy, but at the same time it had little effect on inflation and unemployment rates. Many informed Yugoslavs felt that the IMF only cared about the amount of hard currency Yugoslavia could acquire to service its debts, regardless of the long-term consequences for the country's economic development. By the end of 1981, the popular sense of deepening crisis could no longer be overlooked by the media, social scientists, and politicians of Yugoslavia.

The term "crisis" was first used in March 1982, in a background paper prepared by a group of sociologists for the Federal Commission charged with establishing a program of economic stabilization.⁸ Not until September 1982, however, did a leading politician speak of an "economic and political crisis." Soon thereafter the term was used at a LCY Central

⁸ See Silvano Bolčić, Ed., *Aktualni trenutak jugoslavenskog društva i pravci dugoročnih promena* (Current Problems of Yugoslav Society and the Direction of Long Term Change), Belgrade, 1982, mimeograph.

Committee session. The notion that Yugoslavia was living through a "crisis" was thus formally introduced into the political vocabulary of the country. In the meantime, social scientists were engaged in lively discussions of the phenomenon at professional meetings and in scholarly journals.⁹

THE FIRST of the three books under review here appeared in this political and intellectual setting. Written and compiled by Josip Županov, it was the first to offer a sociological portrait of the Yugoslav social and economic crisis. Even though it is no more than a collection of eight lectures and essays delivered or published by the author between 1979 and 1982, it has yet to be surpassed by any other scholarly work on the subject.¹⁰

Modestly entitled *Marginalia on the Social Crisis*, Županov's book has several unique characteristics. To begin with, it is the first theoretical assessment of Yugoslav society that did not try to blame domestic social and political difficulties on external factors—such as the international economic crisis, IMF pressures, or the hostile intentions

of neighboring countries, particularly Albania. Second, Županov rejects the notion that the crisis was merely the result of a temporary juncture of unfavorable factors, a situation that would be overcome and then followed by a resumption of the country's smooth development. Instead, according to Županov, "Our crisis, as well as the Polish one, can be best characterized as a situation in which [a patient] neither gets well nor dies, that is, a prolonged malfunction of the economic and social system that could last indefinitely and in which the system reestablishes equilibrium at lower and lower levels of efficiency" (p. 10).

Third, Županov rejects the classical definition of "crisis" as the "cradle" of a new revolutionary wave that would overthrow the existing institutional system and social structure. Indeed, accepting this definition of crisis could be dangerous in two respects: it could either induce the "establishment" to stifle all discussion of the "crisis" for fear of revolutionary change, or it could encourage an ambitious faction within the party to advance itself as the bearer of a "new revolutionary leap forward."

Županov's most valuable contribution is that he avoids the one-dimensional explanations of the crisis found in most Yugoslav social scientists' discussions. Some of these social scientists take the macroeconomic approach to the situation and then argue either for the need to have a planned administrative and centralist system or they stress the need for a freer market and increased decentralization of decision-making. Others, usually political scientists and jurists, put the blame for the crisis in Yugoslavia on inadequate and outmoded political institutions. The solu-

tion, according to the latter, is to change the Constitution and transform the role of the LCY. Županov manages to overcome the limitations of both of these approaches. He does not analyze the social subsystems, but rather concentrates on a critical assessment of the basic unit of material production, the "organization of associated labor." Drawing on years of empirical research on the behavior of Yugoslav workers in their "self-managed" firms, Županov concludes that there is a fundamental contradiction between the formal socioeconomic structure of the "organization of associated labor" and its external environment—the domestic and, more important, world market. Županov explains:

We have a situation in which a firm is defined as an association of direct producers but it behaves according to a different definition, that is, like a true firm. It does not, however, function like a joint stock company (owned by its workers), but as a crippled enterprise. . . . If a firm is not an outmoded notion, one that can be readily abandoned, but rather represents and will represent for a long time to come the inevitable framework for economic activities, then we must ask ourselves: what kind of firm do we need, a crippled one which goes every which way in the shadow of a utopian "association of direct producers," or do we need an elaborate model of a joint stock company (owned by its workers) which would behave rationally, according to the criteria of a market economy. (p. 83)

Županov identifies the system's failure to recognize the existence of a labor market as one of the main factors contributing to the "crippling" of the firm. The labor market, he argues, as well as the

⁹ See, for example, Okrugli Stol JUS-a, *Savremeno jugoslavensko društvo: sociološko istraživanje krize i mogućnosti izlaska* (Contemporary Yugoslav Society: A Sociological Analysis of the Crisis and Its Possible Resolution), Ljubljana, May 27–28, 1982; *Godišnja skupština Političkog društva Hrvatske* (The Annual Meeting of the Croatian Society of Political Science), Belgrade, June 22, 1982; as well as many essays and articles such as Zoran Vidojević's "The Revolutionary Movement and Social Crisis," *Marksistička Misao* (Belgrade), No. 6, 1982; Janez Jerovšek, "Economic Crisis and the Human Factor," *Naše Teme* (Zagreb), No. 4, 1983; Srdan Vrcan, "An Ad Hoc Study of Crisis or the Theory of the Contemporary Crisis," *Naše Teme*, No. 3, 1983; Andrija Kresic, "Marx and the Crisis of Communism," *Teorija* (Belgrade), Nos. 1–2, 1983, and many others.

¹⁰ In this review, I limit myself to only those scholarly works that have been published by legal publishers and periodicals in Yugoslavia, and are part of the public record. Thus I omit any references to the "samizdat" publications of dissident authors.

necessity to allocate resources rationally, exist regardless of the institutional framework of the economy and regardless of ideological references: "economic and social phenomena exist and function—whether we recognize them or not! We do not recognize them, it is all the worse for us, not for the phenomena" (p. 94).

THE BOOK *Socialism—Crisis—Responsibility* by Professor Jovan Dordević of Belgrade is representative of those scholarly works that seek to assess the current social and political crisis in Yugoslavia in terms of its institutional and legal aspects. In his collection of essays on the open question of the Yugoslav sociopolitical and juridical system,¹ the author covers a wide range of topics, from a critical assessment of the Yugoslav political system and the problems of Yugoslav federalism to the role of the legal system in a socialist state and the human-rights situation in Yugoslavia.

In his introductory essay on contemporary socialism, Dordević identifies four phases of socialist development: "(1) the vanguard state, (2) early or primitive socialism, (3) maturing and mature socialism, and (4) socialism as a true human community" (p. 10). Drawing heavily on Hegel's classical definition of "history as the process of triumphing freedom," the author concludes that the third phase—that of maturing and mature socialism—needs to "acknowledge and respect the pluralism of interests not only among the self-managing entities [that is, Yugoslav firms], but also among different social and political forces which does not inevitably imply a multi-party system" (p. 14).

Dordević's point of view deviates from the "official" definition of pluralism set forth by the leading

Yugoslav political theoretician and close associate of Tito, the late Edvard Kardelj. Kardelj had allowed for the possibility of differing interests among "self-managers" stemming from local conditions and/or the specific nature of their social activities. These differing interests among various sectors of the working class, according to Kardelj, need to be harmonized through an elaborate system of "social compacts" and "self-managers' agreements." However, Dordević, as the quotation above indicates, goes further than Kardelj. He allows for the existence of and respect for "different social and political forces," which, in practice, means the recognition of different class interests and their political expression. Although he adds that this need not automatically lead to a "multi-party system" in Yugoslavia, Dordević does not explain how "different political forces" could express their views, if not by means of separate political parties.

In the same vein, Dordević claims that "mature socialism" should provide

guarantees of the following collective and individual freedoms: freedom of thought and expression, freedom of information, freedom of association and assembly, freedom of movement within the country and abroad, free and independent workers' trade unions with the right to strike, inviolability of private life, respect for the right to vote, the possibility for a minority to democratically alter majority policies, and the freedom of religion, culture, and expression of different philosophical, cultural, and artistic convictions. (p. 14)

Failure to recognize these freedoms, according to Dordević, "makes it impossible to even call a country socialist."

In dealing with the concrete conditions in Yugoslavia, Dordević is equally critical. He points to the flaws of the socialist state as the chief source of the current political crisis. In his view, the Yugoslav political system is "not homogeneous, since it encompasses specific dualisms: between self-management and the state apparatus, between representation and direct democracy, between federation and confederation, between nominal and constitutional or 'legislative' power on the one hand and the so-called 'pressure groups' on the other" (p. 22).

Among the inconsistencies in the political system, Dordević particularly emphasizes the dualism between "federation and confederation," adding that the state is not "withering away" as was predicted but has in fact increased its power—thanks to the "transformation of political and administrative territories into states" (p. 22). Since "political territories" are an obvious synonym for "federal republics," and "administrative territories" for "autonomous provinces" within Serbia, it becomes clear that Dordević belongs to the group of academic critics who advocate the unification of Yugoslavia under a strong, centralized government, as opposed to what they perceive as the "confederalization" that resulted from the constitutional changes of Tito's last years.

It is worth emphasizing that this critique is most prevalent in Serbia, a reflection of that republic's political traditions, and of the fact that Serbs live not only in Serbia and its two autonomous provinces, but also in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Montenegro. There is a tendency among Serbs to consider the process of decentralization—by which all federal units have obtained greater legal, economic, and political power—to be

undesirable, since the Serbian Republic thereby becomes unable to "protect" the Serbian nationals living outside its borders.¹¹ By contrast, Croats traditionally, and, Slovenes more recently, favor a looser and weaker central state, with some of their nationalists advocating overt separatism.

Dordević contents himself with blaming the current crisis in Yugoslavia's political system on the absence of dialogue between the central government and the federal republics (p. 49). For him, the biggest problem is that the representatives of the individual units of the federation chosen as delegates to the Yugoslav government, parliament, and other federal bodies act too much on behalf of their constituency and so ignore the interests of Yugoslavia as a whole. According to Dordević, the way to avoid the present stalemates in federal decision-making would be to require that all representatives, after being nominated in their native republic or autonomous province, be approved by all the other such units. This would ensure that central organs be composed only of those "generally approved personalities of Yugoslav standing" (p. 49).

Dordević goes on to stress what he sees as the difference between "centralism" and "centralization":

Centralism is an ideology of subjugation. The centralization of certain state functions, such as for-

eign affairs, defense, security, finance, the economic and political systems—all common functions and basic social values—is a prerequisite for democratic, productive and functional federalism. (p. 53)

From the standpoint of a nation-state or an American-type of federalism, Dordević's arguments make sense. However, in Yugoslavia—a multi-national state with a long tradition of political, economic, and cultural rivalries among its five nations—it is much harder to draw a distinction between centralism and centralization. The Yugoslav nations differ in many ways: in numbers, language, religion, level of economic development, geopolitical situation, and distribution throughout the country. Authoritarian centralism, resented by smaller Yugoslav nations, has been tried in the past and has proved catastrophic, since it contributed decisively to the speedy disintegration of the country following the Axis invasion in April 1941. Despite its shortcomings, a federal decentralized Yugoslavia, in which the equality of all nations and nationalities is acknowledged at the institutional level, has proven to be more stable.

Admittedly, Yugoslavia is now in the midst of a deep political and economic crisis; however, recentralization is unlikely to resolve it. Examining the inconsistencies in the "mode of production," as Županov does in his book, is more likely to lead to a resolution, since the institutional structure, the government, and the ruling party are merely the social superstructures that have grown out of the existing material conditions and the resultant "mode of production." It would thus appear to be more efficacious to treat the crisis in Yugoslavia at its roots, in the field of material

production, that is, at the level of the "enterprise."

THE THIRD BOOK, *System and Crisis*, by Professor Jovan Mirić of Zagreb, is the most recent and most controversial of the three books under review.¹² Like Dordević's work, it endeavors to "contribute to a critical analysis of the constitutional and political system" and proposes to resolve the crisis by attacking the superstructure. Mirić focuses on the constitutional system, stressing what he perceives to be an "impe- missible" emphasis on "nationalism" as opposed to "class" characteristics of the Yugoslav federation. He sums up his argument in the following motto, which serves as the subtitle to his introductory essay and is in fact a paraphrase of a statement in Karl Marx's *Contribution to the Jewish Question*: "No Croat, Slovene, Serb, or Macedonian can be free as long as one worker remains alienated," that is, exploited (p. 7).

Having defined social emancipation as a prerequisite for national emancipation, Mirić develops an elaborate critique of the Yugoslav political system. According to him, the Yugoslav working class does not control the distribution of surplus value and thus cannot be considered to be the country's ruling class. In this respect the decentralization of the political and economic system has not im-

¹² Mirić's book has been the subject of a lively public debate in Yugoslavia. The first reaction to it was a strong condemnation from the political leadership of the two Serbian autonomous provinces. A somewhat milder reaction was registered in Croatia and Slovenia.

The Serbian media in Belgrade has given Mirić wide publicity and support. In a survey conducted at the end of 1984 by the Belgrade weekly *NIN* to find out who the most popular people were in 1984 among citizens of Belgrade, Mirić, together with the Yugoslav Minister of Defense, ranked somewhere in the middle category. President Reagan won overwhelmingly in the category of international personalities.

¹¹ The most intelligible account of this political platform was offered by the novelist Antonij Isaković in an address to the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences in September 1984. He stressed that "Serbian nationals live in many federal units which is why (Serbia) naturally prefers a federal to a confederal principle . . . Serbia has reached the position unprecedented among European states, of losing its national territories in time of peace." See "The Speech by Academician A. Isaković in the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences," *Polet* (Zagreb), Jan 18, 1985.

proved the position of the working class. Instead, it has meant the expansion of the bureaucratic apparatus since, alongside a central bureaucracy, Yugoslavia now has extensive republican, provincial, and local bureaucracies. Though these claim to be the protectors of both working-class and national interests, decentralization has not contributed to the cause of socialism or improved the situation of the working class. On the contrary, Mirić argues, the alleged "equality" among nations achieved by decentralization is nothing more than the equality of national (republican and provincial) elites who negotiate among themselves. For Mirić, this is a situation "behind which it is not difficult to identify the subjugation of the class element to the national element, that is, the subjugation of socialism to nationalism" (p. 22).

Mirić offers no solution to this problem, however. He fails to explain why a centralized decision-making process would be more progressive and "socialist" than the present decentralized one. If the crux of the problem is the lack of control by the Yugoslav working class over the distribution of surplus value, then simply shifting the decision-making from one level of the political system to another would not solve it. He attacks decentralization but fails to address the problems of the present situation. Instead, he places the onus on others. "Social science and praxis have yet to deal adequately with the question of the motives and sources of our national antagonisms, mistrust, and closing-up after 40 years of common life in a socialist community based on equality among nations" (p. 22).

Mirić is especially opposed to the notion that "the federation is only that which is agreed upon by the federal republics and provinces," which he views as merely

"an intercession on behalf of confederation" (p. 25). Interestingly enough, Mirić opposes the principle of parity only with regard to the representation of constituent federal units in the central government. He considers the present Yugoslav Constitution to be more rigid than those of other confederated states. "While in those compacts, the principles of rotation and unanimity are merely a rule, in this country, they are inflexible principles." Instead of commending the Yugoslav Constitution for guaranteeing strict equality among member nations, Mirić considers the democratic principles of rotation and consensus to be outmoded.

Mirić is also highly critical of the constitutional provisions governing Yugoslavia's legislative and executive bodies. He considers it inadequate for both houses of parliament (the Federal Chamber and the Chamber of the Republics and Provinces) to be made up of deputies elected on the republican and provincial level. "No one in Parliament represents the inhabitants of Yugoslavia as citizens, as politically equal members of this community, irrespective of their particular characteristics—national, religious, social, etc." (p. 24).

In the abstract, this assertion has a convincing ring to it. It nevertheless disregards some basic facts. The creators of the present Constitution (principally Kardelj and Tito) knew only too well why there could not be a house of the parliament that represented "the citizens of Yugoslavia regardless of their nationality." Unlike Mirić, they did not overlook the fact that Yugoslav nations vary in size. Were the number of representatives in such a chamber to be a function of population (for example one representative per 100,000 inhabitants), the equality of the rep-

resentation of nations that currently exists in parliament would be seriously eroded. Although Mirić falls short of asking for a simple majority system in contrast to "parity," "rotation," and "consensus," it is clear that larger Yugoslav nations would benefit from such changes in the delegate system and electoral process.

Mirić's views are even more clearly expressed in the section dealing with the constitutional status of the Republic of Serbia. He criticizes the ordinance declaring the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo to be both a part of the Republic of Serbia and a "constituent part of the Federation." According to Mirić, this makes the provinces not just "autonomous," but "sovereign" communities, and this turns Serbia itself into a small "confederation."¹³ Ironically, Mirić's assessment of Serbia's constitutional position contradicts his arguments on Yugoslav federalism. In discussing the latter, he argues against the idea of republics as sovereign states, while in discussing Serbia's situation, he expresses concern over the fact that Serbia must suffer "a double division of its sovereignty, in favor of its provinces and in favor of the federation, [a situation] which must (and does) lead to an obstruction of the [political] system . . . [with] far-reaching economic, political and social consequences" (p. 35).

THE DISCUSSION of the political and economic crisis in Yugoslavia came to a head in 1985 and produced two distinctive "schools of

¹³ On page 34 of his book, Mirić emphasizes: "The problem becomes even more complex if we take into account the fact that Serbia itself—by the constitutional definition of its provinces—is defined as a federation and, even worse, one with strong elements of a confederation."

thought" within the party. The first, often labeled dogmatic and conservative, seeks to preserve the best of Tito's legacy: the concept of a federated Yugoslavia based on economic and political decentralization as envisioned in Kardelj's vague notion of the "socialist pluralism of interests." The second, allegedly more liberal, promotes the concept of the so-called Third Yugoslavia, which paradoxically rests on a highly centralized state and party, as well as a more government-controlled economy.

Toward the end of this year, the debate eased somewhat when these two streams realized that the discussion was dangerously approaching a point of no return. The compromise they seemingly

agreed upon is reflected in a recently issued official party document entitled "The Critical Analysis of the Political System" (*Kritička analiza političkog sistema*). According to this document, the main traits of Tito's legacy would be preserved, but the system as a whole would be adjusted so as to overcome its most evident flaws and to improve its functioning.

It is clear that the fundamental shortcoming of the present system lies in the fact that Tito's policy of democratization through decentralization had not gone far enough. Merely transferring decision-making from the central bureaucracy to republican and regional bureaucracies, rather than to the industrial and financial

enterprises themselves, in fact merely multiplied the problem and further fragmented the economy. Meanwhile, the crucial problems of how to devolve the economic decision-making from the bureaucracy to industry, and how to allocate capital by objective forces (the market mechanism) rather than subjective ones (the party mechanism) still remain unresolved.

If the Yugoslav political elites both central and republican, succeed in coupling regional decentralization with relinquishment of control over capital flow and transferring economic decision-making to industrial and financial enterprises, then overcoming the current crisis could become a more manageable task.

French Communism on the Defensive

Frank L. Wilson

ANDRÉ DONNEUR. *L'Alliance fragile: Socialistes et communistes français 1922-1983* (The Fragile Alliance: French Socialists and Communists, 1922-1983). Montreal, Nouvelle Optique, 1984.

JEAN ELLEINSTEIN. *Ils vous trompent, camarades! (They Are Deceiving You, Comrades!)*. Paris, Belfond, 1981.

MICHEL BARAK. *Fracture au*

THE PAST FIVE YEARS have been a time of deep crisis for the French Communist Party (PCF). Ironically, this crisis has coincided with the achievement in 1981 of the PCF's long-sought goal that Communists participate in a government of the Left. The party's experience in previous Left government coalitions had been that the PCF profited from such alignments by extending its electoral base, recruiting many new members and activists, penetrating auxiliary

Frank L. Wilson is Professor of Political Science at Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN. He is author of *French Political Parties Under the Fifth Republic (1982)* and of numerous articles on French politics.

PCF: *Des communistes parlent* (Rift in the PCF: Communists Speak Out). Aix-en-Provence, Edisud, and Paris, Karthala, 1980.

JANE JENSON and GEORGE ROSS. *The View From Inside: A French Communist Cell in Crisis*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1984.

PHILIPPE ROBRIEUX. *La Secte* (The Sect). Paris, Stock, 1985.

groups such as the trade union movement, and in general polishing its image as a legitimate participant in French politics.

This time, however, the results of three years in government have been exactly the opposite. First, the PCF has suffered major electoral losses. In the 1978 National Assembly elections, Communist candidates had received 20.6 percent of the vote; three years later, they managed to gain only 16.1 percent of the vote; recent polls indicate that only 10 percent of the voters intend to cast their ballots for Communist candidates in the March 1986 legislative elections. In terms of the absolute number of voters, the PCF lost one-fourth of its support in the 1981 elections, receiving 1.87 million fewer votes than three years earlier.¹

Second, PCF membership has fallen. According to its own official figures, the PCF dipped only slightly, from 750,000 in 1978 to 710,000 in 1982.² Independent observers put the losses much higher—estimating 1982 membership at only 400,000.³ Of equal or greater significance is the decline of activists among those members who remain in the party. Jane Jenson and George Ross estimate that the party had lost one-third of its activists between 1978 and 1981 (p. 34). Instead of the anticipated benefit from its position in the left-wing government, PFC losses in activists have continued after 1981 as traditional sources of patronage-based party workers have dwindled. The party's losses in the 1983 municipal elections and in the trade union movement have cut into the traditional source of salaried full-time party workers.

Third, the communist trade union, the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT), has been undergoing a major crisis that is only

¹ François Platone and Jean Ranger, "The Defeat of the French Communist Party in the Spring 1981 Elections," *Revue Française de Science Politique* (Paris), October-December 1981, pp. 1,015-37.

² *L'Humanité* (Paris), May 14, 1982.

³ François Hinckner, "The French Communist Party and the Government of the Left in France," in Stuart Williams, Ed., *Socialism in France: From Jaurès to Mitterrand*, New York, St. Martin's, 1983.

partly related to the party's problems. To some extent, the CGT has shared the problems of the entire French labor movement: sharp divisions among rival unions, a decline in the number of members, the aging of those members who remain, and a generalized feeling of impotence even though a left-wing government is in power. The CGT's problems, however, have been more serious than those of noncommunist unions. It suffered because of a decline of French heavy industry, where it had much of its strength. In the intensified competition with rival unions in these and other enterprises, the CGT has lost ground in shop elections to more moderate unions. At the same time, the growing problems of the party led PCF officials to divert personnel from trade union efforts to the imperative task of shoring up the sagging party apparatus, thus further weakening the CGT.

Finally, after a decade or so of growing public acceptance, the PCF now finds public opinion shifting sharply against it. Throughout the 1960's and into the 1970's, the party had benefited from a more tolerant public attitude toward inclusion of the PCF in a government coalition. No longer did French voters seem to harbor the "great fear" that in the past dissuaded many of them from supporting the PCF or any party aligned with it. These favorable attitudes began to erode by the end of the 1970's. Voters were willing to vote for the Left even with its Communist component, but their views of the PCF itself were becoming increasingly negative. In 1983, for example, only one out of five of those polled in a major national survey reported that they had a favorable opinion about the PCF.⁴

THE GRAND victory of the Left in 1981 has thus turned out to be merely another milestone in the PCF's decline. Indeed, the Left's victory was anything but a success for the PCF. The party had sought, ardently and sincerely, an electoral victory in coalition with the Socialists for more than a decade—from the mid-1960's through 1977. But the victory came only after the PCF had formally abandoned that objective. While the PCF rallied publicly to François Mitterrand's side for the decisive second ballot runoff in May 1981, it did so very reluctantly. Indeed, some insiders report that the party activists were secretly urged by the leadership to vote for Valéry Giscard d'Estaing rather than for Mitterrand.⁵

From the party's viewpoint, the Communists entered the government under the worst possible conditions—when receiving fewer votes than at any time since 1931 and losing their long-standing electoral edge over the Socialist Party (PS), now a dynamic party with a parliamentary majority of its own. The intensity of the PCF campaign against the Socialist Party and Mitterrand between 1977 and 1981 meant that the triumphant Socialists knew that they owed nothing to their Communist partner. The PCF could not control the new government's agenda, nor could it expect to get more than token ministerial portfolios from the dominant Socialists. Yet to refuse the Socialists' offer of a coalition would only heighten the risk that even more of the voters would defect to the Socialists in order to support the Union of the Left. The PCF was, in a very real sense, "a prisoner of its constituency."⁶

Once in the government, the PCF found itself confronting one of the most severe challenges in its history with little freedom of action,

and trying to balance two contradictory positions. On the one hand it was partner in a government it could not control but whose policies it was obliged by the principle of solidarity to support, even when the policies were far from the PCF's desires. On the other hand its leaders and inner circle of activists cherished a secret hope that the Socialist-led government would fail and that the PCF might then be able to regain its traditional supporters. But such hopes could not be revealed in public, for fear that even supporters would abandon the PCF if it showed any lack of loyalty to the first government of the Left in over 30 years. The incongruity between public support of the government and private hopes that it would fail paralyzed the Communist party and made it unable to respond to its growing crisis.

Nevertheless, the party's participation in government should not be overstressed when explaining the PCF's inability to reverse its decline. In the 18 months since the summer of 1984 when it left government, it has done little to correct its impotence and poor political standing. Indeed, one of the noteworthy aspects of the crisis is the party's inability to decide how to explain its problems and consequently how to formulate a policy to counter them.

OBSERVERS outside the PCF have also been unsure to what factors the PCF's decline ought to be ascribed. Thus far, there has been no comprehensive analysis of the Communist crisis. Although the

⁴ François Hinckner, *Le Parti communiste au carrefour* (The Communist Party at a Crossroads), Paris, Albin Michel, 1981.

⁵ Armen Antonian and Irwin Wall, "The French Communists under François Mitterrand," *Political Studies* (Guildford, England), June 1985, p. 254.

⁴ *Le Monde* (Paris), Apr. 3, 1984.

books reviewed here explore directly or indirectly parts of the crisis, none purports to have found the key to the PCF's problems. These books focus on two aspects of the crisis: the party's divisive internal battles and the PCF's approach to the alliance with the Socialists. The two themes are linked since much of the dissension within the party was related to the leadership's handling of the alliance. Both are seen as being intimately connected to the PCF's decline but by no means as the only reason for it.

André Donneur's *L'Alliance fragile* is the latest of several book-length analyses of the difficult search for leftwing unity in France.⁷ To understand the strengths and limits of the PCF-PS alliance in recent years, Donneur contends that one must look at the history of earlier efforts at cooperation. He traces the pattern of alliance from the abortive Front Unique in 1921-23, to the fleeting success of the Front Populaire in 1936, to the Resistance coalition after World War II, to the Union of the Left of the 1970's.

Donneur adds perspective to the French alliances by considering as well communist-socialist cooperation in other countries during each of these periods. These coalitions invariably failed—sometimes on account of rightwing coups but more frequently due to divisions among the coalition partners. Nevertheless, such coalitions reemerge continually, usually at the initiatives of the communist parties. He sees the formation, forms, and collapse of leftwing unity in any country at a certain point in time as affected by the "synchronic" influences of similar alli-

ances in other countries and by the "diachronic" influences of past alliances. From these comparisons over time and with other countries, Donneur seeks insights into the eventual collapse of the Union of the Left in France after 1977.

One factor remained constant in all these efforts at cooperation: whenever a communist party concluded an alliance, it viewed the alliance as only a step toward the ultimate conquest of power by the communist party. But this ultimate goal was often superseded by other objectives, notably in the PCF's case by a defense of Soviet interests. Termination of communist-socialist alliances can thus be frequently traced to the changing exigencies of Soviet foreign policy.

Donneur finds the most recent Communist-Socialist alliance in France to be different from the earlier ones. In the 1930's and 1940's, the alliances were based on decisions by the Socialists and Communists to unite in the face of the fascist threat. In the 1970's, the alliances were based on conclusions reached by the Socialists that the Communists were evolving toward a more responsible and democratic form and were at last freed from the Kremlin's control. That evolution, if genuine, offered the prospect of more enduring and successful alliances than had been possible in the past.

In explaining the breakdown of the alliance in 1977, Donneur discounts the impact of the rapid Socialist gains in public approbation during the mid-1970's. Instead, he ascribes chief importance to PCF fears that the Socialists would retreat from the policy commitments of the Common Program adopted in 1972. Communist anxieties about the altered political balance (the Socialists received 21.2 to the Communists 21.5 per-

cent of the votes in the 1973 National Assembly elections) were incidental to their fears about what these changes would mean in terms of the policy commitments of a leftwing government. The PCF feared that the Socialists' growing electoral advantage would make it impossible for the PCF to prevent the PS from reneging on its earlier program commitments to far-reaching social and economic changes that would bring a final rupture with capitalism.

To support his claim that relative electoral strength was not the major factor in the PCF decision to break with the Socialists, Donneur points to the PCF's continued hold on one out of five voters and its growth in party membership in the mid- to late 1970's, at a time when the Socialist Party actually lost members. He takes seriously the PCF's repeated public claims that the alliance broke up over the Socialists' retreat from several key programmatic commitments. The PCF concluded that this dilution of the Left's program would render impossible the attainment of the "advanced democracy" that the Communists believed essential to attaining true socialism. Once the PS resisted the programmatic elements that the Communists felt to be essential, "the union [of the Left] no longer held much attraction for the PCF" (p. 281).

THE ANALYTICAL framework that Donneur develops contains the potential of moving the treatment of leftwing unity in France beyond a historical survey—an approach that has thus far predominated. He is correct to point to the important effects of the experience in earlier alliances and to similar alliances in other countries on relations between Communists and Socialists. Unfortunately, he tends to apply his framework mechanically and

⁷ See for example, R. W. Johnson, *The Long March of the French Left*, New York, St. Martin's, 1981.

superficially in a few paragraphs at the end of each chapter, where he briefly analyzes the diachronic and synchronic effects on the period in question. These brief summaries, based mainly on public statements by PCF and PS leaders, bring out the more obvious points without fully exploiting the potential of his comparative framework. The bulk of his treatment is a narrative account of leftwing unity not unlike several others.

His emphasis on the PCF's reaction to the supposed doctrinal retreats of the Socialist Party as a major explanation of the breakdown of leftwing unity is questionable. Donneur notes the problem inherent in the use of double language—a recurring practice in all eras of leftwing unity—whereby the partners used one meaning in talking with each other, and another in the internal discussions within their respective parties. It is clear that the Common Program of the Left included many such examples of ambiguity and hidden meanings. But it is incorrect to attribute the breakdown of the alliance to the gradual discovery of these problems by the PCF in the late 1970's. The PCF was always aware of the problem and counted on its important electoral base and organizational power to counteract the tendency toward back-sliding by the Socialists in an eventual government of the Left. Moreover, there was little concrete evidence that the Socialist Party's commitment to its principles waned during these years. Indeed, in 1979 the party discussed at length a draft for a new party program for the 1980's that one knowledgeable observer described as "a museum piece: a Marxist delirium in which most of the world's woes were blamed on imperialist exploitation, multinational enterprises, and capitalist contradictions."⁸ The

program finally adopted by the PS was quite orthodox in its commitment to a pure socialism and to rupture with capitalism.

A more extensive use of his synchronic analysis might have helped Donneur to provide a fuller explanation of the breakdown of the Union of the Left after 1977. He correctly, if briefly, notes the Socialists' concerns about the dangers of governing with Communists that were based on the experiences of the East European socialists in the post-World War II period. But he might also have noted the PCF's concerns based upon the awareness of what happened to West European communists when they faced competition from dynamic socialist parties. Gabriel Almond pointed out over 30 years ago that where communist parties faced competition from other vigorous leftist parties, they usually lost their electorate and were relegated to the political sidelines.⁹ It may very well have been that PCF leaders in the late 1970's, drawing on this experience elsewhere in Western Europe, were more prescient than other observers in seeing the risks of continued alliance with the Socialists just when the latter were becoming an attractive leftwing alternative for the first time since World War II.

BY THE MID-1970's, it was apparent that a significant change had already occurred in the French party system. After 30 years of dominating the Left, the PCF ceased being the most powerful vote-getter on the Left. The PS overtook the PCF by the 1978 elections. Donneur is correct in noting

that the Socialist gains were not accompanied by a decline in Communist strength, which remained basically constant during the period of the coalition. But this does not mean that PCF leaders were unconcerned about the changing electoral balance. In fact, by the mid-1970's, Communist leaders showed growing anxiety that their loss of primacy might soon be translated into electoral defeats.

There were several reasons for those worries. The PCF recognized that an important part of its support came from voters who were not committed to communism but who voted for the PCF because it was the party of the Left. The loss of primacy on the Left might well result in the shift of these voters to the Socialists, since their loyalty was more to the Left than to any single party.

Second, the two-ballot electoral system, and the agreement that Socialists and Communists withdraw in favor of the best-placed leftist candidate for the runoff, contained dangers if the Socialists continued to grow while the PCF remained stable. Communist leaders feared that if their voters regularly found themselves with a Socialist candidate on the second ballot, they might acquire the habit of voting for the PS candidate on the first ballot. Several parliamentary by-elections in the mid-1970's suggested that this fear was not without foundation.

Third, the growing strength of the Socialist Party was eclipsing the PCF. François Mitterrand was almost universally acknowledged to be the leader of the Left. The media turned increasingly to him and his party, while the PCF's position on major issues became little more than a footnote to the extensive coverage given to the Socialist Party's statements.

⁸ Stanley Hoffmann, "French Politics, June-November 1971," *The Tocqueville Review* (Charlottesville, VA), Winter 1980, p. 150.

⁹ Gabriel Almond, *The Appeals of Communism*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1954, pp. 386ff.

In short, the PCF leaders recognized that the threat to their party's electoral base was there, even if it had not yet reduced its votes. The PCF's success in maintaining its share of the vote in the 1978 parliamentary elections and the 1979 European Parliament elections did not reduce these apprehensions.

This is not to say that the PCF response to possible electoral weakening was the best one. In fact, the feared decline has been aggravated by the party's current strategy. If recent polls about the elections next year are accurate, the PCF will have lost over half of its voters between the elections in 1978 and 1986. Meanwhile, the PCF has tried unsuccessfully to staunch the hemorrhage of voters first by repairing its relations with the PS (from 1981 to 1984) and then by resuming its attacks on its erstwhile ally (after 1984). The advantage of its hard-line response in the late 1970's and then again after 1984 is that it deemphasized the importance of electoral support. The Communist Party could pursue the goal of revolution with only its militant followers and so regain the élan of a revolutionary movement.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY'S sharp changes in policy from cooperation to confrontation with the Socialists and from participation in the government of the Left to opposition to it not only disoriented its voters, but also confused and caused tension among its members. Ordinarily, PCF members have deferred to their leaders in even more drastic shifts in strategy, in obedience to the Leninist principle of democratic centralism. This was not true of all of them in the late 1970's. Reaction by party members to the PCF's abandonment of the Union of the Left was delayed by the need to maintain unity during the 1978 election cam-

paign. But after the Left's defeat in that election, the party leadership's new hard-line policy came under sharp attack within the party.¹⁰ Three of the books under review bear directly on this topic.

Jean Elleinstein, a professor of history and former member of the PCF Central Committee, was a leading critic of the party leadership's strategies after 1978. *Il vous trompent, camarades!* was written after the dissidents had been silenced or encouraged to leave the party. For Elleinstein, the problems of the party stem not only from collapse of leftwing unity but especially from the PCF's retreat from Eurocommunism. The PCF, he contends, is in "full speed descent on the fatal slope from Eurocommunism to archeocommunism and Sovietophilism" (p. 14). This happened not because the Socialists reneged on their commitments, but because of the betrayal of the interests of the French working class by the PCF leadership. To reverse the party's decline, it must once again make an honest commitment to Eurocommunism and break definitively with Moscow.

Elleinstein rejects the position of those who question the sincerity of the party's pursuit of Eurocommunism in the mid-1970's. The sometimes hesitant steps toward a more moderate and independent form of communism were more than a tactical maneuver; they represented a historic effort to distance the PCF from the Soviet Union. They remained hesitant and ambiguous because an important part of the party leadership was hostile to the Eurocommunist strategy. After a brief "morning" of Eurocommu-

nism, the PCF made "a turn to the East" and became again Moscow's most loyal ally in Western Europe. This return to the fold coincided with the collapse of the Union of the Left, which was the fault of the PCF leadership. It severed the union not because of the Socialists, who "remained loyal in essence to the Common Program of the Left" (p. 199), but because the PCF leadership feared the strength of the Socialists. Those within the party who opposed this choice were isolated, divided, and defeated by the party leadership and its powerful apparatus.

Michel Barak, also a historian, was the leader of a PCF cell in southern France who joined in the criticism of the central party leadership in 1978. His cell drafted a statement criticizing the PCF leadership for deserting the Union of the Left and thus assuring the Left's defeat in the 1978 election. The statement was published in *Le Monde* after the PCF paper, *L'Humanité*, refused to print it. Eventually it was turned into a national petition to the party leadership with more than 1,500 other PCF members joining to endorse this statement.

Barak's book spells out the reasons for this action and the leadership's reaction to it. The author shows the institutional resources available to the party leadership in enforcing democratic centralism in order to be able to define party policy unilaterally. This book reproduces the text of the statement, press reactions, and correspondence between party leaders and the cell. It also includes a generous sample of the letters sent to endorse the statement. These letters provide insight into the spirit of dissident party members at that time.

Jenson and Ross offer an even deeper understanding of the trou-

¹⁰ See Frank L. Wilson, "The French Communist Party and the Elections of March 1978," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July-August 1978, pp. 1-4.

bled Communist Party members during the late 1970's by examining the debates and activities of a single party cell during the crisis period of 1978-79. As participant-observers, they not only convey the political battles but also depict the personalities and lives of the cell's members. Despite their personal involvement with the cell's members, Jenson and Ross nevertheless maintain their objectivity. Apart from the insight they offer into the PCF's crisis, *The View From Inside* is a valuable account of the operation of a PCF cell and of the people who participate in Communist Party activities.

The book is even more valuable as an insider account of the PCF's crisis. Their description of the disorientation, frustration, and ultimate demobilization of the rank-and-file members as the party leadership reversed its strategy and squelched internal opposition bears witness to the disarray and malaise that spread throughout the party after 1978. Many of those who had joined the party in the 1970's as supporters of Eurocommunism or the Union of the Left withdrew from the party or remained as inactive and dispirited members—frustrated not only by the party's new strategy but also by their inability to make their views count within the party. Jenson and Ross show how, after the election defeats in 1981, Communists loyal to the party leadership began to blame the defeats on the lack of effort on the part of those party members who failed to fall into line with the leadership's new strategy. Even the excitement of entering government failed to heal these rifts in the party and revive enthusiasm.

DESPITE the importance of these three accounts in illuminating the internal battles of the PCF, they

have a common flaw. They focus on the attitudes and reactions of an unrepresentative sample of the PCF membership. The cell observed by Jenson and Ross was in Paris, and it was dominated by intellectuals and middle-class, white-collar workers. In 1978, it was one of the most Eurocommunist cells. By the same token, Elleinstein and Barak are both intellectuals. In the national petition, Barak and his colleagues made concerted efforts to attract signatures from blue-collar workers but with only moderate success. Since discontent within the party was especially strong among intellectuals and middle-class members, it was easy for the party leadership to deflect their criticism on class grounds, claiming that the leaders spoke in the interests of the real working class. On the surface, the party's more radical stance was easy to justify as a reaction by an oppressed working class to growing economic troubles. It was calculated to attract disgruntled workers and to renew the sense of party solidarity and militancy.

By the 1981 election, the most obvious of the party's internal problems were largely resolved through the disarming or departure of those who advocated Eurocommunism and leftwing unity. As one dejected party member said, those who remained were those "who would march backward to Vladivostok without understanding why, if [PCF Secretary General Georges] Marchais said they should" (Jenson and Ross, p. 319). Yet the party continued to suffer from malaise and apathy. And it seems to have suffered a disproportional loss of activists, due no doubt to a tendency for such activists to come from intellectual and white-collar social backgrounds rather than from the blue-collar stratum.

THE LEADERSHIP'S success in eliminating or circumscribing the advocates of leftwing unity later contributed to its paralysis when the union was resumed between 1981 and 1984. After the PCF's heavy electoral losses in 1981 (the PCF received 16.1 percent of the vote to 37.8 percent for the PS), the leadership felt obliged to renew unity with the now victorious Socialists in order not to lose even more of the Communist electorate that apparently failed to recognize the need to break the alliance. With the coalition back in place and the PCF in the government, PCF activists were very reserved and often quietly hostile. These Communists, whose loyalty to the leadership had already been demonstrated, did not openly rebel against the party's return to leftwing unity; but their coolness made it difficult for the party leadership to press for full advantage from the renewed alliance.

In effect, the leadership was trapped between the conflicting demands of its two key clienteles. The majority of the remaining PCF activists favored a return to the hard-line revolutionary posture—especially as the Socialist version of economic austerity evolved—and this was in accord with the inner convictions of the party leaders. But the remaining Communist voters seemed to prefer renewed cooperation with the Socialist Party and a return to Eurocommunism. Torn between these two conflicting audiences, the PCF became immobilized. As one former Communist leader acknowledged early in the Mitterrand presidency: "the contradictory, ambiguous, and embarrassed situation in which the PCF finds itself today, straddling two policies of which the more visible one is not the one that corresponds to the fundamental strategy, inhibits it

nd renders it lifeless."¹¹ The departure of the Communist ministers from the government in 1984 only partly solved the problem. The PCF was not able to escape responsibility for the record of the socialist government, most of whose policies were formulated while the Communists were still in the government.

A more serious problem for the PCF is the continued attachment of much of its electorate to the Union of the Left. A poll several months after the PCF left the government found that 55 percent of those who indicated that they would vote for the PCF favored a new, close alliance with the Socialist Party.¹² With a sizable proportion of its electorate still favorable toward leftwing unity, the PCF cannot attack the Socialist government as hard as it would like.

NOTICEABLY ABSENT in the books discussed thus far is any indication that the French Communist Party's orientations and problems are due to anything other than the choices or errors of the party's own leaders. Passing references to the Soviet Union's negative reactions to Eurocommunism and related activities of the French party discount any serious Soviet impact on the decisions that produced PCF strategies.¹³

For Philippe Robrieux, however, the explanation of the Communist Party's recent tergiversations can be traced to the hidden hand of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Robrieux, a former PCF leader, traces Moscow's power over the PCF to the secretary general who, he claims, is selected

and controlled by the CPSU. Through a French version of the *nomenklatura* and an army of 50,000 professional cadres, the secretary general makes certain that the will of his masters prevails in the French party. Since the chief criterion for measuring the PCF's success is its support for the Soviet line, the electoral fortunes of the PCF are only of secondary importance. Robrieux contends that the strength of the party lies not so much in its electorate but in its apparatus of professional party workers who constitute a veritable neo-Stalinist instrument (p. 255).

Robrieux's analysis of the party's cadres and the system of control through the use of biographical files on each cadre are interesting contributions. They provide insight into the strength and discipline of the party and into the leadership's ability to assure loyalty regardless of what strategy it selects.

However, the implication that the Soviet Union prefers to promote to the leadership post an individual with a somewhat compromised past who will thus be more easy to manipulate is not supported by very convincing evidence. Robrieux delves into Georges Marchais's problematic wartime record. Elleinstein, too, raises the issue, but puts it aside with the assertion that the record is not clear and in the absence of better evidence he would give Marchais the benefit of the doubt (pp. 9-11). Robrieux shows no such scruples, since he sees this questionable past as one of the tools by which the CPSU assures total fidelity by Marchais. Consequently, he argues that the meaning of all that the PCF has done since 1977 is to be found in the party's acceptance of the CPSU's primary goal: the weakening, isolation, and discouragement of its

principal enemy, the United States government (p. 202).

It is misleading to ignore entirely the influence of the Soviet Union over its French comrades. There is ample evidence of direct and indirect pressure on the French party and support for elements in the party favorable to Soviet views during the years of internal party division over Eurocommunism and the alliance with the Socialists.¹⁴ But it is equally misleading to overstate it, as Robrieux does. A more balanced account, in my view, is one that stresses the continued heavy reliance of the PCF on the CPSU, but that also acknowledges that their relations are characterized by interdependence, mutual manipulation, and mutual restraint.¹⁵

OVER A DECADE AGO, François Mitterrand explained to his Socialist colleagues his rationale for pursuing a union with the Communists: "to rebuild the large Socialist Party on the terrain occupied by the Communist Party itself in order to demonstrate that out of five million Communist voters, three million can vote Socialist."¹⁶ Now that a vital and strong PS has apparently achieved this goal, many question the ability of the PCF to survive in the face of the competition. The 30-year-old prophecy of Gabriel Almond that communist parties confronting effective socialist rivals are shunted to the sidelines must now weigh heavily on the minds of Communist leaders in France. Indeed, as I have argued in this essay, the PCF's inability to

¹⁴ Richard Lowenthal, "Moscow and the 'Eurocommunists,'" *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1978, pp. 38-49.

¹⁵ Brian L. Zimble, "Partners or Prisoners? Relations Between the PCF and CPSU, 1977-1983," *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Los Angeles), Spring 1984, pp. 3-31.

¹⁶ *Le Monde*, June 30, 1972.

¹¹ Hinckner, "The Communist Party . . .," p. 168.

¹² SOFRES poll reported in *Le Monde*, Oct. 25, 1984.

¹³ Jensen and Ross discount much of Robrieux's work linking PCF strategy with the Kremlin, labelling some of it "clearly political fiction" (pp. 228-40).

compete effectively for voters is the major explanation of its policy shifts over the last eight years.

The authors of the books reviewed here see the PCF's future in a variety of ways, although none is optimistic. Dissident Communists like Elleinstein and Barak hope for a reformed Communist Party that will some day return to more positive strategies, such as Eurocommunism. By doing so, it could offer a "third way" to socialism between the totalitarian excesses of the Stalinist Soviet system and the excessively moderate social democracy of the Socialists. However, such a middle course is very difficult to define, even by its advocates, especially when the French Socialists are as far to the left as they are now, at least in terms of rhetoric. The question remains whether there is room for a third way between the revolutionism of the current PCF line and the orthodoxy of the Socialist Party program. Of course, at the present time, the PCF leadership shows no interest in a "third way" strategy.

Robrieux is perhaps most sanguine about the prospects for PCF survival. His stress on the importance of the cadre to PCF strength permits him to discount the signs of continuing electoral decline. The PCF may no longer be able to claim to be the workers' party, but it will still be able to fulfill its important role as the French arm of the CPSU. Faced with a hostile environment, the party's leader can

rally his followers and strengthen discipline and unity. No longer genuinely a workers' party or political party, the PCF is an apparatus party. Hoping to come to power now, he argues, only through Soviet pressure during some future "Finlandization" of Western Europe, the PCF in the meantime can only serve as a spoiler by trying to cause the Socialists to fail.

The views of Robrieux are not far different from those of the PCF leadership. The party hopes that the failures of the Socialist government will redound to its advantage. Disillusioned leftists will leave the Socialists and rally to the PCF as the only legitimate hope for achieving leftist aspirations. While the declining public standing of the Socialists may give some credence to these hopes, a corresponding swelling of Communist strength is nowhere to be seen. While the approval ratings of the Socialists are shrinking, the indicators of PCF voter strength also are declining—and at a more rapid rate than for the presumably discredited Socialists.

A longer-range hope for the PCF is that its radical stance will permit it to revive working-class militancy and solidarity. Efforts to achieve this renewal of the party's working class base during 1977–81 were disappointing. As Jenson and Ross point out, the "old PCF 'us versus them' appeals to subcultural solidarity were less and less effective, even if considerable nostalgia

about the days when such appeal worked was rampant inside the party. The boundaries between 'us' and 'them' had become too fluid" (p. 335). There is little evidence that the French workers still respond to these calls for worker solidarity against capitalist oppression. Indeed, in the last four years the membership of the Communist trade union has declined steeply while the most moderate French union, the Force Ouvrière, has thrived by making practical demands and engaging in collective bargaining.

The Communist Party's evolution since 1978 has stripped it of those elements that supported the energetic rethinking of doctrine and strategy in the early 1970's. The leadership's continued faith in the ultimate crisis of capitalism and belief in the virtues of class solidarity and militancy impeded reconsideration of both doctrine and strategy. The PCF is likely to lose still more votes as its claim to be the party of the working class is further disproved. But its organizational strength, local political base and hold on a small but loyal electorate should permit its continued existence. As Jenson and Ross conclude: "Barring a miracle, it is likely to survive as a declining museum piece from French labor history, engaged primarily in the defense of certain sectors of the French working class, while hiding behind the rhetoric of outdated revolutionary tradition" (p. 346).

Correspondence

NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to The Editors, Problems of Communism, US Information Agency, 301 4th Street, SW, Washington, DC 20547, USA.

Leaders of Chinese Provinces

TO THE EDITORS: William deB. Mills's article "Leadership Change in China's Provinces" (*Problems of Communism*, May-June 1985) calls for several observations regarding the nature of his statistical generalizations and therefore of the conclusions that he draws from them. In a word, the definitions he employs tend to exaggerate the extent of real change wrought in the leadership of China's provinces by the 1983 streamlining. Based on my study of Zhejiang Province, I would suggest that the turnover of provincial leadership personnel in 1983 was much more limited than Mills indicates.

Before addressing these matters, I would point out that the Zhejiang experience does confirm a number of points made by Mills. For example, it is true that the Chinese media "consistently distorted the magnitude of the reforms, giving only partial statistics, overlooking the relative importance of the various members of a given leadership body, and publishing

biographic information only on exceptionally young or well-educated appointees" (p. 29). Mills also is correct in concluding that "political careerists do not appear to have lost their predominant position to intellectuals" and that "political reliability remains a far more important qualification for high office than does technical expertise" (pp. 29-30). Of the five new appointees in Zhejiang given national publicity, four had previously worked in tertiary institutions in the provincial capital, Hangzhou, and the remaining person had served in the government bureaucracy. Their ages ranged from 47 to 57. Although undoubtedly classified as intellectuals, all five had served as administrators in their respective colleges or departments, and at least one is more accurately described as a political cadre than as a specialized professional. The careers of other, more powerful, newcomers to the provincial leadership received no such media coverage. They were party political generalists who quickly established themselves as men of substance in the new provincial hierarchy.

Second, Mills correctly indicates the high degree of control and direction exercised by the center over the shake-up of provincial leaderships. I discuss this point in "The Reform of Provincial Party Committees in China: The Case of Zhejiang," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley, CA), June 1984, pp. 631-32.

And third, Mills's suggestion that there was local opposition

to central dictates has been borne out during the party rectification program of 1984, particularly in relation to the campaign to wholly negate the Cultural Revolution. I discuss this in a forthcoming article in *Pacific Affairs*.

However, I disagree with Mills on three principal points. They concern his definition of what constitutes a provincial leadership body, his failure to differentiate between the numbers of *positions* and the number of *personnel* in these positions, and his misleading conception of what constitutes retirement in the Chinese political system.

Mills defines the standard provincial leadership body as being composed of "the first and deputy secretaries of the party committee, governors and vice-governors, and chairmen and vice-chairmen of the standing committee of the provincial peoples' congress" (p. 27). Although he does acknowledge that the provincial party committee "appeared to be the most powerful" institution in the provinces (p. 26), he excludes from his definition those members of the party committee's standing committee who are not party secretaries. I would argue that certainly prior to, and perhaps to a lesser extent subsequent to, the 1983 reorganization of provincial leaderships, the standing committees of party committees have clearly been the real source of power in the provinces. The political clout that a governor, vice-governor,

or a peoples' congress chairman or vice-chairman wields has often been based on, or substantially enhanced by, the individual's membership on the party standing committee.

For example, prior to the restructuring of the Zhejiang leadership in March-April 1983, two of the seven secretaries (in the sense defined by Mills, p. 28, fn. 17) held the concurrent posts of chairman and senior vice-chairman of the Zhejiang Provincial Peoples' Congress (ZPPC). Another two party secretaries wore the additional hats of provincial governor and first vice-governor. The next three senior vice-governors were members of the standing committee of the Zhejiang provincial Party Committee (ZPC), as was another vice-governor. Thus 6 of the governor/vice-governors held senior party posts.

In line with the express wishes (and prior example) of Beijing, the 1983 reorganization went some way in reducing this phenomenon of concurrent posts and overlapping of party and government leadership. However, even after the reshuffle, the governor and second vice-governor of Zhejiang concurrently held the more powerful post of a secretary of the ZPC, while the executive vice-governor was simultaneously a senior member of the ZPC standing committee. Several other persons appointed to the ZPC standing committee in the 1983 leadership reorganization also occupied additional influ-

ential positions in the provincial administration (albeit outside the leading body)—e.g., as secretaries of the two most important municipal party committees in the province, as political commissar of the provincial military district, as political commissar of the people's armed police, and as head of the ZPC propaganda department.

The picture of leadership change in Zhejiang Province that one derives from defining the leadership group to include all members of the ZPC standing committee is significantly different from that derived from the more restricted definition used by Mills. Curiously, in the case of Zhejiang at least, it seems to illustrate Mills's case about the extent of leadership change better than the picture derived from the author's own definition. If this trend was repeated nationally, it could indicate that the Chinese leadership was well aware of the importance of ensuring that the key decision-making body in the provinces—the party committee's standing committee—contained reliable, qualified personnel.

A final point regarding Mills's definition of a provincial leadership body. One feature of post-Mao changes in provincial leaderships, a matter not broached by Mills, has been the "civilianization" of administration. Nevertheless, one could still make a case for the inclusion of some leading members of provincial military districts on provincial leadership bodies. One seat on the ZPC standing committee is still evidently reserved for the political commissar of the Zhejiang Provincial Military District, although the district commander is no longer a member of this body.

Before the 1983 reorganization, the Zhejiang leadership body (by the Mills definition) consisted of 29 *positions*, i.e., was considerably larger than the figure of 16 cited by Mills as the average size of such a group (p. 27). The streamlining of 1983 reduced this number to

Table 1: Zhejiang Provincial Leadership Before and After 1983 Reform

	Old	New
Number of party secretaries	7	4
Number of governors and vice-governors	11	6
Number of chairmen and vice-chairmen of standing committee of provincial people's congress	11	12
Total positions by Mills definition	29	22
Number of persons occupying above positions	25	20
Non-secretary members of standing committee of party committee	11	7
Total positions by Forster definition	40	29
Number of persons occupying above positions	32	26

22, a 25 percent cut—considerably less than the national average of 38 percent calculated by Mills. The number of secretaries fell from seven to four, or 43 percent (Mills calculated the drop at 50 percent nationally). Governor/vice-governors dropped from eleven to six, a 45 percent decrease (50 percent nationally according to Mills). And the number of chairman/vice-chairmen of the ZPPC standing committee actually rose from eleven to twelve, a 9 percent increase (compared to a 17 percent decrease nationwide according to Mills). Looking at the *individuals* occupying these positions of provincial leadership (still by the Mills definition), we find that the reorganization reduced their ranks from 25 to 20, or 20 percent, an even lower share than the 25 percent reduction achieved in the number of *positions*.

If the full membership of the ZPC standing committee is included, we find that the number of leadership positions decreased in 1983 from 40 to 29 (27.5 percent), while the number of individuals occupying these positions only decreased from 32 to 26 (19 percent). These figures demonstrate that the main factor in cutting the size of the provincial leadership body in Zhejiang was a reduction in the number of persons holding concurrent posts on the leadership body. The knife cut

most deeply in the case of the ZPC standing committee, which shrank from 18 to 11 members (39 percent), with its non-secretary membership declining from 11 to 7 (36 percent).

The picture of what happened is sharpened when we examine more closely the fate of those who, by Mills's definitions, were removed from the leadership body. His figures show that only 28 percent of the pre-reform members of the provincial leadership retained their places, that 12 percent were transferred (mostly demoted), and that the remaining 60 percent either retired or withdrew to membership on advisory commissions specially established to occupy the time of veteran cadres. At first glance, the figures for Zhejiang seem to support Mills's generalizations. A total of 15 out of 25 individuals (60 percent), occupying 19 of 29 positions (65 percent), were removed from the leadership (again, as defined by Mills). But when we look at the 19 positions eliminated, we find that 6 of them had formerly been held by a total of 5 individuals who remained in the leadership body in other positions; this would lower the effective reduction in positions to 45 percent, and in individuals, to 40 percent. The number of positions "eliminated" is further reduced if one excludes those whose incumbents transferred to active or

semi-active service in the provincial discipline inspection commission or the provincial branch of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. Mills (p. 29) does view membership in the latter body as a transfer rather than retirement, but one should clearly include membership in the much more influential party discipline inspection commission, which is not mentioned by Mills. In the case of Zhejiang, this further reduces the retirement figure to eleven positions (38 percent) and nine individuals (36 percent).

Finally, it is necessary to examine more closely the seven individuals (occupying eight positions in the old provincial leadership) who joined the Zhejiang Provincial Advisory Commission (ZPAC) as members of its standing committee. This classification of six individuals (formerly occupying six positions) as having been "retired" presents no difficulty, although one of them does remain a member of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission. The remaining individual, Tie Ying, formerly both first secretary of the ZPC and chairman of the ZPPC, clearly falls into a different category (for further details of Tie's career, see "Tie Ying—Chairman of the Zhejiang Provincial Advisory Commission," *Issues and Studies* [Taipei], October 1984, pp. 84–92). In addition to his large honorific post as chairman of the ZPAC, Tie retains membership on the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in Beijing and maintains a highly visible profile in the province. Excerpts of his speech at the 3rd session of the 6th National People's Congress in March 1985—in which he urged caution on the national leadership regarding the liberalization and decentralization of the economy—were reported prominently by *Xinhua*. I believe that flies in the face of political realities in Zhejiang to assign Tie to the retired camp. Thus the figure for retirement is fur-

er reduced by two positions (one individual), leaving the percentages at 31 for positions and 32 for individuals.

If we include as part of the provincial leadership all members of the ZPC standing committee, we find that 23 of 32 individuals, occupying 29 of 40 positions, lost their posts, or 72 and 72.5 percent respectively. At a more realistic scrutiny, along the lines of that pursued in the previous two paragraphs, it reduces the proportion of retirement to 34 percent for individuals and 32.5 percent for positions.

Looking at the three major components of the provincial leadership, we find the following trends (with the percentages of change nationwide, as provided by Mills, in parentheses): two of eleven secretaries, or 29 percent (25 percent), retained their office; three secretaries, or 43 percent (57 percent), retired; and two, or 29 percent (18 percent), were transferred, of whom one remained in the leadership body. Of the eleven governor/vice-governors in Zhejiang, one, or 9 percent (18 percent), retained office; three, or 27 percent (64 percent), retired; and seven, or 63 percent (19 percent), were transferred, of whom three remained in the leadership as defined by Mills and another retained his place on the ZPC standing committee. Of the eleven chairman/vice-chairmen of the ZPC standing committee, seven, or 63 percent (40 percent), retained office; three, or 27 percent (60 percent), retired; and one vice-chairman, Wang Fang, was promoted from deputy-secretary to secretary and head of the ZPC. Tie Ying, as I have argued above, was included in the transferred rather than the retired category, in no category could the percentage of retired officials exceed those who were transferred.

The contrast with the figures provided by Mills is striking. Two explanations for this great divergence suggest themselves. Either Zhejiang's leadership

reorganization defied national trends, or, which seems to me more plausible, Mills's statistics do not accurately reflect the reality of leadership change.

Looking at the pre-1983 ZPC standing committee, we find that three of its eighteen members retained office (17 percent); eight retired, including Tie Ying (44 percent); and seven were transferred (39 percent). Of the eleven members who were not party secretaries prior to the 1983 reorganization, one retained office (9 percent); five retired (45 percent); and five were transferred (45 percent), of whom three remained in the leadership group.

The principal target of reform seems to have been Tie Ying and other members of the ZPC standing committee who fell in the category described by Mills as "uneducated, or politically suspect" (p. 27). Indeed, political unreliability figured in more than half of the retirements from the ZPC standing committee. Age seemed a less important factor, one that was inconsistently applied as a justification for retirements.

The extent to which the Zhejiang provincial leadership changed in 1983 can be gauged from an examination of the composition of the new leadership grouping. By the Mills definition, only six positions (25 percent) occupied by five individuals (27 percent) were filled by newcomers. They included two deputy secretaries (of whom one held the concurrent post of deputy-governor) and the four deputy-governors. However, if members of the ZPC standing committee are included, a greater rejuvenation is apparent. Eleven positions (occupied by ten individuals) of the 22 (occupied by 20) had new appointees. Of the seven non-secretary members of the ZPC standing committee, six were newcomers to the Zhejiang leadership.

The 1983 leadership changes in Zhejiang involved more of a reshuffle than a wholesale cleanout. True, younger cadres

were introduced as members of the ZPC standing committee (two as secretaries) and as vice-governors, to gain experience under veteran Zhejiang cadres such as Secretary Wang Fang and Governor Xue Ju. The vice-chairmanship of the provincial people's congress became a semi-retirement position for elderly party officials who had served in Zhejiang since the 1950's and who had been removed from office during the Cultural Revolution. Four of these ten vice-chairmen have since retired completely, in June 1985.

Mills is to be commended for his effort to survey a recent important event in the history of China's provincial politics. But, as my brief analysis of the situation in Zhejiang reveals, the validity of his generalizations, according to the definitions that he employs, is open to question.

KEITH FORSTER
Department of Political
Science
The University of Melbourne
Parkville

MR. MILLS RESPONDS: It is most gratifying to see the general picture of provincial leadership changes that I sketched in the beginning of my spring 1985 *Problems of Communism* article so rapidly evoking further analysis. Our understanding of the Dengist reforms will be deepened if Mr. Forster's refinements concerning Zhejiang are supplemented by studies of other provinces as well.

I further commend Forster for bringing attention to the issue of defining what constitutes the leadership group of a province. It would be worthwhile to pin this definition down more precisely than either he or I have done—to see if it is consistent across all provinces. One might, for example, speculate that leading economic figures—such as an individual with responsibility over trade in a coastal province—should be

included, regardless of formal party or government titles. One might also speculate that factional ties could lead to a divergence between formal authority and real power.

Case studies based on knowledge gained in China rather than just with the media sources exploited in my paper have the potential for providing valuable evidence on such issues. Analysis incorporating details on the biographic backgrounds and factional ties of leaders could put into better perspective the statistics compiled in my article and Forster's response.

Finally, Forster's evidence that a portion of what passes for streamlining was a function of the elimination of concurrent positions rather than the removal of individuals leads to a further question: to what extent has this led to greater differentiation of institutions—e.g., do party organizations now focus more on broad guidance, leaving day-to-day administration to the governor and the vice-governors? As the organization of my article into an introductory statistical section followed by two case studies implies, the presentation of statistical data summarizing provincial leadership streamlining is only the first step.

WILLIAM deB. MILLS
Foreign Broadcast
Information Service
Washington, DC

S & T IN CHINA'S DEFENSE

TO THE EDITORS: In his otherwise helpful review in your July-August issue, William Tow made several factual errors that need correction. On p. 18 he states that in February 1983, China's leaders merged three organizations to create the Commission on Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (NDSTIC). In actual fact, according to the directive "Decision of the Standing Com-

CORRECTION

On page 21 of Jiri and Virginia Valenta's article, "Sandinistas in Power," in the July-August 1985 issue of *Problems of Communism*, Boris Ponomarev was incorrectly identified as a Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. He remains a Candidate Member.

mittee of the National People's Congress concerning the establishment of the NDSTIC," (see *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guowuyuan Gongba* [Bulletin of the State Council of the PRC], Nos. 1-21, Beijing, Guowuyuan Bangongting, 1983, p. 643), the NDSTIC was established on August 23, 1982.

This directive names the National Defense Industries Office (NDIO) and National Defense Science and Technology Commission (NDSTC) mentioned by Tow as two of the three organizations involved in the merger. However, the third organization

listed in the directive was not the National Defense Industries Committee (NDIC) mentioned by Tow, but a previously unheard of unit, the Science and Technology Equipment Commission Office (*Kexue Jishu Zhuangbei Weiyuanhui Bangongju*—or STECO in English acronym).

The NDIC (*Guofang Gongye Weiyuanhui*) had ceased to exist long before. Prior to the Cultural Revolution, the unit's director, He Long, disbanded it as soon as the NDIO was established. See "Strike Down Liu Ping-yen Capitalist Roadster in

Authority Within the Party," *Feiming di*, May 29, 1967, in *Survey of the Chinese Mainland Press—Supplement* (Hong Kong), No. 209, p. 30.

The NDSTC, which Tow refers to as a government body, had belonged more specifically to the PLA according to the August 23 directive. The NDIO had been a member unit of the State Council. The STECO had been under the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee.

BENJAMIN C. OSTROV
Department of Government
and Public Administration
The Chinese University
of Hong Kong

MR. TOW RESPONDS: I appreciate Mr. Ostrov's useful criticisms. It might be noted that—as my article pointed out—there is often only a hazy demarcation between party-dominated and government-

dominated Chinese bureaucracies both within and outside the military sector.

I might add that I am less certain than Mr. Ostrov seems to be that PRC communiqués disseminated for consumption by Western audiences are a completely reliable source of information about the actual dynamics and interplay of Chinese bureaucratic politics, even though the sources he cites seem the most reputable ones we have at this time for assessing the issue of defense organization. I thank Mr. Ostrov for calling these sources to my attention and appreciate his interest in my article.

WILLIAM T. TOW
University of Southern
California
Los Angeles

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